NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EYES ONLY WASHJNGTON D C 20506 April 10 1991 MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN fi ERSON DDCI FROM DAVID GOMPERT ED A HEWET SUBJECT The Gorbachev Succession This is a request for an analysis of the Gorbachev succession We ask that the analysis be undertaken only in the CIA that it ' involve judgements of SOVA LDA a n d n d that it involve bJ 3 Robert Blackwe l l and Fritz Ermarth as individuals rather than in their official capacities in the NIC The report will be addressed only t o the two of us Brent Scowcroft and Bob Gates The fact that y ou are preparing the report for us should be closely held We need the report by April 29 The maj o r quest io ns we ask you to address are the following 1 What are the potential triggers which could precipitate Gorbachev's departure or removal Are there indicators we should monitor in order to assess the likelihood of Gorbachev's departure 2 How are the dynamics of the succession likely to play out a Wh at are the conditions and scenari o s for s u ccessi on a n d the probabilities associated with t h e m A successi on according to the new c onstituti ona l p rocedures is one p o ssibil ity b u t what are t h e ot he rs b What are the politics of succession likely to be Who for example are the key political players in the succession process c What particular role are republican leaders likely to play in the succession pro cess What opportunities and risks do republics face in this process d How wi l l the relationship of the CPSU and the government be affe c ted by the suc c ession Is there for example a possibility that Gorbachev will leave as President but remain as party leader DECLASSIFIED PER E O 12958 S Cru t Decla s s i fv on OADR Cf'l• o3o't-F 2 3o f1 - 't O'f L f SE C Jl 3 What is the nature of potential successor governments Their political cast The key personalities Their political life expectancy Their internal and external policy predispositions Please call either of us if you need any clarification Withdrawal Redaction Sheet George Bush Library ubjedffitle of Document Re The Gorbachev uccession 14 pp Bush Presidential Records NationaJ Security Council Btll11S R Nicholas Files and Hewett Ed Files Subject Files Date Restriction 4 29 9 b l b 3 50 UC 403g la Document Partially Declassified Copy of Document Folio By Lj1- NLGB on Z o' 6'f WBORMCat I File Location Gorbachev uccession I 5 26 2000 1999-0304-F CF01486-016 1 ppeal Ca e # ppeal Disposition ------------- D_isposition Daft Rele· ed in Pan 8 ---- '200__________ Al _Di o ition Date _R • 1 JlrC' id 011111 H rtl u - MR Ca e # 'lR Di pu ition I -' 2004-196 -MR 27 0 R I ed io Port 1R Disposi iJ D at_L _I _ l _ - - - - - - - - - 1 RI 2 4l JO ' 0 Fn-tdlltn or lM nual 1 1 Cl - 15 nnrl rult i lllld prat'li e of 1111 r 1rlc1io11 c 111 incd in doonr' drtd or 11 b u r- c1 iir1 l b 3J Central Intelligence Agen y f o Washing1m D C 2050S DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE 29 April 1991 The Gorbachev Succession• lf f J The Gorbachev era is effectively over Even if Gorbachev remains in t11L P 'r-t' P£JJ••• t om now real ower is likely to be in the hands the republics blt1 b 3_ 0 -' f- 7 6« iu 2 r ci·ed out in the near tenn it most likely would be by hardliners who would rule t roul rrn-¥µ ' l l K ont man or some sort of National Salvation Committee Without any action _ 'nztiona zs however the influence of r eformers will continue to grow so as · n the odds increase that tlie7 feinocrats will come to power The succession is not likely to be smooth however and there probably will be a period o transition with an intense power struggle and no one clearly in charge b ftJ- - b s The Gorbachev succession is directly linked to the fate of the political system If traditionalists oust him it will be to seek to preserve the empire and autocratic rule through tougher means They would move quickly to suppress the opposition arresting or conceivably even executing its leaders starting with Yel'tsin and to roll back newly won freedoms They would adopt a more truculent public posture toward the United States and seek opportunities to assert their influence abroad Even if they were willing to rely on a massive use of force and repression traditionalists would have difficulty maintaining power because they lack a credible program to address the country 's mounting problems and would have difficulty overcoming internal divisions_ Under such a regime the economy would continue to deteriorate and social alienation would increase sharply ensuring that eveff_l7fally democratic and nationalist movem ents would reemerge tb 1 fbml This memorand um was v Titten in res o nse to a specific set of ques tio ns abo ut the issue of the succession to Goi bacbev It was prepared by __ 1J b C3 f the Office of Soviet Analysis In formati on available as o f 29 April 1991 was used in its re ara t1on mments and questions are welcome and may be directed lO Chief · r ' J iqbJW b 3 - SOV M91-20070 b 1 b 3 DECLASSIFIED IN PART PER E O 12958 AS AMENDED 1'1'19-0304- F 2-- f 3 z -i fo5 bl '- b b 1 b 3 CJ IAS l t O l J_ In short h oviet Union is now in a revolutio current center-dominate p system appears oom Eastern Europe over the past two years all the ingredients e now present m the USSR that could lead n_o_t only to a raf PJ ge in th regime but quickly sweep away the current politzcal system fl i½ r 2 f r 6ECRffi' - Moving Toward Succession The traditionalists on whom Gorbachev bas been politically ' 8 ndeot are openly distancing themselves from him The leadership of the KGB the itary and the CPSU blame him for tbe current crisis as well as for undermining their institutions The thrust of statements about Gorbacbev s policies made to former President Nixon during hi recent visit to Moscow by KGB Chairman Kryuchkov and Minister of Defense Yazov provide furtbeT evidence of a lack of confidence in the Soviet President on the part of the security services bX°i'1 fb 1 · Q Q' - ca Many traditionalists at lower levels are actively organizing against Gorbachev The increasingly influential traditionalist group of legislator Soyuz is collecting signatures to call a special Congress of Peoples Deputies aimed at removing Gorbachev Its most outspoken leader ha e been openly pressing for Gorbachev's removal since late last year Gorbachev's position in the party also continue to deteriorate At tbe April Central Committee plenum he turned back a drive to unseat him as General Secretary with the help of the party leadershl but he still faces a growia and increasingly threatening rebellion in the party ti 1 a The reformers' drive to remove Gorbachev became more serious after Yel'tsin•s nationally televised call for Gorbacbevs resignation in mid-February Although Yel'tsin has recenlly been more accommodating the removal of Gorbachev and his government ecome the princi al demand of the ongoing rniner i strike and their call is now resona · m ot er m us · se rs Most of these group are calling for power to be rans erred to the re € e abolition of the SSR Supreme Soviet and Congress of P opl Deputie b 1 • b J ir Gorbachev has gotten into this p sition because hi polfoies are generally blamed for the di aster in the country and he is not offering any credible way out • He has stroyed the old Leninist political sy tern and not er at d viable n w pohucaJ trucrur t-o repJace 1t r J Last week Gorbacbe aine a political respite with the aborted effo by hardliners to unseat him at t e SU plenum and his accord with repub · leader including Yel'tsin These developments came as the political situatio was rapidly deteriorating and suggest that none of the key players felt ready to e alate the power struggle • Yel'tsin and the republic leaders apparently feared tha f they ushed too hard now Gorbachev could be forced out by hardli At a t meeting with Russian legislators Yel'tsin indicated hi may ha a tactical move saying the time was not ripe for an al t confrontation • The initiative against Gorbachev at the plenum does little to alleviate pressure on him from hardliners The move came from disgruntled mid-level party officials not their traditionalist leaders who would -vl try to seize power in a coup if they decided to act against him b f1 X b If only because of the continued economic disintegration Gorbachev will find the political walls closing in on him again soon The republic leaders particularly Y el'tsin will want to see a meaningful political shift by Gorbachev while the traditionalists will be angered by the further slow erosion of central control and even more so by any sharp shift in this direction by Gorbachev • To reach a lasting accommodation with the republics Gorbachev would need to concede considerable power to them substantially reducing the center's authority and his own political role in effect acceding to their demands for a loose confederation If he does not agree to this his stru le with the republics will almost certainly resume and intensify His abihty to count on the republics' fear of a traditionalist coup and consequent willingness to reach agreements to save him indefini tely is a weak reed to depend on • Any erious attempt by Gorbachev to accommodate the republics however will alarm traditionalists who continue to have a cente rdominated union as th eir top p riority Fear that G orbachev is about to enter a real power-sharing arrangement with the re ublics would be the mo t likely catalyst for them to try to seize power b 1 M 3J Sl3GRFF - • The workers no longer trust Gorbacbev's government Labor unrest is likely to grow as the population begins to feel the effects of recent price hikes and owin shortages of consumer goods Gorbachev's det ermination to hold a center-dominated union together at almost any price will continue to exacerbate conflicts between the center and the republics b 1' ' t J 3 The growing influence of popularly elected local leaders and legislatures will also continue to undermine Gorbachev's little remaining authority They enjoy much greater legitimacy than the central leadership and have made implementation of Gorbachev's policies almost impossible without their cooperation li Yel'tsin succeeds in his effort to create a strong popularly elected Russian presidency and wins the election tentatively planned for June he will strengthen his hand in challenging the center while underscoring ptcy of Gorbachev's position and increasing popular pressure for his removal b 1t bi 3 ca Gorbachev's political position is likely to go from bad to worse Although he willingly entered into alliance with leaders of the KGB the military and the CPSU and is fully behind current traditionalist policies he has become politically dependent on them and will find it increasingly difficult to ignore their demands As a result of his turn to the traditionalists most reformers no longer trust Gorbachev Y el'tsin and eight other republic leaders reached an accord with Gorbachev last week that could provide the basis for renewed cooperation but it is unlikely to last unless Gorbachev accepts a sharply reduced role and cedes real power to the republics Although he can sull use the power of the presidency to set the center's a enda issuing decrees or vetoing decisions by subordinates he has few other political assets left He has lost the political irutiative and is now primarily reacting to events without any realistic longterm gameplan @ M a The essence of the current crisis is that neither the existing political system Gorbachev is attempting to preserve nor the partially emerging new system is able to cope effectively with newly mobilized popular demands and the deepening economic crisis In short the Soviet Union is now in a revolutionary situation As happened in Eastern Europe over the past two years all the ingredients are now present in the USSR that could lead not onl to a rapid change in the regime but quickly sweep away the current political system bifil Xb 3 The Key Players Refonners and traditionalists appear to be squaring off for a showdown The outcome will depend in large part on the ability of each side to overcome deep internal differences and act cohesively and resolutely The stakes are extremely high and both sides probably realize that once they make their final push for power they will begin what couJd well be a life and death struggle jb Bt W 3J Gorbachev Gorbacbev's actions will play a critical role in hO this struggle plays out The longer he stays in office the worse the political and economic situation is likely to become increasing the chances that the current political system will be swept away If he left office now however there would still be a possibility that his succession could take 4 - SECRET J n r place n iore or less within the old syste1 0 although the new regii ne would till be unstable His retrren_ient alone would solve brwever and there IS no certamty that whoever replaced him would do any better _t_ _ i_ l 3 _ Gorbachev's recent statements and actions sug gest that be desperately wants to bold on to power and will be extremely reluctant to step aside voluntarily He and his advisors appear · · · · · · d he ma still believe he can turn thin around n t It cannot be ruled out that as bis frustrations continue to grow Gorbachev would voluntarily stev i ·a11 if he believed this would hel achieve his vision of the • b 1 b 3 b 1 b 3 b 1 b 3 The Traditionalists Traditionalists increasingly blame Gorbachev for going against their advice and pursuing policies that are now destro g the union and the Communist party Mindful of the fate of their counterparts m Eastern Europe--the execution of Ceausescu in Romania Zbivkov's trial in Bulgaria and Honecker's similar fate if he had not been smuggled out by the trthy re no doubt aware of the deep hatred of the CPSU in the USSR and some have BYl'f l a indicated they fear for their lives While they want to return to a center dominate system at least some of themparticularly those near retirement age-may be willing to settle for a solution that protects their lives and pensions fci JJ 1M 3i Sovif The traditionalists who now dominate the top level leadership have been trying to get Gorbachev to go along on the issues they consider most critical By retaining him as president they have a more legitimate front for their creeping crackdown and can avoid the risks that an outright play for power would entail However there are growing indications that they are dissatisfied with Gorbachev for not moving forcefully enough against the opposition For example the black colonels who have been leading the drive to replace Gorbachev with a more hardline regime claim they have tacit approval for their actiVIties from Y azov There is nc 0 Te lost between Gorbachev and his current allies and they could well move to try to dump him if they strongly OJ posed steps they believed be was prepared to take such as a coalition with reformers or if he failed to cooperate on what they see as an essential issue such as using force to hold the union together fb f11 chf 3f · With the changes that have taken place in the top Soviet leadership in recent months the most critical levers of power and repression are all in the hands of trad i-ti-0nalists • Vice President Yanayev is the legal successor to Gorbachev for up to 90 days while a new president is elected He is new to the top echelons of power and is not likely to lead a conspiracy but he has ties to the KGB and would probably be a willing accomplice 5 f i_f £BfJ i • Deputy General Secretary Ivasbko the next in line to replace Gorbachev as head of the CPSU is not a strong leader and would not likely last long as head of the party if it were to again assume an important role • Russian Communist Party leader Polozkov is the leader of the traditionalist forces in the CPSU and could lead a drive to try to revitalize the party if be became general secretary • KGB Chief Kryuchkov who bas impressed observers as the smartest and most dynamic member of this roup is the most influential of the traditionalist leaders and will be cntical in any move against Gorbachev He has been increasingly pushing Gorbachev to take a harder line • Defense Minister Yazov does not appear to be a dynamic leader who would take the initiative in a coup but would be a willing accomplice if the other key players are on board • Chief of the General Staff Moiseyev has openly supported tougher action against independent-minded republics but has also apparently cooperated with Yel'tsin in helping to carve out a larger Russian role in defense issues At age 52 he may be willing to cut a deal with the opposition to save the army and his career • Minister of Internal Affairs Pugo bas a KGB background he would be a willing accomplice but not a key actor • First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Boris Gromov was lionized as the last commander of Soviet forces in Afghanistan At 48 he could emerge as a key player in any upheaval • Prime Minister Pavlov has impressed no one since taking office in January and is unlikely to be a key actor • Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Anatoliy Lukyanov is being increasingly touted in traditionalist circles as Gorbachev's most likely successor They see him as more resolute than Gorbachev an j more credibility with the reformers than other traditionalists jbfilaf The Reformers Most reformers do not merelv want to replace Gorbachev their goal is now to dismantle the entire political system he beads Many are calling for steps along the lines of Y el'tsin's plan for abolishing the presidency or at a minimum reducing it to a technical position with no real power and disbanding the USSR legislatures They would transfer power to the republics in a European Community type arrangement dom jnated by Rus ia All tha t would remain of the center would be some ort of coordi nating body of represen _ · enting republics th at wou ld probably ove rsee overall foreign pol' defense poli common economic issues such as monetary policy and trade and ot r a ri Qetei 1' a ed to it by the republics Y el'tsin and some other reformers see thi transfe r of power taking place through round table talks that would have full decision ma · g authority with Gorbachev the republic residents and representatives of o er political groups such as the miners ci1 3 fi J 6 'RF' i J SECRE l' Reformers have demonstrated the ability to mobilize the population and call out huge crowds in their support in Moscow and other major cities Despite an official ban and threats of police actions over 200 000 people turned out in a pro-Y el'tsin demonstration last month Many workers look to Y el'tsin for leadership s ucb the striking Kuzbass miners and with his support reformers could probabl W41J an extended general strike that could paralyze huge parts of the country fti ti- 'I OI Many reformers however do not yet feel strong enough for a showdown with the government Although they are making progress overcoming their differences they are divided into numerous opposition groups and are not well organized across republic lines Yel'tsin recently talked about the need for a well organized opposition party but so far he has not taken steps to join forces with other reformers some of whom distrust him and see him as an opportunist Aside from Y el'tsin there is no other figure among the reformers who is currently in a position to assume a broad leadership role People like Shevardnadze and Yakovlev are too closely associated with Gorbachev although they could emerge as important figures if there were a search for compromise candidates for leadership positions acceptable to both reformers and traditionalists t ib MM The key players if the reformers come to power will be the republic leaders • Yel'tsin has said he does not want to become USSR president and given the weakness of the office and the unsolvable problems that go with it he would be unlikely to change his mind unless he saw it as the only way to prevent it from falling into the hands of someone who might be able to use the office against him In that case he would probably also hold on to the Russian presidency • The other leadin Kazakhstan and w type of union but are cODJ ieo that their interests not be overwhelmed by those of Russia and Yel'tsin Nazarbayev appears to aspire to a national leve M d could be a candidate for a weakened technocratic presidency b i t f The Reliability of the Instruments of Repression The ability of the traditionalists to act will depend largely on the reliability of their instruments of repression--the KGB the military and the MVD Internal Troops Although the secudty services certainly have enough loyal troops to execute a coup imposing martial law throughout the country would be difficult Moreover if the opposition succeeds in its goal of neutralizing the security forces ' ability to impose broad political repression--or raising sufficient doubts as to their reliability among the leadership so that it becomes reluctant to use force--the game would be up for the traditionalists Once the opposition real_ized that the ce ter would no_t make broad use of for J Z Yit it the breakdown of the umon and the deII11se of the regime would accelerate - a Y el'tsin and other reformers have been working to deepen fissures in the military and KGB Although the top leadership of both organizations appears to be solidly committed to the traditionalist course many officers and rank-and-file members appear to 7 I ' ' '· 1 I ' i i b t b 3 •oECRbr SECR E'I' be sympathizing with the reformers This already appears to be having an impact and there are growing numbers of unconfirmed reports that some soldiers units balked at orders to use force in the Baltic republics and Azerbaijan M TI w rY I 1f The reliability of military forces for internal use appears to be a critical and growing concern for the leadership and it is taking steps to address it • The CPSU has launched a new drive to reassert its influence in the military and propagandize traditionalist values • A campaign is under way to purge the armed forces of reformist officers or at least move them out of sensitive positions b 1 b 3 l Gorbachev's Downfall Gorbachev's terms as president and eneral secretary do not expire until 1995 As a result of changes he initiated in the Constitution and the party rules be can no longer easily be dumped by other members of the leadership the way Khrushchev was in 1964 Legally removing Gorbachev against his will would be a difficult and cumbersome process • He can only be removed as president if he is impeached for violating the Constitution by a two-thirds vote of the Congress of Peoples Deputies • Only a CPSU Congress can replace him as party leader and that would require a long process of electmg about 6 000 delegates M 1Htlij 3j As a result if Gorbachev goes he is most likely to resign under pressure Depending on whether the initiative came from the reformers traditionalists voluntarily stepped down the consequences could be dramatically different A Reformist Initiative Reformers could succeed in driving Gorbachev from office and creating a new political system in a number of ways which are not mutually exclusive • Most likely this would come about as a result of massive ongoing na o °al st es and demonstra ons ed at toppling his government This IS the aun of the current mmers stnke and has been the cry at recent demonstrations inu106row- mtmctedtir rLbL t100 __ eds of thousands These · grassro01 --enorts have been aining stren d there are growing ties --n JJcLong opposition groups thr e country If coercive steps are not taken against them it will be only a matter of time before the opposition can paralyze the country and force major Political concessions possibly including Gorbachev's resignation Y el'tsin could hasten this process if he began to actively encourage such acti ons vJ y 0 t1 7 8 SECR 11-1 • Gorbachev might also be forced out by an ultimatum from the unified leadership of the key republics Although they have not gone as far as Yel'tsin in demanding Gorbacbev's removal other republic leaders sup ort Yel'tsin's goal of a wholesale transfer of power to the republics Yel tsin and the leaders of Kazakhstan the Ukraine and Belorussia are already negotiating a quadripartite treaty that could be the basis for a new political system that excludes the current central government For such a move to succeed it would be important to gain the support of the security forces probably by offering assurances that the military would remain intact and there would not be any retribution a ainst the KGB Some military leaders might even welcome a Slavic uruon because it would keep the bulk of Soviet forces intact while helping defuse some of its key problems such as ethnic tensions • Gorbachev might also be forced out through t roundtable process a desperate effort to try to defuse rising tensio o rLlcb Ea ___ uu agree to the roundtable talks being demanded by the opposition Such a move would probably be a miscalculation and Gorbachev would likely find himself confronted with an opposition united in its demands that he step down or effectively give up power Having agreed to roundtable discussions he might not be able to ignore the l l i without provoking massive national unrest and strikes IJX-1 -Wl 3J A Traditionalist Initiative To take the tough steps they believe are necessary to forestall a reformist victory traditionalists may try to remove Gorbachev and install a more hardline regime Such a move would be conspiratorial and could unfold in several ways • They would prefer to oust Gorbachev with a legal veneer by getting him to agree to step down and installing their own candidate Most likely they would present Gorbachev with an ultimatum to comply or face arrest or death Yanayev would initially take over as president and Ivashko as general secretary The traditionalist Congress of Peoples Deputies would then be used to install the hardliners' preferred candidate--this was the way Gorbachev was elected to the post--using the vagueness of the Constitution to postpone a popular election until 1995 • They could bypass established procedures and use the crisis situation to justify the Congress of Peoples Deputies and Central Committee removing Gorbachev and installing bardline leaders previously agreed on Given the traditionalist majority in both institutions they would almost certainly endorse the choice of a united leadership although there would be loud protests from the reformers in those bodies • They could move decisively to regain control by declaring a state of emergency throughout the country installing some sort of ational Salvation Comnuttee likely dominated by security offi cials and moving forcefully against the opposition • They could arrange an ac 'l'· orbachev and replace him by one of the procedures above ----9 C ' 1 @N t 3 t i ni I' J -SECREI A Temporary Compromise As happened in most of the transitions from Communism in Eastern Europe the dismantling of the current Soviet political system might be a multistage process and could begin with Gorbachev's participation A half-way solution is most likely if neither side is sure of its strength and is therefore willing to compromise Any compromise however would mean a si nificant degree of power shanng _with the reformer 5 and would be a n iajor step on t e_ir ro d to powe Once such concessions were made 1t would be more difficult for trad1t10nalists to tegam the initiative but fear of a coalition that sh ly reduces their influence might be a catalyst for them to act Such a coalition would be highly unstable and would not last long It might happen under the following conditions • Gorbachev agrees to step aside but insists on having a role in the transition perhaps playing for time and still hoping to stay in office • Gorbachev resigns before he is confronted with an ultimatum and neither traditionalist nor reformers are strong enough to take control on their own tr t- f ru a f c - ca • Gorbachev steps aside under pressure or dies in office but the current political system remains with traditionalists retaining control of some key positions while other important portfolios are given to reformers • Gorbachev is forced out as president by democrats but he or another traditionalist remains as head of the CPSU which is able to retain the loyalty of the leadership of the KGB military and MVD T h i create a situation of dual power in at least parts of the country Indicators and Triggers The current political situation is highly volatile and could quickly unravel and throw the country into a succession crisis with few indicators While the reformers' drive to unseat Gorbachev will continue to be fairly public a traditionalist initiative would be a secret conspiracy executed suddenly Military activity would no doubt be associated with it and while preparations for a nationwide state of emergency could probably be detected the moves precedin a coup probably would not and even if they were their intent would not be clear bl 1 b '3 Any of the following developments could precipitate a crisis that could bring the leadership situation to an immediate head • Gorbachev's death or sudden incapacitation would give the traditionalists some advantages if they were able to keep the information secret and then tried to present the succession as a fait accompli • The current labor si tuation could quickly escalate into a national general · strike aimed at bringing down the government • The death of Yel'tsin whether or not by natural causes would spark massive demonstrations against the regime if it is attributed to the KGB as it most likely would 10 'M CRE' f J I r · -ECRET 1 ' _ • • The belief by traditionalists that their days are quickly coming to an end could prompt them to make a preemptive move • After he wins the Russian presidency Yel'tsin and reformers could mobilize the populace to press for the removal of Gorbachev • Another confrontation between security forces and civilians resulting in civilian deaths especially if it is much mo · d in a Slavic region could spark widespread protests baa - - ' Policy Implications No matter what type of succession takes place initially the new political arrangements are not likely to be stable At a minimum elements of the losing side are unlikely to relinquish power smoothly so there could be a period of intensified struggle that could escalate into widespread upheaval Under such unstable conditions a reformist or traditionalist regnne would focus on consolidating power and put other issues on the back burner Nevertheless there would 9uickly be some distinct differences between how each would deal with the most pressmg domestic and foreign policy issues € 1 ithi# The Reformers The exact course of events if reformers took over would depend on circumstances and who the new leaders would be The result however would be a more or less rapid devolution of power to the republics • For at least a transition period a reconstituted center would exist but its policies would be set by collective decisions of the participating republics This would likely be an unwieldy arrangement dominated by Russia It would control the military and limited aspects of foreign policy but decisions over most domestic matters would be transferred to the republics One of the first targets of the new regime would be dismantling the repressive capabilities of the KGB • Different domestic policies would quickly emerge in various republics In most of the European parts of the USSR democratic institutions would develop and there would be a transition to a market economy In Central Asia and parts of the Caucasus authoritarian regimes would likely eTT'_ rge • The military would be under the joint control of the republics but Russia would have the predominant role While the Slavic core might agree to support a common military effort each republic would probably develop some of its own forces possibly allowing for some cer traJized command Sovi_et nuclear pabp_iti s Y- uld e_m ain under a smgle command Repubhcs not paruc1panng m JOlilt rruhtary operations almost certainly the Baltics and the Caucasus would raise their own small armies with small conventional arms but some mi$ht maintain some sort of bilateral defense arrangements with the Slavic core that could allow bases to continue to operate on their soil ll c · ' 1 b 3 J • Although a reconstituted center would probably retain an overall ordin ting role f reign policy it _would be iffi t for t to conclude mtemational negot1at1ons without active republic _paruc1pat1on The republics would probably uphold existing internat10nal obligations and treaties although the dispersion of authority could make implementation and enforcement difficult The republics would also qmckly begin to pursue independent foreign policies and would be particularly anxious to move ahead in establishing forei n economic rel_ations as Ml1as in some cases defense agreements with their neighbors fti -' M a The Traditionalists the opposition Traditionalists would try to move quickly to clamp down on • They would immediately arrest and conceivably even execute key leaders of the opposition including Yel'tsin reimpose strict media censorship ban activities by opposition political groups and revert to tight central control over the economy • Although there would be severe economic constraints the decline in defense spending would probably stop ' j -0 • While the main focus would be on reestablishing control at home foreign policy would become less flexible Progress on arms control would be extremely difficult but existing agreements probably would be observed Soviet active measures would increase and if the domestic situation were temporarily stabilized the leadership would probably look for targets of opportunity to reassert Soviet influence abroad provided the political and economic costs are not too high -' tr' -c -o 0 ' 0 O -' • The regime would adopt a much more truculent public posture toward the West and there would be an internal campaign blaming the country's problems on Western subversion Although the regime would still be mterested in pursuing economic cooperation it policies would create a very unfavorable climate for ·oiot economic ventures and other cooperative efforts R J f3 A Temporary Compromise Because it would be so unstable a temporary political compromise would m_a ke ' my major shifts in policy difficult especially in foreign and defense policy Such a coalition would be preoccupied with the domestic stflli gle and would be unlikely to focus on foreign policy making it difficult to come to closure on arms control negotiations Individual republics however would use the opportunity to press their own agendas abroad and push for recognition as independent states Reformers might be able to make some progress in advancing their domestkinitiatives and the shift of power to the republics would be accelerated giving them greater latitude to pursue their own agendas b f1 tJ 12 I ' I •i ' • -BEClt - Prospects A Messy Transition No matter what happens the current political system in the Soviet Union is doomed H traditionalists seize power with massive use of force and repression they might temporarily reestablish control of most of the country Under such a regime the economy would continue to deteriorate and social alienation would increas almost certainly democratic and nationalist movements would reemerge Time is workin against the traditionalists however The longer force is not used the weaker their position will become The security services will continue to fracture while democratic and nationalist forces continue to gain stren h and organize Moreover as workers increasingly feel the pinch of recent pnce hikes and the economy continues its downward spiral labor unrest is almost certain to become more serious fueling pressures to change the system f JN i b ca Even if Gorbachev mana es to remain in office a year from now the Gorbachev era is over The sharp decline m his power will be almost impossible to reverse and a de facto transfer of power will likely have taken place to either the reformers or traditionalists ·hv much the same policy consequences if they had come to power without him b 11 b 3 13 I 11-J - fli 1 ' Li@ b 3 Withdrawal Redaction Sheet George Bush Library Documtnt No I ubject fitle of Document and Type 02 Note Date I Restri tion Cla - ------------ From Nicholas Bums Lo Ed Hewitt Re Report on Gorbacbe Succession I pp 4 30 91 b I CoUectioo Bush Presidential Records National Security Council Record Group Office t J Seri es Bums R Nicholas Files and Hewett Ed Files Subseries Subject Files Document Doela99ified Document Follows J By NLGB on O J -t -- WHORMCat Gorbachev Succession File Location CF01486-0 ' l''- '6·_____ _ _ _ Date Closed 5 26 2000 r-'--- ---'------ - - ------ - - - OA JD Number FOJA Y Case# I 999-0304-F AppeaJ Case # Re-review Ca e # Appeal Disposition IP-2 P-5_Review Case# R Case # Disposition Date ----- I999-0304-F 28 00 MRCase# Released in ull 8 _002 MR Di po ition RE TRJ TIO Pr id nliml Re-cord tf cl • 4-1 ll • • ll04 a J P - 1 J ' • cional curil a ilitd ln rmation i I ofrhc P J'-2 kclating 10 the 1ppointmrn1 to 1-' edtral office 1 • 2 o thc PRA P-J R J • ould Yi late a cderal statute I 1 3 of1he PRAI P-4 Rek c would di sclo e trade cc re or conlidco1i11I commcrd • I or financial In format ion f a -' of lhc PRAJ P-5 Release would disclose confidcnti al advice between lhe Pre idcnl and biJ ad i ors or between such 11d isors I• S of the PRAI P-6 Reita ould con ituce • early unwarranted 111 •• sion of personal prh•at • J a 6 of 1hc P I trlccion s c n111foed in donor' dcrd or OD Freedom of Information c t - 5 • 552 b J April 30 1991 Ed Here are some thoughts for your Scowcroft letter to Webster on the CIA study 1 The paper is out-dated It was conceived and written before the agreement of the nine and Gorbachev's apparent shift in course In my view those events argue for a rethinking of some of the major points in the paper They should at least give the CIA pause in their stark view of Soviet internal affairs 2 I see this as essentially two different papers The first part is a concerted attempt to make an airtight case that Gorbachev has no chance of surviving and that Soviet politics will be a struggle between reformers and traditionalists They ought to think carefully about infusing this section with a more nuanced approach The second part of the paper is much more useful--it describes the process by which Gorbachev could be ousted and indicates who might do it and how I think this is by far the more relevant and interesting for policymakers 3 In the interest of objectivity they ought to at least make a try at the possibility that Gorbachev might survive The paper needs to be buttressed by a section on how he might survive and the impact his continued rule could have on both left and right NB tJr