2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESID NT JOHN F KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 - IDD 10 - 1 1 i 4' 2· _ 25 I J u e R3 i itry k y -3_ Ju J 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT 1 Meeting on CA Matters with the Panel of the President 'a Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board On 20 July 1962 the Director and the l eputy- Director Plans met w Ltb Messrs Robert J Patrick Coyne Action Programs Murpey- Gordon Ora William Langer and to discuss certain aspects ot the Agency's Political Tbe Director sat with the Panel from 10 30 1til noon the Deputy Director Pl ans vas present from 10 30 to 12 30 and from 2 00 to 3s O 2 The Director opened the discussion with a historical description ot the Agency's covert financial support to political parties in the fight against Communism He described in detail the procedures now in e tfect whereby Political Action Projects are originated statted out and cleared with appropriate elements ot Government Be pointed out that each project must h8Te bis approval prior to its circulation to the members of the Special Oroup At this point he digressed to inf'orm the Panel that reconnaissance overtl 1 ghts are now approved by the Special Ch-oup and subsequently by the·President He said that this sue procedure applies to peripheral fiights although to a lesser degree He terminated this p of the discussion by stating that in his opinion •a11 covert action programs are nov handled in an orderly correct mamier CIA HISTORICAL Rt VIEV PROGRAt✓i RELEASE AS SANITIZED 1998 3 The D l rector then described in some detail Agency covert H financial support in the recent f er f elections tbe last @ eei electiona $ and tbe Firmiai eleotion Be also described •· our actidties in con- mction with the Italian political parties Following this he covered our plans for the upcond ngrBraz -1 elect1ons B'e touched on our thoughts· vith regard h tions ij to the political 81tmtion 1n fritish Gtd ·J t tbis junct 11'91 the Director discussed Agelle3' labor operaBe read to 'the group a short paper vld ch outlined our support I - H y to· anti-CftfflJIDn l 8t labor unions inf rancel and 'Ita171 our work th rough Zf 9 e the iCFTj ·and our relationships with ric labor and the assistance United staJ' unio bave given us s AgeDO support to C12l t 1l'alorganizations was raised bJ' · Dr Langer and tbe Director covered 1n some detail the current status of our support plus that of the Ford Foundation to the Congress fmClJl tural Freedom and the International Commission of Jurists He touched on the J sia Foundation and om- •sire to try- to obtain the services of Mr Livingston Merchant to head it 6 In tha time rema1 n f ng to him the Director want over with the Paml country by countr ' an extended list of political parties and leaders supported by the Agenoy throughout tbe world have an What he did not opportun lt - to cover 1n·tb1 s list the Depui J' Director Plana fillished during the remainder of the morning and durl ng the afternoon session 1 00 -37 Also in tbe -afternoon the Daput7 Director Plana read -to the Panel a paper on Operation Mongoose wb l chthe Director had used earlier in tbe day tor briefing the President This paper was used on the instruction ot the Director The Panel asked questions about jgencJ' activit ' involrlng Cuba all of -vhioh wre annered with the exception of om having to do with the role of the Attorney- General 'l'h la querJ 1f 8 raised b r Hr Gray who recognized and cepted the tact that be gracef1JllT ac- vu not answred_directly 8 Before the afternoon session adjolll'Jl8d the Panel raised the question·or the total dollar 81BO'ID1t o f' f'lmds expended mmual 11' for_ covert· action The DeP11t1' Director Plans showed them a chart com- piled by DDP PO dated h April 1962 - This chart gives the p-ecise These figures var - from the Congres- dollar amcnmta expended ammally sional ones since the·support slice _is not included Distribution _ Original - 'l'be Director · l cc Bue Director 1 cc - 0 CA-IO 1 cc DD P - _ ···•·· - - · • i ' 1 - 1 -00000 - ' · _ Meeting on CA Matters with the Panel of I he President's Foreign Intelligence Advisor y Board SUBJECT J ··- On 1 November the Deputy- Director Plane met with Messrs Rob HmpbJ'11 Gord D Gray- and J • Patrick Coyne to preseat- a toll ow-up brief1ng on the Agency• s political action programs since the one held on 20 J 2 There vu 1962 The meeting luted trom 2 30 to litt le diaouasion on Cuba 4145 1n response to Mr Murpb1''s inquiry' I told lua that a good l ntell 1gence job bad been done but tbat I thought it desirable to have this studied by the Board on the bas ot a per which Director was having pre- pared and which Hr Kirkpatrick had aaSlll ed Mr Coyne 10ul d be sub- mitted t o the Board after the Director bad had an opportmdty to review 1t ' The Lraz eleat ion progl'Ul_ was covered detail Points cowred were _ m considerable a the reason tor the prog£'811l b tbe manner in which candidates were chosen c the amount of monq In- volved d the methods ot 1'mlding and e the coord lnation o t State and the Agency- on the entire scenario • Follovmg the presmtation of the 'actual elements_ there was considerable discussion o r the politi- · cal situation i n and the dJrection in which that Government seamed to be tending 1'3-00000 -2- 4 CIA-sponsored activities at the Helairud Youth Festbal was the next item presen A tun report was given which i'blland care- ruuy the po 4110rtaa writ ten b7 the 0A Staff S As tor CA activities in the remainder o r I ai in America the tol lov lng countries wre covereds II A · II Dominican Republic• Chile• c'I eriJ am Jenez tf andJ ritiah Guiana7were then touched an with -- _ y parl 1cul ar reference to the sensitivity- ot tbe Es-ajcoopera1-Jon on the lai tc 6 In Southeas Asia• an up-to-date report was preaellHd on m operations Laos• Soutrh Viet mm and North Vietzlam Problems 1n connection vi h lfo h Vietnamese opera ions W9E'8 spec li'ica idEtJ$1 tied ZY 7 On the@mo-J n conruc t tbe Panel was made aware of pending and ccrrant requests b'o m Z9 the ntilan ari ts r assistance in the training of guerrllla forces The m le of the 'fil etana was also identUJ ed ln response to a q'IHll'7 tram Mr Murpey• I said t bat I did not see arq- requirement at tbia t lme for an increase of our perm a nent establishment m In apresamg the opinion 1 bat any tramars and paramilitary aperts which we might send ooul d be covered tor us $ by the jn d ani l¾c- 13-00000 -3Mr Murph7 seemed parl icularly lnt ereated in the lewl of activit ' in Italy and our ef' rorts to 9 At one point cut it back 1n the briermg I spoke of the change Sn status or the A trican- American Institute and told of our nego1 iat1ons 111th the Ford Foundation on the Congress tor Cu l t 'UZ'al Jreedall I - 6 mentioned the Department of State Yeto cm passing· f mds to ldc Jkiberti There was soae dl acusaion of the Yemen and uaodated p roblana Her•• I s lmp T ga Ve an mtell i gence br le t mg on the Yemen and the ettects of the revollltion there on Saudi Arabia and t be British pos1 t1cn ID the A den teotorat e 1lictardRalma Deputy l jrector Plans Distnlrations O r-1 g lnal - Director• CIA 1 cc - lzac Direetor 1 cc Chiet CA l cc - rJD P •' _·· ' 13-00000 _ -- _ 0 O 0 CO S IDENTIAL _- ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET • I ERJfNfY SECRET ------------ SUBJECT Optional NO FROM Office oi the DD P · Bm C-34-Hdqrs TO Officer designation raoni number and building DATE ·· DATE OFFICER'S INfflALS 2- NOV 1962 CO NTS Number each comme t to show from whom· line across column ofter each comment 11 t whom · Draw a 1 •' I A'lieu - --1' J e- 2 · • ·-Ji3'e1·· 3 9• 10 11 12 13 14 15 56 61 oUSEED crs • sEcRET 0 CONFIDENTIAL • INTERNAL USE ONLY • UNCLASSIFIED GPO 1961 O-H3M a 13-00000 • t I ' • ' - -----·----- -·--·-- - -· - MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT Meeting 011 CA Mattera-with the Panel of the President's Foreip Iatelligence Advisory Board 1 On 15 April at DDP•a reqv eat I met •1th Meaara Robert Mv rplly Gordoil Oray ·aad J Patrick Coyne to bri4tl them on major covert act101l cleYelopmenta alace tllelr prevlowa brlet'lng oa 2 November 1962 TJae meetlaa luted from-10 00 to 12 15 2 At Mr Marplly•• nqaes 1 begaa wltll a deacriptlonj of oar electoral operatlona - ppprOYed by the Special Croap 11 Chl _ the 1 Dombalcaa Republic i' and Gwl emala 1 r Muphy was partlc'11arly coaceraed w the altution ill razllJ aad 1 oth· he aud Mr Gl' J' fOtUHI lt clWlccalt to uderataad why the State· De eaat 6 coatlnaetl to provide lar •••cale ecoaamlc aaalstance whea ulari ba4 to date rel11aed to llou ae of the Commwuata and fellow travelers bo witbla tile govermnent aad tile labor mevemel t They were_ llltereateci la bowing tbat we werr ill toa c h with aome of the military leader• who are opposed to Gowar_y and they seemed to feel that a military coop point mipt be prefe ra W e to allowizia a coon try@- large and p6werfw aa Braaif to clrilt into the handa of the oppoaldon -Botll ·geatlemea wiahed to know the amounts tbat we had expended 1a ·the'ae electoral operatlou aact oCU own estimate of tbe reaulta They cllcl oot queatloa eltber cJae aeed for laterventloa or the alse of ot t r ellort althotlp ·1D tJaetaalle-a cue Mr M11rph l wanted to be sare that we had evidea ce that the fmula passed tbroagb _tall 9' baac l a actu ally readlecl the • Chriatlan Democrat• C cl•- • r• • l · · Mr Muplay then ralaed tbe Argentin problem and aaicl t he had beea informed la New York-that tj e State Department was pv ttiag coulderable preaaue on • rgeatfn4 reaime to peraaade lt to hold the electio11a achedw ri f o#f •n l 963 He qu••tloned the wisdom ot hi• P reaaure pointing 01 1 that there waa a real danger of the erimiat ret11rning to power lf the election• were lleld He a eked 011r opinion Ad I iaaid tbat deaplte the preas11re there wu still conaidera'ble doubt whether the election• wow d actually take place 1% c- 13-00000 i • - _ _ - I added that the more reaponalble military 7re trylna to work oat with t the uldo Jkoverameat ud the 11oa eron1ajpolltical pa rtiea a t'orrnula which would prevent the Eeronlat from making large gaiaa national level 011 the II 4 0a tbe •abject of ti Mr M ar y felt that in ao am ll a country ac loa should be po•• bl• to remove Duvaliei Ld wondered why it had not be_ea clone I pointed out tbat we bad as yet 110 policy approval for aacll_ action but that we were active 111 ldeq f lng and maldD coatact with oppoaltlor elements otli wltbul t uld in exile I described some ol the clifflcaaltl••• a11cb ai Pavalier'j coatrol ol the uma ia the palace ud J ala wldeaprea4 penetration of opposition llaac W JHt reaalte t ID tbe rall Da 11p of a coup-mpt by army ofllcera 5 Mr Ciray DOted tJaat ae had •••11 ba tbe aewapapera a report of oar receat declalon to allow • - Llberty to broadcast -111 Ruaia to the Sovlet t roopa 111 Cua He wu keardly la favor of • h action but wondered bow we were alale to -obtala approval of lt whe11 the Adml11latration •eem• so a udou a to avoid actlou that might appear to De proYOCaUve to tlae Sovf eu I lnftn'med him that 1bere had in Lac t beea aome clel J' 111 oMalnlag the approval 6- Botb tile 1ea t1emen anecl for detailed lnlormatiou ora the atractare u d workiaga of tbe Latia American Polley Committee LA PC aad aaked wl e luar we felt tale committee 1A any way hampered or interfered witll the approval proce•• lu the Special Group l aaicl tl aat botll CJ alef WH aad myself were well pleaaed •1th the way the LAPC opera tea and believed U to be hJ ply caselul 7 I thea brielecl them 011 actlona which were takea la ScM theaat Aala partlcalarly the meaaare to •Jr•a1the11 the border police la the 0 north of Indl I talcl them tut elfr 7waa aware of these actlou and 'lhey waated to be t Mr _owlea wu clearly lutructed prior to hla departare baaa doi J t 6 8 Botb men objected to presa report• that certain· AdminiatraUon offldal• believn the Sovie to 1M exerting a aelpfu1 and reatralatna bdluence in Laoa l had to aaree with them that lt waa bard to maintain aach a view in the face ol the lacreaa1D1 aggreealveraeaa of the Pathet Lao aml 1 cieacribecl the exlatlq policy limits 011 011r relatloaa wf tb 'laou mjJ arad a Le I tbea described the pre•ent of the Soviet-Chinese '7 •tat• £ 2 f c 13-00000 l - split and •ome oi 0111• efforta to exploit aad exacerbate these tenaiona Mr Muphy ukecl for specific Wormation on the extent of trade if ao y • 'between ChiD a aacl the Soviet Union and the amoaut of the OGt• atandlag CJalaeae debt to tbe Soviets 1 agreed to provide tbia via Mr Coyne Mr Gray u ked abou t the depth and extent ol 011r intelligence from Peking and the China mainland and was critical of the informatioa a11ppllecl to '11' by the Chinese Natiooallata I aaJ d that lntelllgence operations ln China were not my field b 1t that I would make a1 re that a report oa tbia did get to them 9 I went on to cle•crlbe the cult11ral ferment within R11saia and rec eat action Khr11ahchev had take11 to disclpllae the dlaaldent wl'ltera and artiata They were very mw la 11 tereatecl 1n the actiooa welhail takera to ezplolt thl• altaation aad parUcalarly 1Atereete4 ln the current laa11e of Encoantei- and la the accoant ·tberelA of the l hr11ahcb ev tirade at the recent art ezblbitloa 10 OIi Ca ba 1 explal11ed that 1 'WU not in a poeitlon to brie f them 1n depth and any queatlona ln thla field woald be handled by the Director or DDP I did however brief them on the Kralak Committee and the rtac em meeUD • la Maaa u regard101 meas11rea tbat could be taken to llmlt the export of a11bveraion from Ccaba I have aea t to them via Pat Coyne tile CIA Memoraaclum on tlle present scope of the Cuaa a11bve raive tralnlns effort 11 I d••cribed the covert s11pport to the political parties for the forthcoming parliameatary election a a approved by the Special Gro•P• Mr• Murphy had 11ot prevlollSly known of the decision to lend some aelective a11pport to tlle el'IDi a ltonomiat a ud described this decision with aome aurpri•• u qcaite a awltch 8 12 Flraally whee Wormed ol the icy limitation• 2n our relatioiia with the aolara Natloaiallat and@olden Rober Mr Muphy expressed blmsell as being in agreement with tboae llmltatlona and 'fl seemed to feel that the beat cou-ae o follow waa to uaiat the rtug11 eai Covermneo t in lta attempta to control the situation He aaid tba Ile bad met recently for the first time withl oberto Holdei l11 New York laat week and was not bnpreased by the man 6 J 13-00000 ' ' 13 The meeting wu throtaghout a cordial one and I detected evidence of a critical attitude tow ru the A ency'• covert actloa pro1ram • DO • I i - · - ' - ' - -- J a CORD MEYER JR Cbief CoYert Actloa Stall Dletrlbtltio11 Orig • Director CIA l - Exec Director 1 -DDP l • C CA- s -0 C 4 13-00000 - --- --- · · 0· -- ' ' • ·- E fy UNClASSIFIED O ROUTING AND RECORD -FROM TO DATE' OfRcer designation room number and - DATE OFFICER'S fOIIWAIIDED INfflALS t---- ----i RECEMD L 'SFIEE NO C CA • SECRET ------------- - c ijFIDENTIAL -COMMENTS N mlw each om nt -_to sh froin wh 11D whom _ Draw a line ocrms · column after each com-t -Exec · Director- 2 3 - - 4 - - 5 ' · 6 • -- 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 s6 610 u s e • SECRET • CONFIDENTIAL • INTERNAL USE ONLY 0 UNCLASSIFIED PO IHI 0-9t JM• 13-poooo - - 23 April 1963 • 13-00000 2-- · • r ' 0 J DC · CLU CU09N • ' ··7 - 4 § E J 1 2 1-t Handle Via Indicated Controls i 11 flx M AN J r lr 13 ················ v '1 - O lo' ' 00 00 Th •••••••• 0 oood •• ho U• ' d S••••• •llh • '• ••••• This document contains information· referring to Projects M 011 # % f h u % · • •••••••• •• ' '••oo wi h l• i • ••••••I- •• •h• •• • •'•• oo•••••• •lo••• •• Hoou • -' • • Ing of the espionage lows U S · Code Title 18 Sections 793 and 794 The law prohibits its transmi •• sion or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person as well as its·use in cny manner prejudiciol to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign govern• ment tc the dotriment of the United States It is to be seen only by U S personnel especially indoc• trinoted and authori r ad ta receive information· in the designated control channels Its security must be % J 13-00000 1· '1 •' · 24 April 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board 1015 Tuesday 23 April 1963 Present Dr Killian Mr Murphy Mr Clifford Mr Pace Gen Doolittle Mr Gray Dr Langer Dr Land Staff m em bers Messrs Coyne an d Ash From CIA Mr McCone Mr FitzGerald Mr Bruce Clarke Mr Lym an Kirkpatrick 1 When Mr McCone entered the room the group had been discussing the release of the American prisoners in Cuba and it had been explained to the Board that the three CIA men who d been imprisoned had been released Mr Murphy had asked what their cover story had been and had been told that they represented themselves as conducting audio surveillance for commercial interests and that their fictitious names lad apparently held up during interrogation Mr Murphy asked Mr McCone the conditions of the release of the 22 and the DCI explained that at Castro's request we were-trying to obscure the fact that there had been a quici pro quo in releasing the four Cubans in exchange for the 22 Americans The Attorney General had arranged the release of the three Cubans who had been accused of but not convicted of sabotage · and Mr McCone had personally arranged the release of Molina with Governor Rockefeller who had granted him executive clemency with deportation Mr McCone noted that the release qf the three CIA persons was very important to the Agency and that nothing in the agreement for the release involved any other commit nents Mr Murphy asked what the DCI thought was behind Castro's making these releases Mr McCone replied that it was probably domestic foibles and that Donovan was the only thread open to the United States Mr Clifford asked if we had everyone out that we wanted The DCI replied that he knew of no one else there that we wanted reported that Donovan had to make a statement that he would not return to Cuba advised that he had no intention of returning at this time and he would have to use another cover if he did return Dr Land asked why Castro did all this and the DCI said we didn't really know but one possibility offered by Donovan was that Castro apparently is interested in trying to reach some rapprochement with He 13-00000 ·' l '· · the United States that Dono i an says he is not a Communist and that Fidel didn't know how to go about making any accommodation with the U S because he was so closely surrounded by advisers who were watching everything he did Mr McCone said that Castro had specifically requested that the President the _¼ tt Ge c I a 1 and the DCI be advised of his attitude Mr Clifford asked why Castro wanted the DCI to know and Mr McCone said he had no idea because at no time during the Donovan negotiations was any indication given that CIA was being consulted or advised Dr Killian then suggested that the Board turn to the briefing on Cuba Mr McCone said there were several things he wished to discuss before going on to that briefing i Mr McCone reported that on coordination the NRO agreement was in effect and working pretty well An agreement had been reached on the complete and comprehensive use of the NPIC facilities by DIA and NPIC was developing well The Special Group has expanded its review of counterinsurgency activities to include those of the DOD and they are now cognizant of DOD activities in this field In the field of current intelligence reporting we are now attempting to correct the DIA and CIA bulletins and to establish one bulletin with increased DIA input and with DIA issuing addendum Mr McCone said this was supported at the DOD stage by the Secretaries He noted that he was attempting to get all issues with the DOD settled by the 15th of May so that they can be fully implemented before Mr Gilpatric leaves in June He said that in the clande_stine collection field the work of Defense was being fully and carefully coordinated on a regular basis Mr McCone said that reasonable progress was being made on the five areas of coordination He said that he and Mr McNamara had postponed the reorganization of USIB It was going along all right as it was and they didn't see any point of creating problems on the Hill by a reorganization at this time ql o Mr McCone reported that recent CORONA f id TACKLE flights over Chin Produced the best photography we have ever had and that he had not set up a formal briefing for the Board because of their busy schedule He advised that there was one point concerning ICBM complexes in the Soviet Union which he wished to call to the attention of the Board The last CORONA flight had revealed one new ICBM complex and this now located these installations in 18 separate places He noted th t these complexes ranged from four pads to possibly as many as 18 This might well indicate that 18 launching pads were standard and if the support faciliti s are proportioned similar to the one with 18 pads there might well be as many as 18 times 18 launching pads or a total of about 450 Mr McCone advised that at this time we were analyzing each one to determine the level of support facilities - 2 - f 'lftf'r ' t VU t 13-00000 -l • • · • ' rl 'l'· ' - SECKET f I··· • 11 The photograph was being reviewed for clearer guide lines as to construction time He said he saw no reason to change the mid-'63 estimate of 125 to 150 launching sites but there might be reason to change the future estimate Dr Langer asked how many sites there were with 18 pads and Mr McCone replied Only one 11 4 Dr Land stated that CORONA was getting better and better and he hoped that all of those in the pursuit of a better vehicle would not forget that CORONA is doing the job Mr McCone replied that this was true and said that he had the schedule for satellite launchings which he would leave with the Board This called for CORONA-M once a month to July with an extra one in May and CORONA-J once a month from May 1963 to July 1964 with two in September If trouble develops with the J' ' configuray9n M can be continued once a month Up til March The next AN YAR lH ot is scheduled for early next month and will be followed by three more The first 4 I _GAMBl shot is scheduled in June and will then be launched once a month through all of 1964 Mr · McCone noted that if there were future failures there should be no hiatus and a maximum of only seven days' delay between shots · 9 I _ · 5 Mr McCo p' reported that the_ OXCART ve icle would have one_more flight at MachE and then would be pus9-ed up to its full speed and altitude General Doolittle noted that the next fncrease presented very serious engineering problems Mr McCone said that this was thoroughly understood but he wanted the Board to be apprised of the status 6 Mr McCone reported that he was establishing a panel to make a judgment as to what additional steps should be taken to bring satisfactory photography in the area of resolution He noted that he felt we were dealing too much in· optimistic hope at the present time and that he wanted the best possible judgment as to the resolution that could be achieved from satellite photography in order to be weighed with the political decision of overflying the Soviet Union Qle stated that he had gone to Cambridge to see · Dr Edward Purcell in an effort-to persuade him to chair a panel which would be composed of the best brains from both inside and outside the Government · He reported that he felt he must be able to tell the President when satellite photography would reach the desired resolution Mr McCone advised that he had a memorandum establishing the terms of reference of this committee which he would submit to the President's Board He noted that there were many studies oriented toward the most exotic types of reconnaissance including the best read-out but that he wanted this committee to be completely impartial and objective and therefore was establishing it under his personal direction He noted that he had the enthusiastic support - 3 - 13-00000 - TOP-· SECRET of DOD in doing this He said he would like the support of the President's Board and their thoughts on the terms of reference and the membership including whether they thought some members of the Board might sit on the committee or whether this would present a conflict of interest as the Board had apparently felt in a previous matter J Dr Killian asked if this panel was supposed to look at the future potentiality of satellite photography and Mr McCone then read to the Board the terms of reference in his memorandum He noted that he thought this panel should be constituted at this time because there were serious doubts in the U S Government about flying an aircraft over the USSR Mr Clifford asked if the panel would deal with politics and Mr McCone replied No 11 Dr Land asked what the relations of the panel would be with NRO and Mr McCone replied that NRO would support the panel Gen Doolittle noted that the Air Force had a committee on satellite survivability and Mr McCone said that he knew this but felt that that committee was not full out and not devoting the effort that the seriousness of the problem warranted Gen Doolittle replied that he was a member of that committee and he thought they were giving the problem verr serious consideration Mr McCone said he thought the problem involved a vast amount of work and he was concerned because all of the views were not being pulled together He noted that what was necessary was to get an authoritative expression as to what resolution wa·s required down to the nearest inch in order to determine the engineering of missiles Mr Land asked what Dr Purcell had said and commented that he thought such a panel would be all right if it was composed of four or five who knew what they were talking about Mr Mc Corie replied that he was not sure he had been able to get Purcell and that he might have to ask Dr Land to persuade Purcell Dr Land replied that he might be able to do it r -- • - -- -- -·-•--- ---· · · - - -- · ·' · · --- - --- ------- --- · - ----------- -- - ---- - ----- p e · _· I _____ 1__ Cfir · sk i h th itherehad been -one or two U-2-flights Cfiliia Mr McCone replied that there had been two and that they had ffl ' produced some interesting results These included progress on a possible gaseous diffusion plant He noted that the preparations are just half those ij i of the Soviet plant of which it may be a duplicate He said that this was i ' not understood and noted that as presently constituted the plant could not produce cascades to develop the quality of the top product He noted that it '' could possibly be another process metallurgical or textile but on another q area there were a large number of cooling towers Mr McCone advised l J that he had set up a special group under Dr Roddie to study the Chinese ' nuclear energy program This group has made a report in which they pointed LI 1 However they had put togeihe J • I out the paucity of the information available 'l t fi ' ' - -•- 2-- -•-- __ __ _ _ _c ----c-'- - _ -- c·- _- - - -- ' - -- - 4 - -ri -J _ ·_--- - · · r r i ' · •'- f · - _ -· --- - - · -· Ji --- ' 13-00000 • • • -- _ - - - _- - - - -- -- • 2 e1 of intelligence infor on td come to th conclusion that · ihe Chinese Communists were making a tremendous effort in this field and were possibly nearer the stage of exploding some device He reported that the Board of Estimates was making a new estimate on the subject at 11 this moment and that the program was being supplemented by intensive over flights Dr Land asked whether the_DCI saw any problems in using the A-12 over China and Mr McCone said that he didn't and furthermore that he ' ' _ - - - - · - - -- - - - - - · - -· - ------- _ -·- -- II l r- 1 1 _ pe_rs 1 1 y didn t -a_nY- - r- l -i - sing_Jt__o r- USSR C -- --- __ _ --· · -- -- -- __ L_ 8 Mr McCon- advised that he had taken some-adaiti'onal steps to- ' -- -- - ✓ pull together the Agency's scientific and technical assets j He had established a Research and Development Review Board He said that it didn't seem wise at this time to relocate OSI and TSD The Office of Scientific Intelligence analyzes and makes estimates on the basis of incoming intelligence and its removal from DD I would take away an essential link in th process of that area He said further that TSD was directly linked to the perational aspects of DD P and he didn't feel it should be removed from that' area He noted that the Research and Development Review Board would meet under General Carter biweekly and would provide cross fertilization and coordination He said that he would provide a copy· of the memorandum establishing this Board and read to the Board the membership 0 ' - 5 - 0- 0 13-00000 TOP SECRET t 9 Mr McCone then turned to a discussion of Cuba and stated that he was giving the Special Group this afternoon a study showing the results of 51 days' reconnai sance over Cuba and that this was disturbing when the four principal targets were analyzed There were 59 occasions when weather precluded any readout of what was going on in these four Soviet military camps Some of the camps were not seen for five or six days in a row and in one instance for as long as 12 successive days Mr McCone then read from the memorandum on reconnaissance over Cuba dated 23 April 1963 and said he would provide the Board with a copy The DCI then reported t hat James Donovan during a nighttime drive to Veradero had passed a convoy of 25 very large trucks the type generally carried on railroad flatcars Mr McCone stated that an examination of the photography for that day and the following day provided absolutely no trace of the convoy Dr Land stated that the DCI's previous statement may have provided the answer as to where this convoy might be The DCI said he planned to recommend low-level flights in order to provide more information 10 At this point Mr FitzGerald was asked to give his presentation on operations in Cuba He commenced by displaying the chart which indicated the number of resident agents illegal teams legal teams shipboard agents and penetrations of Cuban installations He noted that the number of illegal teams had risen to three as a result of a successful operation on Sunday and one of these teams had as many as 100 subagents with extensive co rage in the province of Pinar del Rio Dr Langer asked what the subagents were looking for and Mr FitzGerald replied that their coverage was mostly military · Mr Murphy asked if these agents were all strictly collecting intelligence and Mr FitzGerald replied that this was their primary purpose at the moment but the illegals could create a resistance net if this was desired He pointed out that the policy at the present time precluded attempting to develop a large scale dangerous activity 0 Mr FitzGerf d pointed out that the penetration of Cuban installations were mainly@iploma119installations and that some i4 Cuban dipltfuat were our agents Mr Clifford asked how the information was gotten out of Cuba and Mr FitzGerald replied that it was mostly by secret writing transmitted to ¥exico Citj by mail and then forwarded to Washington He said there were four radios in Cuba and that we now had a greatly improved medium ZY speed transmitter that was quite small £he size of about two cigarette carton'fJ and it could get a message off in just 60 seconds He said that there was a smaller and better transmitter currently in the process of development · - 6 - _ nf •d J ·1 •• 1· ' 13-00000 _ Dr Land asked if the loss of this transmitter would compromise others Mr FitzGerald replied that it would not compromise any other agents except the one apprehended and the DCI noted that it would simply compromise the instrument Mr Murphy asked concerning the quality of substantive reporting and Mr FitzGerald noted that the 1 040 reports looked impressive but it was quite true that this was not a true indication zff-e said that some of the reporting was very good and there were two f uban ambas sadorJ on the payroll who provided e1ome first-rate reports and were closest to the bone in what Castro was thinking Mr Murphy asked if we ha d Castro's immediate entourage penetratecfand Mr FitzGerald said his sister worked for us but that she didn't always have inside information He pointed out that the 665 report s from resident agents were primarily on military targets and the intelligence community felt they were really worthwhile as a supplement to o e head reconnaissance General Doolittle asked if an illegal team was tvfi Ji n and Mr F itzGerald replied 11 yes 11 • Mr Murphy asked whether these agents provided information on Soviet troop strength and quipment and Mr Fitz Gerald replied in the affirmative Mr Clifford noted that with just·two illegal agent teams in Cuba at this time we were back to where we started from in 1962 Mr FitzGerald commented that the casualty rates were very high and referred to the charts Legal Resident Agents in Cuba and Illegal Agent Development At this point Mr McCone left the meeting and Mr Cottrell came in Mr Gray asked if the modest number of agents was a result of policy or operations Mr Fitz Gerald replied that this was primarily a result of operations and noted that it was not the result of lack of effort but because of the high attrition rate and the dangers involved He went·over the lists of what had happened to the agents that were put in He noted that it was presently planned to carry out approximately five operations a month Mr Murphy asked if there was evidence of organized resistance in Cuba Mr FitzGerald replied yes but they were now small bands scattered throughout the island He noted that Castro had broken up the large countrywide resistance networks last summer · He then produced the chart entitled Illegal Infiltration - - Exfiltration Operations and commented on this Mr Murphy asked if the groups on the island committed sabotage and Mr Fitz Gerald said the policy presently precluded major sabotage operations and limited it to subtle sabotage Mr Murphy asked what constituted subtle sabotage and Mr FitzGerald described it as tying a rock to a wire and throwing it across high tension lines - 7 re· - r 1t -- - ·· · ··· I_ · - 13-00000 L · 11 The Board then turned to Mr Cottrell and asked him to describe the work of his group Mr Cottrell said the President had become concerned there were so many gover_runent agencies dealing with so many Cuban groups and he had set up the group under Mr Cottrell to coordinate all of this activity He said that his immediate group consisted of a representative of De fense and CIA and there were additional committees or groups reporting to them He outlined the general policy guidance under which they were operating and under questioning from Mr Murphy stoutly denied that the policy was basically defensive in nature and it was directed toward getting rid of communism and Castro in Cuba It was further explained that CIA I s actiyities were coordinated through this group 12 Dr Killian then asked Br uce Clarke to give a brief report on the situation in Cuba and with the aid of photographs Clarke analyzed the present Soviet troop strength on the island and explained how these figures were arrived at At 12 00 this session was recessed to permit the presentation by DIA Lyman B Kirkpatrick Executive Director 1-61 C J t tj U 1 _ b I fl J bl C 1 tt 3 - £ b -II- • £le - 8 f · · t- · i 13-00000 Subjects covered in briefing 23 April 1963 1 Discussion of the release of the three American prisoners in Cuba 2 Coordination on NRO agreement - ''in effect and working well 3 Report on photographic results of Coronalf d Tackl ights ver Chini mentioned there wou d be one more Ox flight at Mach and then be pushed to full sp ed and altitude_ 4 Reported on establishment of Purcell Panel 5 Discussion of U-2 flightsever Chini a nd results 6 Establishment of R D board to pull together the Agency's scientific and technical assets 1 n J1 fl l 7 Discussion of Cuba DCI said plans to recommend low-level flights to provide more information 8 FitzGerald gave presentation on operations in Cuba 9 Cottrell described the work of his group 10 Bruce Blark gave report on the situation in Cuba' ' rr k I 17 91 r GB YEMA 131 QQOOO ' -- Z4 - 22 19 3 20 April 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR Mr Kirkp trick DCI does not t to meet the Board with Cottrell and requests that you advise the Board that Cottrell is not privy to many operational matters Your suggestions seemed agreeable to Mr McCone W Elder 13-00000 J 22 April I 963 SUGGESTED TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD 10- 15 A M 23 APRIL -l'tl l '1 -· I 1- J I I f1 r- Coordination a NRO Agreement- -currently in effect b NPIC- -agreement with DIA is fairly well solidified with not too many differences in opinion c qou riterinsurgency--new system whereby DOD goes to the Special Group now in effect d Current Intelligence Reporting- -now in negotiation stage with DIA e Clandestine Intelligence Collection- -close coordination between CIA and DIA now in effect b II 1 i $ q9 -- Recent CORONA Covera e lus Recent TACKLE ' -t V - t -L Xz III Progress on a t - Cf _ _ _ ____ _j CAR Establishment of the Purcell Panel ' IV Scientific and Technical Intelligence in CIA ·- _ a Report of the Roddis Panel on Chinese nuclear energy capabilities b The CIA Research and Development Review Board L - - ---' a '·· UJ-v-f-_ __ _u I • 13-00000 Hand MAN Co u m 17 April 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR SUBJECT Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Tuesday 23 April 1963 1 The President• Board has asked that you meet with them on the 23rd from 10' 15 to 11 15 They have suggested that the later half of this period be devoted to a review of both operations and intelligence on Cuba and have suggested that Mr Cottrell attend for that period 2 Assuming that the question of the Board's charter and procedures will have been settled prior to the 23rd I would suggest that you may wish to give them a quick review of outstanding matters including their recommendations and perhaps a briefing on the latest C _ and _- flights · °t B Kirkpatrick Executive Director cc DDCI Handl e Cont 9f MA Nj m 1---· ·-·- ---·- ·-- - 11 · 13-00000 · _ _ - _ - - - - - - --l 28 March 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR Executive Director Reference the attached memorandum from the 'Director I will of course be pleased to meet with the President's Board on Tuesday 23 April and would appreciate ver·y much your informing Pat Coyne accordingly I hope that you will be able to be present also in accordance with your normal procedures If not I would appreciate your appointing an appropriate representative If you can find out in advance from Mr Coyne just what the Board may want it would be most helpful In the meantime please ask the staff to prepare appropriate briefing memoranda on whatever will be appropriate at that time I Marshall Cart er Lieutenant General USA Deputy Director Attachment Memo to IDCI from DCI dated 28 March 1963 ER 63-2540 MSC blp Distribution Original - Addressee w att 1 - DDCI w cy att 1 - ER w cy att 13-00000 I ecu ive Registry I • 28 March 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR General Carter In discussions with Dr Killian he mentioned that his Board were meeting for one day He had been advised that I would be in Europe at that time The meeting date is April 23rd Dr Killiap specifically requested that you be available for an hour or so on that date and I said I would convey this request to you t •• - • '• JI•· · ·· _ - • · 13-00000 W #pl' ff # #%7 · •cc•• m•o• @ cy# 0 · Handle Via Indicated 0 ' • I 0 ' --1 f l ········ Controls I J J - -· Th•••• ••••• ••••• ••••••• •11 o •• •• ••oh• U• ••• ''°'°' • •hi• •h• •• • Ing of the espionage lows U S Code Title 18 Sections 793 and 794 The low prohibits its tronsmls• sion or the revelation of its contents in any manner to on unauthorized person as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign govern• ment to the detriment of the United States It is to be seen only by U S personnel especially indoc• - · · · ' - •i ' ' • This document contains information referring to Projects ··············· ··············· j 13-00000 SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSU UNCLASSIFIED I I -'TION TOP AND BOTTOM CONFIDENTIAL I SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP TO 1 2 INITIALS DATE NAME AND ADDRESS M d OCI Evr -c 'D- n 3 l CI 1 7 p J wf _ I 1M e -- C6-'r d 4 •i y 44 r • - 5 - 6 DIRECT REPLY DISPATCH FILE INFORMATION ACTION APPROVAL COMMENT CONCURRENCE PREPARE REPLY RECOMMENDATION RETURN SIGNATURE • Remarks Distributi n to other than DDCI and yourself awaits your approval FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER FROM NAME ADDRESS AND PHONE NO DATE Jl Dec bi Executive Director UNCLASSIFIED FORM NO 2-61 237 I Use previous editions I CONFIDENTIAL I SECRET 40 U S GOYERNMINT PRINTING OPFICI •• o-sa1zaz 13-00000 'T -- · - - - - 1' C - - '• ' j 28 December 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT Meeting of the DCI with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Friday December 28 0930 a m Specific Subject Discussion of Cuba 1 At 0930 Dr Killian opened the meeting with a statement to the Director that the Board had read the report and appreciated the great amount of work that had been put into it He commented particularly on the lucidity of the report and said the Board had also looked at the changes which had been sent to them this morning The Director commented on page 90 the final conclusions and said that he still did not feel sufficient attention had been paid to important inq icators Mr McCone then said that there were one or two other subjects that he wanted to mention to the Board before getting into the Cuban report These are covered in separate memoranda 2 After coverage of the other subjects Dr Killian then asked Mr McCone whether he had any further comments to make on the report The Director referring to conversation the previous evening said he had no further comments and that he thought it was understandable why his personal position had not been included in the report He noted that these were covered in his October 31 memorandum for the record which the Board had Dr Killian asked if the Board did have this and Mr Coyne z s YE 7 Sf-C-1 o ft ¼ · 13-00000 · 2 noted that Dr Killian had seen it at the previous meeting Mr McCone went on to say that the Board should realize that the people in receipt of his c ables had been receiving intelligence on an hour to hour basis Mr Clifford noted that the Director 1 s messages would be of tremendous interest in any Congressional investigation and thought that the Board should have copies of them Mr McCone replied that he realized this and would supply copies 3 Mr Gray asked if they could then turn to question 16 Dr Killian asked the question which was whether the existence of the Special Group had complicated the intelligence program and he noted particularly the detailed decisions made by the Special Group in relation to Mongoose Mr McCone replied no in fact the Special Group had assisted He noted the way it operated and said that the Augmented Special Group with the Attorney Gener al served as authority to stimulate intelligence gathering through increased use of agents refugee interrogations and third country activities He noted that prior to Mongoose ihere had been a hiatus and that everything apparently had stopped after the Bay of Pigs In December of last year there had been no interrogation of refugees no agents and no Miami set up At the instigation of the President the Attorney General and himself all of this had been built up Mr Murphy asked why opera- tions against Cuba had stopped and whether this was for psychological reasons The Director said _it was psychological There had been investigations and there was general discouragement '7 r 1'·-- -r -' l - - I Dr Killian said 13-00000 wasn 1 t there a similar danger now and that there seemed to be a general euphoria and a feeling of success danger inherent in Cuba Mr McCone said there was a great The SAM sites were still there as well as many other things He said a week ago Monday he had brought this up forcefully in the Executive Committee and the President had issued instructions that word be gotten to the Soviets that any interference with our reconnaissance over Cuba would bring an instant reply with action from the United States This word was communicated by Stevenson to Kuznet ov and by Thompson to Dobrynin He said that the present understanding is that we will fly two or more high level flights a day or if weather or other reasons fore- stall these flights · there will be a request made to the President for low level flights He noted that low level flights could escalate a critical situation 4 Mr Pace asked if there were any prohibitions on intelligence collection on Cuba today Mr McCone replied yes more aggressive pattern of agent infiltration We would like a He said he thought it was important that in the next three or four months there be extensive intelligence operations to find out the trend of developments in Cuba He said he thought the Soviets might move completely out of Cuba and certainly this was one impression they were trying to convey or second that they would recognize they had a good piece of real estate which they would want to maintain for subversion through Latin Anlerica and a base of operations This would involve a control of Castro and while they might not re-install offensive missiles they will always have the 3 13-00000 _ I • _ • 4 capability to do so Mr McCone said he was inclined to believe that the second alternative would be followed and obviously the intelligence effort should be at a maximum to discover Russian intentions 5 Mr Murphy said obviously there should be an all out effort to penetrate the Cuban government The DCI said yes that every effort should be made to exploit cracks in the top in their monolithic structure and that more and more agents should be put it He noted that only this week a teazn had been infiltrated and another teazn exfiltrated - Mr Murphy asked how many there were in a team and the Director repliedli -ree to fivi 6 Mr McCone went on to say that we are making extensive efforts to utilize third countries in the Cuban intelligence effort and mentioned 'l 8' 9' ' the ritis l @ anadianj frencf iermani a nd one or two Latin countries He said that he expected some invaluable information would be produced by discussions with Donovan and Nolanlhad a fight with Che Guevar a Zl We already know that Castro Castro also-spent three hours with the p captain of the rican Pilci and the captain had indicated that he wanted to talk to intelligence immediately on landing in Florida Mr McCone said that he intended to get the Special Group immediately after the first of the year to approve a program for extensive intelligence activities He said that he did not believe that any efforts should be made at this time to stimulate an uprising and that all of our resources should be concentrated on intelligence collection 13-00000 · 5 7 Mr Pace asked whether this plan would include using Guantanamo The Director replied that he did not recommend the use of Guantanamo He noted that if it was used as a base for intelligence operations and we' got caught Castro could mobilize world opinion against us Dr Killian said that Castro assumed that we used it in this way whether we do or not 8 now General ·Doolittle asked how frequently we are overflying Cuba The Director replied that there were two flights a day at present but if the weather is bad and our program slips there is authority to fly additional daily flights General Doolittle asked how frequently this gave complete coverage of the bland and Mr McCone said that t worked out to about once a week He ncted that some areas such as harbors were covered more frequently and that COMOR had worked out a system of priorities for aerial reconnaissance 9 Mr Pace then asked if we had studied the possibilities for the use of Guantanamo and what could be achieved in using it as a base for operations 10 The Director replied that we had made no such study - Mr Pace then inquired about restrictions on U-2 flights during NO ' September and said that apparently effort was made to penetrate critical areas by agents and therefore he thought we should have explored using Guantanamo Mr McCone pointed out that the operators had proposed a r-o-- G-c o - -iaria' - i series of agent infilitrations hi August but that this was not approved Nobody at the policy level including the JCS would approve these operations 13-00000 ' ''t' ✓ 6 1 I Mr Gray then asked if the situation in January looks different than it did in August would there be accelerated operations The Director said he would re-open the whole question if that was the case Mr Pace returned to the subject of Guantanamo and said that in his opinion if effective use could be made of it this should be done regardless of policy inhibitions SIGINi purposes Zt c Dr Killian asked ifeu antanamo was used for Mr McCone said that he was sure it was and - · Z9 referred to Mr Kirkpatrick who read from fie NSA memoranduii on i their expanding activities in June noting the additional positions were Zt activated in June and the fact that there some iloating position established near Santiago de Cuba 12 Mr Murphy then asked what was the difference between Mongoose and M 0 ngoose B-plus Mr McCone replied that the first phase of the Mongoose operation was to determine the intelligence potential in Cuba This was fairly successful despite extreme difficulties He mentioned that there were 100 000 informers organized on a block and community basis 'throughout the island and that these people controlled ration cards and travel thereby making all movement difficult He said the second phase of the Mongoose operation considered three or four different levels of activity ' A precipitating a revolution B involved extensive sabotage was the most violent directed toward B plus was somewhere between the two and therefore involved even more activity such as mining harbors Mr McCone said that his big problem · 1 0T _ 13-00000 # - •' - ···Ii -· r a 1 7 is the question of United States policy He did not wish to put CIA in the position of stimulating an uprising unless he was certain that U S policy would commit troops to back the uprisin g He noted that on August 10 when he forecast MRBMs in Cuba to the Secretary of Defense he had discussed the ramifications of an uprising in Cuba extensively asked who chaired the Special Group on Mongoose Dr Killian Mr McCone said he wasn't sure whether it was Bundy or the Attorney General and turned to Mr Kirkpatrick who didn't know 13 Mr Pace asked whether an assessment had been made of the accuracy of NPIC interpretations on Soviet missiles He said he wondered whether there were flaws which might change some of our estimates Mr McCone replied that quite to the contrary there was no instance where NPIC failed He said that for example the September photography of San Cristobol showed some construction equipment In retrospect we know it was for developing missilesites but the photography could be interpreted as being only a few trucks for agricultural purposes 14 Dr Killian said that he was very concerned about the clear implication that the Soviet Union would soon be developing better camouflage techniques This plus the lack of resolution in the photography might pose considerable difficulties different story Mr McCone said that this was a He noted that he was concerned about the adequacy of coverage of the Soviet Union He noted that the targets for coverage were · reviewed repeatedly but at the present time of year the light was poor and the coverage was bad He noted that there was a certain margin 13-00000 t · ' · · 1 iI 8 allowed in the estimates to take into account missile sites that might not have been seen The DCI said that NIE 11-8 had just been reviewed and that an amending memorandum would be issued shortly He said obviously it was impossible to say precisely what was going on in the Soviet Union 15 Dr Killian said that he was terribly concerned about the fact that the public now seems to feel that we have swung all the way from a missile gap to a great superiority over the Soviet Union and that this was obviously the wrong way was definitely wrong Mr McCone said he agreed that this Mr Murphy asked whether the government was putt1ng out this information Mr McCone said he didn 1t know and that he felt it was wrong and dangerous and would develop complacency and might even result in an economy minded Congress cutting the Defense budget drastically Mr Murphy noted that it was implicit that we should have precise knowledge on what was going on inside Russia Mr McCone said that in his presentations to Congre_ss he specifically made the reservation each time that there were obviously things we didn 1t know Dr Killian noted that even photography can be wrong and can give an erroneous impression e g that nothing is there Mr McCone I acknowledged that this was a danger Dr Killian asked whether Congress the President and the Secretary of Defense understood this danger Mr McCone replied that he always stressed it and he also stressed that intelligence was commencing to have almost absolute dependence on photography 13-00000 • 9 16 Mr Pace commented th_at since November there had been 72 overflights of Cuba and yet for a much greater length of tirre there had been no U-2 flights over the Soviet Union which was a much more important target He said that obviously there must be great gaps in our knowledge on the USSR than that General Doolittle said it was even worse He noted that CORONA had given no valuable intelligence on Cuba and that apparently the U-2 gave questionable intelligence so that low level reconnaissance was needed The Director said this wasn 1t accurate that _the U-2 gave all of the intelligence that was needed to convince the OAS and our other allies The low level flights were needed for backstopping possible military operations Mr Pace asked if it was correct that CORONA had produced no valuable intelligence on Cuba and Mr McCone said that this was true General Doolittle noted the closeness of the dangers and commented that if the Cubans had moved faster and gotten the camouflage up we might never have discovered the missiles 1 7 Dr Killian noted that the time was drawing to an end and said that the Board would make a strong recommendation on 1 1 an intensive research programEn sensors to break through camoufl 18 Mr Murphy asked if the Director had noted any difference in the philosophy of the State Department in regard to intelligence He noted that the Department had played quite a role during the Cuban 13-00000 • · 13-00000 - • • • r - ·- - - __ _ 1 o crisis Mr McCone said yes he thought there had been a change in the State attitude and noted that it and others had been quite timid on the U-2 and other intelligence activities He said that he was having a recapitu- lation made of the inhibitions on intelligence operations which might interest the Board He cited the fact that we had been prevented from _II - - covering@hini North Vietnam and North Korea He said that a second 0 U -2 had been sent to tormos and that the wraps had been taken off I ar Easteri reconnaissance On the other hand every time there was an overflight State got very nervous and had made sever al telephone calls 19 Dr Killian again expressed the Board's appreciation fo-r the report and for Mr McCone• s taking the time to be with them · Mr McCone replied that he would be happy to consider any suggestions the Board had cnncernirig the report except that he felt the conclusions should stand as presented If however there were any additional substantive matters there might well be additional conclusions that could be drawn 2 0 This session was c ampleted at 10 40 LBK rm Orig - DCI cy 2 - DDCI cy 3 - DD P cy 4 - DD R cy 5 - DD I fl 'V --- l G x e' 'l Cc t DttiT1-- r iP F r t lAB l'lc t fit 1 l e-se - i -- L _1 i · - -· • _ 3