- ·-- - - '·' · - SECRET UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION WASHINGTON c c 20545 Tr ill do - ro nt C 'l- u i lll APR 2 1 1966 No __J__ of of J 1L Copies pagea Sarl1s1 1 _A _ Mr John T Conway Executive Director Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Congress of the United States Dear Mr Conway Attached is a report of the April l966 inspection visit to the Dimona reactor site in Israel The sensitivities of the Israeli Goyernment to the occurrence of these visits prompts the requirement that the ini'ormation thereon and even the fact that the visit took place be given limited dissemination as Secret Defense Information The basic conclusion of the team is that although there is a bare possibility that the reactor may have been operated to produce about 3 kilograms of plutonium since the time of the last visit in January 1965 the most probable conclusion is that the reactor was operating as a research reactor it had experienced some difficulties in its initial operation but is being used for• rather exotic physics experiments at the present time Further the team concluded that there is no evidence of any nuclear weapons research and development work being conducted at the Dimona site Declassified Case· NW# 38431 Date· 02-15 2@1 Enclosure Trip Report NOT REIL£A-SABL-6 TO 'l'HE PUBLIC WITHOUT FURT-HER REVli W SY c e -4RTMENT OF EJl P GY OFF IC E QF Cl ll$£1F lC TION AUTHO TY IOC - l 'C BY R E O't F t N Q 9 I · v - GROUP I Tll s material contains infonnaHori effecting Hit EXCLUDED FBOM AUTOMA' rIC natior r l cfcnse o the U iited Slates ithin the meanln i of tile e r ion3 e law fil e 18 U S C DOV NGRADIHG AND DECLASSIFICATION SECRET NW# 38431 DIS RIBUIION LIMITED Docid 31971043 Seer i l3 2nd 7S4 the trn icmiss1c- n or revelation • of whicll in ar y m3nnor to 1111 unauthorized panull l a prol ilJitad bV llW t l I • ' r- I ' ------------------ ---- ' 'o 0 ' 0 SECRET This document·consists of 18 pages N o of 30 copies Series April 13 1966 PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE VISIT TO ATOMIC ENERGY SITES IN ISRAEL MARCH 31 TO APRIL 4 1966 This material contains information affecting the national defense of the US within the meaning of the espionage laws Title 18 USC Secs 793 and 794 the transmiss on or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION T RELEASAl31 1 TO THE P °a1 tc wlTliOUT FUR SECRET NW# 38431 Docid 31971043 REVIEW BY DE PARTM OF E N•ERGY OFFtC5 OF CLASSl-f'lCATION 'l'TY· oOS •DPC AUTHO • 11ft l3Y R E o'GRIEJ'f DA 8 Gl J 6 ' tJ 1 fj 7 0 0 ·sECRE The following preliminary report has been prepared by the threeman team which visited Israel from the evening of March 31 to the morning of April 4 1966 The information which follows does not represent all that was learned nor is it intended to present completely checked information The observations result from visits to Weizmann Institute Nahal Sorek Dimona the phosphate strip mines southeast of Arad and from discussions with the responsible Israeli staff members and individual researchers at each site We were given complete access to facilities and information all questions were answered frankly and without hesitation I CONCLUSIONS 1 Before presenting summary information let us first state our unanimous conclusion that there was no evidence that Israel is or intends to produce nuclear weapons materials in the facilities which we have seen The one repeating member on the team thinks that there is more evidence to support this conclusion this year than last to wit a The Dimona site has been opened to research personnel from Weizmann programs are tied by objectives as well as personnel to Weizmann and Nahal Sorek Some research projects at Dimona are supported via Weizmann and Nahal Sorek with funds from various agencies of the US Government b Tb ere is no chemical reprocessing capability at Di mona no facilities have been built nor are they planned according to our conferees There is no hot analytical capability equal to a reprocessing plant requirement c The waste disposal tanks will not be used for the storage of liquid wastes and have not yet been used for hot material because of fear of spread of radioactive material by bombing or sabotage executed by the United Arab Republic d There is no capability in installed equipment for producing Pu metal in any appreciable quantity Research on the Pu supplied by the French 150 gm in 1963 is of a very basic NW# 38431 Docid 31971043 0 0 nature not of particular value a$ development for production of Pu metal for weapons parts Metal production capability is at the very small scale of 25 gm batches e The irradiation of the uranium fuel in Dimona although not yet above an average irradiation of approximately 433 megawatt days per tonne of uranium MWD MTU will be carried to as high a burnup as possible to all observable evidence Their irrad- iation objectives of at least 1200 MWD MTU probably 1500 MWD MTU preferably 3000 MWD MTU will not produce Pu that is particularly useful for nuclear weapons f The reactor has not been pushed to completion and full power operation at its design power of 26 MWT with any urgency During the 15 months since the last visit the fuel exposure has been increased only from an average irradiation level of 211 MWD MTU on January 28 1965 to 433 MWD MTU on March 29 1966 Of this accumulation 100 MWD MTU was accumulated by March 1 1965 which ended the period of acceptance test at power prescribed by the contract with the French During one full year after March 1 1965 the reactor operated for a total of 739 MWD reactor plant factor of 7 8% for test and personnel training at 2 MWT to 8 MWT Much time was consumed by repairs and alterations g There is no evidence that diversion of the uranium inventory at Dimona occurred The team accounted for all of the uranium at the Dimona site both by examination of what were almost surely the original records and by partial piece count The records showed that 40 96 tonnes of uranium had been received in canned slugs l7 56 tonnes and uranium hydroxide concentrate 20 40 tonnes from France and 3 0 tonnes of domestic concentrate from the Haifa pilot plant By now all uranium is either in slug or metal ingot form visual check as accurate as possible in a short time leads us to believe the fuel inventory check of the Israeli records We visited almost all buildings on the site 11 that we asked to see by random - 2· NW# 38431 Doc td 31971043 I 0 -' 0 SECRET selection and observed no additional uranium h French technicians approximately 25 in number at the time of the 1965 visit ·were at the Dimona site in decreasing numbers 11 until the end of the year 11 i e 1965 Their presence on the site with their intimate knowledge of all facilities mitigates against diversion or deviation from the pattern which we observed i The removal of Dr Mannes Pratt as Director of Dimona because of stated dissent in the scientific ranks and his urgent replacement with Mr Joseph Tulipman indicates that mounting confusion existed Further the budget April 1 1966 - April 1 1967 for Dimona at $10 000 000 includes possibly about $5 000 000 for a research program which to our view is fundamental in character j The chemical plant for converting uranium concentrates to metal is again shut down after a period of operation which ended in November 1965 The metal slug manufacturing plant operates now at only about 10 per cent of capacity to improve yield and for the production of developmental fuel 2 There is the possibility that the team may have been deliberately deceived but it is believed that this is unlikely However prudence suggests that we list the following reservations a We have no knowledge of the existence of other sites for a reactor or chemical plant but neither are we in a position to determine whether such exist It is important that intelli- gence sources maintain a constant surveillance of the entire country to determine whether such a plant or plants exist or are being built In this connection the disposition or shipment of the irradiated fuel discharged from the reactor should be determined as conclusively as possible see item II 6 b We could learn nothing about the 80-100 tonnes of uranium concentrate purchased from Argentina - 3 - SECRET - - NW# 38431 Docid 31971043 Although we are • 0 0 SECRET convinced that this uranium has not been delivered to the Dimona site and that the personnel ther·e including the new manager Mr Tulipman know nothing about it it could be a supply of uranium that has been or could in the future be run through the reactor between our visits and not be detected so long as the indicated reactor utilization is low 3 As a result of the above consideration we should possibly be concerned if after another year has elapsed the reactor continues to have a low operating efficiency If this is the case next year the survey team should demand very concrete evidence to explain its failure to operate at design power II SUMMA RY OF POLICY DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 1 The Israelis are very concerned about the possibility of a UAR preventive strike against their atomic energy establishments particularly Dimona This is because Nasser in a recent speech asserted that something should be done to destroy Israel's nuclear weapons potential 2 Dr Amos De-Shalit Prime Minister's representative for this visit suggested that Israel would agree to have open inspection by multinational teams or established agencies such as EURATOM or NATO who have no tie with the UAR 3 They will not agree to IAFA inspection because they are convinced that information developed by IAEA inspectors would be available to the UAR from the file in Vienna even though inspecting teams had no UAR members Further it is Israeli opinion apparently that safeguards inspections require the filing of sufficiently detailed plans and operating data to be useful to the UAR in case of war or for sabotage This should be checked in detail with IAFA 4 The security forces around Dimona now include two military posts plus triple fences one of which is maintained at lethal voltage 5 Because of their concern about the immediate possibility of a preventive strike on Dimona the Israelis are requesting that - 4 - NW# 38431 Doc rd 31971043 • 0 t SEer·-··jl 0 t' the French arrange to take the 23 fuel assemblies 113 slugs as soon as possible This is to remove readily dispersible radioactive fuel from the easily destroyed cooling canal in the Dimona reactor building 6 De-Shalit will discuss with the Prime Minister the possibility of the US witnessing the loading and shipment of radioactive fuel to France The agreement of the French may be required Possibly after preliminary discussions between the United States and Israel and the French if required to reach tentative agreement Israel might formally offer to allow US representatives or perhaps a multilateral team of Israeli designation to witness fuel shipment This possibility should be pursued very soon through diplomatic channels informally in the opinion of the team 7 There is increased concern about maintaining secrecy concerning this year's visit to Dimona De-Shalit said that the Israelis think that Nasser's reference to destruction of Israel's nuclear capability came as a result of the leak that occurred following our team's visit in 1965 8 De-Shalit was not aware of the circumstances which led to the US confirmation of the 1965 visit During the 1966 team visit he was informed of the involvement of Eban in a conversation with John Finney which resulted in a direct call to a member of the 1965 visiting team 9 It is the team's opinion that Israel wants to establish an op€n inspection of their nuclear facilities including Dimona The Israelis are aware of the advantages to be gained by the removal of suspicion which surrounds their nuclear program according to De-Shalit that an open inspection which does not at the Sall1 e time give detailed information concerning their sites to the UAR will serve to reduce the potential of a UAR preventive strike It should be noted that this suggestion for open inspection comes - 5 - SECRET NW# 38431 Docid 31971043 0 0 s·ecRET I ••• only from De-Shalit without-a statement that he had been asked by the Prime Minister to open such a discussion therefore it could be that it is only De-Shalit's idea and not that of the Government of Israel 10 We suggest that there may be a new or possibly heretofore unrecognized possibility to place Israel's nuclear program under a multilateral surveillance and that this should be explored as soon as possible III FACTS AND OBSERVATIONS 1 The team was received in the same manner as in the past with pas sibly even more attention given than last year to the maintenance of secrecy Dr Amos De-Shalit was asked by the Prime Minister to be our host and met us at the airport with Mr Samuel Shmuel Avi-ad Ministry of Defense who was our constant escort 2 We visited these sites and saw the following principals during our stay Time Thursday Mar 31 Friday Apr 1 Site 10 30 p m 9 30 a m 2 30 p m 10 00 p m Saturday Apr 2 Sunday Apr 3 Docid 31971043 De-Shalit Avi-ad Weizmann Institute De-Shalit Dr Shnior Liffson Dir Dr Ebriam Kachowski Biochemist Nahal Sorek Dr Shimon Yiftah Dir Site Mr Pelah Dir Reactor Div Party at private home Dimona 8 00 a m Helicopter to Arad 6 45 p m - 6 - NW# 38431 Airport 8 00 a m 10 15 a m Principals Mr Joseph Tulipman Dir Dimona Eddie Strickler Mgr Desalting Proj under Gen Tsur Mr Adar Engr for Reactor of Proposed Desalting Project Mr Joseph Tulipman and Dimona staff Mr Levi Engr for Proposed Phosphate Works Oron Mr Barnoy Geol and Mining Engr Helicopter to Jerusalem ·o 0 SECRET Time Site Principals 5 30 P M Hotel Accadia Winfred du Clerq Actg US Science Attache 6 15 P M Casbah Dinner meeting with Tulipman De-Shalit Restaurant 10 30 - Car Discussion Team Member A wi tp De-Shalit Hotel Accadia du Clerq 11 15 P M 11 30 P M Nahal Sorek 3 Yiftah at Nahal Sorek is the AEC representative on the Joint Desalination Committee He reports that the remarks of Perez Deputy Minister recently concerning the desirability of seeking other suppliers o'f reactor-desalting combinations has some sound basis since natural uranium reactors as built by Canada or proposed by Britain may be best for Israel We understand that there have been contacts between the Israelis and Canada and the UK concerning the possible use of their reactors for desalting 4 The AMF-built swimming-pool reactor at Nahal Sorek has operated satisfactorily for the last 15 months at about 2 to 2 5 Mw Fuel will be returned to the United States next year they are thinking of trying to increase reprocessing batch size to reduce processing charges by combining fuel with a country like Denmark Sweden or Norway This is very probably the source of a rumor that Israel was negotiating ·with Norway for processing at the Kjeller pilot plant which is not capable of reprocessing Israeli fuel 5 The radioisotope production cell block and radioisotope laboratories seen last year in an early state of construction are nearing completion Two cells each approximately 14' x 14' x 14' to 16 1 high containing a track-mounted 1 2 ton chain hoist and shielded by four feet of normal concrete _1000 to 10 000 curies - T - SECRET i NW# 38431 Docid 31971043 0 '• 0 are as yet unequipped The buildi-ri' g rnd cells will be used to produce short-lived target produced radioisotopes for immediate use in research and medi ine in Israel a requirement now being met using equipment housed in temporary wooden buildings at Nahal Sorek No long-lived fission products will be isolated here The cells are large enough for a very small radiochemical separation plant really of no consequence if for natural uranium This obviously is not the intended use however 6 A new chemistry building for general nuclear chemistry is being constructed but will not be finished for another year 7 The site employs about 500 people and is about at equilibrium size It is open to all research use in Israel and has many visiting foreigners who come for training and research They have research contracts with National Institutes of Health Wright-Patterson Air Force Base EURA TOM They are also working with NUMEC in the evaluation of industrial isotope utilization 8 Their large 30 000 curie cobalt source is being used for studies on nitric acid production via radiation and extensively for food sterilization and insect control research Dimona 9 The 26-Mw reactor has operated only for training or has been shut down for most of the past 15 months The MWD MTU accumulation is reported herein for the period from January 1 1965 through March 30 1966 The total megawatt days per tonne of uranium accumulated on the first core was 433 MWD tonne averaged across the whole core of 10 835 slugs in 167 fuel elements On January 30 1966 33 fuel elements were discharged from the center zone of the reactor at an average burnup of 530 MWD MTU and a peak burnup of 800 MWD MTU 11 Dr Thieburger - physicist for the reactor has drawn up a discharge plan which divides the reactor into roughly five annular zones - -·a' NW# 38431 Docid 31971043 0 • 0 within which flux is roughly the same The reactor will be dis- charged in batches of about 30 to 35 fuel elements each as the metallurgically safe burnup level is reached The visual examina- tion of fuel irradiated to 650 MWD MTU peak has revealed no distortion The 800 MWD MTU peak slugs will be examined in several months The next batch probably will run to 1000 MWD MTU and each successive batch may be increased to obtain maximum fuel exposure This plan of exposing to the highest possible burnup within metallurgical limits will make Pu less acceptable for weapons use 12 The 33 fuel rods plus two discharged prior to our 1965 visit and one discharged on July 22 1965 total 36 fuel rods 180 slugs were all in evidence in the fuel storage ponds No Slugs a Thirteen full rods were unassembled in the racks------------------------------ 65 Cerenkov radiation was observed assuring that these were active elements b Twenty-three elements had been disassembled before our count Counted in slug storage had Cerenkov radiation c ll3 178 Two slugs had been sent to metallurgical examination---------------------- 2 180 13 The total uranium balance across the plant is as follows Slugs Input From France 1963 1200 From France 3 65 678 Subtotal 1878 From France 12 63 PCRltt DocI d 31971043 17 56 10 0 - 9 - NW# 38431 Metric Tonnes U ' 0 0 SEC-Kfl · • Metric Tonnes U Comments 10 4 From France 3 65 · Haifa 1963 1 4 Haifa 1965 1 6 40 96 Balance REACTOR BUILDING In reactor 835 7 81 In pool 178 891 good 1 66 8 32 Stored reactor bldg Reactor at 26 MWT Counted Not observed 7 rejects 0 07 URANIUM METAL BUILDING #3 Stored Ingots Stored Slag Observed 8 64 108 1 12 II Stored Ingots 1 68 Counted Small pieces to complete 0 14 Observed Scraps 0 35 II Material in the line 1 85 II Fabricated Slugs good 4 40 Counted Fabricated Slugs rejects 1 77 PROCESS BUILDING #5 Not observed 0 04 4 HOT LABS COLD LABS WASTE 0 50 1 48 11 II n LOSSES 1 15 II II 40 98 TOTAL 14 tt France supplied additional metal slugs as indicated The total of 20 4 tonnes of concentrate from France probably came as one shipment but was delivered from some other storage area to Dimona at two different times 15 No one at Dimona nor any of the others in attendance know or ------------------------ -- professes to know of the whereabouts of the 80 to 100 tonnes of _________ --- Argentine concentrate ----------- Tulipman knows nothing and acted as though it was the first time he had heard of it when asked - 10 - NW# 38431 Doc td 31971043 0 ' 0 16 As a consequence of our review of records and charts and a partial count coupled with a lift test of uranium in the plant we are confident that we know where all of the uranium in the Dimona plant is located and that there has been no diversion We walked through most of the storage spaces and shop buildings on the site selected at random and detected no evidence of other stocks of uranium 17 Chemical reprocessing facilities do not exist on the Dimona ___ site and according to Mr Tulipman there are no plans to build such facilities The team inspected the room in the Filtration and Decontamination Building earlier designated as a possible location for a 1-kg -per-day reprocessing pilot plant The room is used for storage of contained phase air filters and other supplies The room is approximately 20 feet wide by 40 feet long and possibly 18 feet high - too small to enclose hot cells of any consequence 18 There is no analytical chemical capability in the Hot Laboratory building of sufficient scale and shielding to provide support for a chemical reprocessing plant 19 In the Pu wing of the Hot Laboratory building there is no area or equipment devoted to the purification of Pu and its reduction to metal other than a small glove boxed system for producing 20 to 25 gm metal buttons used in fundamental research on plutonium metallurgy 20 The total quantity of Pu available for research is 150 gm about 50 gm are in use the remainder in storage This Pu was supplied to Israel by France as reported last year 21 The low level waste evaporator has not yet been used for radioactive ·waste solutions from the plant During the year rela- tively poorly conducted tracer level experiments ·were run to determine decontamination factors available from the evaporator --11 - · NW# 38431 Docid 31971043 ' 0 ·secpr I 0 They have observed factors of 105 this year As reported last year the evaporator is shielded by only 18 inches of normal concrete not satisfactory for the concentration of high level wastes from a chemical processing plant 22 The three buried waste tanks have not been used 12 meters earth cover and will not be used for liquid waste storage Tulipman because of fear of sabotage or bombing that would spread radioactive material 23 Tulipman says that Dimona wastes will be stored only in solid form and buried These low-level wastes reduced to concentrated form will be incorporated in concrete unlikely or asphalt The facilities to do this have yet to be conceived designed and built 24 A new burial ground and a small solid waste disposal building are being constructed 25 A new dormitory is being constructed near the main gate ultimately for the purpose of housing visiting scientists but probably to be occupied initially by army security forces assigned to protect Dimona The library and dormitory shown on the earlier site plan between the hotel and cold lab has not been built yet but will be undertaken during the next year 26 There are no foreigners at the Dimona site The last of the French technicians left at the end of the year 27 Tnere are 1200 people em ployed at the Dimona site of ·which 150 are engineers and scientists 28 We visited the Instrument Shop the Maintenance and General Shop the Main Stores Building and looked into the three small auxiliary storage sheds 29 A railroad now in construction will soon reach the town of Dimona probably will not be extended to the reactor site It will be extended to the Arad phosphate mines and the presently operating - 12 - NW# 38431 DocI d 31971043 0 0 mine and beneficiation prant at Oron 30 The chemical cycle in Building 3 Metal Conversion Building operated this year to convert 10 4 tonnes of concentrate from France and 1 6 tonnes of concentrate from Haifa to metal ingots All of the concentrates now available to Dimona have been converted to metal ingots or canned slugs and the plant is not operating It has been shut down since November-1965 Some special metal reduction for a new experimental chromium-uranium alloy is done in very small quantities Lavi still in charge There is sand on the floors and some of the mechanical equipment is unlubricated and rusting 31 The Fuel Fabrication Plant operated to produce enough slugs for at least one additional core of Israeli-manufactured fuel and sufficient metal for two additional core loadings The plant continued to operate at about 10 per cent capacity to improve manufacturing techniques Arad Site of Proposed Phosphate Plant 32 We were flown by army helicopter from Tel Aviv to Arad on Sunday morning We were met by Mr Levi process engineer for the pro- posed 165 000-tonne P205 plant and Mr Barnoy geologist and mining engineer both of whom were present last year We landed on a level site in the middle guarded for our protection by a hurriedly-moved-in army squad of the intended site of the phosphate plant Construction of the plant has not been started and ·will not be until urgently needed foreign capital can be raised Mr Levi is not aware that a uranium circuit is planned for the plant but Tulipman who was and may still be in charge of plans for phosphate production told us that a uranium recovery circuit would eventually be included even though the necessary process is not yet developed - 13 - Jhf CT - _- _ _ NW# 38431 Docid 31971043 •• • 0 0 IV PERSONNEL AND POLITICAL OBSERVATIONS 1 Dr Bergmann has resigned his resignation has been accepted as of June 1 1966 Replacement a Dr Dostrousky - as Secretary General a new post reporting to Eban from Dr Amos De-Shalit Weizmann b Another from water project - name not caught or remembered from Joseph Tulipman Manager of Dimona site 2 Joseph Tulipman new Director of Dimona replacing Dr Mannes Pratt former Deputy Director of Department of Economic Planning recently returned from 6-week course at Harvard Advanced Business for Executives in charge of planning for phosphate development coppe mines petroleillll replaced Pratt in January 1966 after many of scientific staff at Dimona had left or threatened to leave Dr Mannes Pratt is completely out of atomic energy program may receive a new post in the Ministry of Economic Development or may become a private consultant 3 Concern about secrecy - as anticipated the Israelis are ve'Xy ·con - cerned about a possible leak which again might draw Nasser's attention to the reactor Shmuel Avi-ad our escort from the Ministry of Defense replacing Moshe Gilboa who is on assignment for Youth Corps activities in London first expressed their official concern De-Shalit on our last evening Sunday after I P O symphony orchestra concert drove one member of team to hotel along to explain and discuss this point During this discussion it was quite obvious that De-Shalit was not familiar with the circwnstances leading to the US confirmation of the visit of January 1965 De-Shalit knew nothing of the John Finney situation on TV and subsequent comment by Eban further was not aware that the confirmation was not intentional on the part of the United States and that it came as a result of a series of penetrating questicnsfrom Finney which - 14 - · 1FcRr 1r NW# 38431 Docid 31971043 • •• 1 0 0 were touched off by comments ··by EQan after a TV appearance 4 Dr Amos De-Shalit - Physicist at Weizmann former head of Department of Nuclear Physics former member of Israeli AEC under Bergrnam and one who resigned with other AEC members several years ago - from du Clerq a De-Shalit says that it is his opinion that his government has long recognized that it cannot develop weapons to the displeasure of either US Jews who contribute heavily to Israel's support or more particularly the US Government b Further he observes that Israel is greatly concerned that Nasser has personally stated in recent speeches that the Israeli bomb threat must be stopped and the Jews annihilated this quote should be checked The Israelis fear that there may be an unannounced large strike at Dimona a new army base exists there and the US Acting Science Attache says that he thinks some of the HAWK missiles recently obtained by Israel are located in the vicinity Previously other Arab leaders have made such threats not Nasser The Israeli Government thinks that the leak and US confirmation may have touched off this recent strong Nasser statement c The Israelis will not agree to IAEA inspection 0£ the Dimon a and other sites because of their certainty that the information obtained by inspectors selected from any country would become available to the Arab bloc from De-Shalit Such information which must include capacity potential sources of uranium and even experimental programs can be used against Israel even if only for adverse propaganda used to stir the Arab league cou tries with potent bomb-scare stories d However De-Shalit stated that Israel is willing to have another multilaterial agency which does not have any tie to UAR countries such as EURATOM NATO or others inspect regularly Israel's - 15 - SECREl NW# 38431 DocI d 31971043 -4- 0 nuclear facilities 0 This should be explored fully soon It will not do for openers to try to negotiate with the Israelis on accepting IAEA inspection because they will not accept such negotiation may break off discussions that could lead to a much more satisfactory arrangement than the present unstable annualized bilateral inspection with all of its potential for embarrassing both parties and containing the certainty of its own termination via a situation that will cause reciprocating bitterness e As a personal opinion De-Shalit said that he thought that Israel will gain materially by such open inspection both to reduce the effect of UAR criticism and to diminish the world suspicion of Israel f The team thinks that the United States might gain by shedding its role of secret surveyor of Israeli facilities Other countries particularly the UAR would be more convinced by known and possibly advertised inspections by an agency or group of nations rather than the United States 5 The Israelis are so concerned about the possibility that either bombs may be dropped on or placed in the reactor storage pool at Dimona that they are making arrangements to ship the irradiated fuel elements stored in the reactor canal to France as soon as the French can arrange for carriers Thirty-three full assemblies from the hottest of five zones in the reactor were discharged on February 1 1966 6 At the suggestion of the US team De-Shalit agreed that it might be possible to have the United States possibly multilateral witness the loading of this fuel for shipment to France He will discuss this possibility with the Prime Minister on April 4 1966 French concurrence may be required - 16 - NW# 38431 DocI d 31971043 0 0 The team further suggested that this be implemented by an offer by Israel rather than a request from the United States If such an offer is to be made preliminary considerations as to requirements for witnessing this and subsequent fuel shipments should be formulated Some preliminary discussions are desirable with Israel and after these with Israeli agreement joint discussions with France if necessary - 17 - NW# 38431 Docid 31971043