I 1l PAKISTAN-US · Demarche on F-16 Equipment · · Pakistan has threatened not to accept any of the 40 F-16s ordered last year--including the six scheduled for delivery next month--unless the US approves the advanced ALR-69 radar warning receiver for the aircraft Islamabad says failure by the US to provide the system-especially after Pakistan has signed an agreement to protect US weapon technologies--would undermine the credibility of Islamabad's defenses and reitforce Pakistani doubts about US reliability -·--·- -1 25X1 - Comrnent _Islamabad is unlikely to reject ' the iF --16s c -· · but-j i t is pressing foi -iresolution of -the issue · before· President zia's visit to ·the us next·month In the near term · PakTstai probably will honor i pledge to safeguard new US weapon systems to protect the arms supply relationship Islamabad has provided Beijing with Western arms in the past however and continues to have close military relations with th Chinese It is likely that China will at some point gain access to the new US systems provided to Pakistan especially if major strains develop in Islamabad's relations with Washington I I c _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ 2sx ·S Secret - - - L_ 8 November -1-9 82_ ___ __ _--_--_--_--_--_- _· ___·- · - Approved For Release 2007 06 14 CIA-RD - P-84_8_0_0_0_4 _9_R_0_0_16-0-4090013-3 _J25X1 8 --------- aE£P7Ffp 25X1 Approved For Release 2007 06 14 CIA-RDP84800049R001604090013-3 Central Intelligence Agency MEMORANDUM FOR SUBJECT The Honorable Frank Carlucci Deputy Secretary of Defense Risk Assessment of the Sale of the ANLALR- -69 Ra ar Warning Receivet' to Pakistani I 25X1 i The sale of the AN ALR-69 Radar Warning Receiver to Pakistan entails a significant risk of the equipment being exploited by China Pakistan's close military relations with China suggests that Islamabad may at some point give Beijing access to new US weapons it receives despite having signed a General Security of Military Information Agreement For the near term however we believe Pakistan probably will safeguard the new US arms it receives to protect its arms supply relationship with the us But major strains in rel tions 1th the · United States--reinforcing Islamabad's doubts about United States reliability--could cause the Pakistanis to give China access to US arm X 1 25 1 2 China has obtained French weapons--and possibly us air-to-air missiles--from Pakistan and has negotiated agreements on joint weapons developments based on Western arms technologies acquired by Pakistan Pakistan is aware of US concerns about unauthorized transfer of US technology to China but considers its security felations__j lith China more durable than those with the United States L______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _25X1 3 Acce s to the AN ALR-69 would be beneficial to China It offers the potential of a significant improvement in radar warning capability should the Chinese choose to copy it In addition China would benefit from access to Western avionics fabrication technology gaining several years in the development of a modern radar warning system Finally such a system would be useful in any conflict with th Soviet Union I · · 25X1 4 Release of the AN ALR-69 should be stringently controlled It is the most advanced radar warning receiver in the US Air Force · inventory Compromise of the device might enable a potential adversary to employ his radar equipment in a manner to defeat the AN ALR-69's capab i1 i ties I 25X1 J • L __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 25X1 WARNIMG MOT CE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Approved For Release 2007 06 14 CIA-RDP84800049R001604090013-3 - - - - - - - • i Approved For Release 2007 06 14 CIA-RDP84B00049R001604090013-3 SUBJECT Risk Assessment of the Sale of The AN ALR-69 Radar Warning Receiver to Pakistan 5 On the basis•of the points covered above I believe that the ·release of the AN ALR-69 would not be in the best interests of the United States 25X1 25X1 25X1 5 John N McMahon Deputy Director of Central Intelligence t 2 ·SECRET1 7 25X1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Approved For Release 2007 06 14 CIA-RDP84B00049R001604090013-3 - - - - - - - - - e11cat r _ an '- t 11 C II AA Approved For Release 2007 06 14 CIA-RDP84B00049R001604090013-3 426026004 Q 1 • • - KEY JUDGMENTS Pakistan's President Zia-ul-Haq faces growing problems but no immediate tfireat to his rule His largely benign authoritarian regime has given Pakistan general political stability and substantial economic growth Zia lacks an organized constituency outside the Army however and he could find his hold on power challenged should a strong opposition emerge Zia's visit to Washington will be paralleled by the arrival in Pakistan of the most visible symbol of the new US relationship-the first six of 40 F-16 fighter aircraft Islamabad is aware that only the United States can offset Soviet pressures and provide Pakistan vith the sophisticated weapons it believes it needs The· US-Pakistan deal on economic aid and weapons sales undoubtedly has strengthened Pakistan's internation il position and restored some of its self-confidence The relationship faces several difficult hurdles however - Islamabad sees nuclear weapons as crit al to its long-term survival and continues to-develop a nucJ ar explosives capability Zia is unlikely to detonate a device however while the $3 2 billion US program remains on track He also knows that any reprocessing undertaken in Pakistan to acquire plutonium would likely result in the termination of US assistance - The Pakistanis continue to doubt the reliability of US commitments and US steadfastness in ·times of crisis These doubtsbased on earlier disappointments-color current Pakistani concerns about the funding of the US arms package and the precise equipment to be supplied Pakistan's leaders believe that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan fundamentallv altered the balance of power in South Asia and the Zia · government has· strongly· opposed ·the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan But Pakistan also views the indefinite presence of 2 5 million Afghan refugees on its own territory as unacceptable Pakistan therefore has pursued the UN-sponsored indirect talks on a settlement on Afghanistan Islamabad might accept-some conditions such as accepting a new Kabul government closely tied to the Soviet Union-which the United States would not favor-as long as most Soviet troops left and the refugees returned home Major concessions such as recognition of the Babrak government and acceptance of a continued Soviet troop pres_ence are unlikely in at lea t the next year e ·en if the US relationship should falter because of concern over the reaction of conservative re1igious parties and weU-armed Afghan insurgents at home and vital ___________ Approved For Release 2007 06 14 CIA-RDP84B00049R001604090013-3 - - - - - - - - - - Comments NIE IIM 426026004 02 friends abroad such as Saudi A abia and China The primary factor in Pakistan's foreign policy is susp1c1on of India Pakistan is aware that it cannot count on US support against India and therefore continues to view a nuclear capability as its ultimate deterrent Indo-Pakistani relations are unlikely to improve substantially despite the ongoing talks on a no-war pact Zia and his opponents will plan their current actions with an eye to the Washington visit Zia may announce a date for nonparty elections while the political parties plan a series of protests Terrorist groups may attempt spectacular actions such as the hijacking of a Pakistani airliner Zia's hold on power remains firm for now but his failure to fashion acceptable political institutions and win broad popular backing leave him vulnerable should he blunder the economy stagnate or a popular leader emerge to unite the opposition Although the opposition parties so far remain ineffective there are signs of increased impatience with martial law and stronger calls for a return to civilian government through elections When change comes it is likely to be abrupt and violent The most likely event leading to Zia's downfall would be mass public unrest in Pakistan's major cities probably stimulated by economic problems The Army would move quickly to remove Zia if strong discontent should develop His likely successor would be another general ruling with civilian support based on the promise of future elections A new regime might change domestic economic policies but would be less ___likely to alter basic foreig l J Ol cies indudi g relat on5- wHh t_he United States Ethnic tensions especially in Baluchistan will continue to be an irritant but do not threaten Pakistan's national integrity Random terrorist actions are unlikely to bring -about the downfall of _the government Terrorism weakens the Zia government to the extent that it undermines public confidence in the regime's ability to maintain public order Relatively good economic performance has been an important element in the stability of Zia's regime to date The potential for continued strong growth exists but it is threatened by serious structural problems especially government overregulation Zia will have to walk a narrow line to carry through on necessary reforms without -triggering - ·tmblic discontent over rising prices Failure to make these reforms will eventually heighten economic problems making them too abruptly could have adverse perhaps fatal political consequences ---------- - ·· ·· ··• - Approved For Release 2007 06 14 CIA-RDP84800049R001604090013-3 _ _ _ _ _ _ __