81 • -0 G -'f»• - kT '1 l---i ps m St c Ft T AS DEFINED BY ATOMIU ENERGY ACT OF 1954 COPY NO TOP RlIB'liICTED DATA OF 3 COPIES 1 1958 REPORT OF THE NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMI'rl'EE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 10 November 1953 NSS Declassification Review EO 13526 Declassified in Part on 10 2712010 B_y Mar_y Ronan roP S_l C R ED DATA TS•NES-777-58 -1- IFU SJCJ n c u ci ICJ A A £ie - s I-O F s G·R - F AS DEFINED BY ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 AS DEFINED BY ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 - DATA II A GENERAL SU1'14ARY AND CONCLUSIONS This Net Evaluation 1s based upon analysis of world-wide operations in a general war initiated by th USSR in m1d-1961 with strategic surprise Military actions result- ing from implementation of a single hypothetical SOVIE' ' war plan countered by implementation of a single hypothetical war plan were considered in this analysis u s The implementing actions and counteractions governed by meticulously prepared opera tional factors were inter-played only once Carefully predetermined assessment factors remained constant during the analysis The analysis procedure provided for each aide a single 11st of Actual Ground zeros AGZ's of weapons detonated against the enemy country and these in turn served as the basis for the assessment of damage to the UNITED STATES and the USSR as summarized below B EFFECT OF SOVIEn' ATTACK 1 Description of Attaclc a Measures to Attain Strategic Surprise Minimum essential SOVIET'forces were alerted prior to H-hour the time of penetration of ALLIED warning nets world-wide only 500 Long Range Air Force LRAF airo t a£t were allowed away from home bases prior to H - 15 minutes and not more than 50 submarines were allowed H-hour to deploy on the high seas prior to SOVIE ' SATELLITES were not informed of the attack until H-hour b The Initial Attaclc Maximum forces consistent with reasonable restrictions to preserve strategic surprise struck with concerted effort at H-hour 04oOZ Tuesday 15 May 1961 midnight Eastern Daylight Saving Time 14-15 May 1961 At that moment two clandestine eight megaton devices ED DATA AS DEFINED -9- BY ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 fR R'·'Il C TCJ m11 4 ' •• k r E O R E T AS DEFINED BY ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 TOP R- ElS'ffir CTED DATA were detonated one in SOVIET diplomatic premises in WASHINGTON D C and one in offices of the SOVIEr United Nations Delegation in NEW YORK CITY At the same time the first of 42 11 end-run 11 bombers neared bomb release lines BRL 1 s Eight of these bombers had sneaked into contiguous radar coverage disguised as BRITISH airliners on established airways Also the first wave of' 140 250· ·scheduled 1ntercontin- - ental ballistic missiles ICBM 1 s penetrated the Ballistic Missile Earl warning BMEW Line the first main wave of 354 450 scheduled LRAF aircraft penetr ted the Distant Early Warning DEW Line and 11 miss1le-laun6hing submarines attacked the cont I nental UNITED STATES while 16 others attacked U S bases SOVIEr intermediate range ballistic missiles IRBM 1 s overseas attacked u s and ALLIED atonu o-oapable forces overseas · Alerted at H-hour SOVIfil' tactical air Navy and Army forces augmented by BULGARIAN and NORTH KOREAN forces implemented emergency plans to attaclc ti s and ALLIED forces with nuclear weapons and to launch planned campaigns to s ize WESTEru EUROPE including ENGLAND the MIDDLE EAST and SOUTH KOREA earlier alerting o·r Sacrificing tactical forces and thu1 1 delaying nuclear attaclc on u s and ALLIED tactical lert forces was deemed necessary to avoid premature alert1ng or·u s and ALLIED strategic alert forces a11d This delay proved·costly as u s ALLIED alert forces were not seriously degraded prior to take-oi' i' • c In the first 30 Damage 1n First 30 Minutes minutes the initial strategic attacks destroyed in addition to WASHINGTON and NEW YORK CITY some 50 per oent of SAC bases world- - ide along with 1 255 SAC aircraft of all types including some 14 per cent ICBM sites or the ALERT FORCE or Also three out of' five U S and ALLIED IRBM sites and tc¥El©J ere dest •oyed SECRET RESTli TA _ - TOP -10 - RJt _ R O eT· 'D' '' i 'i Dfj if' '-' ' ia si f - - ' i 'f' ·p S··EG• R E t _ AS DEFINED BY ATOMIC ENERGY AC OF 1954 'f RiJ' U-'iD olir-w· ·P - S TI AS DEFINED BY ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 TOP CTED DATA d Continued Attack to Ht 30 00 Hours 'lb e attack on C0KUS continued with a second wave of 115 of 250 scheduled ICBM's targeted largely against-Air Defense-installations The ntire ICBM attack 500 scheduled resulted in detonation of 234 In addition there were 37 weapons 187 MT on U S • targets detonations off-target and 17 duds 'Ihe SOVIETS also continued ·the attacl-c with second third and fourth waves of IRAF bombers and with submarine-launched missiles By H I 30 00 hours the LRAF had a residual of only 139 nuclear weapons suitable for employment against C0NUS It had operational less than seven per cent of its initial bomb r force w ith no Lt 1AF home bases usable The nuclear ·exchange was therefore declared terminat i l at H ·30 00 hours bombel 8 penetrated 1 During the en ire attack 750 LRAF manned u s ·contiguous rac ar About 61 per cent wer·e attrited by defense forces with suri'ace-to air missile SAM defenses a coµnting fol' somewhat ovei• 50 per cent of the k1lls All strategic actions against CONO'S resulted in 909 enemy nuclear weapons 4 215 MT penetrating C jntiguous radar coverage Of this number 274 weapons 2 007 MT were killed by nuclear air defense weapons In addition 150 of the-weapons were detonated off targe t many in of'f-sho1 a coastal waters and having no direct effect on CONUS when carriers were destroyed without a weapon kill or ICBM' s fell dotm- -range from target SOVIET Army Navy and tactical air forces also had virtually exhausted their nuclear capabilities without defeating U S and ALLIED 2 t'or ces with their -superior nuclear support Weights of SOVIET Attaaks The a bo•le des cl ibed attacks succeeded in detonating 553 weapons of varying size in or near and affecting the C0NUS 2 186 MT Total yield of these weapons was Of the weapons detonated 398 1 092 MT were- on military targets 87 476 MT struck non-miUtat'Y targets and 68 618 MT were misses which contributed little to the blast effect but significantly to the thermal and fallout effect TOP SSCf RESIJ R CTED DATA -11- IR E n 40 e '1tf r R1lf' a·s r 'lil ' •1ffje- 't 4T•0P l il$-EO R'E- 'f i ' l · ·-r ' '§t ' J • • • AS DEFINED BY ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1 54 ·iX J R y ftR Oe• • e • ¼ cW l ffes - ' • 1 •w 0 - G· R·-E-T AS DEFINED BY ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 TOP § elm R-Es1rf-l'fCTED DATA Strategic actions detonated weapons of 146 megatons equivalent yield on other areas or the WESTERN HEMISPHERE CANADA ALASKA GREENLAND ICELAND AZORES BERMUDA PUERTO RICO SOVIET tactical air and tactical ball istic missile TBM attacks detonated 232 megatons on ALLIED ocean island and overseas bases and 481 megatons on WESTERN EUROPE NORTH AFRICA and the MIDDLE EAST SOVIET naval attacks delivered 12 Ml' on CONlJS 39 MT on ALLIED ocean island and ovet'seas bases and 123 on WESTERN EUROPE NORTH Al 'RICA and the MIDDLE EAST Mr USSR ground-delivered weapons aggre ated 3 85 Ml' in WESTERN EUROPE and o 8 Ml' in the MIDDLE EAST 3 Damage by SOVIET Attaclcs a All but Military Forces Damage and Residuals five or SAC•s initial 56 operational bomber bases were out of action by Hf 30 00 hours Lost or denied by rallout were over 1 700 aircraft or all types and nuclear weapon hough 313 B-47 1 a 1 106 B-52 1 a 1 22 B-58 1 s'and 678 ined operational w1th a total res dual o osa· or Uve • I initial nine major SAC operational headq arters and serious degradation or bases support racilities and malntenanoe capabilities# as well as the cumulative effects of fallout i- ould delay ror several days· the regrouping· and preparations necessary to launch rurther maJor strikes Air Defense forces had been degraded by loss of Continental Air Defense Command CONAD Headquarters 50 per cent or their manned interceptors and more than 50 per·cent or SAM units toss of control centers and seriously degraded collllilunicat1ons had lowered defem1e effectiveness even more than is indicated by numbers of The U S Navy lost 25 per cent defense units out of action or its surface ship operating bases and 50 per cent of its submarine bases Naval aircraft losses were 23 per cent ihile Navy combat ship losses were only 20 per cent The Navy TOP SECRET r • l S DATA -12- ijJt r fi G l '' ' -li i i IOJJtirl i lJ 1 iM'i'li cl l ii T JP ' SE-0-R err AS DEFINED BY ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 · -Rj R G e '1 f i • _ ' ' i 9 p -- E T AS DEFINED BY ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 TOP · ICTED DATA · -etained more than 70 per cent of its initial allocation of t l'J Qj CONUS Army combat capa'oility was de per cent Howe er difficulty of control · transportation and communications would delay mobilization to a erious degree The five U S divisions in EUROPE suffered 26 per cent casualties but ALLIED divisions lost only ten PE 1•etaine l thei•s te npoi•arily denied virtually esidual intact with some Tactical air forces in EUROPE ' ·cnougl losing much-of thei1• base structure retained 299 nuclear carriers 617 non-nuclear carriers 989 ' • ' j emporarily denied and-adequate bases and aircraft for delivery b · Damage to CONUS 1 STATES General 'J 'he SOVIET attack on the UNITED resulted in the detonation·of 553 nuclear weapons with a total yield of 2 1 186 megatons ' be daraag caused· by these weapons was such that the UNITED STATES would not fully return to pi•e-attaok status for years The direct ei'fects of' the attaclc we1•e a sti•uctural damage OV t' Blast overpressure sufficient to cause i'Ol r per cent of the land area of the nation most 01' which was· urban b Widespread fires which ultimately btn•ned out 169 000 square miles or 5 7 per cent or the land area • -13- ' lff T Ff1 C1 Wt 10 o T o p-sEelfET AS DEFINED BY ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 t ATA c A lethal blanket of·radiation which covered at its maximum one-half the nation and persisted in small areas for over two years 2 Effect on Population Twelve million people were killed outright and casualties largely from radiation continued to increase for a year after the attack By this tin1e there were 50 million dead and nine million sick or injured out of a pre-attack population of 179 million 3 Effect on Survival Needs ·nation to exist were generally available The needs or the Where housing and food supplies were lost the population also perished In many areas there were surpluses but in the northeast section 6£ the country there were severe shortages causing famine until supplies could be brought in The complete inadequacy of' remaining medical resources constituted one of the gravest problems facing the nation 4 Effect on Co11u11unications and Transportation The nationwide system of radio and telecommunicati on f'acilitfes suffered severe disruptions In the earl post-attack period only local communication was possible but by D f 30 nationwide service was r estored on an emergency basis 'Vransportat1on sys ems were paralyzed by the attack to the extent that oomplete effectiveness could not be restored within a year Due to t e large areas denied by radiation the distrib tion of he most urgent survival needs could be accomplished only by airlift 5 Effect on Industry Roughly 20 per cent of' the nation's industrial resources were destroyed and an additional 60 per cent were denied by radiation for periods varying from two weeks to one year '11th the exception or medical supplies the remaining resources were capable of meeting the needs of the nation with severe rationing of some commodities The war-producing capabilities of the country were immediately reduced by 80 per cent and although the majority or these t1esources were recovered within three months the peculiar TOP SEC s llESTR ccTED DATA -14- RJE' S R- O n Pi ri ts -- fA 'l At r X Q a efSE G· R·E7 AS DEFINED BY ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 IR 11 R• 1 Gi 9' 1 9 i f « ®' • ' lQ G·R€ As DEFINED BY ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 shortage or certain critical items would keep war production to a small fraction of pre-attack volume for at least one year 6 Effect on Iabor 'lhe nation 1 s ability to produce goods was most seriously affected by the immediate loss of one-third or the labor force Although the survivors could be a gmented by people previously unemployed the over-all effectiveness of labor would·barel reach 50 per cent of pre-attack efficiency within ·one year 7 Finance As a result of the heavy loss of banking facilities and general disruption of the complex domestic financial system1 large segments of the· population would be dependent on a barter system for six to 12 months after the attack 8 Government ' he Federal Government with the exception of the Vice-Pl esident and the Secretary of the Interior was virtually wiped ut However the majority or State governments survived and Congress could be reconstituted by appointment In the initial phase or reoovery state and local governments would be the prinoipal sources of_ authority until the Federal Government could be re-instituted re-located and effectively begin to deal 1th its overwhelming task 9 Summary Loo d ng ahead to the years afte the SOVIET attack the survival of the UNITED STATES as a nation appears highly probable ·There will be drastic changes but with the material available the remaininB population is capable or eventually attaining pre-attack standards under determined leadership ls l IR'i' f r- R ' u ' ·E l'l' f'J ' • · j ' if-·l • i e-p 7ii 50iEee•R'E'T AS DEFINED BY ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 TO S ICTED DATA C EFFECT OF U S ATTACK 1 Description of Attack _ Receiving warning of hostile attaclt at Hf l minute S C immediateiy ordei ed the alert 1 force to launch 6 minutes By The i'irst planes weI'e orr the runway at H HI 30 minutes f 449 bomber and electronic counter- measures ECM aircraft and 311 suppoz·ting tanker aircraft were airborne This force delivere I· gainst 341' target areas 253 oi' which were_ population-industrial complexes and Due to losses on t e ground and aborts on lal l lchers only five or the ten alert force ICBM' s i'lere iaunchecl tal gets Fi fty-three or 90 programmed IRBW s were launched · 41 arriving on target at about Only three hit Hf be genei•ated SAC began launching tt1e follow-on strike 01 00 hour and launched as·rast as aircraft could As a result the timing of the SAC assault shows no clear delineation between waves Beginning at about H - 06 30 and continuing until Hf 16 00 there was an almost contin1Jous penetration of SOVIET defenses by attackins a Lrcl•af't All avallable SAC aircraft and missiles were launched by about H 17 30 hours Eight hundred five SAC carriers wit --enetra ted OVIET de enses d li·1e1•1n_ civilian t rgets and targets · other weapons detonated off-ta get SOVIET interceptors SAM• • and antiairct aft artillery AAA guns destroyed 367 SAC aircl'aft The guns accounted for slightly less than 10 per cent or the klils with the remainder split approximately equally between TOP SEC g i'D fcl I RESTRICTED DATA -16-· SAM 1 s and interceptors Only iRt Jl11 ·••f • t t1rM- e - @ T 1 AS DEFINED BY ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 TOP - ICTED DATA Theater Air forces reacted rapidly after receipt of warning of strikes against and laWlched large numbers airfields radar and control sites missile sites and military complexes 'lllese forces scheduled 1 076 aircraft and 264 missile strikes · equivalent yield placin on SOVIET BLOC targets Naval ·forces in the east ATLANTIC and MEDITERRANEAN a truck at targets in the EUROPEAN SATELLITES and the USSR Wh le PACIFIC naval forces attack d targets in COMMUN LST CHINA and the USSR 'lbe Navy's P6M multiple bomb delivery capability enable tHe deployed forward to deliver From submarines deployed forward at H•hour were launched at strategic targets impacting on target Naval forces strikes during the period of hostilities g1vin impacts in the target areas were given valuable time to occupy emergency combat positions as SOVIET ground and tactical air forces were not alerted until H-hour This prevented unacceptable casualties prior to dis- persal in combat formations With superior ground-delivered atomic support U S and ALLIED ground torces stabilized the SOVIET advance some 25 miles in side WEST GERMANY TURKISH forces contained the BULGARIAN and SOVIET advance3 near the TURKISH borders and u s and SOUTH KOREAN forces halted the advance or the NOOTH KOREANS DANISH troops contained and were eliminating at Hf 30 00 hours the one SOVIET airhead established SAC 2 delivered weapo·na on the USSR R DATA -17- Is'° ' if 1 l _'a l _ --£ -- r • a T Q ' ' 5_ r r- r »aE U Jt R ff ff '-iitft•- -v1 _ 1 --m E -- 'i Y J i T AS DEFINED BY ATOMIC EN RGY Aqf OF 1954 R i •fi 'iOs$ e e 4t £' i A @ •wJ J P S -R'E 'T AS DEFINED BY ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 t€ti ©J -a Military Forces Damage and Residuals • LRAF command and control facilities were virtually eliminated by Ii f 30 _oo hours 'rh1r y-one 1' 33 1n1t1al higher head qua rters had beer destroyed along wi th all home bases of the LRAF bomber units Of the initial fo ce of l 500 heavy and medium bomber-type aircraft about 95 per cent were deAtroyed expended or denied ·by fallout Some gr per oent·or the ICBM inventory and 93 per cent of the IRBM inventory had been lost expended or denied Sixty-seven heavy and medium bombers rema1ned operational with 84 others denied by fallout One hundred thirty-nine nuclear weapon13 suitable for employment against CONUS fallout were operational with 37 others denied by However general disorganization and laclc of control would inevitably delay any effort to launch further strikes Air Defense forces retained 5 972 interceptors of an initial 15 724 However only 18 of 81 initial b ees were usable and only 47 per cent of the ground controlled in ercept ·cocI sites were operationa Only 37 per cent or SAM installations remained operat1on i with greatly reduced communications Personnel effectiveness in all Air Defense installations averaged only 35 per cent Tactical air forces retained 974 aircraft with 549 or them denied or 3 840 initial inventory Only six TOP SEC RESTR DATA -18 RIE $ U -R 0· ' '1 fef§ $iJ e· i e 'i 'J Jli f ' ifric' i 'tO eii 40 S E C fl 6X i As··•o·EFINED BY ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 AS DEFINED BY ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF TOP 'fffICTED 1954 DATA nuclear weapons remained available with 23 others denied All naval operating bases were lost and only 10 per cent of na val support personnel remained effective Six hundred twenty-one or 897 initial ships survived at H 30 00 including 330 of 532 submarines Eighty of t ese ships including 55 ·submarines were denied by 303 air- r which were denied craft but onl by fallout The SOVIET Navy· was not capable of sustained operations since re-supply and service 'l'tere not availa ie · SOVIET Army forces in WESTERN EUROPE ·had suffered some 35 per cent personnel casualties 1n the 24 divisions which were 1n action Badly outclassed in numbers of grounddelivei'ed nuclear weapons 'at the outset the SOVIET forces at H 30 00 retained only nine of 200 initial nuclear weapons for close support One·hundred fifty divisions inside the USSR of unestimated residual strength might eventually reinforce the depleted div sions on the Western Front However lo of 10 nu l1tary district headquarters 'had been destroyed and commun1 at1ons and transpo tat1on were so badly·disrupted as to delay and weaken any such effort • I ogist1c· ·support capab1l1tie i were very limited with 01· ly 12 per cent of the depots and supply centers remaining IA w residual capability to handle and move stoolcs rurthei• reduced lo 1stic capabilities Move- ment of large tonnages oi' supplies into or within the US SR appeared impossible for several months A iimited capability rema ned· for air transport or troops and supplies as 301 of an initial l 130 troop carrier aircraft were residual with 4G of tl'lem denied by fallout and further fallout denial anticipated b Damage to SOVIET Resources 1 General Damage to physic al production facilities communications networks and transportation TOP S iffiICTED DATA t'acilities was extensive was in population However the most damaging loss Combined·errects of physical damage and personnel losses are estimated in the swnmary hereto 2 The SOVIET pre-attack population Populat o n of 206 million was depleted by 44 million immediate casualties 41 million of them fatalities By DI 30 days there were nearly 127 million casualties in the USSR with 106 million fatalities and by D 6 months there wel 'e nearly 120 million casualties with 114 million fatalities The total pre-attack population·of 952 million people in the SINO-SOVIET BLO C sui'f'ered 75 million immediate casualties 71 million of them fatalities Thei•e were 249 million casualties at D f 30 days including 196 million fatalities At D f 6 months there were over 229 million casualties ·including 215 million fatalities 'l'hese figures ·include extremely high proportions or population or· the larger cities and industrial compiexes 3 Government Control and Communications Control facilities in the national capital cities ot MOSCOW PEIPING and PYENGYONG were completely dest oyed In 14 or· the 15 UNION REPUBLICS of the USSR capital cities suffered serious dama e and casualties of over control force 90 per cent among the It is extremely doubtful that central control could be established throughout th SINO-SOVIET BL09 within the period of one year 4 survival Potential ood and housing losses · were compensated by greater per·centage population losses and so quantitatively presented no great problem Control ani l distribution of food however presented a 131 ave problem Medical supply shortages wei•e acute and could not be alleviated Substantial new casualties and fatalities were the inevitable result TOP • • -•Ti''i'Rl DATA ' - - R -' -20- £ Sl -0 lQ e A A r 11f IP ' ✓ 2 1 tO EL 1i-• S 6G R r AS DEFINED BY ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 AS DEFINED BY ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF TOP CTED 1954 DATA 5 The economy of the USSR Economic Disruption was reduced to localized operations during the first postattaclt year by Transport capability w 1 thin the USSR was reduc ed 88 per cent during the first year ' he SOVIET Gross National Pl •oduct GNP was ·reduced by some 75 per cent for the ·year following attach Total SINO-SOVIET BLOC GNP was dec1·eased by about 56 pei • cent SOVIET production War Supporting Industry 6 was reduced by 85 per cent that of the FAR EAST BLOC by 64 per cent but that of the EUROPEAN SATELLITES b • only 35 Jo l' ce i t for tl1e first year afte1· at tack 7 SUll1Ill9 ry of Damage It is probable that the USSR and CHINA would survive as nat ions but with governments and economies in greatly modified form CHINA would revert to an agra1•ian economy and remain in that status· fol· some yearsJ as its modern industrial plant was vi i •tually eliminated USSR might by shifting to 'The ts industry those labo1• forces available 1n rural areasJ the SATELLITE countriesJ and CHINA rezain aventually some 50 pe cent of pre-attack industrial capacity D LONG TEnM EFFECTS OF RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT The Atomic Energy Cornmission estimates effects on the appi•o cimately 130 million sui•vivors in the tn I 1$D STATES aa fol lows 1 and on Genetic effects of some degree on 2 million pregnancies Goo ooo live births 2 Average life expectancy reduced by 800 to 1600 da 'S 3 Nearly 2 million cases· o t ' leui emia and between 2 6 anu 5 2 million cases DATA o' bone cancer -2l- JE fil r we ' c5 o -f--£ts e · 'f f •J 'li ' 111 1 ' i 4 0 f J $EG R E T AS DEFINED BY ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 • r 'tl1llfe 1E O Tffef S t T AS DEFINED BY ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 T RESTRICTED DATA E CONCLUSIONS Any evaluation of net capabilities at a time three years in the future is necessar l ly speculative We have had to make definite assumptions regarding a number of factors with respect to which our knowledge 1s limited We are unable to detennine with assurance 01' accuracy the composition strength and equipment four own forces in 1961 We are uncertain of the low altitude capability of Air Defense Wea _ ons Systems the impact of offensive Electronic Countermeasures on those syste111s and the operational status of the Ballistic Missile Early warning System The effect of radiation clouds on col ll'llunication and warnine systems is worthy of particular mention Preliminary reports from the recent Hardtack series of nuclear tests indicate that radiation clouds of' nuclear explosions above 100 000 feet can cause communications blackouts and seriously deg1•a de such systems over a wide area Insufficient data exists at present to justify a conclusion as to the possible impact of' this development I bt1t the NESC Staff will closely review the evaluation of' the Hardtack tests Our estimates of' the strength composition equipment and state of tactical development of SOVIET forces are of' necessity even more conjectural than those of' our own _forces Although our assumptions are based on National Intelligence Estimates '01' the 1961 time period there are many critical areas not adequately treated by these estimates upon which specific assumptions were necessary Among these were The composition of the SOVIET Nuclear Weapons Stockpile The organization and disposition of' the SOVIETLonz Range A lr TOP Force SECE i -' P E D DATA -22- AS ·DEFINED BY ATOMIC ENERGY AGT OF 1954 DATA The state of development of tactics equipment and techniques of the SOVIK'l' Forces The operational characteristics of SOVIET missiles and aircraft Despite the deficiencies which we have recognized our studies have convinced us that the hypothetical nuclear exchange which has been summa1•ized is within realistic limits and that the results indicated are sufficiently valid to ju·stify the following conclusions 1 In 1961 a nuclear wa1• initiated by the USSR under condition of strategic surprise would result in devastation of vast areas of both the UNITED STATES and the USSR but the· balance of strength would be on the side o1' the UNITED STATES at the termination of the nuclea1• exchange 2 In 1961 the USSR will have the net capability of ·aelivering a·aurpriae nuclear attack on the UNITED STATES which could result in the loss of one-thir6 of the population and one-i'ii'th of the resources and the disruption of the politicalJ social and economic structure of the nation Additionally the long range e i'feots of radiation would adversely affect millions more of the surviving population ·1n years to follow 3 A general nuclear war• initiated by the SOVIETS in 1961 would result in devastation within the USSR which would virtually eliminate that nation as a world power unless the USSR can· substantially degrade the U S alert retaliatory forces prior to launch 4 In 1961 the SAC Alert Force can be successfully launched providing a m1n1mwn of 15 minutes tactical warning can be obtained against sul'prise attack by ICBM submarine launched m1ssiles and end-run bombers Unless such warning 1s provided or some tactical means such as an airborne alert TOP SECR R E S DATA o -23- ffe r-R tf1r' u i n F- E e'RC 'T AS DEFINED B_Y ATOMIC ENERG ' ACT OF T · STiUCTE D DATA 1954 - bomber force is developed the tnUTED STATES must accept the probability that its massive nuc·lear retal1atol IJ capability will be substantially deg aded in the event of surprise attack In these circumstances the balance of strength could be on the side of the USSR at the termination of the nuclear exchange 5 In 1961 the estimated SOVIET ICBM capability _alone could heavily darnage the UNITED STATES 1 and 1 without the critical 15 minute warning provided by Ballistic Missile Early Warning System could seriously degrade the nuclear retaliatory capability 6 The possible damage resulting from unopposed ICBM · attacks in the 1961 time period again points up the need for urgent development or ai t anti-ICBM system 7 In 1961 a well conceived and coordinated clandes- tine nuclear attack aGainst SAC bases could ii' i•isked by the USSR and if' preparat_ions therefor were undetected re1 1ult in sel '1ous cleg t'adation oi' the SAC AleI't Force m1clear 1•etaliatory capability a The unrestricted employiaent of nuclear a1r defense weapons at all altitudes in the highly integrated u s air defense system planned for 1961 could significantly degrade the capability or the USSR to inflict damage upon the UNITED STATES by massive nuclear attaclc 1 but sorre u s casualties ·must be accepted from these nuclear air defense weapons 9 The concentration or the u s retaliatory effort against a combined milita t J-urban industrial target system as opposed to a strictly military target system would destroy the SOVIET nuclear off'ens1ve capability ancl at the same time inflict increased casualtiee on the order of' 50 per cent the eby substantially reducing the capability of the USSR to recover TOP S RE'f CTED DATA -24- 'E s lr i f T AS DEFINED BY ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 D A T A 10 'l'he effects of radioactive fallout will more than double tile number or casualties resulting from the blast theri lal and direct radiation effects of a nuclear attack 11 ·Casualties rrom radioactive fallout could be significantly reduced by a comprehensive fallout shelter p1•ogram and by a forcefully conducted national education progrrun to insure complete understanding by evecy citizen of actions required 'or survival during and following a nuclear attaclt 12 A· re- examination of the Nat i onal Strategic Stockpile should be made with a view to the incorporation of finished products e g food medical supplies tools radiation detection and decontamination equipment stoclced at disperse locations throughout the nation to asSlst in recovery following m icle attack 13 Chaotic conditions·which can be expected as a result of massive nuclear attack require comprehensive integrated Federal and State plans supported by legislation to insure the continuance or early re-establ1s unent of organ1zad civ11 goverrune1_1 t under the Constitution These plans should provide for the utilization of available military fot'ces including National Guard and Reserve Fol•ces to prevent interference with the military defense of the nation and to assist the civil government in the maintenance or restoration of order and recovery F RECUHRENT CONCLUSIONS Stud tes of the net capabilities of the USSR to inflict damage on the UNITED STATES by massive nuclear attack have been conducted on an annual basis since 1953 Evaluation Subcommittee and its predecessors by the Net During the preparation of the report of this year it was considered appropriate that the Net Evaluqt1on Subcommittee Staff exam1n TOP S Q mll '' T E D DATA -r1a1r-1' rtV •TAAa1 °' -25--••---•• •-- - R 2 - e Aif ¼ • toA-- ff ET AS DEFINED BY ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 · · RES' i'IUCTED DATA past i•eports and study their conclus1ons fo i comparison purposes This examination revealed that conclusions of past x•eports are comparable and _mutually supporting in many respects Similar findings in critical area a although diffei•ine somewhat in phraseology have recurred with persistent frequency l Beginning with 1954 ea ch report has contained a con·clusion that a · surprise nuclear attack on the UNITED STATES wot1ld result in the disruption of the political - socia l and economic structure of the nation 2• Each report beginning with 1955 has contained a conclusion that a nuclear_generai war initiated by the USSR would result in de astation of both the UNITED STATES and the USSR 3 Beginning with the J 956 report each has contained one or more conclusions l n critical m l litary area a regarding · a The indispensable l 'equ l rement to maintain an adequately protected nuclear retaliatory capability b The actions required to insure the employment or the SAC alert fo 'ce in the light or the drastically reduced warning time caused by the development of the SOVIET ICBM capability c The reqt1irement for a highly ef f'ective air defense system l Two of the reports contained conclusions concerning the necessity for inte3ratea plans to 1nsure continuance of the govei nment the re-examination of the St1•ategic Stockpile and the reduction of casualties by a comprehensive shelter program We consider that the persistent recurrence of these conclusions tends to support tho i r validity and to substanti ite the conclusions reached in the 1958 Net Evaluation • __ __ _ ---·· ·-- - _ _