UNCLASSIFIED t• SECRET NOFORN WNINTEL NOCONTRACT • ·· EASED L UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY j I WASHINGTON OFFICE OF June 16 1986 THE DtRE CTOR MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS SUBJECT Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program and us Security Assistance Pakistan's decade-long pursuit of nuclear weapons continues apace despite US efforts to stop it We thus face three questions 1 Do we stand by the President 1 s nred lines to contain the Pak weapons• drive 2 On what basis can we convincingly make the statutorily-required certification about Pak nuclear activit es and the impact of US aid this September 3 How best can we convince Congress to renew the waiver permitting us a·id to Pakistan after September 1987 These three are related The sooner we take steps to uphold the red lines the better off we will be in the other two Red Lines The US gave a non-paper in May 1984 to Foreign Minister_Yagub Khan stating that the u s would be obligated to terminate security assistance if Pakistan assembles or tests a nuclear device transfers technology for such a device violates international safeguards or undertakes unsafeguarded reprocessing The paper also stated these were the points made by President Reagan in his December 1982 meeting with P resident Zia President Reagan wrote Zia in September 1984 that enrichment of uranium above five percent would be of the same significance as those nuclear activities such as unsafeguarded reprocessing which I personally discussed with you in December 1982 and would have the same implications for our security program and relationship Zia specifically pledged not to enrich·uranium beyond five percent That pledge has l een violated When we confronted Zia last'···-···-·-April with the evidence he lied to us a_gain and· denied anY' _ L ' -r _ Dept of State ISS JPS Margaret P 9nfftiTd uJ £ Classify as Extondas Downgrade to Date Declassifyon · Reason____ SECRET UNITED STATES DEPAR O 'Ff#i Riri NOFORN T REVIEWAUTHORITY S ONEAHMAD DECL QAT LCASE ID 01 NOY 2011 2011022 3 s· · ·--· ' UNCLASSIFIED SECRET NOFORN WNINTEL NOCONTRACT -2- production of high enriched uranium Since our demarche Pakistan has continued to produce such uranium us failure to do more than jawbone risks the President's credibility and has virtually no prospect of convincing Pakistan to cease its enrichment activ·ities This threatens to undermine Congress• support for our security assistance needed both to maintain the present program and to ensure its continuation after September 1987 Unchecked Pak stockpiling of nuclear weapons material also heightens pressures on India to accelerate its nuclear weapons activities September 1986 Statutory Certification Congress last year prohibited aid unless the President certifies annually that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and that us assistance will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device Since last year's certification the situation has become much worse It is clear now that Pakistan has overcome the last major obstacle to nuclear weapons by producing enough high enriched uranium for one or more nuclear devices This calls into question the basis for future certification since we have defined possession as including either a fully assembled device or all the elements which would give it the ability to assemble a nuclear device in a short period of · time Moreover Pakistan's continuing nuclear weapons efforts undermine· the conclusion that our aid program significantly reduces the risk of such possession Due to these two factors it is not clear to me what basis we in ACDA would have to make a convincing statutory certification September 1987 Renewal of Legislation Because of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program we needed a special amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act in 1982 to permit us to provide security assistance to respond to Soviet actions in Afghanistan To continue security assistance beyond September I987 we will again need new legislation exempting Pakistan from certain provisions of that Act Zia's actions significantly weaken our hand in trying to convince Congress to pass such legislation Recommended Next Steps I hold to three premises 1 we need to go beyond just jawboning if we are to have any chance of convincing Zia to honor his pledges 2 abiding by the red lines will best advance all our interests in the region and 3 Zia will blink if we give our warning·some bi te '· · ·t Our repeated warnings and demarches to Pakistan on nuclear issues have had little significant effect so far Still more · ' UNCLASSIFIED ' SECRET NOFORN WNINTEL NOCONTRACT -3- words without some action to back it up will only further reinforce Zia's belief that he can lie to us with impunity We may eventually be forced to conclude that the least bad alternative is to accept Pakistani enrichment while toughing it out with Congress on the aid relationship Even so we should attempt to force Zia to face the choice between enrichment and security assistance before conceding him both If successful the payoffs are high Presidential credibility strengthened the prospects for favorable Congressional action on aid enhanced and the risks of an overt nuclear arms race in South Asia reduced Increasing pressure on Pakistan has risks Should Zia stonewall 11 we may well have to reverse ourselves thereby damaging our credibility I assume we would not want to terminate aid thereby damaging our Afghan interests Moreover if we start doing more than jawboning Congress might overreact And if the issue were forced publicly Zia might reduce assistance to the Afghan rebels to show his independence from us pressures These risks however can be minimized if we apply pressure on Pakistan discriminately Moreover I believe these risks are less than the risks associated with not making this effort Finally if confronted with a stark choice I believe Zia would now stop production of high enriched uranium in part since he already has some bomb-grade material and in part because the strategic payoff of military sales and the aid relationship is high for him Consequently I recommend that the President tell Prime Minister Junejo when he is here next month that he has ordered a review of what to do about Pakistan's continued production of weapons material This review will be concluded by September 30 1986 and that pending the outcome he has halted all actions involving rnilitarl sales President Zia should be informed simultaneously via a Presidential message I also recommend that we approach some key Congressional leaders to reinforce -the message that Zia should stop production of bombgrade uranium Kenneth L Adelman 0