Secret 9F9RN -IN L _ -NaeoN i HACT - Military Intelligence Summary Volume VIII Latin America U Defense Research Reference Series Defense Intelligence Agency ·11111111111 1'0007783 DDB-2680-108-88 December1• Secret If FEB 1£99 L' 1 I It 1--f J I'·' • 4 -· •'· I DISSEMINATION CONTROL MARKINGS VONINIEL nN t 'afAirtg Netiee lntelligMc Soarces 1r Mllhcds ln oluad eAeCN OC DISS 11d11atian Ad Extraction of NOeCN'fRilce F NG Not Releasable to Contractors Consultants l'ftOPIN l'ft eautto Ptop1ieta1 p 11 feffflatieA ln111al¥1d N8F8RN ENF Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals r 10 USC 424 Secret N6F8RN- --WNINftL NBCONTRACT Military Intelligence Summary MIS Volume Vlll Latin America U Defense Research Reference Series This is a Department of De Int elligence Document Prepared by the West Eurgpe Latin America Division Directorate for search Defense Int elligence Agency This blication superseda MIS Volume VIII DDB-2680-108-86 October 1986 Information Cut off Date 1 August 1988 Ci Li ii BJ lrlUfttpk lJbW tea Bcclatait 811 OilH DDB-2680-108-88 secret PROPERlY Of DiA UBRARY Sec1el PREFACE - Gµl'he Military Intelligence Summary MIS published in eight volumes is a synopsis of military intelligence worldwide Intended to serve as a ready reference the MIS presen a compilation of intelligence on those forces that contribute to the military security of each country and on the political and economic factors affecting the country's military capability Published annually the MIS serves to update information in other DIA publications U Information summarized in the MIS is available in detail in numerous DIA publications A list of related publications both completed and scheduled is published in the Register of Intelligence Publications DRS-2600-37-86 and the Defense Intelligence Production Schedule DDB-2600-85-87 Vol VI U Each classified title and heading has been properly marked all those unmarked are unclassified j b 3 10 USC424 U 'fyping support was provided b rl ____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ U Questions and comments concerninp this nuhlicatiqn should be referred in writing to the Defense Intelligence Agenc f3 1ousc 424 _JWashington D C 203400001 Requests for additional coiyes s t auJd be iorwprded through command approval Jin accordance with DIA Manual channels as appropriate to DIAl b 3 -10 use 424 59-1 DIA Intelligence Dissemination Reference Services Reverse mank iii Secret Secret Argentina Belize Bolivia Brazil Chile Marker Index To use bend book and follow margin index to page with black edge marker Colombia Costa Rica Cuba Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Guyana Haiti Honduras Jamaica Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Suriname Uruguay Venezuela Eastern Caribbean States V Secret Secret Y I ST - _ _J CHRISTOPHER- - NEVIS INSET ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA BRAZIL ' j _ - OMINICA ST LUCIA BARBADOS ST VINCl NT AND THE GRENADINES_ GRENADA 0 I 0 IOOMiles I l l domelffl TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO ' LATIN AMERICA 500 0 0 500 UIOO 1000 l500MIIH 1500Kllomalen vi Secret -Secret PERU TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1 GOVERNMENT a Key Government Officials b 'fype and Stability of Government c Internal Threat d External Threat e Communist Influence f Economic Factors g Military and Political Alignment h Key US Officials 2 MILITARY GENERAL a Key Military Officials b Position of Armed Forces c Military Trends and Capabilities d Military Budget e Population 3 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES a Arm y b Navy c Air Force d Paramilitary Forces e 'lbtal Military and Paramilitary Personnel Strength f Foreign Military Presence 1 1 1 2 3 4 5 5 6 6 6 7 8 9 9 9 9 17 22 29 30 30 APPENDIX Installation BE List 31 I Reverse Blank Secret -Secrret PERU 1 GOVERNMENT a U Key Government Officials President Alan Garcia Perez First Vice President and President of the Senate Luis Alberto Sanchez Prime Minister and Minister of the Presidency Armando Villanueva Minister of Economy and Finance Cesar Robles Freyre Minister of Foreign Relations Louis Gonzales Posada Minister of Interior Adm ret Juan Soria Diaz1 Minister of Defense General of the Army ret Enrique Lopez Albujar Trint Director National Intelligence Service SIN Lt Gen Edwin Diaz Zevallos b Type and Stability of Government U Peru has been under a constitutional civilian system of government for nearly 8 years following almost 12 years of rule by a military junta A new constitution written by an elected Constituent Assembly in 1979 entered into force at the same time that the civilian government took office in 1980 C 1n July 1985 Fernando Belaunde Terry completed a 5-year presidential term and was succeeded by the charismatic leader of the center-left American Popular Revolutionary Alliance APRA Alan Garcia Perez who received 45 7 percent of the vote in free and fair elections held in April 1985 Although the Constitution specifies that the President needs a majority to be elected Garcia's prospective runoff opponent Marxist Lima Mayor Alfonso Barrantes Lingan withdrew and the National Elections Board declared Garcia the winner APRA also won a majority in Congress 60 percent of the Chamber of Deputies and 53 percent of the Senate The Marxist United Left IU party was the second largest vote getter with 21 2 percent in the presidential election e 1985 elections were a milestone in the development of Peruvian democracy as they marked one of the few constitutional changes of government in Peru's history the succession was the first transfer of power from one elected government to another in 40 years The new government moved immediately to check inflation limit foreign debt repayment and reduce arms purchases while declaring its intention to promote agricultural development respect human rights have a nonaligned foreign policy and end government corruption The Garcia government has thus far had limited success in accomplishing these goals Economic problems continue to plague the country and a feeling of political crisis perpetuated by Garcia's governing style hinders stability - Sf The Peruvian Armed Forces have a long history of active involvement in the political system of the country There have been numerous coups and unsuccessful uprisings throughout the years since Peru gained its independence in 1826 For long periods of time military leaders and dictators have held the reins of governmen In recent history Peru 1 U Controls the Guardia Civil and Guardia Republicana PERU 1 Secret Secret has been governed by the military during 1948-56 1962 1963 and 1968-80 During periods of civilian government the Armed Forces have always been the final arbiters of political power Of the three services the Army is dominant c Internal Threat v i a n democracy faces a serious threat from insurgents and drug traffickers while the current economic crisis inhibits the execution of costly yet vitally needed nationbuilding projects to help eliminate the root causes of insurgency In addition austerity measures and low demand for Peruvian exports have created continuing labor unrest and popular discontent that are likely to continue until the employment situation and real wages begin to improve 0 'fhe fanatical Maoist-oriented Sendero Luminoso SL - Shining Path has clearly become the most visible insurgent organization in Peru It has attracted a substantial number of recruits who have taken a violent path to discredit and bring down the central government and disrupt national and municipal elections A second group Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru MRTA - Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement has emerged as a dangerous urban terrorist group i8TThe primary insurgent objective is to destroy productive infrastructure Terrorism combined with the economic recession and natural disasters has increased the pressure on what is still a fragile democratic political system The national elections in April 1985 and municipal bi-elections in November 1985 represented victories for Peruvian democracy Both provided evidence of widespread support for the democratic system and for Alan Garcia's APRA and its program of social change q By law the Civil Guard the Republican Guard and the Investigative Police PIP are responsible for internal security The Armed Fbrces can only become involved if the President declares a state or area of emergency and orders military participation in maintaining order 'Thrrorist activity led President Belaunde to declare such states of emergency in 1982 ' CfN'7 As part of its counterinsurgency campaign the Peruvian Government has opened two regional Emergency Zones since December 1982 One known as Emergency Zone 5 EZ-5 lies in the south central mountains and consists of 15 provinces in 3 Departments Apurimac Ayacucho and Huancavelica The other known as Emergency Zone 7 EZ-7 lies in the drug growing and drug trafficking region in north central Peru and consists of four provinces in Huanuco Department In February 1986 in response to increasing subversive attacks in the capital President Garcia declared a state of emergency and curfew in the Province of Lima and the port of Callao Army Navy Air Force and police patrol the city streets to enforce the 1 00 a m to 5 00 a m curfew C11NF In EZ-5 a military force primarily Army of approximately 6 000 assisted by a 2 000-man force of Civil Guard Republican Guard and Investigative Police bears the brunt of the fight The Air Fbrce provides rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft for reconnaissance and transportation of supplies and personnel from Lima to the Zone as well as a small air security detachment The Marine Corps provides about 300 men who are trained in commando tactics In EZ-7 a military and police force of approximately 2 000 men battles the insurgents 8 NF Peruvian military and civilian leaders recognize that Peru's growing internal security threat cannot be combated by repressive means alone Military leaders continue to believe that military civic action and national development programs construction of roads schools clinics etc are vital parts of efforts to pacify areas threatened by the insurgents PERU 2 Secret Secret Human rights groups allege that security forces were responsible for 1 300 di appearances in 1982-85 as well as committing other violations Beginning in 1985 and continuing into 1987 the government has taken steps which have dramatically reduced allegations of human rights abuses U Peru producing some 60 percent of the illicit coca leaf' supply is the world's foremost cultivator and leading source country for coca paste and cocaine base Most of this is exported to 'Colombia for conversion to refined cocaine hydrochloride HCl and international distribution A lesser amount is refined in Peru or smuggled through Ecuador Brazil and other South American spillover countries Illegal coca products are smuggled out chiefly by air from clandestine airstrips or by boat utilizing the expansive Amazonian river basin U An estimated 98 000 to 121 000 hectares of coca were cultivated in Peru in 1987 over 90 percent of which were illegal The Huallaga Valley in central Peru is the principal growing area with other remote areas beyond government control also being used Coca the largest source of foreign exchange earnings generates $700 million in foreign exchange annually and serves as the economic base in regions where cultivated S NF The widespread presence of Shining Path and Tupac Amaru insurgents in the Huallaga Valley caused the area to be declared a military emergency zone in November 1987 The military presence in the region has in general not enhanced security for antidrug operations Clear jurisdictional lines do not exist among security agencies and there appears to be minimal coordination and increasing friction between the Army and police Further drug money and bribes provide an enormous temptation to both military and police officers in the area It is not believed that there is institutional corruption or extensive security official participation in narcotrafficking schemes rather some officials are suspected of taking no action to stop illegal activities in return for monetary remuneration - et The Garcia administration with US assistance is pursuing an interdiction and eradication effort against traffickers with mixed success Peru's severe resource constraints prevent adequate manpower and material support for effective law enforcement activities The 500-member Civil Guard Anti-drug Police CGAP formerly UMOPAR with the support and policy direction of the Ministry of the Interior is assigned the lead in suppressing the trade Narcotraffickers often have a clear operational edge in equipment firepower mobility and intelligence d External Threat · The Peruvian Government considers the most significant external threat to be that posed by possible hostile activities emanating from Ecuador Chile or Bolivia each of whom in former times has been involved with Peru in border disputes iSr-The longstanding border dispute between Peru and Ecuador erupted in late January 1981 into 5 days of fighting in the Condor mountain range where 78 kilometers of border are still unmarked Ecuadorean forces were driven back by the Peruvians The conflict coincided with the 29 January anniversary of the signing of the Rio Protocol which ended the 10-day war between Peru and Ecuador in 1942 The outbreak of fighting has been ascribed to Ecuador's efforts to publicize the border dispute have it adjudicated by the Organization of American States and open the 1942 Rio Protocol to further mediation Peru for its part insists on the validity of the Protocol and has succeeded in limiting membership of the OAS Investigating Committee to representatives of the four guarantor countries - Argentina Brazil Chile and the United States Internal problems in both Ecuador and Peru calll ot be discounted as possible reasons for the outbreak Recurring incidents illustrate the volatility PERU 3 Secret Secret of the border issue Peru is prepared to enforce its position militarily if Ecuador should resort to military means to press its claim The perception of a threat from Chile which appears to have peaked in the mid-1970s probably stems from the psychological impact left by the War of the Pacific 1879-83 in which Chile soundly defeated and humiliated Peru and Bolivia The Peruvian Armed Forces do not believe that Bolivia is a military threat but they are concerned that Bolivia's efforts to obtain access to the sea may heighten tensions in the Andean Region President Garcia has played down the external threat and sought to improve relations with Ecuador and Chile He reportedly confronted his top military commanders with the statement that Peru's true enemies are hunger and misery Garcia has declared his intention to cut back Peru's arms purchases preferably under terms of mutual reductions negotiated with Ecuador and Chile He has indicated that if necessary the Peruvian Government will make unilateral · cutbacks in order to fund its development plans e Communist Influence S NF Overall Communist influence in Peru is considered high Peru maintains diplomatic relations with nearly all the Communist countries the exceptions being Mongolia Vietnam and at the moment North Korea Since 1968 when radical leftist elements of the military seized power 11 Communist countries have established relations with Peru and four - the Soviet _Union Cuba German Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of China - maintain defense attache offices in Lima Under President Garcia Peru has returned to the aggressive Third Worldism which characterized the military regime Peru and Cuba have announced plans to upgrade relations to ambassadorial level but the exchange has apparently been postponed over a dispute about Cuban asylees in the Peruvian Embassy 8 NFt The Soviet Union provides 60 to 100 scholarships per year to Soviet universities About 600 Peruvians are believed to be studying in the USSR The most influential returnees · are professors at San Marcos and San Martin de Porras Universities Their numbers are relatively small but they contribute to the network of Soviet-trained professors who seek out bright candidates to follow in their footsteps tE¾'N-F Soviet influence can frequently be seen in the Lima daily newspapers Communi1 1t Unidad and leftist La Republica El Nacional and El Diario Marka now defunct The Soviets appear also to be heavily subsidizing the distribution of Russian language books in Lima through at least three different publishing houses These books are sold at a number of stores at prices that seem well under the cost of publishing Cubans in Lima operate closely with the Soviets and take the lead in pushing Communist propaganda lines 5 NF The Communist Party of Peru PCP - also known as PCP-Unity - PCP U is the Soviet-line Communist Party in Peru Its membership consists of about 1 500 active and aging formal party members Its secretary-general is Senator Jorge del Prado Chavez Although the PCP is submissive to Soviet direction and receives a small monthly Soviet subvention Moscow finds it to be an asset of limited utility A number of other leftist parties which together with the PCP constitute the United Left lzquierda Unida - W are more able competitors for disaffected Peruvian youth These parties usually incorporate the terms Communist Socialist or revolutionary in their titles to signify their antiestablishment and at times anti-American views but in no way signifying subservience to foreign direction What political weight the PCP enjoys comes from its domination of the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers CGTP Peru's largest labor central B- 1NF The Soviet Union considers Peru one of its most promising long-term targets in PERU 4 Secret SecFet South America Beyond their significant stake and position within the Armed Forces the Soviets maintain close ties to the United Left IU Peru's democratic Marxist coalition and are attempting to build a solid relationship with the center-left government party APRA Moscow-line elements do not dominate the ru but the Soviets regard increased strength for the left in general in Peru as a favorable development Similarly the Soviets stand to benefit from increasing violence associated with SL and MRTA terrorism Although the Soviets categorically denounce and disassociate themselves from the Maoist-inspired SL the fact remains that SL is a revolutionary group whose destructiveness and perturbation of the democratic order assist the Soviets to realize their long-term objectives in Peru S 'N t Soviet goals in Peru are to expand relationships with the APRA government establish useful friendships within leftist and particularly Marxist parties keep the military as a moderate friend and at times politically helpful ally and encourage a viable Marxist opposition poised to come to power in a polarized political environment f Economic Factors U Peru's economy deteriorated sharply in 1988 as the government virtually ran out of cash and lost control over inflation Despite some improvement in agricultural and fishing exports manufacturing mineral and energy production are declining Peru which has been a net oil exporter for the past ten years will become a net oil importer by 1989 as oil wells continue to be depleted With the economy again unraveling popular discontent is growing An increasing number of terrorist attacks against economic and political targets is plaguing Peru as a rising number of young people turn to subversion as living standards deteriorate further U Much of Peru's economy is geared for illegal coca production Revenues of over $500 million annually make cocaine Peru's single largest cash-earning industry - G -Peru's foreign debt bill includes over $15 billion owed to Western creditors and almost $900 million owed to the USSR President Garcia's policy of limiting repayment of foreign debt to 10 percent of exports has made Peru virtually ineligible for further loans from Western lenders Peru has repaid nearly $200 million of its Soviet debt with trade and recently refinanced the balance of this debt through a multi-year trade agreement with the USSR $ 'NF Peru does not have sufficient industrial capacity to support its Armed Forces Its naval construction capability is increasing and Peruvian shipyards are now capable of building merchant ships up to 70 000 tons One Lupo Class frigate was completed in 1984 with extensive material and technical assistance from Italy A second unit became operational in January 1988 Ordnance produced includes submachineguns handgrenades ammunition and mortar and artillery rounds Historically the Free World has been the main source of military assistance to Peru but since 1973 the USSR has been the chief single supplier to the Army and Air Force Soviet contracts are valued at over $2 billion and account for approximately one-half of Peru's military assistance agreements 'Total Free World sales of $2 0 billion are led by France with agreements totaling nearly $700 million Total US deliveries are valued at $246 million g Military and Political Alignment NF -Peru is a member of the Inter-American Defense Board which plans for the joint defense of the hemisphere Additionally it is a signatory of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 Rio Treaty under which it assumes the obligation to support other signatory American states whenever they are threatened by aggression Peru entered into a bilateral military agreement with the United States for specific military PERU 5 Secret Secret cooperation the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 26 April 1952 through which it has received US military assistance The agreement was modified in 1969 when the US Service Missions were asked to depart leaving only a small mission in Peru Argentina has had close military cooperation with Peru which became even more evident during the 1982 Falkland Islands war During and after the conflict Peru provided political and military support to Argentina The latter included transfer of 10 Mirage 5 aircraft and associated spare parts to Axgentina training of Argentine pilots in Peru and testing and evaluation of Argentine armor for possible procurement by Peru 0 NF Peru owes a massive debt to the Soviet Union primarily for military equipment purchased under a former leftist military regime An estimated 40-60 Soviet military advisers and technicians are in Peru to provide assistance to the Peruvian Army and Air Force in tank artillery aircraft and helicopter maintenance as well as air defense operations Peruvian Government leaders maintain a firmly pro-Third World outlook and adhere to APRA's anti-imperialist philosophy Most share the ideals of democratic government individual liberty and others bases of Western culture However pl'agmatic considerations generally outweigh ideology in GOP foreign policy The closeness of its relations with Western Soviet Bloc and other countries has largely been based on the government's perception of benefits it stands to gain from the relationship either in material terms or domestic popularity h U Key US Offirnc'iT ia l s -------- b 3 50 USC 403-1 1 Ch1'ef 0 f M'lSSlOn ----rr b 3 07 1 0 us 'c 4 '24 -----_ ___ ___ Defense and Naval Attache AA h rn b 3 10 umsvc 4 '24 ------------------I tUmy ttac e __----- - - - - c - -----'----- Assistant Army Attache b 3 o use 424 A h b 3 10 USC 424 Air ttac e L ---- 'F'l' o ------------ Assistant Air Attache blC3l 10 use 424 Chief MAAG lC3 so use 403-1 il Arm S ti Ch f b 3 50 use 403-1 1 y ec on 1e ' ' - -----__ _ • b 3 50 SC 403-1 1 Navy Representative 2 MILITARY GENERAL a U Key Military Officials Joint Command of the Armed Forces President Lt Gen German Vucetich Zevallos Air Force Chief of Staff Maj Gen Carlos Mauricio Agurto Chief Division IT Intelligence RAdm Jaime Carrera Rivera Army Commander General of the Army Artemio Palomino 'lbledo Chief of Staff Lt Gen Alejandro Antunez de Mayolo Director of Intelligence Army General Staff Maj Gen Juan Campos Luque PERU 6 Secret- Secret Inspector General Maj Gen Julio Valasquez Giacarini Navy Commander Adm Oscar Anderson Noriega Chief of Staff VAdm Augusto Fernandez Hidalgo Chief of Naval Operations VAdm Daniel Mariscal Galiano Director of Intelligence RAdm Julio Raygada Garcia Inspector General VAdm Gonzalo Gambiriazio Martini Commandant Marine Corps RAdm Manuel Reyna Mendoza Air Force Commander Lt Gen German Vucetich Zevallos Chief of Staff Lt Gen Cesar Gonzalo Luzza Director of Intelligence Air Force General Staff Maj Gen Armando Llosa Alvarez b Position of Armed Forces S NF 'he President of the Republic as commander in chief of the land sea and air forces presides over the Ministry of Defense the highest organization concerned with National security Created in January 1988 over the vehement objections of the Navy and Air Force the Ministry of Defense has repl ced the former Supreme Council of National Defense It has a mandate to establish national security and defense policies It also controls civil defense- and armed forces-related socio-economic development projects It coordinates a nd establishes budget allocations manpower strengths and personnel policies for the three branches of the Armed Forces The Ministry also is mandated to subsume the decentralized public organizations the various industries owned or operated by the armed forces by 1989 S NF The Ministry of Defense is out of the operational chain of command The command line goes directly from the President of the Republic to the President of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces The Joint Command consists of the three service commanders one of whom serves as its president This body is tasked with planning and coordinating joint service operations In case of emergency the President of the Joint Command is to assume command over all military and palice forces Joint service theaters of operations were authorized in 1969 but in general were inactive until 1975 Peruvian military doctrine for joint combat operations provides for four of the five Army Military Regions MR I II ill and V to convert to theaters of operations respectively northern central southern and northeastern The commanding general of the region becomes the theater commander and his joint staff comprises the region's general staff for plans The deputy commander of the region becomes the ground force commander for the theater and his army staff comprises the region's general staff In Military Regions I IT and ill the commander of the air wing becomes the deputy commander of the theater In Naval Zones I IT ID and V the naval zone commander becomes dual-hatted as the naval adviser to the region No joint operations are contemplated within Military Region IV The Armed Forces probably do not yet have the ability to put this doctrine into practice in an effective manner Joint operations were not undertaken during the 1981 border conflict with Ecuador which was primarily an Army affair supported by air and naval units U There are two-star three-star and four-star flag officers in the Armed Forces There is no one-star officer rank In the Army a two-star general de brigada is equivalent to a PERU 7 Secret Secret US major general and a three-star general de division to a US lieutenant general In the Air Force and the Navy a two-star mayor general and contralmirante are equivalent to US major general and rear admiral while a three-star teniente general and vicealmirante equate to a US lieutenant general and vice admiral In December 1984 a new four-star rank was established for the two top positions of each service general del ejercito general of the Army almirante admiral and general del aire general of the Air Force Seniority is determined by the date of rank or in cases of equal date by position on the promotion list The officer at the head of the list is senior c Military Trends and Capabilities C NF Modernization of the Peruvian Armed Forces began in 1967 with the apparent purpose of in easing the size and capabilities of the forces before the Centennial 1979-88 of the War of the Pacific Since 1979 the rate of modernization has decelerated however some equipment purchases have continued from both the USSR and the West - Q The Army's main priority is to upgrade the combat capability of its air arm through purchase of a combination of observation attack and transport helicopters Army leaders have decided to try to reduce army dependence on the Soviet Union for equipment and training They realize that to do so precipitously would probably jeopardize readiness and are therefore implementing a long-term program to reduce this dependence Q i Iru Jltl elrnization program in the 1960s with the acquisition fighters Major deliveries of Soviet equipment for as armOfed personnel carriers equipped with antitank missiles or se ense o o se the purchase of fi hter interceptor aircraft by neighboring Ecuador and Chile the Air Force purchased b 1 1 4 c which were delivered in 1986 Soviet-made Mi-25 HIND helicopters for the Air Force were delivered in 1983 The Air Force's modernization program has included a program to expand and upgrade its airfields ranging from revetments for its aircraft to modern instrument landing systems S NF The principal objective in the Peruvian Navy's modernization program is construction of a new naval base in Chimbote in order to ease congestion in the main naval base of Callao The first phase of the navy program to upgrade former Dutch combatants with missiles new fire control s stems and enhanced antisubmarine warfare capabilities began in 1985 with the cruiser b 1 1 4 c The Navy would like to replace its aging Daring Class destroyers with two modern destroyers To date the Navy has refused to acquire Soviet equipment Since 1973 it has received cruisers destroyers and inland minesweepers from the Netherlands two Lupo Class missile frigates from Italy two others have been constructed in Peru missile patrol boats from France submarines from Germany and leased LSTs from the US -'ffi The Naval Aviation Force has been mgraded with the purchase of b 1 1-4 c l b 1 1 4 c _ j1977 b 1 1 4 c and AB-212 antisubmarine warfare ASW elieouters from Italv in 1979 Two Bell 206B Jet Ranger helicopters were received from the_ib 1 1 -4 c were received from the US in 1988 The Navy would like to acquire a high-altitude-capable helicopter to use in its counterinsurgency operations S 'NF l b 1 1 4 c PERU 8 Secret II Secret only one EW company in Lima The Peruvian Army however plans to establish an EW system in the future d Military Budget I lS NF l b 1 1 4 c l b 1 1 4 c No service allocation available e U Population 21 269 074 excluding jungle Indian population estimated at 101 000 in 1961 as of 1 July 1988 Males ages 16-49 6 233 000 physically fit 3 643 000 227 000 reach military age 20 annually Ethnic division 45 percent ·Indian 37 percent mestizo 15 percent white mostly Spanish 1 percent black Japanese and Chinese Literacy est 80 percent 3 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES a Army 1 Mission U The mission of the Army is to guarantee the independence sovereignty and territorial integrity of the republic comply with the Constitution and the laws and if called upon by the President assume control of public order during a state of emergency Its primary military duties are to protect the territorial integrity of the nation and guarantee public order 2 Ca pabillties 0 NF The Army as currently structured and equipped is minimally capable of performing the dual mission of conducting internal security operations and defending the countq from a conventional attack by Ecuador or Chile b 1 1 4 c _J l b 1 1 4 c l Pe ru-'s_a_ir-bo_m_e_u_m ·ts_ar_e_c-ap- a b le of air assault operations in support of a main attack The major factor limiting conventional operations is an overall logistic weakness Peru would not be capable of protracted offensive operations or support ef maneuver elements over long distances There are indications that full-scale operations could be sustained only 10 days without major resupply from foreign sources h e Army's capacity to structure an effective counter insur enc cam ai is constrained by a variety of factors b 1 1 4 c e aut on y n manpower eqmpment nor trammg nee for such a program Further many within the Army insist upon maintaining a conventional capability focused on the traditional threat emanating from Chile and Ecuador As a result there is a reluctance to deploy more than 10 percent of the army's total assets in the Emergency· Zones to counter the internal threat 0 N b 1 1 4 c j b 1 1 4 PERU 9 Secret exercises and low educational level of its conscripts To improve the professionalism of its enlisted men the Army offers specialized training to those c _ onscripts who reenlist 3 Personnel Strength tgtN-ffil b 1 1 4 c j b 1 1 4 c 4 Organization and Deployment a General The Commander of the Peruvian Army is responsible for the operational command and control of the Army He is assisted by the Army General Staff which is organized into · nd commands and is headed b the Chief of the Arm General Staff The b 1 1 4 c T e reg1ona ea quarters contro most of the forces located wit m t eir respective areas of responsibility The major exception is Military Region Il where the Academic Centers fall directly under the control qf the Commander of the Army · b 1 1 4 c iffi j b 1 1 4 c I r c • • a services battalion a signa company an engmeer company an or an 1 an companies The one Jungle Division however has no artillery unit There are five reserve infantry battalions one each assigned to two military region headquarters two armored divisions and the airborne division r l8 NF j b 1 1 4 c 1 1 4 c b 1 1 4 c b 1 1 4 c b 1 1 4 c e army air e ense organization is designed to prorct the armored units Three ADA battalions each equipped with 2 s If- ro elled tracked ib 1 1 4 c lin--Moquegua and Camiara in b 1 1 4 c and in Tumbes in Military Region I The Jose Galvez SAM Group SA-3 cons1stmg o our ring battalions and support units is deployed to Ilo and Camiara The each comprising one air defense organization in the future b 1 1 4 c SA-3 missile battalion b 1 1 4 c and possibly one SA-7 battery In January 1988 the air defense assets of the Army were officially transferred to the Air Force The effective transfer is as of yet incomplete PERU 10 Secret- Sec1 et b fBlNFJ Ground Units b 1 1 4 c c Army Aviation 1 General iSfN c Army Aviation was formed in 1976 with a mission to provide troop lift and light transport in support of airborne and light infantry air mobile operations It is also tasked with providing VIP troop and cargo transport and resupply to remote army outposts It has approximately 65 pilots It is organized into a helicopter reconnaissance and attack squadron two helicopter assault and transportation squadrons and a services battalion All are based at the Callao Arm Air Base hie is located on the north ramp of Jorge de lo ed fro · · e to provide Chavez International Airport b 1 1 4 c direct support to combat units · b 1 1 4 c an be armed and is capable of carrying 24 troops at sea eve 12 at 2 000 meters and 6 at 4 000 meters The Alouette II ·helicopters are armed with AS-11 antitank missiles received from France in 1976 2 S NF Summary of Units b 1 1 4 c PERU 11 Secret Secret PAGES 1 3 AND 14ARE DENIED IN FULL ' · · · d Deployment - S NFr About one-fourth of the Army is deployed in the central region which contains the capital and important railroads to the interior as well as the terrorist-ridden central highlands Less than one-third is located in the far south near the Chilean and Bolivian borders while well over one-third is stationed on the north border adjoining Ecuador b 1 1 4 c 5 Weapons and Equipment a General The Army is equipped with a heterogeneous assortment of materiel Prior to 1968 this equipment was a collection of US and European arms mostly of World War II vintage The Army began a modernization program in mid-1967 In 1973 the Peruvian Army became a client of the Soviet Union and acquired T-55 tanks combat cars field artillery air defense artillery antitank missiles and transport helicopters The Army has a variety _ I field hosnitals includingl b 1 1 4 c b 1 1 4 c I an incomplete US hospital only medical equipment and 12 German mobile surgical units b f-Si1Nl Ground Weapons and Equipment b 1 1 4 c PERU 12 Secret Secret 6 Logistics - C NF'f Procurement from numerous foreign suppliers greatly complicates the Army's lo ·stic system At present b 1 1 4 c b 1 1 4 c The Peruvian A mi y 1s ar --------- 7' ' ' f T - -- r - - -r - - 'L' -' wea est points C NF War reserves are thought to be limited but there are sufficient reserve stocks of necessary munitions - repair parts small arms and consumable supplies - for at least 10 days of combat All stocks are kent in covered well-guarded restricted areas l b 1 1 • I b 1 1 4 cl C 'NF Although varying widely from one unit to another the quality of maintenance for the peacetime Peruvian Army seems to be generally good The two main problems are the small number of well-trained maintenance personnel and the inadequate supply of spare parts Maintenance and su l roblems have been im actin · on the availabili rate of the ' • b 1 1 4 c e pro em o e s or ge o mam enance personne is being reso ved through increased emphasis on maintenance training in units and as graduates of the Army Technical School are effectiv ly used 7 Personnel Procurement and Retention U Except for a few specialists from civilian universities officers are commissioned from the Military Academy Their retention rate is high Men and women are required to register for the draft upon reaching the age of 17 All male citizens 18 to 50 years old and women 18 to 45 are subject to peacetime military conscription All persons between those ages are considered to be members of the reserve At present only men are conscripted The military services assign conscripts to serve in units within their own geographical area so that they do not have a problem of acclimatization in the dense jungle and high-altitude regions of Peru In accordance with Peru's Military Service law conscripts are inducted for a period of Service of 24 months Upon completion of service a conscript may reenlist entering into a contract for service of successive periods of 1 to 2 years The no al tour of duty for inductees is 1 year for those with 5 or more years of primary education and 2 years for those with less than 5 years of primary education Industries are held education Inductions are held four times annually three in the jungle area C 'NF There is a token volunteer women's force These volunteers are designated as part of a mobilization reserve force and will be used to augment the Regular Army in case of national emergency ES NF Subordinate to the Army Mobilization Directorate are 5 military preparatory schools and 131 recruiting offices - 25 in MR I 50 in MR II 22 in MR III 16 in MR IV and 18 in MR V Reserve infantry battalions are activated and assigned to divisions and regions as needed 8 Training - Gt Conscripts begin their 2-year stint following induction All personnel entering the Army are required to undergo 10 weeks of basic training oriented toward military indoctrination and training for the job that they will perform There are no specific training units that conduct only basic military training Each unit is responsible for providing training for its new recruits Enlisted specialists tecnicos are usually trained in the units PERU 15 Secret Secret to which they are assigned however a few selected men are sent to various branch and service schools as well as to some civilian technical schools · C 'NF The Army has a comprehensive school system for officers and noncommissioned officers culminating for the officers in the Army War School Escuela Superior de Guerra The quality and effectiveness of military training have improved steadily over the last decade Annual joint Army-Air Force maneuvers are conducted in the military regions and triservice maneuvers are held in the coastal regions CfNF Since 1973 training in the Soviet Union has been provided for both officers and enlisted personnel Courses in intelligence helicopter maintenance pilot training ordnance missiles armored vehicle maintenance and supply operations have been offered Training of enlisted personnel has been primarily in the area of maintenance although some have also received intelligence training The exact number of Army officers and enlisted men who have been trained in the Soviet Union in unknown but at least 200 have been positively identified It is estimated that inore than 1500 Army personnel have attended courses in the USSR since 1973 9 Reserves and Mobilization a Reserves C NF All Peruvians of military age who are not on active military duty are members of the reserve Until 1971 the Peruvian Army's trained reserve was a mostly unregistered manpower pool of former Army personnel In 1971 registers were compiled and in 1972 reservists were called for field exercises Courses were also instituted for university students desiring reserve commissions The Army has both an active and an inactive reserve The active reserve consists primarily of former members of the Army while the inactive reserve is made up of the registered military-age populace and is only a manpower pool Training for the active reserve is conducted annually and in some cases semiannually in all military regions Active reservists apparently have specific unit assignments normally in their former unit This continued emphasis indicates that the reserve system is an important · complement to the Army b Mobilization b 1 1 4 c b 1 • 1 ·4 This concept has been tested and found workable in most units High-priority units such as those on the Chilean and Ecuadorean borders are maintained near full strength with troops who were discharged during the previous year being designated to be called up as replacements for anticipated casualties in the event of conflict In addition most divisions have reserve motorized infantry battalions already integrated in their organizations The cadres of these battalions are Regular Army officers and NCOs with reservists who have been called up for training filling out the troop strength As logistics are the major factor limiting the mobilization potential of the Army it is doubtful that an attempt will be made to form a significant number of additional units C NF Under emergency conditions mobilization capacity is estimated as follows r 1Personnel 1 4 Divisions c PERO 16 Secret Secret b Navy 1 Mission CfNF The mission of the Navy is to defend the coastline enforce Peru's claim to the 200-nautical-mile limit of territorial waters protect coastal shipping and patrol the inland waters The Marine Corps participates in counterinsurgent operations in the Emergency Zone of south central Peru The Navy also engages in civic action missions and commercial shipping in the Amazon Basin 2 Capabilities O NP The Peruvian Navy is capable of defending Peru from attack by the naval forces of any immediate neighbor Its submarine force is one of the largest in Latin America However these ships plus those assigned to the surface fleet are aging and suffering from a lack of maintenance due to budget shortfalls The Navy possesses a significant capability in submarine antisubmarine and surface warfare areas Its strengths include high morale and good tactical pro b 1 1 4 e major shortcoming of the Peruvian Navy is the paucity of surf - · · · '· c only the Lupo Class guided missile frigates are equipped wit b 1 1-4 c t er s ortcomings include the diversity of the ship inventory a lack of passive ASW capability poor utilization of electronic warfare information no planned maintenance PMS program in effect on some ships a lack of minesweeping capability and a lack of amphibious equipment N al h b 1 1 4 c The Peruv1an b 1 14 avy 1s an annu part1c1pant m t e _ · · c However it did not participate in 1982 because of ---v 1an -res-e-n-tm-en_t_o_v_er_t eUS position in the Falkland Islands conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom With few exceptions performance in these exercises has consistently demonstrated that the Peruvian Navy is capable of effective integratioB w jth US navel units in providing assistance in the defense of the Western Hemisphere b 1 1-4 c provide only a brief sampling of Peruvian Navy performance but they do demonstrate the capability of individual units at specific times OfNF Within the Navy are Naval Police and Marine Corps units which provide a modest capability to support the ground and air forces in the maintenance of internal order Three navy hospital ships which have regular schedules along the Amazon River and its tributaries carry out the Navy's civic action program of routine medical attention to villagers and transportation of material and technical assistance 3 Personnel Strength 8 1N-F 27 500 2 610 officers 14 200 petty officers 10 700 enlisted men and conscripts total includes 120 pilots 60-65 Coast Guard officers and 4 000 Marines includes estimated 100 naval officers who are technically qualified as Marine officers The total does not include 526 cadets 400 Coast Guard petty officers and nonrated enlisted personnel and 6 278 civilian employees 4 Ship a nd Aircraft Strength a fSJ-Ships b 1 1 4 c PERU 17 Secret Secret b 1 1 4 c In addition the Coast Guard has 24 patrol l __ b_ _1 _ 1_ 4_ _c _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____ 6 Organization and Deployment a General Service b 1 1 4 c operationa orces t oug t e omman er o av perations and the Commander of the Amazon Naval Force and over land-based facilities and the personnel of five naval zones The Commander General of the Navy is assisted by the Navy General Staff organized into three departments with subordinate divisions and headed by the Chief of the Navy General Staff The Inspector General of the Navy the Directorates General of Personnel Material Economy and Maritime Interests which includes the Coast Guard as well as the Directorates of Communications and Intelligence all report to the Commander General Naval schools and training centers are subordinate to the Directorate of Instruction b 1 1 4 b 1 1 4 c b 1 1 4 c All major combatants are assigned to the fleet under the Commander of Naval Operations and are based at Callao Naval Base A few river gunboats small craft and barges are located in and near Iquitos on the Amazon The Navy deploys two submarines two destroyers and two corvettes to Paita Naval Base on a monthly basis b 1 1 4 c PERU 18 Secret ·sec et rb 1 1 4 c b Marine Corps lnfanteria de Marina 1et The Peruvian Marine Corps is responsible for amphibious and counterinsurgency operations as well as naval installation security Often referred to as a brigade it consists of infan ba talions b 1 1 4 c b 1 1 4 c The battalions consist of between two and six companies ere are at east our m epen ant companies two of which were formed in 1984 With the addition of artillery engineer transport and support elements a battalion can be tailored for amphibious operations Marine Corps headquarters and training elements are located at the main Marine Corps Base at Ancon about 86 kilometers from Lima Detachments of approximately 40 men platoon size are deployed oil port security duties throughout the country Companies of about 260 men each are assigned to the Tumbes area in northern Peru to Piura and Talara and to the jungle regions Under the operational control of the Commander of the lid Naval Zone and commanded by a Naval Commander two companies 300 men each rotate on 2-month counterinsurgency duty into Emergency Zone 6 along the Apurimac River in La Mar Province Ayacucho Department c Naval Aviation The Naval Aviation Force is responsible for aerial antisubmarine and antisurface warfare at sea as well as airborne patrol and surveillance Naval Aviation is organized into six squadrons all stationed at the Naval Air Base at Jorge Chavez International Airport Callao except for two which conduct pilot training from San Juan de Marcona Naval Air Station The Command has about 120 pilots and qualifies 16 to 17 pilots annually An unknown number of enlisted personnel are assigned to the Naval Aviation Force A summar of Naval Aviation units follows b 1 1 4 c - et Organizational-level maintenance for aircraft based a t San Juan de Marcona NAS is performed there All other organizational-level intermediate-level and some depot-level maintenance is performed at the Callao Naval Air Base The Air Force's SEMAN facility provides maintenance support on request In late 1982 the Navy purchased three S-2F ASW aircraft from the US Na the aircraft were to be overhauled in the US before delivery in b b 1 1 4 c PERU 19 Secret • Secret D b 1 1 ------- b 1 1 4 c ' · Exocet · surface-to-surface missiles and in 1982 purchased at least four Exocet · c air-to-surface missi of the four SH-3D helicopters have the capability to carry and b 1 1 4·taunch ·two·-ExocetL __J_air-to-surface missiles each They must however be configured · c for the requisite m1ss1on at the Callao Naval Air Base and armed with either missiles or torpedoes prior to deployment Two separate incidents have been reported of a helicopter firing an Exocet to a range of approximately 36-40 kilometers In addition the helicopters have the capability to guide missiles fired from surface ships Five Beechcraft B-200 maritime b 1 1 4 patrol aircraft ordered from the US in 1981 have eived The aircraft are used for rdered from the US in mid-1 81 c ' · both training and mai itime reco issany_g _ Thr ee---· have not y tp_ e n deh-vered- - •e11ft ently due to a lac o spare parts and money Peruvian ----Naval-Aviation Units are at a low level of readiness d Coast Guard Direccion General de Capitanias y Guardacostas Established in 1969 the Coast Guard is responsible for patrolling Peru's coastal waters out to a 200-nautical-mile limit and for controlling Peruvian ports A branch of the Peruvian Navy it is commanded by the Director General of Ports and Coast Guard a rear admiral who is subordinate to the Director General of Maritime Interests The service with a normal strength of 500 personnel including 60-65 naval line officers is augmented with 30 line officers and approximately 600 Navy enlisted personnel in order to man all positions in the major Port Captaincies and the patrol boats however the 24 patrol boats in its inventory are manned only by the Coast Guard The Coast Guard is moderately able to complete its assigned missions under noncomplex circumstances Although charged with suppression and interdiction of smuggling the Coast Guard has committed little effort to countering narcotics trafficking 6 Status of Equipment ier Surface ships are of US UK Italian and Netherlands construction The two cruisers have an average age of 30 years and were both purchased from the Netherlands The Peruvian Navy plans to upgrade the weapon systems on the cruiser Almirante Grau and the Friesland Class destroyers with Exocet surface-to-surface missiles new fire control systems and enhanced antisubmarine warfare capabilities Complete overhaul of the cruiser at a cost of $130 000 000 is being performed at a shipyard in the Netherlands during the years 1985-88 Two destroyers are modified UK Daring Class ships In 1973 these two had their weapon capabilities significantly enhanced by the addition on each ship of eight Exocet surface-to-surface missile SSM launchers The Navy is upgr dine its fleet with the addition of Lupo Class guided missile frigates FF equipped with b 1 1 4 c Two constructed in Italy were delivered in March and September 1979 while two others began construction with Italian support in the naval shipyard in Callao The first of the latter pair - the Montero - was laid down in 1978 launched in October 1982 and commissioned on 29 Jul 1984 a d b t · · l b 1 1 4 c I b 1 1 4 c and commissioned on 28 December 1987 In b 1 1 4 c Exocet-equipped missile patrol boats and 20 Exocet missiles were received om ranee e submarine force the largest in South America traditionally has been the best equipped part of the fleet Of the 12 submarines in the Navy inventory 6 were obtained from the US - 2 Guppy IA and 4 Tiburon Class Six are the German 'fype 209 probably the most favored submarine sold for export in the Free World in early 1984 the Peruvian Navy leased four Amphibious Vehicle Landing Ships LST from the US Navy The ships arrived in Callao in March 1985 The LSTs were provided under ·a s year no-cost lease renewable for a second 5-year period Cost of reactivation was borne by the Peruvian Navy This action was the first transfer of ships to Peru by the US Navy since 1974 I PERU 20 Secret Secret 7 Logistics U The Peruvian Na has some roblems maintainin its force at sea for an extended eriod of time but b 1 1 4 c b 1 1 4 c The Navy uses fresh food due to the high cost e oo erwise without underway replenishment of stores o ozen canne an onstation time is estimated to be approximately 10 days POL - fuel gasoline and common lubrication oils - are locally available Special lubrication oils and oils and greases for ordnance equipment and other special uses must be imported A shortage of funds affects essential items such as fuel oil Spare parts must be obtained from foreign sources often at high cost Maintenance capability of the Peruvian Navy is excellent however spare parts shortages and budgetary restraints have reduced overall readiness to below sixty percent In February 1984 the Peruvian Navy's only naval base Callao was severely damaged by flood waters The high cost of the cleanup probably forced postponement or elimination of many of the Navy's planned programs Levels of ammunition stocks are unknown The mis·sile invento is believed to b 1 1 4 c Three facilities Callao Iquitos and Chimbote of the Peruvian Navy Shipyard SIMA - Servicios lndustriales de la Marina work under contract for the Navy and for other government and private agencies SIMA has the capability to construct small patrol ships and large auxiliaries - 25 000-ton freighters 80 000-ton tankers and oceanic scientific research ships SIMA does repair and maintenance work on the Navy's submarines and surface ships In 1981 SIMA initiated a new arms production line including designing and manufacturing 10 000 submachineguns for the Civil Guard and Republican Guard I © l b 1 1 4 c l b 1 1 4 C I 8 Personnel Procurement and Retention U Except for officer specialists who have received direct commissions after they have graduated from civilian universities officers are commissioned from the Naval Academy Petty officers are drawn from conscript and volunteer enlisted ranks They are developed to handle administrative and technical tasks and do not assume leadership positions U Enlisted personnel are mostly volunteers or conscripts who have expressed a desire for Navy duty on their registration forms The inducements of specialized training in trades basic education and the appeal of the seagoing life are sufficient to keep recruitment at the needed level U A program similar to that of the US Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps under study would supply som e non-Academy line officers All combatant units appear to be adequately manned In 1983 for the first time the Peruvian Navy added females to its ranks albeit only in reserve units PERU 21 Secret Secret 9 Traimng C NF The low educational level of most enlisted recruits requires that much training time be expended on elementary education Nonetheless the Navy has a fairly effective training program in which all recruits receive basic naval training Training of officers is accomplished in the Naval Academy at La Punta near Callao which has an effective 4-year program patterned after that of the US Naval Academy Officers may receive technical instruction to qualify them in the different naval specialties at the Naval Technical Instruction and Training Center located in Callao and Iquitos The Peruvian Navy also trains its members in other civilian and military national and international institutions and uses US Navy training opportunities for both officer and enlisted personnel 10 Reserves and Mobilization a Reseroe 0 'NF The strength of the Naval Reserve is unknown However naval reserve battalions composed of both men and women participated in a December 1984 parade celebrating the Day of the Reservist In April 1986 a navy captain was assigned as Director of the Naval Reserve Program A 1971 decree requires all students of university-level schools who have opted for naval service in their conscription registration to register for 80 days of instruction each year for 4 years This training is conducted both at the Naval Academy and on board naval units presumably integrated with that of midshipmen from the Naval Academy who normally take midshipmen cruises during January and Febru·ary Although there are no reserve ships the crews for operational units can be augmented with reservists On 1 March 1986 seven privately owned sailboats 25 feet to 36 feet in length were incorporated into the naval reserve b Mobilization b 1 1 4 c s ps aggregating support potential Four petroleum tankers with an estimated capacity of 2 2 million US barrels of petroleum and related products could provide significant fleet oiler support to the Navy There are an additional 625 ships of from 300 to 999 GRT in the Peruvian register that could provide local logistic and auxiliary support Under emergency conditions with foreign logistic assistance the mobilization capacity of the Navy is estimated as follows b 1 1 4 c b 1 1 4 c c Air Force 1 Mission - e The mission of the Air Force is to defend the country against external aggression Secondary responsibilities are to assist the ground forces in the preservation of internal order assist the government in the economic and social development of the country provide PERU 22 Secret Secret - a government aerial photographic service a government school of civil aviation and a government aeronautical industry 2 Capabilities The Peruvian Air Force has a limited capability to defend its airspace but its capability to provide effective air cover or Peruvian ground· forces is and _the Ecuadorean Mirage growing Air defense capabilities agains b 1 1 4 c F-1 are being improved by the receipt b 1 1 4 c from France Capabilities are still hampered by limited radar coverage in the coastal area of Peru and by the location of the air force aircraft In daylight visual conditions the Air Force could reach tar ets in Colombia Ecuador Bolivia and Chile with -its Canberra bombers The b 1 1 4 c · fighter-bomber aircraft comprise a formidable fighting force The Air Force can prov1 e effective support to ground forces for the maintenance of internal security Air force capability to su rt internal securi o erations was enhanced in 1983 and earl 1984 b the delivery o b 1 1 4 c It could provi e s1 · cant ayhght fair-weather support of naval operations Overall light transport capability was improved with the arrival of Soviet An-26s beginning in 1977 The An-26 however is limited to coastal and jungle operations because of its poor high-altitude and short-field capabilities By mid 1988 the Air Force had received 15 An-32 CLINE aircraft from the Soviet Union These will probably eventually replace the An-26 fleet The Air Force has rehabilitated its DHC-5 Buffalo fleet in order to be able to operate in the mountainous regions and to provide a primary personnel airdrop capability The Air Force's heavy transport capability consists of two DC-8s five L-100-20 C-130 Hercules and six Mi-6 helicopters that provide substantial heavy vertical lift capability 8 PersoJJ1Jel Strength I I @ l b 1 1 4 c l b 1 1 4 c '4 Aircraft St 6 Organlzation and Deployment a General - erj b 1 1 4 c PERU 23 Secret Secret b 1 1 4 c communications and electronics squadron a logistics squa ·on a maintenance squa n and an airbase squadron In addition one group of four squadrons is assigned to the Air Academy - € l b 1 - 1 -- 4 'c ------------- I Operations are conducted primarily from nine air bases - the civil military airfields of Jorge Chavez International at Callao Capitan J A Quinones G at Chiclayo Pisco Capitan Montes at Talara and Capitan Concha at Piura and the four military air bases of El Pato at Talara Mariano Melgar at La Joya Vitor near Arequipa and Iquitos Training is conducted primarily from Las Palmas Air Base near Lima The four wing headquarters are located at El Pato Air Base Wing I at Callao Air Base Wing 2 at Arequipa Wing 8 and at Iquitos Air Base Wing 5 Air Wing 4 has not yet been activated at Puerto Maldonado Air Base b 1 1 4 c _ b - _ 1_ • 1 _4 c -_ _ _ _ _ -- 1 ere as een no es a s mec anism o coo a e the air defense systems an mterservice rivalry has inhibited effective joint control of the systems Currently the Air Force Air Defense Command is absorbing Army air defense assets The Air Defense Command with a strength of about 2 000 men was formed in 1977 to meet the Air Force's air defense mission of protecting population centers industrial facilities airfields and air force installations The air defense network consists of early warning ground-controlled intercept sites surface-to-air missile SA-8 sites 2 and tactical towed air defense artillery ZU-28 One of the Air Force's current priorities is to acquire an air defense system which would integrate with its inventory of Soviet radars The desired system would include t o or three three-dimensional air defense radars six or seven twodimensional gap filler radars complete communications systems and command and control centers e e ense ar Group is hea quartere at as as w1 squa rons at a oya and El Pa to Air Bases detachments are deployed to Tacna and Ilo in the south and to Chiclayo and Tumbes in the north The Commando School is based at Vitor Air Base Incorporation of Soviet radar and ADA into the Peruvian inventory in the late 1970s introduced a well-balanced air defense system into the area one of the most effective _in South America Major deficiencies in the system include the lack of doctrine trained personnel and appropriate communications I tS 'Nfl l b 1 1 4 c l b ' •u c I i0tl b 1 1 4 c 1 2- SfN¥ Of 11 active SA-3 missile sites the Air Force formerly operated 7 and the Army operated 4 PERU 24 Secret Secret maintenance and training are accomplished Helicopters operate in all parts of Peru are active in search and rescue activities and do extensive contractual work in sunnort of oil exnloration and develonment in the Amazon iun1 le basin l b 1 1 4 c l b 1 1 4 c OiNF The air facilities of Peru are limited in number about 300 are poorly distributed and are inadequately equipped for all-weather and night operations Only 29 of the airfields have paved runways Thirty runways are less than 300 meters long 221 are between 805 and 1 520 meters only 40 are between 1 450 and 3 048 meters and 6 exceed 3 050 meters One airfield has a radar approach facility Jorge Chavez International four are equipped with military GCA three with standard ILS and three with Soviet ILS Only 15 airports have an instrument approach procedure and just 10 are equipped with runway lighting Of the 16 major airfields 1 is for civil use 5 are for military use only and 10 are joint military- tlvil installations b 8 l lP W 'I Summary n i of Units Aircraft 1 Total TvnA Principal Base b 1 1 4 c PERU 25 Secret Secret Unit b 1 1 4 c Aircraft 1 Type Total Aircraft assigned to administrative units are As of early 1986 only six were flyable Principal Base not included 6 Status or Equipment Aircraft are of US UK French Canadian Netherlands Swiss Italian and Soviet design Theo ational readiness of Peru's combat aircraft ranges from 40 percent to 60 percent in the b 1 1 4 c from 30 percent to 50 percent for the Mirages and from 25 percent to 35 percent or transports helicopters and trainers Peru experiences delays in obtaining spare parts from the United States France and particularly from the Soviet Union The Air Force has developed a capability to perform depot-level maintenance on most systems but it is hampered by an inefficient supply system b 1 1 4 c These were b 1 1 4 c Later purchases included nine overhauled b 1 1 4 c n 1976 and three either new or overhauled b 1 1 4 c l In 1982 10 Mirage aircraft were sold to Argentina rl1rrine the Falkland IsJbds conflict between _ rdered in 1984 were Argentina and the United Kingdom Twelve_ b 1 1 4 c · ered in e rl 1987 In mid-1976 the Air Force placed orders with the Soviet Union for b 1 1 4 c wing-wing fighter-bombers The Soviet sale included spare parts and provision for an instructor group in Peru for training and maintenance These ai craft w re delivered between April 1977 and mid-1978 Sixteen additional Su-22 aircraft b 1 1 4 c J - ordered in October 1979 were delivered by April 1981 Under the terms of the 1979 contract the Air Force was also to attain its long-held desire to have the capability to perform depo · te on i b 1 1 4 c Other ac uisitions since 1977 have includ b 1 1 4 c PERU 26 Secret Secret turboprop transports and at least 2 surveillance radar systems Fourteen b 1 •1·4 c assault helic delivered beginning in 1983 In January 1984 the Air Force received six unarmed b 1 1 4 c elicopters that it had purchased for use in the counterinsurgency fight in higli mountainous regions of Peru It has also negotiated for the purchase of 15 Blackhawk helicopters and 15 or so BO 10518 helicopters for use in the same campaign The Peruvian Air Force has no in-flight refueling capability however it has acquired a Boeing 707 now being modified by Israeli Aircraft Industries to be a refueling aircraft Paradrops using the An-26 transport have been successful However the high airspeed required by the An-26 for airdrops has resulted in thl Buffalo and the L-100-20 tircraft being_ the ones primarily used in this role Of the eight _ b 1 1 4 c '-- urchased only seven remain operational The Butfalos are experiencing a low in-commission rate as a result of severe shortages of engines and spare parts C NF In July 1980 in an effort to solve the serious problem caused bY · a lack of advanced trai er · r 'ts fighter pilots the Peruvian Air Force purchasedl b 1 1 4 c I b 1 1 4 c In 1982 16 were delivered and assembled in Peru The Air Force 1 4 c Engine overhaul requirements have purchased only left several aircraft out of commission thus reducing the number of student flying hours 7 Logistics The Peruvian Government Aviation Industry Enterprise INDAER has very little capability at this time see paragraph 2 c on page 10 It is almost completely dependent on foreign sources for aircraft spare parts armament and all related equipment Its primary sources have been the United States and to a lesser degree the United Kingdom Canada France the USSR and recently Italy Aircraft ordnance has been obtained from the United States the United Kingdom France and the Soviet Union Communications equipment has been obtained from the United States and Israel i0 Aircraft maintenance and overhaul capabilities generally are good Some technical assistance particularly in the overhaul of jet aircraft is provided by French Soviet and US technicians under contract from the manufacturers Maintenance at the air bases generally has been fair The Air Force's primary depot maintenance facility- SEMAN located at Las Palmas - is the only facility in Latin America that overhauls the Mirage aircraft SEMAN performs almost all maintenance on the Canberra bombers and has the ca ability to overhaul the Hercules aircraft and the b 1 1 4 c and reportedly b 1 1 4 c The facility has the capability to perform epot- eve maintenance to rebui wrecked aircraft and to refurbish aircraft that have been out of service for several years - Gt-With the exception of aviation gasoline most aviation•fuel in Peru such as jet fuel and special lubricants is produced by the refinery of the government-owned oil monopoly PETROPERU at Ta Iara Storage facilities at most airbases are adequate Except at Iquitos where fuel is brought in by river transport air force fuel is transported over highway and road networks that interconnect most of the major towns and airfields These networks are adequate to support the peacetime transportation needs of the Air Force Stocks are believed to be sufficient for 60 or more days of combat operations Other shortages and equipment failures would almost certainly ground most of the aircraft in considerably less than 60 days The Air Force also has access to commercial stocks and the considerable PETROPERU reserves unition stocks are adequate for training War reserve stocks are kept in the Air Force arsenals at Las Palmas Air Base on San Lorenzo Island Callao and at Punta Lobos Air· Force Base Punta Lobos is a joint facility of the Peruvian Air Force and Peruvian Commission for Aerospace Research and Development CONIDA PERU 27 Secret Secret 8 Personnel Procurement and Retention Almost 30 percent of air force personnel are conscripts with very little education who enter the Air Fbrce for a 2-year term Volunteer enlisted men and noncommissioned officers are obtained largely by permitting the more capable conscripts to enlist Peruvian Air Force noncommissioned officers and technicians are products of the Air Force Training Center CEFAP In 1977 the curriculum of the Center was lengthened from 2 to 3 years increasing the number of students by one third to 980 The poor quality of enlisted personnel constitutes a major problem for the Air Force because few have the necessary backgrounds to become good technicians i€ - Approximately 84 percent of the officers in the Peruvian Air Fbrce are graduates of the 4-year Air Academy The remainder are university graduates who volunteer for commissioned service However they can only enter staff and professional specialties such as medicine and law and are not given flight training All combat flying officers must be Academy graduates Since 1974 the Academy has been programmed for an annual total enrollment of about 550 cadets with an annual graduating class of about 95 Between 30 and 40 combat arms cadets pilots and navigators are commissioned each year The Air Fbrce has consistently suffered from a shortage of officers and noncommissioned officers Although there is an adequate pool of manpower in Peru the Air Force encounters difficulties in finding and attracting qualified personnel who meet the Air Force's high academic standards 9 Training G 'WF Peruvian Air Force training although considered superior to that of most other Latin American air forces suffers from shortages of suitable students qualified instructors facilities equipment and funds The steady acquisition of fighter and transport aircraft since 1976 has created a critical pilot shortage In addition the pilot training program is strained for lack of operational trainer aircraft and an adequate number of instructor pilots In recent years the Air Force has suffered a fairly high accident rate Errors point to poor aircrew training poor mission planning and poor crew discipline OfNP Professional military education for officers consists of basic command and staff and higher studies Approximately 15 percent of the officers complete their professional military education in one of several Western nations particularly the United States Enlisted personnel training consists of basic military technical on-the-job and systems training Further systems training which is provided to technicians when a new system is acquired is generally in the country of the contractor One notable exception is the systems training for Soviet equipment of which a large percentage was provided in Peru S NF Since 1973 as many as 2 000 Peruvian Air Force personnel are believed to have received training in the Soviet Union Courses included helicopter pilot fighter-bomber pilot transport pilot early warning radar air defense artillery surface-to-surface missile air controller commando operations paratroop operations armored car BRDM-2 and intelligence Except for intelligence training the Air Fbrce has stopped sending trainees to the Soviet Union as it believes that the Air Force can obtain better results at lower cost by training its own personnel on Soviet-made equipment in Peru 10 Reserves and Mobilization a Reserves - C NF Efforts have been made since · 1971 to organize reserve units and a Reserve and Mobilization Command Comando de Reserva y Mobilizacion was formed within the PERU 28 Secret Secret Ministry of Air The Command was abolished in 1981 and its functions transferred to the Personnel Command and to the office of the Chief of Staff There is no Air Force Reserve Program that would train reserve officers or require reserve officers to serve an obligated period with the regular service The reserve program that does exist is only for mobilization purposes The reserve consists of students in training at the Civil Aviation School at Gollique ex-Peruvian Air Force officers the pilots of Peru's aero clubs and the Civil Air Patrol Some of the Reserve pilots have received training as forward air controllers E J NF The Air Force's transport capability could be enhanced considerably by the requisition of all Peruvian-owned civil aircraft as provided by law in the event of a national emergency Approximately 30 civil transport aircraft of 9 000 kg or more in gross weight are registered owned or operated in Peru Of these 19 aircraft are long-range 6 are intermediate-range and 5 are short-range There are over 900 currently licensed civilian pilots in Peru Over 140 are employed by the major Peruvian airlines b Mobilization fO NF b 1 1 4 c l bX1 1 4 c b 1 1 4 c d Paramilitary Forces The Garcia administration published decrees on 5 February 1986 providing for long-awaited police reform The reorganization places three separate police forces paramilitary Civil Guard Guardia Civil- GC and Republican Guard Guardia Republican a - GR and plainclothes Investigative Police Policia Investigadora del Peru - PIP under joint command with generals no longer belonging to a specific police service branch Fbr the present personnel will retain separate service identity up to the grade of colonel with the division of labor being based on current specializations The plan combines all police intelligence units into a single organization creates a joint training school for new recruits and turns passport matters over to civilian authorities within the Ministry of Interior The Minister of Interior retired 1503 police officers from the three branches by the end of March 1986 There is considerable tension between the Garcia regime and the police forces due to the latter's wage-increase demands and perceived lack of recognition for their efforts A police strike of major proportions in May 1987 threatened the country's stability and was only resolved by forceful action by the President Following are the paramilitary forces in Peru 1 Civil Guard Guardia Civil The Civil Guard a force of 37 500 is charged with the maintenance of public order protection of persons and property and border patrol The Civil Guard is geographically organized into five regions covering the entire country Each region is subdivided into PERU 29 Secret -Secret • PAGES 31'-AN 32 ARE DENIED IN' F JLL ' ' '• Comandancias Major tactical units consist of one cavalry regiment and five infantry battalions two motorized A separate 200-man unit the 48th Comandancia airborne located about 300 kilometers east of Lima in Mazamari has a counterinsurgency mission The Civil Guard is capable of maintaining internal security for all but the most serious outbreaks of violence However even with logistic support from the Armed Forces it is incapable of containing or halting terrorist activities conducted by the SL or the MRTA It has initiated an equipment modernization program which should further improve its capability An element of 100 women was activated in January 1978 to work-primarily with youths women and urban traffic problems In the case of a national emergency the Civil Guard would come under the Commander of the Army 2 Republican Guard Guardia Republicana --terThe Republican Guard a force of 15 000 is charged with the protection of government property the security of national frontiers and the operation of prisons The Guard is capable of fulfilling these duties and of assisting in the maintenance of public order when necessary Its headquarters is in Lima Major units consist of 1 regiment including 1 counterinsurgency battalion of about 300 men in Lima and 1 service battalion The largest concentration of force is in Lima The remainder is generally in small detachments throughout Peru principally in various types of public installations requiring a permanent guard force The Guard is equipped only with standard light infantry weapons Transportation and communications equipment are inadequate In the case of a national emergency the Guard would come under the Commander of the Army e S NF Total Military and Paramilitary Personnel Strength b 1 1 4 c f Foreign Military Presence U There are no military missions currently in Peru except for the US MAAG and the Soviet Military Advisory Group Argentina maintains one naval officer attached as an adviser to the Peruvian Marine Corps Soviet military assistance to the Peruvian Air Force and Army is administered through the Economic Mission of the Soviet Embassy in Lima There are approximately 60 Soviet military advisers technicians and translators in Peru In addition technicians in specialized functions come from the USSR on an as needed basis The majority of the Soviet personnel are assigned to Air Force units and the remainder work with the Army U In addition to the Soviet presence other foreign military personnel are present in Peru French UK Italian US and possibly Israeli technicians assist in maintenance of French British Italian and US aircraft Each year other countries - Argentina Bolivia Brazil El Salvador Honduras Paraguay South Korea - send military students instructors to Peruvian Command and General Staff-level military schools PERU 30 Secret Consumer Questionnaire 11'1fs Military Intelligence Summary MIS Volume VIII Latin America is designed for use by a wide van of consumers Please help us Improve the quality of this publication by filling out the questionnaire and dropping it into the mail 1 Name Organization Mailing Address and AUTOVON number optional 2 Did this publication relate to the needs mission or interests of your organization D Yes 0 No 3 Was It useful to you 0 Yes • No 4 How would you rate the following aspects of this publication Check one a Scope b Organization c l e 81 of Detail d Readability e Photos and Diagrams EXCELLENT GOOD FAIR POOR • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 5 What Is your overall evaluation of this publication 6 What improvements changes would you recommend for the next publication revised edition of this 7 Are there any other West Europe Latin American geographic areas or products which you would suggest for future publication 8 Are there any additional comments you would like to make about this publication Date Product Received DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON D C 20340-0001 11rn 1 OFFICIAL BUSINESS NO POSTAGE NECESSARY IFNAII ED DITHE UNITED STATES PENALTY FOR PRNATE USE 5300 BUSINESS REPLY MAIL l ERMIT NO 12964 WASHIHCTOH 0 C POSTAGE WILL BE PAID BY ADDRESSEE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ATTN DB-3 WASHINGTON D C 20340-6617 DISTRIBUTiON LiST DOD AND JOINT ACTIVITIES AOIO AOl5 AG54 A055 1 085 1 I AU86 1 1 I l AlDZ AllD a I All7 I l I I A124 AZ05 AZIO AZ46 A300 UD2 UDS AS06 U07 AUii UIS I 1 I 1 l 2 1 2 A335 A340 AJ53 AJ55 AUS 1 BOOJ I 8004 8032 8040 8050 8060 l son 8100 8110 Bill 8126 BU7 8150 8217 BJlZ HZ B341 BJ44 8345 B351 2 I 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