' N A 'f' 0 CONP I DE NT I AL POLADS 78 27 ORIGINAL ENGLISH 16th June 1978 To Members of the Political Committee From Acti ng Chairman 125 ALLIED INTERPRETATIONS OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS I AND II TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTION ON HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS Attached is a compendium of Allied interpretations of Additional Protocols I and II to the 1949 Geneva Convention on Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts It was prepared at the request of the Committee and compile s the positions of the Governments of Belgium Canada Italy Norwa¼ the United Kingdom and the United States as expressed in papers they have submitted to the Committee It contains four sections dealing with i the nucl ear weapons question ii articles within the scope of the Military Committee study iii reprisals and iv articles outside the scope of the Military Committee study 2 The compendium is intended to assist the experts of the Political-Legal Working Group in their discus sions on 28th-30th June Signed N A T 0 L REICHLER CONF I e ENT I AL DECLASSIFID Authonty NNb6b l t4 ANNEX to POLADS 18 27 ALLIED INTERPRETATIONS OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS I AND II TO THE -1- 1949 GENEVA CONVENTION ON HUMANITARIAN I LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS NUCLEAR WEAPONS QUESTION In the course of the opening plenary session of the Diplomatic Conference several delegations ·confirmed that the Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Convention on Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts did not cover the nuclear questions which are dealt with in other fora During the closing plenary sessions of the Conference France the UK and US emphas ised once more that the rules established by the Protocols did not apply to the use of nuclear weapons Equally the interventioramade during the debates of the Conference concerning methods and means of combat and the protection of the civilian population did not modify this reiterated principle l In their document MCM-76-77 dated 31st October 1977 the Military Committee analysed the military implications of paras 33 through 60 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Convention The Military Committee considered that it was necessary for all Allies to be fully seised of the essentiality of nuclear weapons to Allied defence and security and to underwrite these recorded understandings UK Position The UK signed the Protocols on 12th December 1977 on the basis of an understanding similar to the statement made by the Head of the British Delegation in he plenary at the final session of the Diplomatic Conference Therefore the UK considers that the negotiating history of the Conference gives ample support to the conclusions that the Protocols were never intended to apply to the use of nuclear weapons In addition the statements made by the UK and the US on signature remain so far uncontroverted However the UK Authorities feel that it may be necessary to enter some clarification upon ratification in order to -ensure that their understanding of the nuclear question together with that of all other members of the Alliance is legaily effective In their view a reservation seems prima facie to be inappropriate because it imples that the effect of the Protocol is such that its DECLASSIFIED Authority NrJ bb3 t4 NA T 0 ANNEX to POLADS 78 27 C ON F I DE N T I AL -2- provisions apply to the use of nuclear weapons The UK recommends that if it were to be considered that the safeguard of a r es ervation is nevertheless necessary the text should be c a refully worded so as to avoid this implication Belgi an Position The Bel gian Delegation shared the opinion that an interpretative declaration would be useful owing to the fact hat the text of the Protocols is not explicit in this r egard They believe that although the preparatory work might confirm that no account ha s been taken during the elaboration of the Protocols of the use of nuclear weapons it would be judicious to reaffirm these theses in the form of an interpretative declaration Such a declaration would be in conformity with the preparatory work and would not be in contradiction to th ri ghts of the treaties and establ ish a general principle according to which any r eserva tions or inter pretative declarations are not incompatible with the scope and the aim of the Treaty to which it relates Finally the Belgian Delegation wonders whether such a declaration should address nuclear weapons or also embrace chemical and bacteriological weapons Canadian Position The Canadian Authorities hold the view that the statements made by the US and the UK at the time of the signing of Protocol I in respect to its applicability to the use of nuclear weapons may lead to certain difficulties if critically analysed They are continuing their efforts aimed at developing the text of a possible official declaratory statement for use at the time of ratification Such a text would of course have to be acceptable to all Allies and for that reason they would carry out full consultations should they decide to proceed Norwegian Position The Norwegian Authorities subscribe to the comments in paragraph 8 of the Military Committee report and therefore are of the view that it will be neces ary for the Allianc_e that declarations similar to those made by s ome NATO member countries at the Diplomatic Conference be tabled again at the time of ratification Whether Norway will make a declaration on nuclear weapons will be a political decision DECLASSIFIED Authority NrJ f bb3 3 4 NAT 0 CONF I DE N T I A L -3- ANNEX to POLADS 78 27 US Position The US is considering making the following statement at the time of ratification - It is the understanding of the United States of America that rules established by this Protocol were not intended to have any effect on and did not regulate and prohibit the use of nuclear weapons DECLASSIFIED Authority Ntvb bb3 3 4 N A 'I' 0 ANNEX to POLADS 78 27 II C ON F I DEN T I AL - 4- INTERPRETATION OF INDIVIDUAL ARTICLES OF THE PROTOCOLS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE MC STUDY Ar ticle 35 previously Article 33 - Basic Rules According to the MC assessment Article 35 would not inhibit Alli ed military operations and would be acceptable militarily subject to acceptance by member states of the Allianc e that the Protocol is not applicable to the use of nuclear weapons and to arrangements being made by these states to make that position legally effective UK Position The arguments outlined by the UK Authorities on the nuclear weapons question as set out in pages 1 and 2 apply also to Article 35 The UK does not envisage that any a ction on this Article will be necessary at the time of ratification Norwegian Position The Nawegian Authorities may state The proh i bition contained in paragraph 3 relates to widespread and long -term effects of warfare DECLASSIFIED Authority ty -J 6h3 3 Y N A 'f 0 CON F I DE N T I AL - 5Article ANNEX to POLADS 7S 27 37 previously Article 35 - Prohibition of Perfidy Canadian Position The Canadian Authorities feel that in order to preclude any misunderstandings which might arise from the comparison of the French and English texts of this Article an interpretative statement should be mad to the effect that it is not the acts included in sub-paragraphs a to d that are prohibited but rather the killing or injury of an adversary through resorting to these perfidious acts DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 6bll4 ANNEX t o ' N A 'f' 0 POLADS 78 27 CONF I DE NT I AL -6- Article 41 - Safeguard of an Enemy Hors-de-Combat The MC study indicates that Artfd e 41 is militarily a c ceptable subject to the interpretation of feasible given under Article 57 being established namely that which is p racticable or practically possible t aking into account all the circumstances ruling at the time including those relev n t to t h e success of military operations UK Position The UK agrees with the MC finding The interpretation of the word feasible had already been placed on the record of the Diplomatic Conference by the UK Delegation in their explanation of vote in the plenary at the Final Sess ion and by several other state s and was not contradicted The UK decided that this point was of importance for several articles e g 41 57 and 58 and entered an interpretative declaration on signature They envisaged that some form of declaration on ratification may be required so as to give further assurance that the interpretation of feasible is legally establi shed Italian Position With respect to Article 41 57 and 58 the Italian Authorities would intend to clarify that the adjective feasible is to be understood as practicable or practically impossible taking into account all the circumstances ruling at the time including those relevant to the success of military operations Norwegian Position In the Norwegian ratification proposition mention might be made that paragraph 3 contains rules concerning POWs under certain circumstances Possible precautions in such circumstances should be taken to ensure protection of the released prisoners DECLASSIFIED Authority Nrll bb3 3 4 N A 'i' 0 C O N F I D E N 'i' I A L -7Article 43 - ANNEX to POLADS 78 27 Basic Rule Canadian Position The Canadian Authorities are concerned that s ome states may attempt to use this article to restrict the s cope of Article 4 of the Third Convention in order to jus tify the denial of POW status to members of the armed forces who are in their power and who are alleged to be war criminals The individual's status as a member of the armed forces of a state in itself establi shes his right to POW status if captured It would be helpful to clarify the phrase enforced· c ompliance e g is the existence of a system for this purpose sufficient to indicate adherence r - criry DEC IFIED Ntv bb ½3 4 NAT0 ANNEX to POLAD$ 78 27 C ONP I DE N T I AL -8- Arti cle 44 - Combatants and Prisoners of War The MC study found Article 44 militarily acceptable subject to the following interpretations being established and made l egally effective a b c the situation described in the second sentence of p a r a graph 3 of the Article can only exist in occupied territory in the NATO context the word deployment in paragraph 3 b of the Article means any movement towards a place from which an attack is to be launched failure to meet the requirements of the second sentence of paragraph 3 of the Article results in forfeiture of combatant status and the loss of entitlement to be a prisoner of war UK Position The UK Authorities agree with the findings of the MC study Besides the clarification made in the context of the f i nal session of the Diplomatic Conference and reiterated in its explanation of vote in the plenary of the final session the UK entered the following understanding on signature to cover points a and b above In relation to Article 44 that the situation described i n the second sentence of paragraph 3 of the Article can exist only in occupied territory or in armed conflicts covered by paragraph 4 of Article 1 and that the Government of the United Kingdom will interpret the word deployment in paragraph 3 b of the Article as meaning 'any movement towards a place from which an attack is to the launched' · The UK decided that point c above was clear both from the text and the negotiating history of the Conference and that no further action was necessary The UK Authorities feel that it may be necessary that point a be confirmed on ratification However point b represents a more difficult situation insofar a a number of s tates disagreed with the UK statement and similar statements made by other delegations Accordingly they believed that there may be a case for the making of a reservation on ratification which would establish the NATO interpretation 'I DECLASSIFIED Authority NNf bb i3 4 H A ' F 0 CON F I DE N - 9- ' F I AL ANNEX to f OLADS 78 27 Italian Position The Italian Authorities would intend to make an interpretative declaration in which 1 t would be made clear that 1 ii the situation described in the second sentence of paragraph 3 can exist only in occupied territory the word deployment in paragraph 3 h means any movement towards a place from which an attack is to be launched Norwegian Posi fun · The Norwegian Authorities intend to point out that the negotiating history showed that the rule in the second sentence of para 3 referred primarily to situations of resistance agains the domination of a territory by alien forc es • According to the Norwegian view such situations would arise most typically in occupied territory On the question of deployment the Norwegian authorities note that many considered it a vague term rorway would consider that a reasonable understanding of the term would be any movement towards a place from which an attack is to be launched The Norwegian Authorities would also note that the rul e contained in the second sentence of paragraph 3 is a minimum requirement also as regards distinction between combatants and civilians and clarifies that members of the armed forces failing to comply with these minimum requirements will fo deit their status as combatants if taken prisoner in flagrante delicto US Position The US Authorities expect to make a statement that t h e second sentence of para 3 describes situations which are exceptional and can only exist in occupied territory or in armed conflicts described in Article 1 para 4 The US would also note that the term military deployment means any movement towards a plaqe from which an attack is to be launched DECLASSIFIED Authority NNI bbll4 ANNEX to N AT 0 POLADS 78 27 Article 50 - Definition C ON F I DE N I AL -10- of Civilians and Civilian Population The MC study indicates that Article 50 is militarily acceptable subject to the following understanding Military commanders and others responsible for planning deciding upon or executingEttacks necessarily have to reach decisions on the basis of their assessment of the information from all sources which is available to them at the relevant time UK Position The UK had already endorsed this finding in their explanation of vote on Article 51 in the Plenary of the Final Session of the Diplomatic Conference However they did not consider that a statement of understanding on Article 50 alone would be necessary at the time of signature nor does there seem any pressing legal need for any separate action on ratification Norwegian Position Comments on Articles 51 and 57 have bearing on Article 50 •ru o u%bont N DLL33 4 N A 'f 0 CONF I DE N I A L ANNEX to POLADS 78 27 -11 - Article 51 - Prot ecti on of Civilian Population UK Positi on The UK Delegation to the Final Session of the Di ploma tic Conference had already made a statement i n Plenary along the l i n es of the interpre tations given by the MC s tudy Similar s t a t ements were also ma de by t h e US FRG Netherlands and I taly No d elegation made a stat ement t o the antrary I n vi ew of the important implicati ons for military ·str ategy and tactics of this Article the UK Authoriti e s believe t h a t § me form of action on r a t ificat ion may also be necessary Canadian Positi on Canada proposed making an interpret ative statement t ot h e effect that built - up areas in the combat zone whi ch are d ef ended or occupi ed by en emy forces can in themsel es be con s ider ed as military object i ves except that particul ar objects wi thin built -up areas retain their civilian ob j ect characte ristic when t hey can b e identi fied a s s uch Italian Position With regard to para graph 5 b of this Art icle and pa ragraph 2 a iii the Italian Authorities envisage to cl arify that the military advantage anticipated from an a ttack is intended to refer to the advantag e anticipated from the att ack considered as a whole and not only from i sol a ted or particul ar parts of the attack They a l so plan to specify that the definition of indiscriminate acts contained in paragraph 4 of the Article does not mean that t h ere a re no me ans of combat or specific weapons the use of wh ich would cons titute an indiscriminate act in all circums tanc es the proh ibi tion at paragraph 7 to utilise the presen c e and the movements of the civilian population for the purpose of protecting military objectives in thickl y p opulated areas is to be intended within the same limits of practicability of the interpretation given to the a d j ective feasible at Articles 41 57 and 58 wh i ch giv e s to the military commander re sponsibil ity of the d e ci s i on s on the bas is of circum stanc e s atthE moment DECLASSIFIED Authority NrJf 663 3 4 HA 'f' 0 ANNEX to POLADS 78 27 C O N F I D E N 'f' I A L - 1 2- Norwegian Position The Norwegian Authorities expect that their ratifi c a t ion proposition woul d p oint out that para 4 contai ns the most i mport ant provision of the Article namely that indi s criminate attacks are prohibited Accor ding t o the Norwegian Authori t i es the rules on indiscr iminat e attacks seen in c onjunction with Articl e 52 do n o t excl ude the shelling of a limited area e g hill junction Nor do these rules have any bearing on the use of mines The No rwegian Authorities would point out that para 5 prohibits such extensive b ombi ng of large urban areas as took place duri ng World War II but not attacks against specific mil i t a ry objectives within popula ted areas They point out t hat s ub-para b of para 5 introduced the principle of proportionality whi ch me a ns that an attack should not be carried out if the harmful effects thereof are excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantages anticipated from it The asse s sment will have to be ba sed on i nformation available at the relevant time and i n c a s es where an a ttack consists of sever al operations it must be possibl e to base the a s sessment on the military advantages of t h e attack considered as a whole US Position The US Authorit ies intend to state at t he time of ratification the under standing of the US Govemment that the references in Articles 51 and 57 to military advantage are intended to refer to the advantage anticipated from the attack cons idered as a whole not from i s ola ted or particular parts of that attack DECLASSIFIED Authority NrJf bbll4 N A 'f 0 CO NFIDE N IA L · - 13- ANNEX to POLADS ' ts 27 Article 52 - General Pr otec t i on of Ci vilian Obj e cts The MC finds t hi s Artic le militari ly accept abl e subjec t to two i nterpreta ti on s given on page s 47 a nd 48 para 7 of their document being establi s hed UK Position The UK Delegation at the Diplomatic Conferenc e had already made a statement in Pl enary at the Final Session on the same l i ne s of interpret ation suggested by ·the MC Other NATO membe r s made similar s tatements and no delegation controverted With r espect to the first interpretation it decided that it should on signature of the Protocols declare its unde standing t hat a sp ecific area of land may be a military objective and en te r ed on signature a statement of understand i ng which r epeated its inte rpretation The UK also considered a second inte rpretation to be important h owever it was already firmly established and not controv erted in the n egot i a t ing hi s tory Italian Position The Italian Authorities intend to make clear that a specific ar ea of land may be a milit ary objective if because of its location or other reasons specific in Article 52 its total or pa rtial destruction c apture or n eutrali s ation i n t he c i r cumstances rul ing at the time offe rs mi l ita ry advantage the first sentence of p a ragraph 2 of Article 52 prohibits only s uch atta cks as may be directed against non-military objectives It does not deal with the que stion of collateral damage caused by attacks directed against military objectives Canadian Position The Canadian Authorities recalled that during the negotiations the Representatives of UK US FRG Netherlands and Canada stated in a Plenary session that a a specific area of land could be a military objective b Article 52 did not apply to incidental or collateral d amage DECLASSIFIED Authority NNf bb33 4 N AT 0 ANNEX to POLADS 78 27 C ONF I DE N I Ab -14- The Canadian Authorities feel that an appropriate interpretative statement should be s o worded that it specifies that the object of the attack must be st ictly limited but not the results of the attack The ques tion of incidental damage is governed by the rule of proportionality Norwegian Position out that The Norwegian Authoriti es point definition of military objectives in this Article no was made of that fact that a limited area itself can a legitimate military target Such an area could be alien force s as an assembly area · or forming up place purposes etc in t he mentiorr constitute u sed by for observation US Position The US believes that it should be made clear that a specific area of land may be a military objective if because of its location for other reasons specified in the Article its total or partial destruction capture or neutralisation in the circumstances ruling at the time offers definite military advantage The US Authorities would also wish to make it clear that para 2 prohibits only such attack s as may be directed against non-military objectives and does not deal with questions of collateral da age except by attacks directed against military objectives DECLASSIFIED Authority NNI bb t3 4 N A T 0 Article 53 - C ONF I DE NT I AL -15- ANNEX to POLADS 78 27 Protection of Cultural Objects and Places of Worship Canadian Position This Article could be interpreted to mean that an object cannot be attacked which is of recognised importance to culture or spiritual heritage of people even though an enemy may be using the same object to support his military effort An interpretative statement establishing the right to attack this object in these circumstances is required UK Position The UK Delegation at the Final Session of the Diplomatic Conference stated in its explanation of vote in Plenary on Article 53 firstly that the expression 'spiritual heritage'which qualifies the reference of places of worship makes it obvious that the protection given by this Article extends only to those place of worship which do constitute such spiritual heritage and that the Article is not intended to apply to all places of worship without exception and secondly that if the objects protected by the Article were unlawfully used for military purposes they would thereby lose effective protectionas a result of the attacks directed against such unlawful military purposes Other NATO members made similar points and were not contradicted The MC study considered the acceptability of this Article depended on the establishment of the interpretation of the second point In view of the military importance of this point the UK decided that its statement in Plenary at the Final Session should be confirmed on signature by a statement of understanding The military importance of this Article suggests that further action on ratification will be necessary Italian Position The I alian Authorities intend to clarify that if the objectivesprotected in the Article are unlawfully used for military purposes they will thereby lose protection H A T 0 ANNEX to C ON F I DE N T I AL -16- POLADS 78 27 Norwegian Position The Norwegian Authorities will xplain that this provision must be seen in conjunction with the corresponding provision contained in regulations concerning laws and customs of land warfare Article 27 a ccording to which protection for the relevant building and places is conditioned on their not at the same time b eing used for military purposes The assumption is that Article 53 is in accordance with and does not alter 'the said existing rules US Position The US plans to make a statement to the effect that Article 53 establishes a special protection for a limited class of obj ects which because of their recognised importance constitute a part of the cultural and spiritual heritage of peoples and that such obj ectives will lose the special protection of that article if they are used in support of the military effort DECLAS 11n D Authonty Ntvf bb 3 4 N A T 0 C ON F I DE NT I AL · - 17- ANNEX to POLADS 78 27 Article 57 - Precautions in Attack The Military Committee Study examined this a rticle in detail and found that it was acceptable subject to thre e · interpretations being established The first is that the word feasible in paragraph 2 of this a r ticle and throughout Part IV of the Protocol means that which is practicable or practically possible taking into account all the circumstances ruling at the time including those relevant to the ·success of military operations The other two interpretations repeat the point already made in Article 51 concerning the meaning of military adva ntage and concerning the information avai l able to commanders at the time Canadian Position The Canadian Authoriti es believe that there are no major difficulties from a legal point of view with thi Article although the interpretation of the word feasible and the scope of obligation of the term military advantage anti cipated from an attack in re gard to the duties of commanders should be clarified Ca nada and some other NATO states took the position during the negotiations that feasible means that which is practicable or prac tically possible taking into account all the circuinstances existing at the relevant time including those circumstances relevant to the success of military operations The Canadian Authorities believe that the position taken during the negotiations should be s upported by an interpretative statement UK Position The UK position in respect to the first interpretation i s covered under Article 31 above As to the t wo other interpretations see Article 51 Norwegian Position The Norwegian Government would point out that the precautions are to be taken to the exte t this is compatible with the carrying out of the militiry operations The obligation is to take such precautions as are possible under the circumstances obtaining at the time Commanders should assure themselves that the object of an attack is in fact a military objective and the r DECLASSIFIED j Authority NrJf bb3 3 4 l A 'f' 0 ANNEX to CON FIDE N IA L • -18- POLADS 78 27 attack should be planned to avoid or minimise harmful effects to the civilian population An ·attack should be avoided if it implies a violation of the principle of proportionality cf Article 51 The Norwegian comments state that as in reference to Article 51 the assessment must be based on information available to commanders at the time If it become s apparent after the launching of an attack that the ob jective is not a military one or that the harmful effects on the civilian population exceed what is permitted the attack should be stopped US Posifun See statement on Article 51 DECLASSIFIED Authority Nt f bb3 3 4 H A 'f 0 CONFIDENTIA L· -19- ANNEX to PotAbs 78 27 Article 58 - Precautions Against the Effects of Attack Norweeian Position The Norwegian draft ratification proposition would point out that Article 58 supplements Article 57 by making it incumbent on a ll pa rties to a conflict to take measures t o prevent harmful effects should tney be subject to attack This means that a ll endeavours should be made to remove the civilian population from the immediate vicinity of militar y objectives that military object ives should not be located in densely popula ted areas a nd that other protective measures should be taken - DECLASSIFIED Authority NrJf bb N A P O ANNEX to C ON P I D E N P I A L -20- POLADS 78 27 II I REPRISALS The MC study did not consider the i ssue of r epri s als holding that t hi s was a matter for national rath er than Alliance decisions This was a difficult issue faced by the Diplomatic Conference in Geneva Due in part to a misunderstanding of the concept of r eprisals and due also in part to the belief held by the Third World countries that only powerful states were in a position to initiate reprisal action every conceivable form of repri s al involving civilians was included in the Protocols including reprisals against civilian obj ects and the civilian population as a whole although reprisals against military objectives are not prohibited Canadian Position To the extent that reprisal action is one of the few sanctions available to governments to respond to continued disregard of the laws of war by an opponent e g indiscriminate bombing of cities it is in the Canadian view regrettable that the Conference adopted such far-reaching measures without at the same time providing an alternative means of ensuri ng compliance with the laws of war As yet no Canadian governmental position has been determined At the working level there is some support for the need to make an appropriate reservation and Canada would be interested in the views of other Allied Delegations as to possible difficulties which could arise from a military operational or policy point of view and whether these difficulties are such as to warrant statements of interpretation or reservations UK Position The UK has not yet reached firm conclusions on the reprisals question They would be most interested to hear the views of other members of the Alliance as well as other DECLASSIFIED Authority NNI bb3 3 4 N A 'I' 0 CONP I DBN 'I' I AL ANNEX to P0LADS '78 27 - 2 1- countries outside the Alliance and shall take these into c onsideration when ac ion may be ·required on ratification so as to s afeguard NATO interests Belgian Position Subject to possible change i their position as a result of Allied consultation the Belgian Authorities do not envisage at present making any reservation with respect to the reprisals issue Norwegian Position The Nawegian Authorities do not contemplate making reservations or declarations conce rring reprisals DECLASSIFIED Authority NfJb bb3 3 4 N A 'l' 0 ANNEX to POLADS 78 27 C ON F I DE N I AL -22- IV INTERPRETATION OF INDIVIDUAL ARTICLES OF THE PROTOCOLS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE MC STUDY Article 1 The term armed conflicts'' is nowhere defined in the definitions of the 1949 Conventions although its juxtaposition - - · with the words declared war in c ommon with Article 2 was clearly significant in its interpretation Nor is this expression defined in Protocol I UK Po s ition The UK Authorities consider that the term in the context of Article 1 of the Protocol implies a certain level of intensity of fighting which must be present before the Conventions or the Protocol are to apply in any given situation It is the UK's view that armed conflicts to which the First Protocol will apply cannot be less in intensity than t hose to which the Second Protocol will apply Accordingly the UK interpret the term armed conflicts as used in the First Protocol in that sense A statement of understanding to this effect which the UK regards as fully consi s tent with the interpretation to be given to the term as used in the Convention was entered by the UK Delegation on signature Moreover the UK Authorities envisage that some action on ratification may also be r equired Canadian Position The Canadian Authorities consider that the interpretative statement made by the UK on signing Protocol I to the effect that the term armed conflicts as used in this Article would mean a level of intensity of military operation not less than that required for the application of Protocol II is legally incorrect in that this error would affect not only the scope of application of Protocol I but also the Geneva Conventions Armed conflicts is consi ered to mean any use of force by the military forces of one state in pursuance of official government policy against another state and does not depend on its meaning upon any considerations of the intensity of the conflict number of personnel involved r nations and degree of the force applied - DECLASSIFIED Authority Nr 1 bb t3 4 -N-A -4' - - -O - N--P-- I D E N 'i' I A L - 23- ANNEX to POLADS 78 27 Belgian Position Protocol I has recognised the qualification of international armed conflicts to national liberation wars as defined in Article 1 paragraph 4 In the view of the Belgian Authorities this Article concerns exclus ively the a ctual conflicts related to liberation movements recognised by the interested regional inter-governmental organisations and which represent the consequences of the decolonisation process or are in relation to foreign occupation Such an interpretation has been reflected in the Belgian explanation of vote in the context of adoption of Article 1 in Plenary Session The elgian Authorities wonder whether it would not be useful to formulate a declaration which would clarify that armed conflicts mentioned in Article 1 paragraph 4 are thos e in which are involved recognised national liberation movements DECLASSIFIED Authority wrD tot o7 1 ' N A 'f 0 C ONF I DB N I AL -24- ANNEX to POLADS 78 27 Ar ticle 8 - Definitions Canadian Posit i on In t he vi ew of the Canadian Authorities there are thre e d efinitions in Article 8 which should be clarified wJth appropr iate interpret ative sta t ements namely a wounded and sick This defi nit i on can be interpreted to mean that once a pers on who is sick or wounded commits an act of hostility he will lose his sick or wounded status for ever The Canadians believe that an interpretative statement app ears necessary to make it clearly unde r s t ood that a sick and wounded person does not lose this status only because at one point in time h e may have attempted to commit or did commit a hostile act b medical units National intentions as to the appropriate identification signs that will be worn- by national civil defence personnel performing medical duties should be announced in an appropriate statement c medical transport The definition provided for medical transport and more specifically temporary medical transport may not clearly establish the right to use vehicles for exclusive medical transportation during a portion of a single journey This should be clarified with an interpretative statement US Pos ition The US Government is planning to make a statement that the und erstanding of the US is that the terms used in Part III of Protocol II which are the sa me as the terms defined 'in Article 8 of Protocol I shall so far as relevant be construed in the same sen s e as those definitions DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 6b33 4 N A cp 0 C ONP I DB N - 25- I AL ANNEX to POLADS 78 27 Article 12 - Protection of Medical • Units ' Canadian Position The intent of paragraph 2 of this article as to the consequences for a medical unit which does not comply with its• provisions is not clear The Canadian Authorities believe ·that the examination of this article by the NATO Political Legal Working Group would be useful in determining an appropriate solution NCIASSmm ' tb Ytt i V tb l14 N A T 0 ANNEX to POLADS 78 27 C ONF I DE -26- N I AL Article 18 - Identification of Medical Units Canadian Position The Canadian Authorities would wish to record by way of an interpretative statement their intention to provide protected status to combatants who might be temporarily employed on medical dutes such as casualty collection and transportation by providing them with an appropriate identification card and armband DECLASSIFIED Authority N tJ el oJ J ' i H A 'i' 0 C ONF I DE N I AL - 27Articles 13 and 65 ANNEX t o POLADS 18 27 Di scontinuation of Protection of Civilian Medical Units Canadian Position The purpose of these Articles is to provide ·civilians employed in civilian medical units with the ri ght to possess light individual weapons for their defence and the defence of their patients The term light individual weapons is not d efi ned in Article 13 But in a related Article Article 65 paragraph 3 civil defence units who are also given the right to possess light individual weapons for self-defence are restri cted to hand guns when they are operating in areas where land fighting is or is likely to be taking place During the negotiations the UK Delegation provided an explanation of light individual weapons to the effect that they did not include fragmentation grenadesor similar devices as well as weapons which cannot be fully handled or fired by a single individual and those basically intended for non-human targets According to the Canadian Authorities an interpretative statement along these lines would be desirable DECLASSIFIED Authority NN bbfl4 N A 'f' 0 C ON F I D E N T I AL ANNEX t o -28- POLADS 78 27 Artlcle 36 - New Weapons Norwegian Position The Norwegian Authorities are very much interested in receiving information on procedures already established or being planned in other NATO member states DECLASSIFlED Authority NrJf bb3 l4 NAP O C O NF I DE N P I AL ANNEX to POLADS 78 27 -29Article 62 Canadian Position The Canadian Authorities point out that it is riot understood what was intended in this Article by introducing the phras e imperative military necessity because the definition of military necessity has always included an imperative element They believe a consideration of this concept by the NATO Working Group may help to clarify the meanin'g of the phrase Since the second sentence of paragraph one could be construed to be a limit on the right of a state over its nationals empl oyed in civil defence organisations Canada declared in a plenary session that this sentence did not inhibit a government from employing its own nationals as deemed appropriate The possibility of the need for a reservation paragraph one should be considered by the Political Legal Working Group DECLASSIFIED Authority NrJI bb3 3 4 C-0 N F I D-E- N T I A ANNEX t o POLAD3 78 27 Article 75 l -30Fundamental Guarantees Norweg ian Positi on For technical legal reasons Norway had to make a statement of interpretation concerning details in this Article at the Diplomatic Conference The Ministry of Justice is cons idering whether to make a similar declaration at the t ime of ratification - DECLASSIFIED Authority NrJI bb33 4 N A 'f 0 CONF I DE N T I AL -31- ANNEX to POLADS 78 27 Article 85 Canadian Position In the view of the Canadian Authori ti es this Article which deals with the repression of breaches of the Protocol has an important provision which is causing them concern This provision in effect makes certain acts or disregard of the Protocol gr ave breaches or t o put it in another way wa r crimes One of the difficulties with respect to this provision will be in its translation of the offences as described in the Protocol into sensible legal language in the Statutes of Canada This is so because an attempt is being made to convert a political concept into an offence e g the Protocol states that practices of apartheid or other inhuman and degradi ng practices involving outrages upon personal dignity ba sed on rac ial discrimination constituted a grave breach Canada will be interested in learning how the Allies intend to make this provision legally effective in the national law DECLASSIFIED Authority N Nb bb3 3 4 MA T 0 ANNEX to POLADS o 8 27 C O MF I D E N I A -32- Article 90 - International Fact-Finding Commission Norwegian Position The Ministry of Justice would not have any objections to a Norwegian declaration in accordance with para 2 a of this Article leaving open however the timing of such a declaration Information on other NATO member countries ' positions would be most welcome DECLASSIFIED Authoritv NN bb3 t4 CONF I DBN -33- I AL ANNSX to POLADS 78 27 Article 96 3 UK Position In the UK Authorities' view paragraph 3 of Article 96 seems to provide logical and acceptable machinery whereby once paragraph 4 of Article 1 is includedin the Protocol its provision can be accommodated that is a machinery enabling authorities representing people engaged in armed conflicts of the type referred to in the latter paragraph to undertake to apply the conventionsandthe Protocol in relation to those conflicts by means of unilateral declarations It was the UK understanding that only declarations made by an authority which genuinely fulfils the criterion of Article 1 paragraph 4 can have the effects stated in pare graph 3 of Article 84 The UK entered a statement of understanding on these lines at the time of signature Some form of action at the time of ratification may also be required ANNEX to N A 'f 0 POLADS 78 27 C ON F I DE N - 34Article 102 I AL Canadian Position The Canadian Authorities believe that comparative studies of the texts in its six official languages will be necessary before ratification This is a long term process and they suggest that consideration be given to ·the pooling of resources or other forms of co-operative -efforts within the Alliance for this purpose ANNEX to N A 'f 0 POLADS 78 27 C O N F I D E N 'f I A L -34Article 102 Canadian Position The Canadian Authorities believe that comparative s tudies of the texts in its six official languages will be ne ce ssary before ratification This is a long term process and they s uggest that consideration be given to ·the pooling of resources or other forms of co-operative ·efforts within the Alliance for this purpose DECLASSIFIED ' Authority NN 6b3 3 4 N A T 0 CONF I DE NT I AL Ai to POLADS 78 27 -35RHODESIA UK Position The understanding on Rhodesia which accompanied the OK's signature of both Protocols is on the lines of that previously used in respect of other treaties Action on ratification will clearly depend to a large extent on developments concerning Rhodesia and is purely a domestic matter for the UK rI DECLASSIFIED Authority Nr JDbb33 4