Sanitized Coov Aooroved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 1 11 ufrcchfr UI - • Central Intelligence ecret 25X1 The Soviet Approach to Nuclear Winter Interagency Intelligence Assessment Secret NI IIA 84-10006 December 1984 Copy 454 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 SECRET 25X1 NI IIA 84- l 0006 THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NUCLEAR WINTER Information available as of 10 DecPmher 1984 was used in the preparation of this AssPssment SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 SECRET 25X1 CONTENTS Page sc oPE NOTE······················································································ V KEY JUDGMENTS I DISCUSSION 5 The Scientific Debate Background The Process limate Changes Key Variables Assumptions and Uncertainties Confidence in Findings 5 5 5 6 7 9 Soviet Views on Nuclear Winter Leadership Perceptions Current Soviet Research Soviet Contributions Technology Transfer 16 Implications Political Benefits Military Side Effects 16 16 18 Outlook The Base Case Potential Dilemmas 18 18 19 Annex A The Soviet Nuclear Winter Network 21 Annex B Selected Chronology of Nuclear Winter Discussions in International Forums 31 Annex C Selected Bibliography 33 9 9 10 12 iii SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 SECRET 25X1 SCOPE NOTE This Assessment looks at Soviet research on Nuclear Winter to determine vhat the Soviet leaders think of the hypothesis the extent to which they are exploiting the subject for propaganda purposes and the most likely implications from Moscow's perspective It does not reach judgments about the scientific validity of the Nuclear Winter hypothesis r- tost of the information on which this analysis is based is derived from the international scientific and diplomatic communities This information is supplemented by foreign media reports We also have debriefed a Soviet scientist who recently defected from the USSR and was knowledgeable of the capabilities of individuals and organizations inrnlved in Soviet research in this field From these sources we believe that we have a relatively good understanding of Soviet Nuclear Winter research Ve also knO v what Soviet leaders say publicly about Nuclear Vinter Their private personal perceptions however are not known We identify some possible military and political dilemmas should Soviet leaders come to believe Nuclear Winter poses a serious danger and note some possible indicators of increasing concern over possiblt' adverst' climatic consequences of nuclear war -- Note This Assessment was prepared under the auspices of the ational intelligence Officer for StrateJ ic Pro - rams It was coordinated at the working level hy the Central Intelligence Agency the Defense Int lli - Pnce A - ency and the intelligence component of the Department of Energy c J V SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 ------- SECRE2-T_ _ _ _ _ _ _---- KEY JUDGMENTS Ve do not anticipate any changes to Soviet nuclear weapons policies or programs solely as a result of Nuclear 'Winter research Senior Soviet leaders are informed about Nuclear Winter Reportedly Foreign Minister Gromyko has been briefed on the subject But the scientific evidence is not yet convincing and more important Soviet leaders do not see any apparent response in US strategic programs to Nuclear Winter concerns Lacking both of these conditions we believe Moscow will continue to maintain a strategic force posture that supports their war-fighting strategy and depends primarily on missiles with large throw weights and large numbers of warheads Consequently we believe that there is little chance for major reductions in their nuclear arsenal as a direct result of published or ongoing research on Nuclear Winter We believe that there is a wide difference in what Soviet officials say publicly about Nuclear Winter and what they believe privately The official Soviet party line is that Nuclear 'Winter is real and the effects are certain and severe but Soviet scientists have privately acknowlPdged that substantial uncertainties remain Despite these uncertainties Soviet Nuclear Winter research remains concentrated among a small group of Computer Center scientists with little background in climatology The research program does not appear to be well coordinated among other individuals and institutions in the Soviet Union that could make important contributions Nor do we have any evidence that the research program is coordinated with the nuclear weapons design organizations at this time Soviet Nuclear Winter research began in 198 '3 when a few scientists moved quickly to conduct investigations and enter into the grmving debate on the subject Their findings were videly reported as independent confirmation of the hypothesis that nuclear war would lead to videspread and devastating climatic changes On closer examination however Soviet research on luclear Vinter is not convincing Neither is it veil documented It is derived almost entirely from CS ideas data and models Early US climate models were greatly simplified and run with input data that grossly exaggerated the effects of smoke from burning cities the key variable in the Nuclear Winter equation Not surprisingly Soviet scientists have consistently reported more severe climatic changes than are usually found in similar research in the Vest Furthermore Soviet reporting tends to stretch conclusions l SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 SECRET 25X1 ell beyond what the rt'search supports often concluding that -- nuclear ar of any dimension ill signify either the disappearance of the human race or its degradation lo a level lower than prehistoric Vhile Soviet scientists privately ackll iwledge errors in their work that produce mon· severe outcomes they puhlich continue to 'oice the party li11e Veskrn scientists haw· heen amazed at this kind of intellectual dish mesty The location nature and findings of Smiet research suggest that the primary interest in Nuclear Vinter thus far is for external political purposes A large ell-coordinated propaganda campaign has hcen organized with the international scientific community as the primary target audience Trw objective is to use tlwse scientists to convince Westt'rn publics am ultimateh their political leaders that arms reductions are necessary that the CS arsenal is already ton large and that llt' weapons arc 11nt needed The themes usually emphasized at international scientific forums and widely n°portcd in the nH 'dia include -- Nuclear ·ar would mankind have disastrous conseqiiell ' 'S for - There is mi effective defense against nuclear attack - There is incrt·asing danger of nuclf'ar war due to the race all arms l S actions are the main cause of the arms race The efforts ha e md ith some success ln certain cases Sm·it'I scientists gain direct access to political leaders in the Vest For example Vladimir Alt'ksandrov the leading Soviet nikr 011 Nuclear 'inter has testified fore tht' LS Co11gn•ss In other cases Soviet participation in iuternational organizations has served to keep tlw horrors of nuclear ar before the public The l Vorld I Icalth Organization for exarnph has placed the study of uclcar VintPr on its agenda In addition to the potential for political influence Soviet participation i11 ' uclcar 'inter research also contrilmtes to continued Sovid access to l'S scientists research and computers It also pro ·idcs opportunities for Sm·it•t scic11tists to de ·elop Ile modeling tcclmiqm•s and improve global circulation models For all of these reasons we expect Sovid research mt ' uclt·ar inter ill contimw but no substantial contributions arc anticipated Experimental rcse lrch 011 large-scale fires hich crmld pro ide useful input data ltas not been approved Also analysis ill be limited h Soviet computers that lack the capacity to use ad ·anccd climate models There ill be continued Soviet inten·st in scientific exchanges itl1 l'S 2 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R0001001700 3-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 ------ S EC R EI'---------------- scientists but Soviet agreement to joint researeh is unlikely because loscow 's public position is that the Nuclear Winter hypothesis has been adequately proved Furthermore it is important to Moscow that Soviet Nuclear Winter research be perceived as independent and original In any event unclassified Soviet research probably will be carefully circumscribed so that it does not cast any serious doubts on the Nuclear Vinter hypothesis Classified analysis of uclear Winter is likely to be undertaken outside of the Computer Center At a minimum military planners would want to know to what extent their strike plans and US retaliatory strikes would cause adverse climatic conditions in the USSR Another major issue is the possibility of asymmetrical damage in which tht' Soviet Union could experience somewhat more severe climatic consequcnces from a nuclear war than the United States because prevailing winds could move smoke from the United States and Europe to the Soviet Union more quickh· than smoke from the Soviet cities would arrive over the Lnited States lh gardless of the climatic consequences of nuclear war Nuclear Winter research has pointed out some additional problems that may have been insufficiently considered by Soviet military planners including Persistent smoke and dust could obscure targets from overhead reconnaissance and interfere with aircraft engirws - Cold and darkness could further stress pnsonnel operating command and control systems High-frequency communications links and satellite ground control stations could be affected by increased dust and water vapor in the atmospht're The Nuclear Winter hypothesis could pose potential dilemmas for the Soviet leadership and it could lead to contradictions between these new considerations on the one hand and Soviet doctrine and weapons employment policies on the other Such contradictions would probably cause Soviet officials to demand exceptionally high standards of scientific proof for the Nuclear Winter hypothesis standards that probably cannot be mt't Efforts to reduce the climatic consequences of nuclear war would nm counter to Soviet war-fighting strategy which emphasizes preemption and massive strikes Rt'sponses to this dilemma would be difficult for Soviet strategic planners they apparently are highly skeptical of concepts of escalation control and small-scale strike options Nuclear 'inter considerations also could result in more emphasis on conventional forces biological weapons such as those achieved by genetic engineering and directed-energy wt •apons 3 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 SECRET 25X1 Should Soviet leadns become convinced that steps must be taken to reduce the possibility of luclear Vinter these measures could affect Sm·iet research and development programs This could reinforce existing trends toward lower yields and better accuracy Nonnuclear warheads also could he considered for strategic targets In addition targeting planners might consider target combustibility along with other factors to reduce the amount of smoke and dust Nuclear vVinter considerations also could complicate Soviet ballistic missile defense Bi 1D efforts Should 1osco become concerned with using BMD both to protect military capabilities and to prevent an attack from triggering Nuclear 'inter then a much more extensive defense capability would lw required Fi11all Nuclear Winter also could influence Soviet thinking about civil defense Because of the potential damage to food production Sm iet civil defense officials could be forced to extend their planning lime frames for basic survival to about a year Thus substantial increases in civil defense food stockpiles might be an early indicator that Nuclear Winter was beginning to influence Soviet thinking at high levels 25X1 4 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 SECRET 25X1 DISCUSSION depletion But the climatic consequences of largt amounts of smoke and dust were overlookPd until The Scientific Debate Background 1 The concept of Nuclear Winter could fundamentally change the way wt think about nuclear war Thl' term rdns to the possibility of catastrophic chamws in climate due to nuclear war This concept was first raised in 1982 and in 1983 caught the attention of the scientific community with the publication of the TTAPS 1 study The study concluded that nuclear war could trigger severe and widespread cl1a11gcs in climate that could have devastating global corncq11c11n·s Other scientists have concluded that these climatic changes could Jpad to the extinction of human lifr on earth recently therefore the Nuclear Winter hypothesis has attracted considerable interest Many scientists however do not agree that the effects would be as seven' and widespread as indicated in early discussions and thus a scientific debate has opened This debatt represents the latest in the long st ries of scit ntific concerns about nuclear war LJ Nuclear Winter Hypothesis The Nuclear Winter hypothesis PSSPntialh argiws that a nuc Par war would product' large quantities of smoke and dust that would absorb solar radiation causing • 2 Nuclear Winter studies raise the possibility that thl' longer term global-scale aftereffrcts of nuclear war may he e 't'll more serious than the immediate dfrcts l'n· ·ious studies were primarily concerned with imml'diate effects including blast heat and short-term radiation Studies of longer term effects comTntrated 011 fallout rt sidual radiation and ozone Tmco B Toon H I' Aekt'fman J B Pollack and Carl Sai a11 ' ucl 'ar 'inter Clohal Cnns QU 'nct's of Multiplt' Nuclt ar Explosions Science vol 222 No 4630 23 Dt'l't'mht'r 1983 Th ' n·port is usualh rt'ferrt'd to as tlw TTAPS study combining tlw initials of tlwir last nam 's A lt'ss technical articlt' on tht subjt'ct by arl Sai an appt'art'd in Foreign Affairs vol 62 No 2 Wintn I 1 8 l - 4 and rt'l't'iwd widPsprPad atlt'ntion The TTAPS study gr ·w out of analysis of dust storms on Mars in connt'etion with th ' l 'S 1'1arirwr spac · t'xploration projt'ct in th ' t'arly 1970s Marint'r data from 1'1ars indicatt'd that tht' widt'spread and persistent dust storms absorht'd considPrahlt' solar radiation and rt'sti ted in temtlt'ratm ·s much hii ht'r than normal at th ' pollutt'd high altitudt s and 11n1ch lowt'r tt'lllPt'raturt's on the surfaet's that wne maskt'd from solar radiation Similar changt s on a much smallt'r seal ' havt' lwt'n 11olt'd on 'arth as a rPsiilt of major volcanic nuptions that inj •ctt-d amt' quantitit's of ash particlt s into tlw atmospht rt' In 1981 a i roup of American scit'l1tists dt'cidt'd to apply what had ht't'll lt'arnt'd ahout tht' eff Pcts of largt' quantitit's of dust in th ' atmospht'rt' to tllt' nuclt'ar war contt'xt in what t vt'ntually bt'camt' tilt' TTAl'S rt·port A St·paratc study in 1982 by Crutzt'n and Birks pointt'd out tht' pott·ntial sii nificanct' of smokt' from burning citit's a11d fmt'sts in lowt'rini surf act' lt'm1lt'raturt s aftt'r a nuclt'ar attack With I his disco 't'ry snwkt' data Wt'ft' addt'd to th ' TTAPS research l'rt·vinush· it had not llt't'II assumt'd that smokt' would rist' to high ·uoui h altitudt's to cause significant widesprt'ad climatic effects c J Paul Ehrlich Tht' Biological Const'QU 'nct's of Nuclear War in Th · Col 1111 I the ark 1984 p 59 1 - Darkness for several weeks or longer - Cooling temperatures for several months or longer - Circulation pattern changes that would bring similar but less severe climatic changes to the Southern Hemisphere D H I' D 25X1 25X1 25X1 The Process '3 Although smoke and dust wt n• found to he the major contributors to Nuclear Winter the TT APS study considered four main physical effects of multiple nuclear explosions smoke in the troposphere dust in the stratosphere fallout of radioactive debris and depletion of the ozone layer A single 1-rnt'gaton Mt weapon detonated at ground level can generate 100 000 to 600 000 tons of fim· dust that is propelled into the upper troposphere and stratosphere In the TT APS base-case scenario about 960 million tons of fine dust was produced about 80 percent of which reached the stratosphere These particles would remain in the stratosphert' for about a year scattering sunlight Airbursts over cities would likely start massive fires that could generate large quantities of smoke Smoke particles could remain in the upper troposphere for weeks to months In the TTAPS study OIH' scenario involved a 1 000-weapon attack using 100- 5 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 SECRET 25X1 Figure 1 Nuclear Winter Atmospheric Effects kiloton ktl Yarhcads against an urban area cqui 'alPnt to about 100 cilit's This scenario produced an estimatt·d 3 million tons of smoke in tlw troposplwre In addition to dust and smokt radioactin· particles also art product' and carried aloft in tht firt hall or the updraft Particles injpc Pd into the lower troposplwrP sl'ltlt hack lo t arth or arc rai1wd 0111 in a matter of ITt'ks Those injec Pd at higher altitudes into tfw stralosplwn· remain there for about a yp u by 1·hich timl' most of the fission products have decayed to safpr It· els Tht fourth effect ozone dt pletion rPstilts f rorn 11itrogt 11 midcs producPd by high-yield explosions and amo11111t'd to about a 10-percenl maximum reduction in omlll' in the TTAl'S base case This '011ld produce about a l Yofold increase in ultra ·iolet radiation i11 the first yt'ar folltming a nuclear exchange according to till' TTAl'S analysis Other pffects including the gpnnalio11 of toxic gasPs dioxins and other dangprous products ITrt' 1101t d hut not cvaluatt d D 1 Smoke ·7 Du t ltitudc 1 1111 111 I 30 temperature·' Stratosphere 1 Ill Troposphere 25X1 Climate Changes -t These physical effects could ha 'c a major impact 011 the global climate due primarily to absorption of s111ilight by thick clouds of smoke from burning l'iliPs Local lt'athcr am prPcipitation could be sPriously disturht'd for up lo a ypar The sc 'erity of changPs in climalt' Yould ·an from rPgion to rPgion and depend 011 till' season during I hich tlw attack occurred hut t' t·11 i11 tht most PxlrPmt' case considered in tht TT l'S study the climatic changes did not suggPst that a lo11g-tnm ict' agt' 11·otild ht triggert d by nuclear ar This is primarily lwcausP of tht' tremendous q11a11tilit s of heat stort d in tlw ocpans that n1uld drivP till' climalt' hack to normal ranges within at most a f1· 1 yt•ars c Trtlwlt ss the combination of darkness and cooling for e ·pn mw year could have disastrous - '111 1 1 -211 II 211 -lli I cn1pcraturc I' I I I'S h l' l' l l'- ' IHHl-tlll'_l t 11 'nl'll lll l Lnclassiried 304429 1-85 SP 'Prt ly rt cluct d in much of tht' 'ortlwrn Hemisphere In addition the superheating of tht' stratosphere could affPcl circulation patlt'rns bringing the pffpcts to the Soutlwrn I IPmisplwrP rather quickh Plants in tlw tropics arc C 'en morP susceptible to damage from minor changps in climatic c mditio11s c l'l lllS 'l J Uelll' 'S c J fi FurthermorP tlwsP conditions could persist for a long pniod of time figure 2 Tlw TTAl'S base-case scenario procluct d subfreezing lt mperatures for about thrcP months and about a year was rPquirt d before lt mperat urPs lwgan to rPI urn to normal lP 'Pls The pffpcts 'ould be less seYt'rP in coastal areas 'hich arP I arrrwd by the oceans Even tlwrP hm1Tvcr sevnP storms would lw common and in some arPas further inland tlwrP could lw continuous sno 'fall for months ' at Pr supplies could lw f rozPn and agriculturt might be impossiblP for up to a year in many arPasc i The normal tempcraturP gradit nl could lw radit·alh changt d by largl' quantities of srnokP in the troposplll'rt' and dust in the stratosphere figure I At tht' surface I ht n waled by the sun the earth has an an·rage a1111ual lt mperaturP of 1°C ifi°F ' uclear dft ds snwkt' and dust in tlw atmosphere could rt'dt1t·e surface lt'mpt'ralurPs to about -l 7°C well lwlm1 frt'czing 1ithi11 10 days of a nuclt ar attack At tlw samt time temperature changps in the stratosplll'rc could lw PH'll larger possibly rising by as much as S0°C as the smoke particles absorb solar enngy Tht impact of such te1111wraturc changt s could lw S ' t'rt' 11 abrupt onst'I of cold may be damaging or fatal lo plants particularly if pxpost d during the gro 1 i11g st·asm1 Crop harvests could lw destroyt d or 7 Darkrwss is tlw SPCOJHI major const' JlH'IlCe of injecting largp quantiliPs of smoke and dust in the atmospht n' 'irtualh all life on earth dt'pt nds on sunlight If light lcvt'ls 1PrP rt duct d by 'j pt rct'11t 6 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 25X1 25X1 25X1 ' Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 SECRET 25X1 Figure 2 Nuclear Winter Range and Duration of Temperature Change• Figure 3 Nuclear Winter Darkness• Vertical optical depth JOO Surl icc L mi lcmpcraturc 20 l'crccntagc of sunlight Amhicnt temperature IO' 5 _ 7 0l II 200 100 911 100 lime 1d 1y I Time log scale a TL PS hasc li ndassificd chC 000-mc aton en trio The logarithm of the rract10n of light that an atrno_ phs ·rs tramm t' rht normal_ clcar k optical dl'pth i C'i'icntially ero a light log 1 - Jhout O__ An uptiL· ll depth or 1 rcpn cnt the tr 1nsition hct wccn in itnm- phi rT h H - o 304430 1 ·85 most plants would be unable to maintain net growth In tlw TTAPS base case smoke from urban fires and forest fires reduced the amount of sunlight reaching the earth's surface by over 95 percent for more than a week in thP norlhPrn midlatitudes figure 3 It could take a year or more for sunlight lo reach normal levels fig1m· 4 Videspread disruption of photosynthesis eombiued with radiation damage severe cold and other effects could pose a serious danger to plants and ultimately to the animals and humans which depend Oil Key Variables Assumptions and Uncertainties 8 Smoke is the key variable that determines the extent to which climatic change would occur over the shorter term while dust largely determines whethf'r the effect will be long lasting In particular the amount of smoke produced the altitude to which it rose and the duration that it persisted are crucial factors in assessing resulting changes in the global climate For example in the TT APS base case 225 is c- scntially transparent ant one that j ora4uc Unclassified million tons of smoke were injected into the atmosphere and accounted for up to 90 percent of the reductions in the solar energy reaching the earth ·s surface and corresponding reductions in temperatures that in some cases amounted to 30 degrees centigrade For such conditions to occur however there would have to be large numbers of urban fires generating intense heat that would carry some of the smoke into the stratosphere where it would persist for much longer periods than commonly occurs at lower altitudes The fireball of large-yield weapons in the megaton range also could inject smoke and dust into the stratosphere Thus the main smoke parametershow much how high and how long-dept'nd on several important assumptions For examplt' tht' amount of smoke generated depends mainly upon tht• kind of fuel the amount of oxygen available weather 7 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 SECRET 25X1 Figure -I luckar Winter Attenuation of Solar Energy Figure 5 Nuclear Winter Scenario Variations '-P 1 t'lh' t 1 u I tlh' l u1111d 1th p 1 ' ltl tfl' Jij _' t_' L lllll 20 mh•Clll h' 11ll'ti' Llllrl ' I ii' ' I P'1 001 -rnq1 1to11 lOllni rfnr _ L' nil Ill l _111 __ I I I'S IIHl- ncg lun c ch 111 c nn urh rn tar ct uni U 1I I 1111 '1111 I 1 1h II 11111 l i I imc· id J d 1 l U nda sifi d l1 44J 1 1-85 304433 1-65 l'o11ditio11s and the ralt' of burn The total injpcted smok • in a n11 'lPar war scenario rmn vary bi a factor of l O or lllOH ' although the number of weapons used their yield height of burst and liming also are important The TTAPS base-cast' scenario involved a total yield ol 5 000 Mt from 10 400 weapons ranging from I lo 10 0 1t each About 20 percent of the yield was devoted lo urban-industrial targets This scenario is similar to those 11sed hy other researdwrs Se · ·ral other scenarios also were used in the TTAl'S rt'search to tt'st the sensitivity of the outcome to variations in the postulated attacb One of the major findings 'as that Pven a relatively small nuclear exchange-100 1t on urban targets-could produce relatively large climatic effects This scenario however used different smoke parametns from the base case In a 'H OO-l 1t counterforce exchange where cities were avoided the climatic con seq m·nces were less severe figure '5 t _ 'ariations in the assm1H•d properties of smoke and dust generated b a nuclt ar war could change the climatological result significantly For example rea onahlc ariations in estimatt's of dust and smoke particle paranwters could vary the optical depth of n·sulting dust clouds from 0 02 to 1 0 Such a range in opal'ity would result in conditions that range from m•idigihle haze to 1war-total darkness Furthermore the TT l'S stmh assunwd i11sla11ta11eous uniform inicdio11 of smoke dwreas actual smoke and dust iHj •dio11s ohvioush would van considerably from plan· to place am over time so thne would he 1·orr1•spondi11g variations in local temperatures In 0111t· cases surfact' lt'm1wratures would he unaffocted in olht'rs t' 't'll a rise ill tt'rnperatures is possihlf' L 25X1 25X1 11 Another uncertainty is the extent lo which smoke and dust will reach tilt' Southern lfrrniwhen· and cause substantial cooling Research 11sing variom climate models suggests that typical circulation patterns Hadley Cells that would normally inhibit the l O The a sumed nuclear war scenarios also significanth affect research findings The critical scenario ariahlc is the e lt·nl of urban-industrial targt'ling 8 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 SECRET 25X1 transport of smoke and dust to the Southern Hemisphere may be interrupted This is due to warming of the stratosplwrt' that could reduce precipitation in the tropical convergencc zone that would be expected to pn• ·t nt the spread of aerosols to the Southern Hemispllt'rc But the research is very preliminary at this point u 1 2 Combining the kcy assumptions about smoke dust and sn·narios in a useful manner presents a difficult problem In particular translating the quantity of burnable fuels in cities and forests into appropriate smokc clouds that can be used in global climate modt•ls is the grcatest source of tmccrtainty in Nuclear 'intt•r rest•arch l'ntil more accurate data can be colltTtt·d from actual large-scale fires there will continut· to he serious qucstions about the likelihood of St' 't'rt' and persistcnt climatic changcs following a nuclear war • Confidence in Findings I 1 The 1 ' uclear Winter hypothcsis initially enjoyed considerable support in the scientific communit Early indcpendt'l1t research using more complex climate models yiclded similar results Nevertheless uclear linter rescarch has not been without criticism For example one argument challenges that rainout would substantially reduce the amount of smoke in the atmosphere within two weeks Other rndt·orological effects such as local winds and cloud caps could furthcr reduet' the effects of smoke Also variations in thc season selected for analysis can significantly affect the outcome For example some research has indicated rdatively minor temperature declirws might accompany a nuclear exchange occurring in the winter As a rcsult of these factors and unn·rtainties about the initial amount and properties of smoke generatnl average tcmperature changes may l t' far less than those suggcsted in the TTAPS study Fmtllt'rmort the areas advcrsely affccted may he more restricted than suggested in the preliminary findings Howe 't'r even if the early Nuclear Winter research is in error by a factor of IO the resulting tt•mperatun· changes may still produce significant nop damage in certain areas 'c J 'F 't·n thou sh local t -mpPraturP changes may frpqupntly he largp a11d rapid i11 nc ·ss of 10° in a matter of hours or days the global climate considl'f 'd as a whol • is rPmarkably stable For example a ·ra s • annual t •mperaturPs havp varied by only 0 5°C over the last hu11dn·d yt'ars Tht' stability of this huge complex system is due tP net•ans acting as lanw energy reservoirs and n1any othf'r con1plex i11t ·radi 't' proc •sst•s that stort' and rPdistributP solar energy Be ·a11sc of the i11llt'rcnt tahility of this system it takes global-seal ' 14 Confidence in the Nuclear Winter hypothesis probably will have to await actual measurement of particles produced by large fircs This could involvc monitoring forest fircs experimental fires or quickresponse mcasurernent of actual large fircs Other important areas of study include the dynamics of smoke plumes regional rather than global-scale mt•teorology and calculations about thc probability of black smoke reaching high altitudes Evcn whcn the physical phenomenon are fairly wcll understood however therc will continue to be substantial uncertainty about the biological consequences of climatc changes CJ 25X1 Soviet Views on Nuclear Winter Leadership Perceptions 15 We do not know how seriously thc Sovit'I political and military leadership takc·s tht· Nuclcar Winter issue although many scnior Soviet officials probably are aware of thc hypothesis For cxample Yevgeniy 'clikhov thc main forcc behind Nrrcl Winter rcsearch in thc USSH has tolcll that hc L_p_e_r-sc- r_ia_l l-y l-ia_s_ __ L_____________ brided Foreign Ministcr Gromyko former Chief of the Genna Staff Ogarkov and Dcfrnsc 1inister Ustinov on the subject of l uclear Winter However we have not yet notcd any significant Soviet militar interest in Nuclear 1inter l I 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 16 If the Sovit'I lcaders havc hccn hriefcd 011 Nuclcar Wintcr and we bclievc they havc then thcy share cssentially the samc scientific basis for undcrstanding the problem as do L'S lcaders Thus at this time Soviet leaders are likely to l t'lievc that nuclear war would cause varying degrees of increased cold and darkness in some regions but tilt' effects would not mean the end of lift' on earth This vicw generally is consistent with what tlwy have bccn saying publicly for over 20 years that is nuclcar war would be a disaster of events to causP changes and even rPlativPly small chang •s to global averages can cause dramatic local consequpncPs For Pxample major volcanic Pruptions injpct large quantitiPs of dust and ash into th ' atmosphere that spreads over much of the Parth The emption of Tambora in Indntwsia in 18 5 produced an estimatPd 200 million tons of aProsol particles that subsequently causpd about a I 0 reduction in the average global tPmpPrature YPt this SPPmingh small change produced the ypar without a sumnwr in 1816 Severe and persistent freezes caused widPspread loss of life and crop failure throughout the l'nited States and EurnpP 'olcanic dust particles because of their largp size arP relatively irwffici 'nt in blocking sunlight An injection of 200 million tons of smnkP and dust resulting from a nuclear war could havp a more spvere impact than a I °C temperature change • 9 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 SECRET 25X1 1mpn•ct•tk11tcd proportions From this perspt'ctivt' cold and darkness ould fmtlwr complicate the alrt·ady difficult problem of sm ival in a nuclear war O l i' 'e lwlie e Sm·ict kadt'rs will remain interested in the subject lwcaust· Nuclear 'inter could havt' profo111HI implications if as suggested in the TT PS tlllh there is a ' threshold • hnond which the use of nuclear t·apons ould he self-destructin• 111 such a situation a com·ept of dt'lt'rrence that depended on the nedihility of launching a retaliatory strike ith a large numlwr of nuclear weapons would lw meaningless Tlw attradin·1wss of a disarming first strikt' also ould lw n·dun·d lwcaust· t' Tll if a first strike wert' utTt·ssful in totally destroying the retaliatory capahilit of tlw athcrsarit·s it could exn·t·d the ' threshold triggering ' fudear 'inter thus hringing about selfdestrnction Furtlwrmore tlw nuclear inventorit's of France the l nited Kingdom and China also could i11depe11de11th rt•prcsent a more significant minimum ddnrcnt capability Despite these considerations So ·it'l cientists han· not exprt'ssed an interest in the military scenarios' or tilt' threshold concept t'XCt'pt to t'tlllllllt'llt in lin ' with their propaganda that the thrt'slwld is t·ry 1cm and en·n a limited nuclear war prohahh 011ld trigger ° uclear 'inter -- IS Tilt' threshold that could triggn °udt'ar Winlt'r is q11it · l m according lo the TT PS study Carl Sagan has s11ggeslt'd that depending 011 yields and targt'ling it may lw sonw ·IH'rt' lwt n·en j and 2 000 nuclear I arlwads Soviet scientists claim that tht'ir calc11latio11s indicalt' that a 100- to J j0-1' 1t ar times less than the TT PS hase-cast· scenario'Tilt' 11 se of lilt' t ·rm threshold in ·omH·dio11 with ' uckar 'rntt•r lia bt't·omt· ·mitrnn·rsiaL 111ai11h lwca11st· it imp ie that tl1t·rt· 1- or1w i nplt' nwa llrt' of warheads or yit'lds that ·ill trigger 1 ht·r t' dohal clirn ltt· const·q1wt1cf' more prnpt•r 11 e of the term Id lt' to i11di ·at · tll ' mass ol s111okt' i11jcct ·d into the atmosplwn· I li t 011ld n1- 1t · dohalls si 11ifit'a11t ll'mpt•ratm · dl't'rt'ases Smok · i 111 1 a ftmdion of tlw rn1tnlwr of weapon tll 'ir icld and rnost could cause a Nuclt'ar 'inter Not all scientists agr 'e hm ever that such a st'lf-destructive threshold cxists °cverthelt'ss such an idt'a has important implications for perceptions of the East- ' 't'st military balancc From tlw Nuclear 'inter viewpoint a limilt'd war in Europe conceivabh could excet'd tlw threshold Thus pt•rc-cptions of a low thft'shold could undt'rmirw tlw credibility of ° AT 's flexible respor1se policy and place additional importance 011 tht' conventional forct· 25X1 25X1 25X1 balance 19 Vt' believe that Sm·it'l military planners art· interested in the possiblt' dangt'rs of Nuclear 'inlt'r At a minimum they would want to know to what extt'nt their strike plans and l 1S retaliatory strikes ould lead to adverse cmlSt'quem·cs in tilt' l 1SSH To answt'r this kind of question tilt' basic relationship IJt'tween nuclear Tapons and Nuclear Vinter will need to llt' lwtlt'r understood 111 particular how do ·ariations in nurnlJt'rs yields am targt'ls affect tlw t xtent and severity of cold and darkness' - - 25X1 Current Soviet Research 20 The logical place for Sm·id climalt' rt·st·arch is the State C omrnitlt'e for fhdrorneleorology and Environmental Control usually callt'd Hydromct the govcrnmt'nt organization gt'1wrally responsible for climate rt'search and forecasting Instead Soviet rt'st'arch 011 Nuclear Vinlt'r until recently has wen com·entrall'd in the Acadt'rny of Sciences Vladimir t'ksandrov Hi is the lt'ading Sovit'l scit ntist working OJI Nuclear Vintt'r and appears to head an ad hoc group of about 20 scientists Aleksamlrm's ork in this field grt'w out of Smit' interest in l s high-speed computers mathematician specializing in computer science Akksandrnv was dirt·ctt'd in 19 6 to shift his research from gas dynamics and plasma nwchanics to climatology lit' was sent to tilt' t·nitcd States in 1978 to study computer-based gt'neral Tatlwr circulation modt'ls and den·lop a comptrlt'r program cornpatih t· with 25X1 1111pmta11t tht' t'o111h11stihilit ol mha11 art·as tar elt'd · lso th · local t'alht'r tilt' s1·aso11 111tl other sariahl ·s can aff · ·t th · e xte11t of cli111at1l' t·fft' 'h t' IHTtt·d frorn a 1111dt·ar war 11otlwr prohlern ·ith tilt' lt·nn ··1hrcslinld iri t· in it list' in _t strict _1 cicntific se11 P a d1• - i ' 11ati11g a div-rt'tc point at hil'li a pht·nomt•rnm occurs such as s1 1t1-r boils al I C h11t not at 99 lh s11ch 11st' ' uckar inlt'r 111ld o Ttir 11 l · 111st· l i halh t wrt· 1- poilll dH'rt' tlH' addition of a inglt• weapon s1 11ilit' 111l t ·1111wralurt· drops ould Vladimir Aleksandrov laeading Sol'iet sci en list on Nuclear Winter tort' rcalisticalh a '011t1111n1111 of or t·t1i11g cift'ds l· l11 ioml cit·ntilic 1-r11 - t·it·t1ti- t- t' l'liangt' So it't cit•11tish ha t' urged 'e- t- to 11- t• t' lrt'IIH' ' 't•11ario 011 tlw order of 20 000 1t lh ·1 111pariso11 tl1t· TT I'S l as1·- - 1s1• sc ·nario ssas 'i 000 It 10 000- lt - t·t·11ar10 111111• ilislll' ilis d ti 1 - lt' lt'd hut gt 1wralh i c011sidert•d to lw larl 1·c J 25X1 10 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 SECRET 25X1 relatin·h slo l'-speed Sovid computers lie returned to tlw l 11ill'd Stall's for furtlwr study and research in I mm and I 982 During his isits he rt•qut'slPd and was granll'd access to a ray-I computer at tll ' National Center for - tmosplwric Hesearch His travel to tht' l nilt'd Stall's has been undt'f scit'nlific exchange agn•t·n1t·nts on climate research signed in 1972 well before Nuc t·ar 'intl'r lwcame an issut' 21 111 198 3 - leksandrov was dirPctcd to work on ' uclcar inter probably by Ycvgeniy 'elikhov a ice president of the cademy of Sciem·Ps Among his St' Tral duties 'clikhm is secretary of the I pparln1t'nl of Information Science C ompult'r TPdmology and 11trn11ation This department creatPd in 198-t overst·t•s the Crnnpult'r Center 'hen• the main uclt'ar i111 'r research is L'OIH ucted 'clikhm·'s inlert'st in tll'lear 'i nll'r stems From his participation in intcr11al ional scientific forums and his responsibilities as director of the Sm·ict effort to dt'vt'lop supercompt1lt·rs I It- prohahly lt·arned of Nt1clear 'inter at one of the nt1m1·rot1s inll'rnational confprt•nn·s ht' attended and recognizt·d its poll'ntial to co11triht1te both to Sovit'I ktHl ledge of 1·ompt1lt'f scit'Ill't' and to influt'lllT inll'rnational pt1hlic opinion on the nuclear arms rat·t• 'eliklui is politicalh influential and a prime candidall' to head the Soviet Academy of Sciem't'S He is lwa ih involn·d in all arPas of nuclear disarmanwnt crnwt·ntrating particularly 011 tilt' issues of militarization of ot1lcr space and the l S Strategic Defenst' Initiative 't·likhm ill conlim1e to he the kn· pprson in shaping Soviet t1dear Vintcr research and t1nder his direction it ill contim1t· lo st'rve Soviet political 1 lllll llllSeS c J Ycvgcniy Velikhov Key promoter of Soviet Nuclear Winter research 22 't•likhm· look the lead on Nuclear Winter and taskt•d the omputer enter which qt1ick y produced the first Soviet research report on the subject The S H'ed l'ilh hich the report as produced is a highly 11nust1 d an·omplislmwnt in SoviPI science In April I S the basic inpt1I information was probably obtai1lt'd at the TT - l'S Peer Heview in Boston lh - t1gt1sl a report was cornpll'led printed in English and deli 'ered at the International Seminar on Nuclear War held annually at Erice Italy Such work would normally takt' ypars in the Soviet Lnion lwcaust' of inht'rl'nt difficulliPs in the system-slo computers lack of cmnputer paper and so forth In this case VP ikhov ·as ablt' lo bring togPtlwr tilt' necessary rpsourc ·s and get the job donl' This was possihll' mainly becausl' AlPksandrov obtained two VPrsions of a ge1lt'ral circulation modt'l Cctvt during his earlil'r visits to the l 1nitPd StatPs-sonwthing Jlydronwt had bPen unabh to do 2 '3 To dalt' Soviet ' uclear Winlt'r research has primarily involved a simplifiPd CCM derived from a LS mod and run on a BESf 1-6 computer In a I D f3 prpprint describing his work Alt ksandrov mentimwd a --10-hour modeling run on the BESM-6 This was for a single calculation orn• year into tilt' futurl' on his highly simplified modt'I HP also noted that similar calculations using a Cray- I compult'r ould rl'quirt' only about eight minult's In addition to thrPe BESM6's a YPS-1060 computer has het'll installt'd at the Acadt'my's Moscow Computer Cenlt'r hut operational difficultit'S with thl' 'frS-IOG0 havt' thus far prt•vt'ntcd succPssful use of a mort' advanced CC 1 1 Cm1St' lll 'llllv Aleksandrov and Stenchikov continul' to rely on thl' mort' simplifit' I CC 1 using the BESM- ic 24 Tlw Computer Cenlt'r lacilitit's impose scvl're limitations on thl'ir abilities to do realistic Nuclear Vinter climatt' moclPling State-of-the-art calculations require hours of timl' m1 Cray-class supercompt11t'rs During a single modPling run in thl' Vpsl about 100 billion arithmetic O t'rations art' perfornlt'd al a typical computational ratt' of about 20 million floatingpoint O t'rations per st'cond Mflop Tilt' YPS-1060 is capable of roughly 0 3 tflop for high-prt'cision scientific modl'ling problems EVPn thl' fastt'sl Soviet scit'ntific cornputt'r tlw Ellirus-1 is still IPss than orw-lt'nth tilt' eff Pctive S Jl'l'd of a C r a y 2 5 Tllt'rt' has not been any significant Soviet rpSt'arch on 'uclt'ar Vintcr beyond thP two reports by Aleksamlro · and Stenchikov delivt'rt'd at Erice in 198 3 and 1984 and f rpquent y repeated l'ISl' 'here I Iowt'ver otlwr Soviet studiPs rt'lated to nuclt'ar effects havt' recently bPen prt'sented at intPrrrntional conf Prt·nces becaust' thl'Y gt'nt'rally support the possibility of Sl'rim1s climatic changt'S due to multiplt' nm•lpar explosions For thl' most part tht'st' additional rpports represent earliPr rt'search completed before the idt'a of 1 'uclear linter l t'caml' popular These additional reports also rt'prt'St'nl sornt' internal compl'tition among various institutt's in thl' l'SSH as thl'Y attempt 11 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 r-------- S __ ECRET 25X1 lo gain addi ioual rtTOl llitiotL Orw r 'port ·· hr ihdrn11wl c·i 'l1ti t L'ond1Hkd that gas 'OIIS hyproduds of n11d1 ar t' plmi011s t·sJ 'cialh 01 orn· i11 tlw lroposphen' llld nitrog1'n o idt'S in tlw stratosplwr ' 011ld produce l 1 t·r surfal't' tt'lllP 'rat11rt' ' that ould persist l 'cause tlw · pollutants mild rt'mai11 in tlH' atmosplww 111uch longt•r thau smokt' and dust rwthl'r 1mp11hlistl 'd Sm it' report noted that tht' atmosplwric injectioll of nitrngcll o idl's from nuclear testing during the J ' - i 1 liml' rr llll ' Illa han· conlrihult'd to about a 0 1'' drop in an•ragt· lt'mpnaturt' Data from nuclear t1· ti11g in tlw 'arh 1mm 1·1T scaled up to a 10 00- lt nm·lcar t· d1angp_ and it a Pstimatcd that t l1t'rt' co11ld ht' a corn•spomling l 0° temperature dr p ithout crn1 sideri11g the l'ffl'ds of srnokt' and loscm as IH'corning rnore S 'rioush inl -n·stt d in uclt'ar 'inter 27 Ve han· not idt'111ilied any st'crd n·s ·ard1 011 'uclt·ar Winter in the l SSH h11t wt· lwli ' ' ' that officials in the w1°apom dt'vt'lopment trnl'turt· at a minimum art' following the ' 11clt ar 'inter rcst ard1 being dom· h the cadt'my of Scii·m·cs Thew officials 011ld 1110 t likely includ ' plannPrs in tht· 12th C hit f Directoratt' of tht' linistr of Ddt'nsc that formula ' rcquirt nwnts for nuclear weapons In addition 1e 1ould expt'd scit•ntish at Ill ' two main nuclear Tapo11s lksi n cenlt'rS at Saro 'a and Kasli also lo he clos 'h following ' uclcar Vinl 'r researC'h Thew dt s gn cenlns fall under the ma11agenwnt of tl1P linistry of tedium lachirn° Building To dal ' t' ha l' no evidence of contacts bt'hH't'll tltese orga11i1 ations and Soviet scientists involvl'd in the unclassified Nuclear inter research d11 t further lmrt'aucratic competition 1 ithin th ' lSSH 011 ' udl'ar 'inter research rather than a coordinalt'd approat'h to imprmt' undcr tanding of tht' plwnonH•rnin Ht'st'arch funds und personal pn• ti t• an· at stake including t'lection to tilt' cad 'lll of Sci 'lln•s or a promotion from corrpspcmding to lull nwrnht'rship Tht' main competition in 'okt's tlw cad '111 of Scicnc •s· Computer Ct'nlt'r and llydromd Yuri' lzrael' as director of lhdromet may seek a laiw·r roll' in ' uclear 'intl'r rest arch using scientist-- itlt mrnT ' P 'ril•11 ·e iu climate re l'arch than tl10 c found at th ' ompllt ·r Ct·nlt·r 11 rael' wads hilatcral c·xck1ngt•s with tlw l nitt'd States on e11viro111JH•ntal sl'i 'lll't' including ' twlt'ar 'inter and could insert 11w1T of his scit'ntbts into the e changt•s or atlt•mpt lo block lt·ksandrov or others from tlw omputcr 'nkr from future mcdings rnong tlw possihlc sl'il'ntists to look for outside of the Computer t'nlt'r i Igor 1- aroL at tht' lain Ceophysical Ohser' atory of l I ydronwt who has done climate research 1l1at inc tidt• s nuckar effects Within the Academy of Scit'llt't'S lmt 1101 yd associated with leksandrnv's group at thc Computer Center there are other scientists Im may lweome inw h-ed in uclear Vintn n· carl'l1 Co tinste1· ith the l1ernieal Physics Institute has been nH•ntionnl to possibly head up some fire t' Pt'rii1w11ts in the t·ssn But if present relationships continue l lost of the wsearch will be conducted at the mn putt·r CPnln and it ill not be ell coordinat •d II ith other rk in the t ssn Increasing involvement of 11 dronH·t would lw an important indicator that 2h ' ' n1wd Composition and Thnmal H ·i irnt' 25X1 25X1 Soviet Contributions 28 Smid uelear inter research b h•rived almost entire f mm l S ideas data and modeb Bt'cause of pressure to produce results qui 'kl and gin'II limitt-d computer capabilitit s Soviet n· eard1 ofli '11 b inaccurate and does 1101 signifi 'anth advam·e the tllldNslanding of the ' uclear 'i ller phenol H'IIPIL 0 tniosplinic 25X1 29 To date therP have wen t J main Soviet contributions lo iuclear Winter research In HJl-l 1 th ' basic ' 11clear 'intt'r findings were tested using a thn·c-dimensional CC for thP first time whereas tlH' original TT PS study St d a one-dinwnsional model ' In 198-1 the dft•ds of n10 ·i11g smoke wt're added to tht' So 'iet GC L 'lwrea previous research had treated smoke in a static_ uniform manner ThPse contrihutions are considered modest conceptual advances from the original TT PS research However some intt'rnatinnalh prominent scientists ho have cond11c t·d research on iuclear 'inter have characterized the work as weak crude and serious llawt d ' evertheless it is currently tlw onh national uclear 'inter research program outside the l'nited States HegardlPss of tlw quality of the work tlw l' SSR has dfrctivdy joi1wd th ' scientific debate 011 ' U 'lear int 'rj -- Th lode HIP 25X1 dimension i altit11dt' Tlw model us -d in tilt' TT PS 'h rn •s - ftt•r th · l'ossihl • 11dear War '' h1 lzrat•I' Karol Kiselev study considns a sin £ ' point on tlH• gro1md as n•prt·s ·11li11g th rnd l o anm of tl1e ai l Ceo11h1 sical Obsenaton o kom £idro1Hd pn· S ·nlt·d at Frin• 11g11sl l 9f t w - 111 sph -rc K ' Komlrat • prcscnted itt hilah•ral nwelinl avtcrn ' ypar-round global tt'rnp ·ralmt' 1 3cc Thtc lemp rat11w al various qc-Js of altitudt' aho 1· this point is tli 'll eak-ulat ·d for arious eha11ge in solar radiution corrp r ponding to scatteri111J and ahsorplion of smok and dust A thn•t·-dnnensional model i11cl11dPs ith · nwrit'atl cicnth t in 1o eo August lollgitud · and latit11d - hsi·nalional Fvid ·m·e nl the lmpal't of 11cl ·ar Explosions i11 25X1 25X1 II as allitudt' 12 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 SECRET 25X1 10 Soviet Nuclear Vintt'f research consislPntly product's more sevt'rt' rt'sults than similar rest'arch done in the 'est For t'Xample the original TTAPS study estimated a temperature decline of up to 30°C ithin a few wt'eks of a 5 000- 1t t'xchangt' As would lw 'XP 'clcd subsequent two- and three-dimensional studies that accounted for the moderating effects of the oceans noted less severt' tt'mperature declines of around 10°C But Soviet research using a threedinwnsional model found a temperature drop of about t0°C over the l nited States figure 6 The addition of mo ·ing smoke to tht' Soviet GCM figure i resulted in even more severe temperature drops than noted in tht' earlier Soviet research These findings result from the unrealistically high input of smoke into ti ' CCM Sm·iet scientists have privately admitted thl'ir ·onn•ptual errors but the results are nevertheless widely reported in tht' Wt'st without reservation or qualilkation 1 I Sovid scientists also tt'ncl to argut' against factors that would moderate the effects of Nuclear 'inll'r For example rainout may remove substantial quantities of smokt' but Sovil'l scientists argue that heating of tlw atmosphere would dt'crease its relative humidity and reduce turbult'nt convection that creates precipitation In addition to discounting moderating effects Soviet scientists nott' the relatively rapid rnoverrlt'nt of smokt' into the Southern Ht'misplwre thus bringing Nuclear Wintt'f to Africa Australia and South America 32 Soviet reporting on l uclear Vintn rt'search often stretches conclusions well beyond what can llt' supported by research most likely to further their propaganda effort For example the central conclusion of the 1983 Aleksandrov-Stenchikov Ht'port was that a nuclear war would probably produce conditions undt'f which man would not be likely to survive Set• inset Such conclusions have even been criticized within the Soviet scientific community Dr Buch·ko with Hydromet noted that small diffPrences in parameters within various models can produce large differences in outcorrlt's In particular he has pointed out that there has been too much duplicatim1 in Nuclear Winter research He and others have called Soviet Scientists' Dramatic Portrayal of Nuclear Winter Our thn·e-dinwmional hydrodynamic model of thl' di matt• shows that the Nuclear Winter will entail an avalanche of pernicious consequences This will generate severe storms along the coasts l'ausing enormous amounts of snowfall on land This alone will t videnth· destroy life on the coastal zone On the other hand the changes in the atmosphere will completely cha11gp tht hydrological cycle and severe droughts will hrt ak out over the night-enveloped frost-bound contim·11ts l11 other words everything living which hadn't ht en incirlt'ralt'd during the fires will freeze out And if it survives in conditions of low temperatures it will m·wrtlwlt'ss dit' of thirst But the earth's flora will not ernlurt' The fort'sts of all middle latitudes will perish The plarlt't 's entire climatic system will pass into a new stalt' a new glacial period possibly The temperatures ovt'r Tibet and the Cordilleras will be ht ated to such an extent that the giant masses of snow and glaciers will melt and precipitate inconceivablt' stn•ams of watPr or1 the continents It will be a deluge in conditions of severe cold Aleksandrov 19 April I 8 1 m1 Moscow News in English The tropical forests which are the main bearers of organic life on earth and the chief source of oxyge11 will be killed the biosphere will be left without its main source of oxygen The effects I mentioned will arise practically in any nuclear war scenario Even with an explosion of 100 megatons Therefore a nuclear war of any dimensions will signify either the disappearancl' of the human race or its degradation to a lewl lower than prehistoric Aleksandrov 27 April 1984 in Soviet Panorama No 84 l ovosti Press Agency Bullt'ti11 The impenetrable black cover would sprt'ad from the northern hemisphere to the southern and ewntually enclose the entire planet All sources of fresh wakr would freeze over all ecological balanct'S would I ' upset and all harvests would fail The total tt'rrt'strial biota that is the total population of various species of animals plants and microorganisms would compldt'ly perish Conclusions drawn from our calculations indicated that if 100 to 150 megatons of nuclear fuel that is 50 times less than in the Sagan scenario were used in a nuclear exchange tht' major cities of Europe Asia and North America would be destroyed and the Nuclear Winter would begin unabated But even this would ensure the end of life on t'arth Moiseyev 3 August 1984 article Scientists Warn Tlw World in the Aftermath of a Nuclt'ar Strikt' A Computt'r-Generated Prognosis Novosti and Sovetskaya Kirgiziya lrrt'SJ ective of the season of the year a protracted Nuclt'ar Winter will begin In the hinterland of conti11t·11ts rainfalls will bt' almost zero agricultural crops will perish and domestic animals even if they survive the cold will die of thirst because fresh water for the most part will only be available in a frozen state Unclassified 13 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 SECRET 25X1 Figure t S niet Nuclear Winter Research Thrl'e-Dimensional Global-Circulation Model 1983 90H -J5 _ _ __ - - _ _ - 0 -56 -- r- - ll P Q 90St--- - Temperature changes day 40 1801 0 180i 9011 EQ r-----5 14 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 SECRET 25X1 Figun· 7 So iet Nuclear Winter Research Thn·e-Dimensional Global-Circulation Model 1984 I r Temperature changes with moving smoke added to model day 40 So urn' I 11tt'rnat1011al St'r111nar on Nuclear War Erice Italy 1984 Unclassified O rn l 1 1 ' - fM for more ill lepe11dc11t research methods and more complete documentation of studies prior to their presentation at scicntific meetings Kirill Kondrat ev a Sm·ict specialist in atmospllt'ric particlcs has suggested that leksandrm and other like-minded·· scientists had reachcd conclusions far beyond what was justified h their limited work Indc·ed this frequently happens al international co11frre11ces when Sm·iet scientists c·c·m lo strdch infrrell ·l's Thc tendency to overstate udear 'inter conclusions howpver is not limited to Sm·il'I dentists TTAPS study-and even these figmes may lw too hii 11 by a considerable margin Althcmgh the Sovil'I scientists initially claimed that thPy were 11Sin ' data consistent with the TTAl'S worst case scenario they made some erroneot1s assumptions They essentially treatc·d dust and smoke equally even though dust tends to scatter sunlight whereas smoke is more ahsorlwnt Fmthcrmore they assumed that the combined smoke and dust absorbed all the sunlight ralhPr than a more reasonable estimate of SO to 70 percent so f t•neral hemispheric circulation patterns appear to he mi placed in Soviet reports 3 3 Sm·id research 011 Nuclear linter does not land up well lo close examination As noted crronp1 11s input data produced more St' 't'ft' climatic conseqtlt'IHTS Smid rcscarch for examp c used smokp paraml'lcrs that wcre roughh equi ·alent lo injecting about 700 million tons of smoke in the atmospherecom1 m·d lo 100- 300 million tom c timated in tlw '34 Such basic errors are surprising for scientists of the caliber of Aleksandrov and Stenchikm does not h e l1-·c·_ _·c·-tl 1c · results of his large computer models because of the simplistic assumptions necessarily incor mralt'd into the model thn 15 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 25X11 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 SECRET 25X1 p11lili 'h contirnw tn voice the party line that uclcar 'i11tt'r i real and the effects are ct'rtain and severe Yc tern scin1tists han' been amazed at this kind of inll'lll'ctual dishonesl 1 and provide practical applications in a rnrit'ly of important fields such as agricultmc Sn 'ict intclligPnn· also could conceivahh gain from contacts ith l S scientistsc J ' In addition lo com't'ptual nrors Soviet research lirnli1n cs iii many cases an· not logically sound Tht'se 9 At a minimum frequent scientific ex 'hang •s enable the Sovit·t leadership to keep informed on the state of research in the 'est In particular we would t'xpcct loscm to be interested in the prospects for asymmetrical damage in which the LSSH could incur somewhat more spvere 'uclear inter dfr·ds than thf' Lnitecl States because the prerniling dnds would move the smoke from the l 1nited States and Europe to the USSH more quickly than smoke from Soviet cities would arrive over the l 'nited States To keep track of these and other developmc·nts Soviet scientists will want to stay in close touch with 'estern scie11tistsc J logical inconsish•ncit's prohc1bh result from the limited data points llSt'd ill the greatly simplified CC 1 along ith tlw limiti·d krnl lt hi c of climatology among Sm id scientists at the Computer Center -j lk card1 findings arc quickly reported and not suh it'dcd to sc11sitidty tests Soviet research on 'uclear inter has not been documented in sufficit'nt detail to understand dearly t'Xaeth what was dont' Proposals lo t'OlllJlclrc dirt·cth Soviet and LS GCl 1s by using the alllt' input data havt' not l t'en favorably considered in tlu· l SSH Whilf' these and otlwr shortcomings become Implications apparent to t' Jlt'rls who tak • the time to inspect Soviet findings and question the scit'ntists the an ragt' particPolitical Benefits ipant al i11t 'rnatio11al t'onferem·es is only aware of the results of tht' So iet research And in each case the 40 In addition to teclrnolog transfer Ioscn r ·portt'd n·sults amount lo a SPW'rt' ' luclear 'inter -_Jderives several political benefits from a modt·st l ucle - 'l ·1 S l I I I I ar 'inter research program The Soviet image as a u t' ond rcsearc 1 1as wen ntec as me P responsible superpower 1s furthered hy takmg t lw Pl'lldt'nt t'rificatio11 of tht' l 'uclear Winter hypotheNuclear Vintcr issue st'riously at international fornms sis it falls far short of normal scientific standards for Soviet officials have an informed position mi l uch·ar su 'h claims It n•pn·sents mon n•plication than vcrifi Vinter that is not based solt'ly on research condiwted l'ation hn·ausc it lacks original Sovit't data or models in the United States Of course it is no accident that l1t•11 asknl at scit'ntific PX 'hanges to provide data Soviet Nuclear 'inter rest'arch generalh confirms from Smid atmosplwric nuclear testing prior to the longstanding Soviet pronouncements on the devastatJ i 3 ban So ·it'I scit·ntish haH' not hel'II ahlP to ing nature of nuclear ar -- rt'spond Early interest hy Soviet seie11tists in joint 41 Soviet interest ill bear 'int 'r n•seard1 also t' l cri11w11ts also apparently has bet' vetoed at higher bas the potential to inflnenC ' arms r 'dudiom in the 1 politi 'al lcn·ls in tlw Smi •t l nion l sing data and l·nited Statt's Soviet leaders undnstand thl' Amerka11 models of l S origin it is not surprising that Soviet political process wPIL and by their aetin· participation limlinic s arc similar to early stndies in the l'nitcd in conf Pn'ncPs on nucl 'ar war and arms control thl'y States ' can support political forces that seek arms reduction and disarmament As noted Soviet prest'ntations Oil Technology Trans fer Nuclear Vinter consisll'nth emphasize St' 'rt' di ma lie conspquences and ar ' widl'ly intf'rJ retcd as i11d •pe1Hl • So id 1mdnstandi11g of advanced computt'r ent verification of the TTAPS stmh Ongoing Sovid modt·ling tn·lllliqut s prohahh has lwndited from Nuclear Vinter research ensure contirnwd Sovid dost· cooperation with t ·s scientists For example participation at international conferenc ·s see figure lcksamlro · lias been able to 11st' Cray computers in t lw l 11ill'd States and has demonstrated rnnsiderablt· -- skill in adapting complex models to a wide range of 42 Ve can alrPady St' ' widespread Snvit'I nse of l'ompnlt'r s t the samt' tinw lt ksa11drov lias actlw Nuclear 'inter theme abroad The primary targd qi1irnl adrnnn·d 'limatohwieal models from the l 1nitaudi nce is the international scil'ntifi ' corm111mity nl Stalt that l'onld lwrwfit Sm·iet theoretical science because of its credibility and the po t r of reason with the ultimate goal of influencing Vestern political ' · ft• ' tl'rn sl'i 11lists would di sal r e with thest' judgnwnts leaders Direct face-to-face cnnHrnrnication is emphaand ·nnl 'nd that Sn id uclear · inter n•s •arcl is original indesized because it is the most persuasi 'e media Thus wt' 1wndc11t 111d contril utes lo fttrtlwr undt rsh1rnlinK of the plwnomcnote extensiq • Soviet participation in international 11011 Tltt· ould fmthcr disal rt't' ith characterizinK SoviPt 'Juscientific forums Tht'se rnedings also m• i kly 8 16 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 SECRET publicized in tlw press on radio and on television The themes that are generally emphasized in the Soviet media and often repeated in the West include Nuclear war would have disastrous consequences for all mankind There is no effective defense against a nuclear attack -- There is increasing danger of nuclear war due to the arms race ·· - llS actions are the main cause of the arms race u 43 NuclPar Winter is appearing somewhat more frequenth in the Soviet media aimed at foreign audienct'S In the August to October 1984 time frame for example Nuclear Winter was discussed on about a 25X1 weekly basis in Soviet foreign broadcasts aml prt'ss releases It also is appearing in a greater varit'ty of Soviet media including poetry and an arliclt' in tilt' Soviet Literary Gazette Much of the reporting is repetitive citing foreign news sources particularly from the United States and the United Kingdom This lends credibility to the Nuclear Winter hypothesis by giving the impression of widespread independent verification c 44 Nuclear Winter receives some attention in Soviet domestic media largely in the context of the dangers of nuclear war In such cases the Soviet U nio11 is characterized as leading the crusade for peace and disarmament Contradictions between the Soviet concern with Nuclear Winter and Moscow's opposition to arms control agreements with deep cuts in strategic forces are not discussed • Figure 8 Soviet Nuclear Winter Network Scientific 'omnll'nt L11n lcoph 11 al l h cn 11 nY ln t tute 01· l'rnhlerns ol krhan1Cs I nstitutc ol Chemical Phy·si ·s Institute of Physical Prohknis I ntcrnational 'oun1 •il of Scirntilk Unions Scicntitic Cnmmitll'c on i'rohkms ol the l'nv1ronmcn1 I COPFI I ntcrnat1onal Ph -- iciatb 'or the Prevention Nuclear W 1r I nstitutc of Atmospheric l'h sic·s lain I lvdmlo ical lnqitull' World fter Fie Politkal Comnll'nl 'ommitt _•c nf So il't sl-is ntp L in D1 ·f t1SL' of PL 1 c and g_a1n t lh k ir ar lnll'rnational Forums lnt rn 1tu1n il Scmin n on Nuclc 11 ar I111 c ll 11 1 l N l cncral - s cmhly World lckorolng h al rg_ani1ation World lleallh r _ ani1at1 HI or N udcar War h und ition KL' ' ind1 ·idtwh 111d lrgani1 1tion - arc discussed in ann x A llndassified 044341-85 17 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 SECRET 25X1 -4 '5 In addition to tlw public nwdia Soviet scientists continually stress the responsibility of all scientists to educate the public and the political leadership on the dangns of nuclear war in general In partirulaL they argu · that scientists should all work for peace In calling for a halt to the arms race and opposing the dt· elopment of new weapons and the militarization of outer space Clt•arly So 'ict leaders want l S leadns to IJ 'lit·n· tlw Nuclear Winter hypothesis On at least two on-asions So 'iet scientists have met with US Congressional leaders On one of these occasions Aleksandrov appeared before a ongressional suhcommittec Such al'l't'SS to the L'S political systt'm is highly valuable to loscow -lfr s part of this propaganda pfforL ad hoc organizations have wen created to produce reports grant i11ten i ·ws and sponsor exchanges figure 8 For cxampl i11 198 ' the Committct' of Sovict Scientists for l't'an· and gainst Nuclear Var was establisllt'd with 'elikhov as Chairman Orlt' of tilt' purposes of this organization is to ··rnohilize thl' scientists' efforts in the strngglt' for prt· ·enting a nuclear holocaust to draw a seiencchast'd and cn·dihle picture of the dangers of continuing along the route of the 'arms race ' which will kad mankind on'r the nuclt'ar abyss and to prnvidt' bro td sections of the public and tluise who direeth tab· politkal dt'cisiom with accuralt' scientific infrnrnation 1c 17 Tlw propaganda pffort is well coordinated In cases foreign attendees arrivt' at intnHational l'01tfrn•mTs to find that the Sovit'l organizers have aln·ady prepared a draft fowl ft'port including a statc111t·nt on tlw adn·rst' c nseqw•nces of 1' uclear intt·r The s11hit'd has het'n raised in a rnriety of i11tl1lt'11tial 11dworks such as tlw intnnational lllt' lical proft•s sion 111 this fiPld Sode initiatives wen· in part rcspomiblP for the World Health Organization's adopting a resolution in lay HJ8 3 that The role of physicians and other health worh•rs in the preservatin11 and promotio11 of peact' is the most sig11ificant L1dor for the atlaim1wnt of health for alL The World I lt'alth ssc111hh endorsed the conclusion that it is impos iblc to pn•pare health ser 'iCt'S to deal in ani systl'matic w 1y with a catastrophe resulting from nuclear arfan· and that nuclear weapons constitute the greatest immediate thrt'at to the ht'alth and welfare of 111a11kimL Tlw · sst'rnhly n·comrnc1HJcd that tlH' orld I lealth Organization in cooperation with otlwr l nited Nations agt•m·ics cm1tinue the work of collt•l'ling anahsi11g and regularly publishing ac- S lllH' counts of activities and furthn studies 011 tht· effects of nuclear war 011 health and health scrvices Such efforts have met with considerable succt·ss in making the general public conccrnPd ahout nuclear 25X1 Military Side Effects 48 'uclear Vinter rt'st·arcl1 may raist· somc issues that Sovit'l military planners would want tn considn regardless of tlw climatic effPcts For example the smokt' and dust generated hy multiple nuclear t'xplosions may obscure targets from overhead visual reconnaissance and could interfere with grouml-to-satt'llil ' links Reconnabsanct' may he precluded over lame an·as for long periods Infrared sensors also may lw dPgradnl hy tlw heat-absorbing at'rosnl part ides Hadar imaging would he less affected exct'pt for a fr hours and in areas whne ground bursts produce very large quantities of dust Thest' considt'rat ions could a ff Pct tht' developnwnt of Soviet imaging systt•ms For exam pit' we would t'XPl'd added inct'nt ives to dt'vt·lop radar imaging wstems for satt llitt's aircraft and possibly tilt' 4fJ Command and control systems also might lw stressed br the effects of ' ndl·ar Wintn Highfrequency commuriicatio11s li11b and satt'l itt' ground co11trol stations could be affected by inneast'd dust and water vapor in the itmosphere In addition dust could interfpre with aircraft engirws causing some degradation to flight operations lso the persomwl that operate command and control system ma han· difficulty functioning t'll during prolonged IJt'riods of cold and darkness Thus iuclcar Vintn com·erns could reinforce existing pfforts to improve· capabilitil's for protracted war that include testing and training with prolonged occupation of umlergrouud command posts Outlook The Base Case -50 Ve do not anticipate any eha11gps to Soviet nuclear weapons polil'it's or programs solely as a n·s11lt of Nuclf•ar Vinter research The scit·ntific Pvide11n· is not yet convincing and nHm• important Sovid h·aders do not see any appart'nl respo11se in l S strall'gic programs to NudPar inter com·erns Lacking both of tllf'se conditions we i Plieve loscow will conti1111t• to maintain a stratt•gic force posturt' that supports tht'ir war-fighting stratpgy and depends prirnarih on 111issilt•s with large tlmm weights and ou larg ' nunilwr of 18 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ Jlc CREI warheads In addition Soviet strategic planning will bt' further cmnplieatt'd by the prospt'ctive modernization of l 1S British and French nuclear forces ' 'ATO deployments of cruise missiles and Pershings IIs and expanding Chinese slratt'gic forces • 51 In any event Sovit'l research on 'udear Vinter will continue thus guarantt'eing Soviet participation in the debate But Sovit'l contributions are not likely to be significant Analysis will be limited by the inadt quate Sm·iet computer capacity to handle advanced climate mmkling for at least the next several years The prospects lor new or original Sovit'l data also are poor Individual Soviet scientists are interested in 1·x1wrirnental research but higher level approval will not lw forthcoming unless senior Soviet officials be 'ollle more seriously concerned about Nuclear Winter For present purposes it appears that Soviet leaders are conlt'nt to rely on l 1S data This will involve continued Sovit t intt'ft'St in scientific exchanges with the United Stall's Joint ex1wrinwntal research could provide access to US nwasurement technologr but there may continm' to be reluctance to approve such work at high lewis lwcause tht' rt'snlts could reduce the credibility of earli •r Sovit't research and Soviet scientists might 1• e11tualh be put in an embarrassing position of agreeing to the possibility of much less severe climatic 25X1 issue introduced into a wide varit'ly of forums especially the various United Nations agencies Furthermore Soviet officials will attempt to raise rnncerns about Nuclear Winter with members of the peace movement in Europe In addition to the Soviet media television documentaries on Nuclear Winter already have been produced in the United Kingdom and Japan In the Third World Soviet officials will exploit Nuclear Winter because research suggests that the consequences of nuclear war could extt'nd to the Southern Hemisphere All of these efforts will lw part of a larger Sovit'l strategy to blame the United States for the arms race and get other countries to bring pressure on Washington to reduce the l' S strategic arms inventory --• 54 We believe it is unlikely that Soviet positions on arms control will changt' dramatically solely as a result of Nuclear Winter research Moscow will continue to oppose substantial reductions in tlwir medium and heavy intercontinental ballistic missile force other major altnations of their force strnetme or serious limitations on their weapons modernization process Pressures to retain a force large enough to carry out the major missions assigned to nuclear fon·t's an· likely to outweigh ' fuclear Winter r·---- Potential Dilemmas l' lllSt' lll 'lll' 'S L_____j 52 The public PH'sentation of Soviet views on Nuclear Winter has shifted from commentary on basic n·search to publicizing the policy implications Soviet officials have noted that the main Nuclear Winter q1wstim1s have been sufficiently resolved and there is a need to mnn' on to dealiug with the basic problem of s111wrpowt•r relations Such views have been expressed hr 1oiseyev Deputy Director of tht' Computer Center and a key administrator in the chain between 'elikhov and Aleksandrov Moiseyev wants to shift the focus to the larger context of man in the biosphere the subject of a forthcoming book he hopes to publish in tlw l 1nilt'd Statt'S and the t ssR In linking the perils of Nudt•ar Vinlt'r to other serious environmental problems involving the superpowers r- toiseyev uses th ' analogy of passengers riding together in a small hoat l11 such a situation any St'rious differences must h ' n·solved to mutual satisfaction Ve can expect to S 'e this theme associalt'd with future Sovit't reporting 011 Nuclear 'inter I - 3 Soviet seit ulists will seek to keep Nuclear Wintn in frout of the public particularly in tht' United States and Wt•slt'rn Europe This will help keep pres nrt' on Vestern governments to reduce their 1111di•ar n•apons iuventories We can expect to sec the 55 The Nuclear Winter hypothesis is uncertain While the Soviets will contimtt' to exploit it for propaganda purposes we believe that there is little chance for fundamental changes in Sovit'I nuclear weapons policies or major reductions in their nuclear arsenal as a direct result of published or ongoing rest'arch on this subject If the Soviet leadership eventually were to accept Nuclear Winter effects as both credible and profound it could lead to serious contradictions between these new considerations on the one hand and Soviet doctrine and wf'apons employment policies on the other Such contradictions are obvious to tht' Soviets and would probably cause Sovit't officials to demand exceptionally high standards of scientific proof for the Nuclear Winlt'r hypothesis standards that probably cannot be met i 56 The Soviets could be faced with several dilemmas if they had to reconcile tht' potential implications of the ' udear Winter hypothesis with important tern'ts of their military doctrine For examplt' ' uclear Winter would call into question those aspects of Soviet war-fighting strategy that emphasizt' preemptive massive nuclear strikes which according to the hypothesis would litt'rally be suicidal for tht' Soviets t'Vt'll if US territory bore the brunt of the nuclear dt'lonatiom 19 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 SECRET 25X1 Ht•sponscs to this dilemma would ht' difficult for So ·id stralt'gic planners they apparently art' highly skt•ptical of conct'pts of escalation control am smallscale strike options l'ltimatt'h increasing doubts that nuclear weapons would lw used could undermine So 'id beliefs in tilt' politieal utility of nuclt'ar weapons This in turn could rt'sti t in mort' t'mphasis on L'On 't·ntional forces biological weapons such as those achit·ved i c t'ngineering and directed-ent'rgy wcapons L___J '57 iuclear linter considerations also could pose dilemmas for Soviet rt'search and developmt'nt programs In some n·s1wcts this could reinforet' existing twnds toward de 'elopnlt'nt of lowt'r yiPlds and better at·t·tiracy to reduce the climatic effects of strikes on critical targets No1111uclear warheads also could be considered for strategic targets This might lw especialh attral'live in the European Theater to reduce the possibility that effects from burning eities would cxll'nd to the l 1SSH In addition targeting planners might consider target combustibility along with yield height of bursts timing and other factors to reduce the amount of smoke and dus '58 ' iwlear linter considerations also could complicatt· Sm id ballistic missilt' ddense BMD planning Large quantities of smoke dust and particulatt' matter in the atmosplwre could degrade target detection tracking and intercept capabilities after the initial strikes Also mort' ad 'anct'd Bt-- lD technologies may havt' to consider the t'ffpcts of intercepts occurring in the boost phase exoatmospheric or terminal phase of missile flight in light of ' uckar Vinll'r Should Moscow become ccmcerned with using B 11 both to protect military capabilities and to prcvent an attack from triggering ' uclear linter then a much more extensive defense capability would he required including - Increased effectiveness to reduce leakage - Extended protection for urban areas to n·cluce smoke and particulate matter 59 Nuclear linter also could influence So 'iet thinking about ci 'il defense Soviet agriculture may be more susceptible to damage than CS crops because of weather patterns greater geographical concentration and less diversity of Soviet crops Because of the potential damage to food produetion Soviet civil defense officials could be forced to extt nd their planning time frames for basic survival to about a year rather than about 30 clays when fallout would bt' the major long-term consideration Thus substantial increases in civil defense food stockpiles might lw an early indicator that ' uclear linter was beginning to influence Soviet thinking at high levels L___ __J 20 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 xt 8 Page s In Document Denied Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 SECRET 25X1 Annex B Selected Chronology of Nuclear Winter Discussions in International Forums 1983 April Boston TT APS Peer Review Golitsyn 17-19 Atay Moscow All-Union Conference of Scientists Against the Threat of Nuclt'ar War the Committee of Soviet Scientists in the Defense of Peace and Against Nuclear War established Velikhov Golitsyn 19-24 August Erice Italy International Seminar on Nuclear War Velikhov Aleksandrov October Moscow CS-USSR Committee for International Security and Arms Control Velikhov Skrvabin Blokhin Bayer 14-17 November Second Vienna Dialogue for Disarmament and Detente sponsored by International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces and World Peace Council Various Soviet scientists 15-17 November Stockholm Sweden Workshop on the Environmental Consequences of Nuclear War sponsored by Scientific Community on Problems of the Environment SCOPE of International Council of Scientific Unions Various Soviet scientists 16 November Washington-Moscow TV hookup Conference on World After Nuclear War Velikhov Aleksandrov Kondrat'yev 2 3 November Tbilisi Georgia USSR Session of the Committee of Soviet Scientists in the Defense of Peace and Against Nuclear War representatives of the Federation of American Scientists attend Velikhov Golitsyn 8 December Washington symposium of Soviet and American scientists to discuss the effects of nuclear war Velikhov Aleksandrov 1984 January Vatican meeting on the effects of nuclear explosions on the atmosphere held at the Pontifical Academy of Sciences Aleksandrov 7 March Tallinn Estonia USSR meeting of the Committee of Soviet Scientists in the Defense of Peace and Against Nuclear War Velikhov 17 April Ashkhabad Turkmen Republic USSR meeting of the Committee of Soviet Scientists in the Defense of Peace and Against Nuclear War Velikhov 9 May Washington conference between delegates of Committee of Soviet Scientists in the Defense of Peace and Against Nuclear War and representatives of the Federation of American Scientists Velikhov 31 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 SECRET 25X1 IS 11111 Lt·ningrad mt t'ling of tlw Scientific Community 011 Problems of tht' Ell iron men I Inkrnational Council of Scit'ntihc l' nions · leksandrm Colitsyn komlrat t' J1111c Ccm' a 'orld lt'lt'orological Organization 36th seminar of Ext'cutin· ommitlt'c lzrael'l ·l- J1111c Helsinki Finland International Physicians for the Prevention of uclt ar 'ar arious Sovit'I scientists IS J1111c Lt ningrad l' ' Hegional Conference on Vorld Disarrnanwnt Colitsynl 9-2-l 11g11sl Erice Italy International Seminar on 'uclear 'ar kksall lrm· S- - Scptcrn cr College Park Ian lam Conference on ' udt'ar Deterrt ncc lt ksandrm 8 Sorcrnher Clasgtm Scotland conference on the dft'cts of a nuclear attack Colitsyn 18-20 S01Y'rnhcr Bellagio JtalY International C onfcn nce of ' uclear ' ar Skr abin 011 the C onst' Jllt'nct's 32 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 SECRET 25X1 Annex C Selected Bibliography Soviet Research on Nuclear Winter Alt'ksandrov V V Slf'nchikov G L The Proceedings on Applied Mathematics LISSR Acadt'my of Scit'nct's Moscow 1983 Alt'ksandrov V V Updatt' on tht' Climatic Impacts of Nucit'ar Exchangt' Erin Italy lntt'rnational Seminar on Nuclt'ar War 1984 Ginsbt'rg A S Golitsyn G S Demchenko P F Development of Highly Turbid Convective Boundary Layer Moscow Institute of Atmospheric Physics llSSH Academy of Scit'nct's 1984 Golitsyn G S Ginsberg A S Possible Climatic Consequmces of Nuclear Conflict and Some Natural Analogs Moscow Committee of Soviet Scientists for Pt'ace Against tht' Nuclear Threat 1984 lzrat'I' Y A Karol I L Kiselev A A Hosanov Y V Atmospheric Composition and Thermal Regime Model Charges After Possible Nuclear War 1 1oscow Goskomgidromet 1984 Kondrat' wv K Y Observational Evidence of the Impact of Nuclt'ar Explosions 011 tlw Atmospht'rt' and Climate Moscow Lake Study Institute USSR Academy of Scit'nces 1984 Western Research on Nuclear Winter LIS National Academy of Sciences The Effects on the Atmosphere of a A1ajor Sue ear Exchange Washington National Academy Press 1985 Ehrlich Paul R Sagan Carl Kennedy Donald Roberts Walter Orr The Cold and the Dark The World After Nuclear War New York W W Norton 1984 Sagan Carl Nuclear Winter and Climatic Catastrophe Some Implications Foreign Affairs vol 62 No 2 Winter 1983 Crutzt'n Paul J and Birks John W The Atmosphere After a Nuclt'ar War Twilight at Noon Ambio vol II No 2-3 1982 Turco R P Toon 0 B Ackerman T P Pollack J B and Sagan C Nuclt'ar inter Global Consequences of Multiple Nuclear Explosions Science vol 222 No 4630 23 December 1983 The Climatic Effects of Nuclear War Scientific American vol 251 lo 2 August 1984 pp 33-43 MacCracken Michael Nuclear War Preliminary Estimates of the Climatic Effects of a Nuclear Exchange Lawrence Livt'rmore National Laboratory Rt'port io 83-84 33 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 25X1 ' Sdll1cidcr and Thllrnpso11 C ohal trnosplwric Fff ·cls of lassin· Srnllkc lr1jt'dill11S frorn a uclcar ar Sat11rc larch l i- 41 pp 21-2 Other Articles trnllspll 'ri ' al 'ulatio11s Suggest ' 'u 'lcar 'i11lt'r Ph11sics Toda11 IFclmiar ID 'ill pp 17-20 Fhrlid1 mw uclt·ar 'i11lt'r R11 letin of the trm1ic Scientists pril 19H41 General Background on Nuclear Effects l S llrign·ss Otli ·t· of Tcd111ology · ssessrne11l The Elfl'l'ts of '111-lcar 'ur a hi11gtll11 l S Co nr111w11t Printing Offict' 1D7CJ l S Dt•part11H'11t of lkft·ns ' The Effects of Sue car 'capons Third Editill11l ashi11gtll11 l S Co t·rn11w11t Printing Ofhce 1977 l nitt'd ations l'kport of the St'nl'lary Ct'rl 'raL Co111prche11sire St111 11 011 Sue car 'ca11r111s ' t· York l ' l 'partrnent of Political and St' 'llrit Council ffairs 'ii and l 11ilt'd ations 'orld l t•alth Orga11izatirn1 E l'Cts of S11clrnr 'ar 011 Jlca th J ' 1 h 'icrl'iccs Ct'll ' a 110 19H- 34 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010 07 08 CIA-RDP87T00413R000100170003-9