-----· • t Director of Central Intelligence l ' The 22 September 1979 Event lnteragency Jntelllgence Memorandum Department of Energy Declasslflcatlon Review Q Q I' 810 I J 178 8_ W-00woo H00012855 1m1111111111 1 I - - · - - - ··- - - -- imu ' • ·' ' • • t'' ' Warning Notice Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved WNINTEL • I NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS NOFORNNOCONTRACTPROPIN- NFIBONLYORCON- REL - Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor Consultants Caution-Proprietary Information Involved NFIB Departments Only Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator This Information H05 Been Authorized for Release to DfllVATIVI Cl IY - _ 1£ llfW ON DK 99 DUIV O J•OM M A microfiche copy of this document is available from OCR DSB 351-7177 1 printed copies from PPG ROB 351-5203 Regular receipt of NFAC reports in either mk rofiche or pt inted form con also be · arranged through PPG ROB • I f - r 1 THE 22 SEPTEMBER 1979 EVENT ur Jnfnrmation availabl ' D1·C mhf r l J79 as Ust'd Jn t hf' prepar ition uf thi• mrmorandum t ' '' • • • I t t '• FOREWORD On the basis of available information we cannot determine with certainty the nature and origin of the event on 22 September 1979 The conclusions reached in this memorandum rest largely on circumstantial evidence and on the assumption that there was a nuclear explosion s' r r his memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Nuclear ProJiferation in response to a National Security Council request It was coordinated at the working level with NFIB representatives in the Jnteragency Intelligence Working Group on Nuclear Proliferation u ' ' • • I ' · 3 -DlSCOSSl-0 ·r ----------------- nuclear-weapon states such as West Cermany have oossessrd both the materials and the technical f' tpertist' 11one of them however has had an inc 'ntlvr on balance to devrlop nuclear weapons much less to test a device Other states that might have nuclrar ambitions-such a Brazil Argt ntina and Iraq-almost ceFtllinh · lacked the fis sile material and nonfissile components required to fabricate- and test nuclt u explosive devices Neitht'r J-'rance nor China h tS agret d to rt'frain from testing in the atmosphere hnl they havE' recl'ntly had no known tE' hnical or political motivation to trstdandestinely in the southPm Indian or Atlantic Ocean Thr Soviet Union would have had to assume inordinate political risks in its rt'lntions wilh the Unitt cl Stal '- to have conducted II covert nuc-lrar t xplosion in violation of t L ited Test Ban Treaty LTBT for any purpose 1' 5 The Defense IntelJigence Agenc ' brlievl'S howt'VE'r that if an atmospht ric test Wt'Tt' in the tc chnical -- intec-r t of the USSR an anonymous tr-st nrar an1 P t _ unwitting pro ' statt' such as South Africa could have ' provided an attractive evasion method J'll'licl'ical termf ' llicleiling of a nuclear device at St'a would not have needed to involve more thun two or three ships or aircroft including sevt ral dozc n cr 'wm 'n ond lfchnicians Equipped with oppropriate diagno tic instruments they could have set up the test within a few hours detonated the device obtained rt quired data within minutes after the explosion and disi ersed within another few hours • foreign respect for South Africa's military strength in all likelihood would have resonated with Prime Minister Botha and other South African officials Botha had rt--nv1m1 7r substantia-1-buildutrt1f--SfflnlrAir drx ------f ense forces in the late 1960s and 1970s following a decision in the early 1960s to achieve self sufficiency in arms Because of his personal convictions as well as his ·official resl onsibilihes he has idvocated more t ban any other Cabinet officer the military coml onents of South Africa ·s strategy for coping with possible external threats He has regarded the West as unwilling to supl Ort South Africa against foreign threats that hf' ha perceived to be growing Moreover he has probably sympathized with views that nuclear weapons might ultimately be needed However he probably has not foreseen any imminent military reQuirement for nuclear weapons or any political advantages to disclosing particular elements of South Africa's nuclear weapons capabilities at this time Nevertheless he may have been persuaded that undeclared but undenied nuclear weapons would have an important psychological deterrent effect that South Africa could better achieve through testing A ac1 1 y was prl'pared in tht' Kah1hari Desert oppar• ently for a series of underground test detonations Th Dt'fense Intelligence Ag 'ncy l1os strong reservations as to wht'lht r this facility was for nuclC'ar testing in light of alt 'rnatiw uses that are conceivable SUC'h as tuxic nuc-lear waste s t o r a g e b _I I 10 After Botha became Prime Minister in Septemkr 1978 South Africa finally succeeded in prodncing highly t mriched uraninm H_EU suitable for nuclear f • 8 In late 1977 the Vorster overnment al parr ntly uspenJed preparations to test Strong US pressurr and otl1l'r iulernalional reactions appeared to havr df'flectf'd South Africa at lC'ast temporarily from testing The setback probably compell 'd Vorster and tht' key offidals in the nuclt'ar eapons program to rr -fow tl1dr wlifllt ipproal·h toward weapons development 111d t 'sliug Slatt mt'nts made by tht' Vorster ovemml 'nl al that time did not vermanenth• foreclose future' options for testing Rather than completely stoppiug their weal Ons program tht' South Africans could thrn havf' decided _to repare for a future 11 If P W Botha had decided in favor of a nuclear lest he would have evaluated alternative options for conducting ii in terms of their expected effectiveness risks and costs To minimize adverse foreign reactions he would have had to assess both the chances and th consequences of discovery While an atmospheric test over unfrequented international waters presumably would haw b en seen to entail some risk of being found in violation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty to which South Africa is a l arty it also would have offered a relativt IY quick safe and easy way for South African weapons designers to l rove a nuclear device without creating unambiguous evidence that Suuth Africa was responsiblE' for a nuclear explosion In contrast an atmospheric or underground test in Soutn Africa probably would have entailed higher risks of nudC'ar t e_i sti m o r e s ei ' cju rC' 9 Botlia's Polscv Argumt'nts that nuclf'ar le-sling could makt' an important contribution to technical vnf J n _in_ _ J_ __to the - tent H wa di o o el 6 r prior detection and ultimate proof by foreign intelligence hecnuse it probably would have required site preparations and left tangible indications of a nuclear _______e_x_p lo-s 1o_n_ _ Bofhas security advisers m1ght1iave warn' d him that if South Africa were discovered to have violated the LTBT il might suffer more serious sanctions than if it tested underground On the other hand they would have raised the possihility of another international uproar and more serious threats if new underground lest preparations were detected and the likelihood of more serious sanctions if South Africa proceeded to test under such circumstances Thui Botha probably would have decided to minimize the risks of prior detection and certain attribution by i stin secretly at sea rather than within South Africa • - -- - - 16 Inclepende t sourct'S who nre fairly reliable t· have reported no evidence of knowledge about the 22 September event among employees at the nuclear 1 enter According to one source the consensus among several technicians and engineers at the Valindaba uranium enrichment facility was that South Africa had nothing to do with the alleged nuclear event of 22 September Another source said there was no evidence at the Pelindaba nuclear research center to indicatt that pt rsnnnel nssociated with South Africa's nuclear program were involved in or had prior knowledge of the 22 September incident In fad South Africa's alleged involvement has become the objt'ct of derisive joking among scientists there s c 12 As Defense Minister since 1966 P W Botha very likely supported the development of a nuclear weapons program including military preparations for nuclear testing As Prime Minister Botha has rt laine d tht' Defense portfolio and has continued to keep closer counsel with senior military officers than with other government officials We have no specific evidence that senior military officers c t rcelve any imminent u an eventually important role for nuclenr weapons 17 Possible Indication of Nuclear Weavons Develovment Testing and Policu Since P W Botha became Prime Minister in September J 978 a number of measures have been taken in South Africa that suggt'st among various possibilities that nuclear weapons devt'lopment may have been under way They certainly indicate a sharl t ning of the govern ment's sensitivity about its nuclear installations and activities In late 1978 a home gua d unit was po iltioned and new security patrol patterns were established near HEU conversion facilities at the Pelindaba nuclear research center 4 A decision that was made in late 1978 or early 1979 lo establish a military facility for evaluating and treating cases of human exposure to radiation could have been intended to permit greater secrecy in the event of accidental exposure resulting from a clandestine nuclear test program And as stated above South African authorities decided not to • Security forces were alsn r st ihltshrd near le 'eral nonnudc ar lralq k f dlitic s during this periud This heli htcned SN urlty ma y relall' more lo 1tl'nE ral curlty concerns than to u cheniic in the paccnf Snuth Africa's nudc 11r weapons prner im 7 ' disclose the production at Volindaba of weaponsusabl enriched uranium s _t _ r 1979 some s cial securit _measures were put into effect which indicate that certain elements of the South African Navy were exercising or on alrrt on 22 September The harbor and naval hose at Simonstown were declared in a public announcement on 23 August to be off limits for the period 17 23 September The US defense attache gathered from several reliable sources that harbor defense exercises took place there during this perlnd 5 Atl1ough such a closure might not be required for a nuclear test at sea it could have screened sensitive loading or unloading operations as well as ship movements Also the Saldanha naval facility which includes a naval search-and-rescue unit was suddenly placed on alert for the period 21-23 September The alert was not publicly announced no explanation for it was given to naval pl'rsonnel and no activity was observed in or around the port While the Saldauh t naval alert app ars unusual we are unable to slate with confidence whether such an alert ·has ever hapPf'nrd before Furthermore at the same time General Malan Chief of South Africa's Defense Fore ' was reportt l lo be touring South America when he might have been expected to he in South Af rlca or at the test observation point during such an important event ¥ 20 On 24 October-before the US disclosures of the technical indications of a test-the Prime Minister addressing an anniversary dinner attended by past and present members of the AEB n c well as members of the local diplomatic corps reportedly paid tribute to the South African nuclear scientists who had been engaged in secret work of a strategic nature He rel orledly said that for security reasons their names could not he mentioned and that they would never gain the recognition in South Africa or abroad that they deserved 6 • 22 Only one official has categorically denied South Africa ·s ·involvf'ment rt However on 25 September- three days after lhf' nuclear event-he told a provincial congress of tht ruling National Party that South Africa's enE mies might find out we have military weapons they do not now about •· His enigmatic remark promplt 'd speculation in the South African prer c th at he hod undeclared nuclear weapons in mind Although no South African Governm e t u_ff ici_al is5 u_e d any public clarifications De Villiers who had been directly involved in weap ons design work at the Pelindaba nuc lear research center before his promotion to President of the AEB in July 1979 almost certainly would be w itting if South Africa had conducted 11 test explosion-and prepared to parry press queries if such a lest were detected On 6 November De Villiers issued a report of periodic almospht-ric samplings that had been conducted by the AER the rf'port concluded It is con idered most unlikely that an atmospheric nuclear test has recently been conducted in this region 23 On 25 October the Commander of the South African Navy made allegation we believe to be foll lt' • Thl' sourc-e of this information l11tc s th111 11lthuu11h the pel Ch wiu all ah int thP 11 -hlt vt'mt nl of South Africa's nudl'llt sc-lt nll5ts It • waJ nut certain thut in r ferrinll tu secTf'l work of II stnll'K c n lurt' Botha spe cific illy said uud r sdrntbb ur iu•t '•cien- • Th - US drfl'nw 11lt11chr' rrport 1 h yrJ duwn tin• ilil-anc-P of thr Simun•luwu clu urt' 11oli1111 tlu1t it was n re1ml11r tm•c-tlt'f' linl rd tu i11t1mU1l Jt fP11_ t' tlsb 8 ¥ - that a Soviet nuclear submarine had been In the vicinity of the Cape in late September implicitly denying that the South African Navy was involved in a nuclear test conducted a sea 6 bfJ i 24 Foreign Minister Roelof Botha 's public statements have been espec h lly ambiguous For instance on 25 October he ridiculed speculation that South Africa had conducted a nuclear explosion but also declined under Questioning to say unequivocally that South Africa had not done so and that it did not intend to acquire nuclear weapons On 6 November the Foreign Minister in a discourse on South Africa's foreign policy presented tn all the foreign ambassadors in Pretorfa said he was dismayed hy allegations In the UN Generd Assembly that South Africa had violated the Limited Test Ban Treaty and distributed the AEB report on atmospheric samplings as evid1mct to the contrary But he did not take the opportunity to deny _that South Africa had a nu lear weaponi program f L _ I - A Secret Test by Others 31 India Indian nuclear and weal Ons e p rts have probably been reviewing contingency plans to develop nuclear weapons in light of continuing developments in Cl1ina md Pakistan Indian political and military authorities however have apparently not decided to develop their nuclear explosive tt ehnology into proven weapans that would require testing Nor are there any known plans to develop Indian nuclear explosive technology by further testing for any purpose The Indians moreover would probably have been disinclined to violate their obligations under the LTBT For this reason and to secure maximum information from a test Indian nuclear weapons dPsigners would probably have preferred to conduct a nuclt iu explosion underground rather than to conduct one over remote oceans in the middle of the night onverse y past US remonstrances about Taiwan's nuclear weapons research program-coupled with Pre sidenl Chiang's determination to maintain a relationship as dost as oossible with the United Statesweigh against a deci ion to test a nuclear devict- '-• _ - - 11 -However Pa dstan's lea • ers av een intereste mainly in achieving nuclear parity with Jndia by conducting a nuclear e tilosion that they can claim as their own presumably on their own territory FurthermorE the Pakistanis are preparing ln Baluchistan a suitable tunnel that would enable them to conduct an undergro nd xplosi n th could credibly match Jndia's ' PNE'' of 1974 10 I I 36 Nevt'rtheless Pakistan's leadt rshiv might have risks of deh dion attribution and sanctions by foreign wanted tu prove its nuclear explosive technology in powers secret before risking an underground explosion whose 39 -The Bureau of lntf'Uigence and Research De-_ __ preparahons and results were s111 i1ect to dett cf 10 'r'l '1 -Trnrr----- ------ _ -' - _ _ nartmt nt llf State helil'ves that while Suuth Afric-a is minimize the chances of a potentinlly conspicuous and in all probability embarkl'cl on a nuclt ar we ipon i politically damaizing faUure Pakistan's nuclear device program has by this timEI acquired sufficient fi -silt' designers might have comi idered alternative wa 'S of mate rial for tht fabricalion of several nuclear devices testing secretly including an atmospheric test over a a nd may be willing to take the risks of testing rt mote ocean area The perceived advantage of such n eventually there are sufficient political motivations to lest however would have been marginal at mosl dt'ter the Botha government from undue provocation brcause te ·hnic-al difficulties would have made it of international criticism at this time The arguments more likely to fail perhaps even detectably Moreover which tht United States and other Western vowers if Pakistan had actuaJly succeeded in such a test it advanced to deter South Africa from proceeding with would probably have been recorded and publicized construction opt rations at the Kalahari site are still immedialt y to secure the domestic Dr 'Stigf' and forvalid unless South Africa is willing to relinQuish a eign resJ 'ct that Pakistan's le ders havf been seeking clandestine as well a o •ert nuclear weapons option its through nuclc- ar research and development In short access tu Western technology and uranium enrichmt nt Pakistan has had little incentive and uncertain cap ibil st-rvices might be terminate d s ities lo conduct an undeclared nuclear test over thf ' ocean in the southern hemisphere on 22 September -10 State INR differs particularly with th l rt mistJ 979 Ct that Prime Minister Botha's government has been · 'f-mort' re idy than its pr decessors to develop nuclear Con lusions weapons It points out that all _S outh African guwrnmt'nts have sought this option but that until recent1y South Africa lac ked the relevant lechnology and fissile material Even now the political constraints would outweigh technical im·entives in South Africa's calculations and lht refore it is unlikely that South Africa elected to test a· nuclear device The ambiguity that surrounds Sontli Africa·s nuclear situation has providt d it with substantially the same bl'nefits- withort th ' opprobrium-as if it had in fact tested F usivr n 'ss serves South Africa best at this juncture and is in line with its previous beha 'ior-nt itht r to confirm nor to deny allegations about its nuclear-weaoons-related activities 41 In sum State INR finds the arguments that South Africa conducted a nuclear t 'st on 22 September incundusive Pven though if o nuclear explosion occurred on tho t do te South Af ric i is the most likely candidate for responsibility 42 The Defense Intelligence Agency believes that the availob e evidence is insufficient to « stimate how top South African officials have balanced the inc ·l'ntives and disincentives regarding a nudear test s N1•· 38 r he ourposes inc on'aii ti g7't st at -nd r cover of clouds and darkness would have been to maximize pretest security and to rt duce tht presumed 11 The 22 Se tember 1·97-g-e71e·n r- C 1 Gabon 'I ''-' I I • • t Brazil ·- • Uruguay lldood sl N IV I I · · - - ··-·A•rffarc t°i' a C DC I _______ _ _ 12 · • • •• ANNEX Summary of Technicol Information Pertaining to the 22 September 1979 Event DOE 6v - 13