MEMORANDUM • THE WHITE HOUSE C J t J • 2890-X WASHINGTON SECRET INFORMATION May 14 1979 MEMORANDUM FOR ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI FROM WILLIAM E SUBJECT Meeting with the Vice President and Hugh Carter on the PEADs and FEM A U FEMA NARAJNLC review s completed ODOM J J You asked what is to be decided at the meeting with the 3vice President and Hugh Carter Nothing but some points about c I vulnerability and FEMA can be made The memo at Tab A submitted by Hugh 1 is one that I drafted after the PEADs were fairly far along the review process Hugh liked it so much that he asked if he could have it since he and his staff had done muGh of the work S The Presidential Emergency Action Documents PEADs are carried in the FOOTBALL By signing them the President exercises a number of emergency powers and sets in motion many things required for war mobilization and emergency economic allocations There are two problems to be solved First update the PEADs making sure that they are legal have the right names agencies etc Second ask the larger policy question is the system of NC A survivability and war rnobilization implicit in the PEADs adequate for today S The first task has been completed 0MB had the lead The second task has been launched by the tasking memo at Tab B Because it concerns policy the NSC took the lead S A couple of questions will arise about the tasking rnemors approach and rationale First why did we not use a PRM format The an · sweris that PRM-32 gave FPA the task of producing whatever policy review was needed During a year of work however FPA could not produce eitheraset of policy choices or analysis for program choices This new tasking memo allows the ad hoc group of NSC 0MB OSTP and the Military Office to oversee the process FPA is so poorly staffed that after two months of failed FPA drafting efforts I had to write out their terms of reference for the review The point is another PRM is unlikely to generate anything At the same time the EOP ad hoc group can get into sensitive programs e g bunker locations etc the way an NSC w rking group cannot S SECRET Review on May 14 1985 Approved For Release 2005 09 05 NLC-12-8-7-7-6 Approved For Release 2005 09 05 NLC-12-8-7-7-6 • SECRET • 2 The second question is about policy issues What policy needs a change The answer is extremely difficult to simplify and the close-hold aspects of many programs makes it difficult to be 3 confident about answers After two years with the WHEP and CI issues I have sifted out j wg general problems or inadequacies in the present continuity of government programs S -- We have an NCA vulnerability problem analogous to our ICBM vulnerability The several hard sites the Federal Arc near Washington are vulnerable to Soviet hard-target-kill capability Thus the key policy programs issue is How can we design a new invulnerable basing mode for the President and the emergency elements of the Federal government S -- Our mobilization and economic emergency management system as spelled out briefly in the PEADs is neither adequate for nuclear war conditions nor adaptable to lesser contingency plans now current in Defense There is a real danger that FEMA's Executive Order will not even include the proper authority to permit a solution to this problem It must include a wide discretion 1n mobilization planning and in monitoring military manpower S Hugh Carter's interest in pressing this PEAD issue with the President was to put some heat on the NSC and the Vice President because we have traditionally p-ut heat on him fo·r the WHEP C Meeting Agenda I recommend that you respond with the following talking points -- You are aware that Hugh has taken the initiative on the PEADs You looked the revised version over last fall and at Odom's request let Hugh put the results forward to the President instead of doing it yourself C -- It was clear at the PRC meetings on PRM-32 that we could not make sensible decisions on what FPA gave us Therefore you sent the matter back for fuller review The tasking memo to FPA January 26 1979 made this a formal request It could have gone much earlier October 1978 but we waited expecting to have a FEMA director at any time Such a basic review is more important for the new agency than for FPA in its weak state C -- Tcrlay there is nothing to decide If we could get John Macy confirmed as FEMA director however that would make us more confident that the review will produce a result sufficient for policy decisions To date there is doubt about the outcome C SECRET Approved For Release 2005 09 05 NLC-12-8-7-7-6 Approved For Release 2005 09 05 NLC-12-8-7-7-6 SECRET • • 3 -- It would be very good if 0MB takes NSC views on the FEMA Executive Order which will ensure adequate authority to deal with the mobilization manpower and lesser contingency planning It is also important that the FEMA Director be brought into the NSC system by the Executive Order for coordination of his national security related programs with Defense CIA and others C -- Finally the first policy issue a new NCA Continuity of Government basing mode is critical for maintaining deterrence a key part of creating an endurable c 3 I capability And the second issue civil-sector mobilization support for Defense contingency plans is critical to make our NATO reinforcement credible S SECRET Approved For Release 2005 09 05 NLC-12-8-7-7-6