--- - --· No Objection To Declassification 2008 04 30 NLC- -ur-3- ECRET ' l3 MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM NSC review s completed -'1bJ I WASHINGTON TOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS March 31 1977 11 L MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI SUBJECT Our Nuclear War Doctrine Limited Nuclear Options and Regional Nuclear Options OSD review completed --- Our investigation of the White House Emergency Procedures for shortwarning nuclear attack has thrown up the question of our nuclear war doctrine The SIOP as you know offers retaliatory options short of a full response but they remain massive in both direct and collateral damage NS DM 242 issued in January 1974 prescribed new guidance for nuclear weapons employment - - limited nuclear tar getting - - and led to considerable controversy over the design of limited nuclear options LNOs In principle the new doctrine was to provide the President with options short of all-out nuclear war in crises In practice it produced several problems and no solutions Policy guidance justifying planning for each LNO The rationale for particular LNO s has yet to be satisfactorily developed Technically an LNO is easy to design but choosing purposes for specific LNOs fs not Progress in this area has apparently been nil although a few LNOs have received JCS approval Limited nuclear war fighting procedures How and from where does the President conduct such a war From the White House The NEACP The Pentagon The underground alternate National Command Center Coordination of intelligence post-strike assessment and Military Command Center's How With whose as sets and operations Does the DCI manage other intelligence for the National conduct of limited nuclear operations What command authority Vulnerability of the National Command Authority The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel of 1970 presented a disturbing evaluation of the survivability of our command and control The National Command Authority and political succession were among the weaker links The situation today is not appreciably different TOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS TOP SECRET No Objection To Declassification 2008 04 30 NLC-7-47-8-3-2 --- ·- - No Objection To Declassification 2008 04 30 NLC-7-47-8-3-2 TOP SECRET TOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS 2 In view of these issues I suggest that you ask the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman JCS to t a Explain what they understand as our present nuclear war doctrine They should comment on the advisability of retaining or c ancelling NSDM 242 and limited nuclear options b Explain the procedures they envisage for actually conducting a nuclear war limited or total beyond the initial attack phase c Set forth the objectives we would hope to achieve through LNG ' s and the system we have for thinking through the political and military implications for executing specifi9 LNO 1 s o f ° ' 0 l -- '- I to ✓ TOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS No Objection To Declassification 2008 04 30 NLC-7-47-8-3-2 _ No Objection To Declassification 2008 04 30 NLC-7-47-8-3-2 MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE J I OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM WASHINGTON Jqoz TOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI SUBJECT Our Nuclear War Doctrine Limited Nuclear Options and Regional Nuclear Options Our investigation of the White House Emergency Procedures for shortwarning nuclear attack has thrown up the question of our nuclear war doctrine The SIOP as you know offers retaliatory options short of a full response but they remain massive in both direct and collateral damage NS DM 242 issued in January 1974 prescribed new guidance for nuclear weapons employment - - limited nuclear targetting - - and led to considerable controversy over the design of limited nuclear options LNOs In principle the new doctrine was to provide the President with options short of all-out nuclear war in crises In practice it produced several problems and no solutions Policy guidance justifying planning for each LNO The rationale for particular LNO s has yet to be satisfactorily developed Technically an LNO is easy to design but choosing purposes for specific LNOs i's not Progress in this area has apparently been nil although a few LNOs have received JCS approval Limited nuclear war fighting procedures How and from wnere does the President conduct such a war From the White House The NEACP The Pentagon The underground alternate National Command Center Coordination of intelligence post-strike assessment and Military Command Center's How With whose as sets and operations Does the DCI manage other intelligence for the National conduct of limited nuclear operations What command authority Vulnerability of the National Command Authority The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel of 1970 presented a disturbing evaluation of the survivability of our command and control The National Command Authority and political succession were among the TOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS No Objection To Declassification 2008 04 30 NLC-7-47-8-3-2 No Objection To Declassification 2008 04 30 NLC-7-47-8-3-2 i fE fORA' ' Dtt f • J ' THE WHITE HOLSE j WASHll'H TOS 1 1_ OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM 1 f TOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS ' ACTION March 24 1977 J MEMORANDUM FOR ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI FROM WILLIAM E ODOM SUBJECT LNO RNOs -- Nuclear War Doctrine qoi w1 c · The memorandum you requested for the President is at Tab A initial memorandum to you is at Tab B My I haye retained the initial scheme of prompting the President to raise these issues in direct conversation with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of JCS 19 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS No Objection To Declassification 2008 04 30 NLC-7-47-8-3-2 No Objection To Declassification 2008 04 30 NLC-7-47-8-3-2 THE WHITE HOCSE OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM WASIIINGTOS qo TOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI SUBJECT Our Nuc le ar War Doctrine Limited Nuclear Options and Regional Nuclear Options Our investigation of the White House Emergency Procedures for short warning nuclear attack has thrown up the question of our nuclear war doctrine The SIOP as you know offers retaliatory options short of a full response but they remain massive in both direct and collateral damage NSDM 242 issued in January 1974 prescribed new guidance for nuclear weapons employment -- limited nuclear targetting -- and led to considerable controversy over the design of'limited nuclear options'' LNOs In principle the new doctrine was to provide the President with options short of all-out nuclear war in crises In practice it produced several problems and no solutions -- Policy guidance justifying planning for each LNO Th ts has yet to be resolved although the JCS has approved some LNOs -- Limited nuclear war fighting procedures How and from where does the President conduct such a war From the White House The NEACP The Pentagon The underground alternate National Command Center Coordination of intelligence and operations- Does the DCI manage post-strike assessment and other intelligence for the National Military Command Center's conduct of limited nuclear operations How With whose assets What command authority -- Vulnerability of the National Command Authority The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel of 1970 presented a_ disturbing evaluation of the survivability of our command and control The National Command Authority and political succession were among the TOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS No Objection To Declassification 2008 04 30 NLC-7-47-8-3-2 lo ' ' 10 Objection To Declassification 2008 0 30 NLC-7-47-8-3-2 _ p 5ECRET SENSITIVE XGDS · · z l weaker links different The situation today is not appreciably In view of these issues I suggest that you ask the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman JCS to a Explain what they understand as our present nuclear war doctrine They should comment on the advisability of retaining or cancelling N SDM 242 and limited nuclear options b Explain the procedure-s they envisage for actually conducting a nuclear war limited or total beyond the initial attack pha_se c Explain what our commanders are instructed to do if the NCA is destr oyed • What are their views on pre-delegation of nuclear release authority TOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS No Objection To Declassification 2008 04 30 NLC-7-47-8-3-2