DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washlneton o c 20520 January · 11 1975 SECRE NODIS MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT THE WHITE HOUSE Subject Issues Paper on Panama Attached is an Issues Paper on the Panama Negotiations for use in the Secretary's oral briefing of the President • l 1 r· DECLASSfAB E 0 12959 SEC 3 5 STATE DEPT GUIDELINES BY f1 r i n g s teen Executive Secretary SECR E'l'fNODIS NAM DAlE J 1 111 o 0 XGPS-3 PHOTOCOPY FROM GERALD FORD LIBRAR · DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washln iton 0 C 20 20 • S C UT NODIS I t• t 1 • ISSUES PAPB OR THE PRESIDENT PANAMA NEGOTIATION ROADMAP With a treaty in sight it is opportune to assure that tb e President knows tb e status and direction of the negotiation will re rate to Defense and the Chiefs his support of 3'nn er's effort will e rilling to consider changing the outdated pres tial instructions in order to obtain a treaty has o roblem with the timing suggested appro es of an educational effort in the Congress and p - vate sector DEClASSIFIED E o 12958 sec 3 5 SECRWl l ODIS STATE DEPT GUIDELINES BY t •NARA OAT-E 111 1 yco V I XGDS-3 PHOTOCOPY FROM GERALD fORD LIBRARY DEPARTMENT OF STATE Was lniton D C 205 20 S 1 CRE'i' ODIS LATIN AlfilRICA I •· THE PAN ANA NEGOTIATION • I SU L'-1 1 RY - BACKGROUND You briefed the President on this shortly after he took office Bunker briefed him twice while he was Vice President Now there has been a negotiating breakthrough a P-ew treaty is in sight Presidential dec i sions are needed however to implement the breakthrough The critical background for th --a is _ rna k 1 ng n s 7 1 continuation of the existing regime in the Panana Canal Zona increases the risk of direct confrontatio with Pa a2a ••• and consequent henispheric repercussions We have al eady delayed for 10 years in fulfilling a b1 part isa i U S co Th 11itment to conclude a new treaty 2 A naw treaty could constitute a striking foreicrnpolicy a - ievcraent for the Administration 3 wil no t be easy of couEse to move a treaty throuc e Senate But the r e a l problem derives Dore I i c 0 2 rtC th in antipctt h v J nc 1 with strong A lr i 1istra t ion suoport we believe ratification will be possibla 4 He shou ld also co -is i d e r that f ·om th ' viewpoint o f rna as i • ne Pan a probl c□ i t is pro babl v bette r to have 3 t e ty which the Congre ss might hold ior a length per ioc t n h J vc no treaty at all OECLAlllflED E O 12959 SEC 3 5 8TATl DEPT GUIDELINE BY a S3CR '£ N0ulS ' NARA DATE 'l Joo PHOTOCOPY FROM GERALD FORD LISRAR · SECRB NODIS - II 2 - STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS Panama has acce ted a pack·ag·e ·o f conceptual agreements which Bunker offered on three important negotiating issues how the Canal is to be operated ••• how it is to be 'de£ended ••• and under what jurisdictional arrangements In essence Panama will obtain jurisdictional rights giving it the sense of sovereignty it requires ••• and in addition some pa ticipation in Canal operation and defense The U ited States will retain primary rights to operate and defend the Canal for the treaty's lifetime Moreover Pa 'la Ua has agreed that the United States may join with i t in suaranteeing 11 that the Canal will remain open on a non-filscriminatory basis permanently That gives tb e United States the political basis -- after the treaty e ds -- to assu -e 'th at our interests in the Canal are pro tected And until t e treaty ends the United States will have the right to ac ilaterally to defend the Canal All □is -e -e sents significant progress toward a treaty Four iss es -emain to be negotiated Two of them -- how uch we pay a for our Canal rights and how much non-essential l return to Panama - - should not pose insur ountable p -c C erns Bunker ·will be addressing them with the anamanians early January The rez 2 iing two will be very difficult how long the · new treaty t - last ••• and whether the United States ·will have exclusive r s for expanding the Canal's capacit y III EXIS' ' s- -ESIDENTIAL GUIDANCE The o - - lding instructions on the two difficult issues years old ••• permit us to offer Panama even less fa- - - - -eab -rtent than ·we offered in the 19 67 t reaty dra fts ••• not consonant with the times they would compel 5 o E s in a significant and protra cted degree of contro - anian territory are no• 2 cs- SECRET NOD IS PHOTOCOPY FROM GERALD F ORD LIBRAR - sBCRBT NODIS - 3 - The instructions require a SO-year timeframe for the new treaty ••• a long-term u s option to construct a sealevel canal or additional locks unilaterally ••• and an additional treaty duration of 30-50 years if we decide to expand it · J t was -oven· •i mp·o s·s •ible' •i n• 1972 ·t o negotiate a treaty ba ec on t e at guidance BUNKER IS NOW DEVISING FORMULAE WHICH PANAMA MIGHT ACCEPT Al ID T ill c - I• -3D STAT ES HI GHT l IVE WITH ·7E WILL BE SENDI G TF 3 P RESIDE T SPECI FIC RECOr-lNENDATIONS SOON We hope Sec etary Schlesinger will join in them but he may not at J east fully DI TIMING If we can cope with the two difficult issues it may be possible to have a complete package of conceptual agreements that is the conf iguration of a n ew treaty -- by say April If the President and Torrijos then indicated that the Negotiators should proceed a final docume nt could possibly be prepared in a month That should allow time to seek ratification before the treaty could become an issue in the presidential campaign DOZ S TEE PRESIDENT HAVE ANY PROBLEH WITH THIS APPROXII_ IATE TI • Lt ' ' A3LE V EDUCJ TI G THE CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC Strong Ac inistration support will be required to secur atification ••• although the new Congress may be nore s 1Inpathetic than its prececessor to a new relationship with Panama Congress i onal treaty opponents while more vocal than vote-power ul have thus far rema i n e d virtually urrchallenged because we ha• e wished to avoid causing a premature public debate Now that a treaty seems pos sible however HE HOPE 'IHE PRBSZD - ' ILL AGREE TH1 T HE BEGii'J A LOW-I Y EFFOR'i' 'i'O GENE ' E SC- 0 t OR IT SECRET NOD IS PHOTOCOPY FROM GERALD FORD LIBRAR'i· IC SECRBT NODIS - 4 - The effort would include -- meetings between senior Administration officials and groups of key congressmen following consultation with the leadership on both sides the establishment of a Citizen's Committee and f a carefully orchestrated program to reach the media and private-interest groups throughout the nation and thereby influence the Co gress VI DEFENSE DE 1 T IBNT ASSISTANCE Throughout the negotiations Bunker has coordinated closel wi th Defense and the Joint Chiefs We believe that the main Un ted States i lterest in the waterway is the security one ot the eco o ic And it is clear that the support of Defense anc the Cb i e s will be indispensable to securing treaty -atif ication Thus far r c y have been helpful in the negotiation ••• despite te '-s cf i e among congressional treaty opponents who have some g say about Defense budgets and programs ••• and despite a a- ural inclination to alter our presence in the Canal Zone as l tle as possible We have - -pl1asized to Defense that United States security nterests a- -e est served by creating a modern environ 1-nent ased on the - --- e of security arrangeinents we have elsewhere n the worlc - o supplant a confrontational envirorunc nt wh ich could lead s o a reoetition of the bloodshed o f 1964 IT wmr 3E HELPFUL IF THE' PRESIDENT COULD INDICATE TO SECRETARY s --- --- SINGER Al-JD TEE CHIEl 'S T iIAT HE SUPP ORTS Bu rKE R' s EFFORT ••• - - r ce they are satisfiQcl with the degree of protection - 2 a ne·w treaty affords to our security interests THAT TE - l ASSIST THE STATE DEPARTHENT IN A CAMPAIGN TO GENERl ' TR EA'l'Y -_ _ IN 'l'H C crn GRt SS AND 'l' hE PRIVATE SEC'J 'OR FOR A £ECRBCI' NODIS ' I - l • PHOfOCOPY FROM GERALD fORD LIBRAR' - ------ ✓ -SECREfy'NODI S - 5 - VII OUR OPTIONS FRm•l A FOREIGN-POLICY VIEWPOINT Unless we are prepared to run the ultimate risk of direct action against Panaraa with effects on our hemispheric and other relations akin to -- and probably much worse than those wh ich followed from our action in the Dominican Republic -- we have no choice but to strive for a new treaty O l terms the world will recognize as eauitable There is advantage from this course -- we ca l put into place a major component of the A ti iistration 1 s policy toward Latin A nerica at a time when we do not have much to offer the Latin Americans and -- we can legitimately point to a Panama treaty as oart and parcel of our effort to build a structure of peace wo lc wide Concluding with the worst case situation -- from a foreign-policy viewpoint It is better to have a treaty on which the Congress migh delay rat iication out-and-out rejectionu seems unlikelv t2- a n to have no treaty at all Thereby we would have s o - - 1 we had done what ·we could And a negotiated treaty Fending in the Congress would help us 11 nanage the Par1a 1a problem for a while longer -SBCREPfNODIS PHO fOCOPY FROM GERALD FORD LIBRAR