FL-2017-13804 B-00002608427 U NC LASS IFl ED 1 4 2024 Page 88 United States Department of State Spt cial Muldle East Coordinator Washington C 20 520 February 10 1997 Strobe As I said to you at lunch I have begun to think about the problem -- NATO expansion and the Russians -- that you have been grappling with for some time I don't know if what I have to say will be useful to you or not -- or even if what I'm offering will simply be a rehash of what you have already been saying and doing But you know me I've never been shy so there is no point in starting now With my apologies for being presumptious up front give my impressions of the picture I see let me To begin with the Russians for all the reasons you know see NATO expansion through a political psychological and historical lens Unfortunately it tends to confirm the imagery that they lost the Cold War their status as a great powgr is collasping they continue to be humiliated and worse they will face poter1tial tllreats closer to their bor ers Politically Lili give the ultia-nationa±ists a field day -- particularly if there is no effective counter to this imagery You have been working to create such a counter and it is very clear to me that your Russian colleagues are interested in developing it I will say more about how to develop the --- o u u t ei - - ¾ __Y deal below but here it makes sense to note two factors that will shape the substance of what the Russians feel they need First they feel they were snookered at the time of German unification As you noted with me Baker's promises on not extending NATO military presence into what was East Germany were part of a perceived commitment not to expand the Alliance eastward In addition the 1991 promise to begin to tran f orm NATO from a military all1a 1ance ---1'@ S o e Soviet exp a · _ _ or- accep_t _i_n_g__a___un_i_fied Germany ---rri NATO ----- ocray- - -I believe -the Russi ans feel both s es snoula have had more of a binding and precise character As a result they are taking the lessons of 1991 and are trying to apply them now in the negotiations on NATO expansion This J · ·i ' -✓ FL-2017-13804 B-00002608427 U NC LASS IFl ED 1 4 2024 Page 89 -2isn't to say that the Russians about the Wehrmacht in Poland driving them tactically is the much more concrete commitments better off today don't have genuine concerns it is to say that what is s nse that had they pressed for in 1991 they would be far Second they don't want the outcome of this process to highlight their impotence They don't need further humilations Here I would characterize their concerns in the following fashion -- We Russians must not look like we sat on the sidelines as something so fundamental to European security was developed and implemented In reality and appearance we must be part of the process and its solution - -- We must also shape the emerging struc tu-res in order to ensure that either we are embedded in them or at least nothing that could effect our interests can be done without us Partly this results from the need to show that as _ wh n Grom ko said in 1971 nothing can be decided the world without u party this results from the neec f7 oavoid further perceived humiliations like NATO's bombing of Russia's Serbian ally Clearly there are ways to address each of their recognizing that it is one thing to devise a process them a seat at the table and another that gives them We can act on the first and as you have been doing the second is a non-starter Here the Russians must pre fer no deal n e we cannot l i h concerns that gives a veto make clear know we They are suggesting this is there posture -- namely that it is better to live with no deal than a bad one I'm very dubious that this is the case The worst outcome for Yeltsin is NATO enlargement and no Russi an-NATO deal ' _othing l d further demonstrate Russian weakness and irrelev nce The point is we have real leverage but we have to orchestrate the process carefully to take advantage of it If we don't the Russians will exploit the differences among the French the Germans the British Solana and ourselves and they will do so in a way that stretches the process out until at least the Denver Summit If nothing else they may believe that they can ex lo' in D to get us to go beyond our redlines on Russia-NATO deal How do we avoid this First recognize our leverage Second _ h o l_g_ in reserve same of the key substantive t s of our package until we · point Third i_ FL-2017-13804 B-00002608427 U NC LASS IFl ED 1 4 2024 Page 90 -3devise a way to bring the allies together with us so the Russians can't deal with them separately And fourth create a process that permits Yeltsin to show that Russia shaped the outcome Recognize our Leverage As noted above we have considerable leverage The Russians cannot afford to look irrelevant to this process While being willing to make a genuine effort to address Russian needs and sensitivities -- and make clear NATO does not view Russia as an adversary -- it is essential for Yelstin et al to understand they can push us too far They must understand that the effort to produce a NATO-Russian charter could stop even if NATO enlargement will not We don't need to play this with a _ sledgehammer but it is a message that they must clearly perceive V Beyond this we have additional leverage For one thing Yeltsin has a profound need to show he is back in control and that when he is it makes a difference He won't want to look like he retreated in the face of our pressure but he will want to demonstrate how he took charge and fixed things We should approach both the Secretary's and the President's meetings with Yeltsin with this in mind What will also matter to Yeltsin is clearly his international standing From this standpoint the Denver Summit is an opportunity for us not to negotiate the NATO-Russian deal but rather to offer Yeltsin an additional place at the table If we are able to make Yeltsin a formal member of the club -- assuming of course the climate is right we would have another arrow in our quiver In noting that we have leverage and must consider how best to use it I am not saying our task is easy It is not But we must use our leverage to give Yeltsin pause about an approach that could put what he values at risk This will be far more compelling if at the same time he will be able to point to some very positive achievements on Russia's relationship with NATO on security issues and on the US-Russian relationship more generally Hold Some of Our Substantive Package in Reserve In any negotiation we always want to hold the key elements of substance in reserve until it is very clear the point of decision has arrived We are not close to that yet We have presented the elements of the package to the Russians -- 0 FL-2017-13804 B-00002608427 U NC LASS IFl ED 1 4 2024 Page 91 -4something necessary to show them we were serious about addressing their concerns Between the charter consultative mechanism possible joint units the approach to nukes and CFE we have enough on the table Refining though not concluding some of these elements is one thing adding anything more like the revision of the 1991 strategic concept should wait Even the refining should involve some but not all of the elements we have on the table for consideration this too is one of the ways to signal there are limits even while showing our Russian colleagues there are gains l A The Secretary in her meeting should present a more refined package to Yeltsin as a way of showing him what we have done to meet Russian concerns We can't be sure what Yeltsin will know or how he has been briefed so we will want to put a positive step forward But she too will need to present some of the limits and hold back what may yet prove to be necessary sweetners Devising A Way To He Needs Keep The Allies Together Give Yeltsin What This may be one of our hardest yet most necessary challenges No matter how much you and Sandy work with your German French and British counterparts -- not to mention Solana -- I am convinced the Russians hear something differen9n in every conversation and that encourages them to delay It v1 probably misleads them about what is possible and it surely undercuts our leverage That's obvious So what do we do about it Create a mechanism that addresses our needs with the Allies and Yeltsin's need to show he shaped the outcome I was initially negative about a Summit of the Five and I remain so for the time being It must be prepared Therefore I believe a group of the Five or Six if you can rationalize Solana's presence makes sense It should initially be chaired by you Then perhaps by Ministers It has the virtue of folding the British French and Germans in in a way that ma imizes coordination at least when compared to the current situation It gives the Russians the ability to say they are part of a visible process that will shape the future Thus it creates a platform that can give the Russians a way to explain what is going on lr V FL-2017-13804 B-00002608427 U NC LASS IFl ED 1 4 2024 Page 92 -5To be sure some will argue this is a forum where we will be in the minority That's potentially true but our chances to increase responsible behavior of the French in particular goes up in a forum like this In addition we will have a stronger handle on what is being said to the Russians Finally I remain convinced we are at a stage where how what we say to the Russians is as important as fillil we say to them And at the end of the day the platform Yeltsin has for explaining the package will also be as important as the package itself The real question is what is the right sequence for using a group of five mechanism And how does it relate to the Secretary's trip and the President's meeting with Yeltsin I would propose the following sequence -- You work with Mamedov until and into the Secretary's trip -- Privately with Kohl Chirac and Major the Secretary raises the idea of the 5-power approach at your level then hers and finally as a Summit She then raises it with Yeltsin -- You have a meeting of the five prior to the President's meeting with Yeltsin Ultimately the logic behind this approach is that for the time-being process is more important than substance If we are to succeed we must ensure the Russians can't play a waiting game can't pocket the best that we can provide can't easily e ploit fissures among the five and yet can present to their public an unmistakable vehicle for showing Russian needs were addressed and satisfied Dennis A V'