• FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE BOMB INDIA'S NUCLEAR MOTIVATIONS 1945- 1974 by bX8 • Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Military Intelligence College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence August 2000 • The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U S Government A truly politically independent India already in the process of economic modernization • would significantly benefit from an independent non-safeguarded nuclear weapons capability even if never actually weaponizc d The mere potential would reflect favorably on the nation's political status in Asia and the world In India's case purely military motivations came last The border clashes with China in the early 1960s created nationaJ antagonisms that began to unravel Nehru's other vision of the two neighboring sisters cooperating in each others maturation as newly independent countries But it was China's detonation of a nuclear device in 1964 that set up the political and subordinate military motivations for India itself to go nuclear ten years later Military factors played a critical role in the mid• to late 1960s and early 1970s separated by a generation from Nehru's original economic vision but reinforcing a subsequent Nehru • -• initiative toward nuclear independence and a nuclear weapons capability totally in isolation from an immediate external military threat 2 • ABSTRACT I I I STUDENT l'b_xe_i_ _ _ _ ___ DATE August 2000 I CLASS No PGIP 0001 I THESIS COMMITTEE CHAIRPERSON __ _ _ _ ___ II • b l 10 use 24 l I I I • TITLE OF THESIS From Independence to the Bomb India'sNuclearMotivations 194S-1974 Every nation seeking to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities experiences a I mixture of motivations Although one may predominate as the agent of catalyst - II typically a national security factor except in India -- others appear almost simultaneously I I I or soon after to reinforce the initial motivator Because of the multiple milestones that l II every proliferant nation must confront there are multiple decision points fur proceeding At each milestone a mixture ofmotivations affects the decision interacting with each Ii I other each with its own constituency of supporters and players In India economic I 1 factors played a key role in the fonnative stages of the national nuclear effort guided by I I I I I I - Nchru s vision of an economically developed nuclear-powered India Political factors especially India's self-image and its role in the region and the world began to take on greater significance Indeed political considerations increased because of the availability of nµclear technology and assistance from the United States and other western nations under the Baruch Plan and the Atom_s for Peace program in the late 1940s and l 9SOs India rebelled as much against its implied subordination as a Hhave-not nation seeking • handouts from the haves as it did against Britain in its path to political i f dependence • CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES iii Chapter Page I KEY ISSUES FOR NUCLEAR MOTIVAllOl S ANALYSIS 1 Motivations Analysis 2 Conclusion 11 2 ECONOMIC MOTIVATIONS FOR NUCl EAR POWER 1945-1964 IJ Safeguarding Independence Overcoming Poverty 16 Jump-Starting India's Nuclear Program 25 Conclusion 34 3 THE BOMB INDIA ·s BID FOR SELF-RELIANCE I962-1974 36 • Change in Administration -- l uclear Weapons Continuity 37 A Preoccupation with China 1958-1964 39 The Rann of Kutch Crisis Leads to War 41 India Resists the NPT 42 The Dismembennent of Pakistan 43 A Peaceful Nuclear Explosion 44 Conclusion 45 4 INDIA·s NUCLEAR MOTJVArtO S 48 Economic Motivations 49 Political Motivations 54 Military Motivations 57 Dynamic Interaction of Motivations 58 Conclusion 60 S IMPLICATIONS OF INDIA ·s DECISIONS 62 India's Prospects 63 Stability In South Asia 66 Conclusion 71 Bibliography 72 • ii • LIST OF TABLES Page Table I Key Indian Nuclear Decision Milestones 1947-1964 16 2 Key Indian Nuclear Decision Milestones 1959-1974 37 3 Key Considerations Feeding India's Nuclear Motivations 47 4 Key Indian Nuclear Decision Milestones and Motivations 61 • • Ill • CHAPTER I KEY ISSUES FOR NUCLEAR MOTIVATIONS ANALYSIS We waited until tlie blast had passe walked out of the shelter and then it was extremely solemn Now I am become death the destroyer of worlds Quoted from Indian Hindu scripture after witnessing the first nuclear explosion J Robert Oppenheimer Trinity Test Site 16 July 1945 Why did India consider it necessary to choose the nuclear weapons option What rest Bined its nuclear program In the face of competitive nuclear developments in the • People's Republic of China PRC and Pakistan in the 1960s and 1970s How does a democratic Tndia view the U S role-in classifying BJtd trying to restrict lndia 's nuclear program as proliferation while striving to engage a communist China What continues to motivate lndia in its longstandin attempts at a strategic T9le in world politicsJ ht asking these-questions a bottom-up study of India offer a distinctive examl le of why nuclear options will remain a global concern and why an in-depth analysis of countryspecific motivations is absolutely essential There is broad interest withil' the international community and the United States national security community in the motivations and intentions of states seeking nuclear weapons Greater understanding of motivations is important because of the continuing proliferation of nuclear weapons technology and its si191iticant impact on nonproliferation policy formulation and counterproliferation considerations Yet there is • a marked lack of in-depth analysis in the area of motivations a critical part of intentions The small number of motivation studies done to date understates the potential value of a more in-depth approach to why nations seek nuclear weapons Much of the published work does not deal comprehensively with the wide range of motivations nor does it address the dynamic interrelationships of motivations arising within a state or as a result of interstate competition In addicion once a country has developed a nuclear science and technology S T capability and exercised its nuclear weapons option the momentum of technology often dictates continuing improvements As such the original motivations to acquire nuclear weapons may be reinforced or they may be significantly modified by considerations of stockpiling or operationally deploying nuclear weapons • MOTIVATIONS ANALYSIS Current studies deal with na1ional motivations only in generalities That is they take a top-down approach establishing a very limited number of potential factors especially concern for national security a desire for prestige and regional leadership and a few others which are then applied to various countries This approach has serious limitations because it does not lake into consideration the much broader range of countryspecific factors that influence the behavior of individual nations This approach also suffers from oversimplification because of its emphasis on security-related issues For example economic motivators are seldom i f ever addressed nor is there any sense of the • 2 • interaction of' military political and economic influences on any particular nation's decision making to acquire a nuclear weapons capability ' A bottom-up country-specific approach taking account of these additional considerations would focus much needed emphasis on the key issue of the dynamic inleruclion of motivations 2 For example the decision to acquire nuclear weapons necessarily involves a complex interrelationship of influences from multiple political economic and military interests Every nation attempting to acquire a complete weapon system or to de elop a nuclear weapons capability of its own passes through a series of milestones each requiring a decision to go ahead or not At each milestone different communities ofinterest--military officers political officials and defense industries leaders--cach influence decisions with its ovvll constituency of supporters The dynamic • interaction of these competing interests has a si gni ft cant effect on the shape and timing of the final decision Although a deep concern for national security is almost always the catalyst for the initial decision to proceed along the nuclear path political and economic considerations gain strength at ea ch succeeding milestone Ultimately each plays a major role in the decision making process Considerations from each area may be rejected subordinated or ele •ated while working tO 'lr-ard a common goal 1 The most important of these studies are indicated lattr in this section One study stands out as a cmmtry-sp«ijlt esample of motivational analysis see Laurie S Eliasson Major USAFR The lslam1C' Botrrb Pokisran's Mori •atit ns in its Qu1 rtfor a Nuclear Weapons Option MSSI Thesis Washington DC Joint Military Intelligence College August t996 See also Ronald A Robinette ISC USNR Malaysia Indonesia and rhe N11dear Weapo11s Option A S111d 1 of'Motii•alion f MSSI Thesis Washington DC Joint Military Intelligence College August 2000 • j bX3 1o use 424 colonel USA FR Rel Associate Dean ror College Part-Time Programs Joint Military Intelligence College Washin llon DC and former scni r analv ar the Defense Intelligence Agency interviews by the au1hor September 1999-August 2000 b 3 1o use s a pioneer in multi• motivational analysis of nuclear weapons acquisition and a strong advocate orthc bottom-up countryspecific approach 3 • This country-specific perspective on the decision making process and the motivations driving countries seeking nuclear weapons must be understood and addressed if any international nonproliferation policy is to succeed The critical dynam c interacJion of motivations readily apparent only in a bottom-up analysis offers a more comprehensive view of why a country would seek a nuclear option over any top-down security framework anal ·sis Ideally a bottom-up motivation analysis could help identify broad areas of intentions Such analysis could reinforce the direction of any capabilities study done during the materials acquisition or signature construction phases Such a study could also serve to uncover program development intentions in countries not previously identified as seeking a weapons program • Capabilitin Intentions and Will While the U S Intelligence Community has three deliverables cutrent analysis typically emphasizes ce1pahilitie 1· at the expense of the admittedly more difficult intentions and will Thus any compn hensive study of states seeking nuclear weapons technology demands a more balanced approach involving all three deliverables to confront proliferation concerns In the case of motivations much analysis centers exclusively on the initial national security reasons for acquisition of nuclear weapons exclusive of any distinctive cultural and psychological complexity of individual countries and policymakers The motivations arc typically simplified and linked to overriding security concerns That overall security determination often fails to account for the • important range of country-specific motivations driving acquisition of nuclear weapons 4 • technology In effect '·current analysis of nuclear motivations tends to emphasize firstorder causes especially the initial motivation for acquiring a nuclear weapons capabiJity ·3 The paradox of nuclear weapons and the interrelationship of motivations on multiple levels are reflected in the very nature of the technology For example while overt pride in nuclear technology prowess is touted as a matter of national prestige it is only a secondary motivation due to the practical requirement 10 keep any developing clandestine nuclear weapons program secret The inherent duality of commercial nuclear reactor technology reinforces the perceived essential security traditionally associated with nuclear weapons programs While such secrecy often impedes much needed independent academic or scientific study and nonproliferation efforts it is seen as a traditional and • necessarily ambiguous part of nuclear weapons technology Current Analysis Acquiring nuclear weapons capability lends to be attributed to first-order causes in current analysis especially for the initial motivation However some studies have emphasized non-military motivations as primary determinants For example in its 1977 report Nuclear Proli eralion and S feguardr the Office of Technology Assessme t OTA contended The technical and economic barriers to proliferation are declining _as accessibility to nuclear weapori material becomes more widespread Consequently the decision whether or not to acquire a nuclear weapon capability has become • 1 Eliasson 1-2 5 • increasingly a polirical one The choice will tum on whether a nation views the 4 possession of such a capability as being on balance in its national interest According to the latest OTA report Pr J im1ti m q Weapons o_ Mass Destruction A uessing the R sks the appeal of nuclear weapons may lie in their perceived value Countries see such weapons as a symbol of international status national pride or associated with the great power status of the fi ·e nations of the United Nations Security Council The percei •ed exclusiveness is reinforced by all of the permanent members being declared nuclear powers ln addition nuclear weapons arc valued for their deterrent value perceived military utility or for S T and industrial economic benefits In effect lhe continuity between the 1977 and 1993 reports led the OTA to the ' conclusion that in the long run motivations are key still holds true ''5 However any in- • depth analysis of the interaction of motivations is noticeably lacking A promising approach to the study of nuclear motivations is in the countryspecific examination of the strategic personality of states the United States seeks to deter One example is Paula DeSutter·s Deni l and Jeopardy Deterring Iranian Use of NBC Weapons where considerations of political military and economic incentives to proliferate are emphasized These include seeking political tools to change the regional status quo for coercion and for undermining courses of action for coalition warfare Military incentives include acquiring the capability of changing the conduct of the war through the threat of use or actual use and using nuclear capable systems like mobile U S Congress Office of Technology Ai sessmenl N11 lenr Prn iferation and Safeguards Washington DC GPO 1977 11 Emphasis added • 1 U S Congress Officl ofTc chnolog · Assess1m n1 l'mlifere11ttm r j We llpcms of Mass Des1ru ·1ion -lssess ng 1 ie Risks Washington DC GPO 1993 99 6 • missiles not only for their psychological threat value but also to draw enemy forces away from other targets Economic incentives include capilal or barter for other weaponry indigenous production to avoid the consequences of export controls spin-off benefits and extracting money from the western nations According to DeSuucr '·deterrence strategies must be tailored to the strategic calculations those states are likely to make and the national context within which decisions will be made 6 Still this broad motivational concept remains in its infancy According to the National Defense University's Strategic Assessmerrl 1999 key nonproliferation trends include the growing community of U S -led market democracies While specific motivations are not discussed indications of such forces are addressed as goals of idcnti ficd key transition swtes Russia China and India • They are pursuing foreign policies anchored in state interests and seek to establish themselves as leading powers Each seeks a revision of the status quo that will increase its influence at the expense of the U S Only China has the potential to 7 become a global power but Russia and India will remain regionally influential The significant impact of economic considerations on the dynamic interaction of motivations is evident in current analysis of China According to George Tenet Director Central Intelligence for China •·the question remains open whether in the long run a market economy and an authoritarian regime can co-exist succcssfully 8 r Paula DeSurtcr Di nial and Jeopardy Deterring Iranian Use of NBC Weapons '' online edition Washington DC National Defense University Press September 1997 URL http www ndu cdu inssibooks dajdlcont html Accessed 30 July 2000 National Defense University Institute for ational Strategic Studies Srruteg1 A m S$menr 999 Priori1ieijor11 T11rb11lent Wur J Washington DC GPO 1999 xi · • 1 George J Tenet 'The Worldwide Threat in 2000 Global Rcalilies ofour National Security DCI s1a1emen1 befori the Senate Sch c I Co1nmittee on Intelligence 2 February 2000 URL www cia gov c ia publicatfairsispec ches dcispc ch_0 0200 html Accessed 15 Muy 2000 7 • Evidence of Motivations from Open Sourc H By themselves open source infonnation professional literature and published analysis oflndia's nuclear motivations are not sutlicient to fully satisfy all U S national security and counterproliferation policy analytical requirements However these sources do provide insight into spccilic nuclear motivations from the original language of key Indian policymakers and nuclear decision makers Traditionally as a remnant of British colonialism and India's aversion to militarism the military has been specifically excluded from the nuclear decision process and thus played only a minor role in early nuclear decision-making process There was no formal connection between the d fense establishment and India's nuclear program 9 However speculation about India's political nuclear moti 'ations includes projected requisite military involvement in working out • doctrine and conveying the deterrent capability with a certain amount of credibility A more visible role of the military would convey precisely such a credibility 1• 10 If the Indian military were assigned that responsibility by policymakers open sources including military journals would likely reflect a commensurate emphasis on their joint observations on how best to achieve such credibility In one example of original language analysis for motivations Jawaharlal Nehru made a significant comment on the military application of nuclear weapons on 26 June 1946 just prior to Indian independence As long as the world is constituted as it is every country will have to de 1ise and 9 M A Z11far Sh11h lnJ u und Jht S11pt rpuwers lflllm ' f J•c1J111u1 Rdurmn f with the Superpowt rs Delhi Vikas Publishing House 19llJ 95 m thi 970 · New • 111 W P S Sidhu India's Nuclear Tests Technical and Military lmperath -cs J me ·s lnt1 1 1genct Rn· ew 8 no 4 April 1996 · 172 8 • use the latest scientific devices for its protection I have no doubt India will develop her scientific researches and I hope Indian scientists will use the atomic force for constructive purposes But if India is threatened she will inevitably try to defend herself by aJI means at her disposal I hope India in common with other countries will prevent the use of atomic bombs 11 These remarks help establish early economic S T moral and political motivations According to George Perkovich Nehru's vision was crucial even before he became prime minister ·•the key representative oflndia·s identity and norms has always been the prime minister This means that his or her personal beliefs and rhetoric about nuclear weapons have mattered enormously ••12 Albeit evolved over a period of time India's early moral aversion to nuclear weapons sharply contrasts with the now perceived more influential power and appeal of nuclear weapons rn the case of bordering Pakistan characterized by a powerful militant • religious right India faces a potential foe that developed nuclear weapons ·•principally to meet the threat from India's conventional military superiority as well as to counter more subtle forms of Jndian dominance in regional affairs 13 India is concerned that Pakistan condoning armed infiltrators into Kashmir appears bolstered by nuclear weapons The motivation to acquire nuclear weapons as a perceived omnipotent deterrent is evidenced by the original language of now deposed Pakistani Prime Minister 11 Vehrtt The Ftr it6O 't t1r vol 2 ed Dorothy Newman New York John Day 1965 264 • George Perkovich lndta · i N11c lea1· Bunih The Impact un G obul Pru iferatiun Berkeley California· University of California Press 1999 449 • 1 ' Leonard S Spector and Jacqueline R Smith Nuclear Amh1tw11s Tire Spread ofNuclear Weupo s 989- YY0 Boulder Colorado Wc stvicw Press 1990 95 9 • Nawaz Sharif He proclaimed on the first anniversary of Pakistan· s nuclear tests •·t wanted to please Allah and not the world Pakistan is now invinciblc 1 As a precautionary note content analysis whether of western or Indian sources is beset by bias and rhetoric and remains subject to subjective interpretation According to Stephen Cohen an analyst at the Brookings Institute The leadership on both sides especially in India has only the vaguest notion of the relationship between doctrine strategy and public bragging 15 However content analysis does provide useful insights Although it is outside the scope of this thesis India's recent reactions to Pakistani nuclear initiatives indicate the value of motivations analysis Current Intelligence Community assessments as reported by the American press surprisingly put Pakistan ahead in numbers of nuclear weapons warheads and delivery capabilities although any • analysis of the motivations driving such changes is lacking 16 The Times of India and Indian Express two of lndia s most influential newspapers carried the story on their front pages Indeed lndia s Hindu fundamentalist Bharc1 tiya Janata Party and the coalition government of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee owe some of their popularity to his decision to test nuclear warheads in 1998 Politically the growing pronuclear lobby gained influence apparently reversing policy and openly declaring nuclear weapons a part of the country's arsenal Raminder Singh Jassal spokesman for the u Ahmed Rashid and Sadanand Dhume ··Dangerous Game Far £us1ern Ecunumic R ml w 162 no 23 10Juncl999 IR-20 u Jane Perlez ·'U S and lndut Trying to Reconcile Hit Bump New York Ttme r 22 March 2000 Final Ed A I • 16 Roben Wmdrcm and Tammy Kuppennan ''Pakistan Nukes Outstrip India's Officials Say U S Rc l rscs Assessment of South Asia Nuclear Balance MSNRC News 6 June 2000 URL hltp' ' www msnbc com newst417106 asp Acces ed 7 June 000 10 • Indian Ministry of External Affairs responding to the U S press account stated ·'The government of India is alert to developments relating to the country's security Our credible minimum deterrent nuclear policy is based on an assessment of our security requirements and is not country specific · 1 CONCLUSION Open source information allows a broad-spectrum examination of nuclear motivations Thus this thesis will address a range of motivations that have led India from independence in 1947 to its first bomb in 1974 with brief comments on implications and repercussions for the 1998 tests and the future While India's nuclear • program remains secret that clandestine effort involved the Prime Minister's tacit approval of scant economic political and S T resources in an attempt to elevate India in the international hierarchy Chapter 2 addresses the early years of India's nuclear program dominated by a strong economic motivation for nuclear power Chapter 3 addresses India's decision for the bomb Both emphasize domestic concerns and international collaboration and provide a chronological overview of the context Chapter 4 presents a detailed examination of economic political and military nuclear motivations and their dynamic interaction The thesis concludes with implications of nuclear proliferation in South Asia and effects on nonproliferation efforts • 11 Patricia Chatterjee ·'Amid Blaring Headlines India Mum on U S Nuclear Report MSNBC News Ne ' Delhi 8 June 2000 URL http www msnbc cointncws 418094 asp Accessed 10 June 2000 11 • At this point while the inlemationa community avoids or awaits the first-ever nuclear war there remains much to be done While much emphasis is focused on capabilities India and Pakistan remain s parated but by their intentions and will The paradox of nuclear weapons is that their great power resides in political restraint from use instead of in its technological characteristics or military application A country-specific approach to ntotivations for seeking the bomb highlights the commonalties and differences among nations and provides valuable insi hts for nonproliferation initiatives • • 12 • CHAPTER2 ECONOMIC MOTIVATIONS FOR NUCLEAR POWER 1945-1964 W e have declared quite clearly that we are not interested in and we will not make these bombs even if we have the capacity to do so Prime Miniscer Nehru Lok Sabha debate 24 July 1957 We are opposed to atomic bombs That is not an empty statement for us to make because we will be in a position--we have the competence and the equipment--to make them We have deliberately said we will not make them Prime Minister Nehru New Delhi press conference Ii September 1961 • wnlike other nations that began their quest for nuclear power and nuclear weapons with a military motivation India began with an economic one in the 1940s - the quest for nuclear power as a building block for national economic development Weapons-related considerations were minimized and largely ignored until the I 950s and I960s as shown in Chapter 3 The assumption for India during 1947 to the mid 1960s was that there is a declining military value in possessing nuclear weapons but there is a continuing political value in the nonusc of nuclear weapons and in the nonuse of a visible nuclear option '' 111 Thus economic factors clearly outweighed military factors in India's early pursuit of a nuclear infrastructure • 11 Ashok Kapur frtrfrtfl '11d11a1· Optiu11 lfun11c D1plo111a y u11J Dl ·1 mm Makmg New York Praegc r Publishers 1976 I06 13 • The origins of India's bomb can be traced through two stages of its history The first period began immediately after August 1945 when a U S -led collaborative international effort ushered in the atomic age ln 1946 the U S -proposed Baruch Plan highlighted the technical feasibility of commercial nuclear power lndia s foundation for atomic energy began Vith Jawaharlal l' ehru's economic vision of an India modernized by science and Dr Homi Bhabha's application as Atomic Energy Commission AEC Chair presumptive of Nehnl°s vision to nuclear power These two dominant personalities who first met in 1937 subsequently developed a close professional relationship and personal friendship 19 1t set the stage for the S T emphasis on initial economic motivations to develop lndia s industrial infrastructure Nehru's vision and political leadership along with Bhabha's establishment of the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research TIFR • began well before India's long-sought colonial independence from Britain on IS August 1947 20 Although Nehru died in 1964 his non-alignment and nuclear power policies continued and have remained significant factors up to present day A motivations study of his early nuclear considerations high ights the ever-present domestic issue of establishing a suitable foundation for India's economic development It could therefore be suggested that India's early national security strategy was largely a domestic economic issue 19 G Venkataraman Bhablw 1 iJ M r gmjicenl Ob w Hicms Hyderilbad University Press India 1994 178 • iu Bhabha's August 1943 funding request to the Sir Oorab Tata Tru5tees considered in March 1944 wns approved in April contingent on government support Ue established the TlfR in 1945 and served as director unriI his death Nu1uble ·1 - 1e1ft-Cent11ry· Sci nlisli vol I ed Emily J McMurray New York International Thom5on Publishing Company I 995 172-173 14 • The second period Chapter 3 a necessarily overlapping progression with the first ran from the initial build-up to hostilities and actual conflict with China in 1962 until India s first peaceful explosion of a nuclear device in 1974 This period is often depicted as representative of the more traditional security-first framework 21 That is by the late 1950s India began to recognize the necessity of developing a nuclear weapon to defend the nation against external aggression namely China This shin in motivations from purely economic to political and subordinate militaJ' ' represents a fundamental change of direction for India and brought it more into line with the initial motivations of the original nuclear powers•· the United States Soviet Union United Kingdom France and China Contrary to the prevaiJing theories postulating security as the primary motivation • for acquiring nuclear power Nehru's economic vision of modernity v 1as the catalyst for India's initial acquisition decision Only later would the dynamic interaction of motivations drive India towards a nuclear weapons program despite the recent memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and in spite of the resulting international nuclear technology hierarchy which sought to control proliferation In the interim lndia faced a number of critical decision milestones for its nuclear power program see Table I As Prime Minister Nehru would state in retrospect while basic national interests remain constant any •·application to a particular circumstance or resolution is a matter ofjudgment •·22 U S Congress Office of Technology Assessment Pmf 'i rauon 55 • 11 Nehru ·s Spe chl r Sepwnher 957 • Apnl 96 IOI 4 New Delhi· Publicaiions Division Go ·ernmcnr oflndia 1964 384 15 • · h- - r -- i - - --_ Y i -ij - d yr -i D i i i P£ Y K e i - t J n t _i A · ·_· · - - -· _· s l r 1 1r-r ar_p t_ _ v_elo 1'u 1 C e i ___ L - J 1 s f r- - ce - - --- -- •··-··· · ·i IJ 4- U JJ J -r t _ m i n f@ ' a Jts_h _e l T aY n JtUJ te ---' _l_ _19 - - h - o_ng te J -- ge_PI -- ------a···· - · ·1- '' •-J - _JJl JK _ s - ry _ _ea tor_ 8 - ---·······• -- _ ·-· 195 _ _19 6 anc d - I _Research Reac o g r Ag -e i ir ___ t - l l J vy_ e - -o S 1-R - e - -··· i_ AP ra e- ar h_R_ _u O Criti I _ Fi t_in_A_ 1956 ·• ··- ·-· 1956 - ·--· ····-· ··-·-·····- ·- C f re _ _n EA ta tc - J g' 'l l s ·-· ---·-· ·• 1958 J Pl to i ' ' Rcp s B £i_l_ Y ···-- CJRUS Research Reactor Critical 1960 ' l I I ••• • • ·•H• •• I f I 1 f ·H ' t Yl •P U • •y W tei '' i g J -· - - ' j jl 3______ _ -- l_J p_u_ P r ntr - 1964 • ' l § C ---•-- I Trombay o ium - l - ssine Facility Active J Table 1 Key Indian Nuclear Decision Milestones Source Author created SAFEGUARDING lNDEPENDENCE OVERCOMil'iG POVERTY Nehru promoted the ·'scientilic approach to the problems of society 23 According to India s current president Nehru•s earliest stated priorities were twofold to safeguard newly won independence and to overcome poverty Describing his Five Year Plans to modernize India as science in action Nehru set up a strategic coalition between scientists and economic planners in India that survives to this day Dr Homi Bhabha his • n Shri 1 R Naray man Presidcn1 oflndia speech presented ar the Inauguration of the Birth Centenary Celebrations of Dr K S Krrshnan Bangalore India 28 July 1998 text Indian Parliamenl homepage URL http parliamentofindia nic inl Accessed I June 2000 16 • successor Vikram Sarabhai and their colleagues implemented India's S T development including atomic energy space computers and missiles India's policy was in essence Nehru's policy His growing influence over national policy predated independence He had been chief of the foreign affairs department or the National Congress since 1928 and his party dominatecl Indian politics for 30 of the first 33 years ofindepcndence Nehru also held the premier and foreign minister posts during the first 17 years As the first Prime Minister he crafted the basic framework oflndia's non-alignment which ser 'ed as a prccl -dent for future prime ministers and he worked on India's constitution enacted in 1949 2 In practice Nehru was responsible for and under considerable pressure to effectively address the burgeoning economic situation in India He saw the much-touted • development of the peaceful ui es of nuclear power as the emerging scientific means to overcome abject poverty His economic motivations for infrastructure development using as yet unproven nuclear reactor technology 25 continued to drive India's nuclear power program well after his death in 1964 Bhabha who served as Nehru's principal S T architect and implementer of their then joint economic vision as well as India's principal nuclear conract for international collaboration died in a plane crash in 1966 Despite their deaths India's dual-track policies of nuclear weapons acquisition and economic development continued with little fundamental change into the 1970s 1 for successive prime ministers including Nehru's daughter Indira Gandhi and her son RaJiY Gandhi endorsement of Nehru's policy see Zafar Shah 12 India's constitution has been amended 85 times India became a republic in 19 50 and held ifs first general elections in 1952 • The first commercial nuclear pO '1-Cr reactor was in 1954-1956 dependent upon lhc source and crireria· plans conslruction or operation date For e ample the Frcnch St lllcd on rormal details 111 195 I 17 • Nehru's Vision of a Nuclear India 194Sw1964 The prime minister the position of political power in India has a dedicated S T function in India's ministerial go 'emment as well as the leading and at times the sole role in nuclear policymaking According to George Perkovich • The Prime Minister has by tradition always held the position of cabinet minister responsible for S TI which includes the Departments of Energy and Space In the prime minister's capacity as Minister of the Department of Atomic Energy he or she has worked closely with the department's senior scientist technologist Dr Bhabha who ser 'es as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Successive chainnan have exened extraordinary influence over India's nuclear activities and policies Indeed there are no means within India's institutional structure to provide independent scientifically expert checks and balances on the nuclear and defense establishments Within the government a Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs has formed the highest decision making group In addition to the prime minister the Cabinet Committee traditionally consists of the ministers for external affairs defense home affairs and finance This body thus represents the most important bureaucracies involved in lndian nuclear policy HoweYer prime ministers have formulated policies witho·ut consulting the Cabinet Committee 26 Indian policymakers early recognized the military dimension of a nuclear option as evidenced during the debate over Nehru's 1948 introduction of ndia·s Atomic Energy Act modeled after the British t ct 27 While peace and economic dc velopment were Nehru's genuine hope he understood the inherent duality of nuclear technology and the necessity for secrecy Congressional debate touched on the inherent ambiguity of such a program and its potential for military use In that debate Nehru acknowledged his personal difficulty in distinguishing between nuclear physics intended for commercial power or for defense against any then ill-defined threat The debate also touched on India's past failures to adopt new technology as a source of economic power moral • fi Perkov1ch 9 n Pcrk wich 18 18 • opposition to nuclear weapons and funding Despite opposition objections the act was approved before the 1949 founding of the Communjst PRC and before a perceived Chinese or any other credible external military threat Thus India's ultimate quest for a nuclear weapons capability began as part of Nehru's vision for a peaceful economically developed nuclear-powered India Weapons-specific considerations were radically subordinated to this overall goal ith only the potential for weapons in some distant unknowable futurc Politically Nehru was likely constrained by India's tradition of a Mahatma Gandhi moral aversion to nuclear weapons Pragmatically while he publicly disavowed suppon of a nuclear option and oven development of nuclear weapons he tacitly allowed Bhabha to establish the time-intensive S T foundation for just such a consideration • Still Intentions are what determine usage Here at the level ofintention Nehru did not rule out military use 28 The Role of Dr Homi Bhabha 1943-1966 The Atomic Energy Act formally established and funded nuclear research and S T development under an Atomic F ncrgy Commission AEC in August 1948 29 It also served as the legal impetus for its commercial nuclear power program under Chairman Bhabha·s leadership According to Perkovich ·'His confident demand for autonomy and resources set the tone for the development of the lndian nuclear program under his i • Con mwcnl A uemb v a fndta legislatirc Dehmesj S 6 April 1948 3323 in Pcrkovich 20 29 Bhabha wa the early dnving force in India's atomic power program Canada agreed to supply India with uranium u cide follo ing Bhabha's visil in 1947 ltty Abrahnni The Mulcing o tlie lmJrun •10111 c Onmb · Science Ser re - •and the Pnircnlunial Stafe London· Zed Books 1998 84 19 --- ---- - - - -· • direction ' Jo The TIFR and the AEC also reflected Nehru and Bhabha's early perceptions of nuclear research as a worldwide symbol of S T prestige Because of its perceived importance atomic energy along with railways and the manufacture of arms and ammunition industries was monopolized under government control in 1948 11 Bhabha·s vision oflndia's self-sufficient S T establishment remains a muchheralded matter of great national pride In his fonna proposal to establish the TIFR 32 he described his institute as an embryo from which I hope to build up in the course of time a School of Physics comparable to the best in the world When nuclear energy has been successfully applied for power production in a couple of decades from now India will not have to look abroad for experts but will find them ready at hand 3·1 Since 1948 India and the TIFR have become the world's second-largest contingent of • scientists and engineers however early on many of them were foreign trained Between 19S5 and 1974 more than I I00 Indian nuclear scientists and engineers trained in the 30 Perko ich 16 H Francine R Frankel Jirdia t Pul11ic11 £c onumy 19 7- 1977 Princeton New Jersey Princeton University Press 1978 77 Homi Jehangir Bhabha Ph D Cambridge UK I9 5 did research at the Cavendish Laboratory until 1939 Visiting India when WWII broke oul h was unable to rctum to England 10 work Random louse WebJlttr ·s Dictionary ofSc enlist s ed Sara Jenkins-Jones New York· Random House 1997 SI • n N Scshagiri Thi Domb 1 F um ofIndia ·s N11c ear E-cplos on New Delhi Vikas Publishing House 1975 I I 4i- I 16 20 • United States34 with Canada training another 263 prior to 1971 JS As a result extensive U S and foreign expertise and material assistance often with very favorable funding arrangements further sanctioned India' s S T commitment to its nuclear research and power program 36 Bhabha was the President of the First United Nations International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy held in Geneva in August 1955 The conference led to calls for the declassification of nuclear research Such responses also led to open publications that advanced lndia·s nuclear program and its early entry into plutonium reprocessing n The second conference held in 1958 was about twice as large At that meeting Lewis Strauss President Eisenhower·s special assistant on atomic energy matters announced that the United States had declassified data on research aimed at • producing power from controlled thermonuclear reactions 311 Soon after the United States provided 200 linear feet of declassified nuclear power information to interested foreign countries j 9 H Roberta Wohlstetlcr The Buddha Smiles Ahsent-Minded Peace ttl Aid and 1he Indian Bomb Los Angeles Pan Heurislics 1977 28-30 11 Robcn S Anderson 8111 dingSt ient1fic r s1i11t1im s id10· S1 1hu and Bhublia Occasional Paper no 11 Montreal Canada Center for De ·eloping Area Studies McGill University 197S IO I e A U S SBO million credit at 0 75 pi rcent interest over 40 'Cars funded Tarapur Pcrko 'ich 60 n France not a declared nuclear weapon state until 1960 published its fonncrly secret chemical reprocess mg method of plutonium eletrac1ion similar 10 the U S plutonium uranium recovery by eKtraction PUREX method For comments on U S icws oflts allies as atomic rivals see Bertrand Goldschmidt The Atomic Cumple t r World-wide Politk11I History 0JN11c l ar Energy Lil Grange Park Illinois The American Nuclear Society 1982 259 Eisenhower Library and Museum homepitgc Atoms for Peace URL hnp I www eisenhower utcxas cdu atom7 htm Accessed S June 2000 • iv Oepanmcnt of State Regulation of Armaments and Atomic F ncrg ' Forei n Relations of the US l955- 9j7 'IOI 20 Publication 9759 Washington OC Depr of State 1990 27 21 --- - · -·- • Bhabha's nomination as conference president was grc eted in India as a symbolic achievement marking the increasing prestige of India's AEC However according to ltty Abraham Bhabha's nomination with strong British backing was the least politically objectionable choice 0 Overall Bhabha directed research and the instruction of advanced physics and was responsible for the establishment and much-needed direction of lndi •s nuclear power program He also commanded wide respect in the international scienti fie community for his scientific contributions and formidable skills as an administrator Credited with the awakening of his go ·emmenfs awareness of the potential importance of atomic energy Bhabha emphasized at the Third l JN Conference in 1964 1'No power is as expensive as no powcr' ' 1 for all developing nations • Establishing a Nuclear Foundation for Electric Power and a Nuclear Weapons Option In 1951 India signed a nuclear cooperation agrei ment with France ·'the first bilateral international nuclear project ancr the Second World War •-4 1n t 9S2 Nehru announced a four-year plan to begin developing India·s nuclear capability which included surveying atomic materials and processing monazite to obtain thorium He remarked The equation of defense is your di fensc forces plus your industrial and technological background plus thirdly the economy of the country and fourthly the Abrnhnm 88· 89 41 • The Biographical Jir11rJna1 - of Scll ntl fl ' 2d ed • ed Ro · Poncr New York· Oxford University Press 1994 70 ' Abraham 83-84 22 • spirit of the people Philosophically the right approach to defense is to avoid having unfriendly relations with other countries ' 3 Nehru•s national security outlook put India somewhat ahead of China industrially and in atomic energy Thus according to Brookings analyst Stephen Cohen its '·original faith in nuclear technology was a way in which India could leapfrog intennediate technologies and dramatically improve the lot of the average citizen ' 44 1ndia's Depanment of Atomic Energy DAE was created on 3 August 1954 with Bhabha under the direct charge of the Prime Minister That same year the Atomic Energy Establishment Trombay AEET was created with responsibilities for nuclear power programs directly involved in applications of nuclear reactor design electronics and material science plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment These tasks • were moved from TIFR to the AEET leaving the TIFR devoted to fundamental rcsearch s Intended to maximize India's use of its limited uranium reserves the DAE initiated a long-term three-stage program that Bhabha formally presented at the Atomic Energy Conference in New Delhi November 1954 The outlined stages were • Build natural uranium-fueled reactors with Canadian assistance for power production and as a byproduct plutonium 0 The Plan is the Country's Oetimsc in Jawuharlul N1 hr11 ' i Sp11 u h1ts vol 3 September 1953 August 195 7 Delhi Ministry of tnfonnnlion and Broadcasting 1958 38-43 'Stephen P Cohen Nuclear WHpons and ConOict in South Asia URL http iww brook edu vicws articlcs cohcnS 1998TSP htm Accessed IO June 2000 H • Bhabha died in a plant- crash on 24 January 1966 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi renamed the AEET the Bhabha Atomic R sc arch Cenrer BARC on 12 January 1967 in memory of us founder Bhabha Atomic Ri search Center hoinepagc URL· h11p- 'www barc c mc1 in barcimdcx h1ml Accessed 16 December 1999 2 3 • • Plan and build reactors nm on recycled first-stage reactor plutonium and abundant Indian thorium • Construct breeder reactors run on Uranium-233 a byproduct of sc cond4 stage plutonium-thorium fuel fission r It should be noted that Bhabha outlined this ambitious proposal before there were any operating commercial nuclear power plants anywhere in the world lt was highly significant because it served as the link between peaceful and potential military uses of atomic energy by no later than early 1964 Bhabha' s ambitious plan focusing on plutonium and emphasizing India• s need for the capability to separate plutonium from spent fuel was the basis forJndia's later nuclear weapons option Access to Canadian natural uranium technology under the $24 million Colombo Plan grants H allowed India to move toward greater self-sufficiency • lndia opted for the Canadian proposal because turning to the U S enriched uranium technology would have left India dependent on U S or foreign fuel supplies In essence India's atomic energy foundation with a possible weapons option was based on forecasted Indian S T expertise Canadian technology and goodwill and Bhabha·s international reputation and bargaining ski 11 ' iK According to the editors of Tracking Nuclear Prul erarion status exceeded security as key motivators In effect for the senior elected officials and a larger domestic constituency the motives for India's nuclear space and missile development has arisen more from status than security needs Developing India's JS TJ capacity-civ ilian and ' • 6 Dhirendra Shanna n 10' Nud mr £ stale New Delhi Lancers Publishers 1983 19-22 4 For Canadian aid under lhe Colombo Plan ror Coopera1ive Economic Developmen1 in South and Southeasl Asia including part of'thc estimated S 14 million reactor installation final cost 524 million see Depanmcnt of State Foreign Relutions 1 j tht US 9jj 9 57 oOI 8 South Asia Publication 9S38 Washington DC Dept ofSrare 1987 467 Kapur 192-193 24 • military-is seen as the means of demonstrating lndia•s world-class leadership potential and of satisfying India·s pressing need to have advanced technology to modernize the nation's still underdeveloped infrastructure and economy 49 JUMP-STARTJNG INDIA'S NGCLEAR PROGRAM International collaboration often heralded as competition provided India a significant boost for its nuclear power program lbe United States as a benevolent superpower had already begun to seek international controls over nuclear power from its position of strength developed during World War II India newly independent from such perceived colonial restrictions and within recent memory of the use of atomic weapons • strove to maintain its freedom of action and to develop its industrial infrastructure for economic development India's nuclear motivations included the drive to self-sufficiency and the subsequent tum to perceived self-reliance The Baruch Plan In June 1946 the Truman administration put forth its plan of international dissemination and control of atomic en rgy Presented to the United J 'ations by the U S representative Bernard Baruch it declared We must embrace international cooperation or international disintegration Science has taught us how to put the atom to work But to make it work for good •• 4 Tracking '11clear Pralij1tratio11 A Guidi ' laps and Chum 99 J eds Rodney W Jones and Mark G McDonough Washington DC llrookings Institution Pres 1998 11 1 25 • instead of for evil lies in the domain dealing with the principles of human duty We are now facing a problem more of ethics than of physics so · Among its provisions the plan included four specific proposals of imponancc to India and other emerging nuclear states • Extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends • Control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes • Elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction • Effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions In essence the plan proposed international control over the entire nuclear fuel • cycle The Soviet LJnion opposed it refused to accept inspections within its borders and in retrospect had likely been involved in its own nuclear weapons program since 1939 India agreed in principle to peaceful uses of nuclear power but opposed any measures to restrict a country's right to develop its own resources ' India was and would remain fiercely jealous cfits sovcrd nty resistant to any inequalities and inequities wary of any semblance of colonialism and righteous in it demands for disarmament 52 The Baruch Plan asserted that a nuclear weapons option was more of an ethical choice than a physics problem Early enthusiasm for a scientific approach to the energy Jo U S Congress Senate Committee on Govcmmenral Affairs Nuclear Prul1 i r_a11on Factboolr 103rd Cong • 2nd sess December 1994 S Doc 103·111 1995 8 • I ' 1 U S Congress Senalc• Nudl ar Pmh l mliort F actbonk 4 Pc rkovich 21 26 • crisis through the power of the atom did not fully consider the proliferation implications The early spread of nuclear technology was viewed as an academic application of nuclear physics for peaceful purposes however the commensurate knowledge and policy to understand and manage its spread did not keep pace Operation Candor Atoms for Peate53 President Eisenhower s domestic strategy to educate the U S public about nuclear war Operation Candor grew into a program to provide international opportunities for nuclear power Atoms for Peace Eisenhower committed to end the nuclear anns race sought the support of the American people for realistic arms control measures especially in light of the belief that the Sovicls had tested a hydrogen bomb in August 19S3 • However even with the assistance from Lewis Strauss and C D Jackson his special assistant for Cold War strategy Operation Candor could not come up with a positive approach for addressing the issue of thermonuclear war On IO September 1953 Eisenhower himself devised an idea for a nuclear disannament mechanism that intended to reduce mililury reserves by shifting fissionable materials to peaceful uses brokered through a United Nations ··bank ' This perceived straightforward confidence-building mechanism aimed primarily at the United States and the Soviet Union was presented to the United Nations as his Atoms for Peace proposal He reasoned that a better use • J t The potential scope and importanc of a moth ation study arc evident in the extent of the intemational collaboration effort which along with the momentum ofrechnology is largely responsible for the proliferation of nuclear technology The merits of examining the U S Atoms for Peace program and researching ilS efTects on rhc proliferation of nuclear rcchnology since the 1950s has been suggested as a focus of funhcr rewh a hour comprehensive srudy of such a collaborative process is outside the scope of this thesis b 3 1D sc interview by the author 27 Jul ' 2000 27 • could be found for such power that would also protect U S technology and expand U S reactor markets overseas 5 ' The United States contention of an overarching UN-hrokercd bank of lissile material did not tit lndia·s contention of developing its own S T program Nehru expressed doubt that a UN organization would represent India's interests as it would likely be dominated by the major powers In the case oflndia's largest neighbor the PRC was not a member of and was under no obligation 10 the United Nations Further as early as I 954 Nehru understood that nuclear weapons cannot be control led by a mere desire or demand for banning them •55 India initially rejected it on two counts As an enforcement mechanism the United Nations sought to exert control over those countries that 'r·cre most in need and it did not address the potential PRC threat • India's Multinational Nuclear Infrastructure India and the United States had initiated diplomatic relations in 1941 $6 In 1946 the emerging Indian government requested U S economic assistance and in 1947 both India and Pakistan began early discussions with the United States about conventional 1 ' Pres Dwight 0 mscnhower Atoms for Peace speech presented at the UN 8 December 1953 final draft cop URL · lrcrp ' www cisr nho ·cr 111c tas edu ta1om I2 htm Accessed 21 Ma • 2000 • u Jawaharlal Nehru Control of Nuclear Energy speech presented to the Lok Sabha 10 May 1954 in Jawahorlt1 Nehr11 ' r Spel ches vol 3 254 • 16 Dennis Kux India nncl lhl U tirec Sl ltef f f tru11 1 d 0 111oc·rt1cic 194 I I 91 I Washington DC· atronal Defc nsc University Press 1993 447 28 • weapons transfers S7 The united States faced crafting a policy addressing Indian and Pakistani concerns Both India and Pakistan took advantage of Atoms for Peace India was one of the first collaborc1tors in the program Canadian assistance provided India with its first research reactor while the United States helped to build Pakistan's first nuclear reactor Eisenhower recognized the early proliferation risks but judged them acceptable believing as in the spirit of the Marshall Plan that Jhe potential peaceful benefits justified the effort Still Atoms for Peace threatened to lead to greater nuclear proJifcration and could contribute to the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world $R • Sidestepping IAEA Sareguards With the Atoms for Peace plan as a foundation safeguards were institutionalized in the IAEA established by treaty Early efforts to address nuclear proliferation were formali ed with the approval of the IAEA statute on 2j October 1956 during the Conference on the Statute of the International l lomic En rgy Agency held at UN n Oepartmenl ofSlare Fure1g11 Relaliuns fJ lh US J9jJ 957 ·ol 8 357-358 For India's 1951 military sales agreement and refusal of 1954 m1litnry aid see _ol 8 62 1 ur India's 19 2 Sherman tank dcltvcry sec Kux 86 • • Cisc nhower Library and Museum homepage Atoms for Peace URL http l 'www eisenhower u1cxas edu atom6 hlm Acc sscd I June 2000 Fur his warning of the danger of the prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by federal money or thot publ c· pol r • ·ould il relj becom the captive of a c ent jic-technologicul lire sec Farewell Rad11J and Tclc ·ision ddress to the Americnn People ' 17 January 1961 URL ht1p'l www eisenhowcr u1c as edu farewell htn1 Accessed I June 2000 29 • Headquarters The statute became effective on 29 July 1957 59 By 1962 there were 37 peaceful bilateral agreements covering the provisions of research power reactors technical advice and training 6u Early safeguard considerations prompted a t S -led initiative that allowed states to request nuclear training and assistance providing such an exchange permitted international safeguards--accounting and control over resulting fissionable material to include plutonium During a September IAF A conference Bhabha successfully argued that India should exercise its right to produce and hold plutonium required for its own peaceful power programs He objected to U S -led efforts to require strict safeguards based on the acceptance oflAEA technical assistance As he noted only the technologically less developed countries required assistance and would therefore be • subject to safeguards while the established nuclear powers would not be obligated to apply such safeguards His 22 October argument over particular uses of fissionable material •·ensured that the IAEA would not be given powers which would enable it to 61 interfere in the economic development and the economic life of the States concemed Due to India's early and continuing insistence on self-sufficiency or at least on minimal international control its fuel-cycle facilities reprocessing enrichment fuel 9 For the IAEA serving as the world's central intcrgovemn1enlal forum for S T co-operation in the nuclear lieId ·· and Ari idc If objecli ·cs ro ··seek 10 accelerate and enlarge the conrribution of atomic energy see Stiltut-c ot'thc International Atomic En rgy Agency lAUA homepage URL http i www iaca org worldatomfglancc prolile tatu1c html Accessed IO June 2000 ° • Eisenhower Libra11· and Museum homepage URL http·l www eisenhower utcxas edu atom7 htm Accessed S June 2000 U S domcslic energy needs and inremational implications date fron1 1958 when 1t consumed inorc energy that 1 produced For 1he inhtm nt economic inefficiency of nuclear power 1n generating elcc1nc1ty see Plutonium Production · Fcdcra1ion of American Scienlists homepage URL www fas org nukc intro1nukc plutonium h1m Accessed 21 June 2000 M J P Jain Nud1tur Jml a ·ol 2 ' cw Dcllli Radiant 1974 72 30 • fabrlcation and heavy water production facilities with few exceptions were established and remain outside lAEA safeguards Bhabha1 therefore played the decisive role in India's successful effort to weaken the scope of safeguards 62 Initial Nuclear Facilities India's resean h reactor Apsara was the first nuclear reactor in Asia outside the Soviet Union It was a maximum one-megawatt thermal MWt swimming pool type suggested to Bhabha in September 1954 by Sir John Cockcroft a former Cambridge associate and then head of the UK Atomic Energy Authority•s main facility 63 Based on British design plans constniction began in 1955 and the reactor went critical on 4 August 1956 The British-provided uranium fuel is safeguarded under a supply contract 64 • In 1955 Canada offered to build a larger 40 MWt CIRUS Canadian-Indian Reactor United States research reactor under the Colombo Plan On IO July 1960 the heavy water natural Uranium research reactor went critical using Canadian then Indian fuel Not fully operational until 1963 it operated without JAEA safeguards The original agreement did include a stipulation that the reactor would be for peaceful purposes only However as with many such agreements it did not provide any effective enforcement mechanism permitting India to interpret its 1974 nuclear explosion as a peaceful one 0 • Pcrkovich 28-29 For Bhabhil and Cockcroft' correspondence see Abrahurn 83-85 The BARC homepage lists the rcacror went crit1cal in 1957 31 • and therefore in compliance However because lndia used CIRUS-produccd plutonium for its nuclear tesL Canada ceased all nuclear cooperation with India 65 India's first nuclear supply relationship with the United States was for the 1956 contract and sale for CIRUS heavy water a S250 000 gift under a similar peaceful purposes stipulation During Eisenhower's December 1959 trip to India Nehru raised the topic ofatomic power He was anxious to get at least one nuclear plant ofS0 000 to 100 000kw capacity to stan India's commercial power program 66 The first U S contract for the Tarapur reactors was not completed until 1963 In the interim India's indigenous but troublesome heavy water processing facilities began with a pilot-scale facility at Trombay The first full-scale heavy water processing facility J angal supplied by the West Gennan firm Linde in J962 remains in • operation for domestic and xport production today 6 According to Seshagiri and Wohlsletter Bhabha decided in July 1958 to build a reprocessing facility at Trombay to extract plutonium from spent fucl 68 Regarded as the key facility lo build nuclear devices construction Project Pho nix began on its Trombay plutonium-reprocessing 0 M lnitinl 1955 references to a CIR Canuda-lndia reactor agreement preceded the 19 56 U S contribution of heavy water thus the CIRUS rcfc ll ncc Selected Indian Nuclear Facilities July 1999 Cen1er for Nonproliferation Studies homepage URL http cns miis edu rcsearthiindiainuclcar hlm Accessed 12 June 2000 Nehru commented ••ffsomething speclacular could be done 10 show the attachment of the Wesl and the interest of the West in India Eisenhowc r the first president to visit indepc ndent India did the world tour just to get lo India Memorandum of Conversation subject Relations Between India and Pakistan Trend ol Devclopmenl in USSR and Communist China 10 Dc cember 19S9 Department of Stale Fureign llt latmn r u thi US 958-1960 vol I 5 Sc ulh and Southeast Ar ia Publication 9996 Washington DC Dep1 of Stale 1992 520-526 66 67 • Nuclear Engineering lnlern itional Wurld Nur eur Jnd11 strp Hcmdhonlt 1996 London Reed Business Publishing 1995 117 '' Wohlstetter 55 • facility in March or April 1961 it was commissioned in 1964 The first test with an inactive fuel element was on 31 March 1964 with active fuel introduced on I June 1964 ri9 Thus by late 1964 or early 1965 the plant provided India with its first weapons grade plutonium The Tarapu r Contract U S nuclear power conflicts with India are well characterized by the Tarapur contract India's first two operating reactors designated Tarapur I and Tarapur 2 were 70 boiling water type light water moderated low-enriched uranium fueled reactors They were part of an Atoms for Peace 1963 contract reactor construction The United States provided very favorable financing and uranium fuel after India agreed ro allow tAEA • sateguards--the first such safeguards anywhere The 30-year nuclear cooperation contract stipulated that the reactors would run exclusively on U S tuel but the agreement vi -as not without controversy Having some indication that India was misusing U S nuclear material under the peaceful use stipulation the United States pressed the issue 71 but without resolution on the Indian AEC in Bombay on 16 November 1970 The United States did suspend Tarapur fuel shipments to India in September 1974 in response to India's nuclear test in May 'Trombay was shut down from 1973-1982 Sesh Jgiri 119 ' • 0 Operational in 1969 Sen John H Glenn 0-0HJ Disappro al of Enriched Uranium to India · Senate Floor S1111emen1 23 September 1980 in U S Congress Senale N11det1r l'ru j'erotiun F111 Jboolc 90-91 33 • In late 1963 or early 1964 Canada agreed to construct the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station unit l RAPS- I heavy water moderated Canadian deuterium-uranium CANDU reactor Completed in 1973 it operates under safeguards but remains lndia s least productive reactor due to technical problems The RAPS-2 project also begun by Canada was interrupted when Canada ceased nuclear assistance in 1976 lndia ultimately completed construction on RAPS-2 Due to the expertise gained from CANDU troubleshooting and construction experience fndia·s proclaimed selfsufficiency began with the indigenous RAPS-I in 1967 and RAPS-2 in 197l despite Canadian assistance CONCLUSION • Nehru·s vision of a nuclear India concentrating on economic development could only be achieved with U S -led international cooperation Fortuitously for Nehru and Bhabha the Atoms for Peace initiative appeared at precisely the right moment for India to take full advantage of U S generosity Canadian and U S assistance jump-started India's nascent nuclear program although India early and consistently sought to avoid lAEA safeguards Nehru·s and Bhabha's recognition that a nuclear weapons option Vas inherent in the infrastructure being built for peaceful purposes led them to seek and achieve a plutonium reprocessing capability in the late 1950s and early 1960s India·s quest for the bomb continued after the deaths of these two principal players in 1964 and 1966 culminating in the first nuclear detonation in 1974 Unlike the nuclear ambitions of • other nations India's quest began oilh almost exclusive emphac is on peaceful economic 34 - • development of nuclear power Military applications were a secondary consideration arrived at by a different set of motivations and catalysis • • 35 • CHAPTERJ THE BOMB INDIA'S BID FOR SELF-RELIANCE 1962-1974 In the pre-t964 and l964 Indian nuclear perspective there were in fact at least two decisions first to keep the nuclear option open and to establish the technological base for a military program second to refrain from building a bomb at present and by implication to refrain from making visible a nuclear infrastructure of a military nature ' Ashok Kapur I976 India became the world's defacru sixth nuclear power with its 18 May l974 • Pokhran I single underground explosion of a nuclear device Claiming credit as the first nation to conduct its initial test underground it portrayed a narrowing of the large technological gap beh•i1c cn itself and the U -brokered nuclear power security framework ' Despite India·s disclaimer that the 1974 test was only a peace f11I nuclear explosion it has been hailed by critics as cilher the ••first deliberate step taken along the inevitable path of nuclear weapons or no more than a gesture of independence and a bid for inc ' pensive prestige '' 73 However given the national security concerns raised by 71 India a signatory to the Limi1ed Tcsr Dan Treaty was obligated to test undcr round The U S de11cloped the bomb for a W Vll military application in part as a response to a reponed'Gcnnan program The USSR contended its bomb offset the imbalance caused by the U S · nuclear monopolistic si1ua1ion The UK sought to safcguilrd Western l uropeiln interests and to coun1erbalance the USSR The PRC sought independence trom USSR assistanci 1960 and to offset U S support for T11iwan 1971 Charles de Gaunc·s insistence on French strategic independence 10 heighten its pres1ige or ro export sovereignty and independence offered France an opportunity to lead a conuncnral Europe less dependent on 1hc U S • n Surjil Mansingh ndtu 'J Seanhfur Power Indira G ndh • · Furetgrt Po Icy 1966- 981 New Delhi Sage Publications 1984 59 36 • lndia·s ongoing conflict with China over Tibet China·s own entry into the nuclear club in 1964 and renewed war with Pakistan India became increasingly B o'al'e of the value of a nuclear weapons capability in its relations with its Asian neighbors and the rest of the world Table 2 indicates the key milestones in its qucs1 for the bomb l jJ i · l Ti t R e l - -i -fod C fli·c · iL - - JP i e ¥ i i stcrJ' ' J e il - J P J tc _ I ea '-' ' n Jc t 1 ··-· _ jl p f ns _ la _i ng_l u fo th_ s iJ --· l _ 1_965_ JJ ist lniti ted fl f utch c isis W r L - -9 ·-· U d eck - N Nu l C t -- - · 6 J e M st r tri_ F - hai - abE 9-_D -- --· ____J _19 g - i ·-· • __ J --'- t e -- - 1 1 i X H - M r l j __1971 1 ngla sh ri_si ·j 1974 I Peaceful Nuclear Esplosion 1 L ll • ··-········ · · ·· · - · · - J J Table 2 Key Indian ' 'luclear Decision Milestones Source Author created CHANGE IN ADMINISTRATION - NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONTINUITY Nehru had little confidence in superpower-directed international security systems and Bhabha placed Huie trust in disarmament as a strategy although both recognized the political value of nuclear weapons and as such did not irreversibly commit India to reject nuclear weapons According to Perkovich India s nuclear option was not a maner of making a one-time all•important decision but of the Prime Minister tacitly allowing a • 37 • largely autonomous program to serve as a foundation if the need arose '4 Andr at each of these decision pointst primary and secondary motivations played a major·role in dictating whether and how to proceed Nehru s tacit approval of an Indian S T foundation and nuclear weapons option policy likely remained unchanged until the 1974 tcstt even after he·died in May l 964 The new Prime Minister I al Bahadur-Shaslri continued 1' chn s policy ofdeclared oppo ition fo nuclear weapons Kowever in a major departure from past official statements on 27 November he openly supported development of a peaceful nuclear explosion PNE and thereby g vc official sanction to lndia'Slnuclear w pons option u Shastri s considerations included acquisition ofeither an independent nuclcardetcrrcn - primarily against China or acredible security g Jarantee from the other nuclear powers Trus was a key pointthat he sought from Britain during Prime Minister Wilson•s visit-in December- 1964' 7 January 1966 marked another transition point Shastri died unexpectedly on IO January and Bhabha on 24 January Bhabha•s passing ended his nearly autonomous reign and virtual monopoly over atomic energy within the AEC lne new Prime Minister Indira Gandhi probably -'U unaware ofthe full extent of the nuclear weaR ns program Bhabha's succc ssort Vikram Sarabhai head of the Indian National Committee for Space 7 ' Pcrkovich 20•2 I u Spector 64 Shastri was Prime Minister from June 1964-January 1966 • 1 Dean Ru k Telc m to Go- ·emor Harriman Washington DC 27 February 1965 Subject• Numeric File 1964-1966 Central riles oflhc Depar1ment ofStnte Record Group 59 National Archives Building WashTngron DC • Research was not Gandhi·s first choice but according to Ashok Kapur his appointment was a domestic political consideration 17 Sarabhai sought to disassociate India from the bomb He quickly espoused maintaining 'the rate of progress of thf economic development of the nation Moreovcr J think ing of both the extc mal and internal threat 1fully agree with lhc Prime Minister when she says that an atomic bomb explosion is not going to help our security 78 He attempted to shut do 11 the PNE project in June 1966 but was not entirely successful because of momentum within the AEC bureaucracy and possibly because the prime minister was still wa •ering on confronting the nuclear weapons option 79 India's quest for a nuclear weapons capability did not die in the critical 1964-66 period despite the passing of its original visionaries Prime Minister Nehru and Chainnan • Bhabha The external threat to national security was reaching a critical stage and India believed its options were limited A review of these threats will place its decision and motivations to proceed to the bomb in perspective A PREOCCUPATION WITH CHINA 1958-1964 The rise to power of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949 brought new perspectives to the subcontinent India officially recognized the PRC on 29 April 1954 By 1958 however a border dispute began to sour relations although China's r Kapur 195 • ' 1 J P Jam 179-180 For a detailed implications account of the chaniic in adminislration see Pcrkovich 112-124 39 • announcement of its intentions to develop nuclear weapons did not evoke widespread public discussion in lndia 110 While India insisted in 1954 on maintaining the traditional British-defined border China sought to acquire over 50 000 square miles of territory In January 1959 China oflicially claimed the three disputed regions during Tibet's rebellion and the Dalai Lama fled to India Jn November 196 I India adopted an ambitious forward military presence in the disputed region From July through September 1962 Chinese and Indian forces maneuvered for position On 20 October China launched large-scale attacks and routed Indian forces During 26-28 October Nehru requested urgent U S military aid and air support President Kennedy immersed in the Cuban missile crisis did dispatch the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise but the war ended on 2 t-22 November when China • declared a unilateral cease-tire and withdrawal Jn February 1963 China and Pakistan reached an agreement on their common border ostensibly offsetting both Indian and waning U S intluence 11 The conflict brought about a significant reevaluation of Indian foreign and military policy One likely result of the crisis India introduced defense planning in 1964 for the first time 82 Also in December 1963 fhe Jana Sangh Pany made the first formal demand in Parliament to reverse India' s declared policy and produce nuclear weapons in part because the conflict exposed weaknesses in India's standing military capabilities ao Tradcmg V111 t ur Prulift ariun 119 11 • Perkovich 42-46 ll B M Jain lnd1u s Vtt Mnt nnd St cur1 ntro-rt gion11 Dimension Jaipur India Ina Shrce Publishers 1998 2 40 • However critics and analysts seeking to Spouse the nuclear option contended that nonalignment could not guarantee India's national security 83 Neither did military agreements with the United States The 1951 Mutual Security Accord with the United States evolved into a new military agreement in November 1962 spotlighting their common enemy China giving India ar least a breathing spell in its relations with China Also in July 1963 India concluded an Air Defense Agreement with the United States agreeing to consult with India in event of a new Chinese attack However China·s entry into the nuclear club with its first detonation in October 1964 made these agreements virtually moot since they did not deal with a nuclear threat to India The U S nuclear umbrella simply could not protect India from China under virtually any reasonable scenarios • THE RANN OF KUTCH CRISIS LEADS TO WAR As part of the growing concern over the nuclear weapons potential oflndia's nuclear power program Pakistan gambled on war In April 1965 Pakistani military patrols led to maneuvering lor position in the Rann of Kut h llJ Although India later withdrew in May a Pakistani-initiated confrontation in Kargil Kashmir escalated into India• s occupation of territory held by Pakistan since 1948 A ceasefire was agreed to on 27 June with India again withdrawing On I September Pakistan launched a major u B M Jain JO • • tr is a marshy area south of Karachi nea the Arabian Sea Pakistan initiated a dispute in 19S4 by declaring the Rann of Kutch a sea marking the border through the middle as governed by international law vice India's declaration that It as a marsh thus cntirdy within India's jurisdiction 41 • attack into southern Kashmir but both countries· military activities subsequently ground to a standstill and India accepted a UN cease-tire call on 20 September Pakistan followed suit on 22 September The day before the Indian Prime Minister was beseeched by nearly one hundred members of Parliament to develop nuclear weapons u A Soviet-mediated agreement on 10 January 1966 settled the peace but did not attempt to resolve the Kashmir issue R6 INDIA RESISTS THE NPT Soviet and continued U S diplomatic pressure for India to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NPT met with staunch resistance In April or • May 1967 a decision was made not to sign although the rejection was not an indication that India necesJ·ar y intended to build nuclear weapons immediolely According to Foreign Secretary C S Jha India's decision was made only after unsuccessfully seeking credible guarantees against nuclear attack and nuclear blackmail Indeed India had requested a nuclear guarantee from the United Nations on 4 May 1965 but subsequent deliberations tailed to reach a consensus Jha contended For the big powers nonproliferation has come to mean selective proliferation for India to make nuclear weapons would needlessly alarm Pakistan with whom we have no quarrel and risk touching off a nuclear arms race with it and perhaps also with China For the types of conflicts lndia is likely to • u Hari Ram Gupta fndia-Pufotan War J965 vol I Delhi· Hariyana Prakashan 1967 105 11 Perko •ic h I06-112 42 • get into it needs conventional arms and the diversion of scant resources into nuclear weaponry can only weaken the con entional defenses of the country 87 On 6 October 1967 India informed the United Kations it would not sign the NPT According to the statement by Defense Minister Swaran Singh While India continues to be in fa 'or of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons it is equally strongly in favor of the proliferation of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes as an ssential means by which the developing countries can benefit from the best advances of science and technology in this ficld 18 THE DISMEMBERMENT OF PAKISTAN In November and December 1971 perceived unequal political and economic • situations between West and East Pakistan led to widespread internal unrest among separatists in East Pakistan West Pakistani military forces entered the breakaway province and ten million refugees overtlowed into India 19 In November 1971 Indira Gandhi authorized Indian forces to cross the border 90 President Nixon dispatched the presumably nuclear armed USS Enterprise carrier group and on 12 December it was ordered inlo the Bay of 0engal to buuress 'est Pakistan On 13 December the Soviet Union assured India the United States would not intervene militarily while China criticized both superpowers for deploying military forces With ndian assistance East 11 C S Jha ··The Non-Prolirerarion Dcba1c Rclc'l-ance oflndia's Stand The Tunes ofIndia 22 fcbrUO' ' 1978 4 11 • G G Mirchanda111 lnJ u ·3· N11clt or IJ1 em111C1 New Delhi Popular Book Service 1968 149 • Indira Gandhi India and the World · ForeignAgu rs SI no I October 1972 70-71 ° Perkovich 164 43 • Pakistan seceded forming the independent state of Bangladesh Pakistan·accepted an Indian-proposed unconditional cease-fire on 16 December Indian troops withdrew on 25 March 1972 After the war with Pakistan essentially dismembered India was let by far the dominant power on the subcontinent 91 Moreover Indian perceptions of a U S attempt to intimidate India with nuclear weapons reinforced its motivation for an independent nuclear arms capability In light ofC S actions India's 1974 test could be analyzed as no doubt partly an effort to make itJ less vulnerable to such external pressures in the future y2 A PEACEFUL UCLEAR EXPLOSION • In May 1972 the zero-energy experimental reactor Pumima 1 went critical marking achievement of the third and final stage of Bhabha ·s original plan93 and a landmark of progress toward a nuclear weapons capability By 1972 the BARC complex housed the Apsara CIRUS Zerlina and Pumima research reactors with 10 276 people working there as of December 1973 9°' According to early work by independent British observers Leonard Beaton and John Maddox India had an unproven capacity to explode 91 Pcrkovich 164• I 66 • Spector 65 Scshaa1ri 12 l Pumima I was decommissioned and rcno alcd 10 make Pumima 2 1984 and it was renovated to make Pumima 3 critical 1990 see Selected Indian Nuclear Facilities • •iJ 1t included 2 560 scientific 4 4 86 tcchn cal I 333 adminis1rative and 1 897 general maintenance and au -tiliary staff sec India and the Bomb P11bfic Opinion und Nuclear Op11ons eds David Cortright and Amitabh Manoo Notre Dan e Indiana Unh•ersity ofNotrc Dame Press 1996 128 The total was a ten-fold increase rrom 1959 Abraham 61 44 • a device by 1964 or t966 based on an estimated capacity to build t a ·o bombs a year from plutonium derived from the CIRUS reactor operation Others contend India's proven bomb capability dates no earlier than its Purnima experiment in May 1972 Certainly by 1972 lndia had the means and the opportunit ' to detonate a nuclear device There remains much speculation on the timing of lndiru Gandhi's decision to move forward with the bomb Such a political decision and the motivations behind it were necessarily tempered by y ars of preparation establishing the S T foundation According to Perkovich • The nuclear scientists and their colleagues in Defense Research and Development Organization labs did much of the preparatory work without explicit political authorization as the prime minister was preoccupied by an intense political struggle and a split in the Congress Pany They had begun doing serious design studies by 1968 and in 1970 the BARC group sought to solve a weapon design problem by beginning construction of the Purnima reactor Explicit aurhorfzation 10 lake rhefinaJ steps and assemble a dev ce did nol come until 972 Thus building the bomb did not entail a specific decision in time but rather a continuous accretion of S T capability and political momentum stymied 9 occasionally by countervailing political moral and economic considerations CONCLUSION In ' fay 1974 India detonated it first nuclear device tndia described it as a peaceful nuclear explosion based on its definition of a nuclear weapon as a nuclear warhead actually mated to a delivery system An thing less qualified for peacefut•• status even if it had the potential for weaponization for Indians therefore 1974 represented progress towards visions of an economically modem India Such judgment is • 9 Pcrkovich 146 Emphasis added 45 • more readily analyzed within an understanding oflndia•s complex historical cultural geographic political economic and moral considerations see Table 3 For the rest of the world 1974 marked the emergence of a potential sixth member of the nuclear club • • 46 • Pre- 1947 1947 I 1953 I 1954 1957 • 1962 I I 1968 1971 I I 1974 I • PRE-INDEPENDENCE Gandhi Moral Tradition Moral O osition to Nuclear Wea ns INDEPENDENCE Safeguard Independence I Overcome Poverty Modernize the Nation I Aromic Energy as Perceived Economic Panacea Political Value of Disavowing Nuclear Weapons Maintain Nuclear Option Worldwide Symbol of Prestige National S T Stature Nonalignment National Sovereignty Superpower Directed International Security ATOMS FOR PEACE Nonalignment I Playoff Superpowers for Economic Support Colonial Aversion Foreign Dependency foreign Expertise Favorable Funding Nuclear Scientists and EnRinccrs Train in U S Declassified Research SUBCONTINENT MILITARISM Conventional Military Forces Inadequacies Foreign Assistance Dependency Seek Indigenous Capabilities U S Military Suooort of Pakistan Military Rivalry with Pakistan INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR POWER SAFEGUARDS Technology Assistance with Requisite Controls Precedent for Remaining Outside IAEA Safeguards Address Self sufficiency CONFLICT WITH CHINA Forward Presc nce in Disputed Regions I Regional Hegemonic rntentions Military Rout Reasses lment of 1ililary Capabilities Political Equity with China Military Leverage China Support for Pakistan Soviet MiG Negotiation Indigcnous Defense Production Capability I Change of Administration I I964 Chinese Nuclear lest NPT NEGOTL TIONS TI1reat to Nuclear Option Nuclear Powers Legitimized Nonorolifcration Norm Policv DISMEMBERMENT OF PAKISTAN Dominant Regional Power I Great Power Status Aspirations Opposition Political Party Platform Nuch ar Weapons I Proving Ground for faolving Chinese Sevier U S Relations Pakistan Mediates Kissinger and Ni con's Overtures Trips to China PRC UNSC Seat Lcaitimi inA a Five Nuclear Power Security framework PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIO Freedom of Judgment and Action Loss ofS T Aid Economic Sanctions Political Signal Political Expression Through Nuclear Option I Pro-Bomb Lobby Counter I Consolidate Political Power' ' ational Prestige Short Cut to International PowcrS T Demonstration ofS T Prowess I Table 3 Key Considerations Feeding India's Nuclear Motivations Source Author created 47 • CHAPTER4 INDIA'S NUCLEAR MOTIVATIONS Conceming lndia·s request for the United States to provide it with all declassmed information on reactor theoryt design and technology Bhabha stated In particular we should be glad to have the detailed designs of such reactors that have been completely de-classified together with all operational data that may have been obtained concerning them We have been given to understand that the big graphite reactor at Harwtll UK has been more or less completely declassified and that the large heavy water reactor at Chalk River Canada has been largely de-classified Homi Bhabha Chairman AEC 96 Letter to C S Counterpart Gordon Dean 1952 • India's motivations for acquiring a nuclear weapons capability are complex and deeply rooted in the national political cultural and economic existence Nehru s 1945 vision of an economically developed India with all the trappings of a modem state including nuclear energy drove the nation to build the basic nuclear infrastructure that gave it the opportunity with foreign assistance to seek the bomb in the late I950s Interestingly and in direct contradiction to current analysis of proliferc1tion motives an immediate and overwhelming danger to·national security was nm the catalyst for that decision Yet security concerns clearly drove a succession oflater decisions 10 follow the path that Nehru and Dr Bhabha set for Jndia before their deaths in the mid-1960s Succeeding prime ministers senior scientists and other officials recogniz d the nature • 91' Quoted in Abraham 79 48 -- • and severity of the nuclear threat from China after 1964 but the initial decision to create a weapons-making capability had taken place at least six years earlier before the initial border clashes with China Therefore its nuclear motivations arc more complex and interconnected than those of most other members of the nuclear club and other prospective members This chapter analyzes India·s motivations in the basic economic political and military categories ECONOMIC MOTIVATIONS Nehru's vision of India as a modern economically developed nation provided the first and most compelling motivation for achieving a nuclear capability India received • massive infusions of foreign assistance -- ultimately nine billion dollars in gifts loans and surplus food ' 97 from the United States between 1951 and 1970 -- to help alleviate the dire economic situation of the population but this treated only the symptoms and did not provide a cure Responsibility for a national economic strategy fell on Nehru as prime minister who sought 10 maintain economic development as well as national freedom and integrity 98 Arguably the success of both interests was based to a large extent on Nehru's vision and Bhabha's implementation of their plan 10 modernize the nation through the application of nuclear science Atomic power seemed the only route to modernize India to ensure survival of the stale while providing an acceptable standard ofliving for its • •ir Quoted in Zafar Shah 156 ' Zafar Shah 9 49 • population As Nehru noted the application of nuclear energy to peaceful and constructive purposes has opened limitless possibilities for human development 911 prosperity and overabundance ' At the same time India had to remain dependent on foreign assistance for some time to come Nehru·s nonalignment policy attempting to maintain freedom of action from a position of independent strength rather than as a proxy of one of the developed nations served as the guiding politic l motivation As he remarked in I94 7 Ultimately foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy and till that time when India has properly evolved her economic policy her foreign policy will be rather vague '' 100 Therefore it is clear that from the beginning economic factors predominated in national•level thinking and policymaking with political and ultimately military factors subordinate to them • At the same time that Nehru and Dr Bhabha were emphasizing the necessity of nuclear energy as a building block for an independent India's new economy they perceived the inherent paradox of its origins and applicability as a weapon of mass destruction The recent memory of the devastating effects of the military atomic blasts in t 945 stood in sharp contrast with the S T euphoria in developed nations concerning atomic power·s peaceful economic potential Bhabha more than Kehru because of his expertise and contacts with nucfear physicists abroad was well aware of the bomb· making potential of any nuclear infrastructure that lndia would build Yet he too argued the economic feasibility of nuclear power -- atomic energy offers the only chance of w Jawaharlal Nehru 'l Speech vol I September 1946 • May 1949 Delhi Ministry of Information and Oroadc astin 1949 24-25 • w Const11u1mt Asl nrbly nflndtu Ltg1 lu11 •f D hnle 2 no 5 4 December 1947 1260 quoted m Perkovich 40 50 • raising the standard of lh•ing'' in lndia 101 At least by the end of January 1958 Nehru went on record concerning India's potential lo turn peaceful nuclear technology into a military weapon In response to questions about how India would react to a nucleararmed neighbor he declared unl qui ocally We can do it develop nuclear weapons in three or four years if we divert sufficient resources in that direction But we have given the world an 11ssurance that we shall never do so We shall never use our knowledge of nuclear science for purposes of war ''1112 Later that year Bhabha finalized plans for acquiring a reprocessing capability ultimately built at Trombay ostensibly as centerpiece oflndia·s economic modernization but with the clear potential for producing a bomb Thus from vinually the beginnings oflndia's nuclear program hs chief political and scientific leaders recognized the weapons-making potential of their nuclear infrastructure • and S T initiatives A distinct subset of economic motivations can be identified in the S T community First as the nuclear infrastructure began to materialize and the body ofS T personnel began to grow they developed a constituency of suppo11ers for maintaining and increasing India's nuclear capabilities oti cn independent of other national-level considerations That is the S T community provided an independent set of pressures on the go ernment to keep and enhance the nation's nuclear achievements Second the sheer pride of that community in those achievements reinforced their willingness to go to the next stepT to seek 1he bomb as yet another example of the economic and industrial might of a modern India Both Nehru and Bhabha considerably underestimated the time • in• Bhabha 1953 stau mcnt quoted in Wohlstc ttc r 39 1111 Mirchandani 23 I SI • required to establish the nuclear power program and economic benefits were slow in coming However this did not diminish national S T prestige for those achievements The idea that nuclear power harbors special S T prestige continues to be a key motivator 103 Third the achievement of economically and scientilically valuable spinofT technologies embodies another area of long-term motivations for maintaining or enhancing a nuclear weapons capability One of India· s core S T success stories software export can be seen as a secondary motivator In fact India is emerging as the largest exporter of software and computer know-how to the United States 104 Another subset of economic motivators can be found in India's overall defense industrial establishment While most of it concentrates on conventional military weapons and equipment -- enhanced by imported weapons and technologies - its health depends • to a certain extent on the vitality or the nuclear weapons program This is especially true because of the vast array of equipment and su systems that the nuclear establishment contracts for from the defense industry As India continues to develop an array of delivery systems for its nuclear devices especially ballistic missiles and certain aircraft the defense industry plays an increasing role in thi overall nuclear weapons effort Therefore that jndustry provides a somewhat independent constituency of support and io For example US diplomats rec ognizi d in 1966 the 'alue-laden aspec ts of nuclear prestige The State Department cau1ioned that the term five nuclear power1 should be avoided because it incorrectly implied that those nations possessed somt ·•spc c ial interest or common power prestige or cupability not shored by others '' Departmcnl of State Joint State USIA ACDA DoD Message subject no tille Guidance Cor U S Public Posture 27 October 1966 2 Subject-Numeric File 1964-1966 Central Files ol'the Dc panment ofS1a1c RL-cord Group S9 National An hives Building Washington DC • ' ' Tony Karon Why India and U S Agree to Disagree Over Nukes CNN 21 Mar 2000 URL http fwww cnn com '2000 ASIAN0Wisou1hf03 2 ltindia3_ I a tmiindex html Accessed I April moo 52 • motivation for nuclear weapons initiatives based on its concern for the economic health of the defense industry Similarly lndia·s space program plays a role in the overall economic motivations Based on the examples of the United States and Soviet Union in particular India recognized that development of an effective space launch system would enhance its ability to build an indigenous ballistic missile system After all those two nations first used ballistic missile platforms to launch satellites and then further developed them into nuclear warhead carriers As early as 1963 they established the Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching Station involving assistance from the United States United Kingdom France West Germany and the Soviet C nion 105 The Indian Department of Space was created in 1972 and the first experimental satellite was launched in April 1975 Dr A P • J Abdul Kalam for example trained in the United States on its space launch program during the l 960s 106 He later became director of the India's ballistic missile program and was the chief designer oflndia's first civHian SLV responsible for its subsequent adaptation to the Agni mec lium-range ballistic missile 107 As with the defense industry proper India's space program had a large stake in the success of the nuclear weapons rd ' The So 'iet Union launched du first earth satellite Sputnik into orbit on 4 October 19 S7 The first U S sa1elli1e Explorer I was sent into orbit on 31 fanuary 1958 President Eisenhower signed the bill creating the National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA on 29 July 1958 Main Events of the Eisenhower Presidenc ' I 9 S3-1961 · Eisenhower Ccn1cr homepage UR l http history cc ukans edu hc riragetabilcne ikec tr html Accessed I5 June 2000 IOI' William H Webster Din ctor of Central Jntclligc ncc le timony in U S Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Nud mr md Mis11lt Prulijerution 18 May 1989 10 I Congress I session Senate Hearing 101-562 Washington DC GPO 1990 12 • •a• K S Ram imurth ' Commc ntai Um Accomplishments of Indian 'Missile_Man ' te t BK30111 I 5397 Delhi All India Radio 1010 Gl -tl' 30 ovcmbcr 1997 FBIS Daily Report - Sou1h Asia 30 No 'ember 1997 FBIS-TAC-97-334 8 53 • program and its support provided another strong economic motivator for continuing and enhancing weapons development o crall economic factors played a critical role in India's initial efforts to nucleariie its economy and to provide the infrastructure requirements for progressing to weapons development and tbr proceeding to design and detonation of a nuclear device in 1974 Economic motivators served as the initial catalyst for rndia's weapons program POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS No nation can seek to acquire a nuclear weapons capability without the political will to make the initial and follow-on decisions to do so In some nations political • motivators are paramount In rndia economic motivators preceded political and military factors although Nehru's original vision of a modern economically developed nation represented simultaneously bmh an economic and a political plan for his people And clearly the 1958 decision to acquire reprocessing capabililies could not have been taken solely on economic grounds since the purely economic payback of the facility could not he guaranteed given the limited uses of plutonium Consequently political motivators played an early if somewhat subordinate role to economic considerations By the late t 960s and early l 970s political aspirations achieved a level of predominance exceeding both economic and military because of the national impact of further progress with nuclear weapons Moreover as U S and foreign nonproliferation policies began to be implemented in the l 960s the argument that nations such as India should devote their • scarce economic resources to the welfare of the people did not carry enough weight to 54 convince Indian political leaders•· in the face of overriding political considerations - to • change lndia·s course of action 108 One paramount political motivator for India concerned ils perception that joining the nuclear club presupposed national capability to demonslra e its bomb-building capability Communist China's special international recognition its admission to the United Nationst and its eventual assumption of Taiwan's permanent Ul Security Council seat in 1971 were clearly matters of political consideration in lndia The mere possession of nuclear weapons seemed to be the entree to international esteem and more importantly for India Great Power statu The desire and drive to achieve that status stands as a critical and consistent goal of all Indian leaders since independence Even Nehru's economic vision had a Great Power component since an economically rejuvenated India •• meant one ready to enter the world stage or at a minimum the Asian stage ready to interact as an equal with the other Great Powers The mere economic polentiul to build the bomb was not enough National political wHlpower to take the next step to build and to detonate a nuclear device with an international audience was essential even if maintaining a veil of ambiguity and deniability Survival of lhe state is another political motivator for India Its independence from Britain rested on an unsure base during the late 1940s and 1950s linked with the parallel fate of the Islamic population of Pakistan Persistent warfare disrupted peaceful economic progress because of the diversion of resources to the military Concurrently • i• Llcwelltn I Thompson Ainba sador at Large Department of Stale Memorandum ro Secremy or State and others subject Indian Nuclear Weapons Capability Washington DC 30 January 1965 Subject-Numc ric File 1964-1966 Central Files oflhc Depanment or State Record Group 59 National Archives Building Washington DC • 55 ·- -· -- - - - - - - - - - - - - · - - · -·- -- ------ • Nehru·s vision oflndia and China as Asian ••sistcr•t nations cooperating in mutual economic and social development towards a non-military Great Power status fell apart with the continuing border animosities and regional political competition China's entry into the nuclear club in 1964 put them even more at odds threatening the survival of India as a nation China's bomb put lndia s national well-being and continued e dstence in jeopardy and in many political eyes demanded the deterrence of an Indian bomb Thus national survival provided yet another purely political motivation to seek a nuclear weapons capability Mahatma Gandhi an icon of nonviolence and peaceful resistance became India's representative of a singular moral approach to the world which led directly to Nehru's initial disavowal of nuclear weapons as a proper path for India's international affairs • Contemporary critics reinforced that tradition in the early I 960s by contending th t the nation could ill afford to base its national security solely on the international environment and on the bomb without due consideration on domestic and traditional moral strength 109 While Nehru and Dr Bhabha successfully changed lndia·s course from purely economic development to first the potential for a nuclear weapon then to actually achieving it the moral tradition as a negali'11e motivator has remained as one of the interacting motivators that could resurface in the future Overall India has been guided by economic motivators toward the bomb with a heavy layer of reinforcing and guiding political motivators both positive and negative since independence in the 1940s • 1 1 ' Pcrko ·ich 73-76 56 • MILITARY MOT1VATIONS In lndia purely military motivations took last place in order of precedence in the development of its first nuclear device It was not until the crisis or China ·s bomb in 1964 that military considerations achic 'ed a significant level of imponance in national nuclear planning Nevertheless India has had some longstanding advocates of at least potential weaponization as a military deterrent against external aggression For example before his accession to be Defense Minister during India's 1974 nuclear test K C Pant gave a public speech in 1965 advocating the acquisition of nuclear weapons and favoring nuclear weapons for military and strategic purposes He argued developing peaceful nuclear explosives was tantamount to a bomb but involved lower risk and cost · • 110 Using the accepted smokescreen he stated that the subsequent 1974 test was nol military in nature but merely a demonstration of Indian capabilities as Nehru said in 1958 if it chose to build a bomb Military leaders however were constrained from making public comments about the nuclear program because the military was insulated from a role in the nuclear decisionmaking process in the l 950s and I960s Even retired General K Sundarji former Army Chief of Stan who was an advocate of nuclear weapons as a deterrent felt reluctant to declare his opinions openly even as late as 1981 when he was Commandant of the Army's College of Combat 111 Only in retirement could he comment that he saw the use of nuclear preparedness as a bulwark against •·uny ill-conceived U S • 110 Perkovich 495 111 Pi rkuvic h 230- 23 I 57 • plan of pressuring or bullying India or the region'' 112 and that The really big secret is that l11dia has no coherent nuclear weapon policy and worse docs not even have an institutionalized system for analyzing and throwing up policy options in this regard 113 Such commentary reveals the subordinate statu of the military in the nuclear decisionmaking process and the minor role of purely military motivations in national nuclear policy Overall purely military motivations played a small role in India's decision to go nuclear putting India in a category separate fro vinually every other proliferant nation Military factors were consistently subordinated to political and especially economic considerations from the very begiMing of the nuclear calculus beginning with Nehru's economic vision in the 1940s • DYNAMIC INTERACTION OF MOTIVATIONS Every nation seeking to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities experiences a mixture of motivations Although one may predominate as the agent of catalyst -typically a national security factor except in India -- others appear almost simultaneously or soon after to reinforce the initial motivator Because of the multiple milestones that every proliferant nation must confront there are multiple decision points for proceeding 111 ··Fonner Army Chief on Aggressive Nuclear Policy tc xl Delhi Patriot 26 September 1992 5 FBIS D01 v RepcJr1•Ne11r £un 011d South Asia 14 October 1992 FBIS-NES-92-199 47 • Ill K Sundarji Blind Men c fHindo stcm lnda-Pulcistom N11dear War New Delhi Sourh Asia Books 1993 xiv General Ret Ktishnaswarmi Sundarji 1928-1999 educated the tradition-bound Indian Anny about the consequences of nuclear weapons For comments on Blind Men as a historical fiction account ot'his experiences see Warrior as Scholar Obituary India Today homepage 22 February 1999 URL hllp f 'ww - india-roday com iloday 22021999fobit html Accessed 21 June 2000 58 ---- ---- ·-- - ·- -- ·--- - • At each milestone a mixture of motivations anects the decision interacting with each other each with its own constituency of supporters and players In India economic factors played a key role in thi fmmative slages of the national nuclear eITort guided by Nehru's vision of an economically developed nuclear-powered India Political factors especially India's self-image and its role in the region and the world began to take on greater significance Indeed political considerations increased because of the availability of nuclear technology and assistance from the United States and other western nations under the Baruch Plan and the Atoms for Peace program in the late I940s and 1950s India rebelled as much against its implied subordination as a ' have-not nation seeking handouts from the haves'' as it did against Britain in its path to political independence A truly politically independent India already in the process of economic l_Jlodernization • would significantly benefit from an independent non-safeguarded nuclear weapons capability even if never actually weaponized The mere potential would reflect favorably on the nation's political status in Asia and the world In India's case purely military motivations came last The border clashes 'ith China in the early 1960s created national antagonisms that began to unravel Nehru's other vision of the two neighboring ' sisters cooperating in each other's maturation as newly independent countries But it was China's detonation of a nuc Iear device in 1964 that set up the political and subordinate military motivations for India itself to go nuclear ten years later Military factors pla ·ed a critical role in the mid• Lo late I 960s and early I 970s separated by a generation from Nehru· s original economic vision but reinforcing a subse_ luent Nehru initiative toward nuclear indcpendencl and a nuclear weapons capability totally in • isolation from an immediate external military threat 59 • CO - iCLUSION The nuclear decision policymakers of India tacitly permitted the development of an S T foundation ror a nuclear weapon option as it was perceived as an internationally accepted symbol of power In addition its nuclear weapon option became a valuable - means of securing domestically imponant goals albeit not _ ithout risk India's complex history see Table 4 included economic motivations for modernization and multiple moti 'ations for self-sufficiency and self-reliance through its nuclear option Though India remains temporarily frustrated in its quest for enhanced state status by the United States and rhe United Nations the study oflndia s motivations demands reconsideration of a traditional security framework analysis in favor of multi-motivational analysis • • through a bottom-up country-specific approach 60 - ----- • I --i 1· r Fr c N cl C pcr iion Agrecmeni l Eco · S T ·P I _ -95 ······jl_ a l n e u - ap a 1 i_ ·- · P 1 1953 1 Atoms or Peace _ -· _j Ec on S T Pol 1 1954 Create Atomic Energy Establishment Trombay Econ S T 7 -1958 ·1 Bhabha s Lo g•tC T e tage r_1an ' -- ····· -· - J_ I ·e • ' f f 1 I I 9 _J A sara Re s rch cact g tiati o n _ J 1 c cs n _J 1955-19 J anadal CI - act re __ ·· ·· l Pol 5con T 9 e ' - IR -· L - _ ·-- 1 ' L _ 1 9 5 6 4 Ail a p sa ra R- e-s ea rc h e-a ct or C r it i£ 1_ f- ir st i -- i aa -· ·l · - i a ii C_ - c s T i P o l -ll -··- - S f _ _Co _f f C nJ S t t eguards j • P c _oJ TJ ir I I L J lL f f 1 N l V_J ' 19 Tl V rQ IL_ JL_ JT ro r nb_aY Pl t ni C p cs ing aci ty Pia • --·-····-·-J -·•··-• Mi c Mix _P J Mil Ec_ n P L __ 1 9 J_cq r_ TI Na__nj t ea s_i g pl '- J 1960 JL IJW cror S d l -_ _u -_Q c isi Y t '- --1 l i l e t e elli PRC l d_i fli t 1 _J L J§ _ Y §_ T _P r o t t E • af g t n 11 _ _4_ i J ll Y P - i ' p ssing i l_Y _ ctiv_ _ l M ---·-· 1964-t966J hal g l _f Ad n istr lio 1 1 CNc r - Jl l stri ha _ Pol Econ S T j 1964 Nu lear Weapon T st • ii ol Eco lJ l 1 J J P f ll ' ing l Jlr uc d t r tl e if l 1 im ··· 9 - --- _H f_a i ' iti a' 1 u r si - _ __ Mil Pol 8 _I T N g l i i 911 P_ l• J co _tS J __ _J 1971 fil • UN S it1 ' ncil_Pcrma 1en1 _Member J Pol Mil 1971 angl pesh Crisis P I i_l _ 1974 lPeac fu 1Nuclear Explo ion JI Pol Econ S T l L ' i J Table 4 Key Indian Nuclear Decision Milestones and Motivations Source Author created • I 61 J • CHAPTERS IMPLICATIONS OF INDIA'S DECISIONS Going nuclear is scientifically feasible politically highly desirable strategically inescapable and economically not only sustainable but actually advantageous Indian Parliamentary and Scientific Committee 17 May 1970 It is clear from this study that India has operated under a complex-combination of motivations in its efforts to acquire nuclear capabiHties for commercial nuclear power • and then for a nuclear weapon and that India does not fit the motivational pattern ascribed to proliferant nations For India economic factors preceded political and purely military ones Since 1974 Nehru and Bhabha's decisions have continued to play a major role in Indian strategic thinking But because a democratic India has openly declared its nuclear status and formally embraced it as part of the coalition government policy the likelihood of its stepping back from such an option is significantly diminished U S nonproliferation and cuuntcrproliferation policy must approach India with those key factors well in consideration • 62 • INDIA'S PROSPECTS Despite modernization efforts and much-heralded international globalization the character of India remains domestically troubled complex and diffuse lt is a multicultural multilingual multi caste and multi-faith society however these domestic issues did not significantly interfere with nuclear weapons development although burgeoning domestic issues arc likely to figure more heavily in future political and security considerations They will play heavily on India's self-image its perception of security aniculation of its national interests and domestic and foreign polic '· The evolution of nuclear and information technology on the subcontinent is likely to be more internationally influential than merely a domestic panacea Domestic • improvements tempered by modest advances in countrywide communications and restricted infrastructure development are compounded by India's high illiteracy rate These realities igniticantly limit the input of India's population in its govemment's decisions but have the potential to erode public support for the legitimacy of state policies In addition such insulated political manipulation of nuclear processes tends to diminish the role of India's conventional military in national security The military continues in its historical exclusion from the nuclear decision process In light of the extensive efforts directed against countries like Iraq Iran and North Korea the question is not how many states support such efforts but what those collective states are willing and able to do about the few states that oppose or circumvent nonproliferation This has direct implications for India The vast difficulties that the • United States and its allies have had in dismantling Iraq's nuclear weapons program does 63 • not bode well for similar coun1erprolifcration efforts against other newly emergent nuclear states Such preventative diplomacy approach is not always successful and is in some cases disadvantageous lo everyone involved India's perception of U S policy is that it is an attempt to persuade both India to voluntarily give up nuclear weapons Some international policy analysts now criticize the premise Richard Haass of the Brookings Institute contends These countries are not about to get out of the nuclear business The idea of roll-back the idea of turning back the clock - choose your image- is not on 1 ' Moth·ations Leverage and the 1998 Nuclear Tests On 6 June 1998 the United Nations contended that the international regime on the • non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be maintained and that neither India nor Pakistan would be accorded the status of nuclear powers under the terms of the NPT The UN condemned the tests calling ·•upon India and Pakistan immediately to stop their nuclear weapon development programs to refrain from weaponization or from the deployment of nuclear weapons land to cease development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear eapons and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons '' 11 As for the UN enforcement capabilities neither country complied However France did recognize India as a nuclear power 111 Scientists Wam of Advancements in Pakistani Nuclear Program CNN 16· March 2000 URL hnp www cnn com 2000 ASIANOW southi03115 pakistan nukcs OI Accessed I April 2000 • 11 United Nations Securitv Council Resolution 1172 I 998 6 June I 998 URL hnp - ww un org Docs scn s l998 srcsl 172 htm Accc ed I July 2000 • Indian and U S relations remain historically troubled Early tensions are often associated with historical U S support and development of a mil itarizcd Pakistan and India's association with Russia during the Cold War India's insistence on open declaration of nuclear status also runs contrary 10 l S nonproliferation policy Still India's complaints on China·s support for the Pakistani nuclear program have met with comparatively little U S condemnation much to lndia•s dismay and anger lnde d there is a considerable push to engage communist China economically Overall Indian and U S relations remain the result of dissimilar national interests India a nonaligned but not neutral nation sets its policy through its own political decisions and priorities Whatever India's perceived place in the world is and how India chooses to attain it has typically met with only U S disinterest or disdain Broader historical and geographic • perspectives and priorities in the international system and order national interests have historically taken precedence 0 'er Indian and subcontinent issues India' s potential to change necessarily requires outside the bureaucracy thought and assistance as envisioned in its stalled National Security Council Its place in the international hierarchy is tempered by its penchant for independence of action and much publicized corrosive enmity with Pakistan While the Kashmir conflict simmering since 1947 remains a hurdle in diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan it is more a political issue rather than solely a military on • 65 ·• STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA India recognizes China as a likely permanent preoccupation At present Pakistan receives nuclear support from China brokered as an instrument of its foreign policy and China counter-balances the elTecl of Soviet support to India Still closer economic and political relations between the two Asian giants India and China are not unthinkable India remains too embroiled over Pakistan's role in the Kashmir frontier issue to seek direct resolution with Pakistan Potentially China's nuclear supply influence could serve to moderate Pakistan on its mHitary support to the Kashmir crisis or joint economic interests could bring India and China closer As a current alternative India has made recent progress in establishing a cease-fire wilh at least one of the independent factions in • the Kashmir fighting 11 1 But India s world standing is not solely a matter or confrontation or cooperation with China or Pakistan India's long drive for self-sufficiency and pretense at selfrcliance as well as its nuclear option and subsc quent nuclear weapons program is a result ofintentional international collaboration India's position in the international hierarchy will likely be determined in the same manner Yet India remains intent on achieving its goals with nuclear weapons despite the French Bridsh and Soviet examples of diminished world power in spite of nuclear weapons In that light first and foremost India seeks to be a respected player not only in its own subcontinent region but also internationally in matters affecting the region India's • ··rndia Blames Pakis1an for Killings 71 e New fork T me 6 Augus1 2000 The New York Tinte r homepage URL hrtp· www nytimcs comfaponlinefil A P•lndia-Kashmir htmr Accessed 6 August 2000 66 •· early domestic issues namely economic and military limitations dominated its early efforts at self-sufficiency India sought domestic influence over its own destiny with much foreign financial and material assistance and then sought deterrence over outside influences affecting its freedom of action India saw nuclear power as a radical solution for alleviating abject poverty t and after independence it embarked on a risky international collaboration program for electricity production through then largely unproven nuclear reactor technology The risks of such a program included an inherent nuclear weapons option seen even then as the ultimate S T symbol of power Certainly even today India remains only a potential international influence in spite ofits nuclear weapons active space program and growing software industry all a result of international collaboration • International Collaboration India's nuclear option as well as any standing in the international hierarchy is a result of international collaboration Collaboration between India and the United States is often frustrated by nuclear weapons p iq differences steeped in democratic ideals rhetoric Any argument over a higher moral plane of one democracy over another or actions deemed outside the notional inlernaticmal community remains largely counterproductive for two reasons One the geographically isolated and uniquely blessed United States is likely an atypical ideal lo hold any nation to Secondly India's pragmatic use of its available resources although arguably a matter of hastily drawn priorities best addresses its oY n democratic national interests Herein lies the crux of the • debate Polic v defined by political choices and influenced by the dynamic interaction of 61 • moti 'ations drives nuclear weapons not numbers legitimacy or consensus In cffecl the key to addressing such proliferation issues is through the decision-makers or regimes and their intentions not solely by restricting capabilities The lesson learned is that in spile or its much-touted sole superpower status the United States remains both unwilling and unable to eflectively address the entire spectrum of world conflict or to contain nuclear proliferation alone If the United States is to maintain its leadership and any effectiveness in nonproliferation efforts it must deliberately and tirelessly afft ct a working relationship with any or all nations involved in the process The U S insistence on its role as the representative for the notional inlernalional ·ommunily will continue to ring hollow until all countries arc equally consulted in the process Of course as seen in the United Nations it will be no easy • matter Conflict Resolution Indeed in its ironic capacily as the largest arms broker and the most vocal proponent of conOict resolution the l nited States exhibits its own chronic reliance on ambiguity as a political tool Who has the latest technology is probably the wrong question to ask It is not a technology revolution that threatens international order but the novel application of concepts For example the nuclear powers remain vulnerable to most of 1hc same domestic pressures as emerging nations However the developed nations enlrenched in heir well knm n com•enliom I srrengths are increasingly subject to asymmetric threats Despite much-heralded viclories the War 10 End All Wars World • War 11 the Cold War and the Gulf War did not mark an end to conflict Certainly 6S ·-··-- • motivations to acquire technological weapons of prestige and nuclear proliferation remain potent forces In practice because of demonstrated conventional superiority countries now look to asymmetric weapons to counter dominant actors' conventional superiority Indeed the term security itself remains relatively obscure and certainly outside the realm and influence of military forces alone Pakistan·s suppon and involvement in the Kashmir secessionist movement and border conflict is likely the largest factor contributing to the border instability with India Indeed while lndia argues that conflict resolution is a bilateral concern with no role for the United States it continues to make efforts to address individual factions and negotiate individual cease-fires This is in part due to the fact that no effective international or UN mechanism for conflict resolution • was or is currently available The Momentum of Technology This study highlights the issue of the momentum of technology reflected in nuclear proliteration India benefiting by ext nsive international collaboralion established a nuclear weapons foundation that served to question and then challenge the beleaguered nuclear sta110· quo eslablishtd and extended by the NPT The precedent it set in 1974 involved a historically persistent S T industry with the tacit approval of the Prime Minister It unsuccessfully sought a shortcut to its rise to Great Power status Such early projected economic development through a commercial power program involved a likely inevitable nuclear weapons program thal was considerably enhanced • even advocated by parallel international advances in technology 69 • In retrospect the inevitable and much desired momentum of nuclear weapons development was evident from their first use The New York Times 1 August 1945 reported the dropping of the first milital ' atomic weapon over Hiroshima According to President Truman In their present form these bombs arc now in production and even more powerful forms are in development What has been done is the greatest achie 'emenf of organized science in history 17 In light of India's 1974 experimenl the 1998 tests could be analyzed as a logical albeit delayed consequence oft he momentum of technology India's motivations to continue to use that momentum to achieve its own economic goals are more instructive than solely a summary ofits nuclear capabilities Given India's considerable difficulties and inefficiencies with nuclear power production its overall nuclear power and weapons • programs could arguably be viewed as less than un economic or technological success According to Anumukti an Indian anti-nuclear journal India's proclaimed S T nuclear prowess is arguable at best The 1998 nuclear tests actually shows the level of scientific illiteracy in the country that ii takes such pride in an achievement of repeating an experiment first done five decades ago clsewhcre '·11 •P ·'First Atomic Bomb Dropped on Japan Missile is Equal 10 20 000 Tons oCTNT Truman Wams Foe or·Rain or Ruin' '' Tire l 'ew Yor t Timrs 1 August 1945 Late City Edirion I 11 • • Anumukti Liberation from the Atom homepiJge URL ht1p i membcrs 1ripod com -no_nukes_sa nnumukli hlml Acce sstd 2 July 2000 The journal was cstc1blishcd in I 987 70 • CONCLUSIO India's dynamic interaction of motivations including the economic motivations for the modernization of the nation and for acquiring its nuclear weapons option is a significant study The complex interrelationship of economic political cultural moral S T and military considerations led India out of colonial independence ihrough its production and testing ofa peaceful nuclear device in 1974 While both events are often identified as seminal happenings in tndia·s history such analysis does not capture the decades-old essence of India challenging the nuclear starus quo established and maintained by the original members of the nuclear club The many different communities ofinterest -- political officials S T and defense industries leaders and • • military officers -- each with its own constituency of supporters has created a dynamic interaction of motivations that remains unique to India 71 BIBLIOGR PHY Abraham luy The tlcrking of the Indian Atomic Bomb Sc ience Se ·recy and the Postc11lonial State London Zed Books 1998 ·•After the Tests India and Pakistan Update Bulletin ofAtomic Sc -ienlists 54 no 5 September October 1998 Bulletin of Atomic Scientists homepage URL http i www bullatomsci org issucs nukenotes so98nukenote html Accessed 2 t May 2000 Anderson Robert S Building Scientific n$titutions in India Saha and Bhabha Occasional paper no 11 Montreal Canada Center for Developing Area Studies McGill University 1975 Anumukti Liberation from the Atom homepage URL c http membcrs tripod com -no_nukcs_sa anumukti html Accessed 2 July 2000 Bajpai Kanti P P R Chari Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema Stephen P Cohen and Sumit Ganguly Brasstaclcs and Beyond Percepti Jn and Management Crisis in South Asia New Delhi Manohar Publishers 1995 Battle Joyce ''India and Pakistan - On the Nuclear 'lbreshold · National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book no 6 URL http v -ww gvv1 1 cdul nsarchiv NSAEBB 'NSAEBB6 index hlml Accessed 10 November 1999 Bhabha Atomic Research Center homepage URL http www barc emct in bare index html Accessed 16 December 1999 Bhabha Homi J Telegram to C S Chairman AEC 23 October 1964 Quoted in State Department telegram 25 l ovember 1964 Subject-Numeric File t 964-1966 Central Files of the Department of State Record Group 59 National Archives Building Washington DC Bhatia Shyam India 'l· Nuclear Bamb Gha7 iabad India Vikas Publishing House 1979 The Bwgraphical Dictionar ro Scientisl 'i 2d ed Ed Roy Porter New York Oxford University Press 1994 Bracken Paul The Second l uclear Age · Foreign 1 Tairs 19 no I January February 2000 146- t 56 Butler Richard Bewitched Bolhered and Bewildered Repairing the Security Council Foreign Alfuir 'i 18 no 5 September October I999 9-12 72 • _ _ _ Joint State USIA ACDA DoD Message subject no title Guidance for Public Posture 27 October 1966 2 Subject-Numeric File 1964-1966 Central Files of the Department of State Record Group 59 National Archives Building Washington DC Desutter Paula Denial and Jeopardy Deterring Iranian Use of NBC Weapons Online edi_tion Washington DC National Defense University Press September 1997 URL h11p www ndu edu inss books dajd cont h1ml Accessed 30 July 2000 Dicken Brad •·congress Back Then The Confinnation Confrontation 19 June 1997 URL http www intellcctualcapital com issues issuc93 item23 I 1 asp Accessed 12 June 2000 The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile India 4th Quarter 1 99 London The Economist Intelligence Unit 1999 Eisenhower Library and Museum homepage URL http www cisenhowcr utcxas edu main htm Accessed 5 June 2000 • _ _ _ Atoms for Peace URL http v 'V' 'W eisenhower utexas edu atom7 htm Accessed S June 2000 Eisenhower Susan Mrs Ike Memorie ' and RejlectitJns on the life ofMamie Eisenhower New York Farrar Straus and Giroux 1996 Eliasson Laurie S • Major USAFR The lsl mk Bomb Pakistan's Motivations in il f Quest for u Nudear Weapons Option MSSl Thesis Washington DC Joint Military lntelligencc College• ugust 1996 Energy 999 Shortage Glut or Enough Ed Cornelia Blair Wylie Texas Information Plus 1999 first Atomic Bomb Dropped on Japan Missile is Equal to 20 000 Tons of TNT Truman Warns Foe of ·Rain of Ruin· · The f ew York Times 7 August 194S Late City Edition I ·'Former Anny Chief on Aggressive Nuclear Policy text Delhi Patriot 26 September 1992 5 FBIS Daily Report-Near East and South Asia 14 October 1992 FBISNES-92· 199 47 Frankel Francine R lndit1 ' · Political J concJmy 9 i - 977 Princeton J cw Jersey Princeton University Press 1978 • Gandhi Indira India an l the World Foreign Affairs SI no I Oc1ober 1972 65-77 74 • Genz Bill •·Clinton's Veto Blocks Sanctions on Russia The Wc hinglon Times 24 June 1998 Al Goldschmidt Benrand •The Atomic Cumplex 4 World-widf Politit al History of Nucleal' Energy La Grange Park Illinois The American Nuclear Society 1982 Gupta Hari Ram India-Pakistan Weir 1965 vol I Delhi Hariyana P akashan 1967 Haass Richard What to Do With American Primacy • Fvreign Affairs 78 no 5 September October 1999 37-49 India and the Bomb Public Opinion and Nuclear Options Eds David Cortright and Amilabh Mattoo Notre Dame Indiana University ofNotre Dame Press 1996 India Blames Pakistan for Killings '' The New York Times 6 August 2000 The New York Times homepage URL c hup www nytimes com aponlinc i AP-IndiaKashmir html Accessed 6 August 2000 India ·s Nuclear Deterrent Pofchran II and Beyond Ed Amitabh auoo New Delhi Har-Anand Publications 1999 • International Atomic Energy Agency Power Reactor lnfonnation System PRIS homepage URL hUp www iaea org programmes a2 Accessed 13 June 2000 International Safeguards and the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy lnlernational Atomic Energy Agency homepage URL htlp 1 'WW iaca org worldatoml inforesourcc factsheets safeguards html Accessed 21 July 2000 Jain B M India's De fence and Sec urily lntra-rcgiunal Dim nsiun Jaipur India Ina Shrec Publishers J998 Jain J P Nuclear India vol 2 New Delhi Radiant 1974 Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches vol I September 1946 - May 1949 Delhi Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 1949 Jawahurlal Nehru's Speeches vol 3 September 1953 • August 1957 Delhi Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 1958 Jawahar ul Nehru · Speeches vol 4 September 1957 - April 1963 New Delhi Publications Division Government of India 1964 • Jha C S Thi Non-Proliferation Debate Relevance oflndia·s Stand The Times of India 22 February 1978 4 15 • Joint Chiefs of Stafl Memorandum to Secretary of Defense subject The Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem Security Aspects U 4 January 1967 Source Subject-Numeric File l 967-1969 Central File of Department of State Record Group 59 National Archives Building Washington DC Kaplan Robert D ··The Coming Anarchy '' The Al antic Monthly February 1994 Adancic Unbound homepage l JRL http wv w thcallantic com politics foreign anarchy htm Accessed 21 May 2000 Kapur Ashok India ·s Nuclear Option Ammie Diplomacy and Decisitm Making New York Praeger Publishers 1976 Karon Tony Why India and t S Agf' c to Disagree Over Nukes CNN 21 Mar 2000 URL http w l w cnn com 2000 ASlANOW south 03 21 india3_2t a tm index html Accessed I April 2000 Kissinger Henry Diplc macy New York Simon nnd Schuster 1994 Koch Andrew The U S Must Lead By Example CNN URL http www cnn com SPECJ ALS 1998 06 ground zero opinion Accessed 13 J u e 2000 • Kux DeMis lndiu and the United S Clte fatranged Democrc cies Washington DC National Defense University Press 1992 Limaye Satu P U S - Indian Relations The Pu -suit o fAccommodation Boulder Colorado Westview Press 1993 Lippman 1· W •Russia to Sell India 2 Reactors Drawing Criticism from U S The Washingwn Pust 23 June 1998 A14 Main Events of the Eisenhower Presidency 1953-1961 Eisenhower Center homepage URL http history cc ukans edu hcritagc abilenc ikectr html Accessed IS June 2000 Mansingh Surjit India 'i Searc h fur Power Indira Gandhi ·s F Jreign Polic y 9661981 New Delhi Sage Publications 1984 1 Maxwell Neville China' s Aggression in 1962 ' and the Hindu Bomb World Policy Journal 16 no 2 Summer 1999 111-118 Mirchandani G 0 India's Vucleur Dilemma New Delhi Popular Book Service1 1968 • Narayanan Shri K R President oflndia Conversation with N Ram on All India Radio New Delhir 14 August 1998 Text Parliamenl of India homepage URL http parliamcntofindia nic in rb nram htm Accessed 21 June 2000 76 • _ _ _ Speech presented at the Inauguration of the Birth Centenary Celebrations of Dr K S Krishnan Bangalore India 28 July Text Parliament oflndia homepage URL http parJiamentofindia nic in Accessed I June 2000 National Defense University lnstitule tbr National Strate ic Studies Strategic A fsessment 1999 Priorities or a Turh11 e111 World Washington DC GPO 1999 Nehru The FirJ· 60 Years vol 2 Ed Dorothy Newman New York John Day 1965 Notable Twentieth-Centu yScientisls vol I Ed Emily J cMurray New York International Thomson Publishing Company 1995 Nuclear Engineering International World Nuclet1r Industry Handbook 996 London Recd Business Publishing 1995 ·•Nuclear Power Plant Information IAEA Power Reactor Information System PRIS homepage URL http www iac a or at programmcs a2 Accessed 13 June 2000 Nudcar Share or Electricity Generation · International Datafile IA EA Bulletin 42 no I January 2000 58 • Office of the Secretary of Defense Pro f eration· Threat and Response Washington1 DC GPO 1997 Paschall Joseph F Major USMC Peacekeeping Is It Working MSSI Thesis Washington DC Joint Military Intelligence College September 2000 Perkovich George bfdia 's Nudear Bomb The Impact on Global Proliferation ' Berkeley California University of California Press 1999 Perlez Jane U S and India Trying to Reconcile Hit Bump The New -York Times 22 March 2000 Final Ed A I Plutonium Production '' federation or American Scientists homepage URL w w fas org nuke intro nuke plutonium htm Accessed 21 June 2000 Ramarnurthy 1 K S Commentary Lists Accomplishments of Indian •Missile Man'•· text BK301 l l l 5397 Delhi All India Radio l OIO GMT 30 November 1997 FBIS Doily ReporJ - South Asia 30 November 1997 FBIS-TAC-97-334 8 • Rane om House Webster's Dit titmctry ofSci mtisls Ed Sara Jenkins-Jones New York Random House 1997 77 • Rashid Ahmed and Sadanand Dhume Dangerous Game Far Eastern Ecoru mic Review 162 no 23 IO June 1999 18-20 Rhodes Tom ·'Senators Outraged by 'Colossal Failurl ' of CIA to Give Warning ' The Londnn Times 14 May 1998 17 • Ritter Scott Endgame Solving 1he lmq Problem - Once andfor All New York Simon and Schuster 1999 Robinette Ronald A SC USNR Malaysia lndone Tiu and rhe Nuclear Weapons Option A Swdy in MotivatianJ· MSSI Thesis Washington DC Joint Military Intelligence College August 2000 •• I _ _ ____ Colonel USAFR Rel Associate Dean for College Partl __ _ _ Time Programs Joint Military Intelligence College Washington DC and former b 3 10 USC 2 senior analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency Interview by the author 27 July 2000 Rusk Dean Secretary of State ·•Possible Indian Nuclear Weapons Development Department Cable to American Embassy New Delhi 29 March 1966 SubjectNumeric File 1964-1966 Central Files of the Department of State Record Group 59 National Archives _Washington DC • _ _ _ Secretary of Stale Telegram to Governor Harriman Washington DC 27 February I965 Subject Numeric File I 964-1966 Central Files of the Department of State Record Group 59 National Archives Washington DC Scientists Warn of Advancements in Pakistani Nuclear Program CNN 16 March 2000 URL http ww v cnn com 2000 ASIANOW south 03 I 5 pakistan nukes O I Accessed I April 2000 Scoblic J Peter •1The Lessons and I egacy of UNSCOM An Interview with Ambassador Richard Butlcr t' Arms Control Today 29 no 4 June 1999 3-9 Secure World ' W Alton Jones Foundation homepage URL http www wajones org programslsecure Accessed 21 May 2000 Selected Indian Nuclear Facilities July 1999 Center for Nonproliferation Studies homepage lJRL http cns miis edu research india nuclear htm Accessed 12 June 2000 • Seshagiri N The Bomb Falloul qf ndia - Nuc C ar Ex J usion New Delhi Vikas Publishing House 1975 Sharma Dhirendra India's Nuclem· Eswte New Delhi Lancers Publishers 1983 78 • Sidhu Waheguru Pal Singh Enhancing Jndo-U S Strategic Cooperation London Ox ford University Press 1997 _ _ _ India's Nuclear Tests Technical and Military lmperativcs Jane's Intelligence Review 8 no 4 April 1996 170-173 Singh Jaswant Defending India New York St Martin's Press 1999 Sixth NPT Review Conference '' NPT 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty 011 the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons IAEA homepage URL http www iaea org worldatom Prcss EvcntslNpt npt-2000 shtml Accessed 30 July 2000 Smith Dr Chris Securiry and Stahilily in South Asia Coulsdon UK Sentinel House 1996 Spector Leonard S and Jacqueline R Smith A'ucleur Ambitions The Spread of Nuclear ·weupon i Boulder Colorado Westview Press 1990 Spiers Edward M W mpc n · lass Destruction Prtnpt cts for Proli ferCltion New York St Martin's Press 2000 • Statute of the Jntemalional Atomic Energy Agency lAEA homepage URL http www iaca org worldatom glancc profile slatute html Accessed l OJune 2000 Sundarji K General Ret Army Chief of Staff 1986-1988 Leashing the Nuclear enace '' Foreign Ser iice Journal 69 June 1992 3S-37 _ _ _ Blind Men ofHindooswn Indio-Pakistani Nuc lear War New Delhi UBS Publishers' Distributors I993 _ _ _ OfSome Consequence A Soldier Remembers ' New Delhi Harper Collins Publishers India 2000 Wars of the Near futun To Fight a New-Style Enemy •Jntbrmation' Weapons Asic week 9 January 1998 73 _ _ _• 0 Swami Parthasarathi ''Flirting with Trouble CNN 20 March 2000 URL http v -ww con com AS lANO W time magazine 2000 0320 india viewpoint html Accessed I April 2000 Taipei Economic and Cultural Office New York homepage URL http www taipei org un q3 htm Accessed 2 June 2000 • 79 • Talbott Strobe Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia '· Foreign fairs 78 no 2 March April 1999 110-122 Tenet George J 'The Worldwide Threat in 2000 Global Realities of Our National Security Director Central Intelligence statement before the Senate Select Committee on lnlelligcncc 2 February 2000 Text URL http www cia gov cia publicaffairs speechesldcispecch_020200 html Accessed 15 May 2000 Thompson Llewellyn E • Ambassador al Large Department ofSlate Memorandum to Secretary of State and others subject Indian Nuclear Weapons Capability Washington DC 30 January 1965 Subject-Numeric File 1964-1966 Central Files of the Department of State Record Group 59 National Archives Building Washington DC Tracking Nuclear Proliferation A Guide in Maps and Charts 998 Eds Rodney W Jones and Mark G McDonough Washington DC Brookings Institution Press 1998 l nited Nations Current Peacekeeping Operations United Nations homepage URL http i www un org Oepts DPKO Missionslunmogip body_unmogip htrn Accessed l July 2000 • _ _ _ Population Division Department of Economic and Social Affairs Revision ofthe World Pnpulanon Estimates and ProjectionJ· United Nations homepage URL http w -1 v popin org pop1998 Accessed I 3 June 2000 _ _ _ Resolution 2758 People s Republic of China Mission to the L nited Nations homepage URL http www undp org missions china Accessed 11 June 2000 _ _ _ Security Council Resolution 1172 1998 6 June 1998 URL http lwww un org Docs scres l 998 sresl 172 htm Accessed l July 2000 U S Congress Final Topical index lo Senate Record Votes Defense Stinger Mfa·sile Restrictions 99th Cong • 2nd scss 7 May 1986 URL http www senalc gov rpc rva 992 index htm Accessed l3 June 2000 _ _ _ Office of Technology Assessment Nuc u r Proliferation and Safeguards Washington DC GPO 1977 ___ omce of Technology Assessment Prul feratiun o_l Weapons o fMass DeJ·truction As iressing he Risks Washington DC GPO 1993 • _ _ _ Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Niu leur Proliferation Fac1book 103rd Cong • 2nd sess December 1994 S Doc 103-111 1995 80