C05040077 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTR EO 13526 3 5 c EO 13526 3 3 b 1 25Yrs wAsH1NGToN o c 2Eo 13526 3 3 b 6 25Yrs Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment NFAC 2043-81 9 April 1981 APPROVED FOR RELEASEL DATE 19-Jan-2012 MEMORANDUM FOR - J - C h i e f P o l i tical Military Issues Branch OPA I ---C_h i_e f _N u c l ea r Programs Branch OSWR Deputy Chief Eastern Forces Division OSR FROM SUBJECT Special Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence Request for Review of Draft Paper on the Security Dimension of Non-Proliferation · ' - 1 Attached is a paper drafted by State PM that it wishes to submit to State OES as part of what eventually will be the basic paper on US nonproliferation policy The draft follows an outline prepared earlier by State PM also attached Section I A l of the draft was furnished by JCS J-5 2 This is to request your review of and comments on the draft by COB Wednesday 15 April 1981 L Attachments As Stated When Removed From Attachment Treat as I AL z _ ------ C05040077 • • NFAC 2043-81 SUBJECT Request for Review of Draft Paper on the Security Dimension of Non-Proliferation Distribution 1 - Each a4dressee 1 - NIC AG '_____ 1 - NFAC Registry 2 - SA NPI __J co5o4 0077 1 ' 2 Political Destabilization The emergence of additional nuc lear weapon states could have a Eiignificant destabilizing effect upon the international political c rder One result could be a gradual unravelling of the Non-Prolifera- tion Treaty and the IAEA safeguards which constitute the foundation of the global non-proliferation regime If new states join the nuclear club significant holdouts to the NPT may be confirmed in their resolution not to adhere to the NPT or the Treaty· of Tlatelolco and certain NPT parties might feel tempted to abrogate the NPT Others may choose to follow the path of Iraq and Libya - undertaking an explosive option as NPT members - significantly weakening the treaty regime As more nations obtain nuclear explosives there could be added strains on us alliance systems If radical Third World states develop nuclear weapons neighboring countries friendly to the U S may feel eoerced and perhaps compelled to seek at least a partial accommodation or equivalency This would be particularly true if a Third World state had enough capability so that there were a perception that it would be difficult for the U S to come to the aid of its Allies and friends rn cases involving Middle East oil supplies even Japan and our NATO j llies could be subjected to pressure from strategically placed countries ith even a modest nuclear capability Proliferation would also adversely affect regional arms control Prospects and regional balances especially since many threshold states re neighbors and rivals e g Argentina Brazil India Pakistan and Israel Iraq If a state in a chronically unstable area or one of unresolved conflict such as the Middle East achieves nuclear explosives 1 C05040077 - ' s - 2 - or appears about to do so neighboring states with the requisite tec hnical capability would be tempted to dev alop their own weapons or strike out preemptively at the proliferator Under the threat of proliferation it would be more difficult to seek restraint in coio ventional arms or to maintain a stable political military balance of power In a more proliferated world the Soviets and the U S might p ave less control over the global nuclear balance than is true now Thie smaller nuclear forces of the UK France or the PRC are less destabilizing than nuclear weapons controlled by radical states or those with only regional concerns If a state friendly to the USSR became involved in conflict with a pro-American state and one or both possessed nuclear weapons the danger of superpower involvement and possible confrontation could be increased Furthermore the Soviets could feel threatened by the emergence of new nuclear weapons states in contiguous areas such as the Middle East and South Asia and possibly wish to take countermeasures Finally nuclear proliferation could become a North-South issue of contention Some developing nations see the NPT as inherently dis- criminatory and a potential abridgement of their sovereignty The inconclusive results of the 1980 NPT Rev iew conference indicate the depth of Third World dissatisfaction with the way that the nuclear weapons states carry out non-proliferation policies An attempt by the U S or other industrial states to act against a Third World proliferating state would probably not have the backing of large segments of opinion and would be condemned by many or most developing countries C05040077 ·3 - 3 Further and More Dangerous Proliferation If additional states begin overt tests of nuclear explosives or mo'fing from crude test devices to nuclear weapons a new and more dangerous stage in proliferation would begin Thus far no Nth country including India has proceeded to the systematic separation of special nuclear materials or the assembly and deployment of nuclear weapons Additional proliferation however could begin a chain reaction qf these activities If a number of countries move toward developing nui lear weapons we can also expect some loss of control and possible diversion of nuclear materials and even the weapons themselves It might not be extraordinarily difficult for terrorists or other subnational groups to obtain nuclear materials a task which would be facilitated by an absence of regular accountability and functioning IAEA safeguards It would be impossible for the U S and its Allies to guard against crude terrorist devices using diverted SNM As more nuclear weapon states emerge there would be increased chances of diplomatic pressures or economic including petroleum blackmail against the industrial states Under these circumstances so rne nuclear suppliers might further relax their controls on exports of sensitive materials and technology leading to accelerated and more sophisticated proliferation Fortunately only a handful of non-nuclear weapons states would have the industrial and technological base to move to thermonuclear weapons and advanced long-range inertially guided ballistic missiles A thermonuclear weapons program would require far more resources and highly trained manpower than is available to all but a few developing nations the U S should monitor foreign inertial confinement fusion C05040077 - rese arch closely however - 4 - While the inability to develop adequate miniturization of nuclear warhe3ds would prevent most threshold states from launching ICBMs with high yield weapons there might be some prol iferat'ion of the technology for shorter range suborbital rockets which could carry low yield fission warheads C05040077 c Trends and Threats in Threshold States Non-Proliferation Policy Costs The acquisition of sensitive facilities and material while not itself proliferation raises some of the same political and security problems - even if these facilities are safeguarded Despite attempts to justify these acquisitions on economic energy or technology grounds such actions may be perceived by others as an indicator of possible intentions of developing nuclear weapons option The emergence of such incipient states could initiate a ptocess of destabilizing counternctions During the highly asymmetical and unstable period of transi- tional vulnerability those states which wish to retain regional superiority or fear a neighboring state's nuclear intentions would have an incentive to remove nascent threats Preventive surgical strikes against the nuclear facilities of proliferating states are possible Similarly countries may be tempted to engage in covert operations against the nuclear programs of suspected proliferator states this is already happening to Iraq Awareness of vulnerability to another country's nuclear explosives could polarize affected countries in a region to form regional alliances against the proliferator and to seek outside perhaps superpower protection These alliances might be contrary to U S interests e g front line African states entering into relationships with the Soviets to protect them from South Africa As proliferation develops cooperation between nuclear pariahs ould be likely to become more common further reducing U S influence • Jver the actions of these counrries There already is some degree of nuclear cooperation between such politically isolated states as Israel •raiwan and South Africa C05040077 - - 2 - Acquisition of sensitive facilities could also bring into play t s legislative restrictions on security and economic assistance to st ates acquiring unsafeguarded enrichment or reprocessing facilities 2 step which could affect the area's security balance adversely and jncrease the incentive to proliferate Thus an actual test of an explosive dev ce is only the last step jn a process which throughout poses significant foreign and security 1 olicy problems not only in the proliferation context but for important regional security concerns Iraq is a current example of this process It is an NPT party c nd we have no direct evidence that it intends to develop a nuclear E xplosive option However the fact that it is acquiring generally i afeguarded sensitive technology and equipment in the absence of a r uclear power program when taken with its petroleum reserves which cast doubt on the need for nuclear power for development for the foreseec ble future and its radical political orientation has begun the same ind of regional and international counter reaction that would be E xpected if its imminent intention to proliferate were established As c ould be predicted the reaction has been strongest from Israel - the i tate with the greatest political security concern over an incipient Jraqi explosive capability and secondarily from ourselves as guarantors c f Israeli security Long before Iraq is actually capable of a nuclear E xplosion we may have an Israeli counter action that p9ses grave 1·egional problems In the longer term it is probably safe to predict Iranian concern and possibly an Iranian perception of the necessity i o insure itself with its own explosive option on the Pakistan-Indian n odel Likewise because of the political dynamics of the eastern co5040077 1 - 3 _ Arab region Egyptian reactions to the Iraqi program will have to be carefully watched The Iraqi case also indicates some of the possible difficulties in dealing with incipeint states It has leverage over potential suppliers oil in the Iraqi case political backing for the acquisition of technology from other non-aligned and a regional framework which would be generally favorable to such ambitions because of the area's preoccupation with a regional conflict It may be difficult to identify and deal with the incipient state early on obviously a primary indicator will be the acquisition of sensitive facilities in an area of unresolved conflicts I This seems self evident but the I cases of Iraq Pakistan and the ROK indicate that it is not universally so The threat of proliferation while reflecting changing technological capabilities particularly the industrialization of the Third World and the diffusion of technology is largely but not wholly a product of political insecurity and the decision to pursue or keep open a inuclear explosive option is primarily a political security decision Such decisions will reflect not only regional circumstances but also any perceived shift in the overall us-soviet force balance as well as the emergence of radical Third world regimes No state is likely to take the nuclear option because of a direct Soviet threat but Lt well may do so if it feels threatened by a Soviet client and ' perceives it does not have adequate US or other support Likewise unstable in_ternational security situation offers more scope for tRaneuvare in a regional context of radical regimes more or less C05040077 - independent of the Soviets 4 - The technology of the decision may be dual puicpose but it is neutral there is no necessury connection between technological capability and an explosive option hrnNever that There is no doubt the spread of technological capabilities is continually making the political decision easier to implement co ntinued activist us This argues for a non-proliferation policy not only in regard to the means of proliferation sensitive materials and equipment but also toward the perceptions of insecurity Thus a basic component of a non-proliferation strategy the most important one in the long term must be to alleviate perceptions of insecurity and we will need a comprehensive strategy toward each specific threat to deter or delay a decision to go nuclear It should be added that some proliferation threats do not fit this general pattern Brazil Argentina and to a large extent India seem to fall into a different category Brazil and Argentina seem locked into a rivalry for continent wide prestige and leadership as well as rivalry for status as a world power where security is less of a factor that impels them to keep open the nuclear explosive option The security related tools available to us in dealing with Brazil and Argentina may be less important in dealing with the problem than the political diplomatic ones The case of India is of' another type By the time of its test it had overwhelming conventional military industrial superiority over Pakistan It is predominant in its r gion Presumably while its options are open it would long since have embarked on weaponization if it felt a major threat from China Its explosive test may therefore have been more related to prestige and non-aligned leadership as well as confirming its superiority C05040077 - OVE r Pakistan - 5 - It may also be largely beyond our ability to effectively influence the Indian program except insofar as we are able to affect that of Pakistan • While non-proliferation policy has obvious benefits it should be recognized that there are political and material costs as well and a comprehensive strategy which attempts to alleviate the perceived in ecurity which is at the root of proliferation decisions will require th• most tools to make it effective Some of these possible costs ar« Friction with our major allies over supply of sensitive facilities and materials to Third World countries Continued charges of discrimnation on the provision of nuclear technology by the Third World which could eventually have adverse effects on the NPT IAEA or other international regimes The necessity to provide some form of security assurances economic assistance or military assitance where we might not otherwise do so or not do so to such a degree In some cases this could be perceived as our being blackmailed by the threat of proliferation Spill over from bilateral nuclear issues into general bilateral relations Our attempt to stop the sale of sensitive facilities to Brazil and the Tarapur issue are ' perhaps the foremost examples But even with modified policies we will have legal and political constraints C05040077 - - 6 ·- in the pursuit of non-proliferation objectives which will affect relations in general e g Symington-Glenn Amendments use of intelligence assets Much of our active pursuit of non-proliferation relys on the intelligence community Maintenance of a cooperative posuture on nuclear arms control us Whatever the reality and the possibilities the needs to be seen as being ready to discuss nuclear arms control This opens us to various pressures in the CD UN and other international fora These costs present a speical problem in relation to some of our friends who are potential proliferators - Korea Taiwan and Israel In the case of Korea maintenance of a troop presence and US nuclear weapons desirable as it may be for other reasons may in part be necessary to prevent a nuclear option An attempt to proliferate would require the use of US leverage which could be harmful to our relationship in general To assure non-proliferation in both Korea and Taiwan we may have to decline some military cooperation rockets etc which might otherwise be advisable In the case of Taiwan a continued military supply relationship although also desirable for other reasons is a part of non-proliferation policy but has costs vis-a-vis the PRC The case of Israel could be particu arly difficult An Israeli explosive test or other overt evidence of a nuclear explosive capabilities given the legal constraints would present us with very serious problems It would undermine all non-proliferation policy for the region and perhaps set off a nuclear arms race with the gravest implications for regional security and stability C05040077 ' - rI suggested strategy We need an integrated approach of direct political incentives and security measures together with the non-security measures elsewhere considered in order to dissuade potential threshold states from the explosive option This is especially important since denial of sensitive technology and equipment while still fundamental is not fool proof Since every country is different both in the forces that determine its nuclear policies and its susceptibility to us influence it is impossible to formulate and execute a generalized non-proliferation policy Measures that produce desired results in one situation may not even be available in another With nuclear recipients mainly in the Third World we should focus on the handful of countries of near to medium term proliferation concern e g India Iraq Israel Pakistan Libya nd South Africa Toward the threshold state with generally friendly relations with the U S we could seek to build a broader bilateral relationship to help increase their sense of security and make nuclear weapons seem less necessary to them We would have to rely on more negative methods of dissuasion with states which whom we have strained or inimical relations Obvious methods of leverage are economic and security assistance and conventional arms sales These tools might bolster the confidence of insecure states which might otherwise seek nuclear weapons Generally we do not recommend linking economic or military assistance directly to nuclear policy We should avoid even an implicit link ith countries which are not already friendly with the U S or have an alliance with us 1 coso4 o077 - 2· _ Bilateral military security guarantees and assurances could be us aful part of the confidence-building process which might lessen th a ince n tive to build nuclear explosives · Our willingness to create an enhanced security relationship could include specific assurances joint exercises basing increased U S naval ship and military aircraft vi sitations etc We must be careful to ensure that an expanded military relationship with a particular country does not spur a rival state to initiate or accelerate a nuclear explosives program of its own u s On the other hand vigorous conventional military support by the may be an effective way of dissuading a state from developing nuc lear weapons to answer a beginning nuclear explosives program of a 1 1eighboring state We must also consider the proliferation implications of U S ov• rseas force deployments We must maintain our ability to project our military power abroad since a perceived decline in U S military power might be an incentive for states to develop nuclear explosives The USG should play close attention to the legitimate security concerns of threatened Allies which depend on U S forces to maintain a conventional warfare equivalance The U S should also encourage multinational security-building agreements Promoting additional NPT adherence and expanding IAEA safeguards and international controls on sensitive nuclear facilities can reduce the perception of a potential nuclear threat from a regional adversary Promotion of nuclear weapon fee zones if feasible might also help Promoting peaceful settlement of regional disputes can alf o indirectly be a major contribution to non-proliferation icoso40077 - 3 _ For states which depend on the US we may need to underline the relationship between US military anl eocnomic assistance and observance of non-proliferation commitments In extreme cases denial of US military protection to states violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty cancellation of economic assistance or eligibility for Exim Bank credits would be possible Negative pressures such as these can be eiffective if a potential proliferator has no readily available a lternative means of support Where dependence is not so great however - as in the case of Pakistan - the termination of arms shipments cir economic assistance may not change nuclear policies With industrial states the primary aim is to achieve better cooperation with our West European allies and other nuclear suppliers e nly only in achieving restrain in transfer of sensitive nuclear technology but also in gaining an improved political coordination of e ur mutual non-proliferation goals We will need to work with Western I urope Japan and the USSR to put political pressure on and consider sanctions for would-be proliferators Mutual nuclear restraint and non-proliferation cooperation with the USSR is both important and difficult in light of bur overall strained relationship While the Soviets have generally supported US non- proliferatin objectives deteriorating East-West relations have helped increase the global instability which spurs proliferation attempts Maintaining scrupulously our conventional and nuclear security commitments to NATO Japan and other key Allies is an essential contribution to non-proliferation The presence of US forces in West 1 coso40077 - - 4 - Eu rope and the US nuclear umbrella help to prevent any considerati on of nuclear weapons in Germany Italy or other non-nuclear we apons countries Similarly the US-Japanese defense Treaty and st rong American naval and Air Forces in Western Pacific play a rnaljor role in preserving Japan as a non-nuclear weapon state 0 C05040077 w 1 1-1- r -- · '' - c L · _ - 4 i4 4 ' $ J · t '-4 • 1 J c •• India's demonstrated nuclear explosives capability and the advanced state of Pakistan's nuclear program could have significant consequences for our interests in South arid Southwest Asia The heightened tension resulting from the the presence of Indian and Pakistani nuclear explosives could spur a greater conventional arms buildup and perhaps a race for weaponization India would be certain to win such a race with its superior technological and industrial base There would be a risk that a future Indo-Pakistani conflict could result in the use of nuclear weapons A nucJ ear arms race in South Asia might spur such states as Iraq to emulate the Pakistani program in the longer run Iran might also consider nuclear explosives Saudi Arabia Oman and other friendly Gulf states would feel even more insecure Our bilateral relationships with both India and Pakistan would be hurt we might be unable to assist Pakistan further and our stable relationship with India would be damaged Finally Israel might become nervous at the possible transfer of technology from Pakistan to other Islamic countries _ _· - ---- -- ·· - - ·•· -·--· · - - •coso40077 - C011 ' IO lN'f I iDdJ IIIA2 Ae g ae fl If Pakistan Pakistan has a vigorous and well advanced program to develop a nuclear explosives capability It is trying to acquire the necessary fissile material th o gh both the reprocessing and enrichment routes The Pakistanis' acquired key technology and equipment from abroad Coordinated nuclear supplier efforts to stop exports to Pakistan's sensitive programs have probably delayed the effort but we cannot by x t-- U w £ __ _ '- ' __ _ Pakistan an e losives ca abilit Pakistan I s nuclear ques't i s fueled by its deep-seated fear of India and its increasing conventiona·l· military inferiority Pakistan's sense of vulnerability and isolation has been intensified since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan -- the emergence of a second front on its Western borders -- and Mrs Gandhi's return to power • Pakistan's nuclear program is meant to provide a deterrent to the conventional Indian threat Urgency is d i c d i a · • s PNE Pakistaq also seeks the prestige ' - i ---attached to a nuclear program Th Teffort is very popular with the Pakistani public curtailment by the Zia government would 1 carry severe adverse d m e s t•·---_ _ ___ · _ · _ _ ___ _ _ _-A-__ - - - - - - - i 11 11 Punitive measures ave no issuaded Pakistan from its nuclear efforts Various explicit buy-out options have been considered over the years and rejected by the US as too expensive and or unacceptable to Pakistan This continues to be the case • 11 11 The NSC agreed on a broad policy toward Pakistan which as regards the nuclear issue is based on the premise that a closer security relationship which builds confidence in us and makes the Paks feel more secure is more likely to provide Pakistan with incentives to forego or at least delay a nuclear test than any alternative approach As this relationship evolves we would hope to gain leverage over Pakistani nuclear decision making In approaching the Pakistanis we are emphasizing the security benefits of the new relationship without leaving the impression we acquiesce in their1 nuclear activities We propose to lay down a marker early in the dialogue regarding our deep concern over the potential political costs of continuing their nuclear program We will also continue multilateral efforts to deny Pakistan sensitive nuclear technology and aterial The initial Pakistani response to our initiative has been reserved and discussions are continuing tbNF'lDEMT A o GDS 4 6 87 C05040077 e · · SEGRE I INDIA India detonated a peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974 • I could detonate a second quickly should it decide to do so 'It would also have no difficulty in weaponizing prolifera i n problem in India is thus unique ' itsvolves The non- ' It a strategy designed to persuade the potential proliferator not to make use·of a capacity it already possesses The Ind'ians have repeatedly stated that although they have no intention of becoming a nuclear weapons state they reserve the right to resume a PNE testing program if it proves in their interest to do so They have refused to sign the NPT or to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear facilities They maintain that both the Treaty and full-scope safeguards represent unjustified discrimination against the Non-Nuclear Weapon States India's adherence to this principle has always been strengthened by its interest in keeping Qpen a nuclear arms option which it could exercise against a nuclear-armed China More recently ·Pakistan's nuclear program has bolstered Indian resolve to maintain nuclear flexibility An Indian decision to resume nuclear testing now depends crucially on Pakistan's programs and Indian perceptions of them U S strategy has several aspects We should continue to do everything we can to prevent Pakistan from developing an explosive capacity and conducting a test We need to demonstrate to the Indians that despite our changed strategy toward the Pakistan nuclear we remain firmly committed to curbing the spread of nuclear explosives in South Asia SF CRr I C05040077 SECREI • 0 - 2 - We should seek to resolve our nuclear supply problem wit h India in a way which will protect ·our non-proliferation · interests e g continuance of safeguards on US-supplied fuel and equipment and material produced through their use We should also keep open our lines of coinm unication to the Indian nuclear establishment We should continue to warn IndiaJ that an Indian decision to detonate a second nuclear explosion would have profound consequences for Indo-us relations regional stability and worldwide non-proliferation efforts We should also continue to do what we can to encourage improved relations between India and its neighbors India's willingness to accept out interest in better Indo-Pak ties -most important to our non-proliferation strategy -- has been reduced by our efforts to build a closer security relationship with Islamabad Although US arms aid to Pakistan is unlikely itself to trigger a resumption of Indian testing it might make sharper the Indian reaction to Pak nuclear programs -SEGR I - coso40077 1 A Southwest Asia and North Africa 1 ' Regional Implications of Proliferation Continued movement toward nuclear weapons by Iraq and Libya p ·i J-i or public indications of nuclear weapons by Israel could A jeop rdizf our interests in the area Arab - Israeli relations would become Elven more exacerbated and the initial movements toward Middle East f - t t MR - c ould $all e par - Iraqi possession of nuclear explosives could c ontribute to a state of tension which might endanger Western and rapanese access to Persian Gulf oil Either Libya or Iraq might wish to use nuclear explosives to intimidate Egypt Saudi Arabia or t rt kt could have a duere e· '--1 cither friendly Arab states such a aovlo aJ t o b -1 h P - c - - l • E ffec upon our Ra t k Bc ffle Rti Jlo eli Libya migh't also use its n-u nuclear potential to put pressure on friendly North African and Saharan states • C05040077 E ' ·• '• - ' ' · · · · • € A SB Oi' '' IRAQ Iraq is·a party to the NPT Iraq's nuclear program howeyer 'appears to go well beyond tha t·country's nuclear · power nee4s and we believe is intendeq to pro vide the 1 ptio n · of- developing nuclear explosives in the future ·current U S cop earn focuses on a large r search reactor OSIRAK and a critical assembly· rnoc·k-up ISIS · and Italian laboratories equipment and training which could provide Iraq a small near-term re $ processing capability Iraq• alsoAinterested in an Italian plutonium-producing power react -- - IL__________--1 I Iraqi interest in a nuclear explosive capability is motivated by a number of-factors foremost of which is its belief that Israel lready possesses a nuclear arsenal lraq has been one of the most hardline of Arab states and remains opposed to the existence of Israel Iraq's current military conflict with Iran exemplifies its drive to attain a dominant position in the Gulf Nuclear weapons would give it unparallelled leverage with its Arab neighbors and enable X_OS-3 4 7 01 co5040077 SECRfl'P - Iraq to further intimj dat 1ran which will continue to be an adversary even foilowing ce sation of the present fighting 'Lastly the leadersl _ip in Iraq is strongly in terested in attaining the status •Of a major Third World power A nuclear explosive capability would in their eyes remove any doubt about Iraq's importance on the world scene A comprehensive and durable Middle East settlement includirig a satisfactory resolution of Palestinian demands ould go a long way toward reducing Iraqi incentives for cLcquiring nuclear explosives A further improvement in relations between Iraq and its moderate Arab neighbors c ast in a regional framework which reduces Iraq's isolation and encourages the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone could perhaps motivate Iraq to abandon its current proliferation trend We can also encourage improved rela- tions between our Allies and Iraq while continuing to urge restraint in West European nuclear cooperation with raq Direct U S efforts can include continuing neutrality in the Iraq-Iran conflict f'to reduce the immediate military threat to Iraq according Iraq more attention and recognition a nd candidly explaining the serious threat whiqh Iraq's niuclear program a s currently structured poses in t rms o f pre-emptive actions by its potential adverseries U S • nc m-proliferation efforts with Iraq will probab ly delay but n t prevent its successful development of an explosive capability -- C05040077 Israel has followed a policy of calculated ambiguity oncerning its nuclear capability stating that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the region By doinq so -- leaving its real and potential adversaries with the conviction that Tel Aviv has the ability to conduct nuclear warfare -- Israel achieves a significant degree of deterrence Israel's security situation provides considerable incentive to develop a nuclear weapons capability Surrounded by adversaries which outnumber it both in manpower and the number of conventional weapons available Israel realizes the value of nuclear weapons not onl as a deterrent but as weapon of last resort to forestall defeat in the event of cinother Arab-Israeli war Isra recognizes fur hermore 1 hat some Arab and Muslim states Iraq Libya and Pakistan have weapons· development programs underway and these programs also serve as -incentives to Israel to proliferate C05040077 -· ' - 2 - - Short of extending the U S security umbrella to Israel there appears to be little we can do to persuade ' Israel to forsake its nuclear program now While we should · c ontinue to urge rsrael to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation· Treaty we must recognize thaf so long as a state of war con• tinues to exist between Israel and neighboring Arab countries it is highly unlikely that Israel will do so or go beyond its stated position that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into· the region We should also continue our close security relationship ·with Israel Any effort on our part to get Israel to forsake its nuclear program by being less supportive generally or in particular by utting aid would likely be counterproductive It would almost certainly cause the Israelis to feel that our longstanding support was waning and it would be cited as additional evidence that Israel must provide for its own security by any means available Our best hope for moving Israel away from a policy of calculated ambiguity concerning its nuclear capability and toward signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is to pursue the peace process vigorously Only with he achieve- ment of a comprehensive peace is there a realistic chance that Israel will redirect or modify its nuclear program SECRS'l' In the C05040077 - SECR i T - ' 3 - interim what we are able to achieve with Israel will at best •be a function of what can be achieved with other coun ries in tjle region i e deterring Arab possession of a nuclear capability development of a Middle East Nuclear Free Zone or creation of regional demilitarized zones So long as Pakistan Iraq and Libya are pursuing a policy of developing a nuclear capability the Israelis will not foresake their own nuclear program · 4 - - LIBYA THE PROLIFERATION THREAT Libya is embarked on a deliberate policy of obtaining· nuclear weapons--no matter the cost In part the motiva-· tion for this effort is Col Qadhafi's fanatical desire to achieve the prestige of creating an Islamic bomb-preferably Libyan-•though his support for the Pakistani program is a by-product of this dream Oadhafi however is interested in far more than the prestige such a bomb would confer In his hands such a· weapon would become a powerful instrument for political leverage and blackmailespecially because his opponents believe that Qadhafi is capable of using such a weapon if sufficiently provoked Libya is following both an overt and covert policy 1 to achieve this goal On the surface it is developing a relatively large program for the peaceful uses of atomic energy As part of this program Tripoli under pressure from the USSR has ratizied the NPT and negotiated a safeguards agreement with IAEA There is every indication however that Libya's· adherence to the NPT is totally withou substance The USSR is build' fl o oresearc and er generating reactors in Libya While we are convinced that the USSR remains committed· to a non-proliferation policy this _ C05040077 e 6I ·-·· s _ L · - - r a r '- ·•a --- - rlaqq'' • ' -' ·• ' · -2- is much more highly ·e nriched fuel than the Soviets originally indicated they would supply and Moscow now indicates that contrary to assurances originally given to us--the USSR will not •be taking back the spent full The United States is concerned about this aspect of Soviet support fo r the Libyan program and as a matter of policy will provide no support in any form to the Libyan nuclear effort We are urging others including the USSR--to either follow this policy or at a minimum insure that any cooperation with the Libyan program is non-sensitive in nature and subject to the most rigid of controls Nonetheless the general consensus is that the overt Libya program is not likely to produce a nuclear weapon in the foreseeable future f - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ --------------- -- 1 '----- ---------- N C • I '· ' l m -J '·• C05040077 • ' ' I _ J - - •' E East Asia 1 Regional Implications of Proliferation Although Indonesia could eventually become a source of prolifera- • tion concern the area of primary concern is northeast Asia The development of a nuclear explosive device by the ROK would have gFavely destabilizing consequences for the-region I wo -lspur Japan to -1 vw revif w its attitude toward nuclear weaponst would force North Korea yt 't _ '-' t J fl -r1- Ji J -' to_ ttempt to develop nuclear weapons t an e ·of great concern to the USSR and the PRC Moreover it would undercut the basic US-ROK relation- ship and make it difficult if not impossible to maintain our security r lationship If Taiwan were to develop a nuclear explosive capability it would likewise undermine the basis of our relationship It would interrupt the process of de facto normalization with the PRC and call into question the basic understanding of the US and the PRC over the 1' A nuc 1 ear Taiwan wou ld a l sc rHa v - i• t rnuc h more I f utu re o f Taiwan 1 difficult for Japan to maintain its close relationshi with Taiwan and likewise force it to review its nuclear posturci 2 The case of Taiwan As in the case of the ROK Taiwan during the venti s so ght ' • t-4 I to d •i velop a nuclear explosive sap H ili r' e -r to conv13ntional forces of a communist rival a natural sought to use - • offset the stro·nger Suspecting that 'Taiwan uranium research reactor to produce unsafeguarded plutonium the US ·in 1976-77 forced Ta_iwan to dismantle a pilot - - -r-epr 9 -e sliil19 -fa_giJjJ Y - nq _ r _e_ to t rminate and forego all development - · --· - · _ - • • • ·- - _· - - · - -- • ' of highly enriched uranium heavy water or other indigenous elements of the nuclear fuel cycle · e continue to check on Taiwan's nuclear research pro ram which has e h ·ay-e seemed more aimed at providing future options than at actually proceeding toward development of nuclear explosives - C05040077 •- - t • I • r r· r • · _• 1' ------ - ' t- ile there has been a limited e facto ormalizatio of t•f d ·icns with the People's Republic of China Taiwan's security situation offers a continuing incentive to acquire a short-range •• nuclear force capable of being deployed against Chinese coastal•cities Taiwan could or against a potential Chinese amphibious invasion have only a marginal deterrent if it developed nuclear weapons lv · ' ·✓ f ' C political incentives may be stronger than military the loss of U S diplomatic recognition in 1978 was a serious blow to the nnr'- international standing and Taipei may see nuclear weapons as a ay of restoring domestic morale and increa ing its reputation as a viable entity For the time being however the political and military costs of possessing nuclear weapons outweigh the advantages U S Stra eqy A_s_ainst Prolifera ion · i1a U S was previously successful in blocking dangerous nuclear dcve 1 opment in Taiwan both because of our m-i-li-t-cd -y utual Defense treaty ommitment to the ROC and because suspension of U S nuclear fuel s and compqents would have mbsoJ 'lOlte l _y crippled Tai' - i i ' s civil nuclear ur leverage may have been substantia1 reduced however -w-e- w-J_ _ i ·o · u1 - • • • I _ · • l ' I ' • --b c--l - i 1 •L•J 0 ri ·c i c relations with Taiwan since our security rc1ationship ·ri•J · i 1 • 11 is''teril 1' a nd Taiwan has be_gun to diver-sify its sourcing of nuclear 1iuteria ls and technology to western Europe If Taiwarl ·continues to hold back from developing nuclear explosives -r '4' - ---- - ------- we could clarify our defense policies to show our continuing interest i aiwan's secu-rity We eetild r iake-o J cax•ro-t he·PR€-Qu_r - d e - - - - -- -· - ' to sell defensive 6eapon systems such as the I-HAWK Sea M i L l' 1-t rt 't ·al 'I·OW and perhaps t he F- ll fighter We could continue our cC 1_ r·r - - _- pe nuc - -Lc x cooperation 'including reactor equipment sales while - - - r' C • - r I r --l c ' 1 __ - L- '- • • • - e C05040077 - - ' r '- _ t- t r• - - J'L J • - t · _ 3 - I monitoring evidence of high explosive testing inertial confinement experimentation and other sensitive programs If Taiwan reverts_ a strategy of developing nuclear weapons •' i I' f'i - C ti T C l tE Chnology or nuclear explosives we would 'i Xpla i R te the 'faiwei ft•• g IJ Ocnment that they are jeopardizi ng the basic U S relationshf'p wita- 'i'-a i-pei-c- We cou la mt a ff mil ±-ta I y ass i-s ta nce-ail'ttr Si t 1 d s a J e s - f We C would --V v i t cut off future shipments of nuclear fuel and equipment and terminate ft' t--'- _ _· - 1 cv ' lJr ' Exim Bank financing Aovc al r we would make it clenr to the ROC that U S public and Congressional support for Tti l t ·ly Lf' -- eroded by development of nuclear explosives 3 The case of Korea In 1975 President Park ordered the inception of a nuclear weapons development program The ROKG began to seek from us ana others sensitive equipment for nuclear explosive and delivery system developme nt and sought a nuclear reprocessing plant from the French We 1 £ es 1 ' re sponded with the denial of sensitive equipment and a- GYteA·ei'f s tct tu ta H ' t- f c f f k d1plomat1c eetl ip • 1-gh in which 1 t was made clear to b-fle rtOI lee@@ f SJH f t k CC • that an attempt to evade iw non_-pr lj- e_r ion Tnmitrnents would have · the most serious implicatiopsr t or l_y __f_or__ o ur continued peaceful nuclear cooperation but for our basic_ relationship including the • ab tlity to continue to provide security assistance The ROKG understood ---·--- ________ ·-· -····· ·· thH warning and ceased its exelo _ye _ Pr g_r a _ in r tur n for face saving µ ai' ' t b cle se r peaceful nuclear c 9opi fa 1 6n - _ t -r trirF wa -i3uccessful largely bec se our persuasive efforts were backed with a credible threat and because we were abl to ain the cooperation of other suppliers Since that period the ROK proliferation threat has been largely quiescent although we can expect the nuclear option to be reexamined periodically C05040077 - $ a L - - 4 ·- • -t --t The ROK _ incen ives to proliferate ee u1 tt include offset -v continuing conventional inferiority to North Korea to deter a North Korean a rentieAaJ attack P rticularly to react --t s a surprise ' attack toward Seoul and to insure sainst any lessening of us support for the ROK's security Somewhat analogous to·Israel the US i-s r v· c _ virtually the only possible suppert for the security of the state thus periodic reexamination of the nuclear option by the ROKG leadership is probably inevitable in the absence of a olitical resolution of the tensions on the Korean peninsula b US Strategy Against Proliferation tJ • The primary measure to prevent proliferation by the ROK is the maintenace of a strong credible commitment to the defense of the ROK Thi includes not only the assurances of the US-ROK security treaty l -rJ 1 G C H •-t- 7 _r - 1 but a credible troop presence in Korea provision of military equipment and technology to maintain and strengllren the ROK armed forces political support for the ROKG and the maintenance of US forces in the Western Pacific at sufficient strength to react to Korean contingencies It may also mean maintaining some tactical nuclear weapons in Korea as long as t e is _a_c nventional force inferiority to thi North It also requires a credible political posture toward North-South issues and --- - -- - · the fullest consultation in regard to any political moves involving the - ' North - In th longer run we with Japan and the ROK should continue ---·------ ----·----- -- to seek ways to alleviate basic North-South tensions - 7 ily _ _ _ - • ••• - - · w need to make it quite clear to thE t ROKG leadership • that any abandonernent of its non-proliferation commitments would have 1 the most serious implications for nuclear cooperation our ability to provide security assistance and for our basic cooperative relationship At ·the same time we will need to continue to monitor carefully the -- r- r- c • 'i' • t C05040077 · ' - - 5 ·· - lr- · --------'---------- ROKG's nuclear technology and tieHfiill to provide early warning of any development leading toward delivery vehicles or an explosive capability In this connection we will need to conti ue to work with Allies to d ny sensitive·nuclear matefials and equipment to the ROK In the longer run when the ROK has moved further toward its ambitious nuclear power goals we may wish to • encourage multinational alternatives to sensitive facilities which · -' • l d serve Taiwan as well -------·-···--·· I • i • 'C05040077 · 1 ·' • I _ 1 - - N 1 c A f O •IF tt4Tt01V tEGIONAL IMPLICATION OF ONMGii Jt t teN The United States would not be directly threatened in the near term by the ajguisition of the know-how and 1means to produce weapons grade nuclear material by Latin America's two leading nuclear powers--Brazil and Argentina u s Despite the periodic ups and downs in relations with theStountries both are ideologically pro-West and would qfive no advantage# from directly threatening US military or civilian inte1ests in the region The nuclear programs in both countries are demonstrably aimed at applying nuclear technology to the production of electrical power to meet the energy demands of growing populations an6 economies Both are developing countries intent on breaking what they perceive to be economic dependency on the West Their desire to develop independent nuclear fuel cycles should be viewed within th swider fra ework of the desire for economic independence They interpret U S demands for safeguards assurances through adherence to Tlatelolco or the NPT designed to estrict their l access to techno 1 ogy and mater1a Joy l necessary nuc ear energy independence in order to insure the dominance by developed capitalist countries over the lees developed states C05040077 - ✓ I -1 - 2 - Besides the economic benefits to be derived from nuclear independence Brazilian and Argentine nuclear progra 1s are driven by the desire for the prestige such independence would bring -- both in civilian and military terms Since the military in both countries pla a dominant role in government _nd therefore budgetJ allocations to the nuclear prografjmilitary application of n clear technology ust be a U S concern The prestige to be gained by joining the select group of nuclear weapons states however must be measured against the adverse regional reaction such a development would bring about The twenty t w o Latin American nations for whom the Treaty of Tlatelolco is in force could be expected to condemn whichever country was first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area covered by the Treaty Moreover security needs would not justify nuclear weapons development since internal security is i1 far greater concern to Brazil and Argentina than any external threat The rivalry between these two countries is such that possession of nuclear weapons by one would drive the other to acquire them thereby creating an external n • '1 » security threat where previously xisted The real threat to the u s ·•· of nuclear proliferation i n Brazil and Argentina is indirect Possession of· an tndependent complete nuclear fuel cycle es i_ally in • tJ1 1t ' • ·• • • 1'1 fQ t v tuJ · • the case of Brazil could lead to the irresistable temptation -coso40077 - -· 3 - o - eor to aupply grade material to countries or groups inimical 11 to o s 1 0 conventional sources of energy security interests in exchange for increased access much less important role to ii u s That is ideology plays security in the region ·than the economic advantages that would accrue to the supplier of weapons grade material in exchange for etroleum PHB eAS ep BRAZIL ·1 A Incentives to Proliferate The Brazilian incentivel to proliferate is generally thought to be contained in its desire to increase its prestige as a Third World leader or incipient great power Although this may be true with respect to a small group of military leaders it is also true that GOB policy within the Group of 77 and in regional and international organizations is to avoid any perception of e t erging great power status Besides the economic benefits it derives from its classification as an LDC Brazil has been carefully cufltivating relations with its neighbors to allay fears that it hopes to become a regional power Brazil is however the largest exporter of conventional - arms in the region Economic incentives do exist to develop the means to be able to export nuclear material as well - B 4 - U S Strategy against Proliferation To discourage proliferation · it is in U S interest to develop better overall security and rolitical relations with Brazil to encourage improvement Brazilian - Argentine relations in order to reduce competitiveness in the field of nuclear weapons development and to en ourage adherence to Tlatelolco and acceptance of full-scope safeguards In addition u s strategy should be aimed at assi ting Brazil to overcome its almost complete dependence on petroleum imports from the Middle East in order to reduce the temptation to supply nuclear weapons grade material to countries of that region in exchange for access to petroleum tie eaee A Incentives to Proliferate 01 Argentina Argentine incentives to proliferate derive from its concern with Brazil's size power and dynamism combined with the tact that Argentina possesses the technological and resource capabililty to develop nuclear weapons Balanced against these considetations however is the adverse regional and international reaction that would follow public knowiedge of Argentine possession of a nuclear weapons program a '' well as the incentive such a program w0uld give to Brazil to develop its own progr m • •C05040077 · fl ' II ' I • _ 4 t I i • '•'• i 5 - C B u s Strategy Against Proliferation Improved o s political relations with Argentina and the resumption of U S arms sales would increase our leverage with the Argentine military and our ability to discuss frankly our proliferation concerns We should in addition continue to encourage adherence to Tlatel lco and expand cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy while emphasizing the importance of safeguards on all nuclear programs As an rging regional supplier of nuclear technology and materials Argentina must soon define for itself the role it wishes to play in this field including the conditions under which it will supply these items to other countries U S strategy should concentrate on cooperation wherefver possible in order to maintain some leverage over anclinfluence on these important Argentine decisions I DRAFTED ARA PP 4 6 81 ----__J J' E 'w v • - r· - South Africa 1 Regional Proliferation Implications While many African states believe South Africa alreaQy has nuclear tn explosives or could produce them a relatively short time lovert proof of South African possession of nuclear explosives would exacerbat the regional situation WQ J _ M- woullil l e Uaaer heavy p1r st Jre te cease4 all ' ClL N nuclear cooperation with 5'outh Africa a m t only our veto should we wish to use it could prevent the voting_of nuclear sanctions by the UN 'lift hiOU J a J e o J j k l • • etirieng p e l l e in SIHE opi e9 saac#i j ona eneuoGN fer m0 i - Over the longer term some African n a t i o n s 'MA I • probably seek to develop their own nuclear explosive capabilit leading Nigerian political figures have already s i Ad as much SomE Confirn tion of an explosive program would also be an opportunity for intensifj ij1volvement in southern Africa of the Soviets states in southern Afric might seek some protective guarantee from Moscow While th soviets are not likely to make any explicit commitment they would probably th1 and step up arms and advisory assistance where possible Overt eviden of a South African explosive program would thus result in increased regional polarization intensified Soviet involvement and less room for U S political maneuvre n regard_t the area and a dimiriished US influence and ability to protect· our interest·s 2 South Africrut ease South Africa has as e-xtremeiy-· sophisticated -nuclear- pr-ogram - F ' ·I C05040077 - a -- rt •t f 'r r r ·• - ·· - 11 r • • - 2 - Incentives to Proliferate South Africa has now managed to create a sense of regional threat without the stigma of overt explosive testing It may in fact have done so by undertaking detectable activities when in f ct it was not ready to cross the explosive threshold It is difficult to see a near term military usefulness to nuclear weapons except in the most extreme and unlikely circumstances Africa is likely Ji The principal threat to South remain black urran insurrection y d guerillas operating in border areas for which nuclear explosive would be us ess I They would be militarily useful only as a threat against neigh- boring capitals economic facilities or troop concentrations and their use against such targets could only be an act of desperation However in the more distant future Pretoria might see nuclear explosiv as a deterrent to conventional forces strengthened by the USSR's Vl·J p J r- r • assistance their possession as in urance that the West would step ---- ·- ---in to prevent the occasion of their use Aside from any military benefits the South Africans may believe they can restore Western cooperation on nuclear and other issues··in - - --- return for actual or apparent curtailment of an explo sive program • There may also be an element of bolstering national self confidence as well as the idea that an explosive capability would make the C-· i 9 9 1· r·· - C -- __ 1 - ·· _ · t • 0 • C05040077 - - - 3 - West less likely to undermine South Africa's security for fear of South African provocation of a nuclear confrontation b Inducements Not to Proliferate • Q The most useful immediate step to prevent or br ike South African proliferation would be itp a reement to the proposition we tr1l'l and the French have put to them French supply of fuel for the Koeberg reactors and a veto of UN sanctions which would undercut the arrangement in return for South African dherence to the NPT and full scope safeguards We have also asked the French to pursue a cut-off of HEU production at valindaba with the Sputh Africans The initial South African response to this arrangement was not encouraging but may have been meant for bargaining purposes Should South Africa tl t ultimately decline this arrangmeent penalties are largely economic the necessity to expand its enrichment facility --to develop somehow a fuel fabrication facility likely delay of Kocb rg and continued 'k1µ non-cooperation in nuclear matters with the US There are political costs as well however with France and ourselves· In the longer term if we are unable to conclude this arrangement I the South Africans will eliminate• the existing techni al economic •h-• - -- -•--•--••- - - • • • •- ' • - _ _ leverage and we will have no leverage on their programs through nuclear - cooperation - In such a situation we ould need to encourage the • climate that would inhibit an overt test of an explosive device ·------- -n - -- --- - _ - -- This in turn 1---s- probably only be accomplished by the reduction in tensions - ··----- I' - • ' •- • -- in- -_th a t -Ql¼l G·- e mewith a- Namibia solution and over the --··- - - - - ·----· longer term by political 1 evolution in South Africa J The prospects for·other security related tools do not seem 900d in the case of South Africa We could probably not engage in military ---r r---- -···· 1 t ' d C05040077 I ' - - -· 4 - - • cooperation or supply or conclude security agreements fo · a variety of legal and political reasons Onf the other hand sanctions at • least beyond those we rnt3ht be force to take if there were overt proof •• of an explosive program could undercut our other policies in regard to South Africa and probably would not be effective • • -- --------------------- ···--·--·-- --· - -- __ - - __- - ____ __ - - -- --- - ' i - l · ·- -- -- - --