Office of the Secretary of Defense Ch ief RDD ES D WH S Dat 11 APR2024 Authori ty EO 13526 Declass ify Declass ify in Part X Deny' in Full Reason 1 4 a c g MDR I4-M-340 I SECRET NOFORN MR DECLASSIFY X3 copy_ oF - £coP1Es OPPOSITION FORCE SENIOR MENTOR'S OBSERVATIONS OF MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002 12 August 2002 Limits to Red Free Play During Millennium Challenge 2002 That Could lnnuence Evaluation of the Concepts NOTE 1 As the opposition force OpFor senior mentor I reviewed key MC 02 M1-tmcnts ' to gain an understanding of the purposes of the exercise and more importantly the method and metrics by which events were to be judged These key documents contain a variety of tenns sec exerts below identifying the criteria to be used to ascertain the viability of the concepts In the report that follows my subjective evaluations are contained in the remarks in bold at the end of each paragraph I selected a criterion of assess since it appears in three of the six documents and because the JFCOM Experiment Analysis Plan created an assessment team to gather data Personnel representing the OpFor were able to observe the manifestations of Blue Jlr's efforts to implement the JFCOM operational concepts-rapid decisive operations effects based operations and operational net assessment They were not however able to observe the influences of any of the services technical or procedural initiatives AU italics in the exerts below are added • • • • • • The Millennium Challenge MC 02 Exercise Directive states that the purpose of the MC 02 events is to demonstrate and assess the rapid decisive operations concept 1be MC 02 Control Plan notes in paragraph A 2 of the Introduction that the framework and structure provide an approach that frees the experiment to focus on critical events required to assess the concept Appendix A Experiment Description to MC 02 Control Plan states in its first paragraph that 'Toe primary concepts that will be nplored during the experiment are Appendix C «Experimental Objectives to MC 02 Control Plan uses words such as develop demonstrate pr JVide support etc that reflect an orientation on the conduct of the exercise and experiment not desired outcomes related to appraising the concepts '· The JFCOM Experiment Analysis Plan JEAP in paragraph 1 a PuQ ose says it documents the plan for assessing the Joint Field Experiment on Rapid Decisive Operations RDO in 2007 Millennium Challenge 2002 MC02 Paragraph 2 a 2 states that MC02 Experiment success is defined by validation refinemenJ modification and or revision of the RDO concept A transcript of General W F K eman's commander U S Joint Forces Command news briefing of Millennium Challenge 2002 held on 18 July 2002 DECLASSIFY X13 SECRET NOFORN MR 1 SECRET NOFORN MR DECLASSIFY X3 contains the following quote MC '02 is the key to military transformation uy testing concepts to alJow military commanders to make better decisions and leveraging our information superiority MC '02 helps support the DOD's key transformation goals NOTE 2 In the role of Major General-commander Red JTFSouth I details of my intentions and plans hidden from Ambassador who was playing the role of the Government of Red's Supreme Lea er My suspicion that Ambassador-was not revealing his real intentions to me was confinned at the conclusion of the exercise when I had the oppommity to read his aide memoire in which he revealed his objectives I had no access to Blue JlF information during the course of the keRman JS 1 4 a g i xercise All connections to JECG or Blue data sources were removed from my computer Those modeling and simulation work stations that I used to follow the movement and status of my units had filters to strip off Blue ground truth Finally I did not monitor any closed circuit television broadcasts that concerned JECG or Blue matters I developed my world view by listening to World News Network WNN P ireadin transcripts of broadcasts and from discussions with Ambassador situational awareness of operational matters throu I maintained briefings that included captured screen shots from the Red JTF-South air naval and ground workstations and by visits to my air land and sea commanders in their respective test bay cells Before start of exercise Exercise design 1 During the development of MC 02 OpFor personnel were required to provide detailed supporting information for all desired Red capabilities-the standan l for acceptance appeared high Thus Red JTF-South had available only those technical capabilities that could reasonably expected to be available in Moreover some of these capabilities such as a laser guided off-set sysiciji - w e r e not properly modeled therefore the assets that they were to xample SA-20s were more wlnerable to attacks by precision guided munitions PGMs Conversely Blue bad available P'rnc includin two DD21 land attack destroyers two SSGNs high-speed vessels an Advanced Deploya y m acoustic surveillance system Standard Missile-3 Bloclc lB SM-3 Blk 1B Theater Hi Altitude Area Defense • L• missiles and an airborne laser ABL neon u The ADS is repo a a Warfare Development Command concept with no 'Pl roved mission needs statement or operational requirement document -SM-3 Block 1B missiles DECLASSIFY Xl3 SECRET NOFORN MR 2 SECRET NOFORN MR DECLASSIFY X3 The fidelity of the exercise was too low to determine the impact such disparities might have had on the ability to assess the concept with two exc ptions both involving theater ballistic missile defease TBMD The first exception concerns the destrucdoo of 12 Red JTF-Soutb theater ballistic missiles between 1101Z and 1114Z on 27 July 2002 The modeling and simulation showed that Blue s t TB s four of them b THAAD see attachment 1 • JS l 4 a g The second exception concerns the use of Blue TBMD-capable standard missiles SM The SM-2 is not capable of engaging TBMs A cancelled program-the SM-2 Block 4A-would have been capable of engaging TBMs The SM-3 Block 1B will be capable of engaging TBMs however u noted above it will not be until 2008 that the first 50 missiles will be available Nonetheless the Blue JTF fired 68 - • n d 49 durin the coune of the e 1ercise 67 more tJ an availabh even if the is on hand a year earlier than planned See attachmen Absolutely no conclusions should be drawn from the succen of Blue theater ballistic mbsile dtjense in MC-02 In a higher resolution exercise all of the diaparities noted above would have a simificapt effect on an assessment of the concepts 2 At the start of MC 02 the night shift was declared to be non-experimental Non-experimental was defined as Red Forces will not initiate any significant offensive actions except in response to Blue actions at night 2100-0900 local The rules for conducting operations during this period were revised twice early in the exercise see paragraph 5 below under After start of exercise aercise play The reported rationale from the JECG was that there were insufficient Blue service response cell personnel and pucksters to support 24-hour operations The inability to conduct a realutic level of opendons aroand the cloek constrained the ability of Red JTF-Soutb to stress the concepa in order DECLASSIFY X13 SECRET NOFORN MR 3 SECRET NOFORN MR DECLASSIFY X3 to fully assess them This limitation will have a significant impact on the ne i of • J c J _ ul simulation models were tied to actual real-world systems which hindered the ability of Red JTF-South to employ its capabilities in a realistic manner As an exam le thus Red theater ballistic missiles windows 1100-1300 and 1900had to be notified in advance so After the exercise began a similar JS l 4 a g to exist with the time phased force deployment TPFD system-see paragraph I below under exercise play These restrictions su tantially constrained the ability of Red JTF-South to plan and opente as an adaptive thinking enemy in order to present Blue with situations that would allow assessment of the concepts This constraint will have a significant impact on the assessment of the concepts 4 Much of Red ITT-South's infrastructure was modeled however Blue and neutral infrastructures were not As a consequence evaluation of Red JTF-South actions against these infrastructures had to be done manually with lower resolution This deficiency had a nominal impact on Red JTF-Soutb's efforts to stress the concepts and will have only a minor influence on the assessment 5 World media play was not structured to allow for rcprcscntation of truly independent reporters thus Blue government policies and Blue military plans and actions were not openly questioned or challenged Consequently Blue roleplayers were not forced to consider the impact their actions might have had with the American or world public WNN was not representative of a World-wide view It was heavily biased towards Blue reporting There was little reporting of Red other than unconfirmed sources Little if any news came from other regional or international sources This deficiency had only a minor impact on Red n'F-Soutb's efforts to stTess the concepts and will have only a minor influence on the assessment of the concepu 6 Blue issued a demarche dated 20 July 2007 to the Government of Red on the afternoon of 23 July prior to commencemen ercisc and arrival of its Supreme Leader role-played by Ambassador- A copy was provided to commander JTF-South who responded on 24 July It was not clear why this one Blue diplomatic action occurred outside of the exercise window The contents of this document caused Red JTF-South to immediately focus on a military tlareat and away from Blue efforts in the diplomatic informational and economic arenas This early event will influence the assessment of the concepts only if' Blue intended at this point in the exercise to use other elements of naUonal power against Red JTF-SOutb See para1r9ph 1 of Part 2 of this report for additional darifyiag details However if Blue's plan was to use other elements of national power tbe influence wW be simiflcaat 1 DECLASSIFY Xl3 SECRET NOFORN MR 4 SECRET NOFORN MR DECLASSIFY X3 v JS l 4 a g 1 The Blue TPFD forces were allowed to flow unimpeded that is no Red JTFSouth actions could be implemented that would hinder or slow deployment between Spiral 3 and the start of MC-02 The JECG's rationale was that the effects tasking order ETO would not be able to be adjusted by the Blue JlF during the interval therefore the desire of the JECG was to commence the exerdse with the ETO unchanged As a result the Blue CVBG ARG MCM TF and advance elements of Blue army and air force units were in the Gulf at the start of MC-02 Owing this same period several Red JTF-South supported terrorists actions were to be carried out as part of the Red JTF-South anti-access strategy mines in the d the firing of missiles at US ships from unidentified merchant ships at the southern exit of t h e - These actions were not permitted by the JECG This time jump prevented Red JTF-soutb from implementing its full range of strategic anti-access capabilities-capabilities that would have challenged the concepts and aided in their assessment The impact on assessment of the concepts will be moderate 2 On the first and second day of the exercise the Government of Red and the Red JTF-South political leadership were restrained from aggressively pursuing an ambiguity strategy designed to make unclear the relationship between the Supreme Leader and commander Red JlF-South JECG's rationale was that Blue interagency resources were not robust enough to handle the problem and the primary interagcncy personnel on the distributed net had other real world responsibilities that precluded their working this issue full-time The restriction on Red JTF-South 's ability to exercise one of its tkne strategic approaches-ambiguity the othen being anti-access and asymmetry--1 t the start of the exercise lessened the coherence of the overall strategy More importantly this constraint will prevent a comprehensive assessment of the diplomatic elements of the concepts The effect on the assessment will be sipifigot 3 WNN reports were not updated between Spiral 3 and start of MC-02 making it difficult for the Government of Red and Red JTF-South role-players to gain situational awareness of the international situation and public diplomacy This deficiency prejudiced the tint several days of the exercise since role-playen were unable to place their political and military decnions into a larger context thereby negating a comprehensive auessmeat of concepts during this period The impact on and usessment will be modente After start of exercise Exercise design 1 The initial MC-02 brief stated that Blue would not be part of a coalition Soon after the start of the exercise Blue was depicted as a member of a Gulf Partnership DECLASSIFY Xl3 SECRET NOFORN MR 5 SECRET NOFORN MR DECLASSIFY X3 Policy Council JECG's explanation was that a ''partnership ' is not a coalition From Red HF-South's perspective the effect however was the same Red JTFSouth intelligence identified British Australian and Canadian warships wilh the c navai task force which gave further evidence of a Blue led coalition l'Ihis variation from the expected scenario served as a distracter to Red JTFSouth but will have only a minor impact on the overall assessment of the concepts 2 JS l 4 a g A su ect matter expert SME judged S were major combatants and 4 were amphibious ships JECG adjudication determined only 4 Blue ships were destroyed none o which were ma or combatants or a hlblous sh · s However a subsequent examination of the systems revealed that because of previo-1 unrecognized modeling and simulation federation limitations Blue's issiles were not able to shoot down air-launched enemy missiles W1 this information the SME re-evaluated the results removing all air launched missile hlts and determined one less ship would have been lost the cruiser Antietam SHIP NAME 00A FUU V OPERATIONAL AOE 00A DESTI OVED AOE 00A CWMOEZS% DESTROYED P 1 5 CG 00A MWMUN DESTROYED AOE Mtlatam ADJUDICA110# CG CG CVN DOG DECLASSIFY X13 SECRET NOFORN MR 6 SECRET NOFORN MR DEC ASSIFY X3 OEST 00A FUUY OPERATIONAL OEST OOA FUUY OPERATIONAL OOA FUUY OPERATIONAL FUUY OPERATIONAL FUUY OPERATIONAL FUUY OPERATIONAL DAMAGE PO KTS WD Tarawa AR Boxer OX Cleveland CLE Cantlnat MHC--51 CAR ASL-T-AGOS20 NUMBER OF ROUNDS BY TYPE TOTAL NUMBER OFH1TS LPO I I EST I • 1--rnll o OEST Destroyed o Missile warhead weights • OOA FO 00A OOA FUUY OPERATIONAL DAMAGE P 15 KTS FULLY OPERATIONAL 00A FULLY OPERATIONAL 00A FULLY OPERATIONAL OOA NOT MENTIONED 00A NOT MEtfllONEO 00A 00A OESlROYED DESlROYED TABLE 1 OOA - Out of Action Surface-to-surface • • JS l 4 a g • • o • Air-to- • • • The Digital Collection Analysis and Review System DCARS collects fuses and delivers data from simulations C4J systems and live systems Jts purpose is to provide near real-time availability of dau from target systems and 1SU1lysis tDob to compare and or analyu them o Results shown under the SME'' column above we e determined by a retired Navy officer wi1h 30 year9 surface warfare experience including command of the Afloat Training Group Pacific where sailors are taught damage control and fire fighting The number of ships the JECG adjudicated destroyed or damaged was a reengineered product that is the numbers were based on the minimal ships needed to enable Blue JTF to continue the exercise Thia siuable imbalance between the results of the modelinc and 1imulatio111 and the JECG adjudication continued DECLASSIFY X13 SECRET NOFORN MR 7 SECRET NOFORN MR DECLASSIFY X3 l ' OU ho t the exercise and included air and land forces as well There will be a • -'± • -·· • iifferences between an assessment of the concepts using the modeling and simulations results and an assessment using those of the JECG Exercise play 1 r early all regional states were depicted on day two of the exercise as politically supporting Blue military actions manifestations being the signatures of leaders from six regional states on the Gulf Partnership Policy Council Declaration to Red JTF South and the granting of over flight and air and sea basing rights to Blue forces Visible diplomatic actions by Blue did not seem to support this almost overnight flip in orientation by states throughout region This early set of polipcal relationships negated the possibility of any Red-Blue diplomatic Interaction at a critical time in the exercise The impact on tbe assessment of concepts is judged to be moderate OSD l 4 a g JS l 4 a g 2 The master scenario events list MSEL contained an event #12468 depicting the shooting down of one Blue CRAF aircraft by terrorists This event was requested by OpFor for 27 July but was not approved by the JECG The reason provided was that the Blue ITF TPFD was being processed on a computer that had limited memory available due to real world operations therefore the TPFD run could not be stopped or changed A similar MSEL event #15161 depicted the shooting down of one Blue KC-10 This event was requested by OpFor for 28 July but was not approved b the JECG and therefore could concentrate its attention on other planning issues This situation will have a moderate to significant influence on the ability to fully assess the concepts 3 No Blue information operations 10 as examples psychological operations or public diplomacy were apparent to Red JTF-South during the course of the exercise except on 1 August The messages on that date however were not very sophisticated or likely to persuade an enemy The first message PO #001 below was for a radio broadcast The second message PO #003 below was for a leaflet drop and radio broadcast DECLASSIFY Xl3 SECRET NOFORN MR 8 SECRET NOFORN MR DECLASSIFY X3 PO # 001 US has no territorial ambitions in the region US military is acting in response to potential actions by hostile force against territorial sovereignty of Green and interference w freedom of navigation PO# 003 Violence against US will be met with oveiwhelming force US forces will take all necessary actions to protect all GCC and US interests encourage desertions On 5 August radios were dropped to Red JTF-South forces on the islands but no IO message was provided to give a sense of actions or behaviors Blue desired The almost complete lack of Blue information operations as observed from the Government of Red and Red JTF-South perspectives will significantly reduce the ability to assess the concepts 4 Blue did not appear to be cognizant of Red diplomatic and information activities prior to hostilities As an example no acknowledgement of Red JTF-South's responses to the Blue demarche and Gulf Partnership declaration responses that contained offers to find a regional solution to the problems that require sea mines See paragraph 1 of Part 2 of this report for additional clarifying details The almost complete lack of Blue diplomatic actions as observed from the JTF-South perspective unless Blue conducted no such actions will significantlv reduce the ability to assess the concepts 5 On 28 July rules for the non-experimental shift 2100-0900 were changed to the following JECGOPFORSCNTRL msg 28 July 02 5 17 PM a Land Can and will reposition All forces will accept combat Will not initiate major combat b Sea No red movement Any red reposition movement will be at risk No sub attacks at night If detect blue movement may engage not supposed to happen since BLUE is not going to move c Air May reposition in country May conduct night CAPs no offensive operations Flights out over BLUE will be at risk they must assume is offensive action NOTE Wonder ffiat will happen with a WHITE airliner at nightm ALL TIMES Allowed to engage UAVs and aircraft over territory May have too many exceptions for ONE U AV per day-- prior coordination Right of self defense is not abrogated DECLASSIFY Xl3 SECRET NOFORN MR 9 SECRET NOFORN MR DECLASSIFY X3 These rules were changed yet again on 29 July as follows ECGOPFORSRCNTL 29 July 02 3 40 AM a Land Both Red and Blue can reposition Red forces will not initiate combat but Blue may Red will defend itself if attacked b Sea Both Red and Blue can reposition Any Red or Blue repositioning will be at risk Red will not initiate attacks unless Blue ships repositioning come in range Red will not stalk Blue Ships or reposition so that Blue Ships at rest come in range Red will defend itself if attacked c Air Red Air can reposition in country Red may conduct night DC A but not OCA Flights out over BLUE will be at risk Red ADA will fire at Blue aircraft that come in range Three changes of rules in as many days confused some participants and gave an advantage to Blue in certain circumstances for example red forces will not initiate combat but blue may Results of Blue-Red JTF-South intenctions during the non-experimental shift are unclear and should not be used to evaluate the concepts These several changes of rules diverted Red JTFSouth staff's attention from exercise play on 28 and 29 July to some degree This diversion will have only a minip1al impact on the ability to assess the concepts 6 On 29 July the Exercise Director began providing Red JTF-South commander's guidance on operational matters directly to the Forces and Simulation Branch Chief role playing the OpFor chief of staff supplanting that of the designated OpFor commander senior mentor playing commander Red JTF-South The rationale offered was that Blue had not set conditions for conducting forcible entry operations therefore disposition of Red JTF-South forces in the models bad to be adjusted to allow for the exercise to continue and to match up with live events As a result from this date forward in the exercise the Blue force was no longer facing a thinking and adaptive enemy commander in the person of the senior mentor For the remainder of the exercise high-level battlefield conditions in the models and simulations were set by guidance from the Exercise Director and the Blue senior mentor not by the operational or tactical decisions of the OpFor senior mentor or results obtained from the modeling outcomes of Blue and Red JTF-South actions Examples of the type of instructions that were given subsequently in order to drive the exercise arc shown below JECGOPFORSCNTRL msg 29 July 02 4 10 PM Following guidance bas been provided to OPFOR Sim units by OPFOR Senior Control DECLASSIFY XI 3 SECRET NOFORN MR 10 SECRET NOFORN MR DECLASSIFY X3 already dead 3 remaining launchers arc illuminating at this time 2 of 3 remaining TELARs are illuminating 4 SA20 6 TEL unit at Newport Beach is nonilluminating does have an acq radar contrary to previous 5 TEL unit at Ajo is illuminating 5 Hawks all dead 6 CDCMs CSSC-3 8 and C802 16 illuminating THIS MAY BE OVERKILL NEED CORRIDOR SO THAT WE CAN REFINE 7 Grd forces In def psns practicing c-attack plans have not been attrited 8 Mines They're out there I I SAS 2 SA6 3 SAl sic Phase 1 of this process is to illuminate and absorb expected BLUE strikes to set conditions from I 400Z-0300Z Phase 2 of this process is to tum 'cm off if Phase I docs not work this surgical process begins at 03002 and ends by 05002 And JECGOPFORSRCNTL msg 29 July 02 8 32 PM As you know have been working most of the day to 'set conditions so that JTF can proceed since they are up against a real world event which drives the suns We are aligning numbers on the objectives in order to set force ratios for NTC and for the STOM objective no change in troop disposition TASKS ahead I Deconflict the abn flight route with sim IADS that are still active Looks like -we will have to tum off AJO other ADS 'WefC hit this date but Ajo remains active and appears to be close to the route 2 Determine the STOM route s and determine threat to them especially from CDCM We will be prepared to provide a corridor but probably no change to any ground troops dispositions 3 Intent is to provide ROE for the night's fight which should be normal combat ROE with some exceptions by system DECLASSIFY X13 SECRET NOFORN MR 11 SECRET NOFORN MR DECLASSIFY X3 Still waiting on all pieces tilis decision not veste ir COLs Contractors will confirm with BG Smith and will get word to you as soon as possible As the exercise progressed the interactions including outcomes between Red JTP-South forces and the Blue JTF were increasingly scripted Most of these interactions were built backward from some JECG desired conclusion Attachment 4 provides examples of both detailed and outline scripting Tbe results of Red-Blue interactions post-29 July need to be considered in light of the fact that the Blue JTF commander did not operate against a thinking and adaptive enemy who could win Not having a thinking and adaptive enemy operating against the Blue JTF will have a very significant impact on the aHessment of the concepts 7 On 29 July the Opfor commander senior mentor role-playing commander Red JTF-South indicated his intention to employ chemical weapons sarin nerve agent the next day if Blue JTF forces invaded the mainland of southern Red He was precluded from doing so by the Exercise Director with tbe explanation that this action did not match the persona or mind set created for M G lbe persona the OpFor senior mentor employed was that developedbythcl-9 World Class Adversary which clearly included a mind set to use chemical weapons if Blue attacked JTF-South 's mainland with und forces OSD l 4 g JS l 4 a g DECLASSIFY Xl 3 SECRET NOFORN MR 12 SECRET NOFORN MR DECLASSIFY X3 0 1 August another request to use chemical weapons was made by the Forces ' il11U1ation Branch Chief acting as Opfor commander-see paragraph 6 above but the request was denied with the explanation that this was a secret exercise and Blue would have to use a code word-level response which couldn't be done On 3 August OpFor was informed that control of the location of Red JTF-South chemical weapons was being assumed by the Blue senior mentor The inability of the Red JTF-South commander to employ chemical weapons greatly restricted his ability to asymmetrically confront the Blue forces As noted above asymmetry was one the three basic approaches of ed JTF-South 's strategic plan This limitation will significantly hamper the ability to assess the concepts against an enemy employing asymmetries 8 A Blue Joint Special Operations Task Force JSOTF operation against the Black Star terrorist organization and the Gulf Fishing Company was planned and briefed early in the exercise It was discussed at length by the Blue JTF commander during the after action review AAR on 1 August and touted as an indication of the viability of operational net assessment ONA in planning for a coup d'main without large forces Unfortunately th is proposed operation was not based on information contained in the ONA data base but on infonnation provided directly to the Blue JTF staff by the SOF cell in the JECG After further coordination with the Opfor this operation was later reversed-engineered to tie it to the ONA data base A second raid was likewise constructed to enable culmination of the scenario by attacking the enemy commander and the chief of the Black Star terrorist organiution Scripting was used to further develop the intelligence for the needed parties to assemble at one location where Blue could attack them H either of these opentiom is considered in the assessment of the concepts without recognition of the imposed artificialities it will have a significant impact and reflect negatively on the credibility of the results 9 On 5 August as the Blue JTF was attempting to destroy individual WME chemical warhead cache sites the ITF Commander decided to attack the one remainin site b usin aerial bombs in order to avoid further friendly casualties JS l 4 a g Therefore the JECO adjudica1ed there were no casualties an that the weapons had 100% effect on the wget The scenario before adjudication indicates a fallure to do proper effects-to-task analysis u well as abiding by the ROE Though this event will have minimal ability on assessing the concepea it does reflect a weakness in the utility or application of the ONA DECLASSIFY X13 SECRET NOFORN MR 13 SECRET NOFORN MR DECLASSIFY X3 10 0 5 August the JECG advised OpFor that during planning for the assault on the 10ur aisputed islands in the SOH the Blue JfF determined it would be unable to generate favorable force ratios against the remaining Red forces defending the • In order to focus planning for the Blue JTF the JECG directed the OpF or to script a surrender of forces on two of the islands so that the Blue JTF would only have to plan and execute an attack against the remaining two This JECG action and other similar scripting indicate one of three possibilities One from the outset the design of the exercise was flawed in that Red JTF-South forces were too large or too capable in comparison to those of JTF Blue Two that the ONA was unable to provide the information needed for the Blue JTF to focus its combat power in a manner that would have overcome Red JTF-South forces earlier in the exercise Three that the modeling and simulation system was not able to properly adjudicate Red JTF-South-Blue JTF intenctions leaving Red with more forces at this point in the exercise than would have actually been available This one action will have moderate impact on assessfog the concepts However the cumulative effects of the JECG's scripting will have a very significant impact on the assessment 11 When it became apparent m i d - t_he exercise that the Blue JTF was directly targeting Major G e n e r a l e OpFor placed his location in the model -simulations commencmg on I August Blue JTF was unable to locate n the models with its intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities thus his location was scripted daily from 5 August until his preplanned demise on 9 August as a result of a Blue joint special operations As noted in paragraph 10 above relyinc on scripted events to assess the concepts including this one will have a very significant impact In fact it is difficult to see bow any scripted event could be used to assess the concepts JS l 4 a g Reel JTF-Soutb's Perceptions of Blue Actions 1 Several Blue actions as observed by Red JTF-South were inexplicable in that they seemed to separate Blue diplomatic informational and military efforts counter to the coherent application of the elements of national power supposedly inherent in effects based optrations a Diplomatic Throughout the exercise all diplomatic overtures and cease-fire by the commander JTF-South or his intermediary e r e rebuffed Offers by the Government of Red to broker the removal of Red ITT-South forces from the islands were also refused Discussions between Blue and Red ITF-South I I I - o f any of these proposals may have I u e d For exercise purposes negotiations could not have DECLASSIFY Xl3 SECRET NOFORN MR 14 SECRET NOFORN MR DECLASSIFY X3 been allowed to succeed however not allowing discussions to even 1 01nmence made it clear that this was to be a pure military exercise What remains unclear is why Blue made no attempt to negotiate with Red ITF · · th if for no other reason than to cloak its real intentions Moreover hostilities brought about the widespread destruction of infrastructure in southern Red which would have severely hampered earthquake recovery efforts bringing condemnation from governments around the world This devastation would have also adversely impacted on any discussions between Blue and the Government of Red b Infonnational From Red JTF-South' s position there were virtually no Blue or Blue JTF informational activities that had any impact JECG personnel indicated after the conclusion of exercise play that there were numerous Blue information operations but for some reason the products were never transmitted to OpFor Several examples of deficiencies in Blue's use or JECG·s handling of information operations are noted below • The Blue JTF seemed unable to create a viable Red-focused psychological or media public affairs campaign The very few psychological leaflet drops and Commando Solo radio broadcasts seen or heard by OpFor players contained material with a simple and unsophisticated story line the Red ITF-South's leadership is illegitimate all Red JTF-South forces should surrender or die Given the improved economy in the south brought on by M G policies it is doubtful these psychological messages w o u much to undermine his popularity JS l 4 a g • The daily Blue press briefings served merely as a vehicle to put forth the Blue JTF's perception of the war Tough questions from the most adversarial international press role-players were met with vague answers or answers that were clearly of a party line variety and often facrually inaccurate This treattnent of the media culminated with the two international press member role-players who were openly sympathetic to Red JTF-South being excluded from future press conferences The idea of a Blue public affairs officer banning a legitimate Voice of the Gulf reporter because she was a 'thorn in bis side' and barring the entry of another is unsupportable If this were a real-world situation the international media and the entire Arab world would have reacted negatively towards Blue's'actions The Blue ITF commander would have been aGCUSCd of throwing out a guest In the Arab view the press representative should have been treated the same as a protected guest in a Bedouin tent The Bedouin would defend the guest with all the power at bis disposal This is the yardstick that this incident would be judged against This incident might have stalled tal1cs with the Government of Red DECLASSIFY X13 SECRET NOFORN MR 15 SECRET NOFORN MR DECLASSIFY X3 • Also affecting the information operations aspect of the exercise were Blue's kinetic attacks on all media nodes in the southern region Blue JTF's concern that commercial radio and television stations were carrying coded military messages caused Blue to physically destroy alJ three stations This would have unquestionably produced a negative impact on the Blue JTF's feedback and on the transition efforts following military operations c Military Since Major General-commander Red JTF-South saw nothing except a desire on t h e go to war and • • • • JS l 4 a g • • • • understanding that the United States had publicly and repeatedly announced since as far back as June 2002 that it would employ a military policy of preemption recognizing the inherent dangers in Blue's concept of rapid decisive operations to any nation that allows Blue to initiate military operations having observed Blue position major forces inside the Gulf during late June and early July 2007 having read a demarche dated 20 July 2007 to the Government of Red stating that United States Military forces will use all necessary means available to conduct operations in the absence of anned conflict in the land territory territorial waters and airspace of the disputed islands and the JTF-S AOR to prevent or stop JTF-S from with a list of specific actions being the recipient of a Declaration of the Gulf Partnership dated 25 July 2007 that mandated JTF-South comply with eight specific provisions by 1000 EDT 27 July 2007 from his perspective this appeared to be Blue ITF's H-hour and D-day having tried unsuccessfully on two occasions to open discussions with Blue representatives having noted no Blue reaction to an air rehearsal on 26 July where approximately tw rthirds the number of aircmft as planned for his preemptive combined arms attacks flew staying over land and monitoring the movement of a second Blue amphibious ready group ARO through the straits early on the morning of27 July saw no option except ro strike Blue f nt' These observations raise the following questions • If Blue intended to attack Red JTF-South regardless of any diplomatic gmnbi t s made by MG Y did it issue such provocative docwnents as the demar eclaration which ''telegraphed'' the time Blue military actions might begin DECLASSIFY Xl3 SECRET NOFORN MR 16 SECRET NOFORN MR DECLASSIFY X3 • • • If Blue was employing all the elements o na ·onal fwcr why did it not open any channels for dialogue ·with MG Why did Blue lead with military actions ra er information operations that might have helped set favorable operational and tactical conditions Why did Blue's operational net assessment not recognize that Red JTF-South had been developing the ability to law ch coordinated air sea and missile strike Note the following extract from PMESII Military Special Assessment 11 June- 23 July Summary dated 15 July 2002 Indications of multi-airplane over•water operations continue but at a slower rate with fewer aircraft It is assessed that these indications are consistent with the maritime training oriented towards achieving a near simultaneous time an-top for surface•to•surface and air-to-surface weapons on an US high value unit Italics added From the commander Red JTF Soutb'1 viewpoint there was little evidence of the employment of effecu-bued operations during the exercise Only the application of military power was apparent J OSD l 4 a g JS l 4 a g 1 From a Red JTF•South standpoint many Blue actions gave the impression that they were not the result of an operational net assessment because of the undesirable second and third order effects that resulted Examples are described below a The Blue J T i l i t a r y transport aircraft along a route that passed over a n the night of 30 July but was concerned • ost stgniti mtly e ue e damage assessment apparently had not determined that all of the SA- 20s hod been destroyed l'n attacks conducted prior to 30 July meaning that the effects desired had already been achieved • DECLASSIFY X13 SECRET NOFORN MR 17 SECRET NOFORN MR DECLASSIFY X3 • OSD l 4 a c g JS l 4 a g innocent civilians died when a secondorder effect denied them medical care and a plausible Red information operation created conditions for an unintended third-order effect when Blue redirected ISR systems at a critical period in combat operations b Red JTF-South employed a command and control methodology specifically designed to thwart Blue JTF technological advantages that had been made evident from 1990 to 2007 Blue's ability to intercept electronic communications by a variety of means includin satellites was well known Red leadershi realized that thus were used only for tactical messages that were time sensitive or for administrative traffic Use of cell phones and satellite communications was discouraged for all except the most routine traffic and even that was encoded Emphasis was placed on mission-type orders and long-time personal associations that allowed for an implicit understanding between key personnel Couriers were relied u n for the most sensitive mess es m ·tt an ps practiced operating re ar y un er emission control Activities that would be expected to produce radio traffic such as aircraft taxing for takeoff used substitute -means for example flashing lights from the towers Major General often said that 'he wanted to be in command of his forces but he also wanted them to operate out of any direct control In command and our of conrror was his philosophy Information on this unique Red ITT-South approach to countering known Blue advantages in the area of command and control countermeasures was contained in the ONA data base and was highlighted in scripted material developed during the course of the exercise However throughout the exercise the Blue ITF appeared to DECLASSIFY Xl3 SECRET NOFORN MR 18 SECRET NOFORN MR DECLASSIFY X3 rely on its well recognized technical countermeasures As an example personnel from the JECG intelligence scripting cell used the Distributed 1W Constructive Environment DICE model to determine the effects of Blue JTF attacks on Red JTF-South 's communications systems There was an ingrained belief that when certain nodes of that system were destroyed Red J1F-Soutb would automatically resort to other communications means-cell phones and satellite communications-that were subject t o ter tion · Only after detailed briefings on Major General approach to command and control did the JECG fall o the Blue mirror im · of Red JTF-South's ca abilities 0 OSD 1 4 a g JS l 4 a g The Blue JTF attack on Red JTF-SOutb was wide spread and destructiveairfields seaports tnmportation systems communkations troop units etc It did not appear to be an attack against key links and nodes 2 From Red JTF-South's position Blue JTF's attack was not rapid nor was it decisive After the introduction of flexible deterrent option FOO forces Blue required another 23 days 12 July-3 August to move sufficient forces into theater and to commence offensive actions At the end of hostilities Red ITFSouth still retained its control of the southern Red mainland 3 Terrorist groups were used by OpFor in a number of ways to challenge the concepts First the groups had objectives and goals which though generally similar were also in many ways different from those of the commander Red JTF-South and from each other This was meant to cause Blue to see the adversary as non-cohesive that is the destruction of the war-making capacity of Red ITF-South would not have a direct influence on the groups Second the terrorists provided an asymmetric means to attack Blue's access into the region without providing a direct excuse to attack Red JTF-South forces The terrorists were to be a rear area threat that Blue bad to consider while attempting at the same time to militarily subdue the primary actor cornroaodcr Red JTF-South Third the terrorist groups afforded a plausible means to attack Blue's deployment system even in the Blue homeland The terror cells employed three main methods to accomplish these objectives Political terror such as kidnapping or assassinating key leaders against the regional governments that had sanctioned Blue presence through approval of basing and over flight rights This was seen as a way to punish these regimes for complicity and to coerce them into not cooperating with Blue further Direct action against Blue's logistic centers in the region was meant to draw off DECLASSIFY Xl3 SECRET NOFORN MR 19 SECRET NOFORN MR DECLASSIFY X3 combat units for security and to impact Blue's ability to operate unfettered in us rear area Direct actacks against Blue 's deployrue r t system by shooting d 'li transport aircraft and interdiction of the sea transportation links as designed to slow and disrupt the flow and thus throw JTFperational deployment timelines JS l 4 a g Most of the terrorist actions bad no measunble effect on JTF-Blne due to a lack of adjudication by the JECG The actions to interdict strategic deployment were delayed by the JECG until the effect on Blue forces levels and sustainment were manageable None of the outcomes of the dired attack in theater were faithfully modeled so JTF-Blue operational tempo was not impaired Part3 Assessment of Red JTF-South's Three-Element Strategy 1 Ambiguity There were many facets to the Red JTF South's approach to making the political and military situations ambiguous in the eyes of Blue Primary among these was to cloud the true relationship between the Red Supreme Leader and the commander Red JTF-South At the outset of MC-02 the JECG ordained that the relationship between the two leaders be made unambiguous and that the Red JTF-South clearly be seen as a rogue This direction was reversed two days later by the Exercise Director It was not evident that the Blue JTF ever recognized the ambiguity of the association and the effect it would have on his military operations The second element of ambiguity was the non-cohesiveness of the adversary Beyond Red and Red JTF-South there were the terrorists the pirates and the Gulf Fishing Company all with their own objectives The relationships between these various entities were made as opaque and confusing as possible The situation Blue JTF faced in this scenario seemed to stress the concepts 2 Anti-Access Red JTF-South's anti-access approach consisted of terrorists and conventional attacks on deploying Blue assets in the seventeen day window between Spiral 3 and the start of the exercise terrorists attacks on key leaders throughout the region to dissuade support of Blue attacks on Blue aircraft and ships in the TPFD flow a combined arms surface air and missile attack on Blue forces in the Gulf air defenses against the airborne drop and the air-landed Stryker Brigade and use of chemical' weapons if Blue JTF forces invaded the mainland This element of the three-part strategy appemed to work very well even thougb many of Red JTF-Soutb's anti-access capabilities were not allowed to be played by the JECG 3 Asymmetry OpFor had a nmnbcr of asymmetric capabilities The most significant was Red JTF-South's chemical weapons When the Exercise Director prohibited their use it eased considerably the Blue JlF's operational DECLASSIFY X13 SECRET NOFORN MR 20 SECRET NOFORN MR DECLASSIFY X3 and tactical problems though it was not clear from an OpFor viewpoint her or not the Blue JTF commander knew this These Veapons did however provide Red JTF-South valuable bait which was used repeatedly raw Blue JTF forces into unfavorable fights with well positioned Red JTF South forces The terrorists were another asymmetric capability however they were only allowed to play against countries in the region outside the Blue JTF joint operations area JOA OpFor saw no indications in the Blue media MSEL events or in deliberate Blue planning that the 13 successful and 4 unsuccessful terrorist attacks in the region were recognized or had any significant impact Of the 9 successful terrorist attacks carried out against targets in the Blue JTF JOA OpFor saw no Blue response except a special operations attack against one individual See attachment 5 for details Other a symmetric assets used by the OpFor were small boats the fishing fleet pirates mini-submarines and captured freighters These had minimal effects Conclusions From my observations the MC-02 scenario was scripted to a Blue JTF rapid and decisive conclusion The Blue JTF did not arrive at that end-state by engaging a thinking and adaptive enemy The exercise was not allowed to play out through properly modeled and adjudicated interactions The result was preordained from at least 31 July see various e-mails at attachment 6 The supposed benefits of effects-based operations and operational net assessment were not made evident during the course of the exercise MC-02 can only be presented as a training exercise that perhaps aided in the further development of some of the procedures and techniques that support these concepts In my judgment any suggestion otherwise is not credible As noted at the outset of this report the OpFor was not able to observe the influences of service technical or procedural initiatives employed in MC-02 Paul K Van Riper Senior Mentor Opposition Force Millennium Challenge 2002 DECLASSIFY X13 SECRET NOFORN MR 21