No Objection To Declassification 2008 08 22 NLC-17-26-8-3-4 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON TOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS April 11 1977 NSC REVIEWED DOCUMENT AND HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION -- IN PART 10 5 07 MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT THE SECRETARY OF STATE THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE THE CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE THE DIRECTOR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY SUBJECT SALT and Other Arms Control Issues Addressed in Moscow The following summarizes the outcome of the SCC meeting of · April 7 1977 SALT Our public posture will be to make clear that SALT is a long-term process requiring our patient efforts to try to achieve an agreement We will not underplay the potential difficulties and we should avoid over-optimistic assessments We should play down the significance of the May meeting between Gromyko and the Secretary of State In this connection it was decided to propose that the Geneva discussion be resumed as soon as practical under Paul Warnke' s chairmanship of the U S Delegation to address remaining SALT technical issues verification data base etc and to provide a possible channel for exchanging views on our proposals Guidance on the technical issues will be developed by the SCC Working Group In our private discussions with the Soviets we should emphasize our preference for the con lprchcnsive approach We should try to obtain a more specific Soviet critique of our proposals and Soviet counterproposals These discussions with the Soviets should be guided by PD NSC-7 State Dept review completed TOP SECRET SENSITlVE XGDS No Objection To Declassification 2008 08 22 NLC-17-26-8-3-4 MORI GDF C03347034 bdt z ··-e1td te e tr i i ti f i IL ' kOfft' 4 1 'io £ rj • Matt ' j ibz tr ' · lnzd' · b • 7»1e No Objection To Declassification 2008 08 2 NLC-17-2 -8-3-4 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS z The SALT Special Coordination Committee and its Working Group will undertake a detailed examination of the phasing of reductions in the comprehensive proposal -- the time at which the Soviets can be expected to exceed our proposed 550 limit for MIRVed ICBM' s the kinds of constraints that might apply to TRIDENT the B-1 and Soviet SLBM and strategic bombe forces There should be a systematic and comprehensive examination of all possible constraints on Backfire There should be an analysis of the number of missile flight tests that would be appropriate to our comprehensive proposal including the question of the definition of what is a test There should be an examination of the definition of cruise missile range The elements of the comprehensive proposal should be examined to determine the sensitivity of changes of individual elements and how they would impact on U S and Soviet interests There should also be an examination of how elements of our comprehensive proposal could be added to the deferral package ranging from establishing agreed principles for SALT III to undertaking specific commitments to keep aspects of our co1nprehensive proposal viable such as a limit on· the number of MIRVed ICBM' s In this connection there should be a careful exam ination of those cruise missile and Backfire constraints that might be acceptable OTHER ISSUES CTB It was agreed that there would be an experts meeting ou the CTB following the closing of the CCD in Geneva in late April To prepare or this meeting the SCC Working Grol' p with Paul Warnke attending will review the issues on the Comprehensive Test Ban to dctcrininc whether a full SCC meeting is necessary Indian Occnn weeks We vill defer following up with the Soviets for several 7I r'· IA - 25Xl - ----- _____JI A draft Presidential 1ncn10randum will be cornplct •d and reviewed by the SCC Consultations wiJI b uncle rtakcn with the interested countries in the region on the basis of the decisions reaclwd on the Presidential Review Me1norandum TOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS --- _t--JQ Objection__To Declassification 2008 08 22 NLC-17-26-8-3-4 i 1 t w • No Objection To Declassification 2008 08 22 NLC-17-26-8-3-4 ' • ' TOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS 3 Anti-Satellite Systems Notification of Missile Launches and Civil Defense These should all be discussed on a combined basis in a single working group Anti-satellite systems would be discussed last on the basis of the PRM on Space Policy We would look forward to handing over some of these issues to other forums such as notification of missile launches to the SALT SCC The Director of ACDA will develop the terms of reference for this discussion which will be reviewed by the SCC Chemical Weapons and Radiological Warfare Discussion of chemical weapons limitations will continue in the CCD We will take the position that we a re willing to discuss both of these issues with the Soviets but we will leave the initiation of discussions to them Conventional Arms Transfers Discussion with the Soviets on this subject will be deferred until after the Summit In the meantime we will complete our own work in the SCC and undertake consultations at the Summit Nuclear Non-Proliferation We would agree to regular high-level meetings on non- proliferation No further su bstantive pre pa rations are necessary The level will be that of the Director of ACDA Zbigniew Brzezinski • TOP SECRI T SENSITJVE XGDS No O i_§ cti To_Declassification 2008 08 22 N_LC-17-_26-8-3-4 ___________ _