Talking points for briefing to House Energy and Commerce Committee-Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on 24 April 1991 b 3 10 USC 4241 ·1et o th -N iear Encr Division at DIA With me is ·-•----' b 1 b 3 60 lj sc 103 9 1 4 D ' -- I wear a second hat as Chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee or JAEIC The JAEIC is an intcragency body charged with advising the DCI on the production of intellipmce on ·a11 foreian atomic energy issues and promoting the effective use of community resources 11 - lckr 1 J L2 -- My intention today is to describe our intelligence assessments of the Iraqi nuclear programs focussing on two time periods- the 10' 89-90 time frame and then on the pesen Shield Desert Storm A period My presentation will be at the Secret Noforn WNINTEL b 1 1 4 c V l vel and I will nor discussfl-ntcUlgcnce dai n Before I start I would like to generally characterize the 2 nature of the intelligence we ha ve on the lnlqi program · 1 1 4 1 ' b 1 1A 0 ·-- • ·' b 1 1 c SECRET OU Y Dr-I NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS DECLA$SJFY ON WARNING NOTICE-INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED •· In the 89-90 time frame • There were only two known locations for nuclear activities Tuwaitha or the Baghdad Research Center -70 MW French supplied Osirak reactor the one bombed by Israel in 1981 -800 kW French supplied Isis reactor -S MW Soviet supplied reactor -fuel fabrication facilities -radiochemistry facilitles -a possible reprocessing facility Al Qaim superpbosphate mine where uranium ore was recovered as a byproduct and processed to produce yellowcake b 1 1 4 c • In Nov 89 NIE 36 2 was published which concluded Iraq probably could develop a nuclear device by the mid-to-late 1990s with foreign tcchrucaJ assistance State INR and the Department of Energy believe that even with foreign assistance the earliest that haq would be able to develop a nuclear device would be the late 1990s Although highly unlikely Iraq might develop a nuclear weapon in the next two to four years if it received substantial foreign assistance and had a clandestine source of weapons grade nuclear material In the early 1990 time frame Iraqi effons 10 acquire parts for gas centrifuges from the Germans and Swiss were uncovered and stopped Also in this time the Heathrow sting operations with capacitors occurred Because these capacitors were so well suited to the job of - • firing nuclear weapon detonators I think they provide the first direct evidence of an Iraqi nuclear weapon design effon qeq • 14 t_ · -•- ·- ----· MCTJiEJEtl nOsl --ii - - •llicla tS L I IEE Lt 1 Nl• IIWZ BCUft859i1B I 1001 - - - Q • the_Fall of 1990 because of the concerns after the Iraqi invasion the community under the auspices of the JAElC examined the potential Iraqi use of safeguarded nuclear material for a -nuclear explosive To paraphrase the executive summary of the paper published ln Nov 1990 It is unlikely the Iraqis bad completed all the work need to ensure the viability of a nuclear design and therefore lhey currently did not have one • b 3 2 U'SC 2102 • RD was There enough safeguarded material for at least one device and the Iraqis had the equipment ·-and materials to recover the HEU from the fuel In the absence of a crash program the community reaffinned the judgemen1 in NIE 36 2 - During Desert Storm again under JAEIC auspices the community performed BOA and issued a typescript report on 14 Feb 1991 and identified several additional suspcc nuclear facilities outside Tuwaitha including high explosive tcSt areas at Al Qa Qaa and Al Hadre the Baghdad Suspect Research Center Mosul Unidentified Production Facility and Samarra Suspect Centrifuge Production Facility - DIA bas published a final BDA report on Iraqi nuclear facilities We do not know the location of the safeguarded fuel bul because all known facilities for recovering the HEU from the fuel have been severely damaged or destroyed we believe that Iraq does not have a near term capability to produce a nuclear device The Jong term prospects will depend on 1 raq's post-war priorities but we believe that Iraq's capabllity to make a nuclear device using indigenously produced material has been pushed back to the next century •11 •r lj I ii PEI 5 2St 81 S TC li1tt£1614 iCAHC Ii bl 1 WI M fl II IIWGi arm I iCEtICI 68UIUill I ··-· I I- 11 IJfil l I