UNCLASSIFIED RELEASED IN FULl ow 7 f United States Department of State • •• ••• • re1111 ol Oce111Js a#d l11ter 111tio1111I • •• • L • ••• •• • '4 • • r ftlJlffll l llf il 411 Se mtift c Affairs • • •• •• •• •• •• • •• •• • • ••• •• •• • •• •• •• •••• t • •••••• • • ••••• • •• wa r1Jingto11 D c 20J20 April 9 1987 SECRET SENSITIVE MEMORANDUM TO OES - John Negroponte • 1 ·' FROM OES N - Fre oldrick Acting SUBJEC'J ' ' --Pakist n · ' •• - • _ ' Th ached paper wds prepared at the Secretary•s request It has been held very closely and I was just abl to lay my hands on it this afternoon Ne had no role in its preparation I see no difficulty with it but I'm skeptical that we will be able to put together the proposed Congressional delegation within the time frame suggested I'm also skeptical that the proposed Hinton demarche will produce anything dramatic The proposed Presidential emmissary may hopefully bring about some helpful results Attachment As stated DEP AR'l'll mtrT OF GTATE A COO MB r L t DAm E Li I RI Vl l i ' by L IX l EL • ASD · D CjAf3Sl7Y m C i C D3' Ci ii B n V 1n PAI T D r Y f Uc - -e - io vc tnro rot no ol PA c cc - Ydons _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ ----to OLAB3Il1Ycc ____' Sa ut larlt _ _ _ OAJlll DOvmG a ADE 1'8 to J8 01 0 OADa · • • • • • • • • · • • • ·· ··•·•••• SECRET SENSITIVE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY CHARLES L DARIS DATE CASE ID 16 MAY 2011 200806822 UNCLASSIFIED Of • J tbo i1 _ ________ united States Department of State RELEASED IN FULL -- -- - --· --· ----·------- • •r_· · DEPA1 T_ 2_n· om '-'• c i ' _ DJ CYGE DI y SECRET SENSITIVE J JJ l ICLASBIFY in PART 1 0 · Non-res yJ f o_ P A c zompt to i s -i Sz t I - THROUGH c t VJ A Cl O MB lli1 m i L oAm_ 2f J r ·' TO ITl d'l'rffl J ' The secretary CLAsBIFY as_ '11B author tty to DOWNGB c l E XB to 8 or • OAOB P - Michael H Armacost C OAJ 5 S NP - Richard T Kennedy 6$-fo - FROM NEA - Richard W Murphy SUBJECT Action Plan on Pakistan Nuclear and security Problems - ISSUE FOR DECISION Whether ·to approve a plan to address pressing nucle r security and Congression l concerns affe ting our ielations · with Pakistan ESSENTIAL FACTORS - -- - _ - As Congressional consideration of our foreign assistance ·-request gets undetway we are fa ing strong pressure to add · additional non-proliferation cond itions to the Symin gt n waiv e r · for Pakistan At the same· time Communist military pressure ·on· ± Pakistan has increased- dramatically in recent weeks· - ' --- - ' f - -ir Stepped-up cross-border air raids have led t·6- an' urg eifft $ t·' f-# Pakistani request for additional u s military suppoi'f '·· -_ - -· -· r fs-· 0 • • •-• • • •-· • -- l• •_ ---- - • · · ti -- - Recent publicity on Pakistani nuclear activities -··· Deane Hinton•s speech the A Q Khan interview and Zia·•·s ·· · rece_nt statements has fed support in bot_h Senate and _House for limiting the Symington amendment to two years or conditioning · ' aid on a halt in Pakistani production of highly enriched uranium · The Pakistanis have so far not responded ·- --- · - -' ' ' constructively to our request that they take concrete actions · · to demonstrate compliance with their assurances on uranium enrichment and restraint in other key nuclear areas Wear concerned as ell that India may be reassessing its nuc ear posture and could re-start an·overt nuclear explosives SECRET SENSITIVE DECL OADR UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE ___ RE_VIEW AUTHORITY CHARLES L DARIS DATE CASE m 19 MAY 2monnn2oooof8lsoJ66s s2rzz----TUNnl 'C 'i'iLr7A - S S- IF IE D UNCLASSIFIED SECRET SENSITIVE -2- program Zia has affirmed that Pakistan has no intention to acquire nuclear weapons even though it has the required technical capabilities He has approached a threshold which he cannot cross without blatantly violating his pledge not to embarrass the President The nuclear issue has both short and long-term components We have no illusions that under present conditions India could be brought to sign the NPT or accept full-scope safeguards Thus it will be difficult if not impossible to get Pakistan to do so At the same time to keep Congress on board and to secure our non-proliferation in erests over the long term we need not only to obtain specific actions demonstrating restraint but in a systematic way to convince Pakistan to rest on its oars and avoid further elaboration of its nuclear capabilities This will require Indian restraint as well We need to respond to this confluence of Congressional concern about Pakistani nuclear activities and escalating Soviet pressure Our objectives are to obtain a concrete demonstration of Pakistani nuclear restraint in time to influence Congressional t inkingi while b6lstering Pakistan's security and inducing Indian cooperation in avoiding a regional ·nuclear competition Candidly we believe it unlikely that Pakistan will move si nificantly on the nuclear issue expecially on enrichment ·in responie to further executtve· branch requests Nevertheless we must continue the pressure on the GOP Correspondingly our stratigy should inclGde the following elements PHASE r Hinton Demarche Following the recent_shoot-down of an intruding Afghan aircraft the Pakistani asked us t6 provide help with air defense including lease of an AEW platform and Hawk missiles There are legal impediments to leas i_ng AEW and serious· _ ' · L ' _ financing problems for both systems We believe however · that it is important to be responsive to ·the Pakistani request and propo e t6 instruct Amb Hinton to tell them that wa are prepared to provide additional AIM-9L missiles on an rgent basis should stepped-up incursions deplete Pakistani stocks and ·to offer a mid-May ex_erc ise with E-2C AEW aircraft opetating off a U $ aircraft-carrier Ne should also be able to provide an immediate teplacement f6r the Pakistani F l6 recently lost once certain technical details_ have been settled DOD is also urgently examining possiblities for making an AEW airciaft available to Pakistan We may be able to follow the exercise proposed for May with additional exercises involving-E-2C air6raft In principle we could link such an exercise to an offer to sell Pakistan E-2C's either by SECRET SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED SECRET SENSITIVE -3- reallocating new production aircraft or from the Navy's inventory DOD is strongly opposed to either of these options however in view of current Navy shortages and operational needs The Pakistanis have repeatedly expressed a preference for the E-3A AWACS AEW system for which there would be an even longer eadtime than for E-2C Any AEW p rchase would requir e substantial Saudi funding and we will need to take the matter up again at senior levels in Riyadh we have in mind a Weinberger-Sultan message Ambassador Kennedy believes that a clear linkage should be made now between our security assistance and Pakistani action · on non-proliferation to give further evidence to Pakistan of the seriousness f ur concern on the nuclear issue and to evidence to the Congress that we are in fact deriving what leverage we can on the nuclear issue from our military efforts NEA opposes this proposal and notes that the PRG has already considered and rejected it With respect to the nuclear issue we recommend that Hinton provide Zia with an appraisal of the Congressional state of-play and be instructed to say that concrete steps on enrichment and other nuclear concerns will be necessary to avoid imposition of additi6nal non-proliferation conditions on the assistance package · We will stress the need for Pakistan to observe the nuclear firebreaks we ·have already asked for No assembly of a nuclear device tompl1ance with their assurance to restrict uranium enrichment to 5%r o more nuclearweapons-related high explosives tests the u s for the ' Hinton should indicite th t - mere repetition of Pakisiani verbal assurances will be insufficient and that· to be credible Pakistan will need to offer some arrangernent for on-site inspection of its uranium enrichment facility Kennedy points out however that w should be under no illusion that steps or visitations short of the equivalent of IAEA safeguards would give any real a surance Such steps would have little more than cosmetic value and probably would not satisfy the Con ress for long We also propose to deliver a message to India urging restraint on their part and a positive response to existing Pakistani proposals We need to make clear to the Indians that they cannot us the nuclear issue to drive a wedge between the U S and Pakistan given strong Congressional support for our assistance program and further that they cannot rely on the u s to solve the South Asian nuclear problem without action by India The upcoming visit by Natwar Singh will provide an opportunity to make these points SE CRET SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED ' UNCLASSIFIED SECRET SENSITIVE -4- PHASE II Congressional Game Plan We have succeeded in avoiding crippling nuclear amendments to the foreign assistanpe authorization at the HFAC markup on April 7 although it provides only a two-year Symington amendment waiver We now need to make calls to key members of the SFRC and th Senate leadership to discourage unacceptable amendments in the SFRC mark up scheduled for April 8 he SFRC staff draft currently circulating would in our view be unacceptable to the Administration Among other provisions it would impose a new P esidential certification that Pakistan had provided reliable assurances against production of highly enriched uranium ' We should encourage a Senate delegation to visit Pa·kistan and India during the recess John Whitehead is calling Senator Byrd about this · The senators could impress on t ie Pakistanis the inevitability of concrete action on enrichment and seek to persuade the Indians that they cannot expect congress to end assistance to Pakistan over the nuclear issue paricularly since India has been unwilling to respond to the existing Pakistani non-piol•iferation proposals PHASE III ·-- A Presidential Emissary Obtaining any lasting solution to the nuclear issue and therefoie securing our relationship with Pakistan over the long term will require moving bey6na unilateral Pakistani restriint to establishment of a regional understanding which includes India · To move the process alonef we should dispatch a -· Presidential emissary who co ld engage oth Islamabad and New -·· · -t· a · · - i e a d n f ii e in o e t l s ai6 l n Y 0 i - -d position to make a sustained effort over a period of time to bring the two sides together Legislative action pending or completed is likely to give the emissary increased leverage At the same time the emissary's mission its lf would help to demonstrate to the Congress a serious Administration commitment to non-prolife ation in South Asia The rnissary could be a senior Department official ·ce g John Whitehead Mike Armacost Phil Habib or Dick Walters or someone currently outside of government but strongly identified with the Administration e g Paul Laxalt John Tower Don Rumsfeld The Vice President might also be personally involved pos ibly Making a visit to the region as part of the process SECRET SENSITIVE ONCLASSIF1ED UNCLASSIFIED SECRET SENSITIVE -s- The emissary would be sent after the SFRC markup but before the final Congressional outcoma is in hand Hid-May is probably the earliest that he could go We would hope he could secure concrete Pakistani actions on nuclear firebreaks that would help us to protect the assistance package on the H i 11 He JO u1 d p u r sue a f rank d i s cu s s ion o f t he nu c 1ea r i s sue in Islamabad urging the Pakistanis to rest on their oars and not go beyond their present level of nuclear capability In particular he could press for Pakistani acceptance oE verification measur s on uranium enrichment To maintain the focu of his mission on the nuclear issue and to preserve his credibility in New Delhi the special emissary should not discuss fu ther security assistance to Pakistan but he could point out that progress on the nuclear issue would inevitably create more favorable conditions for further sales of sop isticated military equipment In New Delhi the emissary would seek to convince the Indians that there is an opportunity to avoid Pakistani acquisition of nuclear weapons but only if India is prepared to participate actively in regional arrangements We need to convince India that lt would have much to giin from putting forth_proposals of its own in this regard He would also press India to refrain frora undertaking any uclear weapon · ·activities of its own As an initial step he could se k agreement on an interim India-Pakistani greement against acquisition or testing 6f nuclear explosives or other similar confidence-building measures We should also give onsider tion to engaging other nuclear weapons states in the effort most importantly the Soviets and the Chinese The UK has proposed a multilateral approach to the South Asian nuclear issue involving the U S Soviets and possibly· others The Soviets continue to press for the use of uu s leverage on Pakistan and the Europeans ar rai ing questions about U S non proliferation policy towards Pakistan Amb Hinton has recently sent you a cable requesting authorization to pursue nuclear discussions with the Pakis tanis ·He proposes that we offer Pakistan additional security assurances including assurances against Indian attack as part of a deal which would include Pakistani NPT adherence although he notes that these assurances should be carefully phrased to avoid a deep u s commitment Hinton also would include a U S offer of assistance with construction of a nuclear power reactor in his proposal to Pakistan Amb Kennedy has repeatedly informed the Pakistanis that if they would undertake the NPT we would desist from our strong effort to discourage other countries from elping their power program SECRET SENSITIVE · _ -UNCLASSIFIED ---- ------- _ _ __ UNCLASSIFIED SECRET SENSITIVE -6- and would be prepared to directly assist them ourselves • Up to now • this has had no effect We are studying Hinton's ideas and will be making recommendations shortly for your response RECOMtlEN DAT Im That you endorse th strategj outlined abov Approve Di$approve t· - ·· ·· ·- ·· · - · · ' ··-- --- SECRET SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED SECRET SENSITIVE -7- 0rafted by NEA RA Wang 0076s Clearances NEA EDJerejian NEA RAPeck S NP GSamore DOD ISA SGneh H EFox C A B --·-· ···- - • __ · -_ ' ' _ · ··· -- --··· •__· _ _ · •• Z Jt - x r h-' - - --t•_ • -_ •• - ---· - _ - · '- _ · - ··-· - • - - - ·· • SECRET SENSr'TIVE UNCLASSIFIED 1 -