C00992469 • ' Approved for Release 2013 07 03 Director of Central Intelligence 1 • Approved for Release 2013 07 03 b 1 b 3 C00992469 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 Warning Notice Intelligence So_urces and Meth WNINTEL co·ntractor Consultants Caution---Proprietary Information NFIB C epartments Only Dissemination and Extraction of lnformotio Controlled by Originator This Information has been Authorized for Release to J J Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C00992469 ' Approved for Release 2013 07 03 -- r- - -ito tet N t __ - - I INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM SOUTH AFRICA'S NUCLEAR OPTIONS AND DECISIONMAKING STRUCTURES L __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C00992469 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 NOTE Much effort has gone into collecting and analyzing data particularly technical data on South African nuclear developments Yet some eight months after the discovery last August in· the Kalahari Desert of activity suggesting an imminent nuclear test we are still far from· certain what the South Africans are up to We do not know precisely what their capabilities are or how they got there The assessment that follows has a twofold purpose First it attempts to set forth and analyze what we think we know about South Africa's nuclear development its genesis and direction the institutions and leading people involved its economic and financial aspects Second it takes a look at the political side of an assumed nuclear weapons program what alternate strategies would be available to the South African leaders and what might they see as the advantages and drawbacks to each While this cannot be a definitive assessment of South Africa's nuclear programs it offers a framework for interpreting future facts about them It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the role that foreign cooperation may have played in helping South Africa to develop a nuclear weapons capability Although the conclusions of this memorandum would probably be affected only marginally by such an examination more substantial modifications are at least conceivable Briefly stated South Africa's options for imminent test readiness would be enhanced to the extent that it were engaged in strategic nuclear exchanges with Israel Taiwan or other countries This memorandum is the product of an informal interagency working group chaired by CIA under the auspices of the Associate National Intelligence Officer for Africa and the National Intelligence Officer for Nuclear Proliferation The memorandum has been coordinated at a working level ii 0 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C00992469 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 CONTENTS Page KEY JUDGMENTS DISCUSSION • I THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAMS A B C Uranium P rcicessing and Sale·s • Nuclear Power Generation Nuclear Weapons Development iv l l 1 3 4 Valindaba 4 Weapons Design Laboratory 6 De 1 i very Systems 7 D E F II Kalahari Facility 8 Weapons Deveopment Versus Weapons Production 10 The Nuclear Decisionmaking Process 11 ALTERNATIVE NUCLEAR STRATEGIES FOR SOUTH AFRICA • A B C 14 Shifting South African National Security Strategy • · 14 Alternative Nuclear Strategies The· Political' Dimension 17 Net Assessment 22 ANNEXES Annex A Annex B The Nuclear Establishment • • Financing Nuclear Development iii l I Approved for Release 2013 07 03 25 28 C00992469 ' Approved for Release 2013 07 03 KEY JUDGMENTS South Africa's leaders almost certainly have been pursuing a prog·ram deliberately designed to give them the option to produce nuclear weapons we think it likely they will continue to pursue such a program even if they accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and thus are forced to conduct parts of the program clandestinely In particular · we believe the South Africans will attempt to build a reserve of highly enriched uranium to be readily available for fabricating weapons and will continue to design and develop nuclear weapons without necessarily intending to test them The South Africans will probably be more prepared to accede to the obligations of the NPT once they have accumulated a stockpile of highly enriched uranium--even if international safeguards were to be applied to it The price they will demand of the United States for adherence to the NPT however will be high In addition to securing US commitments to supply both research and power reactor fuel and to continue cooperation with South Africa in the nuclear area they will seek broader US political support and greater acceptance of South Africa's perceptions of its long-term security needs Meanwhile contrary to what we judge to have been South Africa's earlier intentions we consider it unlikely that it may feel compelled to detonate a nuclear device in the near future and particularly not in the next few months iv Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C00992469 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 iop Scc J- 7 DISCUSSION I THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAMS A Uranium Processing and Sales 1 South Africa's nuclear program since it began has been oriented primarily toward the commercial exploitation of vast domestic uranium deposits Those deposits which amount to more than 250 000 metric tons of uranium have permitted South Africa to become one of the largest producers of natural uranium 2 All uranium sales are arranged by the Nuclear Fuels Corporation commonly called NUFCOR Together with the Atomic Energy Board AEB and the National Institute for Metallurgy NUFCOR has developed and constructed several pilot plants for the production of uranium compounds At present South Africa can produce modest amounts of uranium tetrafluoride UF uranium hexafluoride UF 6 uranium dioxide U 2 and very4 pure metal in addition to me capability of producing about 6 000 metric tons of natural uranium concentrates per year 3 The AEB is responsible for managing South Africa's nuclear projects most of which are located at the national nuclear research center Pelindaba The Pelindaba center dates back to the early 1960s the original facilities include a modified version of the US Oak Ridge research reactor and a small 3 million electron volts accelerator 4 One of the announced goals of the AEB in the early 1960s was the development of a domestic reactor system that would make use of natural uranium fuel One of the unannounced aims was to develop a process for enriching natural uranium in the U-235 isotope In the mid-196Ds according to fairly sketchy evidence the secret work on uranium enrichment had yielded sufficiently successful results to warrant a largescale research program South Africa decided in 1967 to shift its available resources from attempting to develop its own nuclear reactors to concentrating on nuclear enrkhment studies l Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C00992469 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 ' --- - L_____ '- - - - - including the designing of a complete uranium enrichment plant Although the secrecy of this work may reflect military intentions it also can be attributed to a commercial interest in protecting proprietary information 5 In July 1970 Prime Minister John Vorster announced that South Africa was beginning the construction of a pilot uranium enrichment plant Vorster stressing the peaceful intentions behind the nuclear program noted that South Africa would accept international safeguards over the pilot plant when certain conditions were resolved--that is if its proprietary information could be protected The announcement focused worldwide attention on the development of Valindaba--the site that had been chosen for the headquarters of a new Uranium Enrichment Corporation UCOR and for construction of the pilot uranium enrichment plant 6 Valindaba adjacent to the Pelindaba research center · now consists of three large enrichment buildings several administrative buildings and support buildings used in the fabrication and assembly of sensitive proprietary equipment The site has been expanded to include a new prototype facility designed to test a new generation of process equipment that is to be ·used in a future commercial enrichment plant 7 Construction of this future uranium enrichment plant is valued primarily as an important step in the commercial exploitation of natural uranium resources The South Africans plan ultimately to export finished reactor fuel and completion of the necessary enrichment plant is considered a major project in the peaceful nuclear program Establishment of a commercial· enrichment plant will put South Africa in a unique position to con solidate the normally separate marketing steps for uranium mining conversion and enrichment--all of which are controlled by the state 8 Successful completion of the commercial enrichment project will require purchases of foreign equipment and technology however The most sophisticated components approximately 10D axial flow compressors were to be ordered this year Other important projects include for the short term production of fuel for the research reactor and--for the medium term--producing fuel for two power reactors scheduled to begin operation in four years 2 Top Secret Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C00992469 ·• Approved for Release 2013 07 03 rl ······1 but South Africa was unable to line up the necessaryJ or eie IL up_pJier s _ 1 I - - - - - - - 1mpurran rsupp-irers·1n··west··Ger many and France would not be permitted to export equipment for the enrichment project The United States as well has imposed export restrictions which have frustrated the project managers and government officials alike 9 Because of the reluctance of foreign governments to provide assistance in the commercial enrichment venture the Minister of Mines revealed in February that South Africa would postpone use of the complex helikon technique which had been developed for this project and which requires the axial flow compressors in favor of a simpler design Using less sophisticated technology probably not much different from that used in the pilot plant additional enrichment facilities are being constructed adjacent to Valindaba to permit annual production of perhaps 100 tons of reactor-grade uranium This course was chosen both to keep the enrichment program alive and to ensure a supply of fuel for domestic power reactors The new facilities which we think probably were designed to facilitate safeguards inspections may enhance South Africa's overall ability to reach high enrichment levels B Nuclear Power Generation 10 A modest plan exists for the construction of nucl ar power plants in South Africa The first station--to include two 925-MWe megawatt electrical reactors of French origin--is under construction at Koeberg near Cape Town where the distance from coal deposits has made nuclear power economically practical The AEB has projected the construction of several power stations totaling about 10 000 MWe by the late 1990s All of these power reactors are expected to be purchased abroad This plan is consistent with South Africa's strong desire to reduce its dependence on foreign energy suppliers but because most of the nuclear generating capacity is projected to be built during the 1990s construction of nuclear power stations is not deemed to be a pressing issue 3 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C00992469 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C Nuclear Weapons Development 11 Evidence that South Africa is working to develop nucle ar weapons is circumstantial but persuasive It relates to the· Valindaba uranium enrichment plant and to an isolated facility south of the Pelindaba research center Valindaba 12 A veil of secrecy has continued to surround the Salindaba uranium enrichment plant since Vorster's announcement in 1970 and aside from one open paper and several published photographs information concerning the technical details of the plant has been very tightly held Assessments of the capabilities of the Valindaba plant as a result are based pri marily on estimates and assumptions 13 Aerial photography of the plant acquired during its construction shows positions or cells for an estimated 329 groups of process equipment Photographs released by South Africa in 1975 show the kinds of equipment that presumedly is installed in each cell Because the functions of certain pieces of equipment are open to question differing models can be made of process flow streams in the system These differing interpretations of the process arrangement support the same basic conclusion that the plant could be used to produce highly enriched uranium The major differnce in the models is that one indicates the need for only one pass of feed material through the plant to reach 90 percent enrichment and the other requires more passes of the material through the plant--the latter involving more difficulty in reaching a high level of enrichment 14 The size of the Valindaba plant suggests that South Africa undertook this project with a nuclear weapons option in mind Although laboratory-scale pilot operations undoubtedly preceded the Valindaba plant it nevertheless was a demonstration--a first large-scale application of the technology--which normally would be limited in both enrichment levels and capacity But Valindaba is large and costly--much more so than is needed simply to prove that the enrichment process is economically feasible Thus it is clear that South Africa built the plant 4 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C00992469 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 specifically to be capable of producing significant quantities of enriched uranium The intended enrichment level is not clear but our limited knowledge of the plant's capacity indicates that the attainable annual output of reactor-grade uranium falls short of that needed to fuel even one of the Koe berg power reactors This suggests that the desired capability was for high enrichment 15 With a mode of operation dedicated to high enrichment several hundred kilograms of highly enriched uranium probably would be produced per year far more than is needed to fuel the Safari research reactor which is the only known consumer of highly enriched uranium HEU in South Africa 16 One cannot deduce from the existence of the HEU capability of the plant alone that South Africa ever planned actually to exercise its high enrichment option In terms of national security the desire to have the high enrichment capability might in itself be sufficient motive for expanding the role and size of an otherwise simple pilot plant Similarly operation of the plant need not equate to production of highly enriched uranium since the plant probably can be operated to produce a limited amount of reactor-grade uranium 18 In sum it appears that South Africa has intended from the outset--the late 1960s--to translate its uranium enrichment technology into not only a commercial advantage but also a nuclear weapons option Substantial quantities of weaponsgrade uranium may become available in the near future or may already exist The operating history of the plant indicates however that the South Africans have encountered technical 5 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C00992469 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 problems in their e_fforts to bring the plant up to full capacity Although officially the Valindaba plant has been operational since 1975 it is fairly certain that as of April 1977 it had not reached a significant capacity · The present operational status of the plant is unclear Reports of technical difficulties have persisted L--- ··• ----· · Tn s etneJ South Africans apparently wish to produce liighly enriched uranium at Valindaba their capability yet to do so is not clear Weapons Design Laboratory 19 We believe that a facility at Pelindaba just south of the main complex and separately secured probably has been engaged in the development of nuclear weapons technology for sever·al years L · · · · · - ·- - J 20 The facility was first occupied in 1972 · the group which moved there from the main complex at Pelindaba is called the Reactor Development Division According to the AEB Annual Report of 1968 the year this division was created the Reactor Development Division is responsible for applications of nuclear technology in the broad sense Its main overt responsibility is the development of fast breeder reactor technology but· the level of this effort indicated by the Annual Reports falls far short of justifying the observed expansion of RDD facility buildings 21 At least one member of the Reactor Development Divi- iQ Lis kno IDL tQ hay tu died in a wJ llDPD s- related iield -···· 6 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C00992469 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 22 The physical layout of the RDD facility as observed in overhead photography indicates that provisions have been made for conductin_g_hazardous exo_eriments_ c__ _ _ _ _ _ _ 23 Several general statements can be made about nuclear weapon designs Because of its simplicity a gun-type design can be developed relatively easily This type of device is suitable for a one-shot demonstration of capability or perhaps for a very limited number of weapons but as compared with implosion devices the design is very inefficient in terms of both yield and quantities of nuclear material required Development of the necessary high-explosive implosion systems requires highexplosive testing but is certainly not beyond the capability of South Africa a country particularly strong in the development production and application of high explosives Although it could be disguised at Somerset West or elsewhere no facility for conducting such tests has yet been identified in South Africa Regardless of whether South Africa has opted for a gun-type or an implosion device a finished design could be in hand now Delivery Systems 24 South Africa has several potential nuclear delivery systems on hand none however is specifically adapted for the task The most likely delivery mode would be by aircraft The 7 -reµ Soccer_ Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C00992469 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 - -_I ' I I I South African Air Force inventory includes light bombers longrange reconnaissance bombers medium-range transports mari time strike aircraft all-weather fighter-bombers and allweather fighter aircraft--all of which could provide some delivery capability In addition medium-range and long-range •transport aircraft are available in the domestic civil air inventory Each type has its limitations--for example range payload escape capability or the need for overtarget delivery modifications It is unlikely that nuclear delivery modifications to any of these aircraft have been undertaken Atlas Aircraft Corporation a government-funded corporation which overhauls hath civilian and military aircraft could perform some straightforward modifications to some of these aircraft The South Africans have for a number of years attempted to modify the Mirage 1 III to accept the local air-to-air missile Whiplash but with little success and they may also have difficulty in making · the sophisticated changes necessary for precision and safe nuclear delivery from strike aircraft 25 It is possible that the South Africans are working toward producing their own rockets and surface-to-surface missiles but none are known to have been produced The nearterm prospects for domestic development of a ballistic missile -delivery system are poor Such a project would be hindered 'by cost complexity and lack of foreign assistance Prospects for conventional artillery delivery are remote D Kalahari Facility 26 Against the backdrop of evidence concerning nuclear • weapons development the facility discovered a year ago in the Kalahari Desert 80 kilometers north of Up ngton was identified as a probable nuclear test site Construction of the site is estimated to have begun in mid-1976 As the site developed elements appeared which are not normally associated with a facility constructed for nuclear testing There are several explanations which have been offered for this One is that the facility never was intended to be a nuclear test site and that its marked similarity to a nuclear test site in certain respects was therefore transitory The other is that the facility originally was designed to be a nuclear test site but that it has been altered since last August because South Africa--presumably in response to US pressure--has postponed or abandoned plans to conduct a nuclear test there · 8 1· L ------- Approved for Release 2013 07 03 --- C00992469 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 27 Although the evidence remains ambiguous we judge J he second interm etation to be the more likeJy '- - - - - - - - ' 29 In sum while the Kalahari facility has features that suggest a nuclear testing role it appears likely that the planned development of the site was changed in late 1977--that is following public knowledge of the site Regardless of current intentions however the holes which have been drilled and capped are believed to be of sufficient depth and diameter to permit small-yield nuclear detonations This being the case the facility remains a potential nuclear test site but it does not as yet constitute reliable evidence concerning South African plans for production of nuclear weapons 9 lop ssc et Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C00992469 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 ' -- · -- --77 ---' E Weapons Development Versus Weapons Production 30 It is not clear whether South Africa intends to go beyond the development of nuclear weapons technology to the actual production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons Open statements by South Africans who are likely to be knowledgeable about nuclear weapons plans have included vague references to a nuclear weapons capability but none have indicated an intention to exploit that capability On the contrary the open statements deny any military goals in the South African nuclear ro ram 10 L -op Scei at Approved for Release 2013 07 03 ---- C00992469 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 31 Whatever the South African plans were a year ago it is almost certain that they have since been carefully reviewed We have noted that as a result the South African Government probably has suspended plans for conducting a nuclear test We have also noted that scientists at Pelindaba are preparing to make their own fuel for· the Safari research reactor These two developments may be related Use of domestically produced Safari fuel would necessarily be an overt demonstration of nuclear capability If South Africa once planned to conduct a nuclear test as a demonstration of strength or toughness this decision may have been reversed in favor of overt production of highly enriched fuel the political impact being comparable and the costs being significantly smaller If South Africa has planned to develop an actual nuclear weapon system on the other hand perhaps including plans to detonate a series of test devices production of Safari fuel would not represent a crippling diversion of material Indeed production of Safari fuel might be supported to provide a legitimate peaceful purpose for the production of highly enriched uranium F The Nuclear Decisionmaking Process 32 Our knowledge of how nuclear decisions are made in the South African Government is fragmentary The South African system is highly personalized and informal maximum secrecy prevails particularly on sensitive national security matters Nevertheless we can deduce cert µn premises from our general knowledge of overall decisionmaking procedure at the high levels of the government 33 Although the constitution of the Republic of South Africa provides for· a parliamentary system similar to the government of the United Kingdom the Cabinet exercises virtually supreme power The National Party which has been in power since 1948 arid now has an 82-percent majority in Parliament represents the bulk of the 2 7 million Afrikaners and its extraordinary solidarity reflects their long struggle to secure 11 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C00992469 ' Approved for Release 2013 07 03 their language and culture against alien inroads Johannes Vorster who has been Prime Minister since 1966 is the unrivaled leader of the party His cabinet appointees have included the party's next most influential personalities Especially in matters related to national security cabinet ministers exert sweeping executive powers that are seldom effectively challenged in Parliament or in the courts 34 Although Vorster has maintained the Cabinet's tradition of collective responsibility qualified observers believe that he has also asserted a decisive role in shaping the politically important decisions He usually works his own way to a difficult decision then sets the stage for posing the matter to the Cabinet His informal manner or decisionmaking is facilitated by his mastery of an executive structure that is much less complex than its American counterpart 35 Before a policy problem is posed to the whole Cabinet Vorster usually consults the relevant cabinet ministers and key civilian officials or military officers He tends to set up small ad hoc working groups to deal with problems that are politically important or substantively complex Vorster apparently uses such ad hoc groups not only for genuine consultation and problem assessment but also to postpone difficult decisions and contribute toward his usual consensus- building process If the latter motives are foremost a working group may emerge as a special commission rounded out with prominent nongovernmental experts 11 Whatever the apparent policy formulation process Vorster very likely makes the critical decisions outside the confines of the Cabine t or any other identifiable body 36 One authentic working group has been formalized as the South African Security Council although it does not meet regularly or maintain its own staff Its core membership includes the Prime Minister Defense Minister Pieter Botha and Foreign Minister Roelof Botha as well as General Magnus Malan Chief of the South African Defense Force and General Hendrik Van den Bergh Director of the Bureau of State Security the principal intelligence service Our scant information on the Security Council indicates that the council has· set up special working groups each chaired by a regular member of the council 37 The Security Council very likely would be the primary locus for a decision to test a nuclear device or to take other critical steps in a nuclear weapons program The Council 12 - oP JcoM1 t Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C00992469 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 ' might set up a special working group that would include key members of the existing bureaucratic entities that would be involved in planning and implementing the various facets of a weapons program Both the Atomic Energy Board and the National Institute for Defense Research would be involved in formulating a nuclear weapons program Among the key personnel in the AEB and the NIDR Dr Abraham J Roui who has directed the AEB since 1959 is the official most likely to be called upon to assess the technological pros and cons of a test explosion Roux has supervised· not only the component that would produce a nuclear explosive but the civil nuclear programs that would be affected by diversions of South African facilities or cutoffs of foreign inputs See annex A 38 Although a group tasked with weighing the pros and cons of nuclear weapons developments normally might be expected to include the government officials considered best able to discuss the economic costs of various options neither the Finance Minister nor the Minister of Economic Affairs is reputed to be particularly influential with Vorster Rather he apparently relies for economic advice primarily on the key figures in the South African Re erve Bank--Governor Theunis de Johgh and Deputy Governor Gerhardus de Kock 39 Because the critical decisions concerning a nuclear weapons program require weighting an extraordinarily complex pattern of military technological and economic factors Vorster may pay more heed to the specially qualified professionals than the politicians while working toward a decision His essentially political instincts however are likely to prevail when it comes to reaching the final decision For a critical nuclear decision he may well be as anxious to reach a binding consensus among all cabinet ministers as he apparently has been anxious for consensus on the most sensitive racial policy decisions If Vorster follows his usual tactics he will listen more attentively to the stronger members of the Cabinet · and allow them ample opportunity to shape the final decision and convince their colleagues in the shaping process · 40 For a decision to test a nuclear device Foreign Minis ter Roelof Botha as well as Defense Minister Pieter Botha and Cornelius Mulder Minister of Information and Plural Relations probably would be among the key actors We have no reason to doubt that these men share with Vorster the basic belief that national defense has top priority Conceivably they may have significantly different views concerning how a nuclear weapons 13 I 1 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C00992469 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 r - ···· ·· __J 7 i »- - ----- ----J program would affect South Africa's overall military strength or foreign relations but we have no reliable evidence of such differences on this subject 41 Any presently conceivable successor to Vorster will be similarly subject to the Afrikaner concern for solidarity and probably will emulate his moderator role--within the Cabinet and throughout the National Party As in the past future decisions on critical steps in South Africa's nuclear weapons program probably would be made by the Prime Minister in concert with a few key technicians and cabinet colleagues The Prime Minister and whomever he consults on a sensitive nuclear problem are likely to share a common perception of fundamental South African interests 42 In sum Vorster unlike prime ministers in other industrial non-Communist states need not consult or accommodate a wide variety of constituencies on nuclear matters The South African electorate traditionally has shown an unusually high degree of trust in its top leadership so long as the government is not seen as failing its supporters on the key issues of national security and white supremacy the leaders are able to exercise a far greater degree of latitude in policy matters than is the case in the United States or West European countries This clearly gives Vorster at least the internal political flexibility to initiate change or terminate a nuclear program without broad accountability to the South African people It also enhances the chances of maintaining secrecy about such matters II ALTERNATIVE NUCLEAR STRATEGIES FOR SOUTH AFRICA A Shifting South African National Security Strategy 43 The dramatic political changes which have occurred in southern Africa over the past few years have altered Pretoria's perceptions of South African national security and have led to significant shifts in its general strategy South Africa's 1977 White Paper on Defense noted that it no longer is possible to define national security aims with little or no thought for trends and events outside South Africa On the contrary it states that 14 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C00992469 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 •• developments in Africa and elsewhere have today thrust the Republic of South Africa against its will into the foreground where the attainment of national security aims is directly affected by occurrences and trends of thought beyond our borders The South Africans see the basic nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union lending itself to instability at lower levels and southern Africa is one of the many victims of this regional instability 44 In the white paper's threat assessment it is noted that the pace of change has accelerated during the past few years thus bringing the threat to South African security nearer ·in time Of special concern is the relative proximity of Soviet influence and military aid 11 which is said to have had an impact both on guerrilla activities along South-West Africa's northern border and on the internal situation in South Africa While it is stated that African states are not strong enough to attack the Republic some African countries are supported by a superpower with the ability simultaneously to wage integrated revolutionary and conventional warfare The threats in terms of the goals of its unnamed enemies 11 are -- Expansion of Marxism by fomenting revolution in southern Africa The overthrow of the remaimng white regimes so that the militant African bloc can destroy so-called colonialism and radicalism and establish Pan-Africanism 11 The development of an indirect strategy to unleash revolutionary warfare in the region isolate the Republic of South Africa and force it to change its domestic race policy 45 Although Defense Minister Botha's preface to the white paper asserts South Africa's growing strategic importance to the Free World the theme of South African defense as a part of the Free World's defense is much less evident in this than in earlier white papers Indeed the twin notes of independent military capability and self-sufficiency in weapons get heavy emphasis in the latest paper For example 15 --··· I- - - - - - - Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C00992469 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 The Republic of South Africa does not form part of any alliance with any foreign power nor can it rely on such an ally in time of war Our forces must be so structured that they can meet the threats against the RSA without outside help 46 The South African Government appears to be paying more than lipservice to this new strategy It has announced a new role for the Navy instead of its traditional role of defending the Cape sea route its mission now is to defend the seaward extensions of South Africa's borders with Angola and Mozambique In addition recent Army maneuvers were directed toward stopping an enemy armored diviEion supported by aircraft which had entered the country via South-West Africa an attack well beyond the capability of any neighboring state's armed forces let alone that of a guerrilla group 47 How then does South Africa's emerging strategic outlook bear on the question of nuclear weapons Does the perceived threat to South African security suggest the need for such a weapon There is no direct evidence one way or the other that is we have no information· that the South African military establishment has either sought or rejected nuclear weapons Nor have we any strong evidence that the defense forces have incorporated nuclear warfare into their strategy or tactics 48 Nevertheless contingency planning to acquire a nuclear weapons capability would be consistent with the published South African military doctrine Having given up apparently the notion that they could count on the West ultimately to come to their rescue South African leaders are attempting to prepare for any type of attack conventional or unconventional that might be launched from within southern Africa Moreover it seems clear--from the recent white paper statements by Vorster and other leaders and the character of recent Army exercises-that the South Africans have revised their threat projections The threat no longer is seen exclusively as a low-key guerrilla war with only distant rumbles of something larger It seems In 1976 the South African Air Force issued a public release describing practice toss bombing by Buccaneer Hawker-Siddely jets a bombing technique normally associated with nuclear weapons delivery This was an isolated piece of evidence however 16 C ______ Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C00992469 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 likely that South Africa's leaders now think there is a good chance they may ultimately face something far more serious a large-scale Soviet- and Cuban-supported ground and air attack across South Africa's borders 49 Yet South Africa's revised strategy also is consistent with a decision not to go nuclear Its military leaders may well have concluded that their most effective defense is a flexible well-trained strike force equipped with the most advanced con ventional weapons and that a nuclear weapon would in terms of their perception of the threat to South Africa have only limited use militarily while running grave risks politically--for example that South African possession of a nuclear weapon might lead a number of black African states to seek a similar · capability B Alternative Nuclear Strategies The Political Dimension 50 Neither the technical evidence analyzed in part I of this paper nor the above review of shifting South African military doctrine and strategy are conclusive one way or the other as to South Africa's nuclear intentions and capabilities Large areas of uncertainty remain In this section we try to sort out and weigh the political factors that we think would bear on the RSA's decision We do this in terms of alternate nuclear strategies all based on the assumption that South Africa has or soon can have a weapons capability The evidence and analysis in part I raise the strong possibility that South Africa has in fact continued to keep the nuclear weapons option alive Although we have no evidence of the actual production or stockpiling · of nuclear weapons we consider it likely that South Africa has planned for some years to develop the capability to produce weapons-grade uranium and that it may already have or may soon have substantial quantities in hand 51 The question is how would South Africa use such a capability What political objectives would its leaders seek through nuclear weapons options 52 The options should be seen as being exercised at various points along a nuclear continuum beginning with the decision to develop a capability to produce weapons-grade fuel and ending only with the actual demonstration threat or use of a nuclear explosive Before a test a program may be 17 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C00992469 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 accelerated slowed suspended or redirected at various points along the continuum If the technically determined or normal momentum of a program is interfered with however considerable costs--both financial and technical--could but need not result Generally the nearer the test date the greater the costs of postponement Suspension or redirection may also have political costs--for example in terms of disappointed scientific or military constituencies 53 We do not know where the South Africans are along the continuum We believe that they now have the technical capability to produce a suitable test device and may have sufficient fissile material to do so While we suspect that South Africa was preparing for nuclear tests until mid-1977 we do not know its current intentions Several alternative strategies can be envisaged To move deliberately toward developing and testing a nuclear weapon according to South Africa's own technically derived timetable--presumably within the next 6-12 months--while officially denying any intention to do so 54 This strategy would rest on the proposition that the Vorster government is determined to acquire a recognized nuclear weapons capability that this goal is of such high priority that it outweighs Vorster's concern over likely world reaction to a test as well as any hope he might have of extracting Western concessions by refraining from a test 55 There is in fact good reason to believe that the Vorster government is · determined to join the world's nuclear powers as a coequal Vorster and other top South African leaders have publicly stressed their concern over the serious and growing external threat to the country's security and their view that South Africa is diplomatically isolated and must prepare to face the threat alone Vorster might also perceive that an acknowledged nuclear capability would be highly valuable as a domestic political asset--in this case to reassure the Afrikaner people that their survival as a nation is secure Moreover Vorster like De Gaulle is convinced that his country has not - The South African Government has given private assura11 ces to the United States and public ones to the International Atomic Energy Agency that South Africa has no plans to produce or test a nuclear device 18 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C00992469 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 had the recognition it deserves he may see a demonstrated nuclear capability as a means of elbowing South Africa's way into the inner councils of the Western powers 56 This policy would be consistent with the so-called Afrikaner mentality --its inner-directedness its single 0 ilrinded pursuit of narrowly defined Afrikaner interests and its bias toward using aggressive and forceful means for attaining goals Moreover while personal integrity and honor are prime virtues to the Afrikaner deception of the United States on South African nuclear intentions could easily be rationalized in terms of a higher good survival of the Afrikaner people 57 Yet this course would entail serious political risks A test explosion could be expected To intensify antiapartheid and antiwhite South African feeling abroad To make it even more difficult for any African or Western industrial state to maintain overt friendly relations with the Vorster government To undermine any chance of continued open cooperation in nuclear matters between Western European states and South Africa To increase the chances that various punitive measures including various forms of economic sanctions will be applied to South Africa To raise the prospect that neighboring states might seek and obtain a security treaty with the USSR To terminate completely US - South African nuclear cooperation · 58 Vorster might of course be willing to bear these costs in order to demonstrate conclusively to Presidents Neto of Angola and Machel of Mozambique to the other front-line states and to others that South Africa has· nuclear weapons in its arsenal and that any serious provocation against South Africa would risk nuclear reprisal A conceivable though less likely South African motive for testing might be to attempt to internationalize the southern African conflict that is by 19 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C00992469 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 frightening the black border states into seeking a strong military alliance with the lJSSR Vorster might hope to force the United States to acknowledge the importance of South Africa as a regional military power A second possible strategy is to proceed with the research and development of a weapon but to refrain from testing while South Africa seeks to maximize Western--particularly US--concessions in exchange for swearing a nuclear weapons program 59 This strategy is politically more sophisticated than the first It would be based on a perception that the rest of the world already considers South Africa an incipient nuclear power hence there is no overriding need for a demonstration of its capability But Vorster would nevertheless expect to negotiate from a position of a state with an acknowledged nuclear capability 60 Using this strategy what would Vorster seek For a variety of reasons we believe that his price for formally agreeing to relinquish the nuclear option would come high For one thing he is aware that the US Government attaches great importance to halting the spread of nuclear weapons For another we believe that Vorster may have a strong personal and political incentive to provide South Africa with a nuclear capability At a time when South Africans feel themselves isolated as never before and threatened militarily by Soviet- and Cuban-Supporter neighbors the attainment of a nuclear capability would have strong appeal as a way to reinforce confidence in the government's ability to maintain the status quo and to discourage potential attackers Moreover as we noted last August it is consistent with Vorster's personality to favor proceeding with weapons development and to undertake testing Vorster has shown throughout his career a strong inclination toward actions which project power positive action and toughmindedness Moreover Vorster is much concerned with his place in Afrikaner history and has lamented privately that his achievements in maintaining the status quo are not appreciated South Africa Policy Considerations Regarding a Nuclear Test Interagency Assessment NI M 77-023JI I 8 August 1977 _J 20 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C00992469 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 He may therefore view development of a South African nuclear capability as a dramatic achievement for which he will be remembered 61 At a mlilllilum therefore South Africa would demand guaranteed supplies or' reactor fuel and generally close cooperation in the nuclear area But it remains our best judgment as it was last August that Vorster would seek US concessions ranging over an area broader than the nuclear one alone in particular he would like to buy time for South Africa to work out its domestic policies What he most wants is a general softening of US policy toward South Africa His position may well be put something like this if you want us to renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons you must make it easier for us white South Africans to survive as a nation He probably would seek a US undertaking not to take punitive economic or financial measures against South Africa and to help stave off UN sanctions A variant of the second strategy would be to plan on delaying a test indefinitely while taking observable small incremental steps toward an apparent readiness to test The objective would be to enable South Africa to extract maximum concessions from the West before officially grvmg- up its weapons program 62 Although this strategy should not be ruled out it appears a far less likely one--particularly since the dismantlement at the Kalahari site In addition while it would create uncertainty for the US Government it would also lead to uncertainty for South Africa--for example how long before the strategy would be discerned what would the reactions then be and what concessions if any could be got in the meantime Our feeling is that the South African leadership does not tolerate ambiguity well enough to be comfortable with such a strategy A third strategy would be to develop a weapons capability clandestinely without the intention to carry out a test or possibly with the intention to conduct a clandestine nuclear test 63 This strategy is an attractive one for South Africa particularly because its leaders feel that their actions are under intense scrutiny from abroad Clandestine development would 21 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C00992469 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 r--- r 'l' n - ' '- 1-1_-_-_-_j-1-- I - ------------J _ ' _ avoid the heavy political repercussions that a test would bring on would be relatively easy to deny plausibly and would give the South Africans the capability which we believe they seek 64 If this is the South African strategy however we are left with the need to explain the construction of the Kalahari site hence we would judge such a strategy to have been developed only since August 1977 C Net Assessment 65 Ambiguities and uncertainties surrounding virtually all aspects of South African nuclear developments · make us cautious about judging South Africa's capabilities and intentions in this area There are nevertheless a number of general propositions which can be made with a fair degree of confidence We think the chances are high that South Africa's leaders have deliberately followed a program to give them the option of producing nuclear weapons We also believe that they will continue to pursue this option with the result that it is likely South Africa will take the following steps toward a weapons production program - Creation of a reserve of highly enriched uranium which would be readily available for fabricating weapons - Completion of all weapons design work and high explosives testing short of an actual nuclear detonation The South Africans' success to date is not clear We judge the chances better than even that they are near or past the point of producing the necessary quantities of highly enriched uranium We have little doubt about South Africa's capability to produce a device but we have little· evidence that they have yet developed a deployable weapon 66 The question remains of the various nuclear strategies open to South Africa which is it most likely to choose 22 up Scc at Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C00992469 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 'f' -n - •••-- - l l---------·········· l Our assessment of the Kalahari facility leads to the conclusion that in early 1977 South Africa was preparing for a series of nuclear tests That is it probably in tended to detonate more than one nuclear device which indicates that the South Africans were developing a nuclear weapon that was sufficiently complex to require testing Furthermore unless the test site was built only for contingency planning purposes--that is un- less there were no firm plans for scheduling a test--the construction of this facility implies that a nuclear weapon system was intended to be perfected acknowledged openly and deployed 67 The fact that South Africa has since given assurances that no test is forthcoming and has partially dismantled the Kalahari facility--thus moving farther away from a test-ready state-suggests that South Africa has suspended plans for a test in short that it has given up option one It is also likely in this case 50- to 60-percent probable that the weapons development work would be redirected toward developing a reliable weapon of predictable yield without the need to test 68 Also at about the same time as the original international attention to the Kalahari facility and quite possibly because of this attention South Africa decided to produce its own highly enriched fuel for the Safari research reactor A fuel fabrication facility which will use highly enriched uranium from Valindaba is well on the way to completion The South African Government almost certainly regards this project as an unmistakable yet plausibly deniable demonstration of nuclear weapons capability because it is generally assumed that any country capable of producing such fuel enriched 30 percent or more is also almost certainly capable of producing weaponsgrade uranium 69 Bearing in mind South Africa's possible nuclear strategies we then must ask what will its position be toward negotiating over the imposition of various constraints on nuclear weapons development We doubt that the South African Government is willing to give up its nuclear weapons options but it may well be willing to forgo the future production of weapons in advance of their need Generally the more advanced South Africa is in accumulating the ingredients for a weapons stockpile the easier it will be for the government to sign the NonProliferation Treaty or to accept international IAEA safeguards on its nuclear facilities Once a stockpile of weaponsgrade uranium is in hand South Africa probably would attempt 23 ----- fop SettM-- Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C00992469 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 to pursue a covert weapons program separate from the facilities under safeguards notwithstanding its NPT commitments Tough negotiations are nonetheless likely however given South Africa's desire for concessions on other matters as discussed in section B above We anticipate the production of a few hundred kilograms of weapons-grade uranium probably in parallel with the production of Safari fuel Thus we consider it likely 60- to 70-percent probable that South Africa will be prepared to sign the NPT or accept similar commitments soon after the domestic production of Safari reactor fuel is accomplished reportedly scheduled for the end of this year 24 I L--------- Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C00992469 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 --- nn_Ci Pr__r A 'tf--l- 7 - _ _ I l ANNEX A The Nuclear Establishment 1 The Atomic Energy Board AEB established in 1949 formulates policies governing all South African activities in the nuclear field including research uranium production and the nuclear power program The AEB includes key officials from the state corporations responsible for the industrial aspects of nuclear operations the Department of Mines and the Department of Foreign Affairs as well as representatives of the mining industry and the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research CISR See figure 2 The principal industrial operations involving uranium are conducted by several state corporations The Uranium Enrichment Corporation UCOR operates the pilot uranium enrichment at Valindaba near Pelindaba which is to be expanded for production of slightly enriched reactor fuel in the early 1980s The Nuclear Fuels Corporation NUFCOR handles international uranium sales on behalf of South African mining companies and supplies the basic input for the enrichment plant The Electricity Supply Commission ESCOM will operate the nuclear power station now under construction near Cape Town as well as any future power plants 3 In addition to its coordinating role for all nuclear related activities in South Africa the AEB maintains its own staff some 1 700 in 1976 which operates the National Nuclear Research Center at Pelindaba and performs various support functions such as licensing the industrial uses of radioactive materials and maintaining industrial safety standards Although the AEB is nominally under the Department of Mines for budgeting and administrative purposes its research and support components constitute a virtually autonomous agency directed by the president of the AEB who also serves as chairman of the governing board The title AEB is commonly applied to the research and support components as well as the board proper 25 luµ Scers t Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C00992469 • Approved for Release 2013 07 03 y__Q 1 s_e_c _re t °- ··· ·· u 1 1 Figure ATOMIC ENERGY BOARD CHAIRMAN Dr A J A ROUX PRESIDENT MEMBERS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE Up to 31 October 1976 CHAIRMAN Dr A J A Roux MEMBERS Dr Dr Dr Mr Mr Dr R L STRASZACKER Chairman Electricity Supply Commission Dr C v d M BRINK President Council for Scientific and Industrial Research · R C P A W L Straszacker v d M Brink E Rousseau W S Schumann P Viljoen Mr J M CHRISTOPHER Director of Companies From 1 November 1976 CHAIRMAN Dr A J A Roux Mr J P COETZEE Managing Director - S A Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation Alternate Chairman Dr R L Straszacker MEMBERS Three members designated by the Chairman Mr B G FOURIE Secretary for Foreign Affairs MANAGEMENT Mr C J F HUMAN Managing Director Federale Volksbeleggings Beperk Dr A J A ROUX President Dr J P B Hugo Deputy President Dr J W L de Villiers Deputy President Dr L Alberts Vice President Mr C Moeller Manager Technical Mr J 0 Tattersall Manager Licensing Mr J G W van Zyl Manager Administration Mr J J KIT SHOFF Chairman Industrial Development Corporation of S A Limited Prof S F OOSTHUIZEN Consultant Dr P E ROUSSEAU Chairman Roessing Uranium Limited Mr A W S SCHUMANN Chairman Nuclear Fuels Corporation of S A Limited Mr W P VILJOEN Secretary for Mines Source Annual Report of the South African AEB 1976 26 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C00992469 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 4 Four of the scientific divisions at Pelindaba--the geological and the three metallurgical divisions--are engaged primarily in research related to uranium mining and processing Others are concerned primarily with the industrial agricultural or medical potentialities of nuclear materials For instance the Chemistry Division along with the center's engineering and instrumentation services has cooperated with the South African Citrus and Subtropical Fruit Research Institute in designing an experimental irradiator to be used for controlling moths that attack citrus fruits As noted earlier the Reactor Development Division may be engaged in developing a nuclear weapon 5 South Africa's bureaucratic structure pertaining to nuclear programs is so complex that bringing a nuclear weapons program to completion very likely would involve a good many components These would include the AEB at its Pelindaba facilities UCOR which could produce the necessary highly enriched uranium and the National Institute for Defense Research NIDR which regularly receives funds for secret projects from the Department of Defense The NIDR is a component of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research which in turn is represented on the governing board of the AEB Although the weapons program presumably is not discussed in the regular meetings of these bodies the open linkage facilitates discreet coordination of sensitive matters 27 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C00992469 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 ·· •- t ------- _ '' - i ANNEX B Financing Nuclear Development Energy Expenditures 1 Reported expenditures by government and industry on nuclear development and operations have totaled about $1 4 billion since South Africa began producing uranium oxide in 1952 See table 1 Industry expenditures for mining and processing are estimated at $850 million to $900 million or about 60 to 65 percent of the total Nuclear expenditures reported in government budgets have totaled $540 million to $550 million 2 Spending by private industry on mining and processing more than doubled in 1977 to $85 million reflecting increased investment in response to new export contracts Production is rising sharply reaching about 3 700 tons in 1977 as compared with 2 800 tons in 1975 See table 2 3 Nuclear spending by the government is listed in the public budget under allocations for the Ministry of Labor and Mines About three-fourths $340 million of allocations for the period 1971-77 was to fund construction and operation of the pilot enrichment plant at Valindaba Allocations in the same period for the Atomic Energy Board AEB totaled $120 million About one-quarter of AEB funding was for capital construction and equipment and the remainder for administration and operat ing expenses 4 Total government nuclear spending increased rapidly during fiscal years 1971-76 reflecting construction outlays for the pilot enrichment plant Spending then leveled off at $70 million to $80 million a year in FYs 1977 and 1978 Weapons Expenditure 5 None of the expenditures that are openly identified as being for nuclear programs are flagged for weapons development or construction Pretoria either could mask such expenditures under other budget allocations or could withhold reporting on them altogether 28 rL ______-- Top Sbtrct - Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C00992469 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 Table 1 South Africa Private and Public Nuclear Expenditures 1952-77 Total a Total a Industry b Government of which Uranium enrichment Atomic Energy Board Miscellaneous Million US $ 1952-70 1971-75 1977 1976 1415 875 540 160 85 75 115 35 80 485 180 305 655 575 80 340 50 60 230 0 200 5 25 negl 20 negl 75 1 80 1 a Components may not ad d to totals because of rounding b Data are for fiscal years April-March c Data are for 1959-70 Table 2 South Africa 40 515 1 466 2 998 3 963 5 174 5 669 5 846 5 814 4 961 a Estimated Metric Tons Metric Tons Metric Tons 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 Uranium Oxide Production 1952-77 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 4 558 4 112 4 033 2 669 2 981 2 915 3 522 3 610 3 737 3 800 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 29 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 3 629 3 094 3 074 2 809 3 111 3 700 a C C00992469 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 • 6 There is no doubt that South Africa can afford to develop and test a nuclear explosive if it chooses The pilot enrichment plant at Valindaba is believed to be capable of producing weapons-grade enriched uranium Given the enriched charge the cost of constructing and testing a crude explosive would be almost insignificant 7 Inflation since 1974 plus added technical costs if South Africa were planning a more sophisticated device would raise the costs considerably Even $100 million however would be easily handled in South Africa's $11 billion budget FY 1978 30 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 C00992469 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 Approved for Release 2013 07 03 it