' SECRET UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ALAMOS SCIENTIFIC LABORATORY 1CONTRACT w 405 NC-361 P O BOX 503 7 '1 -------------- 05-4-l-i4-l t0S -NEW-t l -X-IE0 5 44-------NOV-3--0-197'IN REPL R£F£R TO MAIL STOP DIR 100 November 26 1919 - - - - - - - - - - - ' DOE andia Laboratories P O Box 5460· Albuquerque NM 87115 I ment am 6 3 b t _ forwarding t as a strawman for com- I believe it is necessary that we reach a unified position on such an important issue 1 e b r J b '-1 Enc IT0-79-155 Copy 3A J0032 01 2 ov 9 i lIR 00 -OQRtaiA i-se ' • ' •EU DA' A • 11 10 « _ - - f- ii i ti · heSECREl ·_ _ Ut 26 · i a _ • ·_ · · if fr- r-ve Action Equal Opportunity Employer I ft i J ·1 ' ECREJ IT0-79-155 NOV 3 0 1979 November 26 1979 -1-- I TiilS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF iU -PAGES NO J_ OF COPIES SERIES L A DRAFT 22 SEPTEMBER 1979 EVENT by NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS Warning Notice - Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved B E'STRICTaB BA'l'-A Wbi seewffient ee eine Re tcictee lA - __ _ 2A _ 3A - 4A - ISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF IN- 1 r 'T -- i FORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR 0 1 •j J I J-7- - -5 ' ECREt a SECREf 1· November 26 1979 -2- IT0-79-155 TABLE OF c·oNTENTS Page SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 3 3 BHANGMETER SIGNAL • • 9 9 CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 18 TRAVELING IONOSPHERIC DISTURBANCE TIO NUCLEAR DEBRIS COVERT NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM REFERENCES - 7 21 • • I ' i' --SECRET - ' -3- ITO-79-155 November 26 1979 22 SEPTEMBER 1979 EVENT T SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS exact location has not yet been determined but it was somewhere within a large area that includes South Africa the South Atlantic Ocean the South Indian Ocean and a large portion of Antarctica see Fi_g 1 SECREJ • I '• • 4 I # • t I · IT0-79-155 -SE€JE November 26 1979 SOUT AFRICA Prince Edward Is FIG 1 FIELD OF VIEW CONSIDERED FOR THE NUCLEAR EVENT SECRET - 1 I' I I SEeR El -5- IT0-79-155 November 26 1979 64 60 56 52 48 44 w 40 0 I- 38 Q 32 -I 28 I- a 0 24 20 16 12 8 -4 o -------- --------1 10 22 SEP 79 ----------------- 10' -- - -- TIME ma FIG 2 BHANGMETER OPTICAL TRACE NO 1 FROM •·a - - _ - 'Ill n I i November 26 1979 IT0-79-155 64 60 66 52 48 •44 40 uJ 0 i 38 Q i 32 J ao 28 24 20 18 12 8 4 0 L-__ rr1-- -- --r T l 'T'T'lr-f--- - 'i1 felc l H 'i e l l 0-1 22 SEP 79 10 1 TIME ms FIG 3 BHANGMETER OPTICAL TRACE NO 2 ECREJ 4 10 I' IECRH ITO-79-155 -7- November 26 1979 TRAVELING IONOSPHERIC DISTURBANCE TIO An _ionospheric electron density profile was being measured from 0430 to 1130 GMT on 22 September 1979 from the Arecibo Ionospheric Observatory in Puerto Rico The data indicated a TIO that could have resulted from a large atmospheric nuclear explosion The TID passed over Arecibo between 0545 and 0715 GMT with a south to north velocity component of 275 ± 75 m sec The east to west velocity component is not known The TIO which was at an altitude of between 180 and 270 km peaked at 0630 GMT Arecibo observations of TIDs are common However almost all of them are produced by magnetic storms in polar regions and propagate from north to south TID·s traveling south to north and east to west are very unusual but could be produced by nuclear explosions earthquakes or severe thunderstorms TIOs from previous atmospheric nuclear explosions over Novaya Zemlya have been detected at distances greater than 4000 km 1 2 Propagation velocities for different modes from the Novaya Zemlya tests were 630 m sec 430 m sec and 260 m sec If the major peak of the TIO seen at Arecibo at 0630 GMT corresponds to one of these modes the distance from Arecibo to the nuclear event was either 12 700 km 8700 km or 5300 km SECREf ' ' r SE-OREl IT0-7 -155 November 26 1979 NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN AFRICA ' JUERTO RICO SOUTH AMERICA FIG 4 AREA OF INTEREST SEe REf - fCRET IT0-79-155 -9- The Institute director described the radioactive fallout as the kind one would expect recent atomic explosion in the atmosbhere I November 26 1979 fJOE 1 IT0-79-155 - 10- November 26 1979 ' · · I SICREJ i L ' J ·I • SECREJ - • IT0-79-155 -11- November 26 1979 b b Before a country can enter into a nuclear weapons development program some of its scientists would require a fairly high level of competence in a number of well-documented scientific techniques Among these are nuclear criticality studies in which predictions of the critical mass for specific geo i - - - -determined s of l Db 6 After these techniques are fully understood the next step in a development plan would involve a full-yield test of a nuclear r fI· iECREJ weapon November 26 1979 -12- IT0-79-155 If the full-yield test were to be in the expected 10- to 20-kt range the US would undoubtedly recognize the occurrence of such a test However if the country didn't want its nuclear weapons capability known to the world it could take an intermediate step to satisfy its needs while maintaining the secrecy of its success This step would involve the underground testing of very low-yield nuclear devices from zero to a few-hundred tons of nuclear yield The zero-yield test would be one in which the total yield was only that from the high explosive HE of the device i e no yield would be derived from the fissile material in the device This type of program would require 10 to 20 test holes depending on the number of intermediate tests desired The first test would involve a device that includes the complete HE system but only a small amount of the fissile material so that a nuclear yield of zero is guaranteed Each succeeding test would involve a slight increase in the ratio of fissile material to inert material This slight increase in the ratio is determined from the diagnostic measurements of the previous test s The nuclear yield of a test device can be obtained from the rate of its neutron-output which is proportional to the measured rate of its gamma output Because the increase in fissile material is so slight from a zero-yield device to one in which a nuclear yield is obtained it is extremely important to have a strong background of neutrons In the first experiments this high level of neutrons can be provided to the test device from a The material is inert in the sense that it will not contribute to an appreciable fission yield SICIEt ' November 26 1979 IT -79-155 ' PROMPT e uRST REACTOR ffi · ClOSURE MECHANISM EARTH BACKFll t · • · ' -· • · ·i i L · -·· - · -·- · ·· · -·· · · · • LOS PtPE -· • _ -·· · _ ·· ··• CLOSURE MECHANtSM TEST DEVICE Y DETECTOR FIG 5 PROFILE OF TEST GEOMETRY FOR NEAR - 2 ERO YIELD NUCLEAR TESTS S EeRET ' ·SECRET IT0-79-155 prompt burst reactor PBR November 26 1979 -14- The PBR would be located at the surface of the ground and would e connected to the test device with a line-of-sight LOS pipe see Fig 5 Because the' expected yield from the first few experiments would essentially be only from the HE probably 50 kg the test hole depth required would be about 15 m When nuclear yields of a few tenths of a kilogram have been detected by instrumentation from a test device the measurement of the neutron-output rate will be sufficiently above background such that the PBR will no longer be required as a neutron source A pulsed neutron source Zipper in the proximity of the test device can then be substituted for the PBR see Fig 6 J As the total yield increases from one test to the next the required depth of the test hole increases Since the PBR is no longer required the LOS collimation to the surface is no longer necessary After nuclear yields have been achieved another technique for determining the nuclear yield can be used The gaseous debris from the nuclear explosion could be valved to a gas-trap container located above ground for quick recovery after the test see Fig 7 The gas-trap container could be designed to allow sampling without radioactive contamination of the nearby environment Radiochemical analysis of this debris gives an independent check on the nuclear yield Upon completion of these analyses the radioactive material equipment and gaseous debris samples must be disposed of properly this could be done by merely burying this material in some nearby area The data from the first 10 to 20 tests should be sufficient for extrapolation to the full-yield nuclear test However extrapolation over a large yield range is reason for concern f • C •I November 26 1979 IT0-79-155 EAR TH BACKFILL i if1@ i i 1 i OETE TORS TEST D EV ICE Y OETEC TO R ZfPPE R FlG 6 PROFILE O F TEST GEOMETRY FOR VERY LOW YI ELD NUCLEAR TESTS EeREJ I ' ' L· I ' 3ECR f -16- IT -79-155 November 26 1979 --------------------------- --• BREAK ANO SEAL --- - AFTE R T EST 1 EARTH BACKFILL J1 J1 i - - · • TEST DEVICE SECRET FIG 7 PROFILE OF TEST GEOMETRY FOR ABOVE GROUND SAMPLING SECREJ I t ' • ·l I ITO-79-155 -17- November 26 1979 Hence it would be reasonable to obtain one or two data points at a few-hundred-tons nuclear yield a yield that is still teleseismically undetectable The depth of burial for this yield would be between 75 ahd 100 m · Whether the country has this it can afford to expend this much material for testing would have to be weighed against their desire to continue to appear as a non-nuclear-weapons state The fissile material is actually not lost to the country because it is in storage underground in the vicinity where it was tested in a nuclear device It would be well worth the country's cost to recover this fissile material ---- - ---- ------ ------ J amount of fissile material and whether L - ----- - For xample one country could supply the fissile mate rial and some nublea expertise in exchange for the use of ___ another country's test site After having stockpiled a few nuclear devices the growing concern of just how accurate the extrapolation data is from a few-hundred tons of nuclear yield to 10 or 20 kt could tempt the country to test at a significantly higher yield perhap •l-2 kt or even the full yield of 10-20 kt In order to maintain the profile of a non-nuclear weapons country the next nuclear test would have to be conducted outside the country If the country 8ECR JIT0-79-155 -18- November 26 1979 had access to an island the nuclear test operation could be prepared there The nuclear test device could then be mounted on a barge and towed on the ocean to a distance consistent with obtaining the necessary test diagnostics from the island ' i o A bCu bCt The Prince Edward Islands 1200 miles SE of Cape Town belong South Africa and are uninhabited The two islands that form the Prince Edward Islands are Marion Island the larger and Prince Edward Island M rion Island 13 miles long by -miles wide has a meteorological station Prince Edward Island just NE of Marion Island has a circular shape and is 5 miles in diameter The island rises to 2370 ft Either of these S CREJ l - 3ECREJ - 19- IT0-79-155 November 26 1979 uninhabited islands would make an excellent choice for an Additional circumstantial evidence implicating South Africa comes from recent statements made by Botha the South African Prime Minister of Foreign Affairs On 25 September 1979 Botha told a provincial congress of the ruling National Party that South Africa enemies might find out that we have military weapons that they do not know about On 24 October 1979 before the US public disclosure of the Bhangmeter indication of the nuclear event Botha spoke at an anniversary dinner attended by past and present members of the South African Atomic Energy Board He reportedly paid tribute to the South African research scientists who have been engaged in secret work of a strategic nature He said - •• that for security reasons their names could not be mentioned and that they would never gain the recognition in south Africa or abroad that they deserve S Cl -f I ' I SECREt 1 IT0-79-155 -20- SfCR'EJ No ernber 26 1979 I i I ·•' i ECREl IT0-79-155 November 26 1979 -21- REFERENCES 1 Row Ronald v Acoustic-Gravity Waves in the Upper Atmosphere Due to a Nuclear Detonation and an Earthquake Journal of Geophysical Research Vol 72 No 5 p 1599 1 March 1967 U 2 Harkrider David G Theoretical and Observed AcousticGravity Waves from Explosive Sources in the Atmosphere Journal of Geophysical Research Vol 69 No 24 p 5295 15 December 1964 U O A bll hlb J 1EGREl