6EGRETHNOFORN v - _ i ··- r 11 0 1-m UrH Rti C H t 1Ar r ' ' U Colombia COLMIL Historical Perspectives 31 December 2003 · ' • · · - b 1 U Then and Now • U In 1959 and again in 1962 U S officials conducted survey of COLMIL counter-insurgency 1 2 capabilities · • U Key findings included o U Lack of central planning and coordination affecting counter-insurgency efforts at all levels o U Resource fragmentation requires logistical reform o U Insufficient communications transportation and equipment to prosecute coordinated and sustained combat operations o U Inadequate fusion and dissemination of intelligence at COLAR and national level hamper counter-insurgency effort o U Civic action and psychological operations must be continuous rather than sporadic o U Broad social political and economic problems exist and solutions appear remote o U Continued development of special counter-guerrilla teams from helicopters with emphasis on Lanceros will substantially reduce guerrillas within a year 3 • U Key findings of most recent Oct 03 evaluations include • U Three weeks of engagements with COLMIL commanders presented seven key judgments o bX1 0 0 0 0 0 0 SEGRETNNOFORH SEORETHNOFORt• U COLMIL Campaign Plans Compared U Plan Lazo 1962-1966 five phased plan whose stated primary objective was to eliminate the independent republics and destroy guerrilla-bandit groups4 o U 1962 total estimated strength of guerrilla-bandit groups was approximately 8 500 o U 1964 total estimated strength of guerrilla-bandit groups was approximately 2 000 o U According to 1964 AMEMB cable COLAR determined more aggressive action was necessary in one communist zone located in southern Tolima where a communist nicknamed Tirofijo Manuel Marulanda a k a Tirofijo had been active in this zone and continues to sit atop the FARC o U 1966 violence levels significantly reduced but Plan Lazo stalls as elite interest wanes U S became increasingly focused on conflict in Vietnam BASIC PHASING Phase - 0 1 1 62·- 66 ·PAT'RJ01A 2QC 3·· 06 • Develop campal i plan 1 1 2 2A Prepratory actions • Position forces for 2A 1nma coumwactton • Repel FARC from cundlnamarca secl h Bogota Position forces for 2B • Prep - b baut4tspac• • Attack·FARC areas Of combat aener inopow 3 1 28 4 2C 5 2D AHUlll t affWIIIVe •· T arget S1rateglc'ltadetshlp Destroy guerrtllas and bandit gangs Secure Memllln and key economic cenlllrs • Extend operations natlonw targeting remaining concentrations Reconstrucaon and • l 9rata demeiblllzed C i errllH • consollda19 gains • Unclll'tlke socio-economic reforms development · consolldadon programs Plan Lazo vs Plan Patriota • b I U Plan Lazo Lessons Learned 12• 13• 14 • b 1 o U Civil affairs civil defense and counterinsurgency operations combined to deny wides r • b 1 • o U Attacking leadership of guerrilla-bandit gangs splintered organizational cohesion resulting in a 20 percent increase in enemy KIAs SEGRETNNOFORN 8EGRETHNOFORN 1 · o I U Intelligence was a vital force multiplier allowing security forces to deal with both mainline uerrilla units and their under round su ort structures • b 1 • o U Counterinsurgency is a political strategy with a derivative military component other components are political economic social • b 1 • b 1 DOI 24 December 03 Dc1 ioea Fro111 M lti le So reee Deeleeeif J 011 E1 Coordinated with 1 b 5 Sources - - - - - - - - - - - - b 1 SEGRET ilNOFORN 6EGRETHNOFORN lD 1 6E€AETNNOFORN