Al Qaeda and Affiliates Historical Perspective Global Presence and Implications for U S Policy John Rollins Coordinator Acting Section Research Manager Specialist in Terrorism and National Security February 5 2010 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www crs gov R41070 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Al Qaeda and Affiliates Summary Al Qaeda AQ has evolved into a significantly different terrorist organization than the one that perpetrated the September 11 2001 attacks At the time Al Qaeda was composed mostly of a core cadre of veterans of the Afghan insurgency against the Soviets with a centralized leadership structure made up mostly of Egyptians Most of the organization’s plots either emanated from the top or were approved by the leadership Some analysts describe pre-9 11 Al Qaeda as akin to a corporation with Osama Bin Laden acting as an agile Chief Executive Officer issuing orders and soliciting ideas from subordinates Some would argue that the Al Qaeda of that period no longer exists Out of necessity due to pressures from the security community in the ensuing years it has transformed into a diffuse global network and philosophical movement composed of dispersed nodes with varying degrees of independence The core leadership headed by Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri is thought to live in the mountainous tribal belt of northwest Pakistan where it continues to train operatives recruit and disseminate propaganda But Al Qaeda franchises or affiliated groups active in countries such as Yemen and Somalia now represent critical power centers in the larger movement Some affiliates receive money training and weapons others look to the core leadership in Pakistan for strategic guidance theological justification and a larger narrative of global struggle Over the past year senior government officials have assessed the trajectory of Al Qaeda to be “less centralized command and control with no clear center of gravity and likely rising and falling centers of gravity depending on where the U S and the international focus is for that period ” While a degraded corporate Al Qaeda may be welcome news to many a trend has emerged over the past few years that some view as more difficult to detect if not potentially more lethal The Al Qaeda network today also comprises semi-autonomous or self radicalized actors who often have only peripheral or ephemeral ties to either the core cadre in Pakistan or affiliated groups elsewhere According to U S officials Al Qaeda cells and associates are located in over 70 countries Sometimes these individuals never leave their home country but are radicalized with the assistance of others who have traveled abroad for training and indoctrination through the use of modern technologies In many ways the dispersion of Al Qaeda affiliates fits into the larger strategy of Bin Laden and his associates They have sought to serve as the vanguard of a religious movement that inspires Muslims and other individuals aspiring to join a jihadi movement to help establish a global caliphate through violent means The name “Qaeda” means “base” or “foundation ” upon which its members hope to build a robust geographically-diverse network Understanding the origins of Al Qaeda its goals current activities and prospective future pursuits is key to developing sound U S strategies policies and programs Appreciating the adaptive nature of Al Qaeda as a movement and the ongoing threat it projects onto U S global security interests assists in many facets of the national security enterprise including securing the homeland congressional legislative process and oversight alignment of executive branch resources and coordination efforts and prioritization of foreign assistance The focus of this report is on the history of Al Qaeda actions and capabilities of the organization and non-aligned entities and an analysis of select regional Al Qaeda affiliates This report may be updated as events warrant Congressional Research Service Al Qaeda and Affiliates Contents Background 1 Origins of Al Qaeda 3 The Threat Unfolds 5 Afghanistan 6 Pakistan 7 Background and Assessment 7 Implications for U S Policy 9 Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula AQAP 10 Background and Threat Assessment 10 Implications for U S Policy 11 Al Qaeda in Iraq 13 Background and Threat Assessment 13 Implications for U S Policy 14 North Africa Sahel Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb AQIM 14 Background and Threat Assessment 14 Algeria 15 The Sahel 16 Implications for U S Policy 17 East Africa 18 Background and Threat Assessment 18 Somalia Safe Haven for Terrorist Groups 18 The Islamic Courts Union Al Shabaab 19 The Leadership of Al Shabaab 20 Implications for U S Policy 20 Al Qaeda and Radical Islamist Groups in Southeast Asia 22 Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya 22 Suspected Al Qaeda Links to JI Splinter Cells 24 The Abu Sayyaf Group 25 Implications for U S Policy 25 Al Qaeda’s Global Strategy and Long Term Policy Implications 27 Contacts Author Contact Information 29 Congressional Research Service Al Qaeda and Affiliates Background1 While Al Qaeda has transformed in recent years its strategic objectives remain the same Osama Bin Laden and his associates’ desire to attack the United States and its interests and citizens abroad have not abated In an August 2009 speech the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism stated that “Al Qaeda has proven to be adaptive and highly resilient and remains the most serious terrorist threat we face as a nation ”2 Before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee in September 2009 the U S intelligence community assessed that Al Qaeda’s core is “actively engaged in operational plotting and continues recruiting training and transporting operatives to include individuals from Western Europe and North America ”3 Due in large part to the actions of the U S government “corporate” Al Qaeda reportedly located in Pakistan is under tremendous pressure U S military and intelligence operations appear to have degraded the core’s capacity for conducting large catastrophic operations similar to the attacks of September 11 2001 During the 2009 Annual Threat Assessment hearing in front of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Dennis C Blair Director of National Intelligence DNI stated that Al Qaeda “today is less capable and effective than it was a year ago ”4 At the time many analysts suggested this lack of corporate Al Qaeda planning and operational execution capability was due to the significant leadership losses the movement has suffered during the past 24 months The Obama Administration launched a total of 39 missile strikes from drone aircraft into Pakistan from the beginning of 2009 until the end of September the Bush Administration launched 36 such strikes in 2008 5 Those attacks killed 13 senior Al Qaeda leaders including Khalid Habib Abu Laith al Libi Abu Khabab al-Masri and Usama al-Kini 6 According to DNI Blair the loss of so many top commanders in such a short period has made it difficult for the organization to find replacements with equal levels of operational experience However during the 2010 Annual Threat Assessment to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence the DNI further explained that “until counterterrorism pressure on Al Qaeda’s place of refuge key lieutenants and operative cadre outpaces the group’s ability to recover Al Qaeda will retain its capability to mount an attack ” While it appears that many terrorist cells located throughout the world are affiliating their actions with the organization the Al Qaeda movement is simultaneously facing perhaps a longer term challenge in the form of a legitimacy crisis within Muslim communities In the words of DNI Blair the United States has “seen notable progress in Muslim opinion turning against terrorist groups like Al Qaida ”7 Muslim populations some of whom showed approval of Al Qaeda’s 1 Prepared by John Rollins Specialist in Terrorism and National Security ext 7-5529 and Seth Rosen Research Associate 2 “Remarks by John O Brennan Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism ” speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies August 6 2009 3 “Testimony of Michael Leiter Director of National Counterterrorism Center hearing ‘Eight Years After 9 11 Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland ’” before the U S Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee September 30 2009 4 “Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence ” Dennis C Blair Director of National Intelligence February 12 2009 5 Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus “Success Against al-Qaeda Cited ” The Washington Post September 30 2009 6 Bill Roggio “US Airstrikes Alone Cannot Defeat al Qaeda ” The Long War Journal September 23 2009 7 “Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence ” Dennis continued Congressional Research Service 1 Al Qaeda and Affiliates actions in the wake of the invasion of Iraq appear to have turned against the extremist movement The killing of innocent Muslims in Iraq as well as the bombing of three hotels in Amman Jordan in November 2005 appears to have produced a significant backlash against the movement For example a poll conducted by Jordan University’s Center for Strategic Studies a month after the Amman bombings showed that only 20% of the population viewed Al Qaeda as a “legitimate resistance group” – down from 67% in 2004 8 Some would argue that the theological interpretations religious justifications and strategic aspirations that underpin Al Qaeda’s actions are all under attack from credible sources Over the past two years several prominent religious scholars and former Al Qaeda associates—including Saudi Sheikh Salman al-Ouda and Sayyid Imam al-Sharif one of Al Qaeda’s original spiritual leaders—have spoken out against the movement’s indiscriminate tactics and ideology However in the face of disapproval by a majority of the Muslim community Al Qaeda continues to attract potential recruits and possess an ability to influence and support global organizations with similar goals and philosophical objectives DNI Blair recently noted the following Al Qaida will continue its efforts to encourage key regional affiliates and jihadist networks to pursue a global agenda A few Al Qaida regional affiliates and jihadist networks have exhibited an intent or capability to attack inside the Homeland Some regional nodes and allies have grown in strength and independence over the last two years and have begun to project operationally outside their regions 9 Though Al Qaeda affiliated groups have perpetrated numerous deadly terrorist attacks over the past two years the core in Pakistan has demonstrated limited operational effectiveness in that time span Because of the loss of top commanders and continued pressure from U S intelligence activities and foreign partners the Al Qaeda core has been unable to orchestrate many spectacular attacks Analysts routinely point to only two such attacks occurring in 2008 the suicide attack on the Danish Embassy in Islamabad with a Saudi suicide bomber and the bombing of the Marriott hotel in Islamabad 10 The core organization’s apparent inability to commit large-scale attacks has led some analysts to question the relevancy capabilities and competency of the group 11 There is also some evidence that the Al Qaeda core at times struggles to retain recruits and raise funds In June 2009 the group’s leader in Afghanistan Mustafa Abu al-Yazid released an audio message stating that Al Qaeda members in that country were short of food weapons and other supplies 12 In light of the numerous smaller scale attempted terrorist attacks throughout 2009 and the most recent events directed at U S interests of the November shootings at Ft Hood Texas and the continued C Blair Director of National Intelligence February 12 2009 For the 2010 Threat Assessment hearing in front of the Committee the DNI went on to state “ Muslim support for violent extremism did not change significantly in 2009 and remains a minority view according to polls of large Muslim populations conducted on behalf of Gallup and Pew On average two-thirds of Muslims in such populations say that attacks in which civilians are targeted cannot be justified at all ” 8 Murad Batal Al-Shishani “Jordanian Poll Indicates Erosion of Public Support for al-Qaeda ” Terrorism Focus Vol 3 No 6 February 14 2006 9 “Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence ” Dennis C Blair Director of National Intelligence February 2 2010 10 Ronald Sandee “Core Al-Qaida in 2008 Review ” The NEFA Foundation April 8 2009 11 See comments of Brynjar Lia an al Qaeda expert in Ian Black and Richard Norton-Taylor “Al-Qaida Faces Recruitment Crisis Anti-terrorism Experts Say ” The Guardian September 10 2009 12 William Maclean “Al-Qaida’s Money Trouble ” Reuters June 15 2009 Congressional Research Service 2 Al Qaeda and Affiliates December bombing attempt aboard a U S airliner some analysts view these operations as evidence that the organization and its affiliates are no longer capable of launching a large-scale catastrophic terrorist attack directed at U S interests These analysts suggest that recent acts are an acknowledgment that the destructive capabilities of corporate Al Qaeda and those individuals with similar philosophical goals are actually on the decline and are indicative of an organization desperate to prove its continued viability Others however suggest that this recent trend may be indicative of an organization becoming more select and sophisticated in the operations it pursues and adopting a model of encouraging affiliates and sympathizers to undertake smaller scale acts to divert international attention and resources away from planning and preparations for larger more catastrophic attacks Recognition of a more aggressive and resilient enemy may have been enunciated in a January 20 2010 statement by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI before Senate Judiciary Committee “as the Christmas day attempted bombing illustrates the threats we face are becoming more diverse and more dangerous with each passing day ”13 Similarly in apparent acknowledgement that current U S polices and programs may not currently be aligned to meet ongoing threats posed by Al Qaeda Daniel Benjamin Coordinator for the State Department’s Office of Counterterrorism stated in January 2010 “the events of Christmas demonstrated that some of the understandings that underlay how we organized ourselves for counterterrorism need updating ” Benjamin went on to state “other events in the latter half of 2009 have also underscored how some of our operating assumptions were no longer adequate ” Origins of Al Qaeda14 The primary founder of Al Qaeda Osama Bin Laden was born in July 1957 the 17th of 20 sons of a Saudi construction magnate of Yemeni origin Most Saudis are conservative Sunni Muslims and Bin Laden appears to have adopted militant Islamist views while studying at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah Saudi Arabia There he studied Islam under Muhammad Qutb brother of Sayyid Qutb the key ideologue of a major Sunni Islamist movement the Muslim Brotherhood 15 Another of Bin Laden’s instructors was Abdullah al Azzam a major figure in the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood Azzam is identified by some experts as the intellectual architect of the jihad against the 1979-1989 Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and ultimately of Al Qaeda itself he cast the Soviet invasion as an attempted conquest by a nonMuslim power of sacred Muslim territory and people 16 Bin Laden went to Afghanistan shortly after the December 1979 Soviet invasion joining Azzam there He reportedly used some of his personal funds to establish himself as a donor to the Afghan mujahedin and a recruiter of Arab and other Islamic volunteers for the war 17 In 1984 Azzam and 13 Testimony of Robert Mueller “Securing America's Safety Improving the Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorism Tools and Inter-Agency Communication”” before the U S Senate Judiciary Committee January 20 2010 14 Prepared by Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs 15 The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 in Egypt and it has since spawned numerous Islamist movements throughout the region some as branches of the Brotherhood others with new names For example the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas traces its roots to the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood In 1966 Sayyid Qutb was tried and executed for treason for his opposition to the government of Egyptian President Gamal Abd al Nasser 16 Rohan Gunaratna Inside Al Qaeda Columbia University Press 2002 17 The September 11 Commission report says that U S officials obtained information in 2000 indicating that bin Laden received $1 million per year from his family from 1970 two years after his father’s death until 1994 when his citizenship was revoked by the Saudi government Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon continued Congressional Research Service 3 Al Qaeda and Affiliates bin Laden structured this assistance by establishing a network of recruiting and fund-raising offices in the Arab world Europe and the United States That network was called the Maktab al Khidamat Services Office also known as Al Khifah many experts consider the Maktab to be the organizational forerunner of Al Qaeda Another major figure who utilized the Maktab network to recruit for the anti-Soviet jihad was Umar Abd al Rahman also known as “the blind shaykh” the spiritual leader of radical Egyptian Islamist group Al Jihad Bin Laden apparently also fought in the anti-Soviet war participating in a 1986 battle in Jalalabad and more notably a 1987 frontal assault by foreign volunteers against Soviet armor Bin Laden has said he was exposed to a Soviet chemical attack and slightly injured in that battle 18 During this period most U S officials perceived the volunteers as positive contributors to the effort to expel Soviet forces from Afghanistan and U S officials made no apparent effort to stop the recruitment of the non-Afghan volunteers for the war U S officials have repeatedly denied that the United States directly supported the non-Afghan volunteers 19 The United States did covertly finance about $3 billion during 1981-1991 and arm via Pakistan the Afghan mujahedin factions particularly the Islamic fundamentalist Afghan factions fighting Soviet forces By almost all accounts it was the Afghan mujahedin factions not the Arab volunteer fighters that were decisive in persuading the Soviet Union to pull out of Afghanistan During this period Bin Laden Azzam and Abd al Rahman were not known to have openly advocated undertaken or planned any direct attacks against the United States although they all were critical of U S support for Israel in the Middle East In 1988 toward the end of the Soviet occupation Bin Laden Azzam and other associates began contemplating how and to what end the Islamist volunteer network they had organized could be utilized U S intelligence estimates of the size of that network was between 10 000 and 20 000 however not all of these necessarily supported or participated in Al Qaeda terrorist activities 20 Azzam apparently wanted this “Al Qaeda” Arabic for “the base” organization—as they began terming the organization in 1988—to become an Islamic “rapid reaction force ” available to intervene wherever Muslims were perceived to be threatened Bin Laden differed with Azzam hoping instead to dispatch the Al Qaeda activists to their home countries to try to topple secular pro-Western Arab leaders such as President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s royal family Some attribute the Bin Laden-Azzam differences to the growing influence on Bin Laden of the Egyptians in his inner circle such as Abd al Rahman who wanted to use Al Qaeda’s resources to install an Islamic state in Egypt Another close Egyptian confidant was Ayman al Zawahiri operational leader of Al Jihad in Egypt Like Abd al Rahman Zawahiri had been imprisoned but ultimately acquitted for the October 1981 assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and he permanently left Egypt for Afghanistan in 1985 There he used his medical training to tend to wounded fighters in the anti-Soviet war In November 1989 Azzam was assassinated and some allege that Bin Laden might have been responsible for the killing to resolve this power struggle Following Azzam’s death Bin Laden gained control of the Maktab’s funds and organizational mechanisms Abd al Rahman came to the United States in 1990 from Sudan and was convicted in continued the United States July 22 2004 p 170 18 Gunaratna p 21 19 Author conversations with officials in the public affairs office of the Central Intelligence Agency 1993 20 Report of the 9 11 Commission p 67 Congressional Research Service 4 Al Qaeda and Affiliates October 1995 for terrorist plots related to the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York Zawahiri stayed with Bin Laden and remains Bin Laden’s main strategist today The Threat Unfolds The August 2 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait apparently turned Bin Laden from a de-facto U S ally against the Soviet Union into one of its most active adversaries Bin Laden had returned home to Saudi Arabia in 1989 after the completion of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan that February While back home he lobbied Saudi officials not to host U S combat troops to defend Saudi Arabia against an Iraqi invasion arguing instead for the raising of a “mujahedin” army to oust Iraq from Kuwait His idea was rebuffed by the Saudi leadership as impractical causing Bin Laden’s falling out with the royal family and 500 000 U S troops deployed to Saudi Arabia to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait in “Operation Desert Storm” January 16 - February 28 1991 About 6 000 U S forces mainly Air Force remained in the kingdom during 1991-2003 to conduct operations to contain Iraq Although the post-1991 U S force in Saudi Arabia was relatively small and confined to Saudi military facilities bin Laden and his followers painted the U S forces as occupiers of sacred Islamic ground and the Saudi royal family as facilitator of that “occupation ” In 1991 after his rift with the Saudi leadership Bin Laden relocated to Sudan buying property there which he used to host and train Al Qaeda militants—this time for use against the United States and its interests as well as for jihad operations in the Balkans Chechnya Kashmir and the Philippines During the early 1990s he also reportedly funded Saudi Islamist dissidents in London including Saad Faqih organized as the “Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia MIRA ”21 Bin Laden himself remained in Sudan until the Sudanese government under U S and Egyptian pressure expelled him in May 1996 he then returned to Afghanistan and helped the Taliban gain and maintain control of Afghanistan The Taliban captured Kabul in September 1996 Bin Laden and Zawahiri apparently believed that the only way to bring Islamic regimes to power was to oust from the region the perceived backer of secular regional regimes the United States During the 1990s bin Laden and Zawahiri transformed Al Qaeda into a global threat to U S national security culminating in the September 11 2001 attacks By this time Al Qaeda had become a coalition of factions of radical Islamic groups operating throughout the Muslim world mostly groups opposing their governments Cells and associates have been located in over 70 countries according to U S officials The pre-September 11 roster of attacks against the United States and U S interests that are widely attributed to Al Qaeda included the following • In 1992 Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for bombing a hotel in Yemen where 100 U S military personnel were awaiting deployment to Somalia for Operation Restore Hope No one was killed • A growing body of information about central figures in the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York particularly the reputed key 21 On December 21 2004 the Treasury Department designated Faqih as a provider of material support to Al Qaeda and Bin Laden under Executive Order 13324 Congressional Research Service 5 Al Qaeda and Affiliates bomb maker Ramzi Ahmad Yusuf suggests possible Al Qaeda involvement As noted above Abd al Rahman was convicted for plots related to this attack • Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for arming Somali factions who battled U S forces there in October 1993 and who killed 18 U S special operations forces in Mogadishu in October 1993 • In June 1995 in Ethiopia members of Al Qaeda allegedly aided the Egyptian militant Islamic Group in a nearly successful assassination attempt against the visiting Mubarak • The four Saudi nationals who confessed to a November 1995 bombing of a U S military advisory facility in Riyadh Saudi Arabia claimed on Saudi television to have been inspired by bin Laden and other radical Islamist leaders Five Americans were killed in that attack • The September 11 Commission report indicated that Al Qaeda might have had a hand in the June 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers complex near Dhahran Saudi Arabia However then-director of the FBI Louis Freeh previously attributed that attack primarily to Saudi Shiite dissidents working with Iranian agents Nineteen U S airmen were killed • Al Qaeda allegedly was responsible for the August 1998 bombings of U S embassies in Kenya and Tanzania which killed about 300 On August 20 1998 the United States launched a cruise missile strike against bin Laden’s training camps in Afghanistan reportedly missing him by a few hours • In December 1999 U S and Jordanian authorities separately thwarted related Al Qaeda plots against religious sites in Jordan and apparently against the Los Angeles international airport • In October 2000 Al Qaeda activists attacked the U S S Cole in a ship-borne suicide bombing while the Cole was docked the harbor of Aden Yemen The ship was damaged and 17 sailors were killed Afghanistan22 Although Afghanistan was the main base for Al Qaeda leadership at the time of the September 11 attacks after eight years of U S -led efforts to stabilize Afghanistan Al Qaeda is more a facilitator of the insurgency in Afghanistan than an active participant U S National Security Adviser James Jones said on CNN on October 4 2009 that the “maximum estimate” of Al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan itself is less than 100 with no bases there 23 This assessment if accurate would suggest that any Al Qaeda planning for global attacks likely does not emanate from within Afghanistan U S and ISAF Commanding General Stanley McChrystal’s August 30 2009 “initial assessment ” of the situation in Afghanistan appears to back the Jones view According to the McChrystal report “Most insurgent fighters are Afghans… They are aided by foreign 22 23 Prepared by Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs CNN “State of the Union” program October 4 2009 Congressional Research Service 6 Al Qaeda and Affiliates fighters… who provide materiel expertise and ideological commitment ”24 At another point in the report McChrystal assessed that “Al Qaeda and associated movements based in Pakistan channel foreign fighters suicide bombers and technical assistance into Afghanistan and offer ideological motivation training and financial support ” U S military commanders in Afghanistan have in the past said that only small numbers of Al Qaeda members—including Arabs Uzbeks and Chechens—have been captured or killed in battles in Afghanistan according to U S commanders The McChrystal report said that a major Afghan insurgent group - the network of Jalaluddin Haqqani and Siraj Haqqani his son has a “close association with Al Qaeda and other Pakistan-based insurgent groups ”25 The Haqqani network is active in Khost Paktia and Paktika Provinces all in eastern Afghanistan and have reportedly been responsible for some major bombings in Kabul city However the Haqqani network is not known to have global ambitions or to donate its manpower or resources to any broader Al Qaeda objectives The main insurgent group operating in Afghanistan is the Taliban movement that ran Afghanistan during 1996-2001 and which allowed Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda organization free reign in Afghanistan Its leader Mullah Umar and many of his top advisers from their time in power remain at large and are trying to run their insurgency from safe havens in Pakistan Afghan officials have on occasion asserted that Umar and other senior Taliban figures are based in or around the city of Quetta thus accounting for the term usually applied to Umar and his aides the “Quetta Shura Taliban” QST However several expert assessments say that Umar and the Taliban may be distancing themselves from Al Qaeda because close relations with that organization reduce Taliban popularity with Afghan citizens 26 Another major insurgent faction is the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin HIG of ex-mujahedin party leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar HIG has been designated by the State Department as a Foreign Terrorist Organization HIG may obtain materiel support from Al Qaeda but Hekmatyar has been a major Afghan faction leader since he was an Islamist student leader at Kabul University in the 1960s and his focus is almost entirely on Afghan politics not global terrorism At the same time about 40 members of the 249 seat Afghan National Assembly are members of Hezb-e-Islami who have given up any insurgent activities and sworn allegiance to the Afghan constitution U S and Afghan officials have said that there have been talks between Hekmatyar’s representatives and those of the Afghan government about possible reconciliation although Hekmatyar’s statements in 2009 indicated that he would continue his fight until foreign troops leave Afghanistan Pakistan 27 Background and Assessment U S officials remain concerned that Al Qaeda terrorists operate with impunity on Pakistani territory and that the group appears to have increased its influence among the myriad Islamist militant groups operating along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border as well as in the densely 24 25 Text available at http www washingtonpost com wp-dyn content article 2009 09 21 AR2009092100110 html Ibid p 2-6 26 Joshua Partlow “In Afghanistan Taliban Surpasses Al Qaeda ” Washington Post November 11 2009 http www washingtonpost com wp-dyn content article 2009 11 10 AR2009111019644 html 27 Prepared by Alan Kronstadt Specialist in South Asian Affairs Congressional Research Service 7 Al Qaeda and Affiliates populated Punjab province Al Qaeda forces that fled Afghanistan with their Taliban supporters remain active in Pakistan and reportedly have extensive mutually supportive links with indigenous Pakistani terrorist groups that conduct anti-Western and anti-India attacks 28 Al Qaeda founder Osama Bin Laden and his lieutenant Egyptian Islamist radical Ayman al-Zawahri are believed to be hiding in northwestern Pakistan along with most other senior operatives 29 Al Qaeda leaders have issued statements encouraging Pakistani Muslims to “resist” the American “occupiers” in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to fight against Pakistan’s “U S -allied politicians and officers ”30 Al Qaeda is widely believed to maintain camps in western Pakistan where foreign extremists receive training in terrorist operations By one account up to 150 Westerners went to western Pakistan to receive terrorism training in 2009 As pressure has mounted on Al Qaeda in western Pakistan in the latter half of 2009 these camps may have become smaller and more mobile 31 A 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on terrorist threats to the U S homeland concluded that Al Qaeda “has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability including a safehaven in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas operational lieutenants and its top leadership ”32 In March 2009 the Obama Administration declared that the “core goal” of the United States should be to “disrupt dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan ” The President continues to assert that Al Qaeda represents the top-most threat to U S security 33 While taking questions from senior Pakistani journalists during an October visit to Pakistan Secretary of State Hillary Clinton offered a pointed expression of U S concerns that some elements of official Pakistan maintain sympathy for most-wanted Islamist terrorists Al Qaeda has had safe haven in Pakistan since 2002 I find it hard to believe that nobody in the Pakistani government knows where they are and couldn’t get them if they really wanted to And maybe that’s the case Maybe they’re not gettable I don’t know what the reasons are that Al Qaeda has safe haven in your country but let’s explore it and let’s try to be honest about it and figure out what we can do 34 Pakistani officials are resentful of such suggestions Islamabad reportedly has remanded to U S custody roughly 500 Al Qaeda fugitives since 2001 including several senior alleged operatives Despite some clear successes in disrupting extremist networks in Pakistan Al Qaeda has for many years been resurgent on Pakistani territory with anti-U S terrorists appearing to have benefitted from what some analysts have called a Pakistani policy of appeasement in western tribal areas near the Afghan border Some Pakistani and Western security officials have seen 28 During a December 2009 visit to Islamabad U S Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm Mike Mullen asserted that over the past 12-24 months Pakistan-based terrorist groups including Al Qaeda the Afghan Taliban the Pakistani Taliban Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed have grown “much closer” and are “working much more closely together” Department of Defense Press Release “JCS Speech Pakistan Print Press Interviews with Ambassador Patterson ” December 16 2009 29 “CIA Chief Says Bin Laden in Pakistan ” Reuters June 11 2009 “Al Qaeda’s Global Base is Pakistan Says Petraeus ” Wall Street Journal ” May 9 2009 30 See for example “Qaeda’s Zawahri Urges Pakistanis to Join Jihad ” Reuters July 15 2009 31 “Qaeda’s Training Areas in Pakistan Notorious ” New York Daily News September 21 2009 “Terror Training Camps Smaller Harder to Target ” Associated Press November 9 2009 32 See http www dni gov press_releases 20070717_release pdf 33 See http www whitehouse gov assets documents afghanistan_pakistan_white_paper_final pdf 34 State Department Press Release “Roundtable With Senior Pakistani Editors ” October 30 2009 Congressional Research Service 8 Al Qaeda and Affiliates Islamabad losing its war against religious militancy and Al Qaeda forces enjoying new areas in which to operate due in part to the Pakistan Army’s poor counterinsurgency capabilities and to the central government’s eroded legitimacy More recently however U S officials have lauded late-2009 Pakistani military operations against Al Qaeda- and Taliban-allied militants in western tribal areas Islamabad has devoted some 200 000 regular and paramilitary troops to this effort They also claim that drone-launched U S missile attacks and Pakistan’s pressing of military offensives against extremist groups in the border areas have meaningfully disrupted Al Qaeda activities there while inflicting heavy losses on their cadre 35 The August 2009 death of Al Qaeda-allied Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud assumed to be caused by a U S -launched missile was a notable success but a flurry of lethal suicide bomb attacks on urban Pakistani targets have demonstrated the resiliency of militant groups Moreover some analysts worry that successful drone operations are driving Al Qaeda fighters into Pakistani cities where they will be harder to target while also exacerbating already significant anti-American sentiments among the Pakistani people At the same time the Pakistan Army appears hesitant to expand its ground offensive operation into northern tribal agencies to which Al Qaeda and other militant leaders are believed to have fled and which may allow Al Qaeda to continue using the rugged region as a base of operations Implications for U S Policy In the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States President Bush launched major military operations in South and Southwest Asia as part of the global U S -led antiterrorism effort Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan has seen substantive success with the vital assistance of neighboring Pakistan President Obama has bolstered the U S military presence in Afghanistan with a central goal of neutralizing the Al Qaeda threat emanating from the region Yet neighboring Pakistan continues to be an “epicenter of terrorism” from which threats to the United States and other western countries continue to emanate Recently uncovered evidence suggests that the 9 11 hijackers were themselves based in western Pakistan in early 2001 and a former British Prime Minister has estimated that three-quarters of the most serious terrorism plots investigated in Britain had links to Al Qaeda in Pakistan 36 As tensions between Pakistan and India remain tense more than one year after the November 2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warns that groups under Al Qaeda’s Pakistan “syndicate” are actively seeking to destabilize the entire South Asia region perhaps through a another successful major terrorist attack in India that could provoke all-out war between the region’s two largest and nuclear-armed states 37 U S policy options to address the Al Qaeda threat in Pakistan are limited Anti-American sentiment is seen to be at peak levels within a broad spectrum of Pakistani society fueled by perceptions that the United States is fighting a war against Islam that it is not serious about supporting the process of democratization in Pakistan and that drone strikes and other suspected covert operations on Pakistani territory are a violation of national sovereignty A significant and long-term increase in economic and development assistance to Pakistan is a key aspect of the 35 “Al Qaeda Weakened as Key Leaders are Slain in Recent Attacks ” Associated Press September 19 2009 “Setbacks Weaken Al Qaeda’s Ability to Mount Attacks Terrorism Officials Say ” Los Angeles Times October 17 2009 36 “In Military Campaign Pakistan Finds Hint of 9 11 ” New York Times October 30 2009 “Brown Offers Pakistan Anti-Terror Aid ” Washington Post December 15 2008 37 “Al Qaeda Could Provoke New India-Pakistan War Gates ” Agence France Presse January 20 2010 Congressional Research Service 9 Al Qaeda and Affiliates Obama Administration’s effort to reduce the bilateral “trust deficit”—the Enhanced Partnership With Pakistan Act of 2009 P L 111-73 authorized $1 5 billion in annual nonmilitary aid through FY2014 Moreover the United States plans to continue to devote considerable resources toward bolstering Pakistan’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capabilities Yet U S troops are officially prohibited from operating on Pakistani territory and the combination of distrust of Americans and a dire security environment make it extremely difficult for U S officials to operate effectively there For the near- and middle-term then it appears the U S strategy likely will continue to rely on large-scale economic and development aid redoubled efforts to build Pakistan’s relevant military capacity accelerated drone attacks on militant targets and admonitions that Pakistani leaders consolidate what progress they have made and endeavor to keep pressure on Al Qaeda and its allies on their territory Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula AQAP 38 Background and Threat Assessment In January 2009 Al Qaeda-inspired militants based in Yemen announced that the Saudi and Yemeni “branches” of Al Qaeda were merging under the banner of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula AQAP The name “AQAP” formerly denoted militants responsible for the wave of terrorist violence that swept Saudi Arabia from 2003 through 2007 Its original leaders and members were mostly Saudi nationals who were veterans of anti-Soviet fighting in Afghanistan combatants from subsequent conflicts involving Muslims in other regions and graduates of terrorist training camps based in Afghanistan Working with local facilitators these trained operatives launched a series of suicide bombings shooting attacks and kidnappings that targeted foreign civilians and Saudi security forces The Saudi version of AQAP was largely dismantled and destroyed by Saudi security forces after a long and costly counterterrorism campaign Saudi security officials believe that many AQAP operatives fled to Yemen to avoid death or capture helping to lay the groundwork for a reemergence of the organization there in recent years In Yemen Saudis and others joined a growing cadre of local Al Qaeda members and supporters who were taking advantage of the Yemeni government’s distraction with internal security challenges This group called itself “the Al Qaeda Organization in the Southern Arabian Peninsula ” although most observers simply referred to the group as “Al Qaeda in Yemen ” Its leaders were among those freed in a now infamous jailbreak in 2006 in which 23 convicted terrorists escaped from a supposedly high-security prison in the capital of Sana’a Its members reportedly were drawn from a new generation of Yemeni militants that was emerging with support from nationals of other countries Many of these Islamist militants either fought coalition forces in Iraq or were radicalized in the Yemeni prison system At first Al Qaeda in Yemen issued several statements demanding that Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Al Saleh among other things release militants from prison end his cooperation with the United States renounce democracy and fully implement Islamic law and permit Yemeni 38 Prepared by Jeremy M Sharp Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs and Christopher M Blanchard Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs For more information on Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula see CRS Report RL34170 Yemen Background and U S Relations by Jeremy M Sharp and CRS Report RL33533 Saudi Arabia Background and U S Relations by Christopher M Blanchard Congressional Research Service 10 Al Qaeda and Affiliates militants to travel to Iraq to carry out jihad against foreign forces However unlike their predecessors this new generation of Al Qaeda-inspired extremists was more inclined to target the Yemeni government itself in addition to foreign and Western interests in Yemen Two attacks on the U S Embassy in Sana’a in 2008 killed 17 people including one U S citizen and injured dozens of Yemenis Following the announcement of the Saudi-Yemeni merger in early 2009 AQAP struck targets in Yemen and attempted several attacks inside Saudi Arabia including the failed suicide bombing attack that injured Saudi Assistant Interior Minister Prince Mohammed bin Nayef bin Abdelaziz Al Saud the director of the kingdom’s counterterrorism campaign Nearly a year before the failed Christmas Day 2009 airline bombing U S officials had warned that AQAP was growing in strength and capability In February 2009 Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair stated that “Yemen is reemerging as a jihadist battleground and potential regional base of operations for Al Qaeda to plan internal and external attacks train terrorists and facilitate the movement of operatives ”39 In April 2009 testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee National Counterterrorism Center Director Michael Leiter stated We have witnessed the reemergence of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula with Yemen as a key battleground and potential regional base of operations from which Al Qaeda can plan attacks train recruits and facilitate the movement of operatives We are concerned that if AQAP strengthens Al Qaeda leaders could use the group and the growing presence of foreign fighters in the region to supplement its transnational operations capability Despite a flurry of senior level attention from Obama Administration officials—in May 2009 Deputy Director of the CIA Stephen Kappes visited Yemen for talks with President Saleh—the consensus among many nongovernment experts for most of 2009 was that AQAP would concentrate its attacks inside Yemen and inside Saudi Arabia Most observers believed that AQAP’s influence and ability to threaten U S and Western interests from Yemen remained limited However the failed bomb attack against Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on Christmas Day 2009 has once more thrust Yemen into the public spotlight and heightened its relevance for global U S counterterrorism operations in a way that other attacks did not including attacks on the U S Embassy in Sana’a during 2008 Implications for U S Policy On January 20 2010 Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffery Feltman stated in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “evidence of the December 25 conspiracy indicates that AQAP has become sufficiently and independently capable of carrying out strikes against the United States and allies outside of the Arabian Peninsula including in the U S homeland ”40 The Obama Administration which had already increased U S military and economic assistance to Yemen before the December 25 failed terrorist attack has now pledged to boost FY2010 State Department-administered aid to Yemen to $63 million up from a total of $52 5 million specifically appropriated in P L 111-117 the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act Additional FY2010 funds may be allocated in ongoing negotiations between the State Department and congressional appropriators or new funds may be requested in a possible springtime supplemental aid bill to fund military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan In addition the 39 40 “Al-Qaeda ‘Less Capable and Effective’ US Intel Chief ” Agence France Presse February 12 2009 Prepared Statement of submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee January 20 2010 Congressional Research Service 11 Al Qaeda and Affiliates Defense Department has indicated it may seek to more than double Section 1206 funding to Yemen in FY2010 41 In FY2009 DOD allocated $66 8 million in 1206 funds to provide equipment and training to Yemen's armed forces By law the overall allocation of FY2010 Section 1206 funding was capped at $350 million and as such further 1206 funding may also be requested as part of a possible FY2010 supplemental appropriation Nevertheless the Flight 253 incident has once again illustrated a longstanding dilemma for U S counterterrorism policy in Yemen That is for each successful or attempted Al Qaeda-inspired attack against U S interests in Yemen or abroad the United States looks to the Yemeni government and its security forces for assistance—the same government that harbors employs and to a certain extent relies on Islamist political figures and some Islamist militants for political support In January 2010 President Saleh demonstrated a preference to walk a middle line by arguing that “dialogue is the best way even with Al-Qaeda if they set aside their weapons and return to reason ” Meanwhile Yemeni Islamists have warned that foreign security assistance that extends beyond basic cooperation could invite popular resistance to the Yemeni government and its external partners 42 In the weeks after the December 25 failed attack many Administration officials have made it clear that there are no current plans to send major deployments of U S troops to Yemen making the U S need for local cooperation evident Ironically many Yemeni government critics blame the country’s growing instability on the government itself suggesting that new leadership could resolve some of Yemen’s more immediate political crises Prospects for the improvement of local security capabilities appear mixed From 2003 through the present relatively basic improvements in Saudi counterterrorism techniques and investigative procedures has enabled the government to weather and then reverse a sustained assault from trained experienced Al Qaeda operatives However U S government assessments indicate that the capabilities of Yemen’s intelligence security and law enforcement personnel continue to lag behind those of their northern neighbor The limited ability or willingness of the Yemeni government to extend a persistent security presence in some areas of the country also creates challenges for denying AQAP operatives freedom of movement communication and operation Saudi officials have identified denial operations as key to their success in dismantling AQAP in the kingdom and in preventing re-infiltration Although central government authority in Yemen historically has remained relatively weak many observers in recent years have suggested that President Saleh’s ability to secure tribal support that could bolster the government’s security presence in outlying provinces where AQAP operatives are active such as Al Jawf Ma’rib Abyan Shabwa and Hadramawt has diminished considerably The AQAP threat in the Arabian peninsula also has implications for the Administration’s plans to close the U S detention facility at Guantanamo Bay Cuba and to when appropriate repatriate terrorism suspects detained there to their countries of origin Approximately 90 of the remaining detainees at Guantanamo Bay are Yemeni nationals Previous failings in the Yemeni penal system and questions about the effectiveness of Saudi efforts to rehabilitate returning Guantanamo 41 For more information on Section 1206 Funding see CRS Report RS22855 Security Assistance Reform “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress by Nina M Serafino 42 Shaykh Abd al Majid al Zindani a leading conservative Islamist leader inside Yemen recently commented on U S Yemeni cooperation saying “We accept any cooperation in the framework of respect and joint interests and we reject military occupation of our country And we don't accept the return of colonization Yemen’s rulers and people must be careful before a foreign guardianship is imposed on them The day parliament allows the occupation of Yemen the people will rise up against it and bring it down ” See “Yemeni Radical Cleric Warns of Foreign Occupation ” Associated Press January 11 2010 Congressional Research Service 12 Al Qaeda and Affiliates detainees and other terrorism suspects have raised doubts about the advisability of continuing to remand detainees to Yemen and Saudi Arabia Although AQAP is led by a Yemeni militant Nasir al Wuhayshi one deputy Sa’id al Shihri and another former AQAP deputy Muhammad al Awfi 43 are Saudi citizens who were repatriated from Guantanamo Bay in November 2007 detainees #372 and #333 respectively They and others passed through a Saudi governmentsponsored terrorism rehabilitation program before returning to militancy in Yemen 44 On December 28 Congressman Frank Wolf wrote to President Obama requesting that the Administration not release Guantanamo detainees to “unstable” countries 45 After several other lawmakers called for a halt to all future transfers to Yemen the Obama Administration agreed to suspend the transfer of detainees from Guantanamo Bay Cuba to Yemen 46 Al Qaeda in Iraq47 Background and Threat Assessment During 2005-2007 Al Qaeda in Iraq AQ-I was one of Al Qaeda’s most powerful and successful affiliates outside the South Asia region In late 2006 however Sunni tribes in Iraq turned against AQ-I and helped the U S military reduce AQ-I’s activities and influence substantially This turn later enabled the Bush and Obama Administrations to announce a roadmap for a U S military exit from Iraq to be completed by the end of 2011 AQ-I has not been eliminated but its activities have been severely reduced by what a September 2009 Defense Department report calls “significant leadership losses and a diminished presence in most population centers…”48 According to this report AQ-I continues to conduct period mass casualty attacks on government buildings in Baghdad and elsewhere but “at a reduced rate ” The report supports analysis by outside experts who assert that AQ-I has evolved into a more indigenous organization that is increasingly run and manned by Iraqi nationals The organization therefore focuses almost exclusively on affecting Iraqi political outcomes and demonstrates little interest or capability to act outside Iraq or the Middle East region 43 Al Awfi turned himself in to Saudi authorities in February 2009 and gave a lengthy public confession on Saudi television He described his time at Guantanamo his rehabilitation and relapse and his subsequent surrender in a interview with the BBC Peter Taylor “Yemen al-Qaeda link to Guantanamo ” BBC Newsnight January 13 2010 44 A third Saudi former Guantanamo detainee Ibrahim al Rubaysh #192 wrote an article in the eighth edition of AQAP’s online magazine According to one report six other Saudi former Guantanamo detainees are reported to have joined AQAP The Saudi newspaper Ukaz reported in February 2009 that Turki Asiri Yusuf al Shihri Jabir al Fifi Fahd al Jutayli Murtada Muqram and Mish'al al Shudukhi had all joined Al Wuhayshi's group in Yemen According to Saudi security officials Jutayli was killed in an explosion in Saudi Arabia in September 2009 See Arab News Jeddah “Blast Kills 3 Terrorists ” January 19 2010 and Caversham BBC Monitoring “Web Rising Profile of AlQa'idah in Yemen ” April 27 2009 45 “Rep Wolf Urges Halt in Release of Detainees to Yemen ” Congressional Quarterly Today December 29 2009 46 “Obama Halts Yemen Transfers but Vows Guantanamo Closure ” Agence France Presse January 5 2010 47 Prepared by Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs 48 U S Department of Defense “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq” Report to Congress September 2009 Congressional Research Service 13 Al Qaeda and Affiliates Implications for U S Policy Nevertheless the influence of AQ-I in Iraq could grow in 2010 if Iraq’s Sunni Arabs—who have been the core of the insurgency against the U S presence in Iraq and against the Shiite Muslim dominated government—feel disenfranchised or alienated from the ongoing political process Fears of such disillusionment grew in January 2010 when allies of Iraq’s Shiite political leaders disqualified 500 candidates most of them Sunni Arabs from running in the scheduled March 7 2010 parliamentary elections They were disqualified on the grounds that these candidates are supporting the outlawed Baath Party of former President Saddam Hussein The reactions of the disqualified candidates and the constituencies they represent could affect the success of the elections and overall security environment which in turn could have implications for the pace or scope of U S withdrawal plans North Africa Sahel Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb AQIM 49 Background and Threat Assessment Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb AQIM also known as Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb or AQLIM and its offshoots or autonomous cells pose the main terrorist threat in North Africa and the Sahel Under pressure from Algerian security forces AQIM has increasingly moved its operations out of the capital of Algiers The vast area of Algeria’s six Saharan provinces and of its sparsely populated Sahelian neighbors affords AQIM optimal terrain in which to move and conduct training as well as to advance its regional ambitions Algeria’s North African neighbors Tunisia and Morocco have prevented AQIM from penetrating their territories except for some recruitment of individuals both governments fear that AQIM will transfer operational capabilities to indigenous groups Neither has experienced a major terrorism attack for several years but both governments and that of Mauritania continue to unearth alleged Al Qaeda cells and affiliated terrorists It is not clear what AQIM’s “unity” with or “allegiance” to Al Qaeda means in practice as the group does not appear to take directions from leaders in Afghanistan Pakistan A nominal link is probably mutually beneficial burnishing Al Qaeda’s international credentials as it enhances AQIM’s legitimacy among radicals to facilitate recruitment Since “uniting” with Al Qaeda in 2006 AQIM’s rhetoric against the West and governments in the region and beyond e g to Nigeria as well as its calls for jihad against the United States France and Spain have increased Yet its operations remain geographically limited to Algeria and the Sahel and public information available does not suggest a direct AQIM threat to the U S homeland 49 Prepared by Carol Migdalovitz Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Nicolas Cook Specialist in African Affairs and Lauren Ploch Analyst in African Affairs See CRS Report RS21532 Algeria Current Issues CRS Report RS21579 Morocco Current Issues and CRS Report RS21666 Tunisia Current Issues all by Carol Migdalovitz for additional background and information Congressional Research Service 14 Al Qaeda and Affiliates Algeria AQIM’s origins date to the 1990s when Islamist extremists and security forces engaged in a conflict sparked by a 1992 military coup that prevented an Islamist political party from winning a national election in Algeria The terrorists sought and seek to replace the Algerian regime with an Islamic state The Armed Islamic Group GIA was then the main terrorist threat 50 In 1998 the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat GSPC split from GIA claiming to oppose the GIA’s indiscriminate targeting of civilians In 2003 under new leader Abdelmalik Droukdel aka Abu Musab Abdulwadood GSPC declared “allegiance” to Al Qaeda In 2006 it announced “unity” with Al Qaeda changing its name to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb AQIM raises funds primarily by kidnapping for ransoms and by trafficking in arms drugs vehicles cigarettes and persons 51 It also gets small-scale funding from cells in Europe 52 AQIM communicates via sophisticated videos on the Internet In 2006 AQIM increased its attacks against the government security forces and foreign workers in Algeria In 2007 it shifted tactics to “Iraqi-style ” suicide attacks with simultaneous bombings of the Government Palace the prime and interior ministries and a suburban police station in April and of the Constitutional Council and the U N headquarters in December among other attacks An AQIM suicide bomber failed to assassinate President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in September After a relative lull terrorist attacks on security forces escalated in summer 2008 when suicide bombers perpetrated a particularly bloody attack at a police academy resulting in more than 40 deaths In 2009 perhaps because security forces had made it difficult to conduct operations in the capital AQIM mounted attacks elsewhere AQIM continued to focus on the Berber region of the Kabylie in northeastern Algeria where the security presence had been reduced to pacify civil unrest 53 In June gunmen killed 24 gendarmes paramilitary police in an ambush more than 200 miles east Algiers In July they ambushed a military convoy 90 miles west of Algiers killing at least 14 soldiers 54 Several Al Qaeda-linked international terrorist plots have involved Algerians In December 1999 Ahmed Ressam an Algerian trained in Afghanistan was arrested after attempting to enter the United States from Canada he was convicted for the so-called Millennium Plot that planned bombings in Los Angeles His associates and other Algerians in Canada were linked to the GIA and Al Qaeda In January 2003 six Algerians were arrested in a London apartment with traces of ricin a deadly poison with no known antidote In October 2009 two French brothers of Algerian origin one a worker at the European Organization for Nuclear Research CERN in Geneva were arrested in France after intelligence agencies came to suspect them of “criminal activities related 50 GIA remains on the U S State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations FTO’s although its heyday ended in 2001and it has not perpetrated an attack since 2006 51 See also U S Drug Enforcement Administration “Three Al Qaeda Associates Arrested on Drug and Terrorism Charges ” Press Release December 18 2009 52 See also Michael Jonson and Christian Nils Larson “Illegal Tender Funding Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb ” Janes Intelligence Review October 2008 53 See also U S Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism 2008 released April 30 2009 available online at http www state gov 54 Some attributed the second ambush to the Protectors of Salafi Call which reportedly had split from the GSPC and therefore is not considered AQIM 54 Others attributed the attack to a regional command of AQIM and still others suggested that AQIM is encroaching on the Protectors’ territory BBC Monitoring Middle East “Five Regions Reportedly Designated for ‘Terrorist Deployment’ in Algeria ” El Khabar website August 5 2009 and BBC Monitoring Newsfile “Retreating of the Salafi Call Protectors ” Echourouk el Youmi website August 17 2009 Congressional Research Service 15 Al Qaeda and Affiliates to a terror group ” i e AQIM 55 Algeria continues to be a major source of international terrorists and Algerians have been arrested on suspicion of belonging to or supporting AQIM in France Spain Italy Germany and Britain The Sahel AQIM has become increasingly active in the West African Sahel where it “continues to demonstrate its intent and ability to conduct attacks against U S citizens or other foreign nationals ” according to the U S State Department 56 The Sahel stretches from Mauritania to Chad and encompasses several poor often politically unstable countries with large sparsely populated northern border areas and limited state capacity to monitor or secure them AQIM reportedly maintains mobile training camps along the Algeria-Mali border and carries out smuggling operations in countries across the Sahel taking advantage of porous international borders The group has carried out raids on military and police targets primarily in Mauritania and Mali kidnapped and assassinated soldiers and tourists in these countries and Niger attacked foreign embassies in Mauritania and repeatedly clashed with the militaries of Mali Mauritania Niger and Algeria The threat of kidnapping is of growing concern In 2007 AQIM associates murdered four French tourists prompting cancelation of the famous Dakar Motor Rally In 2008 AQIM assassinated 12 Mauritanian soldiers and kidnapped the U N envoy to Niger and a Canadian colleague The Canadians and several European tourists kidnapped in early 2009 were held in Mali and ransomed several months later A Briton in the group was beheaded after his government refused to meet AQIM demands to release a radical cleric who is an alleged Al Qaeda member In June 2009 a U S aid worker in Mauritania was shot in an apparent kidnapping attempt for which AQIM claimed credit and in August AQIM perpetrated a suicide bombing near the French embassy in Nouakchott Mauritania It also assassinated a Malian military official involved in the arrest of several AQIM members That killing was followed by a series of armed clashes between AQIM and Malian forces which with Algerian military aid and French air intelligence support vowed an “all-out war” on AQIM In November 2009 a heavily armed group attempted unsuccessfully to kidnap U S embassy employees in central Niger AQIM’s presence in the Sahel is divided between two main groups whose members are predominantly Algerian but include individuals from Mauritania Niger Mali as well as Senegal Ghana Nigeria and Benin 57 The groups appear to cooperate operationally but their roles and relations are not clear Differences between them may be reflected in the outcomes of the 2008 2009 kidnappings noted above in one a British hostage was executed reportedly for jihadist reasons while the other hostages were ransomed 58 The group that sought ransoms has 55 Emily Andrews “Big Bang Scientist Admits Plotting Al Qaeda Atrocity ” Daily Mail October 12 2009 U S Department of State “Travel Warning Mauritania ” December 2 2009 57 One group reportedly led by Yahia Djouadi and key associates and is linked closely to AQIM’s Algerian leadership A second group operates semi-autonomously under the leadership of Mokhtar Belmokhtar a Mali-based former GIA and GSPC member who reportedly split from the GSPC after opposing Droukdel’s accession to the GSPC leadership See the U S Department of the Treasury “Treasury Targets Al Qaida-Affiliated Terror Group in Algeria ” July 17 2008 Geoffrey York “The Shadowy Negotiator Who Freed Fowler and Guay ” Globe and Mail October 17 2009 and Reuters “Mali Arrests Four Al Qaeda Members Near Algeria ” May 1 2009 inter alia 58 Andrew Black “Mokhtar Belmokhtar The Algerian Jihad’s Southern Amir ” Terrorism Monitor 7 12 May 2009 and U N Security Council UNSC Committee pursuant to resolution 1267 1999 various documents inter alia 56 Congressional Research Service 16 Al Qaeda and Affiliates been responsible for many terrorist attacks but it reportedly primarily pursues criminal incomeearning operations and maintains a regional network of contacts who include state officials possibly marking it as relatively pragmatic compared to other AQIM elements Implications for U S Policy U S policy makers’ efforts to assist North African and Sahelian governments in countering AQIM threats may need to take into account colonial history and regional power balances and navigate them adroitly Algeria Mauritania Niger and Mali are all former colonies of France and suspicious of foreign involvement in their internal affairs and territories Yet despite their unease governments in the region are attempting to improve their counterterrorism capabilities with some foreign assistance in order to address the escalating threat of regional terrorism Algeria which waged a bloody war against France for independence is particularly opposed to foreign interference It has a stronger military and is richer than its neighbors thanks to its oil and gas wealth and sees itself as the regional power This may breed some resentment in the neighborhood and discourage cooperation as may Algeria’s attempts to act as the pre-eminent regional interlocutor for the United States Nonetheless Algeria has hosted regional counterterrorism meetings provided air cover for some counterterrorist operations in the Sahel and provided military assistance to Mali The U S government conducts several initiatives aimed at countering violent extremism in the region In 2002 the Department of State launched the Pan-Sahel Initiative PSI to increase border security and military and counterterrorism capacities of Chad Niger Mali and Mauritania PSI programs focused solely on building security sector capacity In 2005 the Bush Administration announced a “follow-on” program known as the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership TSCTP An inter-agency multi-faceted effort TSCTP integrates counterterrorism and military training with development assistance and public diplomacy It aims to “improve individual country and regional capabilities … disrupt efforts to recruit and train new terrorist fighters particularly from the young and rural poor and counter efforts to establish safe havens for domestic and outside extremist groups ”59 TSCTP is led by the State Department but other agencies including the U S Agency for International Development and the Department of Defense DOD implement components of the program including DOD’s Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans-Sahara OEF-TS 60 Under OEF-TS U S military forces work with African counterparts to improve intelligence command and control logistics and border control and to execute joint operations against terrorist groups 61 As democracy struggles to take hold in the region Sahelian countries face diverse security threats including armed insurrection banditry illegal trafficking and other criminal activities that may threaten state stability more directly than Islamist terrorism Some in the development 59 U S State Department FY2010 Congressional Budget Justification TSCTP includes Algeria Burkina Faso Chad Mali Mauritania Morocco Niger Nigeria Senegal and Tunisia Libya has been invited to join Countries nominated for TSCTP membership by a USG agency are consulted and must agree on the designation 60 For more information see CRS Report RL34003 Africa Command U S Strategic Interests and the Role of the U S Military in Africa by Lauren Ploch 61 TSCTP and OEF-TS capacity building activities with Chad Mauritania and Niger were limited in FY2009 due to U S government restrictions Sanctions on Mauritania applied after the August 2008 coup were lifted in September 2009 Programming in Chad and Niger has been restricted due to both political concerns and human rights vetting issues Congressional Research Service 17 Al Qaeda and Affiliates community question whether U S policy toward the region strikes an appropriate balance between countering extremism and addressing basic challenges of governance security and human development which some view as contributing to the rise of extremism Others question whether the U S response employs the appropriate mix of civilian and military resources or suggests a possibly counterproductive “militarization” of U S foreign policy in the region East Africa62 Background and Threat Assessment The East Africa region has emerged over the past two decades as a region that is highly vulnerable to terrorist attacks and is considered a safe haven for international terrorist groups Africa’s porous borders and lax security at airports and seaports and weak law enforcement agencies are major concerns Political ethnic and religious conflicts in the region create an environment conducive to terrorist groups The inability of African security services to detect and intercept terrorist activities due to lack of technology and sufficient trained and motivated manpower is a major impediment in dealing with the terrorist threats in Africa The takeover of power in Sudan by the National Islamic Front NIF in 1989 led to a significant increase in the activities of international terror groups in Africa The NIF government provided safe haven for well known international terrorist organizations and individuals and the government’s security services also were directly engaged in facilitating and assisting domestic and international terror groups Sudan has also been a safe haven for major terrorist figures including the founder and leader of Al Qaeda Osama Bin Laden Bin Laden used Sudan as a base of operations until he returned to Afghanistan in mid-1996 where he had previously been a major financier of Arab volunteers in the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan Many observers contend that it was during his five year stay in Sudan that Bin Laden laid down the foundation for Al Qaeda The penetration by Al Qaeda into East Africa is directly tied to NIF’s early years of support to international terrorist organizations The East Africa region is by far the most impacted by international terrorist activities in Africa The 1990s saw a dramatic and daring terrorist attacks against American interests in Africa The U S Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 by Al Qaeda killed 229 people 12 of whom were American citizens and injured over 5 000 people In November 2002 simultaneous terrorist attacks struck Mombasa Kenya Al Qaeda suicide bombers drove a four-wheel drive vehicle packed with explosives into the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa killing 10 Kenyans and three Israelis In June 1995 members of Gama’a Islamiya an Egyptian extremist group tried to assassinate President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt in Addis Ababa Ethiopia Somalia Safe Haven for Terrorist Groups The United States Somalia’s neighbors and some Somali groups have expressed concern over the years about the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Somalia In the mid-1990s Islamic courts began to emerge in parts of the country especially in the capital of Mogadishu These courts functioned as local governments and often enforced decisions by using their own militia 62 Prepared by Ted Dagne Specialist in African Affairs Congressional Research Service 18 Al Qaeda and Affiliates Members of the Al Ittihad Al Islami63 militia reportedly provided the bulk of the security forces for these courts in the 1990s The absence of central authority in Somalia created an environment conducive to the proliferation of armed factions throughout the country Somali factions including the so-called Islamic groups often go through realignments or simply disappear from the scene Very little is known about the leadership or organizational structure of these groups There have been three known radical Islamic groups in Somalia whose prominence alternately waxed and waned Al Ittihad Al Islami Islamic Union Al Islah Reform and Al Tabligh Conveyers of God’s Work In 1995 a group called Jihad Al Islam led by Sheikh Abbas bin Omar emerged in Mogadishu and gave the two main warlords General Mohammed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi an ultimatum to end their factional fighting The group claimed at that time that it maintained offices in several countries including Yemen Pakistan Kenya and Sudan Not much was heard subsequently from Jihad Al Islam although a group of Somalis later formed the Sharia Islamic law Implementation Club SIC in 1996 In late September 2001 the Bush Administration added Al Ittihad to a list of terrorism-related entities whose assets were frozen by an Executive Order Bush Administration officials accused Al Ittihad Al Islami of links with Al Qaeda None of the groups mentioned above remain active although some of their leaders are now leaders of groups engaged in terrorist activities in Somalia The leader of Hizb Al Islam Sheikh Hassan Aweys who is on the U S terrorist list was a leader in Al Ittihad Al Islami The Islamic Courts Union Al Shabaab Some observers have argued that the takeover of power in Mogadishu by the Islamic Courts Union ICU may have ended the insecurity and use of the country as safe haven for international terrorists in Somalia if Ethiopian forces with the support of the United States had not intervened to oust the ICU The ouster of the ICU in the view of these observers created a security vacuum in south-central Somalia and enabled Al Qaeda-affiliated Somali commanders to take control of many of the ICU fighters Many ICU fighters who joined the resistance against the Ethiopian forces soon became members of Al Shabaab the youth a fairly new group led by a small group of Somalis with ties to foreign terrorist groups Many foreign fighters and Somali expatriates including over a dozen Somali-Americans who went to Somalia to join the fight against the Ethiopian forces at the beginning of the intervention later fought against the Transitional Federal Government TFG Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda however have not been able to win the hearts and minds of the majority of Somalis The TFG and a number of formerly anti-government armed Islamic groups have formed alliances to fight Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda A faction of Hizb al Islam has joined the TFG and Al Shabaab has not been able to forge a formal alliance with Hizb Al Islam and its leader Sheikh Aweys Another Islamic militia group Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaah has become an ally of the TFG and is currently fighting against Al Shabaab On February 1 2010 Al Shabaab and the Ras Kamboni group led by Hassan Al Turki reportedly agreed to merge under one name Al Shabaab Mujahidin Movement Both Al Shabaab and the Ras Kamboni group have been coordinating their attacks against the TFG and working closely with foreign fighters over the past two years Senior 63 The 2005 U S State Department Country Report on Terrorism described Al Ittihad Al Islami as “a Somali extremist group that was formed in the 1980s and reached its peak in the early 1990s failed to obtain its objective of establishing a Salafist emirate in Somalia and steadily declined following the downfall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 and Somalia’s subsequent collapse into anarchy AIAI was not internally cohesive lacked central leadership and suffered divisions between factions ” Congressional Research Service 19 Al Qaeda and Affiliates TFG officials consider the merger a reaffirmation of a pre-existing informal alliance between the two groups 64 U S targeted attacks against the leadership of Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab have weakened the two organizations over the past two years Two of the three wanted Al Qaeda terrorists in Somalia Abu Taha al Sudani a Sudanese national married to a Somali and Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan were reportedly killed in 2007 and 2009 respectively A number of Al Shabaab senior commanders have also been killed in the past two years The killing of Nabhan in a U S strike reportedly shook the leadership of Al Shabaab and is likely to weaken the link between Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda and it may take some time for Al Qaeda to replace Nabhan with someone familiar with that region Of the three most wanted Al Qaeda leaders in East Africa the only one left is the leader of the group and the mastermind of the U S embassy bombings Harun Fazul a Comoronian national The Leadership of Al Shabaab The leaders of Al Shabaab are not well known with few exceptions Ahmed Abdi Godane also known as Abu Zubayr who is on the U S terrorism list and who trained and fought in Afghanistan is a key commander from the semi-autonomous region of Somaliland In September 2009 Al Shabaab released a video entitled “At your service Osama ” declaring its allegiance to Bin Laden Godane appeared on the video tape offering his service to Bin Laden Mukhtar Robow who is on the U S terrorism list and is a native of southern Somalia is considered one of the key leaders of Al Shabaab and a former spokesman although in late 2009 he reportedly was marginalized Another key leader is Ibrahim Haji Jama Al Afghani who is on the U S terrorism list and also from Somaliland and reportedly trained and fought in Afghanistan Hassan Al Turki is a member of the Ogaden clan from Ethiopia who has openly called for Jihad and works closely with foreign fighters In 2004 he was placed on the U S terrorism list Another individual who was often referred to as the commander of Al Shabaab forces was Aden Ayro Ayro’s importance and influence was highly exaggerated since he did not have a leadership position in the organization Ayro was suspected of killing four aid workers in the breakaway region of Somaliland as well as a Somali scholar in Mogadishu named Abdulqadir Yahya In May 2008 Ayro was killed in a U S air strike Since the killing of Ayro the insurgency has intensified its attacks and membership in the organization increased One of the major mistakes that contributed to the emergence and strength of Al Shabaab was the labeling of the leadership of the Courts as extremist and jihadist and the failure to identify and target the leadership of Al Shabaab according to some observers In March 2008 the State Department designated Al Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity Implications for U S Policy Al Qaeda poses a direct threat against U S interests and allies in East Africa Al Shabaab on the other hand appears more focused on carrying out attacks against Somali citizens the TFG and African Union peacekeeping forces AMISOM On February 2 2010 Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair at a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing stated 64 Ted Dagne interviewed President Sheik Sharif Ahmad of Somalia and other senior officials January 29 and February 1 2010 Congressional Research Service 20 Al Qaeda and Affiliates “We judge most Al Shabaab and East Africa-based Al Qaeda members will remain focused on regional objectives in the near-term Nevertheless East Africa-based Al Qaeda leaders or Al Shabaab may elect to redirect to the Homeland some of the Westerners including North Americans now training and fighting in Somalia ”65 Reportedly over a dozen Somali youth from Minneapolis and other parts of the United States have left the U S and some community leaders believe they went to Somalia to join the insurgency There is no clear evidence of how many and for what purpose these Somalis left Minneapolis although some U S counterterrorism officials have expressed concern to Congress that some of these individuals could be recruited by Al Qaeda to perform attacks in Somalia or the United States 66 U S officials stressed in early 2009 that they did not possess “credible reporting” that suggested such an operation targeting the U S homeland was planned or imminent 67 The concerns appear based in part on the fact that one of the suicide bombers in the October 2008 attacks in Puntland and Somaliland was an American-Somali from Minneapolis although broader concerns exist about the participation of U S citizens in Al Shabaab activities and potential U S -based financing for terrorist groups in Somalia The December 2009 Mogadishu suicide attack in which three TFG ministers and over a dozen civilians were killed was carried out by a Somali from Denmark Over the past decade many Somalis have returned to Somalia to work as journalists humanitarian workers and teachers A number of these Somalis have been killed in the past two years by insurgents and security forces The Obama Administration has been engaged in support of the new leadership of the TFG the same leaders that the Ethiopian government with the support of the United States ousted from power in late 2006 One option available to the Administration is engagement with the Islamic insurgents and clan elders to deal with the political and security problems facing Somalia According to some observers it is pivotal to strengthen the moderate elements of the Islamic movements discretely Most observers believe that Al Shabaab can only be contained by another Islamic movement supported by clan elders Some of the most influential leaders in Al Shabaab are on the U N and U S Terrorism Lists Some observers argue that removing some of these individuals from the Terrorism List in exchange for some concessions including an end to the insurgency and acceptance of a negotiated settlement should be considered as an option One of the key facilitators of the Djibouti talks that formed the TFG was a Somali man on a U N Terrorism List According to U N officials he was subsequently removed from the list The top leaders of Al Shabaab are determined to continue their terrorist campaign and are not inclined to participate in negotiations Targeted measures including sanctions and assassination of the most extreme elements of Al Shabaab could pave the way for other moderate leaders to emerge However others believe that this option is likely to backfire in the short term and increase anti-Western violence Another option is to refer some of these individuals to the 65 Director of National Intelligence Dennis C Blair Annual Threat Assessment of the U S Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 2 2010 66 See “Young Somali Men Missing from Minneapolis ” International Herald Tribune November 27 2008 In March 2009 an NCTC official expressed “concern… over the travel by some tens of Somali-American young men back to Somalia some of whom have trained and fought with Al Shabaab ” Testimony of Andrew Liepman Deputy Director Intelligence National Counterterrorism Center before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee March 11 2009 67 Testimony of Andrew Liepman op cit “Let me stress we don't have a body of reporting that indicates U S persons who have traveled to Somalia are planning to execute attacks in the United States We don't have that credible reporting But we do worry that there is the potential that these individuals could be indoctrinated by al Qaeda while they're in Somalia and then returned to the United States with the intention to conduct attacks ” Congressional Research Service 21 Al Qaeda and Affiliates International Criminal Court ICC for war crimes The most effective way of containing the extremists most observers contend is to look for a Somali-led solution both political and military The TFG Somaliland Puntland and other moderate Somali forces could form a coalition to contain the advances of the most extreme elements of Al Shabaab politically and militarily Such a coalition is likely to get the support of the Somali population rather than an external force The coalition can be assisted by neighboring countries Many Somali observers contend that a Somali-led initiative would take away one of the most powerful justifications used by Al Shabaab to wage war the presence of foreign forces Al Qaeda and Radical Islamist Groups in Southeast Asia68 In the 1990s Al Qaeda made significant inroads into the Southeast Asian region particularly the Philippines Indonesia and Singapore Al Qaeda not only set up regional offices but it also helped create strengthen and make more violent indigenous groups such as the Indonesian based Jemaah Islamiyah JI network By the mid-2000s however the actions of various national authorities in Southeast Asia appears to have drastically reduced the size and influence of Al Qaeda JI and other sympathetic groups Throughout the decade the United States—along with Australia—used capacity-building assistance and at times diplomatic pressure to support and push regional governments’ counterterrorism efforts It should be noted that while there has been much anti-Western terrorist activity in Southeast Asia many militants in the region are focused on local agendas Key factors in weakening violent Islamist groups in Southeast Asia have been the generally moderate nature of Islam in Southeast Asia a relatively high level of economic development the existence of democratic political systems in many affected countries the miscalculation of JI’s radical wing in killing Muslim civilians in their bomb attacks and the ability of most national governments to marshal the resources and public support to root out the most violent groups One possible exception to these observations is the southern Philippines where radical Islamist groups have been abetted by a combination of ongoing sectarian civil conflict and relatively weak government capacity Since 2002 the U S has sent ongoing deployments of hundreds of troops to the southern Philippines to advise and assist the Philippine military Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya After the September 11 2001 attacks U S attention in Southeast Asia focused on radical Islamist groups in Southeast Asia particularly the Jemaah Islamiyah JI terrorist network that have had or been alleged to have had ties to the Al Qaeda network In the years before and immediately following 2001 Al Qaeda used its Southeast Asia cells to help organize and finance its global activities—including the September 11 attacks—and to provide safe harbor to Al Qaeda operatives such as the convicted organizer of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center Ramzi Yousef 68 Prepared by Mark Manyin Specialist in Asian Affairs ext 7-7653 and Bruce Vaughn Specialist in Asian Affairs ext 7-3144 For more see CRS Report RL34194 Terrorism in Southeast Asia coordinated by Bruce Vaughn Congressional Research Service 22 Al Qaeda and Affiliates By the end of the 1990s JI and Al Qaeda appear to have developed a highly symbiotic relationship There reportedly was some overlap in membership They shared training camps in Pakistan Afghanistan and Mindanao and Al Qaeda provided JI with considerable financial support 69 They shared personnel such as when JI sent an operative with scientific expertise to Afghanistan to try to develop an anthrax program for Al Qaeda 70 The two networks jointly planned operations and reportedly conducted attacks in Southeast Asia together 71 Members of JI with extensive ties to Al Qaeda are known to have helped two of the September 11 2001 hijackers In 1999 and 2000 Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok were the sites for important strategy meetings among some of the September 11 plotters By 2002 roughly one-fifth of Al Qaeda’s organizational strength was centered in Southeast Asia Al Qaeda and JI leaders met in Southeast Asia for at least two critical meetings One in January 2000 in Kuala Lumpur during which plans for the attack on the USS Cole and the September 11 hijackings were discussed The other occurred in Bangkok in January 2002 during which an Al Qaeda representative reportedly sat in on the planning of the Bali bombings Two of the September 11 hijackers and Zacarias Moussaoui who pled guilty in April 2005 to U S charges of involvement in the September 11 plot apparently visited Malaysia and met with cell members in 2000 Additionally the FBI claims that Malaysian cell members provided Moussaoui with $35 000 and a business reference In 1999 and 2000 several Al Qaeda operatives involved in the September 11 and the USS Cole attacks used Kuala Lumpur as a meeting and staging ground According to the confessions of one captured Al Qaeda leader Malaysia was viewed as an ideal location for transiting and meeting because it allowed visa-free entry to citizens of most Gulf states including Saudi Arabia In 1999 and 2000 Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok were the sites for important strategy meetings among some of the September 11 plotters By 2002 according to one prominent expert on Al Qaeda roughly one-fifth of Al Qaeda’s organizational strength was centered in Southeast Asia Years of surveillance arrests and killings of JI members by various states are believed to have significantly degraded the more militant JI factions which were most closely associated with Al Qaeda As a result by the middle of the 2000s JI’s known links to Al Qaeda reportedly dwindled to almost nothing 72 JI appears to be taking direction from more “bureaucratic” elements that oppose the militants’ anti-western tactics as undermining their preferred longer-term strategy of building up military capacity and using religious proselytization to create a mass base sufficient to support an Islamic revolution in the future Moreover the crackdown on JI appears to have seriously weakened the organization degrading its command communication and fundraising structures to the point where many analysts believe it primarily operates only in Indonesia with a number of operatives also active on the large southern Philippine island of Mindanao and on the Sulu islands extending from Mindanao Both areas have majority Muslim populations 69 Sidney Jones “Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia Damaged but Still Dangerous ” International Crisis Group Report #63 August 26 2003 p 1 Abuza “Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia ” p 9 70 The 9 11 Commission Report p 151 Yazid Sufaat is the individual JI sent to Kandahar 71 Al Qaeda and JI leaders met in Southeast Asia for at least two critical meetings One in January 2000 in Kuala Lumpur during which plans for the attack on the USS Cole and the September 11 hijackings were discussed The other occurred in Bangkok in January 2002 during which an Al Qaeda representative reportedly sat in on the planning of the Bali bombings 72 Eric Schmitt “Southeast Asia Sees Gains against Insurgencies ” International Herald Tribune June 9 2008 Congressional Research Service 23 Al Qaeda and Affiliates In September 2009 Indonesian authorities killed the leader of one such cell Noordin Mohammed Top Top whose faction changed its name to the Al-Qaeda Jihad Organisation for the Malay Archipelago is believed to have been responsible for organizing the near-simultaneous July 17 2009 bombings of the J W Marriot and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta The bombings were the first successful anti-Western terrorist attack in Indonesia in four years Their sophistication triggered speculation that Al Qaeda had renewed ties with Top suspicions that received more credence when a laptop computer was found at Top’s hideout that reportedly established linkages between Indonesian militants and Al Qaeda 73 Suspected Al Qaeda Links to JI Splinter Cells The laptop also reportedly contained information stating that militant Syaifudin Zuhri bin Ahmad Jaelani who is thought to have recruited the suicide bombers for the July 17 hotel bombings was recruited by Al Qaeda while studying in Yemen 74 Syaifudin is thought to have become radicalized while in Yemen between 1995 and 2000 75 Syaifudin who was a veteran of conflict in Poso with links to international terrorist financing networks was thought likely to replace Top He was killed in a shoot out with Indonesian authorities in October 2009 76 Southeast Asian terrorism expert Sydney Jones has described the central question of the Jakarta hotel bombings as whether Top was imitating or had developed some “structural affiliation” with Al Qaeda 77 The Economist has stated that “Evidence recovered from the scene of Mr Top’s death has also shown that he had links with al-Qaida and received financial support from the Middle East ”78 The head of Indonesia’s anti-terror Detachment 88 Brigadier-General Saut Usman Nasution warned in November 2009 that although Top and other violent militants had been killed or captured new cells or splinter groups could be a source of strife particularly in Indonesian regions such as Sulawesi and Maluku where there has been a history of inter-communal violence between Christians and Muslims Nasution stated that these groups are in the process of recruiting new members to their organizations and expressed his concern that some of the 148 terrorists in detention in Indonesia may rejoin terrorist organizations or form new ones upon their release from prison He and others in Indonesia have called for a deradicalisation programme to prevent these releases from becoming a source of strife in the country 79 From 2002 to 2009 some 454 militants were reportedly arrested in Indonesia Of those 352 were sent to jail 80 In January 2010 it was reported by Pakistani authorities that a Filipino militant was killed in a U S missile strike against a militant compound near the border of North and South Waziristan Pakistan The apparent death of Abdul Basit Usman a bomb making expert reportedly with links 73 Peter Gelling and Mark McDonald “Indonesian Police Kill Alleged Terror Mastermind ” The New York Times September 18 2009 74 “Letter Found on Top’s laptop Implicates Jibril States Jaelani Recruited by Al Qaeda in Yemen ” OSC September 29 2009 75 “Indonesian Terror Recruiter Syaifudin Likely Successor to Noordin ” OSC September 25 2009 76 Sulastri Osman “The Fatal Allure of Extremist Logic ” RSIS Commentaries Singapore October 23 2009 77 Sydney Jones “Noordin’s Dangerous Liaiasons ” Tempo August 9 2009 78 “Indonesia Risk Security Risk ” The Economist Intelligence Unit October 26 2009 79 Salim Osman “New Terror Cells Taking Over JI’s Role ” The Straits Times November 20 2009 80 “New Terror Cells Planning Attacks ” New Straits Times November 20 2009 Congressional Research Service 24 Al Qaeda and Affiliates to Abu Sayyaf and JI points to ties between al-Qaida in Pakistan and militants in Southeast Asia 81 It was reported on January 17 2010 that the U S government was considering placing Hambali an Indonesian militant believed to be responsible for the 2002 Bali bombing on trial in Washington DC Hambali was captured in Thailand in 2003 and was held in Guantanamo since 2006 for his suspected involvement in the 2002 Bali bombings that killed over 200 people 82 On January 20 it was reported that the U S had rejected a request from the Government of Indonesia to turn Hambali over to Indonesian authorities for trial in Indonesia 83 The Abu Sayyaf Group Another Southeast Asian group that reportedly has had sporadic ties with Al Qaeda is Abu Sayyaf which is a small violent faction-ridden Muslim group that operates in the western fringes of the big southern Filipino island of Mindanao and on the Sulu islands extending from Mindanao Abu Sayyaf had links with Osamu bin Laden’s Al Qaeda organization in the early 1990s but these links reportedly dwindled throughout by the early 2000s Abu Sayyaf has a record of killings and kidnappings Under pressure from U S -supported Philippine military operations since 2002 Abu Sayyaf’s armed strength declined from an estimated 1 000 to about 200-300 by the middle to end of the decade Since 2003 Abu Sayyaf has carried out bombings and plotted bombings in cooperation with JI and another much larger Muslim group the Moro Islamic Liberation Front MILF including bombings in Manila Since 2002 the United States has deployed troops to the southern Philippines to advise the Philippine military the Philippine Armed Forces AFP in their fight against the Abu Sayyaf Group The U S role in the operations is supposed to be non-combat and has involved the provision of intelligence and communications support of the AFP including the employment of U S P-3 surveillance aircraft deployment of Navy Seal and Special Operations personnel with AFP ground units joint training exercises with the AFP assistance to the AFP in planning operations and conducting civic action projects with the AFP to improve the lives of the local populace 84 The civic action projects medical treatment water purification installations farm markets renovation of schools on the islands of Basilan and Jolo appear to have weakened support for Abu Sayyaf in these locations 85 Implications for U S Policy Thus far in Southeast Asia actions taken by regional governments appear to have nearly neutralized though not eliminated the threat from Islamist terror groups focused on Western 81 Ishtiaq Mahshud “Filipino Militant Killed by US Missile in Pakistan ” Associated Press January 21 2010 Chua Chin Hon “US Govt May Hold Hambali Trial in Washington ” The Straits Times January 17 2010 83 “US Rejects Indonesian Request to Extradite Terror Suspect Hambali ” BBC News January 20 2010 82 84 Raymond Bonner and Carlos Conde “U S and Philippines join forces to pursue terrorist leader ” New York Times July 23 2005 p A4 James Hookway “Terror fight scores in Philippines ” Wall Street Journal Asia June 20 2007 p 1 Roland Ramos and Inday Espina-Varona “Expanded old war theater Philippine Graphic ” November 12 2007 p 14-18 85 Simon Montlake “U S troops in Philippines defy old stereotype ” Christian Science Monitor March 1 2007 p 7 Al Jacinto “U S Filipino troops go on charm offensive ” Manila Times internet version September 10 2007 Congressional Research Service 25 Al Qaeda and Affiliates targets The responses of countries in the region to both the threat and to the U S reaction generally have varied with the intensity of their concerns about the threat to their own stability and domestic politics Singapore Malaysia and the Philippines were quick to crack down on militant groups and share intelligence with the United States and Australia whereas Indonesia began to do so only after attacks or arrests revealed the severity of the threat to its citizens Once Indonesia came to view the threat as a threat to Indonesians and the Indonesian state it too moved to suppress JI The United States – along with its ally Australia – has encouraged pushed for and supported these local anti-terrorism efforts through several means including funding and training Indonesia’s elite counter-terrorist unit deploying troops to the southern Philippines to advise the Philippine military in their fight against the violent Abu Sayyaf Group launching a Regional Maritime Security Initiative to enhance security in the Straits of Malacca increasing intelligence sharing operations restarting military-military relations with Indonesia and providing substantial aid for Indonesia and the Philippines Also since 2001 Thailand and the United States have substantially increased their anti-terrorism cooperation Combating anti-American terrorism in Southeast Asia has presented the Bush and Obama Administrations with a delicate foreign policy problem Despite mutual interests in combating terrorism Southeast Asian governments have had to balance these security concerns with domestic political considerations Although proponents of violent radical Islam remain a very small minority in Southeast Asia many governments view increased American pressure and military presence in their region with concern because of the political sensitivity of the issue with both mainstream Islamic and secular nationalist groups Such sensitivities are particularly strong in Indonesia and Malaysia the region’s two largest Muslim majority nations Throughout the 2000s the rise in anti-American sentiment propelled by both the U S -led invasion of and presence in Iraq and many Southeast Asian Muslims’ perceptions of America’s stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as “blatantly pro-Israel” has presented difficulties for most governments contemplating an overt U S role in their internal security 86 That said secular nationalist political parties have reaffirmed their central place in Indonesian national politics and asserted their dominance over Islamist political parties While Southeast Asia has had a large degree of success in curtailing Islamist terrorist activity there may be limits on the extent to which lessons learned may be applicable in other parts of the Muslim world One lesson that does appear to translate is that full commitment to fighting Islamist militants comes with the perception by Muslim states that these militants present a threat to their regime and people and not just to Western targets in their country or region The moderate and tolerant aspect of Islam in Southeast Asia may predispose Southeast Asian states to view extreme forms of Islamic belief in a different light than they would in more conservative states in the Arab core of the Muslim world Malaysia’s moderate concept of Islam Hadhhari and Malaysian leaders’ strong condemnation of violence associated with fundamentalist belief while at the same time embracing Islam is one example A further factor evident in Malaysia is the delicate balance between the Muslim community and the significant non-Muslim ethnic Chinese and Indian communities that reside there Indonesia has shown that democracy and national secular government can coexist in a largely Muslim state For these and other reasons the 86 Daljit Singh ”The Terrorist Threat in Southeast Asia ” in Russell Heng and Denis Hew eds Regional Outlook 2003-2004 Singapore Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 2003 Congressional Research Service 26 Al Qaeda and Affiliates Southeast Asian experience in fighting terrorism may be more applicable to places such as Bangladesh than the more conservative Arab centre of Islam Al Qaeda’s Global Strategy and Long Term Policy Implications87 Overall Al Qaeda leaders’ statements from the mid-1990s through the present suggest that they see themselves and their followers as the armed vanguard of an international Islamist movement Al Qaeda and many of its affiliates state a commitment to ending non-Muslim “interference” in the affairs of Muslims and to recasting predominantly Muslim societies according to narrow interpretations of Sunni Islam and related Islamic law Statements from some Al Qaeda leaders advocate for a phased struggle in which the initial goal is the expulsion of U S and foreign military forces from “Islamic lands” and proximate goals include the overthrow of “corrupt” regional leaders and the creation of governments that rule solely according sharia Islamic law Some Al Qaeda leaders also promote military confrontation with Israel and conflict with Shiite Muslims In pursuit of these goals leaders of Al Qaeda and its regional affiliates frequently make appeals for support based on a wide range of political positions and at times attempt to harness nationalist sentiment or manipulate local grievances to generate support for their agenda Although Osama Bin Laden’s self-professed goal has been to “move incite and mobilize the Islamic nation”88 until it reaches a revolutionary “ignition point ”89 Al Qaeda leaders’ statements and Al Qaeda’s attacks to date appear largely to have failed to mobilize widespread support among Muslims While global public opinion polling and media monitoring indicate that dissatisfaction with U S foreign policy has grown significantly in some predominantly Muslim societies the sectarian rhetoric of some Al Qaeda affiliates and the persistence of Al Qaedainspired terrorist attacks that kill and maim Sunni and Shiite Muslim civilians have undermined Al Qaeda’s appeal among some groups Some experts also argue that the uncompromising antidemocratic tone of many of the public statements released by Bin Laden Al Zawahiri and their regional supporters may be alienating Muslims who support the concept of secular or religious representative government Analysis of the statements issued by Al Qaeda leaders and affiliates since the mid-1990s suggests that these groups and individuals believe that characterizing their actions as religiously sanctioned defensive reactions to external threats will increase tolerance of and support for their broader ideological program Al Qaeda and its regional affiliates also appear to believe that the identification of limited political objectives and the suggestion that the fulfillment of those objectives will resolve their grievances may generate broader appeal than the group’s underlying religious agenda Nevertheless the practical political and operational realities facing many Al Qaeda affiliates have often led these groups to take actions that have undermined their efforts to portray themselves as defenders of Muslims with limited objectives For example • In December 2004 Bin Laden identified the conflict in Iraq as “a golden and unique opportunity” for jihadists to engage and defeat the United States and he 87 Prepared by Christopher M Blanchard Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs January 2010 “Usama Bin Ladin’s Message to Iraq ” Al-Jazirah Television February 11 2003 89 “Bin Ladin Interviewed on Jihad Against U S ” Al Quds al Arabi November 27 1996 88 Congressional Research Service 27 Al Qaeda and Affiliates characterized the insurgency in Iraq as the central battle in a “Third World War which the Crusader-Zionist coalition began against the Islamic nation ”90 Nevertheless several strategic choices made by Al Qaeda’s affiliates in Iraq undermined their support among key groups specifically their decisions to stoke sectarian conflict to rigidly enforce religious doctrine in some areas and to target the leaders and citizens of some Sunni Muslim communities Each of these decisions contributed to the significant attrition the group has suffered from 2007 onward at the hands of Iraqi security forces the government’s Sunni allies among the Awakening and Sons of Iraq movements and the United States military • Similarly affiliates of Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia initially oriented their attacks against foreign interests in the kingdom during their 2003-2007 campaign in line with Al Qaeda leaders’ rhetoric that had long targeted the U S military presence and other outside influences Saudi security officials believe that once local Al Qaeda affiliates shifted the focus of their attacks away from foreign targets and onto local security forces Al Qaeda created an opportunity for the government to directly engage and eliminate the group In addition to carrying out more robust security operations the government launched a campaign that used nationalist sentiment to undermine popular support for the group by highlighting Al Qaeda attacks against security officers • Since 2006 Al Shabaab fighters in Somalia who affiliate themselves with Al Qaeda have rallied support from some Somalis opposed to external intervention in Somalia and the Transitional Federal Government TFG However Al Shabaab threats against the United Nations World Food Program have shut down humanitarian aid delivery which has the potential to jeopardize the survival of many Somalis by exacerbating the food insecurity in the country • In Southeast Asia the Jemaah Islamiyah JI network’s 2002 bomb attack in Bali Indonesia that killed over 200 people led the Indonesian government to reverse course and undertake a concerted effort to track arrest and kill JI leaders as well as to increase anti-terrorist cooperation with the United States and Australia The ensuing crackdown in Indonesia and other countries appears to have degraded JI’s capabilities particularly its more militant factions which were most closely associated with Al Qaeda Since the mid-2000s JI appears to be taking direction from more “bureaucratic” elements that oppose the militants’ violent tactics at least in the short term Many observers argue that the success or failure of U S and allied counterterrorism efforts are tied to decisions made by regional governments and publics about the relative importance of combating Al Qaeda operatives affiliates and ideologues within their own societies Recent events suggest that U S and allied counterterrorism policies can be successful when they capitalize on Al Qaeda actions and messages that alienate current or potential supporters Similarly recent events also suggest that Al Qaeda members seek to capitalize on U S and allied policies that hurt or are unpopular among target local audiences These complex dynamics and calculations are likely to continue to challenge international decision makers and require unique approaches in each of the regional contexts described above Counterterrorism approaches that work in one theater or political context may prove counterproductive when applied elsewhere 90 U S Open Source Center OSC Report-FEA20041227000762 December 27 2004 Congressional Research Service 28 Al Qaeda and Affiliates Author Contact Information John Rollins Coordinator Acting Section Research Manager Specialist in Terrorism and National Security jrollins@crs loc gov 7-5529 Mark E Manyin Specialist in Asian Affairs mmanyin@crs loc gov 7-7653 Christopher M Blanchard Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs cblanchard@crs loc gov 7-0428 Lauren Ploch Analyst in African Affairs lploch@crs loc gov 7-7640 Nicolas Cook Specialist in African Affairs ncook@crs loc gov 7-0429 Carol Migdalovitz Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs cmigdalovitz@crs loc gov 7-2667 Ted Dagne Specialist in African Affairs tdagne@crs loc gov 7-7646 Jeremy M Sharp Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs jsharp@crs loc gov 7-8687 Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs kkatzman@crs loc gov 7-7612 Bruce Vaughn Specialist in Asian Affairs bvaughn@crs loc gov 7-3144 K Alan Kronstadt Specialist in South Asian Affairs akronstadt@crs loc gov 7-5415 Congressional Research Service 29