This paper was prepared in my Hudson incarnation I think parts of it are germane to our 2 00 p m meeting UNCLASSIFIED LAD June II 1981 c r-cRcT C i- _l J Implications for U S Policy of a Pakistani Nuclear Test I RELEASED IN FULL Lewis A Dunn ·1 Wi_thin the next year or so P·akistan most probably will acquire nuclear explosive material While it is possible that-the emerging new strategic relationship between the UnitPrt State d Pdki ian wiil tip the balance against shaking the boat by a nuclear explosion it is more likely that domestic political considerations will lead General Zia to test · Standing behind the nonproliferation regime and influencing onlookers' perceptions of their freedom of action--especially if safeguards had been violated--wou1d suggest a strong punitive response to a Pakistani test ·· And pressures within the U S Congress and the public for sanctions are likely to be quite intense But other considerations- including etaining Pakistan's cooperation in buttressing the Western position in the Gulf and hotding down the level of its nuclear weapons activi ties-- will argue for a more muted American reaction lt is important·to begin thinking about how to balance these competing objectives and pressures while identifying the range of potential U S responses • Would the costs of a more muted ·response be Jess for example if Pakistan had not _violated safeguards or if it announced that having matched India's PNE 11 it was seeking an agreement with India ·that both countries stop at that level of proliferation affect that balance What other factors might In turn taking account of Pakistan's limited vulnerability to sanctions what response might minimize the adverse· UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY ERIC W FLEISHER DATE CASE ID 25 FEB 2008 200605267 -_ _ UNCLASSIFIED ______ - _ __ _ _____ _ --------· -- - UNCLASSIFIED -2impact of a Pakistani test on onlookers• perceptions of their freedom of action Are there any available responses--perhaps a multilateral· ban on nuclear energy dealings with Pakistan--that would ' i 1 l i j j I I demonstrate U S readiness to stand behind the nonproliferation regime without underm·1ning U S efforts tn ' st b1izh o t atcg1c 1 u11- sensus in the Perisan Gulf and Indian Ocean Further what conditions might be set for lifting any sanctions · How a nuclear test might affect the risks to the United States of a closer strategic relationship with Pakistan--assuming of course that those ties are not s·evered in response to that test--also needs to be more carefully assessed Both the types and magnitude of risk will depend heavily on how the U S -Paklstani strategic relationship evolves between now and a Pakistani test as well as on India's response to that new relationship and to such a test Particular attention shou·ld be paid to any scenarios· in which the United States might b-e drawn into an lndo- · Pakistani nuclear confrontation Possible misuse of U S -supplied equip- ment if Pakistan moved to deploy a fu11-fledged nuclear force also needs analysis Even after a Pakistani test there are various possible proliferation firebreaks short of all-out nuclear weapons production and deployment of full-fledged nuclear forces by India and Pakistan These in lude for example --a Pakistani test of a PNE fol lowed by the shelving of Pakistan's program and continued Indian restraint --symbolic PNE programs on both sides and UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED -cR --- C - · -- -ii _ - --··- -3- I - limited Indian and Pakistani testing and stockpiling_of nuclear weapons but without deployment of full-fledged nuclear forces Moreover both countries may have reasons to avoid an all-out nuclear arms race· ranging from J·nd i a I s poss i b 1e re 1uc ta nee to sacrifice modern i - I zation of its conventional forces to a potential concern on General 1 Zia's part that nuclear weapons might fa11 into the hands of his domestic l opponents ··1 down the level of proliferation in· South Asia could have a high payoff l i i lI Consequently contingenc·y planning about measures to hold The_ identification and evaluation of any pos ible carrots and sticks that might be brought to bear by the United States with other countries' support is an obvious starting point Would the prospect of access to U S arms enhance Pakistani incent·ives for nuclear restraint Would deferring imposition of sanctions after a tesr be a means of preserving leverage to affect later Pakistani activities Conversely once Pakistan had demonstrated its ability to test might it be induced to shelve its p 9 9ram and put its facilities under safeguards in return for access to civilian nuclear energy technology Or could the Saudis be induced to use their influence in Islamabad to urg nuclear restraint What are the chances of the Soviets doing the same in Delhi Assuming some interest on th part of India and Pakistan in nuclear restraint diplomatic exchanges and mee'tings between them on how to av id a full-fledged nuclear arms race also might be encouraged Such·a strategic dialogue could dampen domestic political pressures in bo th countries for immediate additional nuclear weapons testing allow UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED - - ·-r SEC _· - ' -q- l l I j j the respective leaders to sound out possible interest on the other side in mutual restraint and check scientific and bureaucratic momentum that could lead to the more advanced levels of nuclear weapons activity • Equally important 1 that dialogue might take up possible regional nuclear arms control measures Among possible regional arms controJ measures which co ld help ·1 I dampen pressures ory both sides for more extensive nuclear weapons capa- I bilities might be declarations by India and Pakistan that they would not j l use nuclear weapons first QuaJitatfve and quantitative imitations on each side•s nuclear weapons activ_ities also could be pursued in- eluding facto or de jure agreements on force size deployment types of weapons and so on Confidence-building measures ranging from the stationing of observers in each other's country to reduce the fear of surprise attack to discussi_on of co mand and control rrangements might·· also less'en pressures for augmented nuclear weapons arsenals Hore detailed assessment is needed of these sorts of measures ·as we 1 l as of how the United States and other I ikeminded countries could best support such a strategic rlialogue in South Asia after a Pakistani nuclear test · Bearing in mind that U S observers now ve ify the Sinai disengagement ·agreements between Egypt and Israel this analysis should ot overlook the possibility of more direct· involvement by the United States in the implementation and verification of such limitations But in the final analysis the prospects for holding down the level of proiiferation in South Asia after a Pakistani test may depend heavily UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED -5- I ' on the characteristics of that test If Pakistan detonates a nuclear I explosive device but labels it a 11 PNE 11 and declares its readiness to stop its nuclear testing now that it has matched India's 1974 test i I the chances of holding own the level of South Asian proliferation would ' be increased ·Thus even if the prospects o ·preventing a PakistAni test are dimming it still is important to try to influence how Pakistan conducts and publicly explains that test _ --·· ·- -- UNCLASSIFIED • ·----·