Refe ence - TO SECRET FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE Gypher arP PRIS CC Sir D Ormsby Gore No 2636 October 22 1062 HlllED Ii TE rEbrP-foP-SECRET Cuba Following personal fur Frime Minister from Ambassador I know that David Bruce had instruct-J ons to put us in t11e picture ct idday today in London but it may be useful if I give an account of my talk with the President yesterday He asked me to come unseen to th hi te House just before lunch Fe were quite alone and he told me that no one else outside the United States Government was being informed of what was go·1ng on 2 He then said that the situation with regard to Cuba l1ad completely changed during the course o the last r eek A major photo reconnaissance effort by U 2 aircraft had now shown that Cuba was obtaining two types of medium range offensive mi3siles One type on fixed sites had an estimated range of two thousand miles The other type was mobile with an estimated range of fifteen hundred miles He was not very specific with r gard to figures but he thought that there were perhaps thirty to forty missiles already on the island and they now knew thc t oore were on their way by ship 'l'hey had to assume that these missiles y1ould be armed with nu lear warheads They would be more or less useless without them but the Americans had no firm infor1 iation o t this time as to whether nucleo r warheads h d arr l ved They did however know of the const ruction of underground storo ge f -'lcilities He said that this new information posed a very serious problem for the United States He had made his position very clear on Septe iber 13 when he had said anong other things that if Cuba became an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Un lon then the United States would do whatever ust be done to protect its ovm security and tho t of its Allies This straightforward differentiation between defensive and offensive cl' pacity constituted a clear warning of where the United States 'Nould dro v the line In thefce circumstances and j_n the light of this latest informati on the Administration had had to decide what action they could appropriately take 3 The President said tho t they had come to the conclusion that there vrere two alternatives open to them i They could Reference - E-11-1 xc7 Washington telegram No 2636 to Foreign Office - 2 - i They could order an all-ou t o ir strike first thing lfonday morning to take out all the known missi e sites and the issiles themselves insofar as they had been able to pinpoint their present whereabouts 'l'he military authorities estimat Jd that such a strike would eliminate at least fifty per cent of the Cuban missile potential but it would inevitably cause o large number of casual t - es to Russians as well as Cuho ns Tne strike would be followei by the imposi t __on of a blockc de of Cuba ii They could impose almost immediately a blockade without first carryir g out an uir strike They would stop and search all ships suspected of carrying goods which would help to build up the military potential of Cuba This would mean leaving the Cubans with their present offensive co pacity such as it r1as but would demon trate America's determination not to allow the build up to proceed any further 1 The President then asked me for my vi 'YIS as to which of these two courses I felt was the coITect one I said that I saw very serious drawbacks in the first course of action he had outlined to me Very few people outside the United States would consider the provocation offered by the Cubans serious enough to merit an AmeM con air attack r thought that in the circumstances America would be damaged politically and in any case I could not believe that the missiles so far landed constituted any significant military threat to the United States Even with these wen pons in existence on Cuba the United States could presur iably overwhelm the island in a very short time if they decided at some future date that this hud to be done I t ought we ought also to bear in mind the possible repercussions on the Berlin situation American action of this kind might well provide a smoke-screen behind which the Russians might move against Berlin under favourable conditions Therefore of the two alternatives he had put to me I would certainly favour the second although this too would hf eve far-reaching political implications including the probability of a major Russian reaction perhaps in the Berlin context 5 The President said that he and his colleagues had come to the sar 1e conclusion and that they therefore intended to carry out the second course of action He added that he supposed that there was a tM rd course and even a fourth course open to them They might for instance use the lG test develoµnents as an excuse for a full-scale invasion of Cuba and so finish with Castro once and for all They might never have a better opportunity for such action Again they might do nothing at all and go on o s before but he thought thn t this was not only politically impossible but r1as in any case too dangerous It was now clear that their present actions in Cuba constituted a direct challenge ' by the oviets to the Unit8d States They mew perfectly well what his own position and thaf of the United States Government was and if when mfronted by this provocative challenge he did nothing his friends and Allies TOP SECRET tUULI K VHD Utt Ct Refer ence - E-rvl TOP SECRET - 3Allies would come to the conclusion that he was afraid to move an Khrushchev would be bound to assume that the Am0ricans for all their tough words would be prepa e1 to sit upine and inactive whatever he Khrushchev did This would have its effect in other areas all around the globe an especially in respect of Berlin 6 In answer to this I said that I was sur that an invasion at this time would be most unwise I had seen no e idence that the conditions in Cuba were such that the Americans could expec-' any widespread popular support for thei action and history indicated that -an invasion without ir ternal popular support usually led to endless trouble The idea of a p1ppet rbgime kept in power by American marines was not a happy prospect In any case this could provide the Soviets with the opportunity to take over West Berlin at a moment when United States political stock would be at a very low ebb and the Americans could be blamed for triggering off this exchange of pawns in the most reckless mromer Nevertheless I _could W6ll understand the political dangers and the internal difficulties of doing nothing but I supposed that the blockade itself would give us many headaches and we would now ra- re to pr3pare for vigorous Russian reactions to it 7 I then asked the Presldent under what authority they would institute a blockade of Cuba Hf said that it would be under the terms of the Rio treaty and that a meeting of the a A 3 would be called urgently and they would expect to get a two-thirds majority in favour of the course of action they were taking I said that I feared that the invocation of the Rio treaty would not help us very much as I presumed that the United Kingdom had no legal obligations under its terms Our traditional attitude with regard to the freedom of the seas would put us in an awkward position Here the President commented that he understood that most of the British shipping taking part in the Cuban trade was not operated by the more respected companies He also made it clear that ehip ients of P O L would be denied to Cuba Such shipments would be regarded as assistance to the military rxitential of Cuba and in any case in view of the action they were taking there see1 1ed to be little point in adopting half measures Certainl r the denial of P O L to Cuba would have the most disastrous effects on the Cuban economy 8 The President finally said that he could not help admiring the Soviet strategy They offered this deliberate and provocative challenge to the United States in the knowledge that if the Americans reacted violently to it the Russiru1s would • be given an ideal opportunity to move against West Berlin Jf on the other hand he did nothing the Latin Americans and the United TOP SECRET PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE Reference - E-YV1 TOP SECRET ' ashington telegram No 2636 to Fo reign Office · · - 1 - the United States' other Allies would feel that the A lerfonns ha1 no real vill to resist the encroachments of CGm c1nism and would hedge th ir bets accordingly 9 · The President impressed upon me ho r vi tul it was to keep all t 1is information secret until they were re2 dy to act He wished that only you and your closest advisers should be j_nforrried of what vms happening · I said that in these circumstances I thought it would be b_e tter if I did not report through the usual channels but rather that he should senc you a personal message later in the afte -noon by teletype m'1chine · · · Copies sent to Prime Minister's Office JJJJJ TOP SEQ_@