-· --- I '·-I ·--·-- S EC IE 1r · REPROOUCED AT THE NATl -ARCHIVES ' _ - ' J I _ I • MR GILPATRIC 1S VISIT TO ROME l-12 Feb 1963 ' BRIEFING BOOK TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 -i i II• ' · ·» GENERAL A Schedule B Points for Discussion with Italian Of'f'icials ·1 DISCUSSION ·PAPERS C Replacement of Jupiter Missiles D Meaning of Nassau Accords to Italy E Polaris Missiles for the Cruiser Garibaldi F U S Cooperation 1n Nuclear Submarine Propulsion G Cooperative Logistics Arrangements with Italy H M-ll3 Co-Production 1n Italy I F-104o Iack of' All-Weather Capability ' i ' p I ' ' III BACKGROUND PAPERS ' •' • j J Italian Defense E f f'ort and Economic Capability ' K Italian NATO Forces 1n Being and Force Objectives L MAP and Military Sales ta M Assignm1 nt of Forces to NATO Sub-qroup II Paper Mr Gilpatric on t y N NATO Polaris Forces Su9-Group IV Paper Mr Gilpatric on1y o Disanpament and µ'ms Control p List of' Additional Background Material Separately Available in Rome DOONGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED DOD Dm 5200 10 - -- J ll919 a WVN-W -i a - tz9b3b omr i µc ' 031 SSVl' 330 ' ·MR OILPATRIC 1 8 VI TO ROME ll-12 P'ebrua 1963 SCHEDULE Tentative ll February- 1963 0730 Arrive Rcllle Fiumicino Airport 09 U S Br eting Session ' 1100 Ambassador Reinhardt and Mr Oil patric meet with Prime Minister Fantan1 1145 appx Ambassador Reinhardt and Mr Gilps tric meet with Minister Andreotti 12 Febniaey 1963 1330 Luncheon hosted by Ambassador Reinhardt 1600 u s Evening Dinner hosted by Minister Andreotti ll 00 Mr Gil P8 tric meets with Minister Statt Session Andreotti 1330 Luncheon hosted by Admiral G1ur1at1 1600 u s Evening U S Ambassador's dinner for Ita 11an Foreign Minister Staf'f Session on Germany and Spa in - _ __ $J C l 1I' r j e • • MR GILPATRIC 1 S VISIT TO ROME 11-12 February 3 POINTS FOR DISCUSSION WITH ITALIAN OFFICIALS Background At the conclusion of MOD Andreotti 1 s visit to Washington in September 1962 an agreement was signed by Mr Gilpatric and Minister Andreotti providing for 1 purchase by Italy of a substantial quantity of U S military hardware 2 establishment of a number of Joint study groups for the purpose of advancing U S -ltalian cooperation In defense matters and 3 periodic review of the progress of these groups by senior U S and Italian defense officials This meeting In Rome was originally intended as the Initial joint review provided for in the agreement NOTE When Minister Andreotti was approached regarding specific dates for the meeting he Is reported to have expressed mild disappointment that It was not Secretary McNamara who was coming to Rome returning Andreotti 1 s previous visit to Washington ' Subsequent events have added significantly to both the importance of the meeting and the potential benefits that might be obtained from It The points discussed below are Intended to lead to that end Points Mr Gilpatric Should Raise Replacement of Jupiter Missiles By the time of the meeting in Rome the formalities of clearing this project with NATO authorities should have been completed and U S plans for dismantling the Jupiter complex should be considerably advanced Since Minister Andreotti has already informed us of his Government's approval of the project Mr Gilpatric will need only to confirm U S cornnitments related to the project and to describe the means of implementation This can perhaps be done in the form of an Aide Memoire which will be available by the time of Mr Gilpatric's arrival in Rome The Italian reaction to the U S proposal to replace the Jupiters was under the circumstances generally favorable There probably is however some lingering suspicion as to U S motives and there is certainly some regret especially among the more defense-minded including Andreotti over the loss of taly's a soci te embership in the nuclear club and the break of a special relat1onsh1p with the U S In defense I · matters 'GRADED AT 12 YEAR ltwc RVALS NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED DOD DIR 5200 10 0 P q 7 Q VtNN 39 a Jr29b3bQNJV µCl ' ' G31 HSS'v1J30 I n_ Meaning of Nassau ·Accords to ltaly • lt would seem particularly useful to explore this topic fully with Hirilster Andreotti The purpose would be to promote Interest and enthusiasm for the NATO Nuclear Force NNF concept toward which the ltallans are already quite favorably disposed A concentrated U S effort to get this program under way is scheduled to be launched In Paris by the Merchant-Smith-Lee Group in midFebruary and the Group will visit Rome later In the month Thus Hr GI lpatrlc's approach should be one of encouraging and preparing· Italy • to take the lead In concert with Germany In advancing this concept and getting the program under way as rapidly as possible • The following specific points should be made I The depth and importance of the U S conmltment to a sea-based HRBH force under multilateral ownership manning and control 2 the fact that the U S Is prepared to make a substantial contribution In money and manpower to such a force 3 that the choice between surface and submarine deployment remains open avoiding if possible however giving any encouragement on the Garibaldi and 4 that Ambassador Merchant will be in a position to discuss the subject in detail during his visit to Rome I Polaris Missiles for the Cruiser Garibaldi From the Italian point of view this proposal relates directly not only to the NNF but also to replacement of Jupiters and an attractive case can be made for it on both counts Thus while the U S position is that we believe the project to be Impractical and excessively costly rejection of the proposal should be tempered to prevent either doubts as to the seriousness of our intentions regarding the NNF or possible lessening of Italian enthusiasm for proceeding with the program U S Cooperation In Nuclear Submarine Propulsion This topic Is probably of greatest inmediate interest to Minister Andreotti He has reason to expect a fairly forthcoming response to the proposal contained in his 4 December 1962 letter to Secretary McNamara Alternate possibilities of providing Italy either 1 a complete SKIPJACK-Class submarine or 2 a nuclear power plant for an Italian-built submarine are presently under consideration We would hope to be In a position to present these possibilities to Andreotti for his consideration - subject to whatever cond i tions and reservations we may have to Impose regarding the need for further Executive Branch and Congressional approvals Cooperative Logistics Discussion of this topic should center around the r·e ports of the various Joint study groups Proposed u s positions on these reports will be developed during the week of 4-10 February 1963 H-113 Co-Production P ogram We will have ready for Hr Gilpatric's and Minister Andreotti ' s final approval the formal agreement setting this program in motion '- 2 H lllJ i Owm W a Jr29b3bQNN NµCl ' O' G31 SSv1330 ··o -- - §IE CIR T Lack of All-Weather Capa k' ity We expect to be able to give positive support to any reasonable Consortium - agreed program _designed to remedy this deficiency • Points ltallan Officials Hay Raise By Hr Gilpatric taking the Initiative on the above subjects there should be no significant points raised by t e Italians i l K l ' 1 i _ i -1I f I Prepa red by Revised 3 -- LtCol D D Duff European Region OASD 1 SA 31 Jan 1963 I February 1963 r - - C _ Tactics and T fm1ng Italy Visit 11 Feb 1100 - 1145 Meeting with Prime Minister Fan feni Attendees U S Secretary Gilpatric Ital y Prime- Minister Fan fan Ambassador Rinehardt cUITently doubt f'ul that Andreotti w11l attend Purpose Minister Fani'ani •s purpose is probably to set a tone of greater support for the J'u piter with see TAB C and mu1ti- J lateral force concept than is expected from Andreotti On the other hand Minister Fanfani may also wish to raise the problem of other Italian economic needs which J Jni St be met thereby placing limitations on the extent of military expenditures desired by Minister Andreotti Finally he may desire to get an insight into Washington's reaction to the recent actions of France in both the Common Market and mu1tiJ ateral nuclear forces areas Our purpose during tb4s meeting should be two-fold 1 To insure Prime M l nister Fanfani's support for the necessary multilateral nuclear force and conventiona1 contribution by Italy to meet NATO force goals minimum 2 To direct Minister Fanfani's woITies about excessive military costs to en agreement with our position that a system of progremm1ng must be developed to insure that critical funds are not placed on proJecte which have a limited military cost effectiveness Method In the short time that is available the principal method must be to use Fani'ani 's opening remarks to get him to make or agree with two statements 1 nie quickest and most economical ve y for Italy to maintain its association with nuclear strategy is to give top priority to participation in the NATO multilateral forces priority over eJ l of the methods cUITently being conside d by Italy for development of national nuclear programs 11 lq o W'tM W a yl9b3bQNJV- kµC ' nV n t Jl fl l n - i ' - -· - 2 To encourage a Fanfen f direction to the Defense Ministry to caretully weigh the milltary cost e f'f'ectiveness o f' each modernization project since e miUtary f'inancial contribution required by Italy to meet NATO Fo ce goals will lUl loubtedl y call for considerable additional expenditures therefore requiring that unnecessary or marginal efficiency expenditures be el 1rn1nated 3 At an appropriate time in the discussion it woul d be most advisable to reassert continued U S support to broader concept of en At tic Alliance l n which Italy necessarily fills a vitally important role Notwithstanding French desires for a tighter continental grouping we still visualize the alliance as a viable organization whose broad objectives end specific forces goals could still be su pported by all participants 4 Mr Fanfani should be advised that you intend to discuss the Jupiter withdrawal end replacement with Mr Andreotti later that day 1200 - 1500 Working Luncheon Attendees Secretary Gilpatric Italy Min1ster Andreotti Arnbassado · R inha rdt General Rossi General Costello Admirgl Ta gliambnte U S I Mr Sullivan Purpose 'lhis will be the principal working session between the tvo Ministers Discussion should be held on the J J piter withdrawal end replacement for details see T c OUr objectives for this session are essentially the follow-up of the Fanfani discussions and can be described simply es follows 1 To discuss Italy's position 1n the broad range of m1l1tary preparedness actions required by NATO strategy thoroughly airing the Nassau accords end their meaning to Italy See TAB D the requirements on Italy 1n the fields or air defense anti-submarine varfare and the defense of the SQuthern Flank of NATO - emphasizing at every turn the problem of carefully relating this to financial requi rernents on Italy's economy 2 To get Andreotti's agreement to either conversion of' the present study groups to a forum for thorough weapon systems analysis es a means of assuring maximum military effectiveness of funds invested or sufficient understB11ding on his part of' the problem so he will institute such 8JU1lyses on his own 1 Jl 9Jl 'ar -O W'tH w a je9bjbQivJV C ' V 03l ISSv1 l30 0 Method ' ·- -Y A General strategy Objective It 1a believed that this obJectin ca be met by d11cussion ot tfu folloving 1ubJect1 r 1 'l'he meaning ot the Buaau accord a vith It See TAB D em pbulzing ite utWty to I u the quicke• t and III08t ecan lllical means ot pe rticipatillg 1n nuclear etrates 7 2 Modernization requirements ot Italy'• Armed Forces hu1z ing the need tor a considerable 1ncreue 1n I •• procurement budget 1D the Tery near future 1n order to meet theae require1 1ent1 by the end ot the next tin yeara We should specif'ical ly ucerta1n action by M1n11ter kidreotti to obtain the biW on dollar 11pecial b Jd6et tor IIOdomizaUon vhich he referred to 1D hie riait to the thited State since at present read1 ng I ' • total modemiut1on requirement• tor conventional forces exceeds $J billion Vitbout even considering multilateral torces nuclear submarines and the Caribe 141 Pol aria program J 3 We should be prepared to diecus1 the militar y coat ettect1veneu ot and alternative• tor certain specific nrcaa as tollov1 __ a What 1e the tint trike wlnerabillty of V Polaria Dl111Ue1 on the cruiaer Ge ribalcUT See TAB ' ✓ b What are the alternative vay1 and means tor Itoly to develop 1te own nuclear propula1on technology and are the mll1tary ncUture • tor euch l Ul'1 01d1 reasonable 1D terms ot m1lltary re1ult1T See TAB F c What · are the possibWtieaj ot eigniticant rovcmenta 1D all veatber co pabWties 1n the F-1040 during the next five years alternative means ot achieving this capability and the relative mUitary ue ot undertak1ng the F-l04o improvement program See TAB r d Does the increased cost ot Italian production on the M-llJ or the camnibnent ot tuture tunds to the production ot 3 000 onnored carriers achien milltary effectiveness ot a greater vo lue than an e JC penditure on other proJects'l B Weapon Systems Analysis 'We should take the att1tudo that the lilt ot requirements developed l y the study gro'Ul a See TAB o ore certainly 11gnit'icant ranging vell over a billion dollars 1n coat vithout even consideration ot tonk modernization and the more 1oph1a- ' '- 3 JJl f-J' Q W¥N Ji 18 J Z9b3bQNJr l c ' nV 0311 SSV1330 l ticated nuclear proJects and there tore the next step should really a reyiev of' It a cy's military requirements through c ful veapon system analyses wbich v1lJ weigh military ettectiveness ·gained against economic costs r end resources We should propose that ve v1ll be rfll1ng to provide expert s f'rom Washingto i i to work with the present stuay groups 1n un derteldng such analyses be ' I 16oo - If necessary statt work between Italian WD and U S sta tt v1ll take place at this time to iron out any problems on the M-113 agreement and take u p an detailed subjects not covered during the luncheon 12 Febnmry 1100 - Meeting vi th Minister Andreotti Attendees u s Ita1y Secretary Gil patric Minister Andreotti General Costello General Rossi Ambassador Rinehardt Mr Sylvester Mr Sullivan ' ' Purpose 'To fonnal 1ze a M-ll3 Co-Production Agreement and develop a ote tement of accord for both ottj cial and public P'IU J Oses See TJ B H Method A M-ll3 Cooperative Co- oduct1on Agreement has already been provided Ita11an MOD end should be eady for signature at the time of' your arrival If a statement of' accord to - otticial and public purposes 1s possible fol low1ng your Mo working luncheon a brief' draft v lll be vorked out l-bndsy afternoon which you can give to Minister Andreotti at dinner the evening of' tQe 11th This should give him time to consider it prior to the 1100 meetillg on the following day 4 ------ - IJ 'fd Q fd'ifN 9 9 rZ9b3bQMV C ' Y 031 SS't 1 30 GILPATRIC'S VISN -TO ROME MR · 11-12 Februaey 1963 REPIACEME NT OF JUPft MISSILES Background Pa per Discussion During the December 1962 NATO Ministerial Meeting in Paris Secretaey McNamara proposed to Italian MOD Andreotti the early replacement ot Jupiter missiles in Italy and Turkey The replacement system would be three u s Polaris submarines 1 the first ot which would be on station in the Mediterranean by 1 April 1963 lMemorandum ot Conversation available separately The proposal was subsequently confirmed by letter f'rom Secretary McNamara to Minister Andreotti supplemented by discussions between Ambassador Reinhardt and Italian government officials including Prime Minister Fanfani Copy ot Secretary ra•s letter and Minister Andreotti's two letters in reply are attached · 'l'hese two conf'irming and complementaey actions were taken on the be sis 1n Washington during ot extensive 1nterdei artmental study and dbcussiona the period 28 December-5 Januaey Product of this st available separately During Italian Prime Minister Fan f'ani' s visit to Washington on 16-17 January 1963 replacement of Jupiter was pressed rurther by both Secretary McNamara and the President Public announcement was made at the end ot the visit that the u and Italy bad agreed on the need to modernize both the nuclear and conventionai weapons and forces which the two countries contribute to the Alliance It is expected that appropriate NATO clearance to proceed with replacement of Jupiter as a specific element of this modernization program will be received early 1n Februaey Definitive planning regarding actual dismantling ot the Jupiter complex is now underway 'l'he U S bas expressed a willingness to consider use ot at least sane ot the missiles in Italian or European space programs if' feasible Otherwise missiles and supporting materiel will probably be returned to the U S pending determination ot 1Dal disposition Associated directly with replacement ot Jupiter is a u s commitment to modernize SETAF by deployment ot one Sergeant missile battalion to Italy by 31 December 1963 in replacement ot the two existing Corporal-equipped battalions and to continue for the time beirui to djscbarge operational responsibilities 'With respect to the nuclear weapons assigned to SETAF substantially as at present· · _ DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR IN TERV _ ALS NOT Atn OMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED DOD Dm 5200 10 J l fJ O Vtl'tN 39 g rl9b3bQNJV- JC r 031 1 SSV7 3Q 10 t ·- · M1n1stel- AIM reott1 baa intamcd S e · Mcluara ot tbe J'tel 1aa Oovenmaent •• approval ot the p topo o4 replac- t ot J'u p1ter D4 ba1 OJF011ed h11 rea41ne•• to ccmnlt b l l a ca bow th1• 11· to 'be done · The Borth Atlantic Council 11 ai o ecna1 4artnc the P Wo al and the reault1 ot 1t1 4elibon t1 ou are OZROctod mo cntaril 7 Co leluaion Hr 011 pltrta aboal4 be pnpu-e4 to preeeirt to M1n1 tff' Androott1 perbape 1D the tom ot an Aide Mao1re tbe ••aent1 l e lemmt• ot the U S comm1tmente incorporated 1n the propooal I toll on 1 4eployment o-r three Polan• aubm rin-ee to tho Mediternu iCSD b-C nn1n bT 1 April 19631 2 depl o ment o-r a u s aumed Sergeant 111 aaile 'batt lion to m tAI' by· 31 l eccmber 1963 3 cazncmcCDent ot 4 1 the Jtqdwr ccaplex by l April 1963 ¥1th 1en1ce-to-1err1ca i cbnS l discu11an a t o n r4 th1• end to be got tmden a1 Smmedi taly ant i ec at1me bilateral 41 110111 t hrough the llledim ot ex11ting Joint rtu T group• to 4etendDe amtually acceptable 8 78 and mea n1 ot further modernilatiOD tbe JtAJ 1•n uae4 torcep • Attachments a a Lteol D D Dutt Bar-op n Region OASD ISA 29 Jamarr 1963 3l Amnr71963 2 J H 79 20 W'f l w g jt 9b3bQNfl µc ny 0381SSV1J30 - 0 •• MR OILPATRIC I B VISIT TO ROME • • ' ' • • #o 11-12 February'1 963 MmISTER ANDREOTTI'B LE'l'l'ERS TO BECimrARY McNAMARA ·· · I · · · · Copiesf- · The Minister ot Detense No 630035 AFCAS-12 43 Rane ll Jan 63 Dear· Mr Secretary Reterend your letter ot 5 January ·1963 regarding the modernization ot nuclear veapcna I want you to_lmow that tl ie matter will be discussed by Preside t ot the Council Fantani during hia torthcaning visit to the USA Once ·the delicate political aspects are cleared I will be ready to e xamine vith you vithou turther delay the technical aspects ot tbe· problem Kind regards signeg Oiulio Andreotti Robert S McNamara Secretary ot Detehse Washington ·D c I ·I 29 January 1963 FOR SEClmrARY McNamara SOD REINHARM Following 1a Embassy transl a tion of reply dated 29 January by Detenae MillisterAndreotti to January 5 letter f'ran Secretary McNamara proposing replacement ot Italian Jup l ters by Polaris · I Jru rther to my letter numb r 630035 ot 'January 11 1963 I am bappy to advise you that the Italian Government has indicated its approval with respect to the JllOdernization ot miss11e·weapons referred to in your letter ot January 5• · · 'l'heref'ore I would deem it appropriate to begin as you have sugge11ted mutual consultations with a ·view to reaching specitic agreements 111 am therefore vaiting to hear tram you· concerning the procedures 'through which the above can be accomp iehed Embassy bas not seen January 11 letter but is advised by Defense Ministry it was merely interim reply • Source I j I I DCMNGRADED AT 12 lEAR mr ERVALS NOT Atn'OMAUCALL -lli' tr TCl·m' DECIASSIFIED DOD DIR 5 _ JIJ JN 59 9 JJ l9ff i O ov J Z9bJbQNIV F c 11 ny 031 IISS'vlJ30 Embassy Rane• a 1507 29 Jan 63 ' ' ' I - ' 1 Po Rl 'MULJUU U Al · ' ' ' ' ' · $ EC RlE 1' ' · C ·- -· ' ' If - 't' St ate rl't • By Mr Roswell L llpatric Deputy Secret of Defense United States In Rome Italy 11-12 Feb 63 MEANING OF NASSAU ACCOROO 'ro rrALY I The arrangement concluded between the United States and the United Kingdom at Nassau grew out of discussions of the bilateral problem created by the US decision to discontinue development of the Skybolt missile The solution • reached had as expected broad implications for all members of the NATO Alliance particularly those nations such as Italy which had indicated an interest in our earlier proposals for the creation of a NATO multilateral force In our view it blocks out a general framework containing within itself the greatest possi bilities for evolution and growth The opportunity exists for all interested l NATO members to participate in shapjng the institutiona envisaged at Naasau t ' We feel it would be desirable therefore to proceed as rapidly as possibl e with 1 •• the formation of an integrated Polaris force which will offer an opportunity for Italy as well as other non-nuclear members of the Alliance to participate in the ownership manning and control of strategic nuclear weapons In so doing we wish to make it clear that the United States regards the integrated for e as 1 an important military force in its own right and not merely a sop to the presently non-nuclear nations and as 2 being on a parallel track with the United Kingdom Polaris program having a good chance of becoming the primary form of European participation in strategic deterrence over the long term II Discussion The US viewa the Nassau Accqr d as a major m ve toward the creation of _ an Alliance multilateral force which can include participation by all interested C'I _ _ _ _ Jl Jqa 0 VtNN 39 g Jt29b3b0Nfv µC V G3 i SS'tJlJ30 ·- _ 0 ·_ • t - -· _ • Y • - 't • member nat ions · It was agreed at Nassau tffii t as the · first phase in the creation o f this· t orce some part of the nuclear forces already in existence could be ' assigned to NA' 00 These could include elements from the US Strategic Forces the UK bomber ·command and possibly ·certain selected tactical nuclear forces now 1n Europe although the assignment of the latter forces will require much m re study We will also include US Polaris submarines which are scheduled to operate in the Mediterranean The British Polaris Force will be assigned to N Al'O as it becomes available and will be matched by at least an equal contribution of forces by the United States We would wish to take these initial steps as soon as organizational arrangements are worked out for planning targeting and operation of the force Such arrangements would provide for maximum feasible European participation ' while avoiding extensive delays in implementation or significant disruption of present N ATO military operations and arrangements Therefore it seems to us that the N Al'O Nuclear Force should in the first instance be subordinate to SACEUR It also seems essential that the same command exercise military control over both nationally assigned units and the future multilateral mixed-manned component of the N A' 00 Nuclear Force As Mr Ba1l pointed out in his January ll speech to the NAC however we would not at this point wish to rule out the eventual possibility of establishing a N Al'O Strategic Force at the level of Supreme Commanders Following assignment of existing forces we envisage as the second phase the development of the NATO Force by the inclusion of an integrated mixedmanned component As the multilateral character of the force grows and the Alliance process of political consultation evolves further we anticipat e that 2 Jf JJ'fu '20 'v NN pz9b3bQN7V 39 9 µC ' 't' 03l HSSv1J30 1• · 1 b 0 t the queetfon t withdrawing ° Uo ele a J O-_uld · ' iume decreasing signiticance We a_l so wish to· make it cle ar · th t we are villing to consider any proposals ' d s1red b y • a c nsens' ot the AU - e r ·eg d lit1ca l control ot this force • Beca e of the importance we attach to the development of a llllll tilateral mixed-manned force as an essential compo ent ot the NA 10 Nuclear Force the US wishes to r oove forward promptly 1n this direction We would hope that Ital y 1a prepared to join us in this sign11'1cant endeavo While ther_e are many intricat problems to be worked out before such a force can become a reality we believe that it is possible and essential to take certain initial steps such as beginning personnel training even before many details of the force are worked out -III We believe that the Nassau Accord provides the foundation for building ·a strong multilateral NATO Force by all members We believe that it gives all of us an opportunity to work toward an ever-increasing sense of f'ul l partnership within the Alliance We would regard Italy's f'ul l participation in this project as essential to its success I i I l l I l I I I i l I 1 _ 3 t __ J 9 q-a 0 VtNN 39 a pz9bjbQNIV- C ' '1' G3 HSSv'lJ30 -· o BACKGROUND PAPm Meaning of ihe Nassau cords to Italy Italian reaction to -the Nassau Accord has been sparse and cautious They have welcomed the agreement as an important cont ibution tovard the establishment of a multilateral NA' ro force but unofficially have expressed concern that the Nassau system would formalize the non-nuclear status for Italy ·Italian interest lies in a f'ul ly multilateral non-discriminatory arrangement such as the ori inal US proposal for a multilateral force The Smith-Lee presentation One possible reason for Italy's cautious approach is their desire to obtain Polaris missiles for the Cruiser Garibaldi and two -other vessels presently under construction They have indicated an interest in the Garibaldi being made part of the interim NA' ro nuclear force The problem of the Garibaldi is discussed in a separate position paper Attachment D contains tventy questions and answers compiled for Under -Secretary of State Ball's discussions at the NAC and elsewhere hich provide guidance for the questions mst frequently raised regarding the Nassau Accords I Attachments Al -Statement on Nuclear Defense Systems 21 Dec 63 l3 Memorandum for the Prime Minister 21 Dec 63 C Mem randum by the Prime Minister 21 Dec 63 D Questions and Ansvers re Meaning of Nassau Accords Coordination State - Mr J Conroy Prepared by C N Shane Capt USN Policy Planning Statt ISA 29 Jan 63 - Jl ll-1 o VtNH W a pz9b3bQNfv µC ' n' 031 HSS'v133G I- ' SUGGESTED ·PLANS R R -US ASSISTANCE TO ITALY ·-m NUCLEAR 'SUBMARINE DEVELOIMEN'l' · I I c Plan One 1 C ncept This would b with modii'ications the plan utilized for the provision of the United ngdom· lfith· a nuclear submarine capaQility Italy would build the submarine in its own shipyards ·With the US ·suppl y-j ng the nuclea r- propulsion pl ant · Imm dia tely after the conclusion of the Agreement for Cooperation -the US WQuld supply the plans·a nd specifications for the major foundations for the prqpu sion plant and qther necessary interface inf'ol'Ill8 tion e g piping cabling necessary power ·- hydraulic and other supplies etq but wquld supply no other technical indJormation of actual propulsion plant components • The nuclear propulsion ·plant would 'J e built in the US as -was done for the British except that no technical information other than interface or equipment or the p opulsion pl ant would be provided -until four years a fter the government-to-government agreement was signed 2 Constraints a The agreement for cooperation s lould contain the requirement as it qid in the c1 1 se of the British that the effort being undertaken is not to interfere with the US nuclear submarine program I Attachment V Jt Jarzo v«rm W a Jr29b3bQNJV- µc ri nv 03l HSSV7 30 0 - 'l ' b Per onnel of the rece ivi l8 ·nation would not be - pe tted acc s to the ·US factories or shippens engaged in this work c •A SKIP ·JACK-type propulsion plant d signated S5W Core 2 shoul be provided regardless of the precise type of i submarine being const -ucted 'Ille cost to the receiving government l including engineering '1nd installation services would be a bout $30 million d Training of nuclear -personnel 1 'Ille theoret cal portion a bout 6 months of the program is essc tltially unclassified and tl e US can provide a t any - time the u ncl assified inform ation on -which it is based Italy would then train its own ople on its own soil n the theoretical a spect43 AB in tlle c se of the Br l t Lsh fqreign na tiona ls ·would not be permitted to visit a'Qr reactor prototypes le boratories or other shore fa ilities 2 Begimrl ng four ·years after the ·signing of the Agreement for Coqperation operational trai ning would be provided on board United States nuclear submarines where the trainees would be observers not actually statlding watches was provided the British Experience With them indicated about n Lne months tj me was required 2 I Again this is what 0 · -·· - Plan Two l •8oncept •The submarine would constructed in the United States for · sa e to ·Ita J y In order to prevent interferences with US ·programs it will necessarily J l'OCeed on a 6o-month schedule After the comp etion •of the shelt down operations and the post ·shakedown · e lterations the Italian crew wo d be brought on board for the first tiple a bout 66 months · after authorization of the sh p After ·an adequa te turnover period Italy would take over the ship 2 • constraints a The eement for Cooperation shoul d contain the requirement that the effo rt being undertaken is not to interfere with the US - nuclear submarine program b Italian personnel would not pe permitted access to the ' US factories or shipyards engaged in this work c A SKIP JACK-type submarine with S5W Core 2 propulsion plant ·will be provided The cost to Italy including the necessary services will be about $70 million d A US Navy crew with an Officer in Charge will be required for the ship du ring its building and testing period at the shipyard The US crew will take the ship on its initial trials on its shakedown cruipe thro its post-shakedown overhaul and alterations a¢ will conduct the training period when both Italian and US crews ar on board - 3 K l 9a Q 'q tNN 39 9 rl9b3bQNJV- Nµc1 iri nv G3l l SS flJ30 0 -· -_ e No ·techniaal information conc rning ·the reactor plant can be made available to Italy until years arter the signing of the Agreement -for Cooperation f The milita ry equipment t o be J rovided •with the submarine ·must be approved by the US Chi f of Naval Operations g Training of nuclear personnel would remain the same as that· o lined under ·p1an One until the complet i on of operational traiD ing In ·Pla n Two the crew would have to wait u ntil the completion of the post-shakedown shipyard work before coming on board because of the security -requ lrement set forth above After the Italian crew reported on bo d the US Officer in Charge could reduce the size of I the US crew as necessary to provide ·reasonable liviDg conditions while at the · same ·time maintaining enough men for safe supervision of the learp ing - crew After a sui1 able overlap period and on the recommendation of the US Officer in Charge the ship-would be delivered to Italy I J l9J7 3 0 'ftNN 39 a Ji29b3b0NlV- µc 11 nv G3 1 SSV7330 I - I REPIIOOUCED A TIE NATIONH AROIVES - - ' t MR GILPATRICJS VISIT 'l'Q Ro - · U-12 Febl'Ul l_1 'Y 1963 - - COOPERATIVE LOOISTICS ARRANGEMENTS WITH IT ALY TALKING PAPER I em pleased to note that progress is being achieved in ce rrying out the provisions of the cooper tive logistics agreement we consummated last year Altho1 1 1 only a short time has lapsed since the time of the egreement it 1s apparent that the Joint study groups have been making some headway in j nvesttgating specific losistics arrangements 1n which mutual support can take place to the benefit of both of our countries I understand that the planning has already been initiated 1n the identification of common items in the inventories of our Armies Navies and Air Forces and that in the near f'uture an analysis will be made - of the possibility of cooperative logistics SUiPPOrt arrangements for such common itelllfi I think progress 1n these areas is commendabl e ' and that the work of these study g roups should continue and expand and that at some poµit of time in the ruture ways and means can be found to consider increased Ital iElll Defense support 1n those areas in Italy 'Where substantial U S troop• effort is currently being II - made Before I leave the subject of cooperative logistics support arrangements for common items I would like to suggest that a special effort be made at this ti pie to arrive at an early agreement for support of the one thousand M-113 Armored Personnel Carriers which are sohedu1ed to be AB you know mutual support arrange- I ments were visualized for this and o her items and 8G a result only i del ivered by June of this year a six months supply of spare parts was o rdered for these carriers In viev ot the short time reme1n1nu _ _ - • b a support B9Jq-a 0 W N 39 a pz9b3bQNJV- kµc n n't' 0311 SS'f 30 ·• -· r 'P' - system I believe that ve shoul d direct -the study group on Arm l ogistics 4 r to come to a quick sol ution on the supply of' spare parts tor these personnel carriers Un1ess some action is taken soon I t'ear that vc may t'ace a critical probl cm soon In arr1v1ng at a cooperative l ogistics support fUTB Dgement for the 8 l'DlOred personnel Cf U'riers we voul d be setting a pattern vhioh could be ed for arrangements invol ving other items common to our mill tary inventories I believe that the most sigiufic1 µ1t result of our joint study groups has been the identification of the major weapons systems and equipment which are urgently needed to modernize th Ita 1 iall Amcd Forces in order ' l that they may meet their NATO force objectives Our e timate of this · £ •• requirement exceeds $l billion In viC'W' of the magnitude of these equipment requirements I suggest that the joint study group now channel its efforts to a thorough weapon systems analysis of these requirements so as to permit the application of Italian funds to those areas where the highest priority needs are met while at the same time providing equipment which furnishes the maximum military effectiveness at the lowest cost For such an effort I would be willing to f'urnisb groups of weapons systems experts to assist in these analyses I cannot over- emphasize the importance of this type of joint pl ng exercise because it is only through such planning and analysis that the very large modernization requirements of the Ita 1 ian Armed Fo z -ces can be met Vi thout overtaxing the Italian econoII Y NOTE A list of initial estimates of Italian equipment requirements is attached Cleared Preliminary costing_ Prepared by OASD I L Kremkau -- $1 4 P A Gerardi OASD ISA ruJ 31 January 1963 billion C ·-· _ LIST OF ESTIMATED ITALIAN lm ITARY REQUIREMENTS as reported by MAAG _e Extracted f'rom DAIN 8949 ot 17 January 1963 f'rom cm AAO Rome to OSD ISA Number JPP 2-7015 CHMAAO Ge r11l ey pass to Henry Kuss 'lhis date submitted 1n accordance agreement EUCOM Meeting 11 January List of Materiel to meet NATO 66 Qoals follws • Not verified by MAAG Only screened to eliminate items certain to be procured 1n Italy It represents magnitude of requi ents A Air Force List l 2 74 Mach 2 Aircrai't - F-104 type 148 v sTOL type 40 Trons port A C - C-l 30 type 6 3 AStl MP A C 4 B 768 Rocket BM-55 type No vy List l Missile Terrier BT 3 328 2 Missile Terrier BT 3 256 3 Missile 200 Tartar 4 Complete Terrier System l 5 Reduced tartar system 2 6 Guns 3 50 24 7 40MM Gun 18 8 Radar AN SPS 12 7 9 Radar 3PQ 2 10 14 Data Handlill8 Systems 22 DO vNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS DOD Drn 5200 l0 - - --- · - H -Jf-J l -ZO 'lftl 'H Jr29b3bQN v 39 9 µC '10' G3t ISS'Q'l l30 a r _ 1 l 12 13 14 15 • AN SPA 8 Repeaters and Sfm1l r· IFF AH UPXJ SIF Interrogators D'F AN UPX 12 SIF Repliers Receivers fc r AD Radar Jammers 22 27 20 7 7 16• Anti-Missiles Jammers l 1 Dl A Dm nd tU mila r 18 SIF Modification for lFF 19 Radar Intercepters 20 AN fPA-4 Radar Repeaters 21 Navigation radar 22 AN SQJ -23 B SONAR 23 AN SQf -4 SONAR vith RM' AN SQJ3-4 SONAR 24 17 35 end 81milar ll 2 8 4 SONAR 26 Light SONAR for FPB 27 TMK 6 Noise Generators FANFARE 28 Launcher Rocket Tubes for submarines 29 MK 32 Launcher Rocket 30 • Anti-ship Launcher rocket tubes 31 A 3 MK 44 MOD l ToXPedos 25 32 e PANORAMIC ASAP 33 • AN CQ -1 SUB-10-534 53 309 34 Range Recorder 35• VDT for SONAR 43 44 1 4 8 15 18 · 28 1 217 12 15 2 4 6 36 · Launching Computer for FBP 37 SONAR Interceptor for SSK 38 SONAR Hydrophone system•for SSK 39 SONOBUOY Receiver for FPB 40 Sonobuoys 41 Feeding Cables for ·J MK 6 Bell 42 23 16 5 5 1 654 20 4 Bell Helicopters HPS CBR Defense Equipment 9 AR MK 36 Ammunition 45 5 38 7 200 87 000 46 47 48 3 50 3 50 50 51 MK 71 Proximity Fuzes MK 72 Proximity Fuzes 8oo ' 221 100 2 88o 40 MM 49 105 Rocket Illuminator 3 340 41 200 52 90 50 USA with MI'S Q Fuzes 53 90 50 ·usA Proximity Fuzes 54 7 62 NATO Cartr l dges 55 56 57 58 18 600 15 000 5 000 000 63 000 7 500 Hand Grenades Anti-man Mines AMI Bombs 10 000 AMI Charges 100 000 2 JJ Plq a 'q tNM W Jr29b3bQNN a µc n nv G31 1SS'tfl33G 't JI ll t 'W c • AL t 1 1 1_ t' - k c 1- r my List Parachutes CMP-55 r Awdllary Parachutes 3 Parachute 0 pen on Commend 4 Parachute for Light F quipment 5 Parachute tor Light Equipment E I G 59 6 Parachute for medium Equipment G 12 7 Parachute for Rvy Equipment G llA 8 Single containerr type A 9 Single container type C 10 tbiversal Harness ll SAVr P Light Containers 12 A 5 Light containers 13 A _7 A light container 14 i 10 light container 15 Ji 21 light containers 16 Floating container 17 Container for Air Launohing M tion 18 A 22 medium container 19 Platfo nn parts AM 1 20 Braces Monorail 21 Hydraulic Hooks 250 22 • Hydraulic Hooks 1 000 23 - 'lhru 27 not used 28 81 light mortars 29 4 2MM mortars 30 J ' mortars 31 3 5 rocket launcher 32 155MM Hows Towed 33 155 MM Cannons Gun 34 811 Hows towed 35 Command Posts for wire guided rockets SS 10 1 2 I f 36 37 A M G rt cdium range active rockets SS-10 Long Range active rockets SS-10 38 39 li o 41 42 43 44 45 • 46 47 48 Ammunition Hond Grenades Heat rifle anti-tank bombs Rifle Grenades 7 62 NATO cartridge 50 Cal cartridges M-72 Anti-tank Anti-tank 57 recoiless H E Anti-tank 57 recoiless W P Anti-tank heat 88 rockets Anti-tank 90 62 HECAR HE Anti-tank 90 32 IIECAR AP m 5 421 979 935 855 1 231 205 338 1 095 250 24 000 2 500 3 900 30 130 28 1 300 18 8 12 190 90 000 37 000 eoo ooo 422 000 745 000 18 000 000 18 310 000 39 Boo 32 970 1 000 4oo ooo 18 800 13 000 ' - ' ' --· 3 Jf-1 fd O VtNN W a Ji29b3bQMV- 12 334 10 925 930 1 853 2 669 1 294 3 369 1 669 2 037 µC ' n' G3l HSS Jl330 I SE C l 1r _ 11 C 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 6li 65 66 67 67 68 6 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 Bo 81 82 83 • • • ' Anti-tonk 90 50 HE Pcrcusoion y Anti-tonk 90 50 Im 11A D C 11 - Anti-tank 90 50 A P C Anti-tank 90 50 HV-AP Anti-tank 90 50 WP 4- Anti-tank lo6 recoiless HEP-T Mortar Bombs 81 semi-steel Mortar Bamba 81 W P Mortar Bomba 107 H E J t rtar Bombs 107 W P Mortar Bombs 107 illwninating Mortar Eombs 120 light l 10rtnr Eombs 120 heavy Anti-tank 40 70 HE-I T Anti-tank 40 70 A P inti-tonk 105 22 H E percussion inti-tank 105 22 H E A D E 11 flnti-tank 105 22 HE-AT flnti-tonk 105 22 WP Anti-tank 105 22 illvmlnating Anti-tank 155 23 Percussion Anti-tank 155 23 H E 11 A D E 11 Anti-tonk 155 23 w o Anti-tank 155 23 illuminating Anti-tank 155 1•5 H E percussion Anti-tank 155 45 H E A D E 11 Anti-tank 155 45 W P 155 45 launching charges Anti-tank 03 5 HE ·• -· _ 197 000 100 000 226 000 130 000 33 000 21 800 610 000 88 000 658 000 162 400 12 900 259 000 36 000 51 0 000 45 000 1 500 000 374 000 163 000 240 000 13 600 500 ooc 166 000 62 000 10 500 20 800 36 500 27 400 17 120 163 000 En5ineer Egui 2mcnt Service Lie ht Dull dozers 94 Pneumn tic mechanicoJ equipment with built1n motor on Wheeled cranes 196 Traclc cranea crawler type 45 Trucks vi th dwnp body 761 Crane truck mounted 10-ton ll7 l dnes AP 15 500 000 Outboard raotors 25 HP 191 Communicntion r crviccs Radio station plo toon company Radio station company-bo tto lion 86 Radio station batto lion-1·cciinent 87 Radio station div1 1on 88 Ro dio station vchic ula r low-power P p 89 Radio station v-chicuJ o r hich-po-wer G P 84 85 4 ' ____ 1 'ro 7 Q ftl'iM 39 i a e'9b3b0N V µC r 'y' 031 HSS'tf1J30 8 000 12 000 4 300 1J 2 3 820 98 c $ 1 CIl E 1' ·-· · p ·• · Telephone Central with 10- lines 90 91 92 93 94 95 l'ield phones ·- Field teletypevriters Radio relay Telephone tem1 nel F V • Te1egraph1c equi pment F V 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 Motorization Service Medium heavy tractors 25-ton Tracked tractors M-4 type S P Howitzer 105 MM S P Howitzer 155 MM Tank recc very vehicle Light aircraft port aircraft Recon helicopters Transport helicopters I i 2 423 12 000 300 533 340 aa 530 2 IJOO 250 21 296 124 J 6 92 F stimated total cost •••••••••••••••···$1•4 bill 1on Cleared by OASD I L Mr DeSilva Prepared BY J l JJt Jci O fd'iN 39 a pz9bJbQMV ci nv 03l 1 SSV7330 Mr P A Gerardi OP SD ISA ILN 30 Jan 1963 i ' _' -• • • REPROOUCED AT THE NATIONAi ARCHIVE MR GILPATRIC •s ·VI01T To ROME ' j - 11-1 2 Feb l 963 M-113 C PProduction p Ito J y General Summary Ite lie n industry is submitting to Itollnn M D Andreotti cost and delivery estimate for the co-production in Ite ly or an estimo tcd 2 000 3 000 M-1 l 3 Armored Fersonnel Carriers The Italian firm OTO-MELARA a government-owned subsidiary ho a al rcaey- signed a co-production agreement with FMC Corporation the U S producer of the M-1 l 3 subject w the approve l of both governments It is anticipated that Mr Andreotti will propose that the U S o nd I sign a co-production agreement In anticipation or such a request it is expected that a governmentto-govcrnment agreement will have been coordin ted with the U S and Ital ie n Governments and Yill be rce ey for signo ture o t the l 2 February meeting Attached hereto for your use are l A talking paper for use with Mr Andreotti requesting his decision e s to whether a co-production program is considered economical and fee sibl e and outl ining your desire 'that such a progrem shoul d be conducted primarily between the industrio 1 firms involved with appropriate Governmental monitorship 2 A government-to-government e creement which will have al rca dy been coordinated with the Italian M D and copies furnished to Mr Andreotti You will be given copies of the final e greeme t for cons'UlllillD tion with Mr Andreotti during the 12 Februnry meeting 3 A detail ed background summary ot the events related to the co-production program proposal 4 A paper to be used should Mr Andreotti raise the question U S position of possible sales of M-l 13 Personnel Carriers or pnrts to both the U S and other countries from Ital ion production sto rtiD6 in CY 1 965 NOTE The question of U S parts support for the 1 000 M-1 l 3 Carriers to be suppl led from U S production by June 1 963 is covered in the paper on COOPERATIVE u GISTICS as to the Cleared by OIISD I L Mr DeSilva Prepared by Mr P A Gerardi ON D ISA rilJ 30 Jo nuary 1 963 ·-· - ' i t - i -• · REPROOUCED AT THE NATIONN AAClfVES statement by 1 Mr Roswell L Gilpatric t Secret ot Defense United states In Rome Italy on 11 l 2 Feb 3 ' M-ll 3 CO-PRODUCTION IN ITALY r I am sure you ember that during your visit to the United states in September ot la st year you raised the question of a possible coproduction program involvillg participation by Italian industry 1n the manu facture of M-113 Armored Personnel Carriers I believe you had in mind that e dditione l personnel carriers over and above the 1 000 carriers to be delivered rran u s production by June of this year vould be met by such a co- production program You 'Will recall that at that time both Secretary McNamara and Dcyselt suggested that you consider the economics ot the situation and the urgent need for an early delivery of persoMel ce rrierr to the Italian ' rm I coni'inned Jicy suggestion in a letter to you 1n November 1n vhich I recommended that you seriously consider the purchase of all of your personnel carrier requirements from U S production and I assured you that we could deliver 3 000 carriers by the end of 1963 at an extremely low price from an established u s production capacity In making this offer ot early avail- ability I vas reaff1ming the U S policy that the requirements of the combat forces of o Allies will be g ven equal priority with those of u s military forces in the allocation of duction capabilities u s pro- offer of 3 000 carri before the end of 1963 included the diver ion of production vhich had already been scheduled tor the u s A rar I• 119 f J d 0 ftl 'N 3 j 8 r29b3bQNJv k JC ' nV 03l 1 SS'tfl 30 -- - - - - -- - -- - -- - - -- - - -- - -- - - - - - • - _ F JfJ' ' _ Hovever I understand that there are spcie 1 -econamic and political ' • ' considerations vhich require the participation ot Italian industry the meeting of ItaJ ian Army requirement ctor personnel carriers Government and industry officials f'rom both the U s and Italy have been conducting numerous discussions o vays and means to conduct a coproduction progrem should our tvo governments - e that such a program is feasible end desµ-able I understend that your industry otticials have provided you vith their estimates ot what the M-113 Personnel Carrier wuld cost and 1n what tilne-freme it could be delivered under a co-production program I vould like to hear trom you wether in the light ot these costs and delivery est fJnates you have decided to press tozvsrd with a co-production program At this point it is anticipated that Minister Andreotti in the light of the fact that an industry to-industry agreement has already been Gigned between FMO Corp and oto•Melara subject to government approval ' will indicate that tor various reasons which he may or he desires that a co-production program be carried out it is recommended that you continue as may not specify In this case follows In view of your decision I recommend that ve agree to the following general procedure on carrying out a co-production program A First - a government-to-government agreement should be consummated between ourselves 'lllis eg ement would outline the scope Ii of the program the responsibilities of each government under the I progrQJll ji and would provide for the rog am to be qarried out primarily on an industry-to-industry basis v1th such monitorship by our governments so as to insure that the co-production is carried out in the most efficient manner l l 9-a 0 'qt'tNN 39 a 29b3bQNJV- 1- µc 11 nv 03B SSV1J30 0 B Secon - industry-to-industry angements and 't' ' contracts should be entered into by O'ro-Melara and FMC Corporation and reviewed and ewproved by our govermnen I ·understand that such an industry-to-industry agreement is consummated pending Covernmental proval c - our governments ahou1d de signate representatives to monitor the co-production program and establish appropriate governmental-industry relationships to 1naure that the program is successf'Ully cO J Tied out r I A propo_ s ed govermnent-to-government agreement has already been started between our governments end I believe ve cen both sign 1t nov end pemit the co-production program to move ahead as quickly as possible NOTE Itallan MOD will have already cleared the agree- ment and you end Mr Andreotti should consummate the agreement which will be f'Urn 1shed you prior to your meeting Prepared by Cleared by OASD I L Mr DeSilva Mr P A Gerardi OP SD IJ A mi 30 3 l l 1 d 0 'ft NN W 8 J 29b3bQMV- c ' nV 03 3 SSV7 30 January 1963 't ' •· MEMJRANDUM OF UNDER mG THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF 'fHE GO rERNMENT OF ITALY AND THE DEPARrMENT OF DEFENSE OF TffE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RELATmG TO THE CO-ORDINATED PRODUCTION OF THE M-113 SERIES OF ARM RED PERSONNEL CARRIER This government to government agreement will be developed and coordinated within DOD and the Italian Ministry of Defense prior to your arr1val in Rome and will be rea for your review on the morning of 11 February to be conswmna ted on 12 February Prepared Cleared by OASD I L Mr DeSilva DA AllC Col Abrino 99 qa 7 0 W'4N W ia Jre b3b QNTv C ' 'f G311 SS'tJl 3G by P A Gerardi OASD ISA II1i ·• -· MR GILPATRIC'S VIS ci ro 'ROME ll-12 Febniary 1963 M-ll 3 Co-Production t1i 1IteJ y Background Paper EVENTS TO DATE A During his visit to the U S ·1n September ·1962 Italian Minister ot Defense Andreotti agreed in principle to a program of purchases of U S equipment which included M-113 Anoored Personnel Carriers At that time Mr Andreotti indicated that while he could o gree to en initial purchase of thei Je Carriers from U S production to meet ureent Ital ian Aney requirements further Italian requirements would have to be met through a program which would include participation by Italian industry B The Italian Army had originally intended to meet its Armored Personnel Carrier requirements through a combined procurement and production program involving the French AMX Personnel Carrier Involved in the proposed production program were the firms of OTO-MELARA a government-owned subsidiary FIAT and LANCIA When the Ital ion Army chose the M-ll 3 Carrier in lieu of the French AMX Carrier some means had to be found to provide these three firms with the equivalent production which had been al lotted to them under the proposed French AMX production program c At the time of his visit Secretary McNamara and Deputy Secretary Gilpatric attempted to dissuade Mr Andreotti from his proposal to meet further Italion Carrier requirements from a program of coproduction During this period GenereJ Aloia Italinn Army Chief of Staff visited the production facilities in Co lifornia for the M-ll 3 Carrier and advised the FMC president that the talion Army requirements of about 4 to 5 thousand personnel carriers would be met through the initial purchase of about 1 000 carriers from U S production with the remainder to be produced under a co-production program involving Italia n industry D Al most immediately following the Andreotti visit a tcom of Ital ion industry representatives visited the U S to investigate the · possibility of a co-production program for the M-113 Carrier This teem consisted of representatives from OTO-MELARA the governmentowned subsidiary FIAT and LANCIA the same ·group which hod been chosen to produce the French AMX Carrier This team accompanied by Mr Gerardi from OASD ISA visited the FMC production facil t ties in California for a general orientation _ Jf the production i roc •si 's'·· · 1 involved The FMC Corporation was extremely reluctant to discuss its engineering know-how with the Ite lian representatives since there 99Jq J 7 Q W'tM 39 a Ji29b3b0NJV µe 11 nv 03 SSv'7 30 _ _ - r • -- - •- •·• REPROOUCED AT THE NATIOW I AACIMS ·• -· are few proprietary ric hts involved in the M-ll3 Carrier most of the rights owned by the U S Army on the grounds that disclosure of this knov-how jeopardized the confi e ny's ability to maintain its competitive position over other tJ S firms F v£ Corporation ho s won eveey contract for the production of the M-ll3 Carrier an incident which has incurred Congressional investigation The Visit was conducted and the Italian representatives expressed satisfaction over the resuJ ts thereof During their Visit a hypothetical program involving co-production was developed e x d presented to the Ito lio n industey representatives based on available knowledge of Ito 1ian industry capabilities for producing aluminum a noor plo te magnesium castines n nd other similar items involving a high degree of engineering technology At the c ame time the OASD ISA representative attempted to impress the Italian industey representatives with the necessity that a co-production progrem be undertaken only in those areas vhere the Itol ian Army requirements coul d be met promptly and without excessive cost differcntieJ This concept appeared to meet with re acceptance by the privately owned firms FIAT and LANCIA but was met with indifference by the government-owned firm of OTO IELARA represented by a retired Admiral Bigliardi E In en attempt to discourage further ItaJ ian Government consideration of a co-production proposal a letter from Deputy Secretary Gilpatric to Its lion MOD Andreotti was hand-carried to Italy in November 1962 in which the U S proposed that the entire Italian Army requirement of some 3 000 personnel carriers be met from U S production at extremely low prices and with comP lete delivery including diversion f'rom U S P r ey- production contracts within Cnlcndar Year 1963 This attempt va s apparently unsuccessful and met with no reaction F During their November 1962 visit to Italy in connection with the finalization of the $136 million purchase program signed between Italy and the U S and the initiation of a cooperative logistics arrangement Messrs Kuss and Gerardi OASD ISA Visited the FIAT LANCIA and OTO-MELARA facilities Their genereJ conclusions as transmitted to General Aloia Italian P r ey- Chief' of Staff was that FIAT and LANCIA had the engineering end ent resources to carry out a co-production progrem even if the work for social ond econ omic reasons had to be carried out nt the OTO-MELARA facility in Le Spezia It became readily apparent that OTO-MELARA intended to use the contract to rehabilitate certain large buildings destroyed during WW II through the Italian Army contract to produce M-ll3 Co rriers G In a letter to Seoreta ry McNamara in December 1962 Itn 11 an -DD Andreotti apparently confirmed his desires for a co-production program for the M-ll3 Carrier by formally designating OTO-MELARA as the Italian industry agency to carry out such co-production and 2 requested that the U S provide this i'inn 'Witlr the specifications for the M-113 Carrier antC to permit to visit the F1 c production facility in California production ond cost data for the preparation of an the vehicle would cost if co-produced 'With Italian dra wings and Italian tcchnicjo no in order to obtain estimate of rbat industry I-I Innne d ie tcly following the letter to Secretary Mcllamara Profce sor Magri Director of FII MECCANICA which controls over forty It a lien industricJ firms for the Italian Government including OTO- iIBLARA visited Deputy Sccrcte ry Gilpatric for the purpose of acquiring the g-113 drawings and specifications and to visit FMC Corporation to be in initial preparations leading to a co-production progrrun I• The drc 'Will s ond apecifications were furnished to the Italion Government several d icys after the request was received and a letter sent from Deputy Secretary Gilpatric to the President of FMC Corp ou·tlinina Professor Magri' s mission and indicating the U s Government's interest in the proposed co-production program J DurinB December 1962 a U S Army project manager was dcsigno tcd to implcmc11t the M-113 co-pi oduction program when and if it ·wao consWI lT' a tcd and to assist in the development of a govcrnment-tocovcrnmcnt o c rcen1cnt and more detailed arrangements related to the proerron proposal 1- During Januo ry 1$63 work proceeded on the development of a draft covcnuncnt-to-covcrr JI1cnt aerecmcnt which would be consmn rnate d dui P r the Gil1 0 tric-Andrcotti meeting in Rome in February 1963 should tlle Italian l OD conclude thnt a co-production progro m wao de sirable This aerccmcnt was developed by representatives of the U S Army OASD ISA Office of General Counsel OSD nnd coordino tcd with OASD I L The draft agreement was ha nd-can-icd t Rome and agreement obtained from the It aJ ion MOD representatives Lt Cen S Ca mr u designated to work on the agreement L Durine January 1963 Corporation and OTO-MELARA rco ched agrccm -nt on industry-to-industry arrangements relative to a co-production o rrangcmcnt subject to the approval of both the U S and ItoJ 1 an Governments It is understood that this agreement envisages complete technical assistance by F°r C Corporation to the Italian firm with f c - r baaed on a sliding scale The fees are based on the pcrcento cc of U S purchases made For those carriers where manufacture by the Italian firm is lOo of all components the fee is slightly over $1400 per carrier Where all items are ordered by the U S the fee is zero It is understood that the Italian firm intends to order fifty carriers disassembled during the last half of Ca l ndar Year 1963 This will permit the firm to make some token delivcrico JPJt1 d O W'tN 39 9 -pz9b3bQNIV c ri v 03l SSv1330 - c ·--· _ · to the Italian Army er delivery of the last of the 1 1 000 Carriers in June 1 963 from U S production under the_purchase program signed in November 1 962 During this perio the Italian firm intends to tool up and be capabl e of producing · 50 Carriers partly vith IteJ ian components and partly from U S components during CY 1964 Another 1 000 Carriers are intended to be produced dnring CY 1965 and possibly en e dditional 1 000 Carriers during CY 1966 · M Immediately following the industry-to-industry arrangement in January 1 963 an informal request was s u bmitted to permit nine Italian technicians to visit F 1 in California to obtain detailed production and cost a a ta so that an over-e l l cost estimate could be provided to Ite l ian M D Andreotti for his February Meeting vith Deputy Secretary Gilpatric The President of Ff C Corporation despite his signed · contract vith OTO-MELARA re f'used to permit the transfer of such information without formal approval of the U S Department of Defense n response to bis telegram to Mr Gilpatric such approval was ·granted These technicians have gathered the necessary production and cost data and are submitting their cost estimates to Italian K D Andreotti ANTICIPATED FUTURE EVENTS A It is anticipated that regardless of any cost differentials contained in the cost estimates submitted to Mr • Andreotti by Italian industry Mr • Andreotti vill request that a co-production program for the furnishing of M-113 Carriers for the Italian kt my be consummated D To the above end a government-to-government agreement should be consummated outlining the responsibilities of each government and the general terms under which such a program will be implemented It is expected tp e t despite last-minute changes an agreement vill be f'ul ly coordinated vith the U S DOD and the Italian M D end be ready for Mr Gilpatric' s signature when he arrives in Rome C Following the government-to-government agreement formal industryto-industry arrangements should be submitted to each Government f 'nr review and approval to insure that the co-production program w • 1 r-be carried out in an equitable end expeditious JIWUler D Es ch Government should then exercise such moni torship ovet-· - ' '' ' the industry-to-industry arrangements e s to insure the successful implementation of·the program Cleared by Prepared by OASD I L Mr DeSilva 4 Jl 9'd 7 Q W'IH 39 l a pz9b3bQNJV- µC ' V 03l l SSV7J30 Mr P A Gerardi O ASD ISA ILN 30 January 1963 - I iREPROOUCED l Tit NATIONAi ARCHVES · ' Mr Gilpatr c's Visit to Rome-- 11•12 February 1962 · Possible Sales ot M-113 Carriers lad Spare Parts From Italian Product On During the discussions on the M-ll3 co-production program or on the general subject of cooperative logistics Minister Andreotti may express an Italian desire to sell M-ll3 Armored Personnel Carriers or spare parts for such carriers to the U S or other users starting in CY 1965 Representatives of Oro-Melara the government-owned firm selected by the Italian Government have already broached this subject to OSD representatives and MAAG Italy believes the question arise It is recommended that he be advised as follows 'lhe United states has produced many thousands of these personnel carriers and will probably continue to produce them for some time to come In view of the high inventory of Carriers and parts that we will have for many years and since we now have in the United States two production sources for the veb i le it is unlikely that production capacity in the United States will be curtailed for m e ny years However ' I would not want to discount the possibility that there may come a time when purchases might be made from Ital ian sources ''With respect to the provision of spare parts for M-ll3 Carriers in the hands ot other countries the United States will ot course continue to supply such parts fran United States production 1n the case of countries receiving grant aid from my goven µnent Where countries intend to purchase Carriers or spare parts the question should be taken up on a case-by-case basis In the final run the selection as to where purchases ere made will probably be detemined on the basis of the lowest price and the quickest delivery times available f'rom the several sources I Cleared by OASD I L Mr DcSilva Mr P A Gerardi OASD ISA D B 30 Jan 63 - -·-- u STATEMENT BY MR ROSWELL L • t 1ULP MRIC DEPUTY SECRET ARY OF DEFENSE UNl'lED STATES IN ROME ITALY AND BONN GERMANY ll-12 AND 13-14 FEBRUARY 1963 F-lo4o LACK OF ALL-WEATHER CAPABILITY I Introductory Statement The F-lo4o airplane as currently configured is not an allweather interceptor This arises from lack of canpe tibility between the present N ASARR North American Search and Ranging Radar and any of the all-weather air-to-air missiles coupled with the tact that the Consortium bas not determined the all-weather missile that 1s to be employed in co junction wi'th the N ASARR fire control system II Discussion The production program 1n Europe 1s considered to have made excellent progress especially when considering the number of nations producing the air lane The airplane will be effective in the strike close support e nd reconnaissance roles The airplane could be made effective as an · all-weather interceptor Expenditure o r considerable ad di tiona1 ' I development money is required to develop this cape bill ty However ·- as now configured the F-lo4G is an xcellent clear air mass·interceptor and has a limited all-weather capability similar to the F-86D K with guns and 2 75 11 rockets _ 99 fa O W'tN 9 9 Je9b3bQNJ'v µCL V G3l l SSV7J30 - ---- L' The most compelling problem before us 11' 1 t is decided to develop a ful ly int grated air to ·all veather capability for the air defense roles in NA'IO is that of seeing that reliability o f' the electrical components i1 materially improved There have been several improvements developed and incorpor ted into the NASARR during the last 18 months 'lbrough these measures relia- bility and maintainability have been improved by 50 Increasing the performance and reliability of the HAS ARR will not provide tul J all-weather capability un t ess an el 1weather mis• ile is integrated into the weapon system It is my understanding th- four Consortium sta f'f represent- atives met last December and again in January to discuss · t e air defense role ot the F-lo4G with the objective of reaching joint f'our-country position on al 1-weath r mod 1 fications to the airplane and subsequent to e meeting scheduled to be held in Rome on 26 February a joint position will be presented to SH APE for consideration III Conclu sion r consider it essential that the nsortium evel op with u s assistance as required reasonable perforinance specifications -ror the NASARR so that the Consortium _v ill have a solid base from which to exact contractor compliance Increasing the performance o f' the N SARR is needed regardless of' forthcoming country decisions on the al 1-weather missiles and modifications to the airplane for this capability w fJa a w'tN w ia Je9b3b QNJ'v NµCti' V 03 HSSv'lJ3G _ --- · y 1 - • cbnic l arr gements betveen the USO and Consortium countl ies provide that the Consortium pr ecl aircratt vill have an allveather strike nd an ll-veathe interceptor capability nte · f mdameptal requirement to provide the F-104G vith an all-veatber · - capability is an all-veatber missile vith associated modifications _ 1 the r s llts ot the Oonsortium air staff meetings and SHAPE's j - -- consideration ot the four-country position viU be the deciding factor on - course ot action to p%'9Tide or not provide e F-lo4q vith an all-weather interceptor capabJlity Based on the results ot the Consortium meeting Joint country decisions and SHAPE recOIID ndations the USO vould coosider a request to participate in an improvement progr8lll to provide an integrated all-weather s1stem for U S MAP F-lOl G oirplo ncs -·- -l C ' • MR GILPATRIC' S VISIT TO ROME 11-12 February 1963 it P'-104o IACK OP' ALL-WF ATHER CAPABILITY Background 1'1 per The requirement tor this paper stems trom a conversation betwe e n the Minister ot Detense ot Ital y' Mr Andreotti Secretary McNamara and Assistant Secretary lfitze on 13 December 1962 at the NATO Building Paris France vhere Mr Andreotti then referred to a concern that the P'-104o's vould not be effective as all-veather fighters Mr McNamara said he would have to prepare h1mselt on the question and would talk to Mr Andreotti about it later The Air Detense posture ot KAro Forces is presently being studied Most recent intonation is contained in a Weapon System Evaluation Group WSEG study Aspects ot HAro Air Defense Report No 67 15 November 1962 TOP SECRET prepared as a result ot Sec Def's memorandum ot 2 October 1962 C· Final evaluation ot this study ms not been completed by JCS Nevertheless it points up the tact and is in consoD4 lce with the German position see attached cable trom Bonn that the air defense posture in NATO and weapon system requirement are in need or reassessment · the Inasmuch ae the uajor financial' burden in the Consortium occurs to the substance ot the paper is also applicable to the FRG mo It vould be belpf'Ul it Mr Gilpatric could bring up the question AWX capability vith the FRG We need to know vbat their plans are in this regard We have heard all kinds ot figures ot the P'-lO Jo a In 'l'rienn1aJ Review FRG requested that AWX Squadrons be reduced trom 8 to 4 b The vant to reduce numbers of FRG AWX aircraft fran 225 to 191 They w nt to increase numbers of strike aircrart We have further heard that FRG AF is considering el1rn1M ing AWX entirely This vould be at variance vith technical arrangements their plans C 'nle technical arrangements between the USO and Consortium countries positions vhich are quoted in a cable from Mr Levy DEFREPNAMA to Secretary McNamara prescribe the aircraft produced by the Consortium countries will be contigurated tor the all-weather interceptor missions see attached DEFREPNAMA cable Attachment a s Preinred by 12 YEAJ ------ i 9 V'tNM 39 8 ro mGRADED AT INTERVALS NO ' AUl'OMATI - - DF£IASSIFIED DOD Dm 5 1fZQ r 7 29bJbQJVN ° l' C ' nV 03l HSSV1330 MA Planning Div Col c R Tankersley 29 January 1963 SECJRET 0 ·- - COORDillAnOJI Air P'orce - Brig dier General Dngaley Joint Statt- Ma lor General Callahan Col Dnel Bammaeen EurReg - Colonel Bad tu Lt Colonel Dl1tt - Oeneral Wood 1n1'orme4 Br1ga41er General Steel intormed - 2 l99JJ• t0 Vr 'IU 7 2963bQNN W 9 µ 03 JISSY1J30 REPROOUCED AT THE NATIONM ARCHIVES r ·· ' · MR GILPA'IRIC'S VISIT-'IU ROME ii-12 February 1963 Background Paper · r T ITALIAN DEFENSE EFFORT AND EOONOMIC CAPABILifiF S Estimated Italian defense expend tures for 1963 of $1 4 billion will be about 41 greater than for 1962 thus con inuing the trend established over the last several years and currently projected for the future Expressed as a percentage of gross national product GNP however J1963 expenditures will remain at about 3 6' well below the high of 4 5 o in 1951 which marked the beginning of the re-establishment of the Italian Armed Forces Currently planned defense budget increases of about 4 annually are little more than adequate to meet rising operation and maintenance costs over the years ahead An estimated add 1 tional $2 illion is required to bring Italy's 1966 forces up to established NAro equipping standards• To meet this modernization requirement two significant steps have been taken the financing of which has not yet been included in budget projections First late in 1961 the Italian Defense Ministry was authorized to incur obligations of up to $275 million over and above the basic budget for procurement from Italian industry of critically needed materiel to be delivered over the succeeding three years but for which n t woul d extend over a six-year period Secon lly in November 1962 Italy entered into a credit arrangement with the u s whereby payment for $125 million of u s defense articles and services plus about $11 million in interest changes will be de over a five-year period • Both of these measures are obvious steps in the right direction They will in fact have the effect of forcing bu laet increases larger then those now planned However w1th remaining deficiencies in excess of $1 5 billion and with the u S hopetu lly seeking continuing defense sales to Italy at an annual rate of about $100 million it is equally clear that even greater efforts on part of Italy ere both necessary and deserving of the strongest encouragement The magnitude of' the financial effort required is in the order of a 20 increase over the current defense budget and sustained annual defense expenditures at no less than 4'1 of GNP The significant yet modest increase in the defense effort now underw was generated initially as Italy's response to the threatening Berlin ay situation in 1961 Tb is response was generally good and consistent with u s views as to what was required under the circumstances It served also to reawaken Italian authorities to the serious·def'iciencies already present within the defense establishment and to the even greater problem of modernization that ley ahead The momentum thus developed and subsequent recognition by Italian authorities of the seriousness 0 the U S balance of PEcyments problem were major factors leading to the million purchase from the u s i 125 DOWNGRADED AT l2 YEAR lm'ERVLAS NOT AU'roMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED DOD Dm 5200 10 · -· N9J9'd O ' ' 'q' NM 3f - i a jrl9b3bQN V µc - 0 G H l SSv'l 30 ·' • REPROOOCED AT 0£ NATOUI MOMS Principal current and projected d ciencies in the Ita1ian Armed Forces are operational reserves of equipment and supplies logistical support units technically trained and trainable manpower and an everincreasing obsolescence in such basic major equipnent categories as armored vehicles artillery aircraft and ships 'lhese deficiencies are certainly apparent to Italian authorities and there are indications that insofar as they are willing to do something about them priority vill be accorded to improvement in conventional t' rces Th it would seem that a good foundation exists for further increases in the Italian defense ettort the 1 mdamental problem remains one of developing the necessary political determination to proceed An indication of the capabill ty ot the Italian economy to sustain a defense effort of the magnitude required together v l th some ot the dif'f'iculties that may be encountered is presented 1n the following paragraphs Since 1951 Italy's GNP has more than doubled to an estimated $40 billion tor 1963 'l'his continuing advance refiects one of the higheSt growth rates in Europe averaging 5 to 6 percent per year · The largest expansion has taken place in the industrial sector which has shovn an average annual increase of 7 to 8 percent After reaching a spectacu1ar rate of about 1 in 1961 industrial activity has -somewhat slackened but production still stands at more than twice the pre-World War ll level of output despite considerable var damage to plants and facilities The Italian Government has purpued caretul trade and fiscal policies during the post-var years making the lira one of' the most stable currencies 1n Europe Since 1949 the lira has not changed appreciably in value tram the present rate of 625 to the dollar At the moment the net gold and foreign exchange reserves are well above three b1lllon doll are among the largest national reserves in the world Balancing these favorable aspects of' the Italian economy are a number of chronic problems Although great success has been achieved in recent years 1n reducing unemployment it still hovers around the million mark or about 5 of the total labor forces with a much larger number estimated to be under-employed The per capita gross national product is still among the lowest in Europe averaging sllghtzy less than seven hundred dollars There is a continuing wide divergence between average income for northern and southern provinces despite large government and government-sponsored investment and development in the south Average incomes in northern provinces run about double those in the south and in extreme cases even five times as much ' 'lllere is also an enormous disparity between income levels within the population and striking evidence everywhere ot luxury and even opulence among the most-privileged classes Moreover resistance to payment ot direct taxes particularzy income taxes has tended to heighten government Jl l q'd 0 V't YN 39 Q'9b3bQMv 9 Jc ri nv G3 1 SSV1330 '' REPROOIJCED AT THE NATlONAI ARCIMS · reliance on indirect taxes which pro e about three-quarters of state revenue Although great improvement fd 'being made and the percentage o-t revenue from income taxes is constantly increasing the alleged inequity of the Italian tax system is the object ot persistent criticism by progressives and le rtist forces who demand structural reform ot the economic system Italy should be able to alJ ocate greater resources to defense when its GNP bas doubled and its gold and short-term dollar reserves have risen from $571 million in 1950 to $3 3 billion today Thia wealth should permit Italy to meet its essential detense requirements without outside assistance However the pressures on the government to use public funds for pressing socio-economic purposes are so great and the 1 mportance ot its doing soi order to maintain at least the degree ot political stability it has toda¥ so vital that it will be ditticult to secure annual increases in detense tunds sufficient to meet forecast needs Such pressure increasingly strong during the put several years bas become nearly irresistible since Premier Fanfani embarked upon the adventurous opening to the lef't in March 1962 While this uneasy arrangement with the Italian Socialists has not yet resulted in any disservice to Italy's Western orientation or to its ties to NA'IO the many programs now competing for government expenditures may tempt some Italian politicans to revise the high priority tormerly given to def'ense and to NA'IO Attached is a tabulation of pertinent economic data attachment as stated -- Prepared by Lt col D D Dutt Revised European Region OASD ISA 28 Janu ry 1963 -· l l 9'd cQ WVN W a i 9b3bQNN t µc 'lnv G3l 1 SSV1 30 ----·---------- nt1•nll 11JCLO Al lltli MAIIOIIM MltlllVU l SECIRE'll' 1 -m GILPATRIC' B VISIT TO N J P BONN AND MJ DllID ll - 17 Fob 1963 DIBARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL Bo ckground Paper Oenero l and Compleh Disarmament OCD 'l'hia remain• the pr1mor1 objective ot tho Genova Conterenc Since submission ot the USSR and US proposal• in March and April ot 1962 thero has boon little te nsible evidence ot progre11 in this area Thus tar tho US and USSR cochairmen have developed a dra rt ot tho first tour articles ot a Joint GCD treaty However tho bro cketed unresolved treaty 1ongu ogo in thie dra rt still renecta some ot the major points ot disogreement which are elimination ot all foreign bases and nuclear doliver y vehicles in Stage I extent ot personnel reductions in the Dotense eatablisbmento and the time re uired to carry out treaty provisions A change in the Soviet demand tor elimination ot al1 nuclear delivery vehicles during the t1rst stage ot a GCD treaty was 1nd1cated last fall when Oraeyko told a UN audience that tho USSR was willing to agree to the retention or a limited number or intercontinental missiles surfaco-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft missiles Although the matter was not developed in the subsequent session ot the Geneva Conterence it is possible that the post-Cuba atmosphere will provide a propitious atmosphere for a substantive arms control discussion The US position based on 3'of across-the-board cuts remains in rorce Nuclear Test Ban Efforts have included US offers of a ccmprehensive agreement involving on-site inspection ot underground testing as well as a limited agreement which prohibited testing in the atmosphere in outer space and underwater but did not involve on-site inspection The Soviets have rejected both offers insisting on a comprehensive treaty without on-site inspection Their proposal is of course unacceptable to the United States DOD works very closely- with ACDA in evaluating test ban proposals • In this regard the Defense Department bas been given the responsibility for implementing a program of study end experiment relnting to our capability to detect nuclear tests despite efforts to conceal them by decoupling or shielding Within DOD this program Project VELA has been carried out by the Advanced Research Projects Agency AF c and NASA have coordinated with the Defense Department 1n supporting this program · - IX WJ ' l I AT 3 Yl P i I TWV ALS DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS DOD DIR 5200 10 r -a 1 0 'ftNM 9°ia I fdb 3b0Nl'v uc ' nY I Q3 SSv1330 ·- 1 REPRODUCED Al THE NATIONAi ARCIMS · SE C·IR · l 'Il' Measures to Reduce the Risk of' W 7 A brief' on three measures exchange of' missions direct r nmnn1n1cations advance notification bas been circulated at Gemva on December l2 after consul tation among the Western Four at Geneva and consideration by NAC both of' whi ch were favorable The Soviet delegation was advised that the US is interested in serioua discussion on hot line cammunciations exchange of military- missions and advance notification The Soviets ha e not given any definitive response The position paper on advance notification of' military- movements and maneuvers is in abeyance since the JCS have basic objections to the concept It is expected that an acceptable version of advance notification will be apprOV'ed by the JC before the end of' January- The position papers on exchange of missions and direct ernnmnnj ations are ready tor tormal discussion in NAC and will probably be forwarded prior to the resumption of the ENDC in February Future Developments There is little hope that the discussion ot the present OCD proposals of'f'ered by the US and the USSR will bring significant result11 in the near ruture One reason is that both sides have taken positions of' such a nature that any real movement would appear to imrolve a major concession A more compelling re son is that the GCD proposals are so inclusive that progress is frustrated by the atteJIU t to reach agreement on all issues Even Stage I the US treaty outline ot 18 April 1962 were it in fact separable from the complete proposal is itself' too inclusive for fruit ruJ negotiation Accordingly a limited proposal has been produced within DOD with the purpose ot facilitating rapid agreement by virtue of its essential sim plicity It is expected that a USG position on the proposal will be forthcoming following the Principals Meeting now scheduled f'or 7 or 8 Februar y On Nuclear Test Ban It is understood that Mr 'Foster ACDA will ca rr on private negotiations with the Soviets in New York beginning the week of' 14 January 1963 Prepared by Cdr E 10 ine Jr OASD ISA Arms Control 29 January 1963 - 2 99 'a Q W'vN 39' 8 J 29b3b0Nfv µC ' n' G31 l SS'i1 3Q t · · MR GILPATRIC ts VISIT- TO ROME ll-12 February 1963 _ r LIST OF ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND MATERIAL · Separately Available 1n Rome · A Jupiter l ack-up Material 1 M Con Secretary McNamara-Minister Andreotti Paris December 1962 2 R plaoement of Jupiter Sub-Group J Paper 3 Mem Cons Prime Minister Fanfa ni visit January 1963 4 Jupiter and Related Actions Sec Def' Memorandum to JCS 5 Jupiter Withdrawal Planning Ass't Sec Def' ISA Memo to JCS 6 Use of Jupiters in European Space Program B And reotti letters to Sec Def on Nuclear Propulsion and M-113 Co-Production C Nuc1 ear Cooperation with Allies JCS Memo to Sec Def D Nuclear Cooperation' with Allies Exchange of' Correspondence between Deputy Secre t a ry Gilpatric and Mr Alex Johnson E u s F Cost Data on Polaris for Garibaldi G F-104G Briefing Brochure H MemCon Minister Andreotti _Visit to Washington October 1962 I MemCon Admiral Giuriati Meeting with Mr Gilpatric November 1962 Cooperation with Italy in the Civil Uses of' Atomic Energy J ani Visit Brief'ing Material WwNGRADED 12 YEAR nm RVALS NOT AU'l'OMAfICALLY DECIASSIFIED DOD DIR 5200 10 Jl9f¾'d 0 'tf'tNN 39 g J 29b3bQNJV- c n nv 031 HSS'efl 30 ' i I e J r - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 i R PMOOIJC OAI I HEtU TI ll1'lAACl-flltS - r ' l • u w i ' I -- _____ _ _j ir 1 1 _ _ - _ J'l · '- - i 1-' - l • • J1JID'II l'fA IB w D l l' 4 11· • DnllP l'fflaT -- '·ii i§'· 3 •P '• ' t t -·· '· r· •s 1-- 'f • ' - J 1' Jf Jl ' 1 l t c 1 I· I'll ' ' • l11'1'11 rrAt Y D BUCLEAR StmlWIID PROPOLSl'Olf 0 t 1bv ft - Nr ns f - - L ' ·et - • ' ' ' ' ' ' ' tl 't ' - - - arUW - a haft gt i o n I to the D aJ1ar J--t · ·a91' tR -ie 1D p IOJ ar IW 1 0 a1dffelop mnt - tor i QIIOlUceliJ7 tQJlar o r n t'enae Kin15ter ' 'IJd'O lI •• Wl C V dea _ _ tbp tbe OE '1 15'imada bt A1J1 w r 1a ldll4 • ' __ _ ' __ __I - - REPRODUCED ATTHE NATIONAL AACH1VES l't Illa-- -- -- 1au-q obv1 ou9 that to Uit rd tbe9e p1w could it Ts _ ' ' - tbe dnel - t of the IJm Jltc tar ' lnet i there WOU1 d • a • l o 4nJ n OD ltaU an et rart t and naourca which w belJfte a Dal4 be JIAm l'c ll'ae • well • to ccmvct 1oaal f'orce · ¥ n a4 fla4a nnt to •t abl1ah the at Jm'Ucd pktJm 1A the Mm 111 I r • to tba am - • • Ve ce tMtefm-e peraua4tld I t u14 wf eh GDUd Ull encl to tt aaalrequtrwta oaad t blg l IIQ'JC SQDnel w auclear nbaar1ne propil a1cD - ' I' ·- ' t• m- a ciua1aa ' -1'all' _ an - aa 1al role to »la S D tbe f • • • • •r l r • '-• J llAm ll l Ulau ral •w lem- l'crroe a 1 01• 1dllch ve rep f'4 a noce •ar • I• • ''' 1A 1ncraG11zla cooparat1Gll betveen the US mid to Nd m tecl mol acr M t h1a Jwoture w vould bope tbat t 1ta1 r VQ 114 lace all poeublo err i• t • ca tAiO Gd 1 c m 1D t» liDit 1U nationttl lluclw' emx-t to tba ra bar cteno1 mch1atr1a 1 coopexwtton pN M' 1q mdar tlB c d 8Ull4 Asx _t US•bltu 1'or 0 q c•tJ cm on hacef'Ul um or Atamic Ulrgy elate vbc tt 'bicow paaibl e to percebe Jm'9 Jt eaaa 1 itUl'e clarly the f'ull l DD80 l be Dm of' iq U catiQno Fo rce ha tor ol l Y1U be l N PU'G4 t o reocma tder tbe ••·lied -or tbe AU lauce• w m nuclftr vi th l't ' •• '' '' t • ' ' ' •• I • I ··f ' • ' ' I j 11 t l • ' ' I • e t I t t ' t If I • ' '·'- 'I ll l ·· t l ' ' 1 I' I ' •' ' 1 i I ' •' I I 1 1 ' • ' 'I ' ' ' 89 'f i -ea rt '4N J9' J-rl9b3bONIV g JO ' rlV 0 11 SSV1 3Q coopen t 1an pl D• I ror 1 • • i i rH rnvu ''- '' •• _ _ - and 1n this context m-e the sppl1cntion of' Italian efforts ' • t ••' • funds to conventionnl 't • 1 ' I' I • ' • • v ' 1• 0 •1 defense ' force mdernization and improvement and the • ·· ' 'T ·· support or the NAm 1-i tl til terai Nuclear· e• · •· • 'J ' ' ·1 ' 1' • To offer Itnly nuclear propulsion oasisto nce or no tional ly • ·• •• • ' • 1 I ' I • ' ' •'t f j manned and owed vecoele could be expected to 1 t_•' • and resources ' 1' I I'' energies ' • ' • •• 11 ' •'t O divert • ItallNt to ' tbe detr1 ment of the KAm Force '' •• •' I 1 or discussions with tbe thrust - ' • • 1 ' · ' I ' ' Tbere rorc ' ' the Italinns should be that 1 nt this ' ' ' ' • • • Juncture ve v1ah 't o treat nuclenr coopel'o tion vith Italy vith1n ' • ' ' ' the context of bov such cooperation contributes to the oupport of the Nu le NAm Force nnd ' 2 the Ital inns should firot e tablish the o munt ond «ture of their pnrticipation 1n this Force before 0 't' • I • • committing ''any personnel Md proj c t 9'f we'beii e·•tiiere demonstrate ''clearly to the ' · • • • - I •• • I· · • funds • 16 a ' at ' ' • • • ·to ·the submarine propulsion • thia time boirevcr to • I' • ' ItnlitmS tho t ve have 1n fact been g1v1ng thei equeot tl e co reM consider tlon' ve llad promiaed ' ' • I I · ·• The pos'ition·pa pcr therefore indicates that our thinking prior to N a had evolved to the point vhcre ve had d eloped tvo c1ternative approaches for co ntio It niso points out that never contemplated collaboroting in tho' construction of a I we nuclear • paver plant • ' _ ' REPROOUCEO AT THE NATIONAL AROIVES • _ I -- z • '' -L ✓ - • $' I • c • 'I 1 JJ r r I' 1the Italians are also stud yirla the pa1bi'lity ct tailorin8 US· - ' Italian industrial 11UClear cooperation to meet their military requuemnts At the present time a Trieste tirm 18 1n the process of deaign1ng a nu clear powered tw ikcr and the u e firm l3abcock and Wilcox is neaatiating for the snle of the opulsion reactor A consortium 1 Daludi M EllRAT M ANSALDO and P'IAT plans to build a nuol ear tanker an1 F1Nr Motor COl1lpf3 ey bas contracted to clcsign a pressur1%ed vater reo ctor There is also a report that Weotinghouse 1a negotiating the sale of reactor to an Italian ship- I l 'bnfB1DS firm in Genoa It must be recognized th o t the sale of coomercial reactors results 1n an increased teohnical opero tional capability by the recip-lent nation It 11 possible therefore for Ito l y in the course of time to translate the Peacetul Uses prc aram of milita ry application ua cooparation into mean1 ng1'ul rt is hiShl Y unlikely however that Ita l y would seek to purchBse a camiercial reactor tar military purposes owiD8 to tho precise J eaal arrangemonts gaverninS such tranaactiono We should there1'ore encourage the Italians to pursue their present course 0£ national nuclear developnent for the time boing while not rullng out a lrl lJ1ngMss to review our present o ttitude when the NATO Faroe picture becomes clearer WJqa cO l't VN W J a i 9bJbQMv µe nv 03l JISS 11J30 -·· 0 ' DRAFT Pen ing further clearances c STATEMENT BY MR ROSWELL· 'L GILPATRIC ·DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE UNITED STATES_ IN Rome Italy 11-12 Feb 63 US COOPERATION WITH ITALY IN NUCLEAR SUBMARINE PROPULSION I • Introductory Statement Since receiving Minister of Defense Andreotti's l etter of December 4 1962 the US Department of Defense has bee endeavoring to provide a response 1 to his specific request for US assistance in Italy's nuclear propulsion development I • Discussion We have considered M1nister · Andreotti 1s request carefully and have now reached the ·point where it would be of value to elicit his informal reactions to two -alternative plans for US nuclear ·propulsion cooperation with Italy attached It nrust be emphasized that these are ·preliminary plans which suggest two poesible means of US assistance They cannot be proposed formally until approved elsewhere in the US Government · and following necessary amendments to the Agreement between the Government of USA and the Government of Italy for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes executed December ·3 1960 Moreover because of developments within the Alliance since 4 Italian req lest it will be n ecessary t 0 examine carefully in what way either now or in the future us beginning our study of the December f cooperation 11 JJZJ'd Q W'iN J9 ia J l9b3bQNIV JC ' 031 l SSv'lJ30 -L ·J iREPROOUCEDATTHENATlONAlAROIIIES iJI IC low - -- · c • t' ' ·--- • -• - ' with certain Allies _in the field · of nucleai - wopulsion might be- related to NATO multilateral force concepts Also we ·would wish to assess the effect implementation of either plan would have on rt aly's ability to assure increased modernizatio of its conventional forc s · The high costs of engaging even in the beginning stages -of° nuclear propulsion development are obvious and need to be weighed carefully against possibly only marginal benefits for Italy over the long ter This consideration may have become nore pertinent because of the active ·role Italy will oe expected to play in the NATO Nuclear Force III • Conclusion If Minister Andreotti could provide his reactions to the plans it will be possiole to continue consideration of US nuclear propulsion assistance in more specific terms L While no assurances can be given regarding the out- come of these ·prelilninary t s every effort will be ma de to respond definitively at an early date However Congressional and other approvals of either ·plan wµJ be requ ed before impl ementing _action can be taken Attachment Suggested Plans for US Cooperation with Italy in Nucl ear Propulsion Development L 2 lp'Jq Q W'tN 9 8 Ji 9b3bQN V N JC ' n'l' G3l ISSV133G - i - 1 C S' ATEMENT BY MR ROSWELL L GlLPATRIC DEPUTY SECRE'l AnY OF DEFENSE UNITED STATES m ROME 11-12 FEBRUARY 1963 POLARIS MISSILES FOR THE CRUISER GARIBALDI I Introduction During his visit to Washington in January Prime Minister Fa nfani raised th Pre ident K edy and Secretary McNamara the question of equipping the cruiser Garibaldi with the Polaris missile for a possible It role in the WOO Nuclear Force NNF envisaged in the Nassau Accordswas agreed that serious conside tion should be given to this matter II 1 Discussion It is contemplated that detailed discussion on all aspects of the · NNF will be initiated among NATO authorities in Paris about mid-February- with the object_ive- of reaching the earliest possible agreement t proceed with the project It would seem entirely appropriate that the question of the Ge riba1d1 • s possible role in the NNF e f'ully explored during these discussions There are certain pertinent c6nsiderations which wilJ need to be dealt with in the course of these discussions Among them are - · · the relative merits of surface and subsurface vessels in terms of cost effectiveness vulnerability logistical and operational factors While r cognizing ·that employment of Garibaldi 1n the NNF bas certa 1n '- ' • attractive features tlie U S notes such disadvantages as• • in comparison with submarines the relative inaccuracy 0 P • _----- ' N9 a O W'tN 39 a F29bjbGNtv l C ' v G l HSSv'l BG -- --- 1 it vu1n s - · erability vi - na gation with J --a11E11111111 a-- - ' •·• • • AEPROOUCEO AT THE NATIONAl NICHVES 5E CIR E 1r ' - ·--· _ consequent limitation ot practical opera ting area imdequate on-station endurance small missile contribution ttcbnical alteration equi ed to accamnodate and support the missiles and the requirement for scmething 1n excess of one tull crew preferably duplicate crews There would be the further disadvantage common to any dual purpose ship vith nWllear capability- of imbility to runction 1n one capacity without Jeopardizing the etf'eptiveness of the other For the information of Italian officials in considering the above · i ' ' I and other factors prel1m 1naey u s estimates of the cost of equipping the cruiser Garibaldi vith Polaris missiles range from a low of about $35 milllon to as much as $95 million depending upon the capabilities to be achieved III Conclusion Italian authorities should further explore during the NATO discussions about to get underway 1n Paris and subsequently in Rome the feasibility- of accommodat1ng Garibaldi in the NNF l ll'Ja1 0 ftl N 3 - g J Z'9b3bQN V NVCt ' nV 031 llSSv'l 30 · · 1 ' v a U »oeitf aQ 011 tb1D B bjeat ·u adopted bf SUb-Oro lP IV llA'ro JIUolMl- 1'aroe u u toll ova A leftllt ccmeidare t1on in the auba81'11' Mt-9urlace ship choice ia t tho ltaliAl'QB _ deeire CJC_ or all ot their o t ribution ia th•• fora of the ondoc oartbal 41 and at least tvo 0ther eb1Jil8 now pltum d vith poeeible Pol r11 capabilitiH tho UV to_ ''lncorpQa-atiOD ot th 11 Ad poosibly otbat o1m1l r 1hipt into the 111te t ec1 torce wul4 illareue tho oeni e a o vaU ae 'tbe aotual1t7 of Italian PN'tio1pat 1on an4 would therefore l ind more oeeuro1Y to the venturG It would bo eaaenUal ot courae t bat tbeae alli-ps be subject the se a ail tilatoral ovnerehip and lllmDixi u other ele nts of tho llixe torceJ otherwise their uae would 1ve roa1n1ns llll'll cro particularly G e a teelina of t1ftb clue oiti ensh1p vb1ch would pro'bab be tatn l to sroopeoto tar an 1ntesrated taroe MUitaril y tbe d11advaotaaea of OU1'bal41 arer tba abort term are iable 1nolu4a rel Uve imcouney ot naviptlon Vith • OODN liaitation ot practicable op rating arN oloae tie-in ot logiatic support with tbe Italian l Og1 etio ay9tea 1ne 61quate on-atat1oo endurance D11111 au U contrib l'Uon _ tbe technical altorllti a required t accomnodate a n d the a1ui1ea aZJ4 tba requ1remrlt tor acatbiag in exc eeo one f'ul1 orn prehra'b duplicate Ol tws bre' would be the turtber diaadvantoge coraan w aey chJ l purpose eh1p Vitb nuclear capab1lit v o 1nab111ty- to tunatioo 1n ona capaoity without 1ooparc111111Da the ettect1wneea o't the other ''On be eoca it woul4 aeem tbat the problellS requir1nc 110lut1on in orc ar to mlw the Geribald1 quic ustlble ere too great to 1uttty the ne0MN17 l m4I AD4 - Jlovever it will p r o 'N naaesnry to acree to • Md ocmaiderat1on ot Olrl'baldi aa s-rt at tbe 1nteo-ated toroe · REPROOUCED Al IHE NATl t AI AACIMS il • coul d veil bo reo1atanee bOllto 'both in tional CM rabip ri-at xe4-mamdng the tol lllllr t or reuC ll8 of nniaaal pri 44tJ tM la•ter on prao i-1 Oaftaic eratione 'the Ital Sa CIO baa • aeed 11cm· iutptial• to the ftulbili ot atxecl wna1na Nrn tn viw of the aubetanttal Slweatmn't • -de aoooi t • U S ftl bea4 cUDtolUal team 8V91 1 e• Pl O'f' l d 1118 the WeMl With at lout 'bbe N4illltntu r el ll B required to Polane aiaoil ee it 1a doubttal tha1s argument• epina't th8 project band on coat ettc o iwne88 rill be too i oroUMfW• Ba'Yi08 ly as tar aa tb9' ' hPe alaoat entirely on their own tbe It allan 8 cou vlw oOll pl etiClll of the p rojeot M both reasonable and lOS oal 1 ewn a t COM1'1arable ediUtlonal coat tJ S •ntillll tet 3 ld llion to 9' 11111 10 clepc ndiJ16 l a r on tbe ctee roo of sophiot1cat1on daaired to be obt a no • WbU• providing no clirect asoiatanoe in con rJ gur1ng Qarialcli tc rtbo Pl laria the U S Bav y bu shown oontimd ng protoseioml 1nteroat in t ion pr-oJeot even o1nce its 1noept1on short attor t be tJ 13 otter at coorra 11th Alllea in the nuclear field 11184G at tho NA'ln Bea de o Qc VenJlll9 ted mooting 1n Decaber 1957 'lbB 1nstallat1oa va1 suoceaa vi th the laat tall to U S fe vy awtharitieo Ybo ver• particular 1JIIP1 98 M rolatiw e111pl 1c1t ' an4 D0'9'8lty· ot the 1teG111-pawered launch mchani••· It ia al eo acknovledgad that tho Italian substitute tar a Na l 1¥ ettective DaYiptlon ayataa 18 by no mana completely inettectivo Acldna t aopiieUoatod -stall ft1Pl o18 1 by u s aubnm ine1 the Itel1ena have eatabllabed a aer1ea of positions or tixea aiaoa the coaot of 'Ito l f outticien maaroua to -keep t he t Garib l d 1 alwp vi in no mon t bon tvo b0Ul a launcb1q posit ion Wb1la obviowsly oc aa ria pri 111tive py' U• s standarc s IN Oh • syotea vool4 perllit Qvib6ldi to sel1W aa a Ptllfa •• 'f de- 00 I ' 1 nunrbfn plattona mare or lees e ttbctiveq insofar u concerned navi1 P-t1on in Reprding on-etation endurance Oaribeldi 'a 1nadequaq 1a relative While the vnae1 oanmt sucGHo camp te '111th nuclear aubaar1nea on thia taotor ot endurance 1bo can Mvertbelaaa opll'ate tor ut 20 at 20 knots abou't lfO at 1 Jmoto An4 u to crev requirements tho leo11 rip'OWJ concllt1ons prevailing on a aurftloe vessel 111 ooiapariaon vitb a awmarba voul4 pu ll1 t samething leeu than • full chlplioato crews perhaps no acre than• 25 aupientation • uU traa the question ot oost etteot1wne• a Polaris for the Co ribaldi 1s 110St objec t ll troll the U S oint of view 'becauae of it• i otent1all y hAl'atu1 lfth'tl dG e tablilhmlnt ot the ti u lll ltilateral ld Jelld - nnod taroe Mere • o1tically there ia the probln ot pt'eVenting auch a p-ojec t traa g1Y1ng Italy in appearance it not in tact aom sort ot pr-eterred statue cnez- tar exe rple Oenan y • 'lbe projeot VOUld alao 1nv1te ff 1 oua repercua•1om ft'CII the l rka who aaul d veU ccmat l ua 1 u an unra1r adYlllltaafl to I over 'l'Urkay 1n the attar ot aclequaey o' ' a Nplace11ent tor Jupitar 1111t111le1 untortunawly t heee ft17 feature a tat aa the YeDtuN ot JHt1'mabla to U U S are Ula ¥ to be vi- d 1n an entirely 41ffwat l1lbt 1'7 the l1s Uau and ad4 caaa1a ni 1y to tt• att raott to tllal 'VltD9DG t 119 a 0 'q tNN 39 f 8 pz9b3bQN V- µc n nv Q3 SS'tJ7 3Q SECRET cluion Doce u ee cit t be roc uUAr attra ct 1TaDeao ot tb1 o proJec t t o Italy u e U B tit be pnrt icularl 7 ca Otul 1n rcaiat 1 n 1t leat 1n ao do1n W 4aJ2 on ItelS•n ent bu oiaml tar the er cc nc qt tuel t flleratoro tor the pre11ffl at lcu1 Gt CNI poo1 t1cno •boul 4 be tbat the quoat1oa ot PoJ ar1a tor tho Oaz1 'bal41 t lD rita t o a1r1aa in u e tc rua ot DP 41• •1011• cbOUt to be 1n1t1atell b7 t be Marcbmt- th too en up In tbea• 41eeua•1cm D 1 vUl 'bo neeea5ar1 to w18'b care the potonual ot tha c erlbnld 1 proJoo cm 0ernm tut1o1pat1on in the DP and on poHlble klah reaction auoctaUna tho proJeat Vith rsm al ot 4' q itor 111oa11oa Cloarr coo 1 Pol Pl Am Curt Cotton an4 Col ha-u NciY7 Cnpt nowu 010051 State• t