1 104' 10303-10007 _ -• 2025 ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F KENNEDY ' • '-- • ' • M ir _ • · •- • t • ii f -- ' ' · I i •• I I • i _ I 1 June 1973 MEMORANDUM FOR Mr William E Colby SUBJECT · Special Activities 1 Following our recent conversation I have searched my memory and Mr McCone' s files for examples of activities which to hostile observers or to-someone ithout complete knowledge and with A special kind of motivation could be interpreted as examples of activities exceeding CIA's charter 2 First- as we discussed on 7 March 1962 DCI McCone under pressure from Attorney General Robert F Kennedy agreed to tap the telephones of columnists Robert S Allen and Paul Scott in an effort to identify their sources for classified information whic·h was appear ing in their columns Because the primary sourc appeared to be in the Department of Defense McCone ordered me personally to brief General Joe Carroll Director of DIA orally which I did I understand more complete information on this operation is available from the Director of Security I personally managed to avoid gaining any knowledge of what precise actions were taken what information was gained what was done with it and when the operation was terminated 3 _ As a result of a developing relationship witb the SORCE representative in Washington and also as a result of cerf in information conveyed by Anatole Golitsep James Angleton with the approval of Dick Helms agreed to mount a counterespionage operation against the Fr- acbE b sy in Washington This involved breaking and entering and _the removal of documents from 1 pe-·' de- V oa_j eli 0 ✓ 'tr _ -- s - t r i r a • a r· 1 •• r · i • r · ·• 2 ' • • • ' _- I • •· - f I - 1 • ' •• • I Ii c - s- t ulbt iuar I Ii ii L - 00457 13-00000 I _ • C • · l · t l I r· ·rs 0•1p I •• ·- • I • 2 the Frencm Consulate On 18 June 1962 DCI McCone and Helms briefed Secretary of State Rusk generally on the operation without going into operational details Later on he same day President John F Kennedy was brief ed Actual breaking and enterin occurred somewhat later and on 15 April 1963 DCI McCone met with Pt·cs iden t Kennedy alone and briefed the President on the details of this new phase of the operation· On the same day the Attorney General was briefed and he agreed that he would not mention it to the FBI unless the FBI themselves raised it with him On 3 February 1964 DCI McCone met alone with President Lyndon 8 ·Johnson and briefed him on the operation On 4 February McGeorge Bundy was briefed On 6 February 1964 in a briefing of Sec J etary of State Rus·k on the results of the operation Rusk expressed reservations about the propriety of such an operation He raised this same concern in subsequent conversa ions with McCone on 17 April 1964 28 May 1964 and 14 June 1964 On 12 September 1964 Rusk continued to express · grave reservations and repeatedly suggested that the French be informed directly that we knew about their espionage operations in the United States and ask them to desist In a meeting on 28 May 1964 Rusk expressed these reservations in the pr sence of DCI McCone and President John--F Kennedy· secretary of Defense McNamara was also present and there is no record that he had pI eviously been made aware of this operation · 4 Although certain activities never got beyond the planning stage there are I believe three examples of such planning which could be subject to misinterpretation One involved chemical warfare operations against the rice crops in both Cuba and North Vietnam A second involved a paramilitary strike ag inst the Chi-Com nuclear installations Outside the United States Government General Eisenhower was briefed on such planning A third which assumes a new significance today involved a proposal by Angleton and Helms for a greatly increased intelligence collection effort against foreign installations in this country This planning also involved a scheme for selected 'E - - - f SAl f C - • 1 •· · · · 8 I • • • '·· · ' I • 't ii t - • --- I I l '- V Ii I Ei'ES DULY t I 00458 13-00000 • •• • ' • - ·i · •• - 'I ' r i '-i - - l - • · - • L s 19 '1 r • l 3 exposure of KGB activities and counteractions against the Soviet intelligence service The reasons are still unclear to me as to why the FBI chose to brief the PFIAB to the effect that CIA was planning to wiretap extensively and indiscriminately in this country to greatly increase the Agency representation in the Moscow Embassy and generally to use KGB-type tactics also extensively and indiscriminately Th is led to a hea_ted · xchange between DCI McCone and Mr Belmont of the FBI one such meeting taking place in the presence of -the Attorriey General It is clear that the FBI was opposed to any such proposal then as now and the plan nevet went forward 5 During the period when Des FitzGerald was in charge of the Cuban Task Force DCI McCone' office learned quite by accident that FitzGerafd bad secured the cooperation of several prominent US business firms in denying economic i terns to Cuba There was no question but that the businessmen were glad to cooperate b ut knowledge of this operation had to be rather widespread · 6 On 17 April 1964 Mr Robert B Anderson came to DCI McCone on behalf of American business interests offering to insert some $300 000 to try to secure a favorable result in the elections in Panama Shortly after this approach Mr Clyde Weed of Anaconda Copper Company made a similar proposal to McCone in connectlon with elect ions in Chi le On 12 May 1964 at a meeting of the 303 Committee it was dec'tded that the offers of American business could not be accepted it being neither a secure way nor an honorable way of doing such business This declaration of policy at this time bears on the recent ITT hearings but I am not surprised that McCone bas forgotten that be helped to set the precedent of refusing to accept such collaboration between the Agency's operations and private bust·ness I 7 At the direction of Attorney General Robert Kennedy and with the explicit approval of President Kennedy McCone injected the Agency and particularly Cord Meyer • ·'--· _· · · I • • • II • • i ' • _ II Ii Ii Ii -- c··· L1t11 •· _ 'fL • W- 00459 13-00000 •' ' - ' #' r r _ --• · ' r ' - r I F · • • I • • f I • ' • • • • JI ·' i I • l •· ' i 1- J LI - • -' -' •• •• f- I 4 into the US labor situation and particularly to try to ameliorate the quarrel between George Meany and Walter Reuther Cord Meyer steered a very skillful course in this connection but the Agency could_ be vulnerable to charges that we went behind Meany's back or were somehow consorting with Reuther against Meany's wishes · · 8 There are three examples of using Agency funds which I know to be controversial One was the expenditure of money under Project MOSES in securing the release of Cuban Brigade prisoners Details of this peration are best known to Larr1 Houston Mike Miskofsky Ge·o a Manus and James S'tnitb Second as you well know when Lou Conein received his summons to report to the Joint General Staff Jieadquarters on 1 November 1963 a large amount of cash went with him My impression is that the accounting for this and its use has never been very frank or complete Third at one of the early Speci l Group meetings attended by McCone he took strong exception to proposals to spend Agency funds to improve the economic viability of West Berlin and for an investment program in Mali His general position was that s ch expenditures were not within the Agency's charter and that he would allow such spending only on the direct personal request of the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense or the White House 9 I raise these issues of funding because I remember the Agency's being severely criticized by tbe · House Appropriations Subcommittee for having spent $3 000 for stamps in connection with a program to buy iractors to secure the release of prisoners from Cuba 10 Under the heading of old business I know that any one who has worked in the Director's office has worried about the fact that conversations within the offices and over the telephones were transcribed During McCone's - r-- '· t-••--r-- · • I fP r- r • -•• r-2p I• Ff J ' ' I • r • i 11 - - I - ·l • ' I ·• 00460 13-00000 ' - · rr•· • - -_ 1 5 tenure ther were micrbphones in his regular office his inner office his dining room his office in East Building and his study at his residence on White Haven Street I do not know who would be willing to raise such an issue but knowledge of such operations tends to spread and certainly the Agency is vulnerable on this score 11 Also under the heading of old business I well remember the hue and cry raised especially by Carl Kaysen in the White House when the Agency injected a contaminati'ng agent in Cuban sugar bound for the Soviet Union Shortly after the Cuban missile crisis there was a disposition -in Washington to reexamine the Bay of Pigs and the fact that several Alabama National Air Guard officers lost their liv•s in the Bay of Pigs was surfaced wi_th surprisingly little excitement at the time 12 During my stint on the 7th floor there was a special arrangement with the Office of_ Communications whereby_ the Director's office gained access to non CIA traffic This surfaced briefly at one point shortly after Admiral Rayborn became DCl Re _had visited the Signal Center and removed a copy of a telegram from the Embassy in the Dominican Republic for Under_ Secretary George Ball Eyes Only He returned to his off ice and proceeded to _ discuss this telegram with George 11 who was naturally quite curious as to how Rayborn knew about it and also as to how Rayborn had it in his possession before Ball did Ben Read in the Secretary of State's office and I spent several weeks putting this one to rest 13 Finally DCI McCone as you and I well know operated on a very lofty plane and I think certain of his activities could be misunderst-ood One example was his decision in July of 1964 to h_ave Aristotle Onassis and Maria Callas flown from Rome to Athens on Air For e KC- 135 Their arrival in Athens in this airplane attracted the attention of the local press and ln due course Mr John • I • - i IJ tl • JQ i·lA II I - i ·- - r 2- - ---- ·4 • • •• t U - • - - ii · J• • I - · -• t - 1 - • 0 ' • If il ••• J • 00461- 13-00000 ' ' I - ···r · - -- • I · · ' _- i u ' ll ' ' LI t n I Y • ' 6 Hightower Chief of the Associated Press Bureau for Washington came to see me to ask about the propriety of this action 14 The use of Fairways Corporation aircraft has been remarkably secure but DCI McCone himself fo'rgot about the cover arrangement and became quite exercised when he saw Candidate Goldwater land in the San Francisco airport for the Republican National Convention in 1964 aboard the Grumman Gulf Stream with the highly visible tail number N 8 E This was I explained to him carefully a perfectly legitimate charter but be didn't like it 15 • Cone dealt quite extensively with newsmen in Washington In fact they gave him a gift and a luncheon when he left Washington which ls perhaps indicative of the press's relations with him However in the ase of the Ross and Wise book The Invisible Government he did try to bring pressure on the publisher and the authors to change things They did not change a comma and I doubt that this old saw will ever sing again · 16 - Finally and this will reflect my Middle _Western Protestant upbringing McCone's dealings with the Vatican including Pope John XX 111 and Pope Paul V I would and could raise eyebrows in certain quarters 17 The above listing is uneven but I have a sinking 'feeling t·hat discipline bas broken down and that allegations from any quarter which cast these things in the wrong light would receive great publicity and attention nd no amount of denial wbuld ever set the record straight If I may be of any assistance in tracking down further details ·I am of course at your disposal but I would point 0046 13-00000 - - t ti i ' i _i 7 out that I was very much in the position of the enlisted ma who knew that ·the commissione offic rs were aware of these activities and better able to judge their propriety and possible impact or misinter_pre tat ion 5f WALTER ELDER • u i it • lui vL EYES CiltY 00463