9967 ecre¥NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON D C 20506 December 22 1994 ACTION MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE AND SAMUEL R BERGER FROM ALEXANDER VERSHBOW NICHOLAS BURNS RICHARD SCHIFTER AND DANIEL FRIED SUBJECT European Security Architecture NATO Expansion and Russia In the wake of the Vice President's trip to Moscow and our December 21 discussion with the President we have revised our NSC conceptual paper on how to proceed with NATO expansion We would like to circulate this paper to a small group of senior officials at State OSD JCS and OVP to prepare for the Christopher-Kozyrev meeting in mid-January The preparatory work of Dick Holbrooke's small interagency group will be reviewed and managed by regular Deputies meetings RECOMMENDATION That you approve our paper on European Security Architecture for senior and restricted interagency distribution Approve Disapprove Attachment Tab I Building Europe's New Security Architecture DECLASSmED E 0 13526 White House Guidelines May 16 2017 By 'TL NARA Date ■C'EGfiETDeclassify on OADR RET December 22 1994 BUILDING EUROPE’S NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE We need to maintain U S leadership in defining the way ahead on NATO expansion and other elements of our European security agenda We need to a integrate USG thinking about next steps in the NATO expansion process with our Russian and other European equities b plan consultations with the Russians especially the Christopher-Kozyrev meeting in January Allies CEEs and Uki'ainians and c based on the above set objectives for year-end 1995 when the NATO study is due and beyond The outline below summarizes NSC staff views on USG direction and tactics based on interagency work including Strobe Talbott’s senior interagency process and our own thinking following the NAC Ministerial and CSCE Summit and the Vice President’s Moscow trip Principal developments since the last iteration of this paper include the NAC communique and Russia’s stiff reaction to it but also hints from the Russian Government of interest in a formalized treaty relationship with NATO I Policy Framework Objectives An integrated and inclusive security system for Europe including but broader than NATO expansion In the medium term an expanded NATO including at first one or more CEEs who live up to our precepts with the credible prospect of further expansion to those not admitted in the first tranche In close parallel an institutionalized relationship between NATO and Russia - possibly in the form of a Treaty alliance with the Alliance” or Charter It could include a commitment on consulting with Russia on NATO or NATO-led military operations as in ex-Yugoslavia but without giving Russians a veto or right of prior consultations over NATO decisions The Treaty Charter could establish an institutional framework for consultations in 16-fl format possibly modeled after the SCC and could also include negative security assurances Possibility of NATO membership for Ukraine Baltic and southern tier States i e Romania should be maintained we should not consign them to a gray zone or a Russian sphere of influence This said we should not emphasize this point in public or privately within NATO at this time given Russian sensitivities And looking to the near and medium term we will need to develop a Ukraine strategy in parallel with the deepening of the NATO-Russia relationship DECUSSIFIED w „ E-0-135 6 Sec 3i b SECRET Whjte House Guidelines September U 2006 Declassify on OADR Bjdg NARA Date q o 7ott ’lo r-S112- l u SECRET New NATO members will acquire all rights and responsibilities of current members full Article V guarantee and will be expected to commit to full integration in NATO’s military structures NATO military authorities to undertake detailed planning for defense of new members At the end of the day there might be flexibility on operational issues such as stationing of foreign forces forward deployment but we do not need to decide this now nor should we offer assurances to the Russians in this regard prematurely Expansion needs to take place in a way that does not dilute NATO’s military effectiveness for either coi'e self-defense missions or new peacekeeping and other non-Article V missions At the same time expansion should not be governed primarily by technical military criteria When they join new members should be on a ''credible path” toward making a positive contribution to the common defense NATO expansion should take place in coordination with the enlargement of the EU but should not be delayed to match the EU’s likely timetable Nor should EU membership automatically entitle NATO membership as a general rule there should be no full WEU members who ai'e not also members of NATO Rationale Principles NATO expansion intended to project stability eastward and to underpin the democratic reform process in CEE Stability in Central Europe will be a net plus for all countries NATO members and non-members alike To ensure emerging European security architecture can include Russia expansion process should proceed in close parallel in substance and pace with deepening Russia-NATO partnership leading toward formalized relationship in tandem with a strong U S -Russia bilateral relationship and development of other multilateral institutions in which Russians will participate strengthened OSCE G-8 Contact Group Expansion process to be evolutionary and transparent Consultations with principal interested parties before announcement of decisions or major forward steps Expansion linked to a continued robust PEP as mechanism both for preparing new members and deepening ties with countries not seeking or likely to attain membership or not among the first group to join “Insurance policy” ”strategic hedge” rationale i e neo-containment of Russia should not be emphasized in public diplomacy with focus instead on goal of building inclusive European security ai'chitecture in which a democratic Russia will be a major partner -SECRET- CRET within PFP from exercises to joint peacekeeping and other operations Implement PFP and NACC work programs for 1995-96 broader range of field exercises CPXes defense planning activities political consultations to signify acceleration of integration process - for future members and non-members alike Must decide on priorities for use of $30 million in FY95 and the expected $100 million in FY96for PFP support and to meet the President’s commitment of $10 million for the Baltic Battalion in FY95 With CEEs Consultations with selected CEE countries in rough pai'allel with Russia consultations In 1995 consultations keep expectations realistic - be clear about timing elicit their thinking about achievable next steps for 1996 to help shape our own and Allied thinking Stress need for progress and caution against backsliding vis-a-vis precepts Keep membership door open for all - e g Ukraine Baltic States Romania and Bulgaria countering Allied inclinations to draw a line at the Visegrad countries - while stressing that all candidates must satisfy the same precepts Be careful not to move ahead in our thinking or rhetoric on NATO expansion beyond the CEE countries’ variable and uncertain state of political maturity With Russia Starting with Christopher-Kozyrev meeting hold increasingly serious frank dialogue about NATO expansion enhanced NATO-Russia relationship including possible Treaty Charter convey assurances about timing of NATO decisions Elicit Russian thinking about next steps in 1996 as our own thinking evolves Insist on end to public charges from Russians As long as Russians do likewise avoid use of challenging public language e g no Russian veto but be carefid not to allow Russians to confuse serious dialogue with right ofjoint decisions or veto With Allies Generate deeper Allied consensus on expansion working bilaterally at high levels when necessary and using the 1995 NAC study Move beyond U S identification with expansion issue Develop Allied thinking about military requirements for potential new members including requirements for aspirant nations Explore militai7 options for NATO integration with first CEEs e g pace of military integration forward deployment resources defense planning militai'y doctrine standardization and command and force structure Ensure progress by spring Ministerial to support interim consultations with Partners vECRET Within Quad In addition to above explore possible “German 2 4 solution” for CEEs e g temporary and or conditional restrictions on deployment of stationed forces on new CEE members’ teiTitory but do not broach these with full Alliance or with Russians prematurely Within OSCE Press our agenda strengthening organization along lines we have suggested Increa se its role and visibility within NIS as well as CEE In study of new “security model” for the 21st century express openness to Russian ideas for putting OSCE on a legal basis and for further streamlining of decision-making resist proposals that would elevate OSCE above NATO With Congress and with U S West European CEE and NIS Publics Greatly increase Administration visibility on issue through op-ed pieces speeches USIS outreach and expand infomiation activities by NATO to match U S efforts Need special focused public information effort on NATO PFP in Russia Maintain consistent message before all audiences II Winter Spring Strategy Objectives at Christopher-Kozyrev Meeting Affirm understanding about public discretion and private openness Explore both sides’ thinking Russia-NATO Treaty Charter principle of parallelism between NATO expansion Russia-NATO relationship and robust U S -Russian bilateral relations Reassure Russians about timing of expansion decisions no expansion in 1995 sensitivity to Russian elections in 1995-96 Reject joint decision-making about NATO expansion Press for eai'ly Russian decision to complete PEP implementation documents and to sign NATO-Russia memorandum of understanding Make clear that development of Russia’s relationship with NATO must evolve in step with expansion process and cannot get out ahead of NATO’s relations with CEE countries perceptions of a U S -Russia condominium would set back the progress we have made with the CEEs and would not be in Moscow’s interest either Suggest willingness at proper time to discuss military aspects of expansion e g understandings about stationed forces nuclear deployments etc but not at this early stage of intra-Alliance study Outline of discussions public outreach 1 Speech by Secretary of State or higher Administration official January Op-ed pieces starting in January and throughout the year 2 Consultations with key Allies Quad and subsequently with other allies January prior to and after Christopher-Kozyrev meeting 3 Christopher-Kozyrev meeting mid-January with follow-up consultations at senior official level over following months 4 Discussions with selected CEEs Uki'aine Baltics beginning in January in Washington and capitals via Embassies and visits in both directions Parallel public outreach efforts with CEE NIS 5 Interagency team to Quad capitals before spring NAC Ministerial 6 Reinforced NAC to prepare for spring Ministerial Maximum Year-end 1995 Objectives Deeper Allied U S public Congressional consensus on expansion on basis of our thinking and the NAC study Realistic CEE Ukrainian Baltic expectations and greater degree of confidence in process Russian understanding if not acceptance of package combining NATO expansion and parallel Russia-NATO relationship More robust and visible PEP following year of exercises Enhanced U S bilateral militai7 programs with partners based on Warsaw Initiative $100M Broad consensus among Allies and as much consensus as possible among CEEs Russia about 1996 next steps e g implementation of study and greater differentiation among Partners DF AV NB NAT0I222 -SECRET