---·- - -- · -ref-SECRET W' '' IJ 1%1 JUN 26 · Subj e-· bl ll b 3 ' THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF waahi 1Ston 25 D c 11 19 JCSM-431-61 --- J § --o · 0fr8l W - June ENSE · 1961 _-- z_ 11 1 l 1 _or- · i ' · · a '- f 1--- · q '-It ' ' Berlin con ency Plam ing f ____ 7 11 made t · memorandum f1•om t - sp e i 1 Aasistan quested answers to queft1ons posed by ir Aoheson in his c - j nu1ng review of the Berlin roblom 2· 'l'he three studies were praparo l on o priority basis 'l'hey are responsive to Mr Acheson 1 n qlwot1ons on the above re- ''These qu r tions do not re1'leot quest which state a in part any policy decisions but are posed to m •catt in analytical t t'ameworlc which would be helpful problem 11 11' 1•ov t c w of thci Derlin Consideration was given to the views developed jointly by the Joint Chiei's or start with Mr an Acheson and Ge1' eral Norstad during he discussions held on· 14 June 1961 3 'l'he Joint Chiefs or Starr oonsidc1• that the tmmedio te concern is to 1nfluenoe Soviet dec101ono on Berlin before they are taken this summer or fall ' United States preparations for a Berlin crisis - 1n·the US in Europe and world-wide - should be taken 1n both nuclear and r o mucl ial• mil Lta1 y tm as concurrently In this connection tho requirement for modernizing strengthening and improving the US and Allied military posture world-wide has been recognized however the basic consideration rema1na the need for re-establishing the credibility of' the 0ur Allies muat have confi'dence and the USSR nuclear deterrent ISTRIBU'l'ION _ ' ' N ' 3 Chairman JCS 2 · I' Of '5 tP 1r __- ·· 4go · o't p Wl - ' '- - tutm' IINDEI SECIIETAlflfJq _Secy to ONO J C S C°fo l •· _ D1X'1 P ans AF h '2 • • J'Jttri MarO I s t o u ot 1 £ o 191 1 Dir J S 2 't or s ·P ' IENIT lf naR J-5 -· V Wlllts 1 p t ' s'f C '€ r· 'l'OP SECRET· Oo n of l Copies Each or a •'1 l FfJ· • 'Jl 1 i-C • DOWNGr ADED AT 12 Y 3 Al' INTERVAUJ N01' AU'roMA'rIOALLY D OLASSIF - DOD DDmC'l IVE 5200 10 f v 1R' ' S pages Ser esd 1c 1 • I• · 1 -ll 11J · f ' ' · • r r ' 11 tr7 - TOP SECRET must be made to e 1eve that the United Statoo ho a the will and determination to use nuclear eapol'ls in the defense o r NATO Berlin or the US position world-wide as necessary rather than subpiit to Soviet abr g - tOS-·and Allied 1•1ghts or poSition Berlin is the immediate concern and tho views of the Joint ·Chief's of Staff on the quest1ons posed by rte- • Dean Acheson are Gonta1ned herein •· · 4 The conclusions to the three appended studies which are prd based on the ascumption that nuclear weapol'ls will not be em- · by either side a -e SU lll'll-1 r l ed as i'ollows a• Military Me orld-W1de 1 The e irly exoout1on by the Un ted states of the measures enumerated 1n Annex C to Appendix A within the t1me l1m1ts assumed 1ri t h1a tudy e 31 October 1961 would b expected to influence the soviet decision process regarding Berlin The m1J 1tary ac·t ons can be take11 only 11' the neGessary political dec l eions required to implement them have been made ·Dripl1c1t in such political decisions 1s the acceptance ot the risk o1' goneral war 2 The measures enwnerated in Annex C to Appendix A 1n most casea depend for full effectiveness upon complete Allied cooperation particulai •ly by the nations with the • greatest interest in the Eerlil'l queotion - the United K1ngdom Prance and the Feclei•al Republic of Oerrnany FRO Un 1 ted States action alone ill feasible only to the extent that the Allies Will perm l t the use of their national territories and that the action contamplated does not involve the sovereignty 1 of an Ally signed to be a clear demonstration Tho l lt' asurus aro d - or US determination and leadership which could be expected not 011ly to 1n- fluenGe tbe Soviet decision malc1n process but also to · · TOP SECRET • restore the confidence ·or our Allies in the United states and to obtain their full cooperation and support I • · _ 3 Although a measure or Allied aereement could proba ' bly be obtaine tor the ee rl r execution of soinc of the measures envioagod in Annox C to Appendix A o g increaso state of read1 less or US forces world-wide but pal'ticularly n J urope it is clou J' irul that US Allies 1n the absence of a clear-out Sov1et-1nsp11•ed Berlin 1noidont would atroc to a ro pid and oysteraatic build-up 1'or limited nonnucloo 1• wnx• in 0 lntra1 Eii -rope together with the ri lc o f' general war 4 The execution of tho mcasuren cnvisae cd in Annex C to Appc9ndix A il'l closir nod to Jlt•or1uc a st ron l detc1•rnnt effect on the Soviets Thero 10 n 1 ioca l Jility however that the Soviets might react by tnk Lniz military coW1te1•actions to pre-empt US a nd 01• J lllod efforts to protect West Berlin For this reason the United itates must bo prepared tor general war b Types and Amount of Offenaive Nonnuclear Forc J 2 Certain Contingencies l When opposed by GDR foroos alone The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm thei1• view that the hypothesis of opposition from ODR fo r s 0 10110 10 invalid ancl that there is no su bstant3 ve C 11'fe •1mco betwoen GDR and Soviet military forces However usinG present active ODR forces as a Wlit of measurement 6 divisions and about 225 tactical aircrart it is considered that a balanced force of seven divisio11s supported by four tactical air wings could reopen access to Berlin ' l'h1s size foi•ce is based on the assumption that political limitations SECRET 3 '1'l 1'• ' 1· I t fl I 1 i' f l'' l' i1 ''l' J · ' 1 'l'OP SECffl 0 • Ji · I restrict military ope tions to the axis of the Helmstedt- t_ · Berlin autobahn and the air forces to defensive operations only 2 When opP9sed by readily availabl _USSR and GDR forces in the area or East aermanl onll• Unde1• Sl Ch a situation the hostilities could not be limited to the Helmstcdt- · Berlin corridor alone Operations would have to be con- ducted to meet and defeat Soviet and GDR forces throu hrut East Gel' l14 '1 with the objactivc of' cstabl1Sh1ng a defcmse · line on the er-Net Jae R vcr l lnc Frn •ccs on the order of' 50 allied d1v1S1ons and a corrcapcnding magnitude of air strength wow d be r uir d to achieve thio object vc • 3 To allow the Commw 1sta tim-9 and OpPortu•- ity to change theil' do lision to block acceor I the action bee l nS with Allied forces opposed by GDR forces only a balanced seven div1S1onal force with adcq1$to air support would provide during the first five days time and opportunity for the Communists to change their decision to block access In the event that tho Soviets entered the operation at any time the sit ua tion described 1n p iragra 4b 2 would per- tain • The Allied rorce _or seven div1fl1ona already committed to the Qperation could avoid destruction 7 c Adeguacy of CaJ bil t1ea 1 Af'tor a mobil1Zat1on period of four months the United states or the US and its European Allies has i 4 TOP SECHE'l' ' • I I· I I 'Jl' 11' 11 · r 'J f n- 1 1 1 J·1• Trj' t Jt 1 1 -- • f · TOP SECRET the capability or deploying sufi'icient ground and air · · forces to Eur9 to restore access to Bez lin if opposed only by GDR This same size force could avoid destruc- tion for a period of five days or 15 days 1r opposed by ·ODR and Russian forces 2 Due to the inability to determine the quality of European Allied forces and due to the l nab111ty to pre- dict with confidence that all European Allies and the ' · United States will commence full mob l lizntion four months prior to an anticipated incident in Derlin it ls considered that there would not be suft' tcient forces il'l Europe by 31 Octobor 1961 to restol•c access to Berl ll-i against successively higher levels or GDH and Soviet resistance 3 Because of the need for air bnoes stae ing a1•eas and assembly areas it 1s impractic 11 fo1• the United States to consider unilateral action in the Berlin area As a minimum full cooperation or the Federal Republic or Germany FRG is i•equired and to a lesser degree that or France and Great Britain In addition the United States cannot put sufficient f'oi•ces 1n Europe in a four-month period to restore accec s against successively higher levels or GDR and Soviet resJatance • 4 Considering the re i 1 'O1 •cemcnt rate of both sides and the need for industrial mobilization in order that the United states can aupport its Allies as well as its own forces it would riot be tensible for European Allies or the United States to engage in nonnuclear war for any • ·I extended period with the Soviet Bloc forces which could be brought into the area by 31 October 1961 caaes mobilization ' of' the Allied countries requires 15 I TdP SEORET In some 5 months and only after full mobilization of Allies and the United states is atta1nea one year plus do the Allied forces appear to exist in comparable numbers with Soviet forces • 5 The Joint Cllief's of Sta ft recog1 1ze the desirability or providing viable alter ativ s to seneral war in the event the pieasures enumerated in Annex· C to AppendiX A rail to deter the 'soviets from denying Allied aocel ls to Borlin and limited ground fo ce action 1S unsuccessful In this connection considera- t11n must be given to other measu es thnt will forcibly demonstrate on a rising scale US determination to achiove its objec- tive of restorinS aoceas to Berlin Poosible rr as wes could include consideration or actions such an the ur Cil or nuclear weapons on puraly military ta1•gc ti 1n a manner which will i'oroibly drive homo to the ovioto the scrioueness with ' ' which the United States vi_ews _the s l tu-11 on 6 • It is recommended that you note the enclosed studies and forward them to the Special Assistant to the President for N tional Security Affa u•s as requested by him for use by Mr Acheson 1n his continuing review of the Berlin problem For the Joint Chiefs of • ta f'f n L L LEMNITZER Chairmnn Joint Chiefs of jtaff Attachment TOP SECRET 6 ·ll' r D t i·· 1 fl ' l l' t'I 1 1' 1 • ·-- 111 J ' SECRET ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS RELATIVE TO BERLIN COIJ'l'INGENCY PLANNING - 1 Question How much or the Soviet nudea1• strike force would be destroyed Answer a JCS SIOP-62 plans for the attack nf about 1 000 installat_ions which ear a relationship to nucluar deli very capability The Alert Force is scheduled to attack nbout 75 perce1 t of these installations and assuming timely tactical warning or US pre-emption so that all US aJert forces survive through ni tial launch may be expected to dest1·oy· about 42 percent cir the total including all 76 airfield which constitute the home bases and pr i mti ry st ging base_s o ' the entire Soviet long-range nuclear strike capability ancl the known ICBi'1 and IR aM sites Prosr1¥ ed for attack by the Alert Forc e are all airfields with nuclear storage facilities all primary sta ing bases and all nucelar storage facilities Not at tacl ed by the Alert Force are 235 out of a total of 750 airfields These 235 airfields do not have mi11tat•y aircraft currently assigned and or re inactive or do not have support facilities The Full Force is scheduled 1to attack all of the approximately • 1 000 installations and may· e'xpect to destroy about 88 percent of them assuming no before- aunch losses Additional 1nstalla- tions would be destroyed or damaged but at a level of assurance lease than 70 percent The level of assurance for destruction of all known installations representing a direct threat to the CONUS would be h1c h - about 95 percent Vulnerabil1 ty of SIOP forces to destruction before launch is discussed in paragraph 3 f below In general and as suining timely tactical warninQ of enemy missile attack destruction before ·launch would be expected to be low for In each instance of the use of the term destroyed the term 1'B applied to those targets with an assurance of 70 percent or greater or receiving severe damage conoidering all factors of attrition and rel1ab111ty_except pre-launch destruction of S IOP forces _ TOP SECRET Jc 430-61 1 '11' 'I Ii ' · ·· r 13 t11 u • ' I J J• l l' 1J ' l • • · ' J_ ·' 4 ' I ----·-·--··-··-·- Tor -- - SEt RET · the JiJ ert- li'oroes · 11' tho Sov l t ohoulil ini intt i t-ho ttack w6uie destruct1cm betore launch be i•cla tiveily hie h Cor the tollow--0 1 t'orce unlcso there hn s b c n atr tCJ _c warning 1 utficient f'or force genei•c tlo 1 folluwC' 1 by t ·-t c il wo rning b The abOve j nformation on destrucLton of Soviet nucleax• strilce force 1s GXpressed in temis of cleotructlon of the' bases from 1 which the forces would' be la unchec1 may or may not bta on the basea nt tl1f'l base they would 'be destro 'ed The rorces themselves t tiiH oi' at·tack 11' on •he m 1mhor- ' m ba2e a time of attack would be a-function °0 t' such tactoI•s as the readiness measures taken prior to attack wlicthc1· the US or USSH struclc first and the ot ··l tei ic and tactical - i r-11ln1 wail blc to the Soviets c Annex A hereto show a dc1 a1 l ect br cn biown or the types of installations considered the numb H' plac d at rii 1 by the Alert Force attacks and the number expected to be destroyed by the Alert Ii'orce and the Full Force wHh at lea it 70' assurance The data in Annex A aa in the_ preced1113 paragraphs do not reflect those i'01• es assigned to unified and flpeci 'ied commands which are not comm'1tted to or reflect l · 1n SIOP 2 Question us European and 1l l t woulc1 ' '' tho r i v tvi b i e re1 oult · r- 1 1m 1f • n the Soviet c1v1i Sociotiea Answer a USSR and Red China l There are 103 government contr- 1 centcl•s 111 the USSR and China which appear on the SIOP •rargct List Eighty-three percent of th se could be expected to be destroy d by the I Alert Force and all by the Full Force with 70 percent or ·greater assurance in each case Acld1t l onal destruction and damage would be achieved by the Alc1·t Force but at a lev l o t' confidence less than 70' Twenty-thre_e a ditlonal govern- cent control centers may be destroyed by the Full Force as bonus incident to attack of other targets 2 ·· f' n mi -s i ••• l'I ' ' 1r1 l 1Ctu •1t•ll TOP SEpRET 2 In the USSR ' 199 cities would be struck by the Alert Force anO 295 b · i1 F' o rce By a 1959 census there are 299 cit es in the USSR of 50 000 or greater population Asauming that at least one weapon a1• ves at each programmed Del I Lred Ground Zei•o DOZ the Alei ·t Foi·ce can be expected to inflict ca ualties i cluding fa Uout effects for the first seventy-twe hourB with a 60 sliielding 'actor to 56 of the m•'ban population 'and 37% of the total · population · · c sualties to ' 'b P FUll ForciJ c n be e pcctlld to inflict 72% of the urba i popula' ion and total popula tio 'l 54 of the ThP se figur-cs would va ry dependent on the number o ' eapons actually a r1'j vin£5 at an enemy DOZ The expected destruct1011 of industri Ll floor space in the cities attacked would tie 66% for th lllin •t Force and 74% for the FUll Force 3 In China 49 c i t l es would be tl·UCk by tlie Alel't Force and 41% of the Ul'ban population and 10% of the total population would be expected co oualtleo Sevcnty-elf llt cities would ·be strucl by the Ii'ull Force and 53% of the urban population and 16% of the total poi ulotion would be expected casualties 'l'hese figureu alt o i nclude the fall- out effects mentioned above· 'l'hc expected des true tion of industrial floor space in tJ· i cltleo attacked would be 55 for the Alert Force and 6Lf7t for the l•'ull Foi·ce b Europe l In the Satellite countr iea of Bulgaria Czechoslovakia East Germany Hungal Y Po land and R uJ11anin only militai•y installations are scheduled to be attacked these consist of 166 airfields Basically Inc idcmt to these attacl s the Alert Force would cause an expected 1 378 000 cazualties and the Full Force 4 004 000 These fi ures equate to about 1 and 4 respectively of the 1 u1•opean satellite populations again includ l ng the faDout considerations mentioned earlier T P SEORE'I' · J SM-430-6 l 3 • i ' In Ir I J i LC DI ''ll Iii 11 'lfl C d U 1C -1 li - - - - -··· ·-·· 0 ' 1' 1 · '1 '· II TOP SECRET 2 The probo ble rermltinrs ur u 1 1i 1 J n l ho i LHed European countries would 'be dependent to vc r 1 1 ng dcic r0c L pon the soviet strategic concept which side exercised the initiative whother o tta cl o 'cn ne by suri r tuc 01• woi•c procodc d by usei'lll warning and the Soviet estimate of whether or not the damage which they could inflict pr•i1111 1r1ly on th US o 10110 would b1•in« o bout a -cesoation or hootili tie a a nc1 permit thorn to take ovor uestern Eu i •ope 1ntMt If the soviets decided to pursue this courso 01' notion the o tt cl s on Western Europe probably woi1ld bo refouvely lie ht and restricted to the extent f'oasiblo to mil1ta 1•y tni•r cts which could attacl USSR If a course or action woz•o followed which resulted in attacks o go inst th full spectrum of West13rn Eui•opco n ' military u i -ban-1ndustr1al and politi co l strengths to the extent perm1ttod by availab J l Lty of the dai no c e r O1•00 level would probably be of the srune 1 eneral nature as that suffered by the US Annex B hereto provides more detailed figures on da mag to c l vil ooc Lotico in the USSR China and the European Satellites o United States 1 While a nwnber of studios ho vc been oi mducted through recent yeo rs which indicate t itimntes of da111 1 ge to the US civil society expected to r·esult from a general nuclear war there ia 110 specific study conducted recently and e1-ierally accepted which can be drawn upon for the information you desire u 01'ul source 'lould be the last annual NESC study conduct cd in 1959 The results or that study are not available to the Joint Ch ie i's of '3'L ' ' ' fo 1 • 1 h i pur•poso He · 1- · - 1• there ls rnf fioiont pattoi-- 1 l11 puot i tudl rn to r1 ' t t i ' -O l'l' h o tu f rouulto • i ' 1 wuu 1la 1d ' ol J Ch 11u l u wnuu i hac becm tho t while a nucloo 1 o ohnnt 1 woul cl 0 10 W tlH US in ae 'iously damago 1_ concEi i on 1·1 l th ni 'lny m nions of TOP SECRET JCSM-430_-61 4 I· i il 1 fi'IIJ 'V · '1 l· 'l'· 11 l · I 1't • J I' 'I I •1 f I ft J' ' · TOP•SECRET casualties and little 1m ed1ate war supportin capability the us would continue to-exiat as an organized and viable nation and ultimately would prevail whereas the USSR would not 3 Question What are 'the major uncer1 a1nt1cs e r · regarding the size and disposi t_i 2 1 01· the Soviet mi sile which underlie these j'lidgments _ • Answer 'l'he major uncerta 1nt tes lie in tho areas of the size location post re and oporaticnal efl'octJ veness of Soviet m19'11e effort Also impo -t -it are the uncortainties concerning -sovfet early warning capability which Nliltcs to reaction tlmes or all Soviet n tclea i• del very vehicles and their operational capability to achieve simultaneity of attadc on US forces which affects greatly the destruction before laui ch or ou1• own deli very vehicles 'l'hese·areas or uncertainty are diacussed below in greater _detail a No confirmed deployed ocations oJ' ICDMo ho ve as yet been identified other than the test rane 11 Thcire ls evidence with varying interpretations as to reliability of some additional possible operational ICBM site-crnnplc xoo The most · 'suspect locations for operational ICBM t itc--complexes are in no rthwestern USSR All ICBM and IRBM operational sites are currently considered to be soft but future hardenj_ng is considered probable The primary element of uncertninty 11e3 in the range of divergent Views in current estimates of the number or Soviet ICBMs on launcher The full range of uncertainty as to the Soviet missile capability is reflected in National Intelligence Estimate NIE ll-H-61 » It-is assUJDed that the Soviets will strive to achieve simultaneity of arrival of ICBMs in the-initial salvo against • Weste i ·n ta i •gets Concerning the cu i •rent r·cl1ab1l1 ty or the 'l'OP SECRET JCSM- 39- 6 I i I ·' Jt 1 'P' 'I - - 'i H df i'i' •··1·· J I' I I ' • I I TOP SECRET t soviet ICBM it is estimated tho t aome 40-65 percent of the ii' ' total number of ICBMs on launchel• would get off within 15-30 minu tee of scheduled timco and o rri ve Ln the vj cir11 ty 01' assigned targets i e thre time3 tho nominal Circular Error initial missile and mo nned o ircraft penctI·utiorn of the 1 arly warning and missile detection nets are expected to be well coordinated Ho 'l'ever full sim ll ta11city of mi isile impact will not be achieved but the S iv et ·1111 ondeti vor to coor-dj natc closely _t1mewisei attMks on CONUS and Europe c The Soviet actlve ea l•ly wo rninc capability s extensive elaborate and h l -wil l overlti ppj_ng but limited to medium and high al titu'de cover aboll t the pcrlr hcr· r and aensi ti ve interior areas The only k11owi1 gap i i n ti10 sou thcentr l- southeastern section- border i g on 'l'ibct be closed in the near future is l1m1 ted •J hio will doubtless Ths low al tittide capability The development of h lc h f •cqucncy ionosphcr l c back-scatter 1 •adara for detection of lon -r•ange missne launchings has been w1 thin Soviet ccpab l ll ties fo1• the last five years The Soviets also heve a high capability for long-range passive detection • d The Soviet air defense system is undergoing a major transition which i sie ni fl r - -' ly improvin its capabilities against medium and high altitude a l 1• at taclc aspec s of this transition are 'l'he principal the rapid installation of sui•i'ace -to-o 1r missile oi- ·• o nd the w 1 clcuprcad deployment of an air defense control system with emi-automatic features tper significant recent developments include the advent of better radars the introduction of limited numbers of improved interceptors the estimated introduction of nuclear weapons into surface-to-air misailes and the probable incorporation of more advanced elcct1·on1c gear and amament TOP SECRET JCSM-430-61 6 ·1l' f'llJ l•i' lil l'I J· · t· JI 1 11 -• 1J TOP' SECRET into interceptors ' The Soviets now have an extensive high-pr 1or1ty res a ch program to develop o atat1o antiConsidering their progress to ball1st1o missile system dat their technical capab1lit1e3 o nd the advantages to them of early deployment 11111 1 tecl Jep loymont of such a system is expected to begin in 1963-1966 Notwithstanding the above · the SoViet air defense ayatrnn would still have ' great difficulty 1n coping with l arge- ico le air attacl employing varied and sophisticute l to ctics through at 1east 1963 · e US air de f'anse capability detection o nd 10 curi 'Elntly llmi tecl to activa i tta clc of nir breu thi113 vehiclea an initial capabilit J for detection of ICBMs and Later in the period under conside r •ation the aeconc m 'lf sita w lll · enhance the probability of tac'cico l 1to r -n l n of e1iemy inass ICBM attack The capability foi• pos'c launch detection of submarine-launched missiles and i'or active lcill or ICBM and submarine-launched missiles 1s not envisioned within the time period under consideration f Plannil S for the str kes in JCS SIOP-62 reflects· consideration of and compenaation for all factors which might degrade assurance of success W1 th the po i•tia l exception of destruction before launch T 'l l consiclero tion accorded deat ction before launch is rerlccted in the planned launch of strikes on specific ta1•gets fro1n be sea which differ in location and type and in ut ll l z 1 ne a mix of delivery systems While this conaide1•ation applies to planning the tact rema ins that the strilce errecto and _ I results described herein are baaed upon an assumption of no destruction before launch which would lilcely be inaccui•ate in varying degree in ClrlY case In the c1rcwnsto nces postulated - 1 e a Berlin cr 1s1s with an associated state of tension - the ability o 1' our forces to enhance eterrence to enemy ntensif1cat1on of the crisis or to_ engage survive and TOP SECRET -fCSM-430-61 ···•- - 7 TOP S'SCRET prevail 11' such deterrence fails by a number or political s ' nii'1ca 1tly im roved 30 · 110 and military actions referred to in a separate memorandum· being forwarded to you on that 'hese actions would subject trom the Joint Chiefs of Starr considerably reduce the extent of destn1ct1on of a large ·portion of' our offensive forces prior to launch Moreover the same actions would place us 1n an onhanoed posture for execution of' a possible tionnl dec Lsion to pre-empt in the event other· actions to reta n our rights regarding pier11n were defeated isrop·-62 Extensive two-sided warBam0s of no w being conducted mo y bC l expechd to contribute more precise date on base nd vehicle urvivability than is now available · 4 Queotion of whether the How oNnial to the outcome 'Ould be the guestion us or USSR struck first Answer · In answering 'this question crucial to the out- come is interpreted to mean critical to prevailing in general war a It'·the us exercised pre-emptive 1niUa t1ve in general war the weight of' attack launched against the Sino-Soviet - Bloc would be such that al though the us would be g1•eatly damaged by the USSR retaliatory a1'f'o1•t tho US clearly would prevail b Currently ef'fective o J o i t i onal Security Policy has as a basic objective prevailins in event of g nera l war policy also· precludes revcnt1ve wa r However· current plan- ·n1ng recoanizee that in response to mowleugo that attack against the US h The a Soviet imminent or to honor u secul'i ty tr·eaty· commitment the us i'orqes may be required to ta l e the initiative if so directed by the President a provision of' tbe policy is that the us By implication shall prevail in event of' either initiation ' reta lia tion our general war plans· which are ba sed on this policy are drawn up to permit the US to pl'8v 11 even though placed in a retaliatory role TOP SECRET JOSM-4 30-61 8 ·11' l H 1 i • J ' ·' ''l' J 1 _ '1 l • r' • TOP SECRET - c The degree to_ which we would be nucceasful in pre vail ng 11' placed- in retaliatOl Y role principally would be dependent on the enemy capability relative to the capabilities or us and allied forces includinc tl1e L1• survivability and timeliness of ret 'ponse Timeliness of 1•er ponse in turn would be dependent on receipt of warninc of nttac l timeliness of decision to react and cajj ' Jili ty of tho C'1•1oncJly forces to respond to the decision to sl - J e current inte lHgence estimates accord the enemy a 1ig 1 capaliil1 t • in the way of l oth off'ensiva nnd defensive force • us act i ve defensive capabilities are 1 1 ntli ecl to applicat i on ac lnst nir-brez thing vehicles and pre-launch action c e ainot the cubmarine missile threat through I SW operations WhHf l wm0 n nst -o nce of ICDYI warning is available we have no post lau di active defenses against ICBMs IRJ3llf3 MRBMs ASMs and submarine-J aunched missiles and the1•e are differing evaluations of the degree to which our ASW operations can recluce the sizeo hle Soviet submarine force ' The survivability of our force3 i a complex function of many cr1Ucal factors su •vivc1bili t y is greatly enhanced by increased mobUity and by placing a large number of forces in an aJ ort status Alert foi ces are those which on fixed basos can react l'tithin 15 m nutes of warning time and those on i' v -i ' le bar e ui thin 2 hom•s Additional measures available to incr•easo survivability include additional disperso l of force ha1·deninc and pre-launch of i'orces under po 1 ti ve control cl In swrunary the US clearly woulcl pi•ev ll if vie ini i ia te ge9eral nuclear w r __ - L we are placed in the poui tion of strilcing · in retaliation the -degi 'eo to which we are success ful in prevailing is dependent upon the tlmeliness of' our response our plans and the associated measures for their TOP SECRET JCSM 430-'61 9 I I · 1 ·1t' cm i J• 1 r 1·•i' 1 1 1 ·1 i' ··11· • • 1 - - - - - --- -··TOP·S RET - xecut1on pl OVide for an effective response Success in the· 1mpl8l l8ntation or · thos 9 plans is depe11dent on receipt of adeq ate waming and on t1mel1neas of decision to execute those plans 5 Question f' p1•esent plans were i1t e red so as to concentrate on deatructien or the Soviet nuclear striking force bl_ 0 bringing a greater part or our f'orce to bear on exclusively military tarp eta what would 'b ti e nnrniers to the f trst three stions listod above Ans er a Effect on i t r lclear Strilcinr- For There are currently 1 i 1olud d 1r 'l e t_arget list a ttacl ed by SI0P-62 f'oroes all lmown elements 0£ force and related facilities attack or the Soviet nuclfinr striking The J e·✓ el c1' assurance for all targets representing the nuclear threat to the CONUS 1 e those 148 ins tallo t Lona oo Us tea in Annex A hereto is high - about 95' - considerin an' factors except destruction before l unch which for t he lert Force would be low Directing a greate1 part of our i orce against exclusively military targets would not recult in a sig iif l- cant increase in destruction of the Soviet nuclear striking ' Increasing the level of atta clc agains·l air bases o nd 1'orce missile launch sites wo ·· - - · a rroct the surv Lval of those aircraft and missiles lt1 unohed pr l o i • to arrival of US weapons The num' er so launched or course would depend on whether the US initi'ated the attaclc oi• retaliated Raising the level of US attack against known i' l xed military installa tfons would riot reduce the threat pos d by missiles the location ot which is not lmown 'l'hus the alteration of present plans 1io more· heavily weight the a ttaclc of military targets would not reduce soviet oap ilities_to a significant degree 'l'OP SEORB'r Jc 4·30 5 · I ' • ' r· 10 •• ·- '· 1 i --- - - -- ·11' -1 '' J• ······ '··· · •·• 1· •1 l•i' Il •I ··' TOl' SJi CRET b Effect on US Ei rope and Soviet Civil Societies Irasmuch as increasing the f8Vel or effort against military targets would result in l ttle change ln effGct on the soviet nuclear striking force ther c would be correspondingly little change in effect of Soviet nt1• IJ os on the 'les te z -n European ci v i l aoo 1 et Les US and Diversion of US forces f om other targets to military targets would reduce by ·relatively arr all percentage the effect on the soviet civil society If th diversio 1 were h 1 ghly pl onounced it could lresult in railur e to C una c the war-supporting economies of he USSR and China to the 1 1 tent necesc acy to roncler them incapable of rurtt er cupport of the wm· effo1•t This latter oonditiori was found by Studr No 2009 to be a shortcoming of o ttack1ng only military tar eta · o Major Uncertainties As indicnted in a above divr rting mol e US forces to attack of•militai y tar ets would result in relatively insignificant increase in destruction of the Soviet nuclear striking force Consequently thcI e would b0 correspondingly 11 ttle change 1n the effect of the major uncerta1nt1es identified 1n pa1 a raph · Lt above on jL1dgment as to effects of general nuclear war on the Soviet nucleo l· striking force and on US European and Soviet civil societioa TOP SECRET JCSM-430-61 11 •rop SECRET ANNEX A DAMAGE TO SINO-SOVIET STRAT ' GIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY CAPABILITY BY THE ALERT F'OITT fimr11CfLL FORCE The number of installations on U10 target 11 t of the Single Integrated Operational Plan 1962 IOP-62 i indicated below Included is indication of the numl er of installations _planned to be attacl ed and expected to be destroyed by e l ther the Alert F'orce or the F'lll Force i'ic number indicated de troyed representa those installations Nhich would be destroyed at a level of assurance of 70 percent or mo1°e considering all factors of attritio e nd reliability oi' w ipons cxcc pt d 1t1•uetcor before launch ·'J he ci ctu1il number dcsLroycd or· si nli ic1 mtly damaged would be greater but at a lesser lcvi 1 of' confidence than 70 percent Targets Ati ocJwrJ bv AJert Destroyed El Alert Full Nuclear Threat to United States Airfields w nuclear storage and primary staging bases 76 76 76 76 Nuclear storage 68 58 56 68 Missile sites and storage ICBM - 4 136 Nuclear Threat to Forward Ar' ' Airfields w o nuclear storage nuclears could be deployed · 218 166 99 212 Missile sites MRBM 6 6 l 6 Missile storage MRBM 1 l 1 l 26 Naval Base · 28 22_ 251f 199 2Q_ 121 88 56 24 83 5 5 93 5 61 Satell te Air Threat Airfields w 6 nuclear storage · Air-Surface Missile storage TOP SECRET · Annex A ' JCSM-'430-61 12 I ___ - - ' '77_ - -_ -- 29 5 88 TOI ' SECRE'l' Targets Attackad by ill£ Defltroyed by Residual Aix• and Surface ca eab1litl£ Residual and reserve airfields A C and wpns could be 369 deployed 217 91 276 Naval Base surface 11 11 8 10 Air Depots 8o 7'2 15 56 Air Repair Facilities 29 26 15 26 983 734 415 852 Total Strate5ic Nuclear Threat Install tfons TOP ·•siic·RET JCSM-4 0 61 Annex A 13 11 • i 'I • jl l II •J l - r -- - 'll '1 'I fj l li TOP SECRET ANNEX B DAMAGE TO ·sINO-SOVIET BLOC CIVIL SOCIETIES D estruct1on or floor space and personnel casualties represent use t'ul indices of etfect on civil societies of nuclear general war Indicated below are anacssmcnts or darnae e •expressed 1n those terms expected to result from attacks • planned for SIOP 62 forces These ·estimates are based upon arrival of at least one weapon at each DOZ Dfrntroycd by Alert Force 65 · Industrial floor space USSR - TOtal floor space US R · urban casualtiee ·» USSR Rural oasualt1es USSR Total casualties USSR Urban casualties China Rural casualties China Total casualties China 74 82 75 55 71 21 37 Industrial floor space China Total r10or space China - 39 5 1 53 41 4 Force Full 59 61 62 53 10 16 9 Casualties in European Satellites ·Bulgaria · Czechoslovakia East Germany Hungary Poland Rumania 496 000 308 000 292 000 421 000 258 fJOO 197 000 4 200 497 000 1 300 214 o o 2 636 000 58 000 Urban Industrial Complexes at R lsk USSR China 295 78 Government Control· Centera 1n USSR and China No attacked by Alert Force No destroyed bf Alert Foree No destroyed by Full Force 4 118 85 121 Destroyed means dainage to building or facilities which 'P ecludes production without essentially complete reconstruction of the installation Connotates collapse or severe damage to all principal struotures A greater number or installations w11 l receive lesser but significant damage which would require materials and erro t to repair before production could be restored · with casiialt1es include fallout effects a percent shielding TOP SECRET JCSM-430-61 · ' ·i 14 durinc the first 72 hours Annex B · TOP sECRET Al'l'END i X MILITARY MEASURES WORLDWIDE TI-IE PROBLEM l To determine prepru •ations of mount l ng seriousness which could be taken blr the Ul11ted Statoa in the CONUS in Eu rope 2 and·worldwide to provide a basis for the threat and use of 3 military 'orca to - 't stot-e access t0 l¼rlln by applicatio 1 of 4 a Subs mtiel no -m· iclea ' force ir succo11si ve itas s b General nuclear wu- 5 6 2 Assumptions fo1• th i J stuC y 1ncll dc l i1oac set forth in I paragraph 2 of the basic paper pl rn the l'olJ 0- 1 'inrs a Tho purpos of the preparatory teps cnvisag0d in this fitudy are twof ld 10 1 ' t'o influence Sovit t decisions before they are taken this summer or fall 11 12 2 Provided the preparationo cnv'lsae ed ln this 9 13 study fail to have the desired deterrent effect to 14 ' create no later than 0ct6ber 1961 t 1 l best capability 15 for application cf subst 1ntial nonnucleru • i'orce to 16 restore ground access against ODR forces nlone or 17 against total Soviet Bloc c - tpa i11 1 t1es which can be 18 brought to bear in Eu at Ger·m i ny for poriodrJ or 19 to 15 days before resort is made to the use of nuclear weapons 20 FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM 3 In a memorandum foi• the Secretary of Dcfenoe dated 6 June -1961 the Joint Chiefs of Sto rr stated that the Check- 21 22 I list of Military and Non Mil tary measures in the Berlin 23 Cr1sis 11 forwarded to the Secretary of Defonee on 12 August 1960 24 Appendix A ' TOP SECl'tET J'cSM 431-6 l J' J 11 · e · - · · h- •• i ·· TOP SECRET provides· a wide range of actions respons l ve o the problem of l deterring the Sov 1 et Bloc from attempta to blocl nde access to ·2 Berlin In e dd t t on ln their mP n101 -andum for the Sccretacy of 3 Defense dated 13 April 1961 1 ae well as in their memorandUlT 4 for the Secreta X J of D fense c iated 28 p1•1l 1961 the Joint 5 with the premise on which it 1s 'baoed 1 e ncccpting tl1e 7 risk or gener£1 wa - continues to u n 1 mt l sfnctory initial 8 f 'ramewor k fo r the le•1elopm n'I _CJ pJ c 1rn 'or U and Free· l· orld 9 rtponse to any S JV1et atter 1pt to ta Ice over Berlin or deny Fi·ee lO - · world access thereto · 11 4 For adcll tional f ts see Annex A 12 13 DISCUSSION · 5 For discussion see Annex J 4 B 15 CONCLUSIONS 6 It is concluded that 16 a The early execut l on by the United States of t l1e 17 measures enumerated 1n Annex C to Appendix A within the 18 time limits assumed in this study i e 31 October 1961 19 would be expected to influence the Soviet decision process 20 regarding Berlin 21 The military actions can be taken only if the necessary political decisions required to implement 22 them have 'been made 23 Im1 1icit in such political decisions is the acceptance of the risk of general war b The measures enumerated in Annex c 24 to Appendix A 25 in most oases depend for full effectiveness upon complete 26 'Allied cooperation particularly by the nations with the 27 greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United 28 'Kingdom France and the Federal Republic or Germany FRG 29 United Sta tea action alone is feasible only to the extent 30 that the Allies will permit the use of their national 3J territdries and that the action contemplated does not 3 TOP SEditE_T '• JOSM -431-61 Appendix A 1 · il' 1 11 l'v • 11 r - · 11· 111 I •1 '•'· ''1i1 1 J'l' ' f i _ ____ ·'' '- o l' • · ·' • · ·' TOP SEC ·1nvolve the sovereignty ot·an AJly The measures al e ' designed to be a clear deinonstrat ion of tJ s detennination 3 ·the Soviet decision mal tng proce u but als o to rer to1• the 4 confidence or ·our Allies in the 11n1tc l State and to obtain 5 l 6 o Although·a measure or Allkcl u reenient c ould probably 7 be obtained 1'or the early executJon oi' ·come of the u ea ures 8 envisaged in An ex C to Appe dix A o s 9 bcrease state or readiness or US forces worl6w ue but p rtlcularly in Europe it is doubtful in the c trcmo that 11 would agree to a rapid and· systernatic build-up for limited 13 nonnuclear war in Central Europe toc ether with the rislc or 14 general war 15 d The execution or the measuron env1sn ed in Annex C to 16 Appendix A 1o designed to produce a otrong ueterx•ent effect l There is 8 poaa J bility however that the 18 Soviets might 'react by taking military counte1•act1ons to 19 pre-empt US ancl or Allied errorta to protect West Berlin 20 For this reason the United State s must be prepared for 21 general war 22 JC 431- l I Allie in 12 TOP SECRET us 10 the absence or a clear-cut Soviet-ins1 irea Berlin incident on the Soviets ·I 2 and leadership which could be expected not only to influence theil' full cooperation·and auppoi•t l Appendix A 3 ·TOF SECRET FACTS- ARING ·oN THE PROBLEM The fundamental ifi'ere1'lce in the concept envisaged tn 1 this study and the eoncept envisaged in i he Chcclc11st or· Mil1- 2 tacy · and Non-Military Measures in the Be1•l1n Crisis 3 is as follows 4 a In this study SGlected meaEurc3 would be implemented 6 enhanc ng the crcdibi J ty or th nuclca1• d terNnt and 7 1inproving US and Allied non-nuclear capabilities tn Europe by 31 Octobe 1• 19ol in orde r to deter the soviet Bloc from attempting a blockade of West BerJ in and at the GOJT e time 10 11 0 b The Concept of the Checklist envis r cs progressive 12 application of measures after a ner·lin incident hus occurred 13 while the measures listed in Anne C to Appendix A are 14 designed_ to deter a Berlin crisio by adequate preparation 15 beforehand 16 • · 8 9 to prepare for the eventuality of ge 1e al w r I TOP SEGRET •· Annex A to JCSM-431-61 Appendix A 4 C l i' fl J 'j· I ' jl ' 1 I ' I A I 5 progressively over the next 'ew tiontho w1t 1 a view to ' '-'• 'I • •1 1 11 I ' I I' '• TOP SECR T · J I Afl X B TO J FFl - NDr t ' DISCUS J ON l In accordnnce with the assumptions 1n this study it is envisa6ed that a number of' actions ' particularly military mear1ures could 'be implem nted immecliately oa o deterrent to - l 2 3 possible Soviet Bloc attempts t o _£1evelop a Berlin crisis in 4 he ne ar future 5 - The concept of initiating somu measures of the type envisa ed 1 Annex Oto App0nclix A to cnin n deterrent 6 efffot prior to o n auticipatecl Berlin incident was reco nrncmcled 7 by lhe Joint Chiefs of Sto f 1' in thei1• momora nclum to the Secre- tary ot Defense clntl u 13 l i •1l 1961 sub 1c ct 'l'he Stntus of · Berlin Contingency PlRno 8 9 10 11 • iL Although no iminedi t action wns tnlclln by the us Coorclinat-11 ins Group to implement· the o bove recommeni lntion if the 1oint 12 Chiefs of' Staff some of' the measures recommended for early im- 13 plementation have in effect een executed 14 For example the existence ot the Trip rtite United Stntes United Kingdom 15 France m1l1tary planning stai'J ' LIVEOAK hM become known ns a 16 result ot some recent newspaper articleo 17 3 As the Berlin s1tuat1on has ocvcloped without a ma joi• lei incident since Premier Khruchchev's threat3 in November 1958 19 lt has become increasingly clear that the Soviets remain as 20 1n rnns1gent even with regard to ttie1r objectives of mr- k i n 21 permanent and irrevoca le the_ division of Germ l ny anc l the com- 22 plete incorporntion or West Berlin into the x• e - ot Germen 23 satellite This Soviet position was most recently reaffirmecl 24 ·at the recent meetin6 in Vienna betweon President Kennedy and 25 26 PreJll1 r Khrushchev 4 Accordingly this study focuseo pr1mnrily on those mil tary reinforcement measures and prepnrntiono which could be TOP SECR'm '· JC -43l-6l 1 5 Annex B to Appenclix A f t · • ti n j•i' 1 l' ll ' 1-Vi t 1 l I J ' I ' 27 28 TOP SF CRET recommended to the President tor implementation in order both J to 2 r store the credibility or the us nuclear deterrent and to achieve as early as posstble a military posture which would 3 permit the United States and its Allle3 4 01· the United States unilaterally to ap ly substantia nonriu lee r force again t any 5 soviet Bloc attempt to blockade ground acces·s to Berlin and 6 concurrently to prepare for tha ultimate r 1 sk of general war 7 which such act tonu involve 8 5 The sequence of mil l ar ctio u whlch a •e envisaged is s½ 'oi•th in Anne C oga m t• with corre pond inl political -· actions and pertinent ·emai -lcs with 1•cc ai ·d 10 to l1Jt9 Lcmentat1on 6 An inspection ' ti1e sequence or events in Anne x 9 J1 C 12 readily indicates that the notions cnv i saiSed o inour t to a 13 crash program within the time llmltu c tw 1mcc within this 14 study 1 e 31 October 1961 15 Howeve1• thi aspect docs not invalidate the over-all deterrent effect wh i ch m y be expected 16 from implementation of these mea mrco 17 7 While the eJ ecution 6f the rnei urnres cnvt aged in JS Annex C to Appendix A whether on a US unllutcral basii or 19 Allied basis is designed to produce a ctrong deterrent effect O on the Soviets conceivably it could lluve an advcirse and 21 oppoei te effect on the Sovlet Bloc i c inateud of deterring 22 them from a blockade 01' West J c•· i n it could cause them to 23 tc l e 1n111 to ey counteract101w to n•u-irntJ t Uc 11nd n· J 1J ic d Li efforts to protect west Berlin 25 8 For example if the United States and its Allies 26 mobilize and deploy additional nonnuclear round forces to 27 Europe as a m1nimum·1t may be expected that the Soviet Bloc 28 will respond 1n kind In adclition it may be expected tllat the 29 Soviet Bloc will accuse the United States and the West of 30 · deliberately preparing for age ressivc war 1n Central Europe 3 1 for the purpose TOP _§ EOf1 '1 •JCSM 431-61 or destroying the German Democrat Republic GDR 3 - i 6 Ann X B to Appendix A f · • Jl ' J _ - · - r· •·•1· l j ' i • ' i' p • 1 •• 11 TOF SECRE' t' an reuni t 'ing Germany by force In addition they are certain l' t o raise the spectre ·or a re· urgent and m1Htant Weat Gei llany 2 seeking to agg·l--ess against the Corrununist states under the 1 re- 3 text of liberating East GeI'IT1ariy and Dcrlln l Moreover all or l the se moves are certain to cause seriouc repc i -cuss1ons in other 5 parts of the world 6 For e cample the flxatlon of United States p nd Allied attention on and the provision of add1t1onal resources 7 to Western Europe could motivate tho CI·l COMs to atten pt to 8 ac ieve their o jec l vec o ' l oc 1• t 01c 'l' 'dw m nd OV ll'runn11 g ' 10 So theast Asia by overt mili tary force 9 It is also o v ous from i n cxnmlnntfon of An11cx C that 11 full Allied incl iding N ' TO 001 1poro tio 1 ia not onl desirable 12 but essential 1f the full deterrent cf fe tjve e s or the 13 measures envisaged is to be realized 14 In the • bse 1ce of an overt Soviet-inspired Berlin incident lt fo moGt lmprob 'Dle 15 that the United States could count on full Allied cooperation 16 in 1mple 'llenting a sel'ies of mea sureo such as those envisaged l' 1n Annex O 18 Forceful US leadership l'lQw vcr and U S unilateral preparations to resort to force 1i' nece H ial 'J could have a 19 atalytic effect on our allies in stimulating them to take 20 appropriate corresponding actions 21 10 That 1s not to say that United tatc1 Allies including the FRO would not fight for i 1e t nc - J in It is to say 22 23 however that the people an4 sovernrnonts oi' Western c u1 0pe 24 may remain loath to engar e in such deterrnnt preparotol 'J 25 actions without a clear demonstration o r us leadership 26 TOP I sli dgT· JOS -4 31-61· l ' 7 Annex B to Appendix A I ' J'lOP ' c t •• I • ANNEX C TO APPENDIX A 1 l ·• ' r POSSIBIB Ml ASURES TO DETER A BERLIN CRISIS - ' '' '' ' t 1 ' ' · • ' l Purpose • ' 'he purpose of this l18t of actions 1s·to demonstrate a United states resolve to employ military fo1•ce to lnclude the use o f' nuclear weapons 11' necessary to prevent tho soviets from ·talctnc action to deny llied rights 1n Berlin · '2 Time Phas 1pg • The actions to be taken are keyed to IOums hchev•s p1•ono1 mce nt to sign a separat treaty with the CDR b r the end of 19S1 and are phased into thr3e ti -ne t roupir go D-6 MOS to D-4 MOS D-4 D-2 MOS to MOS D-2 J IOS to D- AY 31 DW 1961 Although this assumed time f'ram e wou td not complete p1•cparut1cma by 31 October 1961 it would constit1 e as muc h p l 'O I' DS a could be J CD 11s l ically expected 1n a 4-month period a sum1ne an npr r·ox mat J July 1961 start 1 ng date 3 Dnplementat1on Although Iaeasures are l 1 Sted 1n a generally ascending ordoi• ot · severity w 1 th1n the measm-te assumed time t'rame the implementation of any listed· 1 S dependent upon the c1rcWllf ltanccs which may develop 1•apidly over the next· rew weelcs Acco1•dinr ly the measures could be' executed 1n any-order required 4 Pol1t cal Measures Oppoo lte each m1·1·1tary-·mc EUJ t'0 - __ ls J 1otud tical act1ona·requ 1 red tor implementation co1 respondin poli- Tho political meaDures column 1s not 1 ntended to cover all ool• s •caponding appropriatu polit 1 cal actions but only the most obvious onco required ro1• miJ itai·y action 01' primary importance is the requ1rc1nent i'or allied particularly tripartite aG1'eement and coopo1•11t1on 1'or 1 h Y run errectiveness 01' many measures TO SECREir·· JCSM- 431-61 I 1· •i ······Annex• c to Appendix A 8 • ' I ·u't1· 1· C t· 1 r 1 · h· '11• I • -- _a A TIME PERIOD o-6 to D-t MOimiS Ass lllle D-De¥ 1s 3l Dece n1 er 1961 - - l Restore CredJb llt r of Deterrent Restore credib lity of the deterrent by e Ef Jumcing posture of nucleer ce paol e forward forces by mov ng e dditionB l nucl e weapons for iard in proxiD ity t f'or e3 e g USCillCEt R 1and-battl e m ssil e rarheeds nov d1sper cd in COllUS b Instituting de- rel opaent progi -e to p -cduce a laild -based MB BM f r r 'f' e Pill req u re PJ esidential approval of i crea ed nuclear weapon dispersal authority az d tclr j oracy au Pentation e t v ia pcn stor86e capacity Using available l ogistical transport end storaae fac1l1ties 1 fon --ard dispersel coul d be ias- iiled l f iJ i itel So riet s cou1d increase their nuclear dispersals to Eu -c _ f £au satellites but net ec · rantege -woald retaia opt on tor tmely vi t bcra -al of e n eugr ente tion if necessary b DOD action requi1 eii to initiate J- PJl l aevelopr ent progrsm a one b Ce be sustained i'l def'ir itelv Co- 1 ter to existing USSR p rC5 l'IID • R •ocable at will c Providing nucl ear e ssister ce to· Frai ce c Executive c·tion to rele3Se nucl ear irSoTJ118 tion to France required c Can be sustaine -d i uda t'initely Ccmnunist reSJIO lse in kind d ou f'ul i e China tion irre--roca le inforrnatioo given ce nnot be • ritw 1ravn rl V E- r' r'1 ffl j' J r d None g d • Executln action to modify Policy is r ecessary u s d • None CORRESPOiIDING KIT ITARY 1- EASlmES PCLITICi L l·iY suF' BS 2 Increese Re ciness · rease ste te of readiness of· US ·0rces · -· rlC -uic'le t t partj_c Ua rly in E - 1 ci ' lis should inclul e discctr i n- a ce of ctivetion and or retirc en cf o-pera ' o j al forces such e s B-47 'trin s e r d cm hibious ships Urge oui· al lies ' o co t e sa ie For e - plc- urge ti1e lfK to iL pro- e th state of ·e s cli ers cf Bi·itish l n 'f cf T · e P hiP e Ei CR a ' d PJ'i 't ' G J - 2 J ly to 1-Tlcluie 1 e cn t of c0 1b t Een ° c• sup ort units and stratesic re erven fr E UK Ar ong E ppropriate 1 easures would be the following a S eF-ilP and practice alert ar d combut prccedUJ ·es to co tinent b D pl oy northc1 n atG lic task force VP Olly or pertie lly to eAOR e _-ea c Illiple entation by llllified and specified cam ders on a periodic basis of selected alert l leasures containel in· their respec-tive alert plane d fatensified training of force US or tripartite selected to execute Berlin probe and ground access operation Con sider cieployMent of this force to the Bel mated area with replacement of this force with units fraa CONUS e Increase readiness to ·execute demolition a J d minin pl ans in Central Europe p 0 8 I r-1 •nI r-1 Y' t I 0 1- CORRESPO 'TDIHG FOLITICl L J 2 l SUBES MILI'J'A 'n' l• SiJR 3 · ReL'1forcece t of US ForceE ' ' sin ir1g US fortes in t 1 rope up to ll strength a c1e st i -ap 0 ce of a - cdcr 1izution Rcquir s Ccng essicr e l -l'c-horization for incre se i i size of A cl s - ir es aud proY sio 1 of ne -r ea ns end equipn c n t L 'l ' 'l ·· i ' io h s ii ie C SU ' e will r eces itate en inC 'l' - e in the mo 1thl y draft call _ To bri1 g current US forces in E ll ope to wn tira strengths • 101lld rec lire de-plo ent of persorL i el frou CONUS units Reple ce ent of such rsonnel rithi i co rus Uili ts tculd be e essa j - A r cessi ry degree of ir ius ial r obllii atici culd 1 c require t -- 1i 'ice r tly increase rate of C°de izc •i i ithin -' Cd eriod 4 Mobil i atiO l I tiate aPJ rop i t obtlizatlon a Preoidential decle etion of a li l lited natiou l ecergenc r followed by s1 ' portL'1g Co 1gressional resolution of a f' ill na ticcal ei argency mc iliza tio · fl 't e reauired to erJ- c r • •- redi le ge cc- e l ··e r oosiure Tiz -✓ c nd 1- rine 0 gani c- l C3cr s AF cner es e nd r G a re gece a l ' co sidered ready for diatP ir te - tion into the a cti•te forces most· reseJ _ a · i T f units vould requfre more tilr e Mo t e L- -tantly the abse ce of a·l'residentia l e laration of emcriency reserve and NG r_its could not be mooilized for a suffici mi '' riod to accomplish the objective Forces rO l' · · e generated in e c ordance vith urrent obil za tion lans s · 1 Pl O 'ria te 4 in to declaration of' national e1 1ergency is to seek new enabling b Alternative b None j I 1neas -es ran Congress c • Request NATO partners particularly UK Frence and FRl to· take c0111parable action or particular importance is return of' the French fleet to lf ATO control ond return of French 1 xey divisions to » rope c l Ol' e 't· - ------------------- CO F ESFOt DDiG POL1·i' CAL 13ASl 'F ZS l-ITLITP F Y J El- 51 ITIBS x -- g' £ d Heme 5 Ftn-t h R ir forcer1ent ot US Forces ep1 oy a litional fo es t m•ope-ancf- other critical aJ eac as rc j_uired Bi1 e terc1 c l-L'sC co · suJ ta'cion should if possi' e r- cede r J ver ni to E' irope of c di io 1al fc ce 3 P- L·m ulf a·i iio11 oI Fre siC e tial d clz rati on of iiationa 1 -- ' · l- o - P - li t1 o· 1t a Presidentia l decl are tiO l of e liational fuergency the followi lg mi ts could oe deplo-Jed to Europe llitbin a t lirty day period Augmentatic' 1 by Civil eser e Air Fleet r - tc 1·eq_uired o- - · µ- u x - • i 1 3 ST R C Divisions 2 lir Force ·foi ces es required up to a Xir u n o'f 41 squadrons 3 F e-et l e rU c Porces 2P grne 1tation - o Mediterranean l Dlvfi1ing Team 1 2d Fleet to Eastern AtJ entic e ui n nt 6th Fleet ' ly one ASI Group e nd one CVA 6 Reidorce ent ot FRO Step-up 5 1'1 jj_ng of·FiiG nJ a 1d air for es vi th nuclear capable eapons and provic e tiJc 71 vi th s- ifficieut lo i ltical Bis' - 'lCe ' o inmu-e their combat ef' lective 1ess A ·r i nge for ec d1 ional bilateral iegotia· icr for the purpcse of ob-ta illing rapid agreer ent on these matters The prov sion of nuclear capable -weapons to tr e FRG is a particule rly- sensitive point vith Premier J hr11Shchev nd the East Germans p l a £ - Iv n w ti ' 0 O· £ - ' ' -------- f -------------------------- COfu 3SPO -JDI m l• ILIT_l' F Y 'S STJRES POLIT CAL £ASURES 7 Air Actions _ _ir Force a '1 d Naval Air actior s which ca '1 be - en - o der onstrate US resolve E 'ld deteroi na ion - ---- - _ e Co 1 1ct a cpera o s -tr -c' lt ri corri dors _ Berlin at eltitud es abo re 10 CA 'C feet with ig ter escort v n epp -cpria te cc 3c d erence to self-i pos d restrict5 n1s u1- '0n use oE co •idor airspace a -co-lid pi-o-rcl e So- riet interce cion a d possible attrition of air r ft Equal possibility trens vould be unc£ all e1 ged b Este bl ish conti laot s eir s ei1 e nce end an f _S- f ba1·rier pat o al o g the Greenlar d-Ice1and-trt 1-ine b f 1ill requi e so ie a u gr iente tio 1 of l 'S forces in the Atlantic end U-i i · ipport in pro• idi ' g coverege fo - UK- c lhance lin of hostile air or sub J arine penetrations of this line e I zecutive e roval required to Feroes portio l of tile 1-ine c Augmer_ t SAC e irborne alert as ·c None _eemed ccessary d Incree se ELilfr aud p 10tcgra ih c sorties eround Si 10-SoViet periphery e Resume U-2 flights r Increase recocnai sance f1ights r Cl 1n Berlin air corridors g Fly-over of Soviet Siberia end Arctic stations h On selective basis destro-J Soviet 3loe eircre rt vhich attempt to interferr with our operations d - h Exec 1t -e approval required dependi lG i l on action to be taken c Enhance de rrence and provide strategic indication of U3 resolve d - h Rislt of attrition and possible capture of US personnel Risk of SOviet prope ganda gain i l Ulf and 'W'Orld opinion soviets could respond in l- i_'ld over Arctic and Europe On balance US vill derive net advantage vith public opinion risks offset by increased respect for US determination and improved intelligence Effort can be- tained for protracted perioq or terminated at our option US i - - --- 8 De onstration of Intent -· Cc d·u et e - ercise p1·eferably tripa rt l t but UB 2 ne if necessl' r r in th viciuity of Hel aztedt -c adily identif a ble as e n ection re i t ' · ici to - -s- oration of 5- -0· md acc ss Seek full UK French F l J coope1·at 1on Will de llOnstrete Allied cohesiveness a 'ld resolve ith 1·es ect - o the use of fo -ce 9 World-Wide t c i- ins e I lterventio i in Lacs a Ste inability - cc -- -ple m nt US 01• SE ' TO pla 1s if r c ry to re e in cont -ol of Lf OS 'reside iti l dceci io required to rest r- ca1t1•0J of Lscs to Ro eJ Laotian Go - · · • i ent to eL-1 inate cOl Jlllurl st s• 1ppo1·te ' a ld augmented Petiiet Le o Y ong Le U '11 tc G a cohesive torce c 1d main obstacle to RIG control b Deployment to South Vietnam Should the situation deteriore te in spite of Obtain D1eo's request tinu ed elllj_ lo 1 1ent of US forces Expansion - may entail dditional operations inst orth Vietnam CiaCCM interYention support for Burma Thailand ·E Pakbwn Res nse in kind - in addition to SO'riet lllOY'es 6 inst countries above may induce nit lilar Sci•riet sponsored ictio P-r l' inst· S Korea Taivc n Re-roce bi l 1ty Once CC r lit ted iar d faced vi th So-riet ren Onscs indicated above there wcn ld be no acceptable alternati•te to su teiaed action until military victory achieved or until the opposition agreed to ne iate a settle1tent on terms acceptable to the US t rl 'I I l i I f one measures nctJ being undertaken deploy organized forces ' - · I c -ri 'O COR -qESFOlIDI iG l OLH·ICAL ' Z ' St c83 f - M O ' IJ RY i ZASIJRES c Nec snres ag inst Cuba 1 U 1dertn ' e p mitive I asures ar airrst c s·- --o Legi 1· i C lt-aJ to t clude nava 7 nd ei L -- ' ss 1 1 t ces5a t oi' e J i t2·a 1 sportc iv l to CUba recoP neissancc O ' te - ---flight inru l C-J e s3- tn i l US ja in Cuban · -oc C Cc 5ts and e lco in-G L 1· ' 1si fice tion c- ' · er o l resi ste nce ·to Cas 'Gro 1 P giEe • 0 f 0 1- f· resiclenti-el decision requJred to weaken c s· ro regilr by icola t c f 'c•u externa1 c ssistence w cl d r cr stre Ce US i·esolve to ··- o -ceful ne - u res tc c· -1 cc ' e Crn z t nist c t t c cl es t l' l ff is he -e oj_ici t OP S coc2eratio - ·- 2 Alternr tively t lte di'fEc· mi i it rf ac-tiou to overthrow t 1e Cast -o re i' le C - - - Cl REJ ' ARKS 0 0 c Scee Latin Anerican advcJ - ·eact 0 1 likely but 1 t cv ' J a cc c 1 · ighcd by respect c - 0 • - fo ncsit ve US indication of st te _gtt i'fecti· re C- foe_YJ response i - 2e a sible co ld be sustained i C' efi i tely or ce celled i euiately at US option Cl s s c eside itial decisjo 1 fo - direct nilii --_- in• r rention requir d I u-- i r- c r ' fi I 1- f k _·· - rl E-t 0 JC 5iJl E- I r i fl I p I - OU E- o TIME PERIOD D-4 to D-2 Months ssur e D-D q ' s 31 ceLlber 19 1 ' 'TE'·I A -L FOR' COII G FOR C01ITil' UATION fu ITER TIOr OR F i t f i S IJ'l E IBCUI'ZD ' OR l_' PIEMENTJI TION · - CO RESFO illPX FOLCTICAL MEASURE' 1-ITLITARY A '11ES Initiate if Ger evs te lks prcih c- - c- e to 'Jle res11l ts i t r tio s justi· fie-ci on basis Sov•i ts - o coc e t o ' ea sc able ha - re not Prean 1ounce or refusal by tenns at the te' 3le De lcnstrate to So-- 1et Bloc and world public opinion the t us refuses to risk ilite ry dis d- _ ar t a cruins frcm continued Sc· ·iet pi·oc1·asti11e tion and i tr sige C G e ' -e Test for il lpro-1e1t-ent of om· r uclear capabilities re1°tiYe to tho 2 of the USSR Soviets cc zld start tests e s ' lell • 2 li ATO Air TI c diness c1vance the state fo readiness cf IlA'IO e i - de e se··e nd reinfor- e JI DIZ oeas11res ould indicate allied s11pport of 0'3 position ' ·rould enhance the air defense posture in Europe Soviets could interfere '1 th ·air operations in the air access corridors to Berlin 3 J leeting oi Military Cc mi anders SACEUR c lld SACLAlt' T hold special meetir BS it h subo dina te cQ llllal iders To highli lt the continuance of extraord1nar acti • ties of key military ca me r -s 4 Co -1 1 ncement of Witbi 'a re l of Notify Allies and e i -pl ain reasons PcrsOllllel Ber_ i n witbdrava of non-essential per-so i- Restr ct to ist trav l nel i cl ud iDG depende ts fr Europe e nd other forward areas 5 r ote ti011 Pol icy Suspended Suspend normal military rotation polic- f to e nd frO ll Europe · stop dependent tra e to Eurppe and other forwrd areas ' • 7 Domestic public opinion v11 l bave to be conditioned to this step F xact timing ·of cQ illY nce nt of evacuation of dependents wi-11 be determined in coordination with U C CIF CEUR llotify Allies of planned -policy Will increase force readiness by retaining experienced pereon el in tbe area -I l - C Tl -E PERIOD D-2 l-bn' hs to D-Day Ass'Ull e D-De y is 3i Deceinber 1961 REVW-1 AU T 2 FOREGOilID FOR c-oi 'TINUATIOH P EITERATION OR IF F 01' l LRD DY XECUTED FOR JLPLEi• Et1TJ'6 'l0N COR lESF01' DTirG POLITICAL 1-lE S l All 1ed Rei iforcenent eq est re l nforc nt end liOVesent -to position of British Fre lch end mlitary forces 2 Col lpl etion of Withdrai -al or Perscmnel Ca Jplete cv-e cuation ot dependents and hospital patients frc ai to i ·r rd a e3S in Europe· 'I-o il crea se HA TO eefense capabilit 1 es ' '-•· - c r strc te Allied lline iese to use force to maintain access to Berl ill State D p2 rbzient ca plete evacuation ot non-essential us·nationals 3 Squadron Dispersal E ecute plan USAFB iiAfusquadron dispe ·sal i Autobahn Trarfic · Organize all milltary nutoba bn tf i'fic to and f'ran Berlin in ipartite convoys escorted by armed MP's e pped with _ two-vay- camnm1cat1ons equ1is ie ¢ Preposition forces l n optimum positron • Dispersal_ of force to 1r proVe survivability- Important signal of dete rmination t o So- riets me by org mic equipment and theater airlift can remain deployed narlnaJ time Soviets WCIUl d counter vit li silllilar depl oyment Canoe returned to normal readiness upon cmq letion of requirement · Al lied agreement required convoy procedure can be l laintairied indefinitely and discontinued vith reduction in tensions Soviet response in kind llOuld not effect ope rat - f I 1- TL - _r· ' I - GOilllESPO IDL fG POZ l' ' ICi' L i•iEASvilZS 1 - ---- - c -l 'O 5 llaval' Patrol ing --- - 1est Italian agreemrcnt req rlred c ctiye at t lling by Italia 1 liz ht rorces 1 St - i ts of Cr tranto i lilaiutain sur tai la e of Albauiai ports w i_i h · partict ar attcr ticn to sulJ -a rL e e cti- ri t s _ •-- - a1 t RKS To i Uo i l Soviets the t their i ilitary ostm·e a ld deplo ' ients are er stt ' IJ 'Eilla 11ce iJould inprov-e PS T ectivities of US forces 11 editer 2 -'lec1 1 Ca '11 be s·LlSteined fo - Od ere te dt 1 ra Cicn a d discontinued o 1 US-Itali an lecisio CL u ilctere l Italie i decision u pcn red uct on or t Bioos C · 8 c ff 0 O ·A · - Q 6 su- imari ie r xe1• ise Conci ct su 1 i - ercises -ith U-3 UK submarines ar 'l 1rkish force in Bl o ck Sea aud alc ig r ish cocst w thi 1 te rms of Montreaux Convention 7 • Am Survetller ce Execute ASU su Veiile 1cc vith 7is thle patrolling at the Straits of Gibraltar and in the Turkish Straits 8 l l ·t l p d T il ilsh agreez ent r-ecr-D red Ad vise AJ lies To alert Soviets to u13 end tfli iaval stre 't h in area in vru fighti '-5 ondition ·In position to close Bo p lorous if appropriate Fm Ces can be meintained in area indefinite only tl adequate beck-up available nedeployment can be effected b decisio i and on short notice co rl I 'i Naval Counte r easures Exect -tc f I 3 i Cisll nc al ccuntermeaS'iu-eS egainst Ienore Soviet protests Soviet ond Gilt shipping as follows a Protracted delay of ship's nen icing b clering provi sioning et c b Re6U1 te tbe r ovement or Bloc ships in Allied ports -- • Will give evidence of increasb g US fin mess of purpose E- ri QC' 1 1 rij t • - _ _ - g ··- CC 'J ESPOtIDiiiG POLl' i' i CAL ' • F ASlBES f -lAF Y S c Increase cr arges to Bloc si ip ping for bu i l eria1 s li6hterhg pilotiI g e d repairs in Allied ports d Re f'l u e to - harter shii pin5 to Lloc cou l ' rit s e In·i ensif su_-r ill nce cf Soviet - 1 ld-Uor-c h Pacific Be pre rec to close rapicly the naval exits i 0 l t le E-3 l t c end Black Sees 4 9 Restrictic s c-n 31cc Air Prohibit Soviet Bloc air operations incl udin civil over end into US and Allied ten itory Follti a l decision to restrict Soviet and S ltellite transportation and cOll ll UIU cati0' 1 ia - t Jll '1 ill 1 e required S istai 1able to the degree that Allied upp --t if o'tltc ir able Ma ' be ecCCIIDi lished -under various administrat l ve and procedural gtJ ses Sovj et response OUld crea11e problea Revokabl e by degrees or ·1nste nteneously 0 rl 1 j 10 • D l s Cersal of eot 1JS Fo -ces Execute dispersal plan for cotiUS based f'orces • 11 r av1gational Precautions Encode LOa ' H and C O ISOL navigatio u l a ' cb IJotify all user i tions Denies international use of nir rigational aills i • CORR SPOHDiliG POLTTICI J AstJm s HILTTARY J EASl ' BS RE •t HKS -0 i Xe- '0- S - -I - ✓- 2-2 • Airbo -ne Alert irec i S C to execute cdrbo1 ne l rt None • Put e e 1 e a l var stri e f'oi·ce i 1 opti rnum position for strike 8 c p i J o lj Offensive Operations - - d uct ri iliter r cp rations B- i · - r d to p -e ent n 1 l i ' ·atu n t S - - Go -e r nt 1 coo cli at c 1 1c i• h 1 ·i 1cipa l Al11es il - o 1 C ar1ce ·Jith c· u-1 ent plE- 1 s as -' ' _U1 re ' US rd JUli ed pla 'ls are L'l being end -e1· cr st a 1'c · vict e 1d z-efinement Seve al pl ns iuclude p ·ecut Gessages cf i ' ' - enta ion requiring onl y decision l iMdeJ --ttle tb mili tarJ action· µ_ - o- -- Cl s s 0 J '-- i- IF r·· 1 - ·· rl E-t O i om r l t i -- • I' Ol p ---g I·· i 0 i i --- ------- · _ TOP SECRET a AP NDJX TYPES AND Jl MOUNT OF OFFEHSIVE NOimucrJEAR FORCE FOR CERTAIN CONTINGENCIES U THE PROBLEM i To dcterrune the type and amount of off nsive nonr111clear 1 force which would have t be appJ ted f n I1 u cpo in order t- 2 a Rest-ore access to Berlir i the Sov1 1• s opposed t t 3 With German Democr ti Republic GDR forcoa alone suocess1vely JJ r le•1els i r0 ·l1ly a• rn Uable us sr r mi 1 I GDR rorces were enco• mtcrad G '7 c Allow the - cr nm n tsts time u 1d opportu 1ity to chance u the1r _decision to bl c c cc' ss by avoid r1tr dc3truct t 011 of 9 or 10 1 five days 2 15 days durini Khich m·-iotie tions could 1 be undertaken looking to restora· on f acces 12 the force without use o US nucle 1 i· 10 e r f' or· a per t od 1 A '3SUM1'TIONS 2 a Assumptions ror this consideration include those set forth in paragraph 2 of the_ basic paper 14 b That the preparatory measu1•c• as outlined in App ndix A have been taken 15 16 c That the operations envisaged for these situations are coni'ined to t 1e aree of Eaot C ' 1 'r lc ny 13 17 18 d That any aggressive ac on co11duct0d in Western Europe 19 would invoke the NATO allia '1ce · and ·that the problem then -becomes one o f NATO ·at war with the Soviet Bloc and 20 therefore outside the scope of' th l s paper 22 21 FACTS-DEARING-- ON__ PHOBLEM 3 See Annex A to Appendix A 23 TOP SECJmT I ' - · • Appendix B 21 JC SM-431-61 I --· · - _ if - _ _ _ • ' • · • I •' '• • •· TOP SECRE T - ' _DISCUSSION ·4 For d1soussion see Annex hereto l CONCLUSIONS 5 Under the assumption that the USSR does not employ nuclea1· weapons the estimated forqes requirc l 3 ttr 'l_ a When opposed by ODR forces olone Tha Joint Chief3 of Stat'f reaffirm their vi w that the hypothes L3 or opposition • from ODR force a alone is invnl l d and tha t tl1er G is no 5 6 stantive d1f f'erenn1 1 betwf en Gi R am Soviet n tl1tar forces 7 fowever using pra11qnt a t1v 8 ODS rorcea ns a unit or measure- lent 6 divisions and about 225 tactical aircr ft it j s considered that a balaM·ed force 01' seven di visions supported 10 by four tactical a1 w-lnga could reopen access to Berlin 11 Thia size force is aaed on the Bsun pt i on t rn t political 12 lim1tationa reatrict mil1 tar- 1 opei·ations to the axis of tho 13 Helmatedt-Berlin autobahn and the a r forces to defensive 14 operations only 15 b When opposed b3• raadily av11 l1ab SSH and GDl'l foi•c ez 16 l lost111t1es could not 'be limited to the Helmstedt-Derlin 17 18 cori•idor alone 19 in the area of East Germany_ onll• Under such a situation the Operatlons would have to be conducted to meet and defeat Soviet and GDR forces throu hout East Ge1·many 20 'wj th the objective of establ5 fl11inz a defense line on the Oder- 21 Neiase R1 ver line Forces 011 the order 01' 50 allied d1 v isions 22 and a corresponding magn l tude of aj r strength would be 23 required to achieve· this objective 24 ' COP SECRET JCSM- 431-61 22 Appendix S ·11' u t • 1 l o ·i' fl •i '''· ·1 i' ··1· J 11 1 I ' ----··• · 4 fl1Jb- 2 • r ' - ----·---· • --··-- - TOP SECRET c To allow the communists time and oppo tuntty to change their decision to block access l It the action begins with 2 Allied forces opposed by GDR fo1•ceo only a balanced sev0n 3 divisional force with adequate a l r support would l'OV i de 4 during the first _1'1ve days time and opportunity for the 5 c ommunists to ohQ 06e their decision to bloc access Cn the 6 time the 7 event that the Soviets enter d the operation at uny • situation described 1n paragraph 4 b 2 wonld pertain Allied force of 3evan divi 1icnc a C'eady committed to the lperat1on ould avoid eetructio TOP SECRm' JCSM-431-61 I 8 9 10 Appendix B 23 Tho TOP SECRE'r TA TO ANHEX TO -· ' TO SECRET ---- Al-'PEUDIX B - __ -- I' AN - l X 'J '0 PENDIX E Ii DISCUSl s ON Prooeedine en the hypothHtD th 1 t pror ara1 ory measureo have -· been taken the US and Allied fo •ces 111 Etirope can be considered a 2 As 3 the United States Alhod action to use militar•y force to reopen 4 ground acoet s to Berl n th r -eatens to overcome the German Democratio Republic CDP f'oroei must decide c i t h er 6 to pennit the u OR f • ' es to be d l'E '1 -od Ol' to come to the -lid or 7 'che GDR 8 to be on war-ti 'lle ba sis and 1 1 a h tr h 3tate of readiness 2 Assurninr the · s · -1 G nome to 1 M SovJ 1ts t 10 a l j ot' the UDR the opera- 9 tions could not be lit• ttte'I to a cori·idor 11J or i s tho lelmstll c1t- 10 rlin axia but -athei• i u ld bP a n1a Joi· wur in Eant Germany ll The forces which the Soviets havtl rt - dEy v11 1 bl0 fox· em1 loy- 12 ment in West Europe - l would require 1 m l llicd attnc to defeat 13 the Bloc forces in Ea e'li Germany and to hol i thio areo by occupy- 1i1 ine positions along the Ocler-Neil 'lse ruver line ctuoJ ly in 15 this operation the objective of Be1'lin Jecom0s secondary and 16 the primary issue beco11ies the unifica' j on 01 ' Gel•ma11y the' Bloc forces in this course ot a t 1 on l Uld To defeat rC'quire cm he order of 50 divisions tor ether with the air force a' 'ld freedom I 17 18 19 of air action commensurate 1ith the m1l gnitude of the g i •ound 20 operations 21 The followin ' io · · 1 r •vva il a That an initial forcie 01' l ven divisions have attacked 22 along the Helmstedt-Berli11 axis against GDR for•oes only and 23 that at some point in the 'operat ton the Soviets entered the 24 conflict in order-to prevent the defeat or the GDR forces 25 b The attaok of the Sov1ets 1 a lim t ted to the Allied 26 forces operating in East Germany o nd that bases and '01·ces · 27 • h in Western Europe are not at acked 28 ··--·· ·······----·--- -··-·· · · I· •i·• ' TOP •SECRET 4 'l'he sequence or aQtions and reactioM o re outlined below a 'l'he decio1on to enter nuclea - war if nacessaI J will have been made at the start of the adtion to reopen ground access l 2 3 b Allied preparations 4 c ·Soviets sie n a peace traaty with CDR and declare that 5 GDR will control E' CCflSfl into BerJ i n 6 d GDR represer tatives refuae entry at • he Helmstedt check point by physicill force in t e f'crm or a 1•1nc id border police e A small m 1 11 t n•y p - 1 c hA s been tried and 1s ro cibly t 8 9 locked by what appeara tv La only GDn forces r 10 The United Statu i commitu a seven dj vis i O 1 thf GDR torcea 'l'l- $ 01 1' 1 forcea jnitially 1' i ht a clelayino action but subaequently as the US 1·01•00 12 o clvancGl 3 attempts to strike the rear and flanks ot the u ro c 13 The us force 14 has prepared againat this and thercfoi·c its progreso toward 15 Berlin continues 16 g At this point it must be reD l Lzed that the Soviets are 17 furnishing at least losistio ai'ld teclmical as natance to the 18 GDR 19 Some manned aircraft rilay be furnished eith0r from Soviet Air Force or from satellites 20 h Increased advance or the US Forces ndicates to the 21 · Soviets that additional forces art 11ecessary to reinforce the GDR At this point Soviet- lll r 23 l Launch an assault on · estei-n Europe with the 24 a5 d1v1·sions located with the ODR ot 22 2 Commit the Soviet divisions w1t j 11 GDR in support 26 GDR forces' effort to halt a nd desl roy the US Force 27 28 advancing towar d Be1•11n 3 Commit orily a small portion of the Soviet divisions 29 in the GDR to strengthen defer sea jus·l enough to counter- 30 balance the str ngth or the US Force 31 TOP SECRET 'l'ab to Annex to Append1X B 27 TCSM-431-61 'r - - 'J i1 ' I -- ' - - ·· 1 · I r l H Ji i • r 1 1 l·' '1 r I' J• ' I J ··•I - •' l ··1 TOP SECRET 4 Conduct nonnuclear hr operahons against lations in Western Europe us 1nstal- 'l'h1s can be combined with a ny l 2 of· the above courses of _action or cn n be conducted i11i- 3 tially as the sole course of action 4 5 Initiate su Jmarine action against allied shipping 5 6 and minin in allied watera 5 The decision to initiate general nuclear 1ar might be made 7 8 under any of the following situations a When the Soviets croso the tic Gcnna 1 bordc r with combat 9 10 forces b When the Soviets conduct u lr bombardment even though 11 nonnuclear of US bases -ai1•fielrl_ -• and in3tallaticns in West 12 Ge many 13 o When the Soviets ente1• the conflict in support of the GDR forces blocking access to Berlin 15 d If West Berlin is seized by East Germans or by Soviets 16 in any action including pa1•a-mtli tary mas ced as a ci vj l 17 disturbance 18 e If the us·Force proceeding along the Helmstedt-Berlin 14 19 axis is 1n danger of annihilation becauue of heavy Soviet 20 air-ground attaclc 21 I TOP SECRET JCSM-431-61 ' 28 Tab to Annex to Apl ' endix B • • t· · ' 1 _ · TOP SECRET AP PENDIX C ADEQUACY OF CAPABILITY THE PROBLEM 1 To determine t 'le adequac- • or our ca Jability to prosecute 1 by 31 Oct ober 1961 the course of action cicocr Lbed in Question 2 • #2 assuming the preparations been made refer ed to i n Qucot1on 1 1 have If' the 31 octc'bor $61 npbility irt judced lnade- 3 ii luate for eff'ectivG e ecu·i c 1 1 hoN lor1g would it talce to create 5 he required capability 6 the viewpoint or rui This adequacy to be consider•ed from All ed cooper tlons l ncluding west 7 German part 1 c 1 pat 1 on and also as a unilat r•a US a9tion 8 FACTS BEARING ON TliE l'ROlJJ h M 2 See Annex A to Appendix A 9 DISCUSSION' 10 3 • For discuss ion see the rme x hci•ctt' CONClllSIONS 4 Arter a mobilization period or fotu• months the US or 11 the US and 1 ts European all 1 es hao the oapa bllity of deploying 12 - au1'f'1c1ent ground and air fo1•ces to Eu1•opc1 to rc itore access to 13 Berlin if' oppoaed only by GDn Th lo same o Lze force could 14 avoid destruction for a per 1 cxl o-1 ' ·i e d 1ys or 15 days if 15 opposed by GDR and Russian forces 16 5 Due to the inability to determine tho quaJ ity of Eu ·011ean l' Allied forces and due to the inability to predict with confidence 18 that all European Allies and the United States will commence 19 full mobil 1 Zation four months prim• to an Mticipatii id l nc l dent 20 1n Berlin it l s considel'ed that there would not be iufflcien'i forces 1n Europe by 31 October 1961 to restore access to Berlin • aga inst succ ss1vely h1ghe levels of GDR and Soviet resistance TOP SECRET JCSM-431-61 29 Appendix C ·1t' IJ• J•i t· •-t' ·· - l1' ri 1· i 1·1• ··- - - - - -• • 21 22 23 TOP SECRET '' 6 Because of' the need for al r bases ctaginc areo s and l assembly areas it is impra tical for the United States to con- 2 sider unilateral o c l ion in the BC ll'l' i n area r s a minimum full CC operat1on of the Federal Republic oi' Ger•man I•'RG 1 s r-cquired ii and to a lesse r degree that of 1'11·ance an Gt•eal Bi•itafn i s also 5 In addition ' he United States cannot p1 1t sufficient 6 required ·rorcea 1n Europe in a four month period to l' zto ce acccs • against _successi •ely hi3har lev J n of' GDR und Soviet resi 3tance 7 Considerinr the rein ' 'or e 1 1- 'Ll tn L11' bo ell siclus and the 7 8 9 teed for induis rial not-11 Uori 1n o dc1· that the fnited States 10 •an support its Allief l acs Ro v f 11 be feasible fo • Eur·o m - 1 J iee Ol' ita ow i rorccc 1' would not 11 the Un l 'i d ·v i tcs to cncagc 12 in nonnuclear war with th ' l Soviet Bloc fo •cce wh1 ch could be Ir r- rne co se s mobill - 11 zation ot the Allied cou tries l'equil•ec l' i mo1i lls a 1d only after 15 f'ull mobilization of' Allies a11ci ·the Jni t d Sta i cs 1s atto i ned 16 one year plus do the Allied fo •cco apr cm ' tc exist in compara- 17 ble numbers with Soviet fo ces 18 broue ht into the ax-ea by 31 0ctobc1• 1961 TOP SECRET JCSM-431-61 -- · 13 ·30 Appendix C ----·-- ··- - - ' ·TOP SECRET ANNEX TO APl'ErWIX C DISCUSSION 1 summary of Reauireinents II sunnnn 1 of the forces required is included in Appendix B Sin ·e E0rl1n is located in the central area and since t11e primar r involvement or US forces will take plcJ oe in the central arc a detailed study of requ1reme nts and adequacy of capabil11 ics wiJ l be limited to this area I that ·uoweve_r H m1 sb 'be moi t ti•on1 5J y e n Jhaslzcd since the actions o· i'c ar -ld ir l hcr io stu lies coulr l Jad to igeneral war it 113 mollt important thllt the north area and south area be reinforced ·r f til -s 1s not ncco 11 liohrid the ccnti•al area can be outflanked ri • d the mt ire NN1'0 posi t on in central Europe be placed in jeopardy Sunumi cy o · the _•cquirernentt1 for ' ' central Europe are a To restore access if oppoocd on 1 v by the GDR Saven Allied divisions and four- tactical L1°· w1nc s would b0 required b To permit progressive appli cation of nonnucleai• forces as successively higher levels of GDn lnd Soviet resictance were encountei-ed Forces on the ordeJ· 0f ma nitucle of 50 Allied divisions and a ooi-i-cspond1ne lllagnltud€l of a iP strength would be requireq - c NavY Since it 1 c i a • 'cl that the actions contained in this study are taken prior to commencement of hostilities - - - 1t follows as a corollary -that --Army and Alr Force units -- -- aea11fted to Eui-ope would be movea ad1nintotratively 1 1ncler peacetime conditions Under actl al cc ndit1onz this as- sumption might not prove to be vulid In view of Soviet oapab1l1ty to initiate submarine 1mrf ii•c at any time or their choice Preparations must be made to insure the _i 1 TOP SECRET Annex to Aptiendix C JC SM-431-61 t ' I i ' 'll'''I i ' l V I i - f • I i l' j t 1 l• 1 r · · ·1·-1' ' ' • · j J' • J TOP SECRET safety of seaborne movements ago inst Soviet interfcr mcc 1 Navy mobilization shoulc l be concurrent with the othe ' Services to bring ships to wartime complements _and to provide the planned AS' f a ue meritation in hips and aircraft fl 'Om Ready Reserve 2 SUmma17 of Cannbil1Uea a esent forces in Europe arc as follows f rmy Foi -cen Count1•1 us l 5 divitiion i France j forces 15 wings di visions 10 winc s 12 divisions reduced strength FRG of UK France and 1· 15 wings 4 c' 1visions reduced strength UK The M _ £rce wings 10 FfiO hu vc a c apalJ111 l y for limited defensive operations and littla or no offcnsj_vc aa pabili ty 'o The current JSCP indicatoa that lurinc the first four months of f'ull mobilization after declaration of a national emergency by the President thn US has the capability of moving 10 Divisions to Europe including the three STRAC Divisions and one Marine Div Wing Team which can be moved at any time but which normally would be moved during the first 30 days aftar mobilizat - 1 c The US Air Force would movo 23 squadrons to Europe during the first 30 days afte1• mob l Uzation the CASF which can be mov ecl at unytimo This includes Durinc thio oame period of time Allied contributions to the alr force in Central rllrope would amount to an estimo ted additional 6 wings d It is estimated that by M 4 month • oui• principal Allies in Western Europe could make the follow i ng additional forces available Country Arm y Forcas Air Force Forces UK 6 divisions 4 wings France 2 divisions 2 wings FRO 8 divisions I ' TOP -SECRm' -- JCSM-431-6J 32 ·' ' ' 'Jl' I» 1 none r « 1 'f 1 Annex to Appendix C ' TOP SECRET e Based on the abcve'f gurea the total US and Allied 1 2 forces available by M 4 ar e estimated to be Air Force Forces 3 count Z_ r For_ us 13 divisions 22 w ings 4 UK 10 div1i io 1s 19 wings 5 6 divisions 12 w l ngs 6 10 wings 7 France ' FRO TOT L o 49 d1v1a1ons divioions 63 wings f The Navy i r iicate3 h t ' i c JO MST 3 l rc n port s now 8 9 in operation 1n tl1e AtJG 1t c a 1 11 Jv n total o ' 1 18 ' oo 10 troopa dur rig a 'our 1 1onth pei• lod J ' llnr cit 1c assumed that this is an e dmin 'r t r i• ive move not forc J t'ul v oppo 0 l by 12 the Russians the mo·111 ment or adUit lon J wm and carr o ls 13 only contingent on the charter rcqulc i t1 m and reactivatio 'l 14 C f additional bottomo to carry tlie re tuire per onnel and tonnage The sealift capability can be lncreased to more than 1neet the total contemplated · lift requirements 16 17 lift would be available to handle prforit movements and 18 advance eche lona 1 3 e t Capabilities Air- 15 Divisions 1n East Ge11nal'l'y The Rii rnians p1'csently have 20 20 It is eetimatcd tl1at they hevc the 21 capability of reinforcing their fo ces in East Germany at the 22 rate of four Divisions per clr _ ·· ' ' 1 e I'trst ten dnys and 23 three Divisions per day for the · r • ud r of the first month 24 after D-Day for a total o1' about J 28 Dl v1 ions 25 Additionally theoe Divisions would be supported by 1000 tactica i aircraft 26 positioned ·in East Ger111any and bacl ed by another 2500 tactical 27 type 28 4 aircraft located 1n western USSR al nc In view or the foregoing the i'ollow1ng points arc 29 30 considered appropriat a It is imposs ble for the US to carr'J out this operation 3J without necesaacy ll1ed cooperation In addition to pro- v1d1ng a united fr mt to the Soviets with the attendant TOP SECRET JCSM-431-61 Annex to Appendix C 33 i ·1 _ 1· t' 'l I I 1 1 r- j J' If ' · ' j• '•1'1 ' J·1 · 32 33 ' -·· ' psyohoJ oe ioP l a lva ntar es it is noce3s Lry to have the uoe of l ports a 1 rbo ses sta6 ng areas rmd n r e mbly area l 2 s a minimurn we innst obtain approval 1 y t ·w Fedc •al RepubJ ic of 3 Germany and o t least tacit ti rcomcnt hy tho French ai d LI Dritish 5 It is very apparent ti at lt l u to our ativantt i e to obtain the coo ierat'l on ancJ pa1 •t1c ir it 1on of a lilE' i1 V of our NA'l'O Allies as i os iblc in thi or orutlon b • 11 nothr r f'actor wh ch woul l r- er•'lonsly nffect the 6 7 8 US Forces 1 s that ca pt 'l11llt and concept fl re bal led on the 10 use Jl of te ct1cnl 'lUt'lle ar wen or1 l n tr·•c r than mr tching tho soviets man for vm cf the lrn i oi' thcoc 1·1 aprins ls demied to our own forces the convc11t10 1uJ bomb and arti t ra ' 12 13 support which could be made avo 'll 11 J e t'or i 1 i s opero tion would be f'ar below levels that wore em Jloyed 'nd con idcred 15 necessaey in Europe during World 16 x· 11 1 _c Tile US ForceB that have be m mentioned in th l ll stnd 1 17 are earmarked in currenb mob l J izo t1on plans for deployment 18 to Europe In addition to thel lo foi•cc FJ the United Stateo 19 has both ground and air forcea wh l ch re now earmrlcecl fo1• 20 deployment to other 11reas 21 These nc c11 t1onal force o could be sent to Europe howevex• tl1ie would have an adverse effect on our world-w i d -· ' li·J • po iture d The equipment and rtlt tiic m 1tcr Lal needed to 22 23 24 initially outfit the additional mobil l zer l forces required 25 in this study must necessarily be dra m from m r reserve 26 stocks which are inadequate l '01 a fore 1 or tbis size 27 Additionally logistical support 01' deployed forces of this 28 magnitude engaged in an extended nonnuclear wa1• would cr ate 29 f'urth er critical shortageD _in certain conventional wenpons and ammunition No reliance can be placed on the wnr pro- 3l duotion base f'or maJor items of combat equipment that a re not 32 in production on M-Day and in most categories in which _TOP SECRET JC -431-6l 34 · - -- -- _---- 33 i'OP SECRET • 'f' ' l 'Y-- or1 t1cal shortages exist a period of f i •om one to two years 1 would be required to balance product lon and consumpti on 2 requirements 3 e The d1v1a1ona of the UK France and FRG are practically4 all understrength logistic·support is marginal and they 5 should not be considered in terms of capability of US 6 divisions ·- _ 7 ' · i y • -- TOP SECRET jbSM-431-61 _ _ _ -----··· 35 Annex to Appendix c ll I ' ' • · 1I '' r·i 1 li- 1· i I I • 11