I ' l i i · • ' • •' t • • • • •· ' ··- ·• ' ·_ ' f • Date Page 09 24 98 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM --' • ' ' - - - - - - - ' - - ----- - - - - - - - 'AGENCY INFORMATION- - _ - - - - - ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -·- ' 1_ - - - - - ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - • - - - DOCUMENT INFOR TION ORIGINATOR FROM · · TO __ T ITLE-· ·-DATE PAGES SUBJECTS · NSC A R ASH THE Fl LE _ BOARD-·PANEL ON·COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS 09 10 63 7 COVERT ACTION DOCUMENT TYPE · PAPER TEXTUAL DOCUMENT ---· · CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET · '-- lB lC - RESTRICTIQNS RELEASED WITH DELETIONS CURRENT STATUS DATE OF LAST REVIEW gs10 19 -OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS Box 10 Cov rt Operations 1954-1967 contained in 206-10001-10001 C ••• ·- ••• os 01 wz Dupl_icate ---------------·-------- ------------------------------- --------------------- R · Page 1 - ITEM rs RESTRICTED • y ·1 1 ·'· ·j · · · j'- 06 10001-1001§ l l Ii ' I ' l·· - _ ·•- • -•-···• O• u -••·•- · - - • • - • - · - · - - - - - - · · · • ····-•· ····•··•·••··· -··-··· -···· v ··o• • • -• •• -- --• - - - · '·- ···-····• •• -·-·•-··•-····· -··· •• •• • ·····-- - -•C - - · · · - - · · • • · · ' · ·••·•· I' iI ·--•_-• ----• 1 -·· - ·- •• ·--• - •··----·· ---·-• · •·-•• · -·· • - • · ··--·---- ····--r · i ···--·· ·-- ······ • l - ·•· ' '·- •·· •- • •··••···- • _ ·-- ·· -··· --- ••·•· • - -•· - -·• · ··-• · · ·•- ·-· -- ·•···'- ·-'· · --- · •·· ••• - -· - •·• ·•· ·•··• · · •· •·•·•·· · c · · · l ······· -·----· -•·ao· - -·- ···· '·-··-- ·····-·•· -•--•· - - - -- _ - _ -- -- ·--···'-- ·• ··- · •·-• ···· · ·' · · -·· · - ··· ·-···- ·--···· ·-·-- ·- - · ·- ' ··-•···• •· ·· --· ·· I1 i J i --··- _• u -----· - - _ ·- ··-· -· ------··--- ·----- • ·--- --··--·· ·-- ·- ·- •• ·• - Hn O - • · • • 0 • 0 •-''•• •• ••••••• 000 - ••OU•-•-••-••-•-• O •••·••-- ----- - 00 - •- - - • v •--- -- • ---•••• -•• • ----- -• • ·• •• • -••••- • • --- • -- - • -·• •••• -_ • • - l I s _ • • _ • l _ _ __ - - · ___ __ _ ___ _ 1 • - ••• -o··--· - - ---· I _ I •• --- • -- - -• - i 1··-----·•···· I - · _ _ - • - - - I ··---- - ·-- • · · - 025 Release under the John F Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 • NW185 Docld 250 6 N i21 Docld 6-71 Page2 _i_ - --- - _- -· ' - --- - - - -- _ _ I fj · _ • -•-_'· · ' · -_ · · -• · •· -•• · · Y J Q l li -_ - - j - -- - -• •• • •' ••- •••••••• •-•••--•• '• •-w'• • J -• • _ • •• ••••• ---•· 1or· sE£RE1 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON September 10 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE SUBJECT Board Panel ·on Covert Actiorr 0perations 1 ·The Board Panel met in the Boara'•s offices on September 6 1963 Panel members present were Mr Robert Murphy Chairman Mr Gordon Gray and Dr William Langer Messrs Coyne·and Ash also attended the meeting During the course of its meeting the Panel wa briefed L_by Mr Richard Helms Deputy DCI Plans CIA and his assistants Mr Cord Meyer and Mr Desmond Fitzgerald head of CIA 1 s headquarters staff dealing with Cuba Highlights of the briefings were· as follows · 1 MESSRS·• HELMS and MEYER British Guiana i i For a· 79-day period ending in July the anti-Jagan Trades Union Congress maintained a general strike which was directed against the Jagan regime and had wide support among agrarian and industrial workers in protest against an oppressive Labor •Bill proposed by Communist oriented Jagan CIA worked out with George Meany a program of CIA financial support $435 000 to t·he strike under the cover of ' AFL-CIO contributions 11 A CIA cover representative ran the strike program The _activity was tricky because the United States and the British desired to avoid violence ·and the situation was complicated by the fact that the British Governor-Ge eral opposed the strike CIA assesses the operation as a success because even though Jagan was not unseated the _oppressive Labor Bill was withdrawn and the TUC survived The strike activity took place against a background of agreement between President Kennedy and MacMillan that the British will not pull out of Guiana for an indefinite future period in the hope that a Communist government will not fill the vacuum when the British do withdraw Cuban influence in the strike was in the form of a $1 million advance from Cuba to the Guiana Import-Export Corporation an arm of Jagan 1 s East Indian Peoples Progressive Party which in turn was borrowed by the Jagan regime Soviet help was indicated by a rumored transfer of over $100 000 to Jagan 1 s Party through banks -oP SECRET 1 NW185 Docl d 25 06 N¥P i12 Docld 34fi71 Page 3 i I • ····-· 1 · • • •· ---- - ' _ ___ _ __ - - - J' _ _ _ _ J_ _ _ __ __ _ __ ·• '' -- ' - • t · · i · • - _ _ ___ • ··- • '° •·· - - ------ --_ - - _ TOP SECRET _ j CIA at present is providing $5 000 to the PNC Party made up or anti-Jagan Africans in Guiana and CIA is sending a Negro cover representative from New York to_ aid the African Party ·· CIA considers that Mrs Jagan a known Communist from Chicago is the brains and guts of the Jagan operation · Haiti CIA has surveyed the intentions and capabilities-of various Haitian exile groups and has supplied them with token amounts of money to test them out Efforts of the groups to form·a united front have failed and in the Dominican Republic· Juan Bosch·has reversed his -intention to help unseat Devalier for t 1he present Ten days ago CIA dropped 100 rifl s and ammunition to one Haitian exile group which has been given sanctuary by a Dominican Republic commander stationed on the border Dominican Republic In this country there is a lack of democratic institutions political party structure labor unions or cooperatives of an effective nature Juan Bosch spends more time debating charges by political opponents than in performing the administrative job of running the country · Bosch is an extreme conservative economically and refuses to spend moneys in excess of assured revenues A twenty per cent unemployment figure is a major problem Bosch has strengthened his Cabinet at the urging of the u s Ambassador and has made peace with church elements with CIA 1 s help Opposition to Bosch is from the right and from parts of the Army He has met individual Communis·t moves as -they arise e g an attempted infiltration of the Planning Conun1ssion but he is not pursuing an over-all anti-Communist program or crusade Although Bosch is 6onsidered by CIA to be anti-Castro and anti-Soviet he has not clamped down on returning trainees from Cuba The twenty per cent unemployment situation provides the basis for a coup in the months ahead Meanwhile the Army strong-man Ernbert one or -Trujillo 1 s assassins waits in the wings · Vietnam CIA's role in Vietnam during the 'past two years has been two-fold J - 2 - NW185 Docld 2506 N¥fwt'Je13 34611 Page 4 TOP SCCRET _· _ c _ • _··-- - - - ' I TOP S CRET· · 1 Total support of the war against the Viet Cong including the training of some 43 000 irregulars now turned over to u s Special F'orces support to _the mountai people in operations against the Viet Cong and CIA training of u s Special Forces in South Vietnam 2 CIA support· of infiltration operations in North Vietnam Not a great success High losses of teams a In response to question based on' recentu s press allegations that CIA is attempting to overthrow the Diem government 11 QIA has never engaged in any such operations whatsoever -no instigation of the Buddhists_ nothing u CIA considers that anti ClA expressions of this kind originate with Madame Nhu 1 The Viet Cong has been working on the Buddhists but the Buddhist leader who took sanctuary in the U • S Embassy has indicated that the Buddhist activity is motivated by a desire 1 to unify what is a loosely-joined individual-Pagoda-type religiqus imvement · I 1 r1 1 • A-ugust 20 saw the temple _raids martial law and then the 1 arrests of students · One·u s reaction was an August 24 cable- gram from the State Department presumably hastily prepared · 1 which in nice diplomatic language to State Department representa· 11 I · ti ves in Saigon gave the word to nun load the Nhus - - 1 e l · I J indicate to the anti-Diem plotters among the Generals that i 1 they should get moving However the Generals proved to be lack- I ing in any intentimto pursue their previously-professed anti-Diem i sentiments CIA considers that the August 24 State Department cablegram was the result of a miscalculation of the General I s l true capabilities and intentions CIA understands that subsequen ly the Executive Committee of the NSC has met frequently on the sub- j ct and more recent State Department cables-have reflected ----a_ r evision of the earlier unlqad the Nhus message · i As yet the political situation in South Vietnam has not had an adverse effect on the_ military effort nor any increased Viet Cong moves t9 capitalize on the situation Mr Helms departed at this point Italy With approval by the Special NSC 5412 2 Group the Christian Democratic Pai _ty was supported by CIA to the tune of $1 million · in the campaign leading to the June elections plus $600 000 to·other political elements in Italy CIA 1 s rationale for the loss of CDP strength in the elections is that 1 there was a loss of votes among the workers from the south who were given the Communist treatment when they moved to the northern cities - 3 NW185 Docld 2 606 NW - Docld 34fi71 Page 5 TOP SECRET « I · ELc- -- L- - 2·- 2 -- ·· --·--- _ ' - - _ _ --·· _ --- - --- - - - - TOP SECRET ' i ' I _ 2 Fanfani and 3 -the Papal audience given to Khrushchev's son-in-law had an effect on anti-Comm nist religious Italian·s including wives or the workers who had preMiously been able to ·persuade their husbands to vote against the Communist candidates Meanwhile the Special Group has authorized CIA to spend $125 000 to support the CDP in current developments looking toward the establishment of a center-left government coalition I I · l j i ' i' r Bolivia The Special Group has authorized a unique effort by CIA in support of Paz Estancero•s program to rationalizen the tin mines - i e a project calling for the firing of surplus tin ners and resettling them in new Jobs This w 11 take some time but may result in breaking the leftist influence among the Bolivian miners · Brazil Goulart is ensaged in coordinated efforts to 1 discredit the legislature 2 obtain backing of the Army and 3 make a demagogic appeal to the Brazilizn people as the o nly leader who can serve their interests CIA is carrying out covert action in the labor movement and CIA believes that Conununist control can be weakened In student groups a number of CIA-operations are going and assets are in place e g in the_ top xecutive committee of the Students' Federation However there is no large-scale CIA political operation in Brazil now MR FITZGERALD On the subject of Cuba In June he NSC SpeciaJ Group approved a CIA propo al for a package of covert actions against Cuba The covert program assumes that means short of military action are to be attempted on the premise that_at the present rate of progress the Castro regime will be even more firmly entrenched because the passage of time runs in Castro I e favor · Mr Fitzgerald turned to a listing of the approved GIA covert actions remarking that if' they seemed fanu liar proposals which were previously under consideration it should be kept in mind that they have now been approved as interdependent actions The actions call for 1 covert collection of intelligence 2 propaganda -action to stimulate low-key sabotagen 3 stimulate disaffection among the Cuban military 4 an economic denial NW185 Docld 2506 N i15 Docld 34671 Page 6 - 4 - J · __ - 5 __ • TOP SECRET r program aimed at precluding acquisition of spare parts for -industrial machinery and other products needed by Cuba 5 _a·sabotage program of a general n -ture and o support of anti-Castro autonomous groups by giving them money -and the means to act but under an arrangement which insures gainst attribution to the United States and which precludes operations from u s or British soil The CIA philosophy is to back only the potentially powerful and effective anti-Castro groups and the military is felt ·to be the best bet - ' The CIA effort represents a shift from external raids to 11 internal sabotage actions CIA mounts about 10 black't oper tions a onth and Cast o security forces have taken their toll among·the CIA teams Three operations were conducted on A us1t 17 and 18 and among other things the objective is to give encouragement to dissident Cuban elements such·as military officers who see no professional future under Cp stro who is unloading military elements which aided himin his initial seizure of the government The Special Group Mr Bundy and other White House staff note the successful mounting of CIA's sabotage operations and have asked for more to be conducted CIA has found it necessary to resist any such pressures for these operations to be increased beyond the present effective capacity which CIA has at this time · Again referring to the Cuban economy it is hurting badly The United States has a monopoly on the spare parts for industrial machinery needed by Cuba and the USSR cannot supply them The Cuban electrical industry 1is particularly hard hit in this respect Castro's re-emphasis on an agricultural step-up means increased ef forts to produce sugar a crop which presents a good sabota e target Finally the Soviet aid at a rate of $1 million a day lmilitary and economic is not enough to keep the Cuban· economy goin Cubans are not starving but they do not·eat ncomfortably even in the larger cities CIA finds that a major problem for their blackn teams is rood re supply in areas where · the Cubans are hard put to feed themselves CIA assets being used against Cuba 384 Washington and Miami contract6r personnel 83 · Foreign nationals 525 mostly Cubans Personnel at overseas posts 45 DD I staff 12 NPIC a big effort on U-2 photography of Cuba Staff u s - 5 NW185 Docld 2506 N i25 Docld 34fi71 Page 7 10P SCCRET ·· - -- - --- - -· - ----- -- --- ----------- -- - - · ·- - • _ - -• - - · ·-·· · -- · - ···- · - ·--·•·-'·····•······ TOP SECRET· r i CIA considers that of all nationalities the Cubans are the most unreliable prone to exaggerate The best information comes from non-Cuban agents There are 108 agents in Cuba including friendly diplomatic personnel There are two illegal teams ·working one of which has 200 sub-agents There are 44 legal travelers world ng 60 agents in Cuban shipping and there are 31 penetrations of Cuban installations abroad As to Soviet shipping into Cuba CIA has an agent in every port but observers cannot say what is in the crates they·see being off-loaded Since January CIA has disseminated 150 photographs taken by agents on-the-ground in Cuba Also CIA has furnished its agents in Cuba more and better radio equipment 1 I • CIA 1 s estimate of bloc personnel in Cuba 12 000 Soviet troops 150 Chinese mostly diplomatic personnel · an unknown number of Soviet civilian technicians and 11 a loth of Czech and other bloc technicians working_with the Cuban military forces CIA considers that in the past 9 months progress has been made in 1 intelligence collection with respect to Cuba and 2 effectiveness of the economic denial program- CIA 11 feels that the X factor is the volatility of the Cuban people whose resignation to their lot under Castro would change overnight if they see evidence of successful sabotage operations against the Cuban government I ' 1 CIA penetration of the Cuban military got under way in April An agent brought out a Cuban Army major and he 1s being sent back into Cuba next week The major says that there is a medium level acceptance among the milita ry of the idea- of overthrowing Castro but although this view is held by individual members of the military they are fearful of communicating 1t to others within Cuba The wife of the chief of-training of the Cuban Arrrry is a CIA sourceo Defectors are naming military personnel to be contactedo There is however a fear of the Castro security system II - The subject of specific kinds and amounts of Soviet military equipment in Cuba is an area of the worst exaggeration and reporting ·by no·nprofessional observers o However there is no eviaence of offensive missiles There are 47 MIG-21 1 s operated by Cuban pilots Cubans are at the SA-2 sites and are being trained to operate them We don•t know what is in the caves exactly Neither CIA agents nor Cubans nor even Castro has access to the Soviet armored camps -- A R Ash NW185 Docld 2506 - 6 - NW 1 il 0oc1 141il1 Page8 TOP SECR T --- - ---- -