DECLASSIFIED I 1J j t ' ·· ·i q5 SECRET NORAD CONAD ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• u• • HISTORICAL SUMMARY Unclassified Declassified by BG Richard W Scobee N J3 Director of Operations HQ NORAD Declassified on December 12 2012 JANUARY-DECEMBER 196iJ Classified by Review ovp 1_ _ _ _ Mul t ipl e Sources 1 December 1 986 SECRET ____ o o aoc • _ __ c IDECLASSIFIEDI SECRET IDECLASSIFIED I WI• be assigned res ponsibility for operat ing the system -f6 However early in October 1966 NORAD learned that DOD had deferred $13 2 million in 440L production funds It was expected t hat this action would delay the initial operation of the sys tem one year USAF was planning to objec t to this fund deferral --fS7- In the meantime on 11 July 1966 NORAD sent its disp lay requirements for 44OL to ADC NORAD asked ADC to start action on t he requirements and to keep i t informed of plans and schedules DOD SPACE DETECTION SURVEILLANCE TRACKING AND DATA PROCESSING STUDY BACKGROUND U In July 1964 the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed an ad hoc group known as the Detection and Tracking of Satellites DATOS Study Group to make a study of all current and programmed D D space detection surveillance tracking and data processing equipment The study was made to recommend ways to reduce c onsolidate and allocate resources and organize space systems so t hey wou ld operate as a coordinated prog ram ts - NORAD contributed to the study by g iving a description of SPADATS equipment and operation and the latest requirements for improving the system Also NORAD updated its April 1961 r e quirement document for an improved SPADATS and sent it to the JCS in J a nuary 1965 The JCS wanted t o include this new document NQR 2-65 in thei r report to the study group -f8' NORAD pointe d out to the JCS in the l e tter a ccompanying the NQR that t here was one major deficiency in the system The system lacked the ability to give space threat and situation warning before the first pass of a foreign s pace- 77 SECRET jDECLASSIFIEDI SECRET bl ············ ··············· ················ ·· ············ ·· IDECLASSIFIEDI · ···· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ······················· craft over all unified or specified command areas NORAD said the implications of this requirement were particularly far-reaching in terms of surveillance coverage -fS7- The JCS supported with minor changes NORAD's requirement The JCS told OSD that foreign space activity was a limited but g rowing threat that must be watched carefully Therefore they supported NORAD's mission of space surveillance and recommended approving the NQR for p l anning purposes They also recommended that priority research and development effort be given to determining the mission of foreign space objects Howe ver they felt that tracking a foreign space object and f i nding out its mission before it passed over a SPADATS user's area was a long range objective rather than a near-term requirement S Based on a recommendation in the DATOS Report published in March 1965 the Deputy Secretary of Defense disapproved NQR 2 - 65 on 5 May 1965 and recommended to the JCS that the NQR be revised Also be asked the JCS to review NORAD 's mission regarding deep space probes He felt that poss ibly NORAD might be -relieved of the re s p ons ibility to detect and track deep space probes ts t On 4 June 1965 the JCS said the NQR would be se nt back to NORAD for revisjon after specific differences over it were settled between the JCS and OSD Also the JCS upheld NORAD 's mission regarding deep space probes They sai d there was an insufficient military requirement for data on these objects at the present time to i ustify buying special equipment However the JCS believed that justification mi g ht deve l op and under those c i rcumstances they said that CINCNORAD should control the operation of the special se nsors The JCS said they were against putting an arbitrary altitude limit on SPADATS at that time tsT On 20 Ju ly 1965 the Deputy Secretary of Defense commented on the dif feren ces between the 78 ECRET DECLASSIFIED I SECRET DECLASSIFIED Wl• JCS and OSD He felt that the issues were settled and his comments could be used to revise the NQR His comments included the following guidance 1 There was to be n o altitude limi t put on the NORAD space mission However coverage requ i rements were to be l imited to the needs of spec ific weapon systems 2 No further action would be taken by DOD on research programs and ope rat ions a imed at determining the mission of space objects until af ter a g roup studying the problem made its recommenda tions It was believed that the r e was en ough emphasis on research and de ve lopmen t in this area 3 The specific requirements for detec ting and tracking space objects s hould be c hange d Emphasis was to be placed on an adequate research and development prog ram aimed at getti ng a bette r capability qui ck l y and economical l y when it was needed - S The JCS asked NORAD on 1 1 Octob er 1965 t o revise NQR 2-65 REVISED NQR APPROVED U NORAD revised t he NQR and se nt it to the J CS on 8 April 1 966 The docume n t was rei ssued as NQR 2-66 NORAD Qual itative Requireme nt for a Space Detection and Tracking System 22 April 1966 NORAD asked the JCS to approve the NQR s o it could s e rve a s the bas is fo r f uture plans and requirements st- The new NQR put first e mphasis the same as the di sapproved NQR had on fi nding out the U For detailed SPADATS requi rements in NQR 2 - 65 see NORAD CONAD Historical Summary Jul-Dec 1964 pp 59-62 79 SECRET IDECLASSIFIEDI SECRET DECLASSIFIED I ----- ---- - - - - - - - - --- - - l• --- - - - - - - - - - ----- - mission of newly launched foreign spacecraft during the first circuit The new NQR linked mission assessment to step-by-step improvements to SPADATS as technology advanced and space activity increased U In May the JCS approved NQR 2-66 and sent it to OSD with a recommendation that it be approved for planning purposes On 4 June 1966 OSD approved it SPACE DETECTION AND TRACKING SYSTEM NQR 2-66 ts- As discussed above NORAD revised its qualitative requirement for improving the SPADAT System and reissued the document on 22 April 1966 as NQR 2-66 It was approved by the JCS in May and by OSD on 4 June 1966 This document supported NORAD's objectives as stated in NADOP 1967-1976 15 October 1965 The NADOP had pointed out the shortcomings in SPADATS The system could not detect all space objects on their first revolution and detection could vary from· a few minutes to several hours after launch Besides being inadequate for support of space defense weapons SPADATS was limited in its ability to detect de-orbiting obj ects and could not deter ine the mission of space objects --fS L To correct these limitations the NADOP had recommended deployment of appropriate sensors to detect track and determine the mission of all satellites during the first revo ution and to give observations on lunar and deep s pace vehicles It also recommended deployment of a launch detection system by the end of FY 1969 for surveillance of the Sino-Soviet land area Such a system would give early warning of Soviet launch activity alert SPADATS sensors and allow the best use of sensor data Furthermore the NADOP recommended using other sensor systems such as Nike X radars to complement and or augment SPADATS 80 SECRET DECLASSIFIED I SECRET · · · ··· · · l DECLASSIFIED ' -fS The recommendations in the NADOP noted above were supported in the basic c onsiderations in the NQR for improving SPADATS The detailed qualitative requirements subject to the limitations of technology priorities and money included 1 Altitude Coverage By 1970 capability to detect and track s pace objects should be provided by s elected optical sensors to permit obse rvation at the altitudes of synchronou s circular orbits Selected radar s ensors should provide detection and tracking to the maximum altitudes attainable with present technology and available funds Selected radar sensors should be modifi e d to provide observation of decayin g or reentering space objects down to 70 nm altitude Beyond 1970 a sate llite detection altitude and trackin g capability during the first circuit is required to prov i de accurate tracking data by selected sensors on s pa ce objects in synchronous orbits ne ar- circular orbits and in highly elliptical orbits particularly in the vicinity of the apogee where orbital changes a re likely to occur 2 Target Size Planned improvement should be directed toward a dispersed network of sensors employing t echnically feasible differing portions of the frequency s pectrum such as rada r optics and IR as well as others that may become feasible in the future In combination these sensors should provide by 1970 a s ystem capability for early de t e ction and tracking of space objects with apparent radar cross section of one squ a re me ter at ranges consistent with the a ltitude coverage required above Beyond 1970 the combined system capability should keep pace with the threat and the requirement for support of U S s pace 81 SECRET I DECLASSIFIED I SECREl ·········· IDECLASSIFIEDI ·········· ······ activities 3 Detection Probability The goal for probability of detecting a foreign spacecraft prior to its f i r st pass over the NORAD area of responsibility s hould be as near 100 per cent as possible The probability of detecting a fore ign spacec ra ft prior to completion of its first circuit may be slightly l ess unless that circuit passes over the NORAD area of responsibility By 1970 such detection probabilities should be developed for all satellites on inclinations o f 2 5 to 120 degrees Beyond 1970 the capability to achieve these detection probabilities should be expanded incremental l y to include sate ll ite inclinations from Oto 180 degrees 4 Catalog Accuracy Based on time of arrival at a point in the orbital plane and using 6 000 nm altitude as a point of reference the SPADATS catalog s h ould have enoug h accuracy to ensure that the identity of special inte rest satellites is not confused The goal for corre l ation of catalog elements with satellite observations from se lected sensors s hould be as near to 100 per cent as possible before 1970 Beyond 1970 catalog accuracies s hould keep pace with user requirements 5 Weapons Support By 1970 target position prediction accuracies one Sigma of one naut i cal mile along track ± one ha lf nautical mile cross track and one half nautical mile radially are required computed within four hours of tar get selection 82 SECRET IDECLASSIFIEDI SECRET - - - - - - -- ----- -- w 1• IDECLASSIFIEDI ------- - - ------ ---- or detection whichever is later These accuracies are required out to the maximum ranges of non-homing interceptors which may be developed Beyond 1970 target position prediction accuracies within reaction time constraints should be capable of growth consistent with t he support of space defense weapons systems 6 Space Population The projected space object population by 1970 is 5 000 The SPADAT System should b e improved to provide detection tracking and weapon support within specified accuracies in this environment by 1970 Design of the improvements should anticipate continuing growth in space activities beyond 1970 ts7 On 21 September 1966 General R J Reeves CINCNORAD in a letter to the Chairma n of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said it appeared that nearly a ll major improvements proposed by NORAD in NADOP 19671976 would be deferred or disapprove d Unless this trend is reversed General Reeves said NORAD's capabi li ties will continue to be unsatisfactory He noted that there were grave risks in almost complete reliance on s trategic retali atory forces for the defense of North America In this r egard General Reeves pointed out that since 1 January 1966 the Soviets had launched 10 space objects which SPADATS had not b e en able to detect on the first revolution He said he was convinced that the potential military threat from space mus t be recognized a nd urged the JCS to support NORAD 's objectives in the forthcoming NADOP 1969-1976 pub lis hed 1 November 1966 for improving SPADATS CANADI AN PARTICIPATION I N SPADATS f8 - Background In February 1965 Canadian Forces Headquarters told NORAD that it was making a study to assess whether there is a p l ace for a space surveillance role in the Canadian participation i n NORAD Over the past few years two Canadian 83 SECRET DECLASSIFIED I SECRET DECLASSIFIED I bl • ························································· · ·······································•• 1••·············· sensors had been giving data to SPADATS an RCAFoperated Baker-Nunn Camera at Cold Lake Alberta and the Defence Research Board's Prince Albert Radar Laboratory in Saskatchewan Canadian Forces Headquarters asked for NORAD's views on the value of these sensors to SPADATS ts t- In March 1965 NORAD assured Canadian Forces Headquarters that Canada·s sensors were valuable to SPADATS and pointed out each sensor's contributions However each sensor had its shortcomings NORAD said that data from the Canadian camera was not equal to data received from the four USAF ADC cameras Performance could be improved NORAD said by modifying the camera adding some new equipment giving personnel formal training and moving the camera about 30 miles from the Primrose Missile Range to the Canadian Station at Cold Lake Also NORAD said the lack of secure communications at Prince Albert limited the radar's participation in many projects S Besides information on these sensors Canadian Forces Headquarters wanted to know the importance of space surveillance in the current defense posture particularly the value of SPADATS in countering the threat as stated in NADOP 1966-1975 NORAD answered that the threat was an anticipated one that could materialize in 1969 The threat could be large yield nuclear warheads in orbit around the earth Hence to keep pace with the threat all new space objects had to be watched to find their characteristics and mission Also NORAD said SPADATS facilities would be needed in any countersatellite system -fS Status On 27 January 1966 Canadian Forces Headquarters told NORAD that the Defence Council had approved renovating and modifying the BakerNunn Camera and buying new equipment to bring the 84 SECRET IDECLASSIFIEDI SECRET ······· jDECLASSIFlED I _ camera up to the operating level of the USAF cameras Also Canadian Forces Headquarters said the Defence Research Board was losing interest in the Prince Albert radar and a new s tudy was being made to find out whether the Prince Albert radar should become a full time SPADATS sensor Until this study was f inished no decision would be made on relocating the camera or ge tting secure and reliable communications A visit to NORAD was proposed for members of the study group to discuss the Prince Albert radar U Members of NORAD and the study group met in early March 1966 After studying the problems involved NORAD decided that there was not enough justification to make the radar a full time SPADATS sensor The result was the Canadians decided to close the Prince Albert radar and it stopped inputs to SPADATS on 1 July 1966 Research was to continue at the site until about March 1967 -ts- In the meantime on 27 May 1966 Canadian Forces Headquarters informed NORAD of its plans to improve the Baker-Nunn Camera and its facilities In addition to updating the camera it was to be U USAF was improving its Baker-Nunn Camera system by adding an improved timing system and equipment to make on-s ite precision measurement of Baker-Nunn f ilm The new timing system would increase the prediction accuracy of a satellite's p osition in space by a factor of 20 This accuracy would be gotten by h aving two or more sites photograph a satelli te simultaneously However t he system would lose t h is accuracy if the Cold Lake c amera could not take part because the most i mport ant simultaneous observations would eome from Edwards AFB and Cold Lake 85 SECRET DECLASSIFIED I SECRET IDECLASSIFIEDI · · · · w l• moved to a better site closer to Cold Lake and put in a new building Communications were to be improved by adding voice and teletype circuits between the NORAD Space Defense Center and the camera site The Canadian camera was exchanged at McClellan AFB SMAMA for an updated one in mid-December 1966 The new camera was to be installed during January 1967 BALLISTIC MISSILE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM SITE I I TRACKING RADAR tst- One of the improvements that NORAD wanted for BMEWS was to fill the low-angle gaps for detecting missiles with re-entry angles of less than 15 degrees To fill the gap between Site I Thule and Site II Clear NORAD wanted a tracking radar at Site II To fill the gap between Site I and Site III Fylingdales NORAD wanted a radar either in Iceland or Greenland -fS-t Finally after the problem was studied and then re-studied t he Secretary of Defense approved in September 1963 a DDR E recommendation to cancel the requirement for a gap filler between sites I and III However he approved the installation of a tracker at Site II Requests for bids were sent to industry in May 1964 Specifications called for an FPS-92 radar -- an improved version of the FPS-49 - - that would in addition to filling the gap between sites I and II provide credibility and serve as a backup to the detection radars at Site II and furnish information on satellites At that time the FPS-92 was expected to be operational in mid-1966 S The Radio Corporation of America installed the radar and on l July 1966 it reached initial operational capability IOC On 15 September the radar was put in full operational capability FOC status 86 -SECRET IDECLASSIFIED I