The true role of the United States in the 1973 coup jornada com mx notas 2023 09 01 reportaje el-verdadero-rol-de-estados-unidos-en-el-golpe-de-1973 1 de septiembre de 2023 Special report 07 00 Peter Kornbluh Reading time 30 min Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet and Henry Kissinger US Secretary of State Extract from the book Pinochet Declassified The United States' Secret Files on Chile Catalonia -A Day in the Life August 2023 by Peter Kornbluh Kornbluh is director of the National Security Archive's Chile Project Published in La Jornada with authorization from the publisher and the author In a few days Chileans along with other people around the world commemorate the 50th anniversary of the coup in Chile September 11 continues to be a divisive date in Chile where a fierce and difficult debate about the causes and consequences of the coup continues with 1 14 the right focused on blaming the government of Salvador Allende for everything that happened and denying any role for the United States This excerpt from the book Pinochet Declassified by historian Peter Kornbluh focuses on what the United States knew and did and did not do as 9 11 approached THE COUNTDOWN TO THE COUP The day after the military seized power through violence members of the State Department met with the objective of discussing the guidelines that Henry Kissinger should follow when responding to the press about the degree prior knowledge that we had about the coup ” Jack Kubisch Deputy Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs pointed out that a certain Chilean military officer—who turned out to be none other than Pinochet himself—had told the embassy that the conspirators had hidden from their backers in the United States the exact date on which they would act against Allende Still Kubisch stated that he was not clear whether Dr Kissinger should use this information since he would highlight the closeness of our contacts with the coup leaders During the months that preceded the coup the CIA and the Pentagon maintained a broad relationship with the Chilean conspirators thanks to the actions of various agents and informants in such a way that they learned the exact date on which the military would seize power at least three days in advance The communications came from some secret 2 14 operations in search of Army candidates to which they had resorted again after the elections to the Chilean Congress in March 1973 The dismal results of the elections led many members of the CIA to be convinced that the actions Political and propaganda had not borne the desired fruits and that the definitive solution to the problem of Popular Unity was found according to the Agency's documents in the hands of the Chilean military establishment Until the first two months of 1973 the political operations and propaganda generated by El Mercurioand other CIA-funded outlets focused on an active opposition campaign aimed at winning uncontested congressional elections on March 4 in which all of Chile's representatives and half of the senators had stood for re-election The CIA's objective was at best to achieve a two-thirds majority for the opposition in order to be able to subject Allende to an impeachment process and at the very least to prevent Popular Unity from obtaining a clear majority of the vote Of the 3 600 000 votes counted 56 percent corresponded to the opposition while the Popular Unity candidates won 43 percent which meant they obtained two seats in the Senate and six in the Congress The reality however was quite different as both the CIA headquarters and its operations post in Santiago understood In fact in the first national test faced by the popularity of Allende's party since taking office his administration had done nothing but increase its electoral power despite the political activity of the CIA the ambitious propaganda campaign against him and the US-led socio-economic destabilization plan The UP program continues to be attractive to a large part of the Chilean electorate the Santiago post lamented in a cablegram The Agency therefore was forced to reconsider its entire clandestine strategy in Chile Future options the head office cabled on March 6 The operations center in Santiago now headed by a new director Ray Warren took a firm position about which of these future options would be necessary In a retrospective review of the congressional elections held on March 14 the Santiago post laid out a series of plans designed to focus even more on the military program We think that in the near future the base in Santiago should emphasize clandestine activities aimed at expanding the contacts information and capacity that we have in order to create one of the following situations a A consensus among the leaders of the Armed Forces whether they remain in the Government or not about the need to rise up against the regime The base in Santiago is of the opinion that we should try to induce as many military personnel as possible if not all to seize power and unseat the Government from Allende … b A secure and close relationship of the operations post in Santiago with a serious group of military coup leaders In the event that our new assessment of existing groups in the Armed Forces indicates that those harboring plans for a conspiracy have serious intentions and the 3 14 necessary capacity to carry it out the post would like to establish a single secure channel with its members that would allow for dialogue and having gathered the basic data on their collective capacity seek clearance from head office to take on a broader struck out role At the same time the CIA base in Santiago also reaffirmed the need to once again focus on creating a climate conducive to a coup d'état the eternal objective of the US government While the post in Santiago hopes to give our military program additional impetus … o ther centers of political power parties companies media… will play an essential role in creating the political atmosphere that It will allow us to achieve the objectives a or b previously exposed Taking into account the electoral results the post believes that it is essential to revive the climate of political unrest and lead to a controlled crisis in order to get the military to seriously consider the possibility of intervention The extremely combative and enthusiastic position of the operations center in Santiago which undoubtedly influenced its performance in Chile received the support of the hardline sector of the Western Hemisphere Division in favor of a more determined and violent approach that obviously was not One of its objectives was to save Chilean democracy On April 17 a group of CIA agents sent a memo to Shackley the director of the Western Hemisphere Division regarding the goals of Chile policy a blunt challenge directed from within to the strategy favorable to political operations in which it was requested to end the secret support of the main opposition parties Such support in his opinion made them mistakenly believe that they could survive until the 1976 elections 4 14 September 10 1973 Urgent CIA cable providing concrete information on what would happen in Chile the next day Instead the Agency was to try directly to develop the conditions that might lead to military action This involved providing “large-scale support” to Chilean terrorist groups such as Patria y Libertad or the “militant elements of the National Party” for a specified period between six and nine months “during which any necessary effort would be made to promote economic chaos aggravate political tensions and create a climate of despair in which both the PDC and the general public end up wanting military intervention Ideally this would induce the military to take over the government entirely However the position shared by the Santiago base and Langley's hard-line sector did not coincide with that of the State Department or that of senior CIA officials who feared the consequences of hasty military action and believed in the need to act prudently given the investigation that the Congressional Committee was carrying out regarding the ITT and the covert operations that had been launched in Chile There were disagreements on some fundamental and strategic issues Could the Chilean military be counted on to rebel against Allende Was it prudent for the CIA to encourage violent demonstrations by secretly funding militant groups without knowing for sure that the military would not act to suppress the protesters Given the investigation Congress had launched into CIA action in Chile were the risks of exposure greater than the potential gains of working directly with militants in the private sector and the Chilean military to end of sponsoring a coup These points were the constant object of discussion since within the Agency the process of elaboration of the proposals and the budget destined to the covert operations for the fiscal year 1974 became the reason for an important internal debate —maintained secret during twenty-seven years—on the strategic nuances of the US intervention in Chile Led by the new Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs Jack Kubisch the State Department opposed the desire expressed by the Santiago operations post to foment a coup through direct support for the Chilean military or collaboration with groups private sector extremists Like Ambassador Nathaniel Davis who replaced Edward Korry in mid-1971 Kubisch preferred to focus covert operations on the opposition's victory in the 1976 election On the other hand some officials at CIA headquarters such as the former director of the task force for Chile David Atlee Phillips —who would return to Chile in June as director of the Western Hemisphere Division— they were well aware of the resounding failure of the Schneider operation and could not help but show their skepticism at the idea that the Chilean military could carry out a coup d'état Cablegrams sent to Santiago from the central office attest to his doubts that the Chilean military would be more willing to act against the 5 14 government than against the protesters and strikers whom the capital operations post sought to support Chilean A cablegram sent from Langley on March 6 warned of the need to avoid fomenting large-scale protests such as a strike as well as any other activity capable of provoking a military reaction against the opposition In a budget proposal dated March 31 1973 While we must leave all options open including a possible future coup we must recognize that the ingredients for a coup are unlikely to materialize regardless of the amount of money invested Consequently we should avoid encouraging the private sector to take actions that could lead to either a failed coup or a bloody civil war It would be advisable for us to make it clear that we will not support any coup attempt unless it becomes clear that it will have the support of the majority of the Chilean Armed Forces and democratic opposition parties including the PDC While we must leave all options open including a possible future coup we must recognize that the ingredients for a coup are unlikely to materialize regardless of the amount of money invested Consequently we should avoid encouraging the private sector to take actions that could lead to either a failed coup or a bloody civil war It would be advisable for us to make it clear that we will not support any coup attempt unless it becomes clear that it will have the support of the majority of the Chilean Armed Forces and democratic opposition parties including the PDC On May 1 a cable arrived from Langley addressed to Warren director of the base in Santiago with the following text We wish to postpone any consideration of any action program designed to encourage military intervention until we have more definitive indications that the members of the Army are willing to act and the opposition including the PDC ready to support a coup d'état In his response the director of the operations post requested that the central office defer its request regarding the financing of fiscal year 1974 until the proposal could be redrafted so as to reflect the Chilean reality at that time The most militant parts of the opposition including some CIA-backed organizations such as El Mercurioor the National Party were mobilizing according to the information offered by the Santiago base to promote a coup The plans drawn up by the opposition forces do not focus so much on 1976 as on the immediate future If we want to make our influence as strong as possible and offer opponents the help they need we should pursue this line of action rather than try to oppose it and counter it by trying to focus the opposition on the distant and tenuous target of the 1976 elections In summary we believe that the orientation and focus of our operational efforts should be based on military intervention On April 10 the Western Hemisphere Division sought approval from CIA Director James Schlesinger for accelerated efforts against the military target According to a memo sent to Schlesinger dated May 7 by Theodore Shackley the division's director these covert 6 14 operations were designed to more closely monitor any coup plots and influence senior Army commanders importance in order for them to play a decisive role alongside the coup forces when the Chilean military decides on its own to act against Allende The Chilean High Command demonstrated that such a situation did not yet exist on June 29 when several independent units of the Chilean Army deployed with the intention of taking the La Moneda presidential palace In his Situation Report No 1 addressed to President Nixon Kissinger announced that the Chilean Army had carried out a coup attempt against the government of Salvadore sic Allende That same day the Secretary of State sent Nixon another memorandum End of the attempted rebellion in Chile in which he informed him that the attempt has been nothing more than an isolated and uncoordinated attempt and that the Higher commanders of the three branches of the Armed Forces remained loyal to the government This internal debate led to a delay in the approval of the 1974 budget for covert CIA operations while the Agency and the State Department reached an agreement on the use of funding authorizations for Chile Finally on August 20 the 40 Committee gave its approval by telephone to the allocation of one million dollars for the financing of opposition parties and private organizations although it designated a contingency fund for the operations of the latter which could only be used with the prior consent of Ambassador Davis Barely three days had passed when the post in Santiago began to urge his approval to use that money to organize both strikes and demonstrations as well as a takeover of power from within which implied goading the military into occupying prominent positions in Allende's cabinet from where to exercise real state power and reduce the president to a mere figurehead Events are taking place at great speed and it is very likely that the position adopted by the military at this time will be decisive the Santiago operations base indicated in a cablegram on August 24 to later add referring to Allende Now For yourself any major event or pressure can determine your future ” The next day in Washington CIA director William Colby sent Kissinger a memorandum in which he set out word for word the base's arguments in Santiago and requested authorization to move forward with the funds The document Proposal for covert financial support to the private sector in Chile pointed out in a style aimed at calming members of the State Department The post in Santiago has no intention of collaborating directly with the Armed Forces to promote a coup nor does his support for opposition forces in general pursue this result However Colby was quick to add the following caveat Realistically though we have to recognize that further pressure on the Allende government from the opposition could lead to a coup 7 14 Augusto Pinochet and Henry Kissinger By this time the CIA had a number of promising reports on coup plots In mid-August David Atlee Phillips had sent a veteran agent to Santiago to assess the situation As he reported in a cablegram during the last few weeks we have again received a greater number of reports that speak of conspiracies and we have seen a whole list of possible dates for a coup d'etat One of these documents indicated that the conspirators had chosen July 7 to carry out another attempt a date that however had begun to be postponed given the opposition of the Army Commander-in-Chief Carlos Prats and the difficulty involved bringing together the most important regiments in the Santiago area According to the CIA source The main problem facing the conspiring military is overcoming the obstacle of vertical command One way to do this would be for generals in favor of a coup to meet with General Prats warn him that he no longer enjoys the confidence of the Army High Command and consequently relieve him of his post The man chosen to replace Prats at the time of the coup is General Manuel Torres commander of the fifth division and third Army general in rank order The conspirators do not consider General Augusto Pinochet the Army's secondhighest-ranking officer a suitable replacement for Prats under current conditions At the end of July the CIA reported the existence of a coup plan about to be completed The conspirators were still trying to solve the problem posed by Prats As the Santiago base pointed out there seemed to be no other way to get rid of him other than kidnapping or murder However the memory of what happened to the former Commander-in-Chief of the Army René Schneider indelible in his mind will make it very difficult for the conspirators to decide to carry out a similar action The Agency also reported that the military was trying to coordinate its takeover with the National Confederation of Truck Owners which was about to launch a general strike by truckers That violent strike immobilized the country during the month of August and became a fundamental factor in creating the propitious climate for the coup that the CIA had pursued 8 14 with such zeal in Chile Among other important elements was the decision that the Christian Democrat leadership had taken to abandon negotiations with the Popular Unity government and focus their efforts on the contrary on achieving a coup d'état In a CIA report dated early July The Santiago operations post noted that there had been a growing acceptance by the PDC leadership that military intervention may be the only way to prevent the Marxists from seizing absolute power in Chile Although the leadership of the PDC does not admit that its decisions and political strategies are aimed at creating the necessary circumstances to give rise to the action of the Army the secret confidants of the Santiago post have reported that in the private sphere this is a generally accepted political fact The position of the Christian Democrats led the Chilean Communist Party traditionally moderate to conclude that a political consensus with the opposition had ceased to be viable and to adopt a more militant attitude that gave rise to deep divisions with respect to Allende's coalition Also the refusal of the hard sector of the Army to accept some of the portfolios offered by Allende contributed to accelerate the political tensions There seems to be a growing sense that something must be done observed a document from CIA headquarters regarding the consequences of a military coup in Chile The resignation at the end of August of Commander-in-Chief Carlos Prats following an intense public defamation campaign led by El Mercurioand the Chilean right eliminated the only obstacle that prevented at that point the realization of a coup d'état Like his predecessor General Schneider Prats had represented the constitutional sector of the Chilean military and obstructed younger officers who wanted to intervene in Chile's political process In an Aug 25 spy report stamped TOP SECRET the Defense Intelligence Agency noted that Prats's resignation had removed the most important factor that could deter a coup On August 31 US sources in the Chilean Army reported that the Chilean Army was “united around the idea of ​a coup and some eminent regimental commanders in Santiago have promised to lend their support By then the Chilean military had established a special coordination team made up of three representatives from each of the branches and carefully chosen right-wing civilians In a series of secret meetings held on September 1 and 2 the team presented a comprehensive plan to overthrow the Allende government to the top command of the Chilean Army Air Force and Navy The newly created Military Junta approved the plan and determined that the date of the coup would be September 10 According to an examination of the coup plot obtained by the CIA the general who replaced Carlos Prats as commander-in-chief Augusto Pinochet was chosen as leader of the group and had to decide what time the coup would begin On September 8 both the CIA and the DIA put Washington on notice of the imminence of the coup and confirmed the date of September 10 A DIA report classified as TOP SECRET reported that the three armed branches have apparently agreed to rise up against the government on September 10 and everything indicates that the initiative will have the help of 9 14 right-wing groups and civilian terrorists The CIA warned that the Chilean Navy would set out to overthrow the government at 8 30 on the aforementioned day and that Pinochet has said that the Army will not oppose the Navy's action On September 9 the base of operations in Santiago updated the countdown One of his secret agents Jack Devine received a call from a collaborator who was fleeing the country and who confided to him It will take place on the 11th His report sent to Langley headquarters on the 10th stated The coup attack will take place on September 11 The Land Sea and Air armies and the Carabineros are involved in this action On the day of the coup at 7 00 a m a statement will be read on Radio Agriculture Carabineros have the responsibility of arresting President Salvador Allende According to Donald Winters one of the top CIA agents operating in Chile at the time it had been agreed that the Chilean military would carry it out when they were ready and tell us at the last minute what was going to happen » On the eve of the coup however at least one sector of the conspirators began to get nervous thinking about what would happen if the struggle continued and the seizure of power did not take place as they had anticipated On the night of September 10 while the coup leaders were discreetly taking positions to seize power violently the following day a high-profile officer from the Chilean military group responsible for planning the overthrow of President Allende as described by the Agency Headquarters contacted a US official it is not yet clear if he was from the CIA Department of Defense or the embassy and asked if the US government would come to the aid of the Chilean military if the situation was complicated He was assured that his inquiry would be immediately transmitted to Washington according to a TOP SECRET memo sent by David Atlee Phillips to Henry Kissinger on September 11 when the coup had already begun At the time of the coup both the State Department and the CIA were developing contingency plans for US support if military action began to show signs of failure On September 7 Deputy Secretary Kubisch informed the members of both organizations that the senior officials had determined the following after discussing the Chilean question If there is a coup attempt that from our point of view shows signs of ending successfully and satisfactorily we will stay out of it' on the other hand if it seems favorable but is in danger of failing we may want to have the competence to intervene Kubisch asked the Agency to see that attention was paid to this problem The question however turned out to be irrelevant The Chilean coup has been little less than perfect Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Ryan head of the US military group stationed in Valparaíso announced in a situation report sent to Washington By 8 00 a m on September 11 the Chilean Navy had taken this port city before announcing that the Popular Unity government was being overthrown In Santiago the Carabineros corps was supposed to arrest President Allende at his residence but he managed to reach the La Moneda Palace 10 14 and from there broadcast radio messages urging workers and students to defend the government against the attack by the Armed Forces While the tanks surrounded the building and fired against its walls Hawker Hunter jets launched a precision rocket attack on Allende's offices around noon killing many of his guards Minutes later there were other air attacks with cannons while the ground forces tried to take the inner courtyard of the palace During the fighting the military did not stop urging President Allende to surrender or mechanically offering him and his family a safe exit from the country by air In a now famous tape recording that includes General Pinochet's instructions transmitted by radio to his subordinates on September 11 he can be heard saying But the plane falls old man when it flies a comment that provokes laughter from his interlocutor As if he predicted the ferocious character of his regime he had pointed out the need to kill the bitch and the levy is over Around 2 00 p m they found Salvador Allende in his interior office lifeless due to a firearm At 2 30 p m the Armed Forces radio station announces that La Moneda has surrendered and that the entire country is under military control The international reaction was immediate widespread and overwhelmingly condemnatory Numerous governments denounced the military coup and massive protests took place throughout Latin America Not surprisingly many accusing fingers were pointed at the US government In his appearance as Secretary of State just one day after the coup Kissinger was peppered with questions about CIA involvement The Agency according to his response was involved to a minimal degree in 1970 and since then we have stayed completely away from any coup plan Regarding Chile we have not tried anything other than to strengthen the democratic parties and provide them with a certain solidity to win the 1976 elections Sustaining Chilean democracy summed up the official version forged after what happened in order to cover up the US intervention against the Allende government On September 13 CIA Director Colby sent Kissinger a two-page overview report on the CIA covert action program in Chile since 1970 designed to provide some guidance on issues relating to role played by the Agency The policy adopted by the United States has consisted of maintaining the greatest covert pressure possible to prevent the consolidation of the Allende government he stated bluntly After selectively reviewing covert operations carried out in the realms of politics the media and the private sector Colby concluded If we strictly understand the definition of participating directly —collaborating in planning and providing equipment strategic aid and a series of guarantees— the CIA does not appear to have been involved in the violent actions carried out by the Chilean military on September 11 1973 The White House pursued supported and accepted the coup during the Nixon presidency but the political risks involved in direct collaboration outweighed any real need for success The Chilean military however had no doubts about the US position We were not involved in the planning recalled CIA agent Donald Winters But the contacts we had among the Chilean military let them know that we were not particularly attracted to 11 14 the Allende government In addition the CIA and other sectors of the US government were directly involved in operations designed to create the atmosphere capable of provoking a coup that would bring down Chilean democracy Colby's memo appeared to omit the Agency's project aimed at deceiving the military the clandestine black propaganda activities that sought to sow discord within the Popular Unity coalition the endorsement given to extremist groups such as Patria and Libertad and the incendiary achievements of the El Mercurio project to which the CIA documents recognize a significant role in creating the scenario in which the coup would take place not to mention the marked destabilizing effect of the invisible economic blockade The argument that all these operations were aimed at maintaining Chile's democratic institutions is nothing more than a public relations ploy that has been exposed by the weight of historical documentation In fact the colossal support given by the Agency to the supposed champions of Chilean democracy the Christian Democrats the National Party and The argument that all these operations were aimed at maintaining Chile's democratic institutions is nothing more than a public relations ploy that has been exposed by the weight of historical documentation In fact the colossal support given by the Agency to the supposed champions of Chilean democracy the Christian Democrats the National Party and The argument that all these operations were aimed at maintaining Chile's democratic institutions is nothing more than a public relations ploy that has been exposed by the weight of historical documentation In fact the colossal support given by the Agency to the supposed champions of Chilean democracy the Christian Democrats the National Party andEl Mercurio facilitated their transformation into protagonists —and main supporters— of the violent interruption of Chile's democratic processes by the military You will remember the discussion of Track II in the late 1970s which has not been included in this summary Colby wrote to Kissinger on the sheet listing the names of those who were to read his 13 September memo September The fact that the CIA had tried to directly 12 14 instigate a coup three years earlier played a major role in making Chilean generals take it for granted that they could count on Washington's support Via II in reality was never considered finished testified in 1975 Thomas Karamessines the senior Agency official who was in charge of the secret operations against Allende The only thing they told us was to continue with our work we would remain vigilant and do everything in our power to contribute to the goals and purposes of Track II I am convinced that the seeds that were planted in that 1970 endeavor had their repercussions in 1973 I have no doubts about that ' The policy that we have followed in relation to Allende has gone well Deputy Secretary Kubisch commented to Kissinger the day after the coup d'état In fact in September 1973 Nixon's men had achieved the objective stated in a manifest way by the president in November 1970 to create the conditions capable of propitiating the fall or the overthrow of Allende At the first meeting of the Special Action Group in Washington held on the morning of September 12 to discuss how to support the Chilean military regime Kissinger quipped —The president is concerned that we want to send someone to Allende's funeral I've told him that I doubt either of us will consider that option No replied one of his collaborators unless you want to go On September 16 President Nixon called Kissinger for an update His conversation was recorded thanks to the hidden recording system of the Secretary of State The Chilean affair is consolidating the latter assured and of course the newspapers are complaining that a communist government has been overthrown Both lamented that the press did not lavish praise on them for Allende's removal In Eisenhower's time Kissinger asserted referring to the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala thanks to the covert action of the CIA we would have been treated like heroes The two then openly addressed the role of the United States It goes without saying that we officially had nothing to do with it the president pointed out We haven't done anything Kissinger replied by which he meant direct participation in the coup itself I mean we have helped them Word omitted created the necessary conditions to the extent possible That's true the president agreed https www ciperchile cl 2023 08 28 el-verdadero-rol-de-estados-unidos-en-el-golpe-de1973 https nsarchive gwu edu briefing-book chile 2023-08-08 chiles-coup-50-kissinger-briefednixon-failed-1970-cia-plot-block https nsarchive gwu edu briefing-book chile 2023-0808 chiles-coup-50-kissinger-briefed-nixon-failed-1970-cia-plot-block 13 14 14 14