No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013 11 15 NLC-12-60-6-25-9 - r o-- -' -•- -•---•- _ I '_ IL 1 ' - ' l ' ' i E 10RANDUM OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM THE WHITE HOUSE CONFI E TIAL WITH TOP SE ET ATTAC -IMENTS WASHINGTON November 21 1979 ACTIO J MEMORA' ·JDiJM FOR ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI FROM WILLIAM E ODOMv fJ SUBJECT NORAD False Alarm C The cover memo on Brown's explanation memo Tab A is a very brief summary Brown adds very little to your original memo but the President should h ivP n chance to read his longer version -- if only for the record C RECOMMENDATION Siqn the memorandum to the President at Tab I U CONFIDENTIAL TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT Review on November 20 1999 Derivative Classification and Extended by Secretary of Defense Reason DOD Dir 5200 lR 2-JOlc 5 No Objection Declassification in Full 2013 11 15 NLC-12-60-6-25-9 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013 11 1§ NLC _22-60_--§ _ 5- -- _ i -- -···-· · t1 Y JE IOR - JDT IM OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM THE WHITE HO USE WASHINGTO i SECPET WITH TOP S C ET ATTACHMENT INFORM i _' ' ' I ON 'rHE PRESIDENT FROM ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI SUBJECT NORAD False Alarm C Harold Brovm has provided a detailed explana Lion of the NORZ D false alarm Tab A C It elaborates the explanation in my memo of last week in much greater detail Harold's conclusion is that the system has been vindicated in that human and technical errors were cont ined and corrected S SECRE'r WITH TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT Review on NovemLer 20 1999 Derivative Classification and Extended by Secretary of Defense Reason DOD Dir 5200 lR 2- 0lc 5 No Objection Declassification in Full 2013 11 15 NLC-12-60-6-25-9 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013 11j1_5 NLC - -2 60--§ _ 9 _____ _ ' I -- • - r · ' --- '• • - • ·c• J c·•-· ·1 · • •-- THE SECRETARY OF DC FENSE WASHINGTON D C 2 0301 MEi'-10RANDUI 1 OR THE PRES I DENT SUBJECT 1- c _ _ J alse Alarm C TS On 9 Nove n ber 1979 a spurious missile attack warning was inadverter tly introduced into the computer system at the NORAD Combat Operations Center NCOC in Cheyenne Mountain As happened in thic case the system tlesign properly and automatically transmits such warnings to appropriate national and regional command centers in the United States Canada and the United Kingdom Understandable concern over this event by those unfamiliar with the technical and procedural safeguards in our strategic warning system has raised questions both here and abroad concerning the potential for precipitous action in a real or simulated crisis The following report surmnar izes the genesis ot the false alarm the actions taken as a result and my conclusions regarding the reliability of the warning system TS The immediate cause of the incident was the inadvertent introduction of d test attack scenario into the automated NCOC missile warning system display To the NCOC operations staff the attack indications were not imm r1i ately identifiable as spurious when the display appeared a c d they properly initiated alerting and verification procedures appropriate to indications of a mass missile raid Concurrently a Threat Assessment Conferenc TAC was called by the Deputy Director for Operations in the National Military Co1mnand Center NMCC to evaluat- e the threat The TAC is an emergency conference one level below the Missile Attack Conference the latter includes the National Commann Authorities As a result of this conference a nd the many quickly identifiable anomalies the threat was clearlyr correctly and conclusively evaluated as spurious in less than six minutes of the first alarm Because of this evaluation and the earlier recognition of the many anomalies before the official assessment of the threat as spurious a Missile Attack Conference was deemed unnecessary TG Within less than sixty seconds of initial alert system redundancy and direct paths of critical warning information from sensors to users had enabled responsible officials at SAC Headquarters and the NMCC to detect anomalies in warning indications r- -·-• - -·- -- - -· J _ f · I k ' · - · No Objection o • • - • - -- --7t - Declassification in Full 2013 11 15 NLC-12-60-6-25-9 ·1 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013 11 1 5 NLC-12-60-6-25-9 _ TOP 2 which could not have been present had an actual mass attack been unc s -- 2 y Inconsistencies also began to emerge at NORAD Headquart rs in about one minute For example Defense Support Program DS satellites and transmission systems were operating normally b- - -_ were producing no dioplo ys to corroborate the miss i le launches d2picted on the NORAD warning display Similarly our radar sensors were operating normally but detected no SLBM aclivity e- re2' ' though the NORAD display depicted over 200 SLBMs en route Assessment of these and other anomalies raised'serious questions reg2 rding the vr1lidity of the NORAD-generated display and avoided a y precipitous reaction involving nuclear forces No nuclear ar2ed aircraft were activated and no increased alert mcusur s w re orderetl for any US nuclear forces 0 TS However this incident deserves close attention causes me real concern and requires corrective actions There are two issues The first involves the technical and procedural causes of the false alarm the scra mbliny of the air defense aircraft and the launch of NEACP As to the cause the possibility of recurrence of such an incident has been eliminated by prohibiting connection of the test computer to the main system in the future without advance coordination and warning to all concerned Acti6n is also underway to review clarify and refine procedures governing launch of air defense and command and control aircraft In short mistakes were made and imperfections brought to light which have been and are being corrected TS But there is a hi0her order of concern It involves the broader issue of the reliability responsiveness and human control over both our strategic warning system and our nuclear forces In these terms the events of 9 November appear to me to provide overall considerable reassurance on all counts Despite a freak incident which severely stressed our warning and assessment procedures the systems worked as designed the redundancy of waxning paths provided the basis for correct decisions and eliminated the risk of precipltous action Most important the people involved at every level acted responsibly and with good judgment based on the information available to them Under the demanding situation of conflicting information a narrow decisiontime window and the natural stress accompanying such circumstances I bRl i eve that the following were amply and creditably dernonsti·a ted a high degree of responsiveness safeguards against precipitate action and a system design that places human judgment in a position to override computer mistakes I i No Objection Declassification in Full 2013 11 15 NLC-12-60-6-25-9 'i No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013 11 15 NLC-12-60-6-25-9 3 '1'S My cve -2 ll assessment of the lessons learned is that the mecha icc 1 1 procedural and human elements of our strategic warning 2 r c control system are fundamentally sound and should be supported as such in response to questions or asserLions to the contrc ry The key point is that the system corrects errors befor2 7ney c scade in a dangerous way However I do not want t' J ainimize the fact that we had several errors in the syste 2 nd we still have considerable work to do to improve strategic command arn 1 conlrol and connectivity across the board For example there are still some bugs to be worked on -_ in NORAD's Command and Control computer System 42 7M • These and 'other problems will receive our priority attention in the days ahead U In case this incident raises further questions in the Congress the media or among allies I believe that the following points should be stressed l At no time were the strategic nuclear forces activated--the incident was completely contained within the command and control community 2 The malfunction was very quickly identified and acted upon 3 The overall way in which the system worked after the initial malfunction is reassuLiHl_ l with respect to tl1 e redundancy of indicators responsible human judgment and adequacy of safeguards in a very short decision time frame ' _' ' -- c r No Objection Declassification in Full 2013 11 15 NLC-12-60-6-25-9 '