4351 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON D C 20504 June 21 1996 Natl Sec Advisor has seen INFORMATION MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE THROUGH ALEXANDER VERSHBOW FROM JOHN R SCHMIDT SUBJECT Your Meeting with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana June 24 4 00 p iti Solana is making his second visit to the U S since becoming NATO Secretary General He has been doing an outstanding job fully vindicating our decision to support him for the post His presence gives us the opportunity to compare notes on the IFOR mission at its half-way point and to look down the road ahead on NATO enlargement and adaptation in the aftermath of the Berlin ministerial On the look ahead you may want to preview some of the ideas set out in the Troika paper IFOR The IFOR mission continues to progress smoothly as it consolidates its successful accomplishments of the first six months and prepares to support elections in September You should again congratulate Solana on a successful operation and ask him what he believes will be the toughest challenges over the next three months Regarding elections IFOR reports that it is providing substantial support to the OSCE including security logistics staff and communications You should ask Solana what support IFOR will provide to ensure a secure environment during elections IFOR has enhanced its patrols particularly in the area of Pale in an effort to inhibit Karadzic's activities and movement You should ask Solana how the operation is progressing and review our policy regarding IFOR's role in detaining indicted war criminals In addition you should update Solana on our ongoing efforts to pressure Milosevic to remove Karadzic from power ■9EeRE¥ Reason 1 5 d Declassify On 1 6 DECLASSIFIED E 0 13526 Sec 3i b White House Guidelines September IL 2006 BjlOi_NARA DBte_iM ®' Cl ‘I NATO Enlargement Solana has been one of our strongest supporters on NATO enlargement Sensing early on that we would press for a NATO summit in the spring of 1997 he has been traveling through Central and Eastern Europe predicting that NATO would begin accession talks next year with the first group of aspiring members This has served to reassure Poland and the others and taken the heat off of us It has also helped to condition expectations within the Alliance that enlargement will happen according to this timetable You should thank him for his help which has been invaluable While making clear that we have yet to take a formal decision you should tell Solana that we have the sense that the December NAC ministerial should announce the convening of a spring 1997 NATO summit to announce the beginning of accession talks with the first group of new members December won't be the main event but can't be a non-event as the French might wish C You should also suggest to Solana that the run-up to the December NAC will provide us with another opportunity to get discussions going with the Russians on building a NATO-Russia relationship With Yeltsin newly reelected Lebed not opposed and Primakov appearing increasingly disposed to discuss the terms rather than the fact of enlargement the Russians may be more receptive particularly if we raise the issue in the context of a decision by key allies to go forward with a spring 1997 summit You should make clear to Solana that in preparing for a siammit it will be equally important for the Alliance to decide what to do about those aspiring members who are not chosen Among the ideas we are considering to address the continuing security concerns of the Baltic states and others are summit announcements that the first group chosen will not be the last that the next group will be drawn from aspiring members not included in the first and that the phase two process of intensive consultations will be institutionalized as part of PFP We will have to think hard about how to word these decisions to avoid forcing a moment of truth on Baltic NATO membership while also avoiding a tacit write-off of Balticsecurity under Russian pressure L You might want to ask Solana for his views about the likely attitude of other allies regarding a spring 1997 siammit Although the Germans seemed most nervous about this a few months they seem to be mollified by Primakov's changing tack and the prospect of Yeltsin's reelection The French however have recently been giving out negative signals about moving in December to call for a spring 1997 summit At last week's •seeRST 8'BeRE- 3 Permreps Lunch the French Ambassador baldly stated that NATO adaptation would have to come first Our suspicion is that the French would not want to take the heat from the Poles and others for delaying enlargement and simply want to ensure maximum leverage for adaptation Nonetheless it would be interesting to hear what Solana thinks about this while soliciting his continued active support NATO Adaptation Our own view is that NATO enlargement and adaptation implementing CJTF and building an ESDI within NATO should ideally come together at the same moment in time We would like to see both processes finished by a spring 1997 summit so that France could use the occasion to announce it is reentering the integrated military structure under the pretext of joining the new NATO You should try this idea out on Solana to see if he appreciates its political beauty On a more practical level the Berlin agreement on ESDI principles papered over some potentially troubling differences in approach We agreed to the dual-hatting of appropriate personnel from within the NATO command structure to assume specifically European responsibilities but insist that they take their orders from SACEUR and the NAC until and unless they are called on to undertake specific WEU-led missions Even in those circumstances we would insist on continuing NATO monitoring of NATO assets We also agreed that the WEU could make requests to NATO for generic planning on possible WEU-led missions These essentially are the only roles we foresee for the WEU The French on the other hand have shown disturbing signs that they favor a more extensive WEU role vis-a-vis the European defense identity and may even seek a system whereby the WEU has automatic claim on NATO assets Whether these concerns are justified should emerge in the months ahead as the NATO Military Committee tackles the command structure aspects of ESD — he dual-hatting--and NATO political military bodies address the liaison with the WEU You should emphasize to Solana that we did not agree to an ESDI within NATO as a means of building up a separate WEU apparatus This means that the essential WEU role vis-a-vis ESDI will be to request planning and borrow assets While the WEU can exercise day-today political control over WEU-led operations involving NATO assetSj — ith appropriate NATO oversight — j t cannot exercise an intrusive function over the NATO command structure In making these points you should ask Solana whether he sees problems with the French on these issues down the road and if so how he would propose addressing them -SfiORET- seeRE'T Concurrence by Daniel Frie