7 TH E WHITE HOUS E WAS HI NGTON February 22 1986 Dea r Mr Gen er a l Secreta r y Th e elimination of nucl e ar weapons has been an American goal for decades from our proposals at the dawn of the nuclear age to my vision of a nuclear-free world made possible through the reliance of our countries on defense rather than on the threat of nuclear retaliation In a 1983 speech to the Japanese Diet and on many subsequent occasions I have advocated the abolition of nuclear weapons I have done so because I believe this is an objective which reflects the deep yearning of people everywhere and which provides a vision to guide our efforts in the years ahead It was for similar reasons that I have sought to develop concepts and frameworks to guide the efforts of our governments in other aspects of our relations -- whether solving the regional tensions that have damaged our relations over the years or expanding the people-to-people contacts that can enrich both our societies It is in this spirit that I have studied with great care your letter of January 14 your January 15 statement to the Soviet people and your s ubsequent statements on the prospects for progress i n a rms cont r ol I b e li e ve they re present a significa n t a nd po si t i v e ste p fo rwa rd I am encouraged that you have suggested s t e ps leading toward a wo rld free from nuclear weapon s even though my vie w regarding the steps necessary differ s from yours in certain respects However h avi ng a gree d on t he ob ject ive a nd on the n eed f or ta k ing concre te steps to reach that goa l it s hou l d be easie r to reso lve d iffere n ces i n o ur vie wpoin t s a s t o wha t tho se steps s h o uld be Our initial mo v es a re o f co urse the e s sentia l ones to s t ar t this p ro cess and th e refo re I belie v e we shou l d foc u s o u r negot iatin g efforts on them J JLho J 2 Of course if we are to mo ve toward a world in which the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons will be possible there must be far greater trust an d confidence between o ur two count ries tha n exis ts at pre sent We cannot s imply wave away the s uspicion a nd misunderstandings which h ave developed over the past four decad es b etween our two countries The process of reducing and e ventuall y e limin a ting nucl ear weapon s can by itself nurture greater con f idence and trust But t here will be many in my country and I believe in yours who will qu e stion the wisdom of eliminating nuclear weapo ns -- which both sides see as the ultimate guarantor of their security -- if they see the other's conduct as threatening This leads me to three general observations First it will be vitally necessary as we move down this path to ensure the most stringent verification with measures far more comprehensive and exacting than in any previous agreement I welcome your recognition of this in your expressed willingness to make use of on-site inspection and to adopt other measures that may be necessary For our part we will be proposing verification procedures tailored to the specific weaponry limits which are contemplated Our negotiators will of course work out the details of the measures but I believe we both will have to pay close attention to this aspect and see to it that our respective government s develop a nd implement the necessary arrangements At the same time it wil l be esse ntial to resolve outstanding compliance concerns and e nsure tha t all obligations o ur governments h ave undertaken are fa ith f ully observ e d My second point is that any sustained ef f ort to resolve our basic security concerns mu st go handin-hand with concrete steps to move ahead in other areas of our relationship -- non-nuclear military issues regional problems human rights and b ila t eral ties The buildup of both n u cle ar and conventional a rmaments ha s tak en place in recent decades to address perceived threats t o security including con flicts in other r egions of t h e world Progress on reducing arms sho uld be a ccompa ni ed by a corre s ponding ef fort to deal wi th these perceptions The process of eliminating nuclear arms is liable to prove fragile indeed unless we can deal with our competition in a peaceful and responsible way q 3 I welcome the statement in your January 15 message to the Soviet people which calls for settlement of regional confli cts as soon as possible I would urge you again to consider seriou sly the pro posal I ma de at the United Nations in October f or a compre hensive and f lexible f ramework tha t would permit our two countries t o work together in conjunction with the peoples involved to solve regional conflicts that have dama ged Eas t-West relations over the years and have brought great suffering to the areas affected We should make every effort to ensure that in the dialogue on regional issues to which we agreed at Geneva including discussions by our foreign ministers and the meetings of our senior regional experts our governments take a fresh look at ways to reduce tensions between us over regional matters I continue to believe that regional conflicts can and should be resolved peacefully in ways that allow free choice without outside interference Finally as you know the United States and its allies must rely today on nuclear weapons to deter conventional as well as nuclear conflict This is due in large part to the significant imbalance that currently exists between the conventional forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact As a result it would be necessary as we reduce nuclear weapons toward zero that we concurrently engage in a process of strengthening the stability of the overall East-West security balance with particular emphasis on redressing existing conventional imbalances strengthening confidence-building measures and accompli shing a veri fiab le global ban on chemical weapons In a ddition our cooperative effo rt s to st r ength e n the nucl e ar non-proliferation regime would become even more important As for the spec ifics of your proposal we certainly a gree c the goal of el i minating nuclear weapons as soon as we have a chie ved the condi t ion s for a wor ld whi ch mak es that g oal feasible We also agree on th e need to get on with the f irst step s towards c reating those condit ions now The pace of progre ss towards an y target date would have to depend on our ability to ar rive at mutually ac cepta ble guar antees t o ensure that the security of the Uni ted States the Soviet Union and our respective friend s a nd allies is in no sense diminished along the way lU 4 I also agree that th e first steps in moving towa rd this goal inv o lve de ep r educt i o ns in the e xisting a rs e n als of the United States a nd the Soviet Union Also like you we c an envision subsequent steps whi ch could involve th e Un ite d Kingdom Franc e and the Peopl e ' s Re p ublic of China so that al l can move to zero nucle a r weapons in a balanced a nd stabl e manner Finally I also share the vi e w that our effor ts should now focus on the first s teps whi ch the U S and USSR can take bilateral ly to begin the pro cess I c an also agre e with several of your ideas on how this program would proceed There are other details howeve r that would require modification before I could accept them For example as our two nations reduce our nuclear weapons toward zero it is imperative that we maintain equal limits on those weapons at each stage along the way To this end the United States last November proposed a detailed plan for reduction of U S and Sov iet strategic offensive forces I am disappointed that the Soviet Union has not yet responded to this proposal which builds on your ideas presented to me las t fall by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze As we discussed in Geneva we agree on the principle of deep reductions but we cannot agree that certain cate g o ri e s of weapons systems on the U S side would be included while like weapons on the Soviet side would be excl uded Similarly we must insist that limits be based on system capabilities not expres se d in te ntio ns Yo u made this po int ve ry e loquently to me in Geneva In regard to l onger-range INF missiles this mean s that we cannot exclude systems from limits merely becaus e of thei r deploymen t l o c a t ion s i nce tho s e systems are capable of moving or being transported in a matter of days between different geographi c a r eas I have h owever studied c los e l y y o ur INF proposal of Janu a ry 15 1986 and believe that our n egot i ators a t Ge neva shou l d be able to arrive at a n equ itab le verifiable and mutu a ll y acceptable I NF agreement In this r egard I have asked our negotiators dur ing this r o u n d t o propose a fl 5 concrete plan for the elimination of LRI NF missiles not only in Europe but a lso in Asia be f ore the end of 1989 In the d efense a nd spa c e are a your pro posal was ambigu ous with reg ar d to strategic defense res ea rch I continue to b elie ve th a t limits on res ea rch could be coun te rproduc ti ve and in a ny case could not be verified ther efore they must not be included in an agr eement Be yond research as I sugges ted in Geneva if ther e were no nuclear missiles then there might also be no need for defenses against them But I am convinced that some non-nucl ear defens e s could make a vital contribution to security and stability In any event our negotiators in Geneva should thoroughly e xamine how we could make a transition to a world involving the increasing contribution of such defenses With respect to nuclear testing I believe that so long as we rely on nuclear weapons as an element of deterrence we must continue to test in order to ensure their continued safety security and reliability However as I wrote to you in December I see no reason why we should not consider the matter of nuclear testing as we move forward on other arms control subjects I s uggested we establish a bilateral dialogue aimed at constructive steps in this field I remain hopeful you will take up this offer Finally although your proposal seems to recognize that the crucial firs t step i s substantia l bil ateral U S and Sov iet nuclear reductions it also attache s cer tain conditions regarding the forces of the United Kingd om and France As you know the United States can make no commitments for other nuclear powers no r can we agree to bilateral U S - Soviet arrangements which would sugges t otherwi se The negotiations of limitations on third country nuclear systems is solely t he respo ns ib lity and prerogative of the governments concerned The leaders of Britain France and China have made known their views on this and on the progress necessary in u s -soviet nuclear reductions and in oth r arms control areas hich would establish t h e 6 conditions fo r them to consider how their security interests wo uld be served by participation in f uture negotiations Thus the important tas k now before us is to make the necessary progress When we have done so -- as I noted earli e r -- I can e nvision a process involving the other nuclear powe r s so that we all can move t o zero nucl ea r weapons in a balanced and stable manner With these considerations in mind and building upo n your proposal I propose th at we agree upon the e lement s which we hold in common as o utlined above and that we accelerate work on the first bilateral steps Implementing details must be worked out by o ur negotiators in Geneva Vienna and Stockholm but our guiding o bje ctive should be to reach meaningful verifiable and balanced arms control measures each of which can stand on its merits at every stage of the larger process In summary I would propose that th e process toward our agreed go al of eliminating nuclear weapons include the following elements Initial Steps I believe that these steps should involve reduction in and limits on nucl ar conventional a nd chemical we apon s as f9l ws 1 The U S and the USSR would r e duce the number of warheads on their strategic ballistic missiles to 4500 a nd the number o f ALCMs on their heavy bombe rs to 1500 resulting in no more than a total number of 6000 such wa rheads on strategic nuclear delivery v e hicles These reductions wo uld be carried out in such a way as to enhance stability 2 I n the INF area by 1987 both the Unite d States and the Sovi t Union would limit their LRINF missile deployments in Europe to no more than 140 launchers each with the Soviet Union making concurrent proportionate reductions in Asia Within the following year both si d e s wo u ld further reduce the numbe r s of LRINF launch ers remaining in Europe and As ia b y an addit ional 50% Finally b oth sides would move to the total elimination of this catego ry of weapons by the e nd of 1989 7 3 Research p rograms on strategic de fe nses would be conducte d in accord with tr eaty ob ligations 4 The U S and the USSR wo uld establish an effe ctive MBFR veri f icatio n r egime and c a rry out i niti a l r eductions in manpower le ve ls along the lines of the recent Weste rn proposal at the MBFR negotiations they would then begin a process of moving on to a balance of non-nucl e ar capabilities in Europe 5 Concrete and meaningful con f ide nce-building measure s designed to make th e European military environment mo re open predictable and s table would be initiated 6 An effective comprehensive worldwide ban on the development production possession and transfer of chemical weapons would be instituted with strict verification measures including international on-site inspection Subsequent steps Subsequent steps could involve other nuclear powers and would aim at furthe r reductions and increasingly strict limits ultimately leading to the elimination of all nuclear weapons We would embark on this process as soon as the steps encompassed in the first stage are completed The goal would be to complet the process as soon as the conditions for a non-nuclear world had been achieved Obligations a ssumed in al l steps and areas would be verifi e d by national technical means by o n-site ins pect ion as ne e ded and by s uch additional measures as might prove necessary I hope that this concept provides a mutually acceptable route to a goal that all the world shares I look forward to your response and to working with you in the corning months in advancing this most important effort Let me conclude b y ag r e eing wi t h you that we should work con s tructivel y before your visit to the Uni t ed States to prepa re concrete a greements on t h e f u ll range of issues we discu ssed a t Ge ne va Neither of us has illusions about the major problems which remain between our t wo cou ntries 8 but I want t o a ssure you th at I am de t e rmi ned t o wo rk wi th you energ e t i c a l l y in f i nd i ng pr ac ti c al so luti o ns t o tho se problems I a gr e e with you th a t we s h ou ld use o ur c orres pondence as a mo st i mp or tant c h annel of commu n ic a ti on in preparing fo r your vi s it Na n cy a nd I wo uld like to exte nd t o you Mrs Go r bac h e va a n d your famil y our b e st wish e s It is o ur h o pe that this yea r will br i ng s igni f i c ant p rogre s s t owar d our mutual goal o f building a b e tt e r rel a ti o nship betwe e n o u r t wo countries and a safe r wo rld His Excell e ncy Mikhail Sergeyev ich Gorbachev General Secretary of the Cen tr al Committee of the Communist Party o f the Soviet Un i on The Kremlin Moscow