· - I -' l I J _ J - CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP REVISED SOVIET TACTICS IN INTERNATI0 NAL AJiFAIRS 1 ORE 1 1 6 Jam Jaty 1947 31 COP'I' • NO_ __ n i l ' tr q _ l i 'ft -_ I • t i fi'lS'l Zr' ill o tt • · wJ t w f' • r · I ____ JjC 2 A4 fndiCB tions of 3 1 C'OPY 6 Januar ll 194 ' t h ns e in SovteL Mt ics 1 Tne USSR ha s apparently deeded tha t fort he time b inw more subtle Lt1 c tic sh uld be employed in lmplementinr lte ha aio oreirn 11 lG ll' ll t 11 C y pol cy r 11 mE 1 dat ea 23 July 19461 Recent d@qlopnLs H•h ca t lrl • I hit d cislon lDclllde Savlet ocnC1e ssion11 on t lvl Trieau isaue l · SC1v i et accept ance t he Danube • o-r c he ·pr-ln c ple or free mvlgat lon on · • So let rcem ' nt ln pr nci ple 1 1 1 int e t ional ir Bpect L • n or 4r r 'Bm' lr'lt n end o e lirnJ na te t ha veto 1n the work of t he c 01' t empl t w a tcmic Md d i e n t comnls aM • s _ t 1 on lncl i l l 1tiria D au bst ant l l i -ed uct on in Sov et occup 1- forces f- lmi 1 H A m or it t Y ftir isorde s mi h e Gre • ehcL J Couru 11 1 o lnv• l i front ler 1 ce reapana- ir Rt ltLXa' 1 al I froo f om£l ' eEl rtmi posll i Cm o irl 1 qwel Utf 1ori s a to L o an1r not an exprega on of veta Ar- 't'eement n ha'I srorel MiniDt 'ra' DepuLl l 'l I 11' lel t ln io l1r9 up dra Londcn before orthc Jlli ng Mcus CN Ccmfeirenc r 80d Oel ' lmly for ust l 2 Thero e a nU nbe - or eons ii raticms bot h lntema tiona Uld da ll st1c which tLppear o ha v eol' lvinced t h Kremlin of the d@s bil1 Y a i @ PQ ' 'J c re o cou rs-e ms Sf j _ lJ zrz- --J F £Ult 3 ln et'1 l tlona l ccinaideratlDM in eetimal fl om er o l mport41'1 e Dclw le - tim policy or the at er-n Pow n espet J llil' the US the rea l lm ian that a l'urtoor e p nsion er 5ov i@t control in Surope cannot b a complished by ra ce without risk or i a r t de• te t o placate t be US God t he UK in ord r- to ent Nnl e e r- ei nxL C11 or t 'rn vi lance to 111 rengttml t he hand or est em llll•ocat ea or carn illa t ory pollcy tcward be USSR and t o o'bt alfl conomic a id trr m the We11t ror sort lY needa-d n-ihal U t a tion • T ne _nenu t o t be r a i 'duer on lD h occupat cm forces WU eCC tct •e control o e So et-d milnat ed 1n urape euablisMd I a the 11' 1 1 1 extent pos ei ble l lt Iree nt t h USSR c a n arrorcl i o re-duce u present xc esa ive occupation f'or ce-s eepec aJJ y ln 1 1lew of Lh lncreaaad 111eChe ru Z5tion of t u· roopa Nchu Ucm J n l l a n forces 'Would m bener 1 1 fl J R lease ct ddit l OM l 111MpoW r II orely n ed for the So•iet lllt enal economy C3 l Alle ¥ iati on of a major cause of popular hoe till ty CCll mllll•t Pe r1 1e1 111 oecup d a re a - re local I lemem Ye been d 1 ilJ u 91 Wlil d arid -1 J C naU d by raLhle• ill Soy ieL r pi ra U0111 policies t hill c Olld uc 1 er SM t t roope a n i 1 he burdl Jl of subals Utli' t hese U OOPG LOW6t'd t ll r 4 1 A ha sis for atteiapt l ng to Lndu c fw-t r r-educ1 lcrui o occujll l t an force• by the II em P r-s US5l- will undcu btedl 1 use any drut c 'eduet ian 1n iJ 11 ocC l l al ic m forces c support a campa l ll of d l plmmc-y arid propag'ILM to 11ecur n rt h r r duct iorae 1n t he ocou ll ltion farces or 'We et em PEl'ltBra Prap clrt io nat e 1cech1 cU 12m by all of Lbe Allied P ni wool d hs'fe the ne - erreci 0£ nmrt henlllil U e Scniet Unlon'a rela 1 t•e po11l Hon on 1 he Cont 1 n ent Once th occupation r cm es or 1 he US and 1 he l D have b-een reduc ed t h re is sell tm chance t t they c ia1 1ld be readll y ll lcrcued ap l 11 Ihe USSR t hfi ct her h rid l A In a po11l Unn to ove t roa ic n• r CIU1 oC I he ar W'ldet' iu cont r·ol wlt b n l t H emie mid aec ecy Jt ia 11 e tse n a posi tion to conceal t he pre1 ice ot lt11 troops e broe d by in 'l lt rs Un f t ill 111 nt o sa 1 elllte amJ 11 e i'ld pal ce f orces and by l I 1 tllnr thffll as •c 1 villana 11 ln cecupied l I Tl Aa re Mjy tor cbihml trll on hDrL no1 cl 011 - 2 - b 0 I d '7stcAEJ n USSR' B med ot • upport at lnt e tional p1 herl nes · D8llet oat ions out s ill e the Sov I bloc lofh1ch b v r- cent ly been allsnin ihe 'JW ld-vee with Anglc dcnn pol li tians 1 ow oaiUon kl lll'ibi t n r Y Scnlet t n ctJ c Q-a n t he d N t ad vonta ge to t he tJS'SR cf pmen l disa rm roent e rocin11 L-b e jar t a- the rieallu t lan ar ge nu d Hnll lment pcognm would reasult in dei Lded t mtlve advantage to th Smrh t Union Whereaa tbe W'eet mn Powerw der Ye their aulltary 11L ogth fnm i m t em1he navies st nt egic air ro 11 M ld Lntrlcat e modet'll wi pons that ot the IJ55R 1 still -111seent l a l ly bued i m JU'Uia hind armill 'D Once c·o l u ed therefo i -e the r pot eoW al or t he st would require -un to rest ore while 1 hat cf th OE SR would be 1mlu1tant i lly re t ored D et'elY by t he re-mobilizln of 11m1p ow r 11 D st J c racu ra vhd ch would tave equd weltht 1n prod uclrig A t l l'DJIOl' i CY change in Sov ht t t lcE1 ·are lnt ernal e-cancmi r con l ltiona The condlUon or Sovtet a gd ult ur 1s undoubtedly l er lawt wil h cri t ic e l i s s -u al gog while c enain 1 asic ind ust r1ea are 61-lu 1 0 me et t he quot a i pres l bed by t h Fm1rt h Flve-Year Plan - As Cl result t be Kremlin y ba e been farced t o E'e'i'iH it a st · 'Le of he propon OM of U n t ion l cCln-a JJ' W • r h CH iuld e w •e ed t o ml tArY purpose•• because t he lJmlediate need11 of t he USSR part l cular11 t he d evut at ed areu nave -ii e'eded net t MIS n a onl ble t o pl l for- 1 nduat ry 1 0 pr-oduce ace h- ClTULui morale There ncreil l lislg e e or e pa 'l h y lld even imre1a1t 4monr the Soviet popul4ce Sn orte ges J l'I f'cod hou s lng and cons wne r rood a h ve ciseat d wi desp e4'rl iii BMt ie 1 lon i110-rous c ampa l ot • ldeola ical i le l ng-• l ndicai t th@- ccnc m wH h which t KrBm lin Ti WB tho situ o Uon c - i Mora le ne fo n ier U 1'8 U on t roop i ocr up a tlcm hAs CUrnislled a larn number cf Soviet eH lzens wl 1 h thllir r 1 rst opp-orttmlty to v t he ou lde world The 'bo eoa rles hpot s ff nraJQ' Aut r 1 a 6ml the Balkans have produced die 1 usloc 111€nt a re l uctance to return to the USSR e J'ld subst a o W numb er or dest1rtiQl'l3 • Dem_g 11- zed oc cupe tlm 1 TOOPQ s t he Lni ect on t-hC'oughout the USSR 'llh1i 1l 113 pr-o-Mbl7 an iport l' J'Lt •element ln cur-rent dcJJDH'l c d l u t Ufac n i on 'r be larg -seal· The o pai - 11 ent or St t e consldera th la 8f ll1 en I too nrcmg btCEWSe lie ll llat l hes con cl 1 iana are rather pr-eva b m C l C a 114 r 8J'1d Jfa vy Uep a rtrnent 11 however cbn l d r t 'l t th se concl itlon 1 are indeed pre a lent lt · t he - 3 - oc clJllB tian has thud constituted a breach n the ba rr-lero which t he Sevlet people Crcn f'ore id ology e m nlllCIB UOP • andl which are no es i ential t o n b t erlalltt er Kremlin' • cont rol i ln v Df t h fo-regotns ccma dua lOM Soviet l eadel li t b ve d c ided UJ ffl t emponry breatitl n 8 jl6 CII tor the INQIO S e IJI l COncw o and ideolorleal reMbU I tatl01'1 at hQl 16 at d the comolldat 1011 of pcsit 1onB Bbroad We bell eve h0W9vec- that the Kremlin has not ban- dcmed a ny or U 11 long---rmi objective de ecrilied in cm l but t nl l ob @Ct l ee NUl n be pursued where ezpedj ent by 1111111 bcda NbU T bm 1 h0111 o rec nt mt11nths Such mBl hod B vlll 1nc 1ude inor Continued etrort 11 t o pJ n polltlca l Dd eecmanl c cant to u end Kcn·ea Ill' i f rl ln cmcact eri stlcally Soviet t edmlq • IOlleb wuld not ce e• t te · t be presence it large Sov let mll t ac y fcn ar Such t chn Lque conaJ 11t or the popular ' ant ii or r Qa lit ian poll t ca-1 at rat ea under whieh relath lY weak CCIIJJIID'list Zt tlea imr wlt h am ln cant rol oC let tl•t e n 11 Ubentl arpn r at illn8' lJIJ 11 'Ati o n b Moe caw qmit 15 or loc e l CGl l lll USte l nl O e1 lfCl'lttnm tU p01111t1cms H clally pollce Judlc W m1l11 8rl' prop • er hnranr Aue1 r-1a Km1PQ1' Czechosl qama and ducs tiOM l agenci the •Hquidat ion• by oc a J Cc mmmi lt Hee of ll l t ive llements which mrht be u ec ted o oppotie t he Sfflliet p rosnw mid he 1 rlppll B or u pn pr te ilan or lce Y ind '-l La l p lanw mid t establ nt or el nhot t car ayste ving the USSR ccmt rol or vU J ir dwn ry 2_ Int enaHica t l cl I of mllit Mt Caimm l U W tbit r h B it-o- eas 0 IT Bide O he pr ent Soviet 1phere lnl C' at or Co 11a m L1 11 -C'Xltrolled roqC' lme11t At pr oduc- b - legal or r Yolntlonary rn a ns 1n aucii COW'lt tles as fnuice It 11 l y Spd n and Ore-ece ' £· Poll c J m d eccncmic he as Md LIU in ica let ra Uan bi the H lddle Ee 81 ltlAbi itate ce mpal fru ot p r anti dlplODClly deslgned r o ccmv i nce he world o-r r he IJS5R a peac ul i nt enU0fl8 and o rC111101 e d 1 t and i I 4b osd · An 1nt enE1lve J cng-r-a np p i -ogr-am T o develop the war pot en1 J al of t he USSR conc1mt-rat 1nr 11peci a l ly C11 t he erpanslon or bu c indWlfir es on the secret developc J lnt r f i iew M ll JlODII en 1 he c qw al on of lnlanAUcn on Gecce mllt ery de elopmenla in other caunt r-i es M'ltl en r- edilcinlf the vulriern tillUy of Soviet 1 nd ust cy to 11 n a c k by o t 01t1 b0t11bs I t ocket 11 t c - 4 it i JQS SFiiiRZJ 1 PrOC tot ion of di cord am lll'ln ll t 1n th£ capU e li st ountri es j - d J ly 'oy seizin any oppon unitle s offered by pe i od ic e conol lic cr-ie es mn unemplojlmnt which the S-ov i ets confidently predict ror the near future 6 Recent developments hAve mmflrmed previous est Jiates tha-r i he USSR did not intend and was not ·In a positlot t o ensa e 1n im r ed i ate Plilit ary conqueeta lta ultilmt@ a C'l lon will epend upon tuitur-e developro1mts ln the Soviet Union and in the outsJ i le' world Meaomile the USSR l B 11eekin1T t o l l0l U3' olida te Us posl tl ons atirC8d mid to ilgpt ove 1ts ecom 11q c wrl psyuholog l caJ pos1 t 1 on at hcne while encouraging diaar mwent and pa cifiam in the ·r est or the wor 1d Soviet tactics however will relffl in flexible and oppgrt unis- tlc The ml lh ms nsvcer- relle il exe lusiveJ y on MY Bingle line J f e c1 i on R l t her He ta ctiC1 1 are based on tile int er-play cf two appe renl J y---c onfli tinf courses international collab I 8 tion 00 unila tera I aggres s icn rid on 1 t a 'ability s f n ly to shif't fl ®l one te the 01 her T-hls technique seeks to achieve- 1 18 Xlmum surprise for each nellii · mov 8lld to promote irucli cont'usion am uncertainty amonif t he optioeit lon as to pr-e-v n the deve-lopment of long--ra nge eount c--e t rau egy Thus in view o the con sidel a tl ons d escribed in t he preced ing pages new tactic of co mpromiH ar1d coneille t1Qll have- been dopt ed llll rd y as a matt er of expediency They will be emplo-yed ari1y ln those sl twitiotm wh@re they a re dee lled to further Soviet foreign a s rles r i bed iii CRE l • - 5 and nl 111-9 rY policy -