DEPARTMENT OF STATE ACTION MEMORANDUM S SECRET NODIS TO The Acting Secretary FROM AF - William C Harrop Acting South African Nuclear Issue The Problem We need to move forward with action on the various decisions taken in the August 25 Policy Review Committee meeting on the South African nuclear issue The attached paper outlines for your approval the strategy which we propose to follow We will of course be clearing individual telegrams to the field with you as appropriate Background Following recent indications that South Africa had made substantial progress in the development of a nuclear weapons capability _and might be preparing to test a nuclear device we consulted urgently with other concerned governments and raised the issue with the South African government As a first step we reque sted and 4ater received assurances from the South African Government that they do not have and o nol intena to aeve lop nuclear explosive devices for any purpose peaceful or otherwise Because of our doubts as to these assurances and because of the broad er implications of this development the Policy Review Committee met on August 25 to consider what additional steps would be needed to defuse the situation and address our vital African and nonproliferation interests Since that meeting the concerned bureaus have consulted extensively and d evised SECRET XGDS-3 DECLASSIFIED- - - • Authority NN D '26i11 SECRET - 2 - a general plan of action including next steps to be taken with the South Africans and others Recommendation That you approve the attached strategy paper as guidance for further action on this question Approve --------- Disapprove Discuss Attachment Strategy Paper PM AL t-e S P J - sba 8 26 77 Clearances AF WBEdrnondson AF I LRMacfarlan l T D JNye c_subs U S P PKreisberg W ACDA NP liarnso t IO GHelrna EUR RVine i # I NEA NVeliotei-l n OES NET JBoright L _ INR STA RCowey info j Drafted £A mut - SECRET • SECRET WODIS STRATEGY PAPER NEXT STEPS ON SOUTH AFRICAN NUCLEAR ISSUE 1 In a further demarche at the Ambassadorial level next week ·we should urge the South African Government SAG to take two additional actions to complement its nuclear assurances -- Immediate action unequivocally demonstrating an explicit South African intent to adhere to the NPT This would be portrayed as an essential first step to provide credibility for South Africa and those nations continuing a nuclear relationship with it as well as an important South African contribution to world nonproliferation objectives As a practical matter the SAG will be unable to adhere to the NPT until necessary Parliamentary action has b e en completed which probably cannot be done until sometime in the first half of 1978 To assure ourselves and others of the SAG's good faith two prerequisites would have to be met 1 issuance of a formal statement pub lic l y EUtting the SAG on recot d a s h aving decided t o adhere to the NPT as soon as possible and 2 evidence th a t the SAG was indee d moving as rapidly a s legal a nd constitutional constraints permitted As an i mmedia t e interim measure pending NPT adherence and i mpl e mentat ion o f comprehensive safeguards pursuant to the NPT Sou t h Africa should unilaterally submit the Valinda b a pilot enTichmen t plant to IAEA safeguards by means o f an u rgen t request addressed to the IAEA Following this a d d i tional p ublic documentation of South Africa's commitment t o the peaceful uses of nuclear technology the U S wo uld b e prepared to send to South Africa quali fied t e chnical perso nnel t o work with the SAG and as soon as pos s i ble appr o pr i ate IAEA personnel t o develop and implemen t s afeguards p r oc edu re s that wo u ld meet their obj e ctive a nd at the same t ime r espond t o South Africa's legi t imate d e sire to protect pro p rietary inf ormation relating to i ts unique enrichme nt p rocess Th ese fu r ther ste ps would serve to bridge the anticip a ted d e l ay of p e rha ps as much a s 18 to 24 mont hs b efore c ompreh ensive NPT safe gua rds could be imple ment ed and e nsure tha t no unsa fe gua rde d production and stockpiling o f hig hly enriched ura nium takes place during that period which SECRET NOD IS - SECRET NOD IS -2- could be seen as contravening the intent of South Africa's assurances -- We should also make clear to the SAG that the U S will continue to monitor the situation including developments at the Kalahari site We would stress that any actions which could be interpreted as inconsistent with South Africa's three previous assurances would be viewed with the utmosl gravity not only by the U S but in all probability by the Soviets who might seek additional propaganda mileage 2 In elaboration of our package we would emphasize that a firm and public commitment to NPT adherence alone in the absence of agreement to permit immediate inspections would clearly be -sufficient for further U S nuclear cooperation or fo resolving the international credibility problem r garding South Africa's nuclear intentions -- If South Africa wishes to consider further the specific question of interim safeguards on Valindaba before giving us a final decision we would respond that the gravity of the situation permits no delay but that we will seek to respond as fully as possible to the SAG's technical concerns once they have taken the initial steps and are moving toward resolution of the problem 3 We should also inform the SAG that if the above conditions are met we would be in a position to r'2 _commend issuance of the necessary export licenses to permit the U S to supply low-enriched uranium fuel for the two nuclear reactors South Africa is purchasing from France and would also be prepared at an appropriate time to modify our existing agreement to permit supply of LEU for a third power reactor a point the SAG has previously raised with us -- This position would need to be coordinated with a corresponding French position on supply of the Koeburg reactors to South Africa s e paragraph 5 below SECRET NODIS D CLASSln D • ' Aalbarity HN D 64 1 -3SECRET NODIS - - - If the subject is raisecl by the SAG we would explain that we could not at this time agree to supply South Africa with highly-enriched uranium Note Given Vorster' s public emphasis on U S failure to fulfill contractual obligations to supply fue l for the Safari reactor it is quite possible that the SAG wil l ultimately insist on shipment of HEU as a quid pro guo for SAG commitments to NPT adherence and immediate inspections If the HEU question proves to be the only obstacle to an otherwise satisfactory arrangement we would have to examine our position in the light of the overall political situation at the time Unless political considerations dictate otherwise we would tell the SAG that we would be prepared to recommend licensing of a sufficient quantity of HEU to permit continued efficient operation of the Safari reactor for a n interim period gn two conditions first that all Safari spent fuel be returned to the U S after the necessary cooling period and second that the U S and SAG b egin immediately to explore p o ssibilities f o r c o nverting Safari to operate on 20 percent enriche d fuel If raised by the SAG we sho u ld remain non-committal on r e vising our p re s e nt restr ictions on exports of equipme nt for South Afr ica 's enrichment plant consistent with our g ener a l po l icy of not contributing to the spread of sens i t i ve ·nuclear technologies If pressed we should indica te our readiness to consider on a casebe_case basis c e rta i n non-sensitive transfers 4 It is highly d e s i r a b le that any interim safeguards arrangements f or Valinda b a be conducted by the IAEA Once SAG agree s to the pr inciple of interim safeguards agency exp e rts would b e b rou g ht i n urgentl y t o design detailed modal i ties and t o implemen t safegu ards arr angements If the SAG rejec t s any I AEA rol e f or interim safeguards as opposed to off i cia l NPT s afeguar d s or if IAEA is unwilling or unable to me et this requirement rapidly or effectively we should be _EL red to propose eith r a mixed_lAEA-multinat1 6 nal t e am or a non- I AEA international team -wlt or without U S participa nts SECRET NODIS DECIASSMD AutboritY NW D bb SECRET NOQIS Because of the political liabilities of appearing as sole guarantor of South Africa ' s nuclear intentions the U S should not provide an exclusively American safegua r ds team unless clearly satisfied that arrange ments for impl e menting international safeguards will soon follow We are querying Ambassador Stone on issues relating to early and effective IAEA involve ment MJ # 5 We would contact the French as soon as possible in dvance of our p rop osed approach and suggest a paral Ter approacn to South Africa L - - We would note the special urgency and priority of beginning Valindaba inspection immediately - - We would explain carefully our intention to continue monitoring the Kalaha ri site so as to be able to take appropriate further a ction i f t h ere is any change that appears t o b e i nconsis tent with South Africa's assurance s -- We would seek f r om the French the ir sup port for our tactics p r e f erably by their indicating to South Africa the difficulty o f fulfilling the contract for supply of the Koe b u rg rea c tors or of serving as a back-up supplier of fuel if South Afiri ca fails to accept and implement all el ements o f o u r package We would stress that French paralle l a ction in t h i s respect could make the difference in achie v i ng South Af r ican acceptance of the kind of safe guard s t hat would pro tec t b oth France and the U S France not its el f a part y t o t h e NPT may fi nd it di ff icult to e x plicit y a ssoci ate itsel f with t he NPT a spec t of our d emands but give n t heir own conc ern s on thi s issue we can r e aso nably hope that the y will support o ur overall a p proach 6 We would also inform London and Bonn of our proposed approa ch b e fore we approach the SAG We would spe c ifi c ally seek to h a ve them reiterate their d emarches to the SAG rega rding NPT adherence and the n e ed for imme di a te sa fe guards on Valinda ba and we would inform them of our intent to monitor closely the situation at Kalahari SECRET NOD IS D Autbarity NN O b64gl J SECRET NOD IS -5 We could also consult a limited number of other capitals such as Ottawa and Tokyo to apprise them of our general approach 7 We would contact Moscow about the time we approach the South Africans with a general statement to the effect that we are seeking further actions from South Africa including a commitment to NPT adherence on an urgent basis and that we are monitoring the situation very closely 8 Once we have presented our package to South Africa and if the prognosis for SAG acceptance of it is favorable we would consult with selected Congressmen to seek their support specifically to ensure that further nuclear cooperation with South Africa would be acceptable on the Hill if the SAG agreed t o all our conditions - 9 At s ome point in the n ear f u ture we may conclude that a f u r ther approach to I srael is needed We should base any fur t h er a ppr oach t o the GOI on a careful review of available t e chnical i n formation and the political climate 10 Since we h ave al ready raised the issue of the NPT with South Afr ica i t is possible that they wil l approa c h us within the n e xt few days along the lines of Vorster 's speech of Augus t 24 i e t h ey may offer to adhere t o the NPT if we wo uld ass u re Sou t h Africa that this would put the r e cent nucl e ar i ssue t o rest guarantee U S supply of HEU as we ll as LEU and remove o ur re s tric t ions on expor t s of equ i pment useful f or t h eir enrichment p l ant In this e v e nt we would simply p r esent the package ignoring in the first i n stance those aspect s of the Sou th African offer that we do not wish to d e al with SECRET NOP IS DECLASSIFIED Authority HN D 1 6-Bi -