FL-2017-13804 B-00002623804 UNCLASSIFIED 05 09 2024 AUGUST 23 IV The process and timetable The combination of Secretary Christopher's meeting in Jakarta with Primakov on July 23 and ST's earlier discussions in Moscow with Primakov and Mamedov have established the following basis for a U S -Russian talks in late August • The Russian government understands that the NAC in December will set a Summit in the first half of 1997 at which the heads of state would invite specified countries to begin accession negotiations • Russia understands that the U S is not prepared to negotiate enlargement per se since that is an issue that can and will be decided solely by NATO and applicant-states • However the U S and Russia have a shared interest in making sure that Russia participates in the elaboration of European security arrangements and acquires a role that accords with its potential influence on European and world affairs It will be important to work out a package of understandings between NATO and Russia The goal should be to establish for Russia a clear understanding of the security environment in which 1 FL-2017-13804 B-00002623804 U NC LASS IFl ED 05 09 2024 expansion takes place thus enabling Russia to accept measures aimed at helping some fo their former client states help themselves by joinging NATO and the EU • The U S and Russia will conduct confidential one-plus-one discussions on a framework for the overall structure which should emerge This should include parameters of what each side can and can't accept in the final arrangements between Russia and NATO bottom lines and red lines An important part of our job will be to make sure our red lines stick - and that the Russians' don't cross ours i e trying to label UNACCEPTABLE Ukrainian and Baltic membership • Russia understands that during the one-plus-one talks the U S will consult independently and fully both with its Allies and with other states that have a direct interest in the outcome particularly CEE applicants for NATO membership as well as the Baltics and Ukraine there will be no U S -Russian condominium behind the backs of the Allies or anything that the CEEs can construe as a new Yalta Simultaneously maintaining confidentiality with the Russians and transparency with the others is obviously going to be tricky - but not impossible In a way it's made easier by the next point • Russia reserves the right to conduct its own bilateral discussions with the Europeans 2 FL-2017-13804 B-00002623804 U NC LASS IFl ED 05 09 2024 Primakov The one-pb 1s-one will remain confidential At the same time each of us will talk bilaterally to the Europeans But I promise you that this will not he to work against what we are doing in one-plus-one In act the Russians and particularly Primakov are acutely aware of differences within the Alliance They will be aggressive in trying to play the French and the Germans off against us Primakov is essentially fallowing a two-track strategy on Track I he will continue to look for every possible way of slowing down and ifpossible stopping enlargement on Track II he seems now prepared to get serious about the NATORussia dialogue we have long been pushing for We must convince him that the only meaningful action and the only way he can advance Russia's interests are on Track II It is in the interest of both Russia and the West that progress on Track II not be defined as Russia I s price for allowing NA TO expansion to go forward From a Russian perspective they cannot and probably should not ever want to endorse formally NATO enlargement wha tever concessions they may claim to ha ve extracted For the West the image of Russia holding expansion hostage is unacceptable To do this it is essential that we maintain leadership on the issue In particular we must counter a FrancoGerman desire to have official small-group negotiations with the Russians Such a development would dilute 3 FL-2017-13804 B-00002623804 U NC LASS IFl ED 05 09 2024 our role It would also raise concerns among sma ller allies and the applicants in Central Europe · Our goal will be to ma intain the definition that we and NATO have established -- we want the most cooperative possible security relationship with Russia we want Russia to be integrated in a new sort of European security community we want Russia's voice to be heard in European decision-making councils NATO enlargement and other institutional developments are designed to further this goal • Following up on the Jakarta meeting ST and Mamedov can conduct the next round of discussions starting in late August and working through the autumn with the objective of reporting to the Secretary and Primakov on a framework before the December NAC • Primakov says he will need some sort of visible evidence that the one-plus-one talks are underway before the U S elections Specifically he is asking for a meeting with POTUS in Washington or New York during the UNGA it would produce some carefully co-scripted statements to establish that the process has begun in earnest Primakov needs this he and Mamedov say because they must contend in Moscow with skeptics and opponents who • Chancellor Kohl plans to call Yeltsin on August 26 assuming Yeltsin's health permits 4 FL-2017-13804 B-00002623804 UNCLASSIFIED 05 09 2024 are already accusing Primakov of going soft on NATO enlargement - and who suspect the U S of stringing Russia along about the dialogue until we 're safely past our elections at which point enlargement will accelerate while the U S -Russia dialogue peters out • When the one-plus-one talks yield what Primakov calls a a point of consensus on the framework - a general understanding but without many details in which reside the devils - the issue will move formally to 16-plus-one a discussion between NATO and Russia with the objective of reaching the full package of agreements understandings and arrangements by the time NATO expands What this means exactly - inauguration of the accession talks actual installation of new members some step in between - rema ins to be worked out The Russians appear not to have made up their own minds on this What they're looking for is parallelism if not simultaneity Primakov ' ' esses ·-tlif i it li developill · -Russia relatio ' Qnd t • expansion of NATO '11 ve to run in p allel ·· __ they have t one confine · · · form of • ogether We cannot have • bile the othet takes the com reie trips T'his is imper ti ve • ' $ t - · -_ -· - - ··- - - At the same time they understand there can be no restrictive or conditional linkage between the two processes they cannot slow down enlargement by slowing down the 5 FL-2017-13804 B-00002623804 UNCLASSIFIED 05 09 2024 ''dialogue In fact we may be able to keep them moving along the dialogue track by making clear to them that they 'LL be left in the dust if they drag their feet Parallelism must also mean that the NATO-Russia dialogue can't get ahead of the enlargement process A possible Primakov-POTUS session - and of course a possible POTUS-Yeltsin meeting in the fall - would have to be managed carefully so that it doesn 't look like we and the Russians are doing a deal over the heads of our Allies and the CEEs • Mamedov is hoping we can set ourselves a deadline along the lines of what we've done successfully in CTB and ABM TMD demarcation 6 FL-2017-13804 B-00002623804 UNCLASSIFIED 05 09 2024 The substance Primakov has agreed to an outline for Jakarta that highlights eight areas for exploration in the next phase I • Nukes and Infrastructure As NATO prepares to expand the Russians are looking for agreed predictable limits on nukes and infrastructure so that they can make reliable plans about their own force structure as 0 a -tr ·1 a it r NATO moves closer to their borders 0 real red line for us't if the infrastructure ' t NATO moves toward Rtissia tha t will be unacc ptable it - - ❖ -· - _ _ ' • • •-• · will not be acct p ed '' l 1amedov droppe s veral dark hints thi t unles · Russia· achieve s tjs action on this point l wm ·b r eak · ·- _ ltt ·- - - Jtiftie - · f i out of the CFE tf • ty iud move tactkal nukes· into•·- •·· · - Western Russia '' The Rtissians liafit yet fully to define wlia' 'f they ·mean - · - - - - - - by infrastructure but at least for opene s the tetm js troublesomelycomprehensive it includ J n d ii ion ·-· - - • · - ' t - f - to bases any fa iJ i es that enhance the o1 i t Fl' · · wherewithal of a state such as C31 and at'i -space · - - · • - - control Unless this is a maximalist co g ' 7 ' FL-2017-13804 B-00002623804 UNCLASSIFIED 05 09 2024 talking to Pritnakoy on this subject J -s movemeot ' in Primakov s lhig g he said Not · if · • ·· --- tJi irlg _ - · • • • • • • · '·'i •V near our bordentgiv es us the flexibilityJQ _ openly nd brJ · ot-her subjects ' ' • -• tJ 2 For our part we can't 1 create a two-tier membership in the Alliance with new members disadvantaged or discriminated against 2 tie NATO's hands on future deployments if conditions or the threat change Operationally that means that sooner rather than later we probably need to drive home the point that while we might be able to deal with nukes and stationed forces as part of the eventual understandings there are a number of activities and facilities that cannot be on the table e g the establishment of headquaners and storage sites 8 FL-2017-13804 B-00002623804 UNCLASSIFIED 05 09 2024 the upgrading of airfields and the conduct of exercises on a regular basis • But perhaps we can agree on two mechanisms for meeting Russian concerns I for nukes additional unilateral declarations by NATO or by new members themselves on the stationing of nukes 1 a la the NATO study perhaps accompanied for appearance and reciprocity's sake by some sort of unilateral statement on Russia's part Pritnako'v mirllionea ''the Norway model as one way to deal' i issue · S ' · We must make the most of nvo facts 1 having nukes on your territory has not been is not now a requirement for full membership only half the member-states have them 2 the CEEs ha ve indicated they don 't want them A couple of possibilities one would be for the CEEs themselves to state formally though with protective hedge that they are not requesting stationing of nukes No foreign troops or mikes but full membership We need to be extremely careful in the way we use or talk about the Norway model Norway's - and Denmark's - policies have been an irritant in the past and have aroused concerns about Alliance solidarity it comes dangerously close to violating the no-two-tier principle we don't wam to encourage the idea of there being regular members and Norway-model members 9 FL-2017-13804 B-00002623804 U NC LASS IFl ED 05 09 2024 another would be for NATO to reiterate its position that it doesn't need to put nukes there advantage any construct that under which the new members reject or renounce nukes could impinge on the Alliance's right to deploy nukes if security needs dictate NATO's position as reflected in the enlargement study is based on an assessment of relevant militanJ threats and post-war not Cold War political realities and these decisions will not change with the addition of new members -three or even ten 11ze essential strategic factor is that nuclear weapons deployments are not decided on the amount of territory to defend or a new member's geographic proximihJ to Russia Wiren all U S ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Europe weapons designed to move with an army proximity became a dead issue Aircraft carrying gravity bombs have the range to reach an array of potential targets and do not have to be fonoard-based to the territory of new members • Ukraine - as recently as ST's visit to Kiev July 17 - emphasized in the strongest terms that no-nukes-closer-to-its-borders is a Ukrainian red line the Ukrainian leaders say they have a moral right ' to make this demand since they've given up their own nukes 10 FL-2017-13804 B-00002623804 UNCLASSIFIED 05 09 2024 In short the U S and NATO have confidence that these gravity bombs can reach targets from where they are now deployed and this assessment is not going to change just because new territory becomes a1 1ailable for basing Indeed forward deployed aircraft would be more vulnerable In any case leading edge of the U S nuclear weapons force in defense of Europe remains submarine-launched nuclear missiles which lurue the mnge and accuracy to lzit their target and are far more su rvi'lmble than air-delivered weapons With the above explnnntion as background and some fine tuning the language of the enlargement study should provide both political cover for new members and give tlie Russians the assurances they are seeking 2 For infrastructure something similar unilateral statements by the Alliance and individual states - with parallel pursuit of CFE II or CSBMs that would address military concerns arising from enlargement a CFE II or CFE modernization agreement that would accomodate the military equipment of new NATO rnembe rs and help address Russian concerns We nef l '• existing arms control · t @ ttt f - ' channels to keep yofii i 11Wfai1'·infrastructure from Mamedov IT _- •• · ' Jl l J ·_'' expanding while f igtiiiirig that you will retain all the rights a ud obli g hs under the WashingtQn - § treaty In SALT - • • Wi t iked first about forward based - · 11 FL-2017-13804 B-00002623804 UNCLASSIFIED 05 09 2024 svstems then centraJ i stems We sbould con i iiµe this ethod ' The' CFE and mll i tacnukes with the'· S • ti - jJ tJUnion and no one l Qntplained · ------ - - · r - - ·- - - that it violated NA il A rrgb rlty so ther e s mt 5 011 'rd•· • we can't continu between Russia snpplement J g Jt with unilateral statements by - - ·ftt@i J _ _ - -·- - - _ NATO and Russia of tsja' tements others may make ·-·- ' CFE is not a ready-made instrument for dealing with troops or infrastructure since the treaty currently limits only specified equipment tanks APCs etc Nonetheless in theory a CFE solution may ·work or at least help because the limits would be reciprocal and the CEEs would be part of the negotiations However as their part of the deal the Russians might have to accept tighter flank limits than they just obtained in order to cap NATO in Central Europe II A Seat al a New Table • While continuing to limit their military participation with NATO to PFP and IFOR the Russians are asking for a seat on a political board of directors of some kind that would • If we follow precedent it won't necessarily help The U S with the strong support of its Allies always rejected the legitimacy of including FBS forward-based systems in SALT START 12 B-00002623804 FL-2017-13804 U NC LASS IFl ED 05 09 2024 deal with the major questions of European security as a whole • We have two central objectives that must guide our handling of this Russian desire 1 we want to deepen Russia's integration into European structures in ways that contribute to overall regional security 2 we want to minimize the danger of conflict or division arising out of the decision to enlarge NATO To meet the first objective we need to give Russia appropriate involvement in European security institutions without harming the efficacy of those institutions in the first instance NATO itself We absolutely can't and won't 1 let Russia into the NATO decision-making process 2 subordinate NATO to any other organization It's an open question on both our side and theirs whether there is some kind of institutional or structural fix that suits their needs while staying on the right side of our own red lines The Russians are looking for a body or arrangement that reflects Russia's special role as a major power Among the ideas that they and others have floated with their pros and cons 1 A Quint the Quad Russia Pro • Reflects the real power arrangement in Europe 13 FL-2017-13804 B-00002623804 U NC LASS IFl ED • does not require the assent of others to establish • no formal powers so doesn't undercut NATO • agenda flexible - issues can be added or 05 09 2024 excluded Con • Everybody not in it hates it • undercuts NATO solidarity • smacks of condominium to CEE • may create de facto Russian expectation that all major matters will be cleared by Quint before NATO action • unlike Quad harder to do discreetly the Quad is effective insofar as it operates very quietly and barely visibly - while the Russians are looking for something distinctly visible 2 A permanently institutionalized Contact Group with a broader mandate Pro Con similar to Number 1 except even more offensive to others and formalization will lead to even greater expectation that Quint takes priority over NATO 14 B-00002623804 FL-2017-13804 U NC LASS IFl ED 05 09 2024 3 A European Security Council an inner core of the OSCE There are two versions of this Version A An ESC with real powers either separate or attached to the OSCE on the model of UN Security Council it could act in an emergency act as an executive committee on behalf of the full OSCE on a previously defined set of activities exercise UN charter Chapter 8 authority in approving peacekeeping operations Possible composition permanent members U S Russia UK France and Germany - plus six rotating members drawing from four groups 1 NATO 2 CEE 3 neutrals Nordics 4 NIS Pro • Gives Russia meaningful role • depending on composition e g through both rotating and permanent members would not exclude other Europeans as in the quint • authority could be circumscribed to protect NATO prerogatives Con • weakens OSCE principle of consensus Kozyrev was promoting this idea when he was Foreign Minister 15 FL-2017-13804 • B-00002623804 U NC LASS IFl ED creates two class states in Europe permanent and non-permanent members of council • could encourage the presumption of authority over other organizations especially for peacekeeping peace-enforcement In any event Russia would certainly push for this presumption Version B OSCE Steering Advisory Committee as an adjunct to OSCE Presidency with no greater powers than the current presidency could meet to form recommendations to full OSCE other non-decision making tasks Pro avoids most of the cons of version A still gives Russia special status as permanent member Con less attractive to Russia because no real authority 4 A RUSSIAN IDEA The Eight minus perhaps Japan which would make it The Seven Pro it has a nice ring in some Russian ears especially after Lyon Con • similar to the Quint but not as good a match with real power arrangement for Canada to play a 16 05 09 2024 FL-2017-13804 B-00002623804 U NC LASS IFl ED 05 09 2024 bigger role than Dutch Poles and Ukraine seems incongruous especially now that Canada has withdrawn all forces from Europe • further complicates already confused activities surrounding the G-7 P-8 quasi-institutions • might draw domestic flak during the U S election campaign 5 ANOTHER ENTIRELY AND TRULY BAD RUSSIAN IDEA Letting the Russians attach themselves to the political structure of NATO ala the French model working their way eventually into the military structure over time Pro Gives Russia a real seat at a real table hence offers real integration Con • Russia could use this device to try to jump the queue - or stop others from moving ahead • Could weaken political decision making at NATO given the requirement of consensus • would be viewed as seriously prejudicial by other CEEs e g the Baits because Russia would have veto over subsequent new members and NATO policy 17 FL-2017-13804 B-00002623804 UNCLASSIFIED 05 09 2024 Mamedov hinted during the Washington round that if we can solve the problem of nukes and infrastructure the real security issues as he called them the Russians might be able to live witoout a new institutional arrangement and that they might be able to make do instead with 16 1 and 1 1 i e a dual structure that is utilizes both NATO-Russia and U S -Russia channels along the lines of the way we've de alt with Bosnia and IFOR However by the Moscow round in mid-July both Mamedov and Primakov had hardened up saying that it was quite important to have both a new structure and a better deal in existing ones Primakov At first glance I like the Quint l lamedov My personal preference is for a contbination of the Quii t because it s central to our se urity in terms o Je ision-making and central to adaptatiQn evolurtQi f c_N ATO and a Contact Group on a permanent basis ·After all Bosnia Viii not be 18 FL-2017-13804 sol ved B-00002623804 UNCLASSIFIED 05 09 2024 arlytifu ' J gtfher is ues wjl n I t td dealt with in that t egj 9ijflike Koso vo and inJlj -_ •-_ tt J 1 aren t mJb Qm l- it th CG thei e s ahvayS tbf r g il -· -· · ·•• • --- _· -· - -·-- ---J @tt i t -' ··' r lt ' ·- i - old 16 1 to kee lll u Hlfa py The guiding 11-'· rmfipli' -- - _ - p i f@f ' _ P · t jf --J _ should be 'completn 'e fit rity ' - - t f-i - Since we don't know how important the seat-at-the-table issue will be in the end that could depend in part on how much satisfaction they get on the security issue we should keep exploring possible new structures with the proviso that the Russians understand they will not have any chance whatsoever to exert political guidance over NATO For any version or combination of versions to work the Russians are going to have to get over their habit - rooted in Soviet mentality and mode of operation and much in evidence during the CG's deliberations on Bosnia - of boycotting or threatening to boycott meetings when they don't like the agenda or the convening process Ill A Better Seat at Existiflg Tables At the end of the day the new structure may turn out to be an enhancement of existing ones along the following lines 19 FL-2017-13804 B-00002623804 U NC LASS IFl ED 05 09 2024 1 A meaningful NATO-Russia relationship 16 1 which might include • a charter framework agreement specifying both procedures and subject matter for consultation joint action • joint military activities NATO Russia brigade planning consultations for non-Article V contingencies formally associated Russian military officers with NA TO CJTF headquarters institutionalize IFOR arrangements • participation in armaments related cooperation through NA TO Conference of National Armaments Directors CNAD • cooperation with NATO on theater missile defense 2 An enhanced role for NATO structures like PFP in which Russia participates directly such as • A Pan-Europe PPP Council subsuming perhaps the NACC with responsibility for setting the Partnership agenda and guiding its activities Prirnakov raised this idea in Berlin We should consider pushing this as an area where the Russians could be a real partner - in technological as well as political terms - in dealing with a serious threat to all of us It could also pay dividends in the domestic political debate on enlargement which has yet to be fully joined 20 FL-2017-13804 • B-00002623804 UNCLASSIFIED 05 09 2024 Possible political role in non-Article V actions in which Partners participate • Expanded partnership activities training for peace enforcement placement of partner officers at NATO headquar ters0 3 A strengthened role for other European institution in which Russia is a member notably OSCE IV Russian Eligibility for NATO • As Mamedov predicted Primakov has begun sounding us out on how we would react to Russia's formally declaring itself interested in joining NATO and asking for accession talks Primakov l' ain that if we raise1 l i · question the aris t r •·woold be no TJieii yt9J ps · - t - ··- · won't have it I11 hi M1wst recent to tl lf'si tiori with·Tom Pickerirtg n thi sue Prfuiaii as e ed - - - ' f • -·- f t• _- t - • ❖··· '- - - -___ _- • - --- - - t ' % ' · · · · _ _ that Russia 'woilld'n bt·raise this issue ·- ice F - - - ·• · • No question some Euros would object French and German officials disagree with our position on this They think we should stop kidding ourselves and simply say flat out no way will Russia ever get into NATO The British however have come around on this and in the end Kohl might support us 21 FL-2017-13804 • B-00002623804 U NC LASS IFl ED 05 09 2024 Our response should be consistent with what we've said since '93 - and what POTUS said to Yeltsin in September '94 in Washington 1 Never say never about anyone No PFP state including Russia is precluded from someday entering NATO If Russia were to ask there is no reason we could not usher them down the path others began this year - i e individual country-specific consultations about what NATO means to them 2 The process of identifying prospective new NATO members is self-selecting that is it's up to interested countries to identify themselves we have never indicated that we would pre-designate a PFP state as ineligible By that principle if Russia knocks on the door we should not throw a bolt of some kind and shout through the peep-hole Go away You '11 never get in Rather our reply should be Take a number and a seat in the garden We would then if they wanted start them down the same path of individualized consultations on NATO membership that others began this year That said Russia if it did knock would have to understand that it would not be entering any time soon - and others would be passing it on the threshold Moreover we and the Russians should both recognize that if they were to declare an interest in joining NATO - or even hold open the theoretical possibility of doing so - the 22 FL-2017-13804 B-00002623804 UNCLASSIFIED 05 09 2024 immediate reaction of others will be to suspect them of a cynical and transparent ploy to block expansion Therefore they would have to acknowledge quite publicly at the time of any such statement on their part that their own application would not in any way adversely affect the chances of other states getting in much soon nor would it affect the pace of expansion V The Balts and the Ukrainians • The Russians are saying that they will not negotiate on the issue of Baltic and Ukrainian eventual membership in NATO This has the distinctly ominous implication of a warning to us don' t even dare think about bringing in former Soviet republics · Primakov This is a Special and emotional pt91ilem Iii --_ - - f Jf l - ·- · reality itis not acceptable to us that NATO tisfoperil o it _- everyori fr·• · What if Ch-e chnya were to 0 ap t iil D t r probI oi' ror us todaf t ·tbat'everything-is· gpf4ji i t e - - well between Russia futd tile West · t%f 0 it · J t - - Buf i f 'i ing an issue that could disr _pt or destroy everi -we · r ' '❖- __ _ _- must be 'very very car¢ful ' ·· ' • _ _ • on the record saying·th a t Ukraine-can never fje ijf -_ - ' - · ittt - · · NATo ·1 understand 'f hat theoretically no on f r-··· i - '· • · banned Internally' however' we would s · 1Jl5-'Jiapie J n NATO a agrave thr t'to our national sJ ii I'1 ' P would be sufficient to kill START II On otJI ts like - -1 -·· 23 FL-2017-13804 B-00002623804 UNCLASSIFIED 05 09 2024 Belarus ·iwe just aV htt ·thQught about it 9ygqf '•iQJJt· · 1 - - - - -· - ---- - Ff - _ - ·- - in general dependm to i f JitjW•it's handled · lro ·-· expansion could postnre cperhaps Belorus · th l iji 11 r' i b aqge our o J J · h f rctnm or' ' As long as they are saying we're not going to discuss this issue our reply should be Fine we have no desire or intention to negotiate with you on what is rightly the subject only of negotiations between the Alliance and other sovereign states Just don't think that your refusal to discuss the issue constitutes some sort of veto over the Baits and Ukrainians having the right to enter the process - and don't let your refusal appear to be pressure on them If the nasty implication becomes explicit we should slam back hard in the same way that we have dealt in the past with assertions from Moscow of a sphere of influence or the right to intervene in defense of ethnic Rus·sians • At the same time we should keep telling the Russians that the Baltic States and Ukraine naturally have the same rights as other PPP states - including Russia itself Thus this point and the previous one about Russia's eligibility for NATO are mutually reinforcing Mamedov reacted positively to an outline of our approach to Baltic security which makes clear that the Baits are not precluded from eventual membership He said that a similar 24 FL-2017-13804 B-00002623804 U NC LASS IFl ED 05 09 2024 approach on Ukraine would probably be helpful It is possible that confidence-building measures in the CFE II context could help with concerns about NATO exercises in the Ba tics We may also have to address the Kaliningrad issue which is neuralgic for the Russians and Germans VI Adaptatwn The new and enlarged NATO could include elements that are reassuring to Russia without diminishing NATO's effectiveness or giving Russia a say over the terms of enlargement Useful here will be NATO's internal adaptation including command arrangements and mission definitioru that stress NATO's role as stabilizer rather than military opponent of Russia NATO adaptation is part of the on-going process of moving NA TO away from an organization designed to defend its members against a well-defined i e Soviet threat toward an organization more generally designed to promote regional stability and democratic values which benefit all European Our Baltic strategy has been blessed by principals and we've begun quietly to roll it out to the Baits the Nordics the CEE and the Allies The strategy keeps open the possibility of the Balts' eventually coming in and proposes a variety of measures we along with the EU and the Nordics can take in the meantime to make sure that the Baits don't feel left out in the cold We have a Ukraine strategy which conceptually has a similar approach but which will need to be operationalized 25 FL-2017-13804 B-00002623804 U NC LASS IFl ED 05 09 2024 states members and non-members alike This is apparent both in NATO's mission statement and its military arrangements Among those components of NATO adaptation or what the Russiaru call evolution are the following • further progress a la the New Strategic Concept of Rome • readiness traruparency measures • redesigned command structures designed to promote European visibility and to increase flexibility to respond to non-Article 5 e g peacekeeping contingencies further reinforce the contention that NATO is not directed at any state • CJTF offers an explicit opportunity for Russia to associate with NATO military structures as in Bosnia • adjustments to force structures designed to improve flexibility also reduce the impression of military threat to Russia Further command and force structure changes will be necessary to accommodate new members These can be designed to take into account confidence building vis a In Rome in '91 as part of its acknowledgment that there is no longer a Soviet threat and that the new threats are regional instability and local conflict NATO began to move away from defense along a front toward a concept based on rapid reaction and reserve force 26 FL-2017-13804 B-00002623804 UNCLASSIFIED 05 09 2024 vis Russia as well as other non-members e g Romania Ukraine Mamedov We caritff itifhe problem J pstil t c 1 II I aiplS-c ritrol m uaj§ fF Jhstructur Li n l institutional innoxattiit fi xes We J 1 lrf ni seilif h t o 1 d t tJr itself on--it r Here we must build momentum of our 1 our e xperience and the · 0 oopitili6n in Bosnia - - I'm - - -thinking -- '' ' of very mundane d6 to-earth technical el hients ·· like friend or-foe idJatlr atl n When oqr m tary ' -··· - - ' ' ' forces exercise or cond_ #t operations together i heyif ' ' identify each other a · rie ' not foes That's a big deal Because of Bosnia the idea is developmg··of 'Russia for NATO and NATO for Russia ' We've got · - ' -·· - • to keep that going · Perhaps over time eV n the intelttgence-gath iirtg _ vi1 ·- - r _ mechanisms on t be · WP ides will become transp arent ' 'i· ◊' • • to each other at Ieasf for certain specific P es- One way to lick the infrastfucture problem ove time is to develop an increasing •d egree of romplementarilJ' in - ' our infrastructures -mfdwur mentalities will follow -f · - We should seize every opportunity to dramatize that NATO really is ev l g toward Russia -not the sense that 'the Ameri s are coming The Americans 27 FL-2017-13804 B-00002623804 UNCLASSIFIED 05 09 2024 ltf The metaphor sh l jll lft - your spa i jf doe king with oursY'Jlj ' - king ca11 only a 'j 1 1 ¢ e on ia •• l 'rts the new th itG pl orif 4 structure There is an important role for mil-util and defense contacts o play her Bill Perry in bllilding his personal relation§lji ith Rodionov sh 4I1 Ire able to show the MOD ffliiihrpugh them Leb dJ ' i if t the ------------ -·· - - --- constellation of ada°Jffatldn ' e margment a nd e irutnced NATO-Russia ties will hcJp t he Russian military transfom1 itself m f ni Qer but more discip ined ' - - - force of which they a nd au RU$siaus can Jake some 1 -·- pride • Mamedov is borrowing this metaphor quite wittingly no doubt from the Vice President who has used it several times to descrihe U S -Russian relations in general 28 FL-2017-13804 B-00002623804 UNCLASSIFIED 05 09 2024 ' VU A Treazy The idea keeps coming up of a formal agreement that would give visibility to NATO's non-adversary role Possibilities • A NATO-Russia treaty pact or charter with a formalized consultative mechanism • A Pan European Peace and Security Agreement to be signed contemporaneously with decision on enlargement pledging mutual non-aggression and cooperation • Turning Helsinki now a •·political commitment into a formal treaty • Sergei Rogov has suggested a a non-aggression pact b a mutual cooperation agreement c a mutual security agreement or d a mutual defense treaty as a sort of sliding scale of arrangements What we are talking about here would fall somewhere between band c 29 FL-2017-13804 B-00002623804 UNCLASSIFIED 05 09 2024 The U S has always resisted this idea that the Russians and French have advocated VIII Beyond Europe • Mamedov and Primakov indicated that it will help if in parallel with our NATO project we can develop some cooperative - or at least consultative - joint ventures in other parts of the world One candidate we've discussed is Northeast Asia the U S Russia Japan China and the two Koreas there is already some work going on at the academic NGO level While recognizing that Japan and others will be reserved about this idea we should consider giving the exercise a more official cast by getting our EAP and S P engaged with thefr Russian counterparts perhaps at the DAS level 30