Vl fV'I -T V V11 l l _ LJ V V LJ _ Ul 111'--ll' V I V YI V --'UV- 1- v ttl • • · v - __ - - V •• '- • _ _ 1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ • • - - •• United States Departni nt of State WaskinGton D C 20520 January 24 2009 RELEASE IN FYLL '- 8BCRBT DECL 01 23 2019' NOTE FOR THE SECRETARY From P - Bill Burns1 '3' Subject A New Strategy Toward Iran Madam Secretary It is natural and sensible for the new Administration to conduct a review oflran policy over the next month or two but as you requested here are some initial ideas on how you might think abo ut Iran strategy and frame a plan of action Purpose Recognizing that Iran is a significant regional player our basic goal should be to seek a -long-term basis for coexisting with Iranian influence while limiting Iranian excesses · to change Iran's behavior but not its regime That means among other things preventing Iran from achieving nuclear weapons capability channeling its behavior so that it does not threaten our core interests in a stable unitary Iraq and ·an Afghanistan that is not a platfonn for the export of violent extremis and gradually reducing Iran's capacity to threaten us and our friends through support for terrorist groups We should also speak out consistently against human righ s abuses in Iran Assumptions 1 Only a comprehensive diplomatic initiative aimed ultimately at normalized relations has any chance of success As was the case with China in the early l 970s we shou d employ careful and incremental tactics at the outset but as part of a coherent long-term strategy We should set an early tone of respect and commitment to direct engagen ient however severe our differences SECRET Classified by UIS Bill Burns E 0 12958 Reasons 1 4 b and d JRELEASEAUTHORITY Paul Hilburn s·enior Revi_e UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No -07420 Doc No C06419966 Date 09 21 2017 Vl't't J VVll 1'-'- J I '-' - t-' '41 IIIVII VI _ _ _ -' _ 1 11tr7a •l'l lt 'rt _ _ - ''- V - _ _ • _ _ _ _ _ _ _ • • - - • 0 k 2 Direct American engagement with -Iran should be e bedded in a wider international effort That applies to the P5 I process on the nuclear issue and also to our approach to Afghanistan and Iraq and potentially to Gulf security issues Our engagement is not only an essential means of testing possibilities with Iran it is also an investment in mobilizing broader international pressure against Iran and of tapping into Iranian popular interest in be er relations with the U S and the outside world 3 Dealing with Iran will require enormous patience persistence and detennination Deeply conspiratorial and suspicious of American motives and riven by factions especially eager to undermine one another in the run-up to Iran's Presidential elections in June the Iranian elite will be prone to false starts and deceit Hostility toward America and its interests is a part of the Iranian regime's DNA while regime survival is Tehran's ·most fundamental concern it w ll be extremely hard to change its attitudes and behavior toward us While essential ground to be covered direct engagement could turn out to be a deadend 4 We should deal with the Iranian regime as a unitary actor understanding that the Supreme Leader not the President is the highest authority We have failed consistently in the past when we tried to play off one iaction against another 5 Iran is a fonnidable dversary-- adept at employing asymmetric means against us absolutely committed to developing nuclear enrichment and reproces1sing capacity and able to endure considerable outside pressures and hardships -- but it is not ten feet tall Its economy is badly mismanaged with rising rates of unemp1oyment and inflation It is vulnerab e to the ongoing sharp decline in oil prices and to its dependence on imported refined petroleum products It has no real friends in its neighborhood distrusted by the Arabs and the Turks patronized by the Russians an suspicious of the Afghans 6 We need to be always conscious of the anxieties of our friends as welJ as key domestic constituencies as we proceed with Iran Our engagement with Iran will be portrayed by those trying to discredit Egypt and Saudi Arabia as tipping the balance in the Arab world away from our traditional moderate allies Without careful consultation with our friends any U S opening to Iran could be misread and abused We will want to coordinate intensively with _our P5 1·partners other important international players Israel and our Arab allies and the Hill as we engage And we must make sure that the Administration speaks with one voice and avoids the divisions which beset the last Administration SBCRBT UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No -07420 Doc No C06419966 Date 09 21 2017 SECRET · 3- 7 We should take immediate advantage of the window of opportunity following the Inauguration to set a new tone with Iran and then use the next few months to carefully test the waters with Iran maintain leverage through international coordination and set in motion preliminary contacts with authoritative Iranian representatives Following the Iranian elections•in June we might have an opportunity for a more durable high-level engagement across the range of issues which divide us Near-Term Plan of Action January-June 2009 We should pursue three parallel but interconnected tracks aiming toward the possibility of more comprehensive high-level engagement later in the year l Nuclear Begin with February 3-4 PS I Political Directors consultation in Gennany Use this to listen to views of partners as we review our own approach Consult also with key Arabs Israelis and Hill Complete our own assessment by early March make choices on whether we join PS I at Po1 Dir level in future talks with Iranians as we did last Juiy in Geneva whether basis for those talks is current freeze for freeze proposal we hold off on new UNSC action and perhaps on new unilateral measures and Iranians don't add new centrifuges whether time period for those talks should be current six week proposal or a-longer period whether suspension of enrichment should be condition for continuing talks or ultimate objective of negotiations what we expect from partners on further sanctions if Iranians do not comply Hold second PS 1 meeting in March to develop common approach Present to Iranians 2 Bilateral In early February after State of Union have P or NBA phone · Iranian Penn Rep Khazaee in New York and convey brief oral message frpm ·President Obama to Supreme Leader emphasizing U S commitment to diplomatic resolution of serious issues of concern with Iran in atmosphere of mutual respect and dignity Confirm whether Iran is wil1ing to open private channel between authorized representatives In subsequent conversation preview with Khazaee or authorized representative a proposal to send American diplomats to U S interests section in Tehran under Swiss embassy as well as interest in discussing an incidents at sea protocol to avoid friction in Persian Gulf Continue private direct talks on both through same channel if Iran is wiHing President Obama issues Youtube message conveying best wishes to Iranian people for Iranian New Year in March Secretary hosts Iranian cultural event at Department on same occasion Make use of track two exchanges to reinforce messages to Iran UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No 07420 Doc No C06419966 Date 09 21 2017 JI • J '-1'-'11 r 1'-IJ J '- -t-' '- 1 loll I V l 1 -• _ _ _ _ _ _ I '1- l •i y • •- W bCRET -4- 3 Regional Convey through NY channeJ if opened willingness to explore cooperation on Afghanistan issues as we did in direct talks in 2001-03 Use opportunities to engage directly on margins of multilateral Afghan donors or Friend-s of Afghanistan groups Express willingness to resume direct contacts in Baghdad and to engage on margins of other Neighbors of Iraq meetings Such contacts might provide basis for longer-term discussion of Gulf security issues involving Iran and its neighbors At same time continue to bolster Iraqi government work closely with Turks encourage first-ever Ministerial meeting of GCC Plus 3 with the Secretary in Baghdad in the spring This grouping GCC states plus Egypt Jordan Iraq and U S sends strong signal of strength to discourage Iranian meddling Also reopen direct exchanges with Syria and return Ambassador reinforcing to Iranians that even their erstwhile partners in Arab world may have higher priorities than ties with Iran All of this is obviously much easier said than done but it offers a preliminary framework for thinking through a new approach I am acutely aware of how fast the nuclear clock is ticking We will need to move quickly to try to improve the overall atmosphere in relations with the Russians who are critical to any serious multi ateral effort to change the Iranian calculus UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case NoSilR -07420 Doc No C06419966 Date 09 21 2017