MEMORANDUM THE PRESIDBNT HAS SEEN r THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON March 6 1973 ' • MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HENRY A KISSINGER SUBJECT U S Support for British Submarine Mis tf Several discussions have been held recently with the British on alternatives for upgrading their Fleet Ballistic Missile strategic deterrent force The British wish to decide on an upgrade option acceptable to bpth governments during the spring of 1973 The point has now been reached where they are ready formally to approach you on those alternatives requiring U S ssistance of one for or another Howe_vt r they wish to avoid making a request which might cause you -- or them -any embarrassment SANITIZED 2 a The British believe that they will have a suitable deterrent if they are able to penetrate the ABM system permitted by the SALT Agreement of 100 interceptors around Moscow Their current capability 3 soft and slow multiple re-entry vehicles per POLARIS missile is generally agreed to have poor capability against the current Moscow GOLASH ABM system A credible penetration capability against expected improvements in the Soviet ABM system requires more re-entry vehicles in order to saturate Soviet defenses A greater lift capability as-·iepresented by the POSEIDON orULMS- T missile may necessary to afford stand-off range and minimize submarine vulnerability to Soviet ASW improvements The British however do not necessarily need to penetrate the Moscow ABM system to have a credible deterrent Other Soviet cities Leningrad Kiev etc are vulnerable afso-be ·---- TOP SEGRET SEJ ' SITIVE Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified SJ NlTiZED iJ 2 rJ0 TOP SECRET SEHSITP E 2 Adverse reactions to providing assistance are possible in several areas Congressio nally becau_se of disclosure of advanced nuclear weapons information domestical ly or internation ally over the sale of POSEIDON or ULMS-1 missiles even without MIRV capability which the British 11 do not desire in any case and by the USSR in SALT based on strategic technology transfer 11 interpretati ons It could be charged that the U S is escalating the arms race in direct contradicti on of its avowed aims under SALT relates to undergroun d nuclear testing They are concerned that _az_ sottfpr-13 hensive Test Ban Treaty may be sought by the U S before they - o ld accomplish testing probably in 1976 If it is decided to prov de warhead technology we should give assurances to the British that we would not sign a treaty barring testing during your term of office Despite these potential problems I believe it is important for both military and political reasons to support our British ally in efforts to improve their missile capability against our major potential enemy The Soviets continue to improve their own strategic missile capability both qualitativel y and quantitative ly As you know they are building new missile submarines with a 4300 nautical mile range missile The choices for providing assistance in ascending order of capability and political costs are a Provide only further assistance to the SUPER-AN TELOPE program hardened and improved warhead and re-entry vehicle and the STAG program allows larger submarine operating area by providing a non-MIRV POSEIDON missile With the SUPER-AN TELOPE improveme nts missiles could probably penetrate the existing Moscow ABM system No' further Congressio nal approval would be necessary b TOP SECRET S ENSITIVE Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified SANITIZED 2 ' TOP oEGRET SE NSITPfE 3 c d Re commendation Due to the high costs of options c and d over 1 2 billion dollars the British will probably select the improved warhead option b if given a choice However I recommend that we offer them all of the above options TOP SECRET SENSITIVE Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified