C05170032 _ ---------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - • • ' b 1 b 3 OL B Directorate of lnlellil ence C J A ALA LAR 'L-a L 7 Latin America Re iew I APPROVED FOR RELEASED DATE 12-May-2009 '· • ' · · ' ·- _ · · 'J ·· - - · - • ··• ·· -- · · - · • - · ·' · • 1 '• - - · J C053 70032 ' i • r Latin America Review - - 13 September 1982 Articles Peru Seooero LuminosoC This leftist insuracnt aroup does not threaten the aovernment directly but President Bclaundc may have to call in the military to quell the 2roup's activities A similar situation occurred during Bclaundc's first presidency and in part led to his subsequent ouster c J 7 -- ·-·9 13 15 _ ·· ·· •_ •-- ·_·- r•·· · co 53 7 0 0 32 -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - • Briefs 'ii • • r • • •i • • _ - • ' - - ' • • C053 70032 •· Articles Peru Sendero Luminoso '-------' Summary Sendero Luminoso SL is a small Maoist terrorist group of approximately 500 committed members Its largest concentration of armed followers is in the Andean department of Ayacucho although it has small cells in I an l other metropolitan areas I r At present SL's numerical weakness and lack of popular support outside certain areas of Ayacucho do not give il the capability to threaten the government directly If the civilian security forces fa to control its activities however Presidcn t Fernando Belaunde probably woultl have to authorize the-military to take a direct role A similar situation occurred during Belaunde's first presidency a11d in part led lo his subsequent ouster We believe that even if the mili• tary does interven again however a re atcd coup against Belaunde is unlikely because he would make every effort to limit the militan·'s involvement and strengthen his own controlj I primarily of attorneys professors and merchants Guzman and his followers-mostly craftsmen peasants and students harged that the group was increasingly favorinil urban areas to the detriment of the countryside and was overly deemphasizing armed struggle Since formally breaking with the Bandera RoJa to pursue a more violent path Guzman has mai tained th_at the L is the onlv le itimate Communist party in Pcrul ________ _ SL's Operations Followin11 President Belaunde's inau2uration in 1980 the SL embarked on a campaign of low-risk highprofile terrorist attacks consisting pril larily of dynamiting electrical towers public buildings and such symbols of authority as the Justice Ministry and police pasts Within the last year however SL opera lions have increased While bombings continue at• tacks against people including the assassination of ocal o fi als and suspected oolicc rormants arc mcreasm e ckground Members of the SL ar nu JJU l Lllll Qs i tlli Jllil __-- Sendero Luminoso Shining Path is a radical leftist operate independently terrorist and insurgent group that follows the organizational and ideological model of Mao's peasancbased revolution in China The SL's goals arc to brin2 down the Bclaunde government and lo remo ·c foreign-particularly US--influence from PcruL_ _-J'------------ - -- - --- ------ - -- hile the heaviest The SL was formed in the rnral southern department concen ra 10n remains m yacucho rece111 activities of Ayacucho in the late 1960s by Ruben Abimael and rcp0rts indicate an increased presence in Lima Guzman Rc ynoso then a philosophy teacher at the and other metropolitan areas ------ San Cristobal de Huamanga National University in Ayacuclto Guzman was also a member of the Ban• dera Roja a pro-Chinest Communist party made up C053J0032 • -· ·- - __ r' I ' -· Co Io m lJl a- ' Ecuador Brazil Peru Slates of Emergency 1-IMA Pacific Ocean - • • ··- ___ Departamento boundary --Province boundary Unclassified llo•ndlfJ-llon not Menliril C • utflorfllliw•• _j _ _ Ir 3 t • ' • - --- C053J0032 • minor damage to the chancery three Peruvian policemen gwirdin11 tt e compound were injured In addition US and other foreign-owned businesses have been targets J The Soviets and by extension tne '--cC c-u b-a-n-s -w-o-u 10__ probabiy be reiuctant to support the SL in any event Not only is the SL's Maoist ideolOiY incompatible with Soviet philosophy but more importantly Moscow values its arms relationship with Peru its only client in South America ----- The US Embassy reports that members arm themselves with small arms and machine2uns purchased in Peru or stolen from police and military posts Explosives are stolen from mines and construction sites Funds arc obtained primarily from robberies althou h there arc unconfirmed reports of money being extorted from narcotics traffickers Indoctrination and paramilitary training are given at clandesHne people's schools ' I I Other recent terrorist operations suggest that the SL 's plan to increase its activity is being implemented In March the SL mounted a highly successful attack on the Ayacucho prison and freed 247 inmates including accused and convicted terrorists More recently nu• merous civil guard posts and small municipalities have been attacked Last month the SL dynamited several electrical towers near Lima blacking out the city for several hours At present states of emergency exist in Lima Callao three provinces of Ayacucho department and one in Apurimac department I I The Threat to Che Goiemment The threat to the Belaunde administration is indirect We judge that the SL cannot by itself overthrow the government and its operations in the past tended to recede temporarily in response to government pressure implyine that they may tail off again under the current state of emergency If however the terrorists were to assassinate a prominent official pull off another spectacular such as the jailbreak in Ayacucho or generally stage more technically sop his tica led operations military pre sure on Belaunde to sanction a direct Army role could be overwhelming Civil• military rel alions could then ur d rgo a period of stress although we are by no means certain that the Belaunde a overnment would be threatened by a mili• tary takeover as a result ---- Twice in little more than a year the US Embassy was the target of bonb attacks presumably perpetrated by the SL On 31 August 1981 dynamite thrown from a passing vehicle caused structural damage to the chancery and ambassador's residence recently a caller to a Lima newspaper claimed that the SL was responsible for the attack In an almost identical operation on 24 July I 982 terrorists used more sophisticated nitrate-based explosives which caused - The SL appears to enjoy little popular support even in Ayacucho althol i h il may appeal to a few lnd i - rou b harkin • 1 ack to their Incan herita e By assnssinating sus pec-t 1-n o-rm_a_nts_a_n oc-a -o_ _ficials the SL has probably alienated most people in the affected area The periodic attacks in Lima have not won SL many adherents in the capital whose more sophisticated 3 · J r • ·· L --- ·¼----i i- __ • 1 L J ° C053 0032 • non-Indian inhabitanls are even less likely lo appredale the LLua Lidcclo 1jn the highland populallon c __ _ _ _ _ __ and he does not want to set up a similar situation now In addition the Embassy reports he is concerned that a tough Army antiterrorisl campaign might endanger Peru's favorable human rig Jts image and p c r h the SL 's hopes of increasing its public supportL__J The SL probabl i believes however tl1a1 i1s current tactics-even though they may not be winning much r u «i pport n H p t nu - v U vlv11t J 1f 1VII h the Army They hope that this in turn will lead to military repression and a subsequent rise in popular sympathy for the SL and its violem tactics The Peruvian public so far seems lo be increasingly weary of terrorist disturbances however and is probably more likely to approve of direct military actiP ----7 against the SL than to support the terroristsL__J Ve Ldic lc rniiiLary inu rvtiuion cOuid ioiiow an incident that hi11hlightcd police inefficiency and made the terrorists appear more dangerous than we believe they are It could also result from a long period of heightened terrorist activity that clearly could not be controlled by civilian forces A major SL success against an Army unit-rulher than the oolice--conld also provoke a military response I In its operations to date the SL has not posed a significant threat to the military Destruction of elc trical towers and assaults on isolated police posts arc difficult to prevent and require lit1le technical expertise to execute Most of the SL 's recent urban operations could have been planned and carried out by small well-trained units According to the US Embassy m-Jsl of the SL's successes-such as the Ayacucho jailbreak-can be attributed to the laxity and inefficiercy of the civilian security forces Rivalries among the various intcllii ence and hiw enforcem ni organizations hamper the government's efforts The competinc organizations often refuse to share information or to follow up lead as was notably the case in the jailbreak Coordinating and centralizing intelligence and law enforcement activities combined with more modern police equipment probably w uJd eive the civilian services all they need to neutralize the SL We see no indication however that this parochialism will be overcome in the near future increasing the likelihood rth 'ac ct_ ____ Belaunde may have to bring in th Armyj --- Likelihood of Intervention We agree with the Embassy assessment that Belaunde will delay involving the military as long as passible even at the risk of appearing indecisive He clearly hopes that the civilian forces aided by increased military log stic support can hold the line aeainst the SL The President remembers his ouster in 1968 by 11 military that had become highly politicized during its earlier involvement in u countcrinsuri ency campaign military leaders several months ago told Belaundc that if they were ordered to move against the SL the President would have to muzzle any press criticism of their actions Ti1cy also insisted that the Army be given command of all antiterrorir t operations and 1otal control of all routes in and out of Ayacucho Belaundc probah1y would refuse to grant the military such sweeping authority and would try to main lain his ability to monitor and contml the scope of operations He might for example allow the Army to operate in is i ated Ayaeucho where civilian security forces have been less successful than in Lima He would be less likely 10 surrender full civilian authority in the capital or other major cities where larg¢-scale military activity would be under closer national and internation il scrutiny We believe that the service chiefs would agree to some such restrictions to prevent a major break with the Presid nt whic they probably would prefer to avoid ----- Outlook Whili tc nsi ns between civilian and military authorities almost certainly would rise during an Army 4 • _ · · ' 4 _·· ' i • - I • - - C053J0032 • intervention against the SL we believe that this would probably not lead to a coup Military leaders are not cager to reassume political power because they are fully aware that they have no innovative solutions to Peru's current problems Most want to concentrate on professional matters nea lcctc d during the 12 years the military governed the cour tryJ I The survival of Peruvian demo racy-and particularly the pro•US Belaunde government-remains impor• tant both for its demonstration effect and for the longterm prospects for stability in the region We do not believe that SL alone currently represents a threat to Belaunde but the military-the direct threat--will be carefully monitorin2 events Military intervention would become more likely as a result of • Increasing popular support for the SL • Evidence of substantial foreign assistance to the SL • Terrorist activity in the northern and junelc rea ions • Larger more sophisticated SL operations against im '°paot smvcrnmcnt tatl ets es cially military __ umtsj _ _________ Even under these circumstances the SL would almost certainly be shattered by a confrontation with the Army especially if the military had the kind of unfettered authority it would like The terrorists arc still at a relatively rudimentary stai c and the Army has performed effectively in past counterinsurgency campaigns I s _ ---- - 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