4 15 24 10 17 AM Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980 Volume IV National Security Policy - Office of the Historian FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1977–1980 VOLUME IV NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 50 Memorandum From William Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Brzezinski 1 Washington January 28 1978 SUBJECT Items of Interest from the NMCC Visit2 First I could not hear all of the conversations but the following points emerged from what I did monitor I put them down for our record and possible follow-up — The President seems not to have been aware of some of the vulnerabilities of our warning satellites DSP This also relates to Soviet laser R and D as I understood this part of the discussion — Your question about varied Soviet attack strategies raises many questions about our command and control which have concerned me for a long time The President responded as I understood him with a desire to do something about command and control as well as the vulnerability of our warning systems doing something of course requires a large step over a number of years it also requires a change in some of our doctrinal assumptions — Harold Brown seems extremely reluctant either to announce a launch on warning policy or to allow the impression to emerge that we might have such policy I missed other interlocutors’ responses — I will get you some better information on the operational significance of DEFCON levels — Harold Brown’s mention of changing Soviet strategic doctrine about limiting use of nuclear weapons raises a key issue in which we will possibly see major revisions in the next year or two The intelligence community has a lot of work yet to be done 3 lines not declassified I have the impression that the President’s view on this is taking a rigid shape He is justified in this view less than 1 line not declassified but it is conceivable that they will change — Your question on the chances of a false warning from the various systems is being researched in the JCS An answer will be forthcoming shortly In this connection I do not believe it was made clear that the DSP systems are not simply waiting for a Soviet launch They record launches almost everyday ours the Soviets and others world-wide Thus we have a vast experience with their reliability and sensitivities — Finally the “feedback” has been very positive General Rogers observed that had we had to go to war at this level a few years ago things would have worked rather poorly The IVORY ITEM series has altered that situation Page 227 remarkably 1 Source Carter Library National Security Affairs Brzezinski Material Agency File Box 4 Defense Department 12 77–1 78 Top Secret Sensitive Outside the System Brzezinski initialed the top right corner of the memorandum and wrote “good ”↩ https history state gov historicaldocuments frus1977-80v04 d50 1 2 4 15 24 10 17 AM Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980 Volume IV National Security Policy - Office of the Historian 2 Reference is to Carter’s visit to the National Military Command Center on January 28 Carter Library Presidential Materials President’s Daily Diary No record of the meeting was found ↩ https history state gov historicaldocuments frus1977-80v04 d50 2 2