OCR of the Document

View the Document >>

White House, “Minutes of Meeting of January 30, 1964,” [The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Meeting with President Lyndon B. Johnson], Top Secret, January 30, 1964

n ii ifiJ 1 il ifi N'fit w - -' ' ' ' ' I tJ ' f W ff i1 l 1 i5 r l 't' t a '' ' · ' f J • ' --•--• O O • ·••• · · - • • t • • • • • _ _ i t •r 1 • J Date - 09 24 98 -- ·• ·Page 1 JFK ASSASSIN ATION SYSTEM · ID-ENTIFICATION FORM '- ' ' • ' ' - ' AGENCY INFORMAT_ION AGENCY · -PFIAB _ -· · RECORD NUMBER 206 -10001-10 Q0 2__ _ - -t- j· _ _ •· -- f -- J 1· - -REC0RDS·- SERIES- · PRESIDENT'S' FOREIGN · ' INTELL IGENCE ADVISORY- BOARD AGE NCY FILE NUMBER -_ ------ - - ---- - --- -- -- ----- -- _ - - · - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - · • _ - - - - - - - - - - - - ' -- -DO-CUMENT -_ -INFORMATION r ORIGINATOR _FRO TO T1TLE DATE PAGESSUBJECTS PFIAB · MINUTES OF MEETING OF' JANUARY · 30 -_ 1'964 01 30 64 67 SUMMARY OF JANUARY ' 0 1964 MEETING ' ' • •' AGENDA FOR 9 ANUARY 3 0 1964 MEETING r -DOCUMENT TYPE PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSI FICATION TOP SECRET 'RESTRICTIONS lB lC CURRENT· STATUS RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW 9 0 PffiA' OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS 01 202' · I' · - - - - - - • • - - - - - • - - - - • - •• • - - - - - - - • - - _ _ _ _· - - - - - _ - -·- R - ' ' _ •• - - - - - - - ITEM IS RESTRICTED •••• 877 -· i • - J - - •• - - - - - • - - - - - - - • - - - - _ _ - - L •• • - _ ' _r ' 1 '•••• 0 1 ' ' • ••• - ic • it 'f1 ' ••• •·i • · ° ' 1· -J •i_ r t f l J t • -tt3I C 1 i 1-- ·• ·l11 f •f J -r ' lt- · ••rnt• 1 i ·-h'·l 'l'•'' • •u-•f fJ f J 1 ' •·· · -• T l r '''1 Jlfu 4l·'t1·-re « i t11 1 11'·•·r •· ' 'JH - • • _··• · '_ · · - 1 '• ··•- _' •• • · 11-f LI ' • • · · · - •·- 1 · ••••• i• • · • · · · lii ' it - 1 -i i' f•· i - fj -'i' •- r · · 'Y •••••• i 1 - t-' • ' ·- · i 1 1 t f ·' ' · · 0 · - - 1 ' _· · · · ' '• · • 0 ·· · 025 Release under the John F Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 19 9 2 ' i ·· IJ% J - · - · · ·· · · - ' - - ' - · tt c '11 •'• - _ _· ' ·_i 1 J' · · ii _· · '_ I •· • • I • ••• 4 0 F t J• ' '· Page2 • · • · · • - · • · l fAO J5 i t •' SECRET PRESIDENT 1 8 FOREIGN INTELLIG NCE ADVISORY BOAHD · f AGENDA FOR MEETING OF JANUARY 30 1964 I·- TIME rrEM 10 00 9 00 1 SUBJE8'1' · Chair n 1 s·T1me 10 00 11 00 Acting D1recior of Central Intellige ce Lt· General Marshall Carter 3 11 00 11 30 Executive Session l't 11 30 12 30 Director National Reconnaissance Office Under Se0retary Broc1Gvay McIVU llan U C-JAF i t '· t _ 5 1 45 12 30 b 1 45 7 2 30· n 4 00 · 9 5 JO - - ·- Executive Session i r 2 30 Lunch--White House Mess ·4 00 C nsideratio of Report to the Pres ident 5 00 Meeting wi h ths-P esident End of Executive Sess1on'and Discussion of Future Board Business Day J I · SEORR'F ·• · NW 18 5 Docld 2492 NW 877 3 1·' · _ · ' • · ' • _ ' 'f'' • • J • i • - s 1 ' I · I'· ' ' t tached memorandq Tabs A through H were used '1 ' I I I ·' ·1 ' b y the Chairman as the basis for an oral briefing on the· Origin of the Board at the PFIAB mr e ti ng with President Johnson on January 30 _ • · - I · · · · i j · · • r • ' ' ·' I I ·'r1 if'-· • J · i ' -1 • r ' -' t i j ' ' - ' ' -t J J1 · • ·• rr l · - J - l - fit l t J - 1· - t ' 1 i'fi ' ' -i - - - f l ll - tri $1 'IJt l J' iit 'r f i _ · ' Ji Page 5 '· ' _ ·WASHING TON ' P SID ENT I S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOP RD · - · 1 · Origin of the _Board From 1946 to 1954 a varfety of ' 3-d hoc· groups were consti Cuted at the Presidential level to review s el-ected aspects of · the fetal U S foreign intelligence effort · · In 1955 the Hoover Commission on Organtzation of the- Executi ve Branch· of the Government recommended a permanent bi-par tisan · ''h'atch Dog Committee 11 to be composed of members of· both -_Houses of Congr·es$ and of public-spirited citizens to make periodic surveys of the · 9rgan1za t1on functions pol1c1e s and eff ectivene s of the forelgn in telli'gence ac ti'vi ties of the several Government agenr ie s concerned • reporting thereon'both to the Congress and the President Pr stde-nt Eisenhower rej cted this prophsal · · 1 · • ' • · ·· · · ' 'i _ ' '· - ' · 1 j ••• there i_ _ ' ' • · · r- · · · I' ' • I ·· ' __ · ' ' i_ _· l· · · ·· r· f ·' 'w In January 1961 President· Kenned r decided· that was '$ · ·continuing ne d for a Presidential advisory board on foreign i nte111 gence but deferred temporarily the appointment of netv members -In _ the interim he reques-ted that the Executive Secretary of the prior_· · BUard remain in office and that he continue to rev·iei• and report· · to the President on the conduct of our fb eign intelligence effo t · - ·· 1 ' as • • 1 _ '_f ' 1 In Feb1 Uary 195D a- t ·ctic to forest_all creation' of a· i £atc · Dog Comrnittee - President EisenhOi•rer ·issued an Executive Order Tab-- A establishing hi owh Board✓ of Consul tan ts on Foreign Ihte lig ence Activities to mainta in a continuing independent review· of all-U S foreign intelligence activities · President Eisenhower's Board functioned continuously from February 1956 to January 1961 · The r ' Tlembership of th Eisenhowe r ' Boa r c l is _lis tea· under Tab B · t · -· · -· rtlDJ Jt Mission of the Board · · On May·- l 1961 following the disaster sufferec _ ·-·1- · r - - c t '· · by the U S at Cuba I s Bay- of Pigs the President by Exec·uti ve Order ' rrJ rf 8 1 1 _ _'-_ _ _ _ _ C 1n h p i 1 · _ · tinuing _ independe·nt rev 1 ew and_ assessme t of all_· functions o f• he _ · ° 11 Js fil J -$t departments and rtgencies ·- having 11 respons1b111 ties in tne foreign iW 1'i51 R Jl ' 2 iz itelligence and related fields -· and b · to 'advise the President _with · · ·· t1 1 f 1' - ii 1 f respect to the objectives-- and _conduct of these activities which -· · · · t · r r f 1 r t ·1 · 11t t'r are require d i n th e interes1t · of foreign policy national qefense _ 1 1- tt i 11 _tt § ff 4 and security The phrase related fields 'pertains to highly · z if 1 sensitive covert _operatio s' relating to poli t1cal action propaganda ·· · _ t #jt economic arfare sab' _t_age - ' scape· and evasion subversion agai st · · f Ji - OJ1J ' ·· hostile s vates or g1'oups · and- support of indigenous and anti-com munist · · id - · - _ ·i• elements in th_ i eaten d- countries of the free world These covert · -· _----- - __ cperat_ions e to be conducte_d· n· _such· manne_r hat if uncov8red -_· · tJ9Jfi Y • - - l e_ u -· _·G _vernm I t 9 XP µ ply di_scl im responsibility for them - · _· - t1i l '' · t - '• · · - _ -' _ - 't •· · ·- t j ' i · 1fj' %· i tttt1 i ✓- ' t · - ·1' ' · ' · ' ' ' · _ -' - ' fft _ fomhershi -of the' Boa r_d f it F t_ ·-st n J ennedy_ s 'Execi tive Order - - ·· ·- _ _·_ rovide that · -·_- e - - -p f t t1B _ha_ l ' be _appointed_ from among ·· - ' · f i· t -'·-i - _O' l - -t - •- P ' Pn P' l l 1 ' 1 P fie • Ct_qv en t · · · -- _ - _All_ appointments to_ ' i- - '- ff'i ' 1n • · 1- • '•'- • - • -- d - - r -fl' ' ·- _ 't• J1 j · J - -- • L f- -- i - - 1 i - -• •1f J · - · 1 · 1 '1r' 1 · · 1 •· u · ··l•f ' r'· ' - 4 u• • t- p l j' il - f t• -1- it • l f -- f • ' _ - _ J r 1'' ' • _ • •• ••r a• _ ' - ' v ' Y • ''r' ' ' 1 - f ii ¼' ifr i Alf 1tWtW 1 i Jf' ft ffe k ·- _ Ji 1t i P 2t ' f 1 J J· 8 8··V ' - 6Vl· ·f Jfa l·- ' 1 ' t ' tf-i11P•ft _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -- · r_ _ _4 _ - - _ · · · i_· _l -_i _ l _ i Bl ·_ r t fr s I s r g o g - · · ' tli l t J 'ck ' f i i 1- - f ij tLnf k it • -t 1 '• '• • · • · ·_ ¢ • 1 1• t - •' i · t t -t f l D E4i'Yl° tG®I'v· 1 n @H NmEBs - 0 u ' it ttTor lfs·EerffiT• - · _ ' - - A ' · · ·t 1- ·' Xi- •n' 1 11- l a ' •• • 1 ' j _ i • 1 •• • • • - - 1 •· f 1 W 0CG lffGi Y lOm _ 0 '•' Page6 '' ' I ' • l • ' • ' • _ ' - - · ' • 'I · - ·' - - ' ' · ' • ''1 · • ' r 5 ·r· ' ' • ' • ' •• '· ··• • •' ' gr ·• SBC EJ 0 the ·Board nave been macle· on _that b2 sis Tnc· Boe rd 's r 1err6crshio is listed under Tab D The Board was chaired initi2 lly by Dr• 1 Jarncs Kil'lian ·Jr In Apr-11' 1963 ' hen Dr· Killian res i _c j d Pr•es ident · Kennedy· aot ointed Mr· · Cia clc Clifford as Chc iman · In a 'l binting • Mr Clifford· the President dire·ct d th at the Board 11 continuc to · perform the highly important fun ctio'n of maint_ain ing jfi_ ind_ J ic dent 1·ev1·ew cind assessment of th · ob'jqc ti ves and -conduct of • thc' · fov eign fn t·elligenc e anq · related - ti vi ties of · the· dcpartm en and·· ag n c'ies· having- responsibilities in thi ·•field • · ab E · ·- _ ' · ac ' Cbinc ident with '•• • ts _• I •2_ •••' Mr Ciifford 's J•' l' •s• appointment -the Presict·e n t 1 made a public annour1cement einphasizir g thai ' he -i•ro uld '' c onc Lnue l'ot · · 1c ok to the Board ·for non· partisan · object1ve apprai'saJ s- ·or the - · ·a c ti vi ties of our intelligeri9e_ agencic s in order11 to assure·- their 1 efficient nianagement 7 and ·maximum effectiveness - Tab P •'· r · - ' · · 1·· · ' - · ' - ' 1 • l f ' - SE011ET ·· f ' · i· · · ' 1 ssista rit fyr National Security A ffafrs the Di recto'r of ' i1 ittrpl Inte'lligence and the Heads of the several intell-igG nc·e · agenc es·· -· · I ' - -- r _ 8 - · ' ' ' • _ - -- · - • i • ··· - ·· t ·· 5 The h2ndlin·g· ·and analysis of intelligence Lnform2 tion received ·in JT lassive a iR unts as the basis for a the•prcparation f r J - of appl''aisals of curr nt intelligence in_dicators 1 and early warning data for time y · consideration by the President arid ·other offir ials and b the formu ation o longer-ra 1 ge national' int elligence estimates for use in the policy making procers F8Il j · 1• ' - t i l ' ' · 7 The safeguarding · of sensitive U s - • 1nforma t1on· · inclµdibg · lntelligence and intelligence i sources and techniques by means· of a positive counterespionage penetration of Sovi·et bloc ·inte111' genc8 operations targeted against our Govern rnent on a Horld- '_1ide basis b the se curit r_screen 1 ng and ·securitY supervision of· f ' ' j · ' •' - 6 The U S •· clandes tine_ espionng e• effort· for ·the·- c ·iire· ction of vitally-needed intelligenc concerning the plans abti'cns and -c 2 pahili ties of the Sino Soviet · bloc in areas sign if ic antly af feet- ·· 1-n·g our national -defense and ecur1 ty l TOP I personnel engaged in sensitive U- ·s Government activities ar d· c phy'sical security measur_cs_ ·for the protect ion of sensitive U S material installations and·operations • i l i I · · ---- · j I f ' ' ·s1 · · · 71lif1 f ig r H i u b fi f i i cal · 1 ilttt f7 _· J '•n A ' ·1xj _ 'ti_ · 9 ' rn_e budc eting and mancige_ment par _ · _ticular _ ly ·in th ' - _ P j 1 w •· r f if ½i i l _ ' 1 1ttr Dep·ar ·_ent of Defense · of' _ th_e_ comp·1ex•··programs· ·ihi·_ch_ m_ak_g _tio o · u_ _ f_ _ ·· ·· tJ ' - · it ' ffif to ta1· foreign intelligence _effort ·•· Over 85% of dµJ · for •¢ign ·• _ t ·· · • · - _ -k Z X1 ·inteiligepce dollar expend'i tu1 es falls within th m·anag m n t ancf • '• - • 10hf 1 contr0l -i-1es ponsibility of t h_ _ •_ · · - cretary of Defense· · · · · · ·· · ·_· ·_· · • k1• t • 't'¾J 10 · The _coordinatfon and guidance_ of all· signif'-ican'c ·· asp c- s' '· _i· •11111 of our entire foreign intellfge'nc_e effor'c as a i 182 S · of ac hiev1ng · '- · · · ' • _ _ i t t fl maximum effectiveness in _ e eting critic al intelligerw e· nE ds of· - ' -_ ' - · · l ti our ·Goverr men ' tm_· • ' · Jt l 1J f l' - i' 1 • i•J l' f J j f i i _ l t Y · f ' r1 1 t 1 1l1 J i ll L 1 ' • • I -4 x fr-1 •' - • y-r- 6 i - ' · •0 · · 1 '- · ·'t1 · ' ' I •'• •I•• t 11 - ··' 1 •• ·1- i - ' ' • l • • · ' ' 1· j • ' J '- •1 • ° • ' • • o • 1 fer ' • • I • _ ' ' • ·• ' ' · · •• ' - · '' J 11 - •' '1 -or '• • t- J 1 • '- '- •• ·'- • ' • k 'r ' • - • •' · • 1 t •• 1•tJ-' 1l '-_ 1'- • 1 r - ' -4 -' ' • ° t' '' ·'1·1 -· - 1 'ij - lt l -' • '1 1 _ r ' ' lh· • •J 1 • _ • i -1- · •· t 1it• ·• - '• - I' - • - 'r · • ' ' •' i' • ·' ' 1 ' • -t• '11' 1 ·' $ • - ·- 1 t · ••'J' t•-· 1 • - • • lj J' ' ' ' ' ' i •'--- '·'• ' Ii _ 1 ' · ·11' I 1 _ r _ •• 1 k ' - -f't l l t i ft • ' ' ip -N- 1 •Y 'Ct •j'- ' - _ ' - A ' ' ' fl ' '• 1 _ ' ' • 'r1-•'- ' •• ' '• • _ i ' ' ' 't' l '• 1 ru •tL° • ' J • fr' L4 $1 1 1 l- _' r·v tr c - ' ·- ' ' _• 1_ • - •• · ¥ ·r' 1t --- - ' -- r tt 1 t1t· ir · _ y i1 t ' i '1' -· 1 • '• • 1 · •f1•• •s • 1 ' ' ct 1 t'l • i'• -r- T 1 -- - r - r • 1t1•· '1 i '' - - ·Jr- c · • · $ 1M - 1 L' -- - ' _ ft 1 - J t • ' l ' tt t _• '7 ' l•l'' S f i' 'i ' ' '• · JU t i1' rf t w '' -1•M ii i fl ' ti t 1 - •1·• •- 1 Jr ···p •·rr • r 1 l ik '1f 01g t- r f Cf hi ·· 1£7 r i'l f' f i9- 1 1 A f ci• ri f j 1 f t ' h L 1 1 '½1 1 ' it - ritri·1 r r I i' ' · 1 1l f i - ' t t t'ft· f lf _ € - t t t '· t· 1i ' i s ·it • • --·1 c · iG ' 4 ' '' a•• ' ' • ' ' -'--s' s' ' _ - '• i•'r · a• J J _ 1'• 1 '' i 1 - _ J' ' · • i 7V ' - br ·- - • p f •i cr -· ·• i -f i - Y•• ftt ½o 1 - JS ·· J r ' - • 1V - ' 'J f' i • - ' ·£· 'i - J -' -- -'- t ·t 1- ' i i• i '- ' 11' 1l ' •- ' f c ' ' • i · l • Pt''i -7• p- fr fJ 8_ t 1l 171 • A - SJii iR J 1 - x ' · i f - fi i t i 1m Jii -y trl f r i - ••- W' Y ' l r ' i • -ff - 1 1-·t •1 fr •'·• _ - t '• _ 1--· 1 1 ' 'r 11 i Y tl '· ''f• 1r-· • '•°' - 1 1 ' t · 1 t ••' _• • J • •i •- 11 _ 1 ' ' 1 - t i ul _ • -· ' r- 't J- j I ·f 'r t A• M ' - - -t lJ l I f ' ' l't J i r ' ' e ' 17 rJ - c_- P- i fil •-'f 'l ' t' - - · • ' i- _· -· v - h'· • l - - i · - r•f _t 1•J 3 s - • 'l l e '· • · - •igf ' · • ro - i0- i 7 t - 'k· ·· I' 71 ' · 1 · •-•· ti • 1-C -h tr i f f - iif - '-- '½ ' - 1 t 1-tu J 1• -1- 1t • · • · · ' l - • • i Jf' 2i -l r 1 'fr ¼ A n _'l' 1 • f · •' •• ' l l • •' - i' 1 • i-F ' i l i-f t' 1 -t ri ' J _ ' ' w Y tvl l7i tp i 'f f •i T'1· ' l' 1l't l 6 il ' f tv 1 u Vi' •6 t' J i l i •· 1i I - • 'SH ill' ' S tt$' 1'4fff Wt r 1ij - t h - • j ffi i £ '- ' l J I • · ' if ' t- % t- rr t 1 ' 1ll • 1 ¥ 1 f J f-1 j#l POB 1 'S ECR BT · f' i I - • ' • -0'• ·A• '''i1 f 1 •· _ - '-' - ·' _ £ ff 1 f · - '• q 1 ' - -- '- I · - r---- - - ' _ ·CC ' _ - --- ----- • • - • • •• ·- •• - · · - J_C TOP SECP£T '' I ' ' I - - ' Jt _ ·-· · ____ -_- _ _ - - i __- _· I 1 -' '· ·- - - _7 · · 1 Decerr1ber 1 19 3 _ j L 3 I - --' - i Slfr Ii-'iARY OF RECOMMENDATIOMS SUBMITTED TO 1 THE PRESIDENT PRESIDENTiS EY·_THE FOREIGU INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD _ ' 1961 - - - - November - 22 1963_ Board Reports of July 2 July 18 October L and October 17 1961 ·The Board mc1de a series of 17 rccorr m_endations calling for 1 a- redefinition of the role of 'the Director o Ce tral I tellis§nte DCI and 2 - a reorganizatior and -L edirection of the 2 c ti vi ties - of the Central Irri - - 1 lie enc e Agency - CIJ These recommcndatioi'1s i·tere submitte on the basis of a Board study requested by the President i antic_ip tion of the appointment of a new DCI which subsequently took place on November 29 1961- The Board reco ended RS follows nee ll That the President - designate the DC I as the_ Government's chief intelJ igcnce officer having primary respons_ibility for lending coord l_nation and guidahce t6 the total u S f6reign intel li erice effdrt 1 2 · j ' 1--- ' L •i' That the DC consider estabilshin a small -st aff to assist him in providing c_oordinatio • and g idance to he intelligeqce effort 3 ' That _the DCI although responsibility for the Ptesideht to assign to day-to-day operational 4 That the DCI be housed in the Exec tive Office of the P ces 1 d nt in orde1·- to· empha 3ize· his role as chief intelligence officer of the United States · - ·· tetaining over-all CIA be_directed by the the Deputy DCI the direction- of the CIA 1--• l 1 i - 1 •-- ' y -'- 1111111 _ t• - r'Yj p J ' ·' ' • • · · ' • estimates and evaluations • _- l - L1 -•··- '•·1 - _ - 11 --t t _ r1 Jr r-- · i r ' 1 J ¥ t1 f S1 Y •t ti i t•1 ' li ' Jir v ·t c fC Ji l f f f·P r · -t Ii_ - iit J i' - • l gi £ · r i '- ' g J-l t _ r f '11' · t l iWJ r ··-- _4 r it J i t _m'fi '•--' i d - i ' 1 i 'f ' ' 6 1 1 - _ TOP SI CRET r -- · · '- -_ '·'HAND' r c ff$ - - _-__ _ 1 - •-- • IJ J1r ·•-'- ··_ t 'r- ttfi iJ ·••• • i ·· _ · I' l f t _ _ - ' • •I ' ' • 1 - · •·r-- '•J r rJ-flJ 1 t 11 P lJ - rhV-1i i' 'i ' 11 - - • 1 -- - · - -'J 11 '-·· ' -' 1' f l i 1 J 'iJ' -'Ji_4 ¢j '' ·' ' - · -· · ''• ' '1-fi ii _ 1 ·t i f· s - 'if - ' 1 -N -' - • That the DCI-conslder taking with him to the E ecutiie Office th6$ CIA personhel ng ged in the ptepir tiqri 6t niti6nal intellig nc ' '' _ 5 i - • - __ - · '' F···i t ' · 'r _·· t f -J • - tifo 'A ' t O 'l ' '' ' _ 11- --•·' ' ·'· ' r • - _·- _1 _ _ - -- _ ·_ _ - _ _ · - _ - •' r r ' r F · r· j lf LC · ' ' ' '• 1' • · 1 -· • ii J- _ i · _ ' ' i- i · i l r · · -' · 71_' ' ' · n l-w l t •• _ - - · _ •' if - - --' '' ' _ - W r tJ '·' • l l · --- is • J 1 r tff ti1%tf t1 - i t i t f i J t ii - iR - ·· 1 t 4i tJ 7 · - - ·- Q li ' -• '-'W'''-' ' - -Y ·-1 _ ' l 1 v 'B p jf l ' -·ql ' 0'9 11 ' - -- m'· ---- k'W' · t k - tt - j f It ' _ l ' · J ' i 'J iJ -1f ' - -r • ' t 7--- t· 7-r r i t ' ' - f ft ' - ' _ -f- •' - 1 rJ1 - lH' ' i ' P - - i•- 1 f ' • 7 -- ' f _ ' t ' ' - 1 ' ' 3 1 r ltlt 1rirt1- tirlt i i -' _ ''J i l JffJ tit l_ -l J -- l 1° · - r 1 ·- '1 c · · i 1 1 'i - 1 l r ' t 1 i - 1· • - p l t ii - - j¥J r ' r-'W i- 'c f jp -' ' 1 i ' t ' 1' i5 - j' G t % i µ ff1 t ¼ ' 1r - Jti%P ' - l f r j t- 1- t fo VJi t l' - I j f NW 381 L w r ·7 1 - u ti I 1 7 l - s -·· _ ' - 1-' '··- •···' r J • - I ' • •- ' ' 1 s - '' - - 11 - -·- - - - - ' • -- i - ' - • - - - · - · · - _ -•---- - - _ ___ _ - - · - -- --- ·-·-- · _ _ - ' '' ·-· - -·· r •• -- ' i ' • i · · ' -- r TOP SZGilET 6 That th DCI participate with the Bureau of the Budget i'ri its reviei·r of the· intell_igence budgets of the various·U s· intelligence ac encies ·• · I 7 Th t the DCI be rcs ponsible_for 1 ovcrs ing the 'preparation of national in elligence estimates by the intelligence commuhity · 2 assuring the timely flm·r of intelligence to the i hit e House and 3 providihg intelligenc b iefings ·to the President and other ite House officials as reqtJired serve as Chairman of the u s Boe rd usm and represent the inte1ligpnci polity matter at l vel · '8 That the ·DCI Intelligence President on the national 9 That C I A l lac e i r1 c re as 1 h g em p has is on the acquisition of hardn i itelligence 2 nd 2 decrease the excessive ei hasis being laced upon cdvert ction progr ms 10' - · That CIA d vise means for identifying and eliminatini cov rt action nroa-r2 ms· of low potential 11 · 0 That CIA coniider the eisibility of transferring clandestine operations 2nd covert operations from CIA to som ·other· agency 12 That d eper cover be chieved fcir all cland stine 14 That efforts be made 'to reduce ·the visitdlit· r of 6ur foreign intelligence activities · through T 2ction by the DCI to reduce to a minimum the appearances of CIA officials · before CongressionaJ Committees and 2 action by officials of all· intelligence agencies to refrain from public statements - ohcerni11g substantiva intelligence matters 11 - -' · J ' r That · if feasible the headqu rters administration of all or portions of clandestine activitie be relocat d to points outside -of Washingtori og tq New-York City and other appropriate points activiti s a d bvert actioni lfj '1- I l•'' r'-r ' · iI r 1 t fr -' r -1vv -1q I li t - -' 'tF -1-- i 1_ t 1tt _ $ f f' ' l c • i r r· ' i '·· ·· · tJ li fJ-1 'J Uf''1LY · k •_ 2 · • • •t •• TOP - °- ' · - • -' • · ·-- · f _ ·-· _ __ • ·· _ 'Im c···•1 - ·_ · · · · · · - -t · · · · ' _ · ·i J 4- - · fill ic -- J f'• f• 'I · 11• #tfi YJ f - • t-_ i i J 1 · - -· - ·_· __ _ - i J · · · ··· r i reJ lr ' ' ' ' ' ·' l l· -1- ' S'•·i 1 ' - ' _ ' '_ 4 - - t1r - y --4- -· _ i_ f l · - · · ' m r - 4 - t n ' lit f t 1 i l f1® Mtr1' ik i'i t ff J -f i Jf tt 6 t J fr7lt0iii' iY1 1Ifr ·1 l i 1 ft f ' c- - - J j i' l l- 1 -• -'- 1 li- rg-- Z 'C ¥ tH- •· •f ''b 1' c i r - x -'l' 't i· -' l' J - t · • - - ' - 1 • -· · H1t J I 7i¾ i 'Ji 1i1 · ff i t · s t tr I ' 1'I f f11f• - • ritl11 iVt r 1 µf@ hl t ' f i i trl f _ fa t 1 - i t' · -1- 4f - % ¥ Ji t J-t l i 1 r -i 'i- i r ff lPJ ± t' J 1 j ' '· '- SL r -tl ·l· • 1·- r t Jr' •' p - • f 2Ji' ' A-- - i -Jlit1t f --1 lW tfl f- J tr i11 1 t t 71 · 1 i tf - · t i fM fi f i · 1 £f ¢ tt-r l-3- ' ' f A'- t 1 - ••t f - j • 1 • n - ' • · - _ '· - 'I ' ' ' ' J 15 rne·· -r '' - s crr r i T'°' Tna t improvcm nts be achieved in the qualit-y of CIA personnel · 1 ' • That consideration be given ·to a oossiblEf - - change ih the name of the CIA • · · ·· 1 · •• i •_ - - ' ·- ' 1 i 7 ' R9c l-2 1 ' 1 I • • ' D • ··J ____ 4 Rec ' •· That posi'tive action on the nei•r lcadeyishio· of CIA be tak n as soon as possib_l · · · · 1 ' - J S Bo 1rd R oort--of July 2 I 1961 - · · t - i-IitI t St X That the Denarttr ent of State rid tric C-IJ 1 ' c' tind u ct ''·· · a study 0f the number of CI i r cpx csenta G'ives · f·· · -_ serving 'overseas unde offici2 l State· Depa r't· erdi-· _s ·· _ _ cover J 1 tit 1 a vie1•1 to ah ordcrly· r·8ou·ctfb n- of such cover positions in tinprbo J 2 te 'instc1-rYce-s ·· - ·· ' ' '• • ···- - _ t · ·t ' •_· That the u s Intelligence Board_ c reate -the ' means for assessing and re portin - ear1y ·• JaI 1 ning r · indications of deve 1 bpi ng 1'·c old·· i'i a 1 c r-rs i ifJ t _L · situations in ·any· par t the· o rld uffl · ifai l y ·rnrning to be hand led sehci'fa'celV from·- nh0f frat' indications dealt Iith the 1-i tionctl · Indic·a · tions Cent r of the u s tnte l ligenc poa ro 1 •R - ' 1 · ' r t _ · ·· ' i· e Hatch Con-mitte ' 0 of 1 in • • Re C Jl • • 11 -' r i '- - · - · ' ' • · i - · ' · 'W TOP SECRET · ' · • · ' That there be real i nm_9nt s ___ 1 n··the · oi r -afiffci-f ' ' '' tion and sta ff-ing of the· CIA ·1itn a ' vi n· to- · increasing its effect ' 'C ess · ·· · if ° i' - f' __ ' _ · • _ ' • • I '• · · ·· ' 1 · t' I ' 7 d •· - ' · I TOP 8EQHET collection and orocessin of Electronics ' D Intelligence ELINT dbn8 by military intel·ligcnc c elements -ri th in the Depc1rtmci1t of Defense 5 a renli t fc re-e xami nation -of th 2 system fo'lJo · ed by the u S - Intelligence Boan 1 in levying intelligenc·e collcc'cJorr requi ements upon the NSA and 6 support by th Defense D partm nt to eet such vital needs of NSA as ship borne intercept stations· and equipr 1ent for intercept coverage of submai'ine·s · and critical ·1and ar·eas in order to meet natlonal as distinct from purely military requirements • ' r • 1 i - • · · · ' r I •'·I That the President support theSecretary of Defense in a reorganization of Defense DepartrT1cnt iritelligoncc ac tivitj 0s th couc ·J the establ shmdnt of a Defense Intelltgence' 1 gency on Rec rr 117 • _ Rec rrJl8 • This rccommendationJ t11e subject of pqssibly ch2 nging the- name of tl1e ClAJ is dca1t··v1l's h in the sur11 1ary of· Rec 1 16 above ·That the Presiden_t oppose 1 the establishment of i Joint Corisreision l Co mitt e on·Foreign · · Intelligence and 2 Congiessional investigations of the _QIA _· ' ' • I ' • '• ' ·i Rec f9 I ' ho t -9-very effort be made to p c otect t'he Pr hsf -- ac ainst ublJc identification · ·1lth specific U S projects and progr trr S i·rivolv i n 1 clandestine spionage activities and 2 covert de -it political propag nda psychological paramilitary and related activities JLlO·'• Rec tr That the Pre de t· lerirl his influence in Rec 111 1 ·' ·· ·· · · · - _ ' ·' · · persuading Congr ss tb reduce it demands ·ror testimony by officials of the CIA rha t the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA e requested to report S8mian ually on the status of their respective action to implement the 43 recomrnendat_ions rnnde on Decembfr 15 1961 by the Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities t-f - • • · j r it f 1 £f ru f l'1 r i il fj f c t t- v · · 1 1 'POP SECRE'I' - rl r - i - ' · i· ill· 1 j iY'i• t1 • ·1 •1 1 •1 r · 1 t - J iiJ'· · · - • -s• fl- 'f vl 1 1' r t- 10 - • 7• -- ' _ i f I i £ i- n 1- t t t t t1 zfs r ·· 'ti r'# fa l o·- - i_ I 1t · x •'·l• ·'' Jt·•VJ i ° 1 ' t l t -t1 t N f t5j 'i · 1 I- ' 'if ·' f-t _'lf ·--• · · I 1i •i •1W i J l tf •- i 4- i 1 - 1 l j ' ·- Ni -- - ' i fi J f filj'1i 1i f·i· ' · t 1 ' I '_ ' i r•i e 1 • ·el' f · Fv 'I - 1 4 m- ·--·n i • • 1 f tt 1 ' T i -• - '· l ' -f - 1 J·•- ' · •J - • ·• • ' ' · ' J '7 f r r r - '' • -l J i' 'f t • 2 f• ti ' ' •lj $ll i 't is Y'· ·-· • - · · · • - - 1 - - · i 1 i f c1» if-r - · 1 t tJ1 1 tf1 1 f J PJ t · j 1 ·r J t 1 '· 1 f · 7' ·•- - --J - '' · '· •'•' ' •' • · r·''i ' '' V J -1f-r5 tW l0J t f·1 t ' Jt ·¥ j5-$ frF t WJJJ' t J_JL c s- A ¥ i 1 •• · f ·· ·• •t• 1 tZ'f J i 1• 15 0 rrft --t W J1 e t l - J b J- • 1 - L • r j r lr t t lrfrJA · tJ 1 r l 1 Y j - 1 i ·•j7 J fl v - k · ·wJ it1' - it- '£ff i •Jfj f '4 f J· 1· T' 1 r l - Ji jJt f 1 1 l r 1 1 t 0r -it - · - rJ'¾ - '- - • n - - • -• · J _ J 1 l l f t ' 1tr-r ' - t ·· -i4 •·iU-lr' 1' · - 'f '1 - ✓ st t 1i jt -' f f f' %t·JtW Jf •l l t q r £ J ' 1 '¥ 7Yr t i ff J • ' - V- 1 877 •• J' ' --t '- -• ·- ·P • ' ' 1 · _ _ · • · ' ' - ' e ' f · --1 _c - - ' 1• ' ' '·' 1 ·· - •' t 1 · I I _ - · ' TOP S 1 0 Rffi'i ' ' ne l v o That the Pre ident ldnd his prtstig0 tn the· p L r to ch 6 r t rant it LO n 1 n V 0 1 Vin g 't n8 · s 8 J 'e C t j r 0 f a n DCI and relateq · r 1atter's to suppo -it aricF c11h2nce thG morale- of the intcll' t6cn ce'' c0fit · ·' 12 • 1 t · - ' -···•- '· __ ri ' _ ' · I -- • • ' nunity · arid to restore publi·c_ cbbf_i'd 'ente ·Jn · the ·CIA by i ·a' Presidential' 'st'ates·en't' · · - con1r11endini ·the ork of those s·e-r r Lng r-1 our intelligence agericiesj- and 2 '·an-'Jhditattor O'' the President of annreciation-f·o r-the · · · lo g J di 9 t ingui shed and pi on¢ crlng' · r9r k ' o ' J · Alle n Dulles in the fore1cn-· intel'l-igcnc2 'fieJ d _ J ' · I ·• __ _ ' · ''· ·i· I ' _' '· _ •· ' •• i ' ' ' ' Board Reo'ort of Julv 18 19·61 - _- Aec· JLl t 3 ·• - · ·' J ' ·• That GIA rEiv ie 'l its pla ns ror' cccU ahcy' f t h _ ' ' ' nc· ·1ly c_omple_ d CIA Hend o uar ers ''Bui ld iil'g· _-sl ' ft · · ' ' - L3ngley arid consider t_he fea sib li ty- o f_ • D9U' ng_ • at so ne other place the adrainistr_ation of ······ - - · 1 CIA s clandestine activities- - ''· • ·' Rec 14 T·hat• the u S1 Intelligence Board TT r1 e a thorough assessment 11lith a viei·l to improving -the colJ ection co0rdination and analysis of intelli ence con·cerning scientific and technical capabi ities of tne Soviet bloca _ ' i c • Tr- 1• ·· 14 I TOP SECRET I ·· '· • ''' '• · ' '· · _ ·· •'· i' 0 I t ' TOP· SECRHP Rec 16 ' ' That because the need for intell'igence·on Soviet nnclear-and missile·capabilities i mote urgent than the current need f r odetic and mapping· inforrnat1on • urgent a_ction -betal en _as follows · 1 · the scheduling 'ci'f -as· many· additional CORONA 3hot as p6ssibl in the corning months with cistp6n erit 6£ ARGON- shots if necessary 2 the THOR-C-ORONA syster 1 to be relied upon as- the pnotog raJ5hic reconnaissance ' •tork ho r-se 11 while' othe-f ·systems in the developmental stage_j 3 ·a -sufficient number of CORONA systems be m·ade avai-lable · to meet basic nee-4s either by orde-ri-ng long· lead time items beyond the ptesen CORONA system · or by ordering addition l CORONA s rstems until advanced systems arc improv e·d- ·and 4 steps be taken to ensure launch pa9 availability to permit future CORONA flights for quasi-tactical objectiv s I' ' ' • 0 · a e r· · 1 Subsequently based ·on informat'ion obtainE d in the course of its continuing review uf the National Reconnaissance P·roe ram t'he iBo'a rd s·u bmitt ed to the _ Special Assistant to 't'he ·President for National se urity Affairs a'report · dated July 5 1963 in which the Board l r ited a sugnificant series of fail H'E S 'whiG 'l had or curred photographic re_c onnals s ance so tellitP missions i because of mErlfun' c-tion's of ' boos er and othet systems and· 2 s ggestid that th8 resident I s offi-ce 'aprropf 1- at ly -re- emphasize ·the urgent ·nded for achieving· and _ m intaining a dependible and tontinuing photo -graphic' reconnaissance satellite capability -lest our Governm8nt be dehied vital y needed ntelligence essential to our intelligenceestimating and policy-formula ting proc_esses · relitive to the Sino-Soviet bloc -0 · I ·- ' · in Rec #17 o' I• I ' · - i i 1' c' · ' • - 1· j · · That the Special NSC 5412 2Group re-evnluate and make recommendations to t h President on the desirability and feasibility of conducting under_ special sec'urity safeguards U-2 photographic reconnaissance missions 0 0 selected areas of the China mainland · ' -' Page 15 · ·' I ··•-·-- ' _ ---- 1 · l i I ' I ' I TOP SF£RET I f - J That the DCI as Chairman oi' the ·u s Intel ligence Board xplore the feasibility pf expediting the operatii na-1- readiness ciate Rec 1 18 April 1963 bf the new Nation l Photog aphic - Inte1 ·pretat-ion Center-· a t the Naval Weapons · ' · • 1' Plant _ i Rec 19 ·' That 1 the Defense Departi n t _ -2·port · oh · the feasibility and statJs of two technica1 · projects· 1nitia ted by the u S Air· Force ·- to eliminate delayn in -the transmi'ssion · of critical Communications In'tellieence ahdElectronics Intelligence data··to Str tegicAir CornJi1a·nd Headquarters ar d 2 the _ Department of Defense comment on t he adequacy of int rim remedial measures which the Board had proposed as a tenbative means of reducing de1ays ih ·the·· transmission of such intelli ence data to SAC headquarters - · ' ' I ' ' r'• · · ·nee l 2 1 i i' i i ' _ Th at preparatory to a ·Board-- review of· the s ecur ft y •-f 1J S c 1 as s 1 f 1 e d int e 11 i gen c e and intelligence sources and methods the DCI submit a detailed report oh the imple· mentation of the following 1 Sectir n 102 J 3 6r the National S curity Act or 1941 which -· provides that the DCI shall be respons ible for protecting intellig nce sources and methods from unauthorized discJosure arid 2 Section 3 of National Security Council Directive No 1 which prescribe • met od by which he DCI in cOnsultation with the U S Intelligence Bqara shall ensure the development of poli ies and_ procedures for the prci ecition of in elligence Rnd tntelliger ce sources and methods ··· from · unauthorized disclosure · ' - ·•·- ' ' · • ' • '1 i ' That at the earliest possible 4at·e actioh _ ' taken on the Board's previous recommendations ··-- · · fO ' redefinition' ·or the role of the Dc· i l tll and fo ' an improved organization of CIA activ1ti So See Rec #1 abo·ve · ·•• ' 1 ·-- · · _· 1- ' •·' TOP SECRET '' I -_ _·· ·· ' - --r - • • _ ' - ' · · ' • _ r _p _ b' J• Iftl · i t- ' t tf-- j · · •• r ' · ' ' ' ' · ' · · -• --- --· 7- _- • • • '• • • ' l • • •• • I - ••• • •• • ' ·· · ' ' '• • L J- ' 'i o1 1 • j • _ · ' _'1 ·• ' · ·• ' I • •• ' i - ' TOP BECH ET ' Board Report of Oct6beT l7 1961 I Rec 1 22 ' I Rec -3 ••a 7 The Board re-emphasized to the President its conviction 1 s to the importance of ·outlii irtg · to the·new1y-chosen DCI the o1Jjectives of previous Board recommendations concerning · the coordinating role of the DCI See Rec #1 '· · vii th z·espect to the National Reconnaissance Office NRO the Board proposed that it review with the Detense Department and_ the CIA the contemplated organizational structure of the NRO for purposes of cJa ifying its respon ibilitiia hd 1ricreasing its effectiven ss in the coordinated man gement and operation of· all satelj_ i L e and overhead r·econnaissance I pro'jectS' j' ' --1 B0ard Report of June 26 1 1962 I Rec # 3--b I · · I i · ' I • j 1vlth further reference to the Nationo l Re connaissance Office tha Board noted that the NR0 ngreement betv1een the Secretary of Defense and the _DCI 0a not adeq0ate to support n fficient NROrorganization and the Bdnrd recom mended furth8r study· to achieve a better' dor- wnentary basis· f0r the NRO with p 1 rticular - eference to Na•tional Securi' y CounciJ directives possibly in onfl 1 ct with the NRO plan then existing • I 'i ' •'·I• - · ' · ' •· ·_ • · i ' - ' · ·- ' t '- · · ' J ' Page f' I ' I-' 'fCP SECRET with respect to the availability of c r ar specialists ·heavily engage in m eting schedules for new satellites aircraft and other recon naissance in3trument s j · U ac cion to enoure· that Department of Defense directive· i whlch guide the National Reconnaissance Program afe consist nt with pe tinent directiv0s frcm higher authoritj such as National Security· • · ouncil Intelligence Dir cti es and 5 within the Defense Depa tment a clarification of present and planned re t1onships as b0 ween the NRO t e Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Ag ncy Eoard Report of October 17 1961 Rec #24 l_ ' ' 'I · Rec #2_2 That ·the Special NSC 5412 2 Group_ review the· pnrarnili tary op·erat ions be ing carried out by the· CIA in ·¼os and e sewhere to d termine Hhe·cher those operations given their present scale are properly assigned to the C IA Not a recommendatJon -- this was a report to the President on the progress achieved by' the Defense Department in performance of itrs share of the responsibility for the efficiency of the Critical Commun'ications CRITICOM1'1 Netwo 'k for the quick transmittal of vital early warn ing and other intelligenc data· from oversea 'posts to headquarter in Washington • • y -· • Board Rep·ort of January 11 1962 · Based on a r view of adv hce i teili ende con cerning the Berlin Wall and Syrian Coup incidents the Board recommended· th3 t Cl a sense of urgency be imparted at field and ·headquart is le els of U S intelligence agenci8s with a viE w to ensuring timely reporting dissemination and assessment of intelligence indicating the imminence of crisis situations which are o' f potential significan6e o the foreign olidy and national security interests of the United States · · 2 without imposi g ndue delay on the transmission of ra 'r intelligence to Washington TOP SF£RET I • _ I 877 Page j • • • • • ' ·' • ' • •r • ·' · · •····· · · ·' · '' ' r 4'0P CE€RJ A 1 • r' St a e Depc1rtmerrt of fi'c ials at OV8TS eas po t S prepare periodic appraisali of developing crisis situations for use at the field level and for · consideration 1t Washington in the preparation •f intelligence analys s and ·estimates 3 procedures ·of the U s ··Intelligence B0ard and its subsidiaries · su ch- a3 th_e Watch - Cammi t tee ensure that intelligence- ppraisals reflect · sllgnificant differences of view which may-develop -il the intelligence estimative process and 4 in keepi g with the DCI's re po sibility for the timely flow ·of intelligence to the White · House the DCI be requested to revieH arrang·e·rnents and procedures· to ensure that a GIA·' s · intelligence assess ents and spot reports on developing_ c risis situations are- made available for· timely Cl insideratir • by the President · and other officials arid b · copies of assess-· men ts and· spot r_eports· t6 the· v hi te fouse ' from · othe1 agencies are fu r 0 ished to the DCI 'tor information and for use·· in preparing inte·11Jgence estimates · •' · · I - ' ' · I • ' - ' • i ' 1 ·• ' •-1 • · i '' Board Report of January 20t - '· ·1 2 7 Rec 7 _ _· l · _· ' I ' · i Based on an on-the-scene - review made by representatives of the Board of u S inteiligence activities in Egypt I ebanon Iran Turkey Cyprus Greece and I rae l J the Board recommended as follows -- • _ 1 _ r ··· ' 1 ' • ·i - · · _ u ' · · · i E 21j f 1 ·' 3 -i Jf · ti i - -· Jf _ _®' · · '· ··· · · -· · • • _ _ _ _- _· _ - ti -· · · · · · ·- i ' ' ' 0 '- 1It½r · _· · - ' I • • ••••••• ' ' ' ' ' · • • '••• • j_ · _ ·_ _ _· ·_ - _· ·_·1 ·__ _ · ·_ •·_ _ __· _·_· - - _ • ' · • · '- -· · · · _•_••_-' _- _ ·-·___ ••·_ 1 1 1 • 1 - • r • 9 -- ' 1-- - __ _ii · 1 I • i@ t _ i JJ 4 c -11 • - 1 ' '· • · ftl · ·• TOP SEGRE'i' '' ' ·· · ' - f '' tf€ l · l' t ' _10 ' ' ri 1• t 11 ·_·_·_ -t 't-tt- rl'H J-- ' ' ' ' ' I -_ _ ' 1 l t _ _ _ - ij b ' ZJ _ _ · - · · · ' • ' ' · _ - · - ·_ - _- · '_ _ _· -_ · · ' -- · __ ·_ · ' • -···sf'• r · 1 ij ·_ process • 'I'hat u s Ambassadors be· made aware of he capab 111ty and security of emergency clandestine radto stations installed 1n selected u s Embassies · · · · · on all poli intelligen e at the time 1 t io being sent to headq1 1arters except when this would unduly 9elay the· reporting · ' c _ 11 1 f · · • at p f t f fr comment t 1 cal - 2 '' 'i·'ll r x That u s ' nbassadors be given an opport·u nity te comment on the drafts· of proposed National· Intelligence Estimates prepared in Washington ·with respect to foreign countries to• which the Ambassa·dors are assigned · l -· ' ' 1962 I ' • J ttl' rt ' ' '·' - - i- • •t t • ·- v·- ' J '- _ 1t im § r '4- • 1 ra i ivtii 1 zvm kfit 1 1 BX•TI iiiit4I Page rrop SCG R SF That U S j_ntclligcnce person·ncl oe assigned to oversea posts i·there best u3e can be ·rr de of their langu ge abilities 1· 5 That ·1hE n int el lic et1c e inf 01 -na t on · 1 s • reported that later proves erroneous approp 1at0 · · correctiv notifitation be giv6n to recipients 1 of the crroneo r ports That the DCI and the Chairfuan Joint CH1efr · of Staff ensure the-validity of' i-nte11igence collection requirements levied upon the CIA for support of the mllitary in vrart1me 7 That the Defense Dcoartment·revie th Attach ' Systeins of _the three Mili°tary Serv 1c8s to· deter j nc the advisability 6f establishing a single_ Military Attache Systen 8 That the ·D'efense Department ens u re adequate foreign language training of Mi1itary Attaches prior to their assignment to overseas posts 9 Th at· the Defense Department• staff ruiitary ' i ' Attache posts on th basie of sp cific intelligence needs and on tbe basis of linguistic and ot 1er ·specialized taJ ents • 10 That the Defense Depa rtmer1 for intel ligence- related purposes ensure efficient allocation of aircraft to Military Attaches at overseas · posts 11 12 Tl1at the Defense Department equii field eiements of the Critical Communications CRITiCOMM Network wit·h capability for rapid commu nication -of r critical messages arnong·maJor·and subordinate military- commands 1 n th_e fieJ d -t That he DCI review NSC 5412 2 and related National Secur ty Council Intelligence Directives anrl recommend any necessary ·revisions t0 ensure adequate u Ld anc e to' U S Ambassadors and CJA· Station Chiefs overseas with regard t6 · ·• 1 -covert actions directed at target - within forei n cour1 r es and 2 - covert actions directed-against third country targets TOP·SECRET - 11 ·1 -' 0 _ - ' '•-- -- - - - 7 ·· ___ __ J • · - ' - ·- i 7 -· - -· - __ _ _ '• · · _ ·' ' p - '· i· ' ' -- '_ _ • • ·-•-- -•· - •-- - - - ' - -- ·-·· · ' 'r l ' ftJf - ' ·7 - f 'i _ ' t I i -· TOP S GRi3T 13 'I' 1at the Signc 1ls Intcll i gence Panel of the President's Board in the col rse of itn· rev le of Uationol Security Agency eiperations dctcrrr ine wheth0r significar1t 1 ntellit sence Gathered by NSA intercept stations in the r1eld is being furnished to U S inttll1g nce a Ge1n c y c on sum c rs and to f i e 1 d c 0 n s um e rs 1 n timely fashion · 14 Thnt the U S Intelligence Hoard revie- ·1 l the ad eq uacy of· c ri terla' used fer the · selection of a particular Milj_tary CriJpto - logic Service or the CIA for Commun1cations ntelligence and Electron cs· Intelligence j_ntcrcsp opcrc1 tions in a· given country and 2 the ground s for s e le c t J n 6 · ta -s g e ts fur 3 u ch operations 1 n a given fore lg n c o u n try • That improvements be mad c in the c ommunica tions of the u S ·E nbassy ·in Cairo pa rticularly under emergency circumstances 'which v1ould · not permit u se of commercial · comrnun1c3 tions ·channels · -5 16 1 That the Defense Department consider ch ngin tl1e Army Attnche otation in Lebanon fro n a Iii -- ' II 1·t a ' d s 11 i p II t o a II rec u 1a r pos t ' t 0 perm longer tours of duty and continuity of experience 17 1hat the DCI and the Assistant Chief of Stnff for Intelligence Army impro ve the coordination of clanrlestite e pionage activities conducted lJ y the ' rmy and the CI A in I - an a s c a 112 d for in Naticinal tecurity C6uncil ·rntelligence Directive No 5 · iB ' t ' · • l I ' That the National Security AgGticy ake an on-the-scene technical review of CIA 1 s covert Communications Electrontcs· Intelligence col-· lection effort in Behsh hr Iran to ensure maximum technical use of this strategicallypositioned activity against $6viet missile and satellite operations TOP SECRET ' L •• • · •• · I -- _ ' j 12 -- jt 1lJ · 1 - ·• I ' · '• ' 1 · ·- C it -- 877 Page 21 I NW· • i · •' l · • • · · · _ _ ' --i ·- TOP £EGRE'i' 19 That the N tionnl Security AGency take steps in Ira n to ensure that 1 the U S Embassy is furnished significant 1ntell1Gence developed by the U S Army Secur ty gency intercept detachment •rhich is housed on the Ei ni assy grounds and 2 he Natlohal Security Agency provides to the Teheran CIA Station Chief any data developed by the Army Sce ur1ty gcncy detachment concerning a ·communi ations of ·the Iranian secufity a d intelligence forces and b illicit Soviet agent commur 1 cat10ns n t 'ork 3 targeted against Iran from Odessa ' 20 That the State Department and CIA review the situation in Iran with a view to 1 improving th coordination of U S • intelligence activities in that country 2 agreeing en procedures for the hand ling by the U S Embassy or· political intelligence developed by the CIA in Iran and 3 main aining an appropriate proportion bet ·1een the numbers· of 'Foreign Service Officer3 and CIA r priscntatives assign d to the Political ·section of th Embassy in Iran _ 21 That the DCI ensure that 1 in Cyprus increasing e phasis is placed on c6vert operations particularly in the trade union and neuspaper fields and 2 the CIA Sta ions in Greece and Turkey pr0vide support to the covert action operations of the CIA Stat ton in Cyprus 22 That the DCI ensure that the CIA Station Chief in Cyprus l eeps the U S Ambassador informed of the nature of clandestine i telligence program in which the CIA Station Chier 1s engaged with the Cyprio• Minister of the Interior ' 2 J That the DCI ermure that th8 U S Ambassador in Athens is adequately informed about the substantive nature of the special relationship between' the CIA Station hief and -the ruling and policy-making off L ia2 s of the Greek Govern- ment 24 '·' I That the DCI re 1ssign CIA personnel who are in excess of the requirements of the CIA Station in Athens - • -i · 0 iill · 'i10P SBCRB F - -- ·•'· ' z • · ·• fi71677 Page 22 il ' · 13 · 1Dodd ' - I I i ' '· • I • - ' _ •• • I ·--- OP SECRECf' s 25 7hat the DCI consider furnishing the U Ambassador in Tel Aviv with details of CIA-Israeli intelligence undertakln s involving Africa 6 That the DCI cc nsider the proposal made to Bonrd representatives by the Israeli Intelligence and Security Servic call ng for 1 extended CIA-Isra li coordination of ntelligence activities in La tin America Africa the i-lidd le East and e lse • here and 2 a cooperative mechanism for the review discussion and assessment of intelligence problems relating to the Middle East and peripheral countries 27 That the Air Force consider the assignment to Tel Aviv of an Air Force Attache having jet fighter experience because of he intelliF ence significance of jet aircraft operating in this area of the Middle East 28 That officials ma'l ing up the Special NSC 5412 2 Group 1 exar 1ine the Turkish government's request for access to operational and early warning data Of the NSA-Service Cr ptologic intercept sites in Turkey 2 conslder assign ng to the u S Ambassador in Turl ey the responsi-b lit¥ for negotiating the Turkish request ana 3 assure coordination of the effo ts of the many U S elements in and out of Turkey which are worl ing on various aspects of the strategically-placed U S Signals Inte lligence activity in Turkey 29 That the National Security Agency take steps to ensure that 1 the U s Army Security Agency Detacr ments at Ankara pass significant intelligence to the u s Ambassador the Embassy Political Section the CIA Station Chief and to CIA headquarter in Washington and 2 improvement is made in the communi at ✓ ons capabilities of selected intercept sit s in Turkey including th Tropospheric Scatcer System 'l OP SEOREP · I 1 14 j I • I 185 cEd 2492 -- ----- _ _ ¥ n •i22 611811 Page 23 ____ ' - -- - - - - - - · '-8'_ _ _ _ _ _ u___ • - _ _ -- -•• -•---• •'--• •- •••••••- •••-• · '• •• _ _ r· ----· i TCP SE CRET 36 I That the Speci l NSC 5412 2 Group revi w the ·desirability and f'ca3 ioility of C-130 0irc r·ar t rec onni3 i s ar ce _ flights over Iran I Rec· fr 8 from Turkish_ bases with a view to covering SovietI misnile tests and r lated nctivities • · i i ' ' That' highest priority b ·placed on the ac-· · quis 1 t1on of c cially-n·ecded nte lligence · · on _the Soviet ICBM cap bilityi_ 01th special and intensive efforts to advance he phot·b- graphic re onnaissance capab111ti s 9f the OXCART and GAMBIT projects even ear-lier than-· now programred · Rec #22_ Rec _ t 30-a · - · Tl1at with regard to CORONA OXCART and 6ther advanced intelligence collection pro jects _ l prompt and stringent measures be taken within the intelligence community and with outside contractofs to keep to_ the ab solute practicable minimum the number of persons cleared for access to lnf orrnation concerning such iserisitive projects and · 2 re be periodic security indoctrinitions of al_ persons cleared for acce s to such' information including knowled'ge o-f · the special photographic capabilities involved · That there be brought to the urgen t a · tention of the Secretary- of State the ··1ntelligP-nce aspects· of ·the u S space satellite program · ·for• consideration i'n connection ·w i th a United Nations requirement for th regisiration by member nations of all satellit e l 'a unchings Board Repor t of May 16 1962 Rec #30-b · Subsequently in a May 16 1962 letter to the Presfdent the B iard 1 pointed out the intelligence implications to the United States ·· bf international discus ions of agreements td provide 1nformation on U s satellite launchings 1 ' to the United Nations and its CornmJ ttee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 2 urged that U S control Of the evelopment of space capabilities for national def nse and intelligence purposes not be foreclosed diniinisht d or compromised and 3 n6ted that _the United States unlike the · USSR · would lose a I ' I° • I I ✓ I I I W_18 ·ocld 2492 '· NW if 877 _Page24 J '· ' - y · ·_1_ _ _ TO 3 r l ZI c C I 1 l Ll·•·--nr r d r · i l ' • • 1· ' 'l • • t ' ·c ••r •··'·on 1 ' J l 1 J J Cl U3CJ OJ l - i • · I ol LI L ' lrs ' 0 L 11•· f v _ j_ J o - '-·' J - r• _ 1-1 '-ci • · ' l ·- - L 1· - - ·11-1 · - -- crt - _ 0-·r n'·c V 11 - -' I r •·' 'l1 ·· c· l V I •• J I' Ii • - t I cute -- z nh8c shoulci r ccJ 1c c co - rrl· l· cf 0 r GOV 8 Cn t 1 8 h 1 r 8 ' ' f C' C t t C' · · ' nm if 1 US 8 C r connnL3sc 1nce satellj_tc J ntc11Jr -6nc·e f'ct j - _ J- tic3 Accordingly the Do'ard rcc'o'r 'Viicncic• J_ 'thc 1 t Ct the Unit'ed St'1tcs formulate i clear position on the --cla tion shlD of ·our · reconndls · t·ncc · El t e j l i t c i n t e 111' ' c 8 pr O 3 r 1 mS t O i il t e r n i t i On O 1 cl scus sion of peaceful use 3 bf outer -- 02 cc 2 the J e3Jdcnt revic1 •t · 2 n C l Dp ro·v·c the po il tion · t o be t 2 ken by · t ·he Un i t c d' St at 8 3 on th i s s u b j e c t 3 tr S representatives invol vccl n Ui I Gcnevn 1 en and other discussions be apprbpfi tely bticif d on the sensitive U S int·elli-gence collection r rogram involved and 4 · dtffe -iinc points of view among U S Government officials on this subjec be resolved as oon as pos iblc __ • · 1- ' ·•1 c _Bee 131 ' That there be a re-exomina ti-on or -t he ' s-cltus of the DCI 1 t ' dete rminc - hetl1cr·h1 s· · · e 1 t v'e po·sition and s a lary are i11 'keeping Vii'th f vf· newly-defined role and •respon·slbi'li ty · o f· -the · · DCI for coord natinG and guiding the U S foreign intelligence effort as provid d in tne Preside0t's ·January 16 ·1962 rnernorancum to the DCI I e c • fr'1 '2 J i That the OCI 1 in consultation •1it' 1 t he U s 'Intelligence Bo2rJJ tevlew the f nctions of tde U S Intel1i 6 ence Board 1 s ✓ a tch Commi'ttee and Natio11al Indicatior s Center to deter nine their effectiver ess j_n carrying out their mission of proviriing eorly warning Board Report of June 6 1962 Rec - 33 · I That the Special NSC 5412 2 Qroup ensure that rl adequate cover stories are apprOved and ready for rele se by r spohsib1e parties 1 if required w ith reiip Qt to the_ U-2 J OXCART and satellite r donriais ri6e pto r m 2 adequate u TOP 8EORE4' - 16 • • ••• - •r••- •••-- -- _ _ _ -- - • -------•-·-• •- - - ••• ' • • I Page25 r ·· · i '· • • ' · · ' · y- 1 ·i ' • • · •' ••• a ' •• ' 'I 'r - ' - a re· 1 n · re ad i ne s for 1 1 L11s c5 Jch i ' 1 I - p i- ·· ancl -3 th a t ·u i n d o·rc 1·1 1 ot s · a r 2 1 n s t r u c t c d a s t o · 1 ppr o p r 1 a t c·- c t i 6' n c t o be t 1ken ·1n case of m 1 sslon· railvres ' ' - pr'OC ed Ur' -S 'c l _ 9r 1scs 'r cc m_ J _ I' a - · · - - -' Bo 3eci on further continued stud-Jes· of v1-2 yr and means to -strcn then the na tior itd-- Corrim·unica-• tio0s Intelligence and Electronicsintelligence effort _under ·au t ho1·· 1 tat 1 vc cont ro 1 and mD nagemcn t or the·- Ia ti0n2·l - ec ur 1 ty -Agcnc y · -the fjoard r'CCOmrncndeJ_ 1 strong c9'ntrol nd manaaernent by NSA- C'' ' r these intell1 Ge nce· actJvit Jcs·' - 2 concen'tration Q- NS on 1ntell1cen-ce· ob Jee- _ tlves of grea_tes ''i 1atio 0al hnpor an·e-e 1-n r ·cs-ponse to U S Intel2 1t ence ·Board guidance i-✓ hio h must be refined 3 ·NSA supervisi'on o f · all Signals·· Intelligence colJ ecti m an processing _ so· tha't national needs will be met without undue· cost a-nd e f fo_rt j 4 t 1e c ompl_e t ion of - 1-or-1gi p0f fd lr ig· plc1ns for improved col ect i6D a nd pr0c'·er stng - of Electron-ics _Intell'lgen cej'• 5 ·ificrer t e'd ··· ·J · Depar tment _of -D-2fP nse leadership' nm•i tnat · - · res onsibility for NSA ctivities ha3 been as 1_ g ned to an· Assistont Secretary of Defense and 6 within NSA itself the exeraise of· strong leadership competent to rn t national intelligende needs rising beyond· -spe' c h ' 1 c --- military intelligence interests • Rec_ j _35_ That t pe Defense Intelligence Agency and the ClA jointly 1 make an oreration l analysis _ of present- and potential i ise of audiosurve illance as an fntelligcnce collection technique 2 work up a plan for ·developint audiosurvcillance devices to meet- operational clan'destir1e · · int iligence requirem nts 3 estimate the cost and re ults o a major ·res nrch and development effort -to produce practicable audio systems for use in ·-clan destine ·collection and counterintel-ligence activittes -and 4 on the counter-audio side install secur rooms electronically and acoustically shielded in sereitive U s poets overseas TOP SECF$T 17 ' ' ' i ''' ' Rec t 2 U S-- Intclli cnce 02 rd C t 1l'J 3tc · · the 1 htelJic cncc r0t nit'L 1l of' tbc ''Eir ' · DJ if- 11 r ioon1 reflcctor · p to Jcc t· o vj that thereifter the Secrctary of Defc se r8acr-i 21n ea ly cl'2 cision as· to the uture f thls ·project · ' ' 6 Thnt I 1 Rec 7 1 J J3 o a rd Re o orI t • of A'J cu s t ' ' 19 6 2 · Bfi3ccJ on a revic1·1 of int cilicence disclosures l n a New York Tirnes a rt i cle ·by Hc1 nf on 1 Bn lcJ 1 rin · · chP Bon d rec Qrnmend ed that 1 the f'1'cs iden t · em has 1 c to _Government of f1 cials ·his c'onc ern c1bout such di sc1osures· and r is intent Lon - tn this case to ider1tify n ncJ tav e- actior i ac al nst·· the · source of Government lq_ aks · ·tnc ·newspaper · ·triler 2 the Pre3ident t D 'l e dr istic· hction a3ainst the offender i'r identified by t ie FBI 1 or agains-t the heads of of fi'ce s -f rom ·v1hicr trfe leak cm3nqted 3 · the' Di p2rt m0nt s--of _StMte • and Defense and the CIA fc uife thbif pet 6nhe1 td make memorahda· of record ·or i talks· i·J°lth ' tne· ' ' ' press and to clear suth contacts in ndvan · 1th departm8ntc1 l Public Heiations Off' icers 4 those responsible for protecting intel·115ence dat2 _and t_echniqdes· identify selected areas of sensitive data r uitinG spe ial hand ing 5 vays be sour h·t to rcd'- lce t_1 1·e rn imber o·r· per ons invol·ved in preparin§J1ie hly sensitive 1ntcl_l ttP nce estirna -C j o the·_DCI and tht Direccor of the Defense Intellic e nce A3'ency be provided •rith tl1e investic ative c8 p 0 b''tlity to run doi•m·leaks of sensitiv·e intellicence datµ 7 a coQfidential to r I ' policy be e tablished 'rithin fhe _ec utive Branch· aS· to the der ree of disclosure· of intell tgence to Congressional· Cpmmi ttees S a re-study be made_of p6ssible proposals to le$islation ·to protect official secrets and · 9 a review be mad e' of Governn1ent po'iicy and procedures with a vi·ew· tQ dcclnsslfying JOn-- sen$1 tive information and therC 'Qy st'r engtheriing d_ata to be mctde pro rirn fof the· safeguatding of serisitive data • '· TOP SECHET 27 - g · TOP s cra7P n ard Report of Octof'er __s_ -1 5422 2a C1 on an on-the-scene rcvic· 1 · r 1 3oi 1rc representatives of U s forcicn intclligen e and related att1v1t1es in Southeast A ia and the Far East J' • f 3b That the Defense Department the Joint Chief3 or Staff and the Defen3e Intellig nc Agency strengthen the intelligence elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Unified Command3 · drawing on resources of th mlli tary intelligence services in he process Rec • ' 1139- That the flow of intelligence guidance from the Defense Intelligence Agency to Unified Specified and component 1 om rnands be oriented toi·rard a 0ontrolled integrated effort on the part of the numerous U s military intelligence organizations overseas e g in S6uth Vietnam Thailand and -Japan in order to make the most effective use of their substantial resourbes Rec JjL O t _ R ec • I It That the Defense Intelligence Agency take action regarding the military Spec1 al Security Offices SSO Communication8 System for transmitting s nsitive information with a view to 1 consolidating parallel SSO net0orks running between· Pc'icific milita commands and Hashington civilian officials and 2 reor1ent1 g the SSO system to make it a primary service and support to Corr --nands in the field and command as distinguished 'ffom Service elements in ' - ashington o Rec tf41 Rec #42 That the National Security Agency accelerate spectrum searches in Thailand in order that the u S Intelligence Boai _d may give guidance o the U s Ambassador in negotiating a permanent u s intercept site in Thailand which is a most favorable location for U S Signals Intelligence operations against targets in the oviet bloc North Vietnam Laos Burma Tibet and Communi st China That t 'le Special NSC 5412 2 G'roup consider authorizing selective airborne defoliati n operations against the V1et·Cong in•South Vietnam 'f OF SEO Rh ¼' - 19 _ - Page 28 ·-- ' -···· _ -·- ·-·--· ·-·•·······-······••···- ···--··· ·•·········· ··•·•·•··•···· ·-·- y·•· · ······ - ····· ··• ·- • _ ' • • -· I TOP SECRE'P • Boo rd Report oi ' October 19 1 ·1962 Rec jli3 i on an on-tr e-scene review· 0f U S ·tnteJ · ligence ac ti vi ties·- in Southe·as t Asia• a nd' the · · i Fcl r East the Board made _the follo lrii lg sub - · _· · - 0 · ' 1 · That th Defense Department co sider staggeifhg the rotation scnedules of U• S Army Intell fg·en-c_e Advi ers to the South Vj_etnam Government arid that such advisers be given more extensive training in the French and Vietnamese language s' - 2 • • • • • - · - · ·· ' 5 · -- · · · - · - ' That the DCI and the D2fense Infe l'ig·enc e · A•g'6ri'cy 4 ' •• That the DCI--and DireGtor of trie Deferrse -Tn t'e 1ligence Agency emphasize effort of U 3 civilian and military inte111genc elements in South Vtet nam to improve the capabilities of sout• h' · Vj e t2 ahn'ese 1 n t e 111 gen c e · and security s er v f c e s '' _ 0 ' · L • r 3 c c·· ·1 ·That the National Security Ag ncy revievi the Office of the NSA Pacific Represent·ativ·e with a view to clarifying its mission ' and it r · · relationr hip to the Pacific Com -nand stru ctur e ' and to 0ther NSA personnel deploye ih tha Pacir1 area B0sed sidiary rE·C0111P 1endations ' ' in their respective areas·of re p6hsibil tgs §ilfeG adey_uate a1 d timely lateral exchange of intel-ligence report 1 ng of the various U s 1 ri telligence un ts in South· Vietnam particularly· -the•· intelligence elements of the Military Assistance Command in South Vietnam the U s Militacy •Att3 ches in Saj_gon and the CIA Station · Saigon _- - - ·-· - 1 · _ ·-'_ ·- · That the Defenie Tntelligence Agency consulting with the tl ree U S Mi 11 tary Inte lligenr e Services consider the advisab iity of 1 extending from· · two to hre years the tours of Service Attaches in Thailand and 2 p ovide Thai language training for Military Attaches selected for future ·assignme t to Thailand 6 That he Defense Intelligence·Agency arrarige fbr u S '-Air Force photo inter retation personnel on Taiwan and at Yokota Japan to receive all reports produ6ed by the Chinat Air F6rce Photo Interpretation CeDte concerning U-2 and other reconnaissance flights over the China Mainland • ' · TOP SBGRE4' · · - ·· t -·20 - _ ··• · 'i ¥J -P- f ES4 • '• 1 1· 1 oscrw · 185· ·· cld 2492 NW f 877 Page 29 I trttt rwrss rurea rt1ttt11t¼ 11 • ·• •--d - t · 7 Thatrthe Defense Irttelligence Agency in 6on su1 ta ti-on with Army Intelligence_ - l as scss ·t ie organization mnnagement and ef fectivehess · bf clandestine espionage operations conducted 1n the Pacific area by Army's 500th_ Int lligence Corps Groupj and 2 a$surc early coordinat1on· · wit h appropriate CIA Station Chiefs of the' few Army Intelligence cJ andestine' operations n ot yet c_oordinated 8 That the Defense Intelligence Agency consulting with U S military int lligenc agencies · assure ttiat under guidance by the Joi t Chiefs cf Staff to the_ Unified Commands maximum use is m de of the substantial intelligence potehtial of U S Military Ass·istanct- c-r'cups deployP d · iri f6re1gn c6untries '9' I I That the Defense_Inte111genc Agency make maximum intell·igence use of Service Attaches in foreign countries particularly-where intelligence is a1so being produced by 1T S Mi-11 tary Assistance Groups and other u s military otganiza tions · 10 r Rec 44 That the Defense Intelligence Agency 9onsult-ing with the Na tiona 1 Security Agency and U ·s · military j_nt lligence agericies reduce thE time required for· sec' lr·i ty clearances of pe rsonnel ssigncd tn sensitive U S installations overseas The Board also r 1ade the following additional recom' ' mendations base on its ·southeast Asia and Far E st r view • 1 2 c· ' -· i That the State D pa1 'tment explore with the ·u S Intelligence Boa -d the practicability of a mechanism to furnish U S Arn as·sadnrs in Southeast Asia w i th ·current regional intelligence evaluations of Si'politi al ·economic and rr ilitary iature concerning the _Southeast Asia area -- · - as proposed by tr e U S Ambassador to Thailand That the State DE·partment re·v1ew the manni ng ta bl of the Pol1 tica Section of the U s Empassy at Bangkok to de tertnine whether an additionq l · office should be assigned as recommended by the·_ -Chief of the Pollt ical Section of the Embassy • t_ _ _ -_ ·• NW 1 u c a z tg z · · · • n · -- - ·_ 'Y ' - t i -- - i fti i l i 1w -y fi• J 3t sl' 9s _-•- - - - - - - - - - NW f n 877 Page •·• i · •· ·•· '' yY f r Yi J 1 tt A¼ c• • ·'· • ·- · ··r -' · •-·-·K-l -·1 ' · · · -· f J 1 µJhtJhW d -- - - f• ·1' - · t· 1 t j • • ' -·-· 'POP BEG IlE'P 3 Rec #45 Rec #46 I i ·· ·· _- -·· That the CIA explore the feasibility of intensifying covert actions against the sizeable and effective influence of Communists among Japanese inte·f• i'c t'-falo educ a tors and students Baseo on its revle 'r of intell tgence coverage assessment and reportin by U s agencies with respect to the Snviet military buildup in Cuba during the months preceding October 22 19h2 the Board submitted to t 1e President an interim report containing the following recommendations 1 That the U S G0vernment 1 maintain an aggressive intelligence effort to equip our policy makers with timely and adequate intelligence information to -meet the possibility of continuing Soviet con ontations in Cuba and 2 resist any tendency toward a let-down in intelligence · coverage of Cuba in the wake of U S intelligence successes through u S military aircraft reconnaissance of Cuba 2 That the United States make inte sified hardhitting efforts to obtain significant intelligence on Cuba through cla ndestine esplonage or erations including efforts by U s intelligence agencies to lay the groundwork for deep cover espionage operations in Latin American and other foreign countries without dependence on official State Department cover which would not be available in the event of a break tn diplomatic relations 3 ' That 1 high-level nd low level reconnaissance of Cuba be continued-as a means of acquirin photographic and Signals Intelligence concerning Soviet mill tal·Y installations forces wba i ons ' That the CIA renew efforts to convince the Thai Government of the need for an effective central intelliGence organization in the Government of 1 'hailnnd the State Department to Jee ide whether the U S Ambnssador should make specific overtures to Mar Jhal Sarit in · this regard · · ·-·• · - -· - - - - ·----•------------ -- •••••••alllll • D lll' llllll W111 jAIIN -- e11i1 r••••• ··11 111NnliJljt1Mtt1••--lilllr«lllritnW1t••--tttttit 11e _M11 t 11J1 l11M6rrnt 1'4M•' tllllt1PMi St•- fllwuie111 11HM11'41 61iaJ1M-1111r a TOP SECRHP nd highly-sophisticated communicntions equip ent in Cuba 2 planning br made fo substitute 1ntelli ence techniques in the event that our aerial tcconnaissance of Cuba is denied us by Soviet air defense systems on the island nnd 3 that the Uni tcd St ates launch a c la 1rJcs tine ac ent program to pro1vide on-the-erot nd photosraphy of intelligence targets in Cuba as ran adjunct to our aerial reconnaissance photographic coverage of Cuc a 4 as ari adJurict to Signals ntelligence ccveragc of Cuba 1 a major clandestine aGent effort be directed toward obtaining vitally-needed SlGnals Intelligence from Soviet enc-0ding machines through the use of clandestine intert ept equipment carried by on-the-ground u S espionage agents tn· Cuba and 2 plans be readied for commando-type or c'ovcrt actions to pre-empt Soviet communications equipments in tr c event of internal revolt or invasion of Cuba That I 5 That in instance$ where exceptional intelligence •Collection techniques are suggested to meet priority U s intelli ence objectives but are oonoscd beca se of oolitical or other risks involved the issues be submitted for resolution at thP Presidenti l level 47 Rec I I • That in view of Soviet camouflage of mj ssile installations 1 1 Cuba the Director of the National Reconnaissance Offlce assiGn hlgh priority to experime° i s t o determine the effectiveriess o _short and long-range photography of concealed ground targets including the use of new sensing and lluminating methods Boal'd Reuort of Januarv Rec #48 - ' I _ J t j' 19 19 2 3 TrJat with regard to the Secretary of Defense DCI plan for surfacing mill t 'J versions of OXCART intelligence con iderations require that 1 no statements or programs should be undertaken whj ch would result in public and Soviet knowledge of OXCART or m111 tar · versions thereof 2 al though leaks concerning OXCAnT wjll eventually occur such leaks should be avolJed as long r s possible - 23 - 4'0P SECl1£4' ·• • i · ¢i -'' c • i t_ ' __ --· ' ---- ----------- - • 4 '··'' '1 1 '4 • 1-• _ _ ' '' •-· $-UNWWWllnW RllllW--l'fllll-lQAlel W Cl MCtaa-•-•-ow- _ _ ----•------ - ·· · w' ·1ss oc Ed 2492 Wj88 1i J ·_ 877 Page 32 I -· _ · ·• • ·· f ·- · · -· -- - · · ·· ' TOP S ORE' l__ I • • I in1 order to nostoonc Sov1e ·dcvclo mcn of countermeasures a alnct OXCART - 2 n J 3 · instead of an OXCART cover story b thi efi'e t that a n0· U s Jntcrc0ptcr ail''crart i- s ·being prodt ced the cover story hould be that a variety of · U S r ' ili tary ai re rCJ ft a r·c hcir1£ developed • In nakir c these reco r 1- -iencJations the Board ccnfined itself tc t -1 intcllir£cncetqlated aspects of the subject noting the ·· Board's awarcn ss that the problem involved milit try 2 nd ong· ressional considcrnti -rl's the B-70 issue for einmplc part f om intelligence concerns _ · Foard Heport of 17ebruary L 1 19 63 i As a follow-unto the joard's interim Cuba repo r t and reco1 1mcndations of December ·28 i96c·_ the Board for -10 rded to the President on· r_ February 4 J 963 'the res 1 1lts the ·Board I '• · n ssessr icnt of the per formance of the U S intelligence c 01 1muni ty ir its coverage and · reporting cf the Soviet il_itary buildup in Cuba during 1962 of Board Renort of r·13rcl1 8 ' i96i On March 8 1963 the Doard submitted to thf' Rec 49 resident its final report or- Cub 1 taldng into a count ·✓ icvrn· and comments '·rhich hnd been received from tl1e Director· of 8n·tral Intc 111gcnce 6oncerninJ intelligence aspects of the Cuba e xp rience The Board m rle a 1 umber of spscific recr -rnrr endations for strengtheninc U S intellig nce coverage of Cuba and for increasing the • apa biJ i ties of the total foreic n intelligence ·program of our Government as follows · 1 That U S intelligence planning include attention to possible Scviet 1nt ition tc create and main · tain in Cl ba a Sovliet base for ornmunications ' surveillance and military comrnand and ' con trol · in the Western Hemisphere with unprecedented oppor unity to use electronic· at1d 6th er means to obtain intelligence on U s 'military and spac capabilities · · i - I - --_ 1· 0 T'OP SECRET 4 ' --····--- - ' 877 Page I ·· · I I -- • TOP SECRET 2 3 That U S intclligcnc- a2 encics make i t a maJor·goal to Jiscover the terms or soviet Cuban agreements arid the -program3_tb c rry out surih agreemerits That intensified efforts be made for subbtantial improvement iQ U s clandest ne espionag rcovera ge of Cuba -- oecause human resource espionage ope· ations corit1hue to · b portant in spite f notcwotthy results obtained by the 'United States in using s cientifj_c ar1 j technical-· intelligence tcc-hnlques jgain t uba · ' 4 That 1 there be r sumption·6r efforts to develop a long-focal-length camerj for se · · in U-2 coverage of Cuba us'ing · co1o r and ster·eo photogrophic methods 2 that therC be a reappraisal of the decision ·to suspend lOi·r-level photographic reconnaissance airGraft missions · over- Cuba and 3 that a vigorous clandestine agent program be instituted with view to obtaining on-the-ground photography of iritellige nce targets in Cuba as on essential supplem nt to aerial photographic reconnai sance o f t he island ' · 5 · That the cuFtent intens Lv·e·· aerial survei_llance · of Cu a b acc-ompanied bi priority planning for dequate sub titutes in the event that our aerial · reconnaissance program is cut off bj the · advanced Soviet air defenses being inst led in C11ba 6 That as recommenc · ed· earlj_er a majcr clandestine agent effort be mounted ag inst Cuba with 2 vi w to intercepting emana ions from sophisticated Soviet code machines -through the use of intercept equipment capable of concealment on acent•s ·r erson 7 ·That as previously proposed the President be as ked to resolve the Ls sue when exceptional_ iotell1genc technique are opposed at lesser levels because of the element of risk ··' ' I - ' TOP BEGRBP --' I · i ' ' 5 ' W' f I ' • · I I • ·• 1 ·• -··--- ·--- -- - -- -- r 3 § r T -- -· · • · · _ _ Page · 7-·- ·--•- • W ' ' f l' f ffl'lt - t • 'Sf ' ' •' - - ' • · i-· ' • ---- - ______ ____________ I 0 1 •-ae - -- • -11 - ---- - ·--tt•M1•-•-•-r 'r• -•---·--- -•12•- ----•r-••-nree-·-• -v m • en eee1--ae er ··- ·'' - TOP ·-sEcREP· 8 ' That 1 u s intelligPnce 6ffic1nls be less teluctant to propbse to higher authority the use of extraordinary means such as the u 2 to c1cquire ·1itJ1l intelligence not otherwise obtnlnable and 2 that thcr be a techa tsm - hereby policy c fficials will be informed of· apcrdtional deJ 8 ys or other factors which ·· call for top-level authorization of -nevi ·or· revised intelligence m1s 1ons 9 '· That in order to meet iritelligence needs in simultaneous -emergencie pre-arr nged · pl ns be made for 1 the rapid - assignment of personnel equipment and other intelligenqe resources 2 the des gnition of vario s processing cent rs for the handling-of · photographic int e 11 i g e 1c e f 3 the · pro c e s s in g · and COTru'11Unication ·of ital intelligence· to major users in Government and· 4 pianni for· such· related intelligence ctivities to meet _the· extra burden if two or more cri es should odeur concurrently · 10 'I That in the event that eme gency situations shbuld arise requiring restrictions on·the normal publication and distribution of- tntel J ie E nce data tl1e U• S • intelligence conuntmity should monitor the appl caiion of such restrictions toJensure that 1 they ar carried throush and 2 they are -nbt ap lied in such o way as to deny critical intelligence to p611 y aking and command officials who such intelligence needr data8 · ' 11 That conc-erted efforts be made to 1 dt v 1 se··· · · ·· an effective mei hanism for the integra tE·d ·' · assessment and cumulative per iodic · -npraisals of early-warning and indicator-type intelligence and prompt reporting thereof to pollcy-1naking and ·command officials and 2 conduct intensified 1 1 r search concerning automatic data processing techniques to facilitate the review and assessment of the great volumE of material de lt with in th United -States intelligence comml-l iity 0 't' j ' t - ---- ---2_6 - --- --- -· •FY -' · ···· I'_·' · · Page 35 •' That the re bit a r - -xa Tiin tj_ on of prc·sent' methods of arriiih i tj t on l ri elli ncc estimates with a view to ensuring that i all indicator·s · · ' t UG·-s-- ---- TOP SECRET • • 41Pi i mi YTR Mt r r rassc •• i r o•wr s ttlllit ewcsrrretsw111wcee rttcrr' aa wsnw ' - TO I s cri m and other avnilabJ c int llige c information re considered 2 the viC'l 3 of in cl ig0· cc community rnc - 1bers are fullY take 1 hto acc ot mt 3 -ccoc nition is c ivcn to the po · 'ibility· of wid e ly-var rtng 1n terprl'3tat1on - of a given· body of evidCnce li cor sid'ecation Ls c iven t9 the tdvisa_ bility of prepari -ig· t· · o ·o r more· estimate i·1hen evidence is susceptio- e of more• than one interpretation- even· thou h under current practice di § nts te noted j_n foot notes· to estimates 'i'and 5 h J t · evc- 1y ·prec at ion be taken to avoid adherence to isolated opinions or preconceived not ons · · · ·· • • ··· 13 Th t the effect l veness of the N2 tiona1 Reconna'issance · Office be strengthened through specific measures separately summarizcn in R2c Rec #50 l 23 I · ·rrhat there be a reoru aniz 3t-ion and reoricritat i on of the CIA 1 s scie tific and techn6logical ictivi ties in the intellfgence field Speci ically · ·c'he Board recommended 1- a· rcs earch Emd ccvelopm· nt effort located outside the intelligence com 1nity but coup ed with deyelopmeht·and enGin er- Lng conducte'cl •rithin CI i ·and other int lli ence · · ·• gencies 2 an administrati 1e nrronger ient inCIA to bring science and technolo5y in o contact 'fith major intelligence rroe rai s and p --ojects of the CIA 3 the vestine of ·scicntif1c and t chnological intelligence responsibiJ ities in a to'p-level official of the CIA 4 the formation n CIA of spedial re s arch and development 1 groups concerned with hat ral· sciences and · behavioral research in studies of such matters as camoufla5e and concealment and 5 nctioris within the Defense Department to emphasize research on·adVanced sensing photographic and other systems and advanced research in the Signals Intelligence field over the next ten y8ars Board Proposal of July 11 ' Rec '' #51 ·1963 That the Chairman of the lJ S Intelligence Board give ontinued ttention to and repott periodically on easures tak h by the U S intelligence agencies '- TOP SECRET 27 lf Page I • t tsu s P 1 M 'I' ·J -- w - --- -·--··· _ _ Mq C 1 TtMss eAe·t·r r z ttw ttt entuo· t es « tontMe fte 4 1' •••OdlllltUI__ __ • _ eta··e e NHH -11 1·-•· •• · 1w-- ✓-· TOP' ScCRET to'strengthen our Government's counterintelligence postute Here the Board reiterated ifs previous endorsement of a recommenda tion that 11 The Dlrec tor of Central In te llieenc e should focus com r iuni ty at tent iori on t he important area o_f counterintelliGence and the see u1·lty of overseas personnel and arisign respons1b1 lty for reriodic rerorts thereon to the United States Intelligence Beard ·- ··· ' ' '• · TGl · SECRET 28 - · ·•·· i lti --•UW •IW - CT 941 I ---- - ·· Ii t ·_ ' · -'· 1 • · ' fi · ·• ' ' ·• •' ' · •f ' ' ·- '-- ' • ' i • I' J O e_SECR T THEW HITE HOUSE •WASHINGTON ' ' M EMORANPUX FOR THE FILE J - • '' J 1- -- ·-· 1 · - ·- ' i - Ji _ ' Janu 1ry 30 _ 1964 - M Ff t · ' · ••· - President's Foreign· Int lig nce Advi1ory BoRrd SUBJECT · ·· ' · ·- · •·· · r ·· ' 1- iu •· ·· · The Pres iden·t' s Foreign· Intelligence Advisory Board oriv ned in reg lai meeting at 9 00 a m on January 30 1964 at the Board's offices Room 297 Pr sent iwere Chairman Clifford· and dar°d member a Executive Office Building · i- - ii i _ ' · · I · Gray Langer Murphy Dooli tle ·Pace and· Lan'd · Dr Baker w 2s unavoidably de·u11ned in w Jersey and joined the meeting later in the morning' and Messrs - Coyne and· Ash · Ii1 executive session Chairman Cl if fcrd gave Board members a f i 11-in · ' on the brief tal_k he had ith Pres ident J hnson a few ·aays after 'the Pres fd'e ri ' · ' t Chairman Clifford h_ad aken the occas'io'n to relate· took o'f fice on November 22 · to ·the Pr s i'dent some of the highlights· of the function· per forme by the Board for President Kenn dy and th comp6 ition of th Board · Alth6ugh Presid n Johngon gave no indication that he had pre •i ous ly kn wn of •_the ·w C rk of the -_B_oa -_9_ _ 1 he ex ressed appreciation for the effort wt ich the Bo rd had made Qn be'half o JJ ' · President Kennedv • f •• The President said that h was comf0rtP d to k - -'· tJ at 'i • ' 'ot thii attention lo the imp0rtant subject of the Board members that he wished ·r which the Board would have schcdu le Page · '' • President ls giving personal attention ' l Mr Clifford expressed the opinion that prior to succeeding to office President Johri o hrs prob hiy ad tew I u oe_ sccncr ' - ·• · r occasions on which to obta • n more than brief glimpses ·of inte 11 igence P Oblems With that· llssumption in mind Mr ' Clifford thought that· the Board's·major ' · ' - purpcse at today's'meeting with the President should be one of education with respect to the foreign intelligence effort and the Board's role it ' it I ' I ' ' I ' I • 1 ' ·· ·- · Mr Cliffor1 pro osed that he bejfn with a background statement to the •I Pres ide n t concerning the circumstances under whichr President Kennedy es tablished t e Board the Bay of Pigs inc dent and ito· respon ibilities and i • 'f ' l method of per forming its - assigned functions Then in order that the Pre·s iden t might bec9mJ better acquaihted wi h the Board membe ship and bme - f th more I' ' significant intelligence areas reviewed by the·Boord · Mr Cliffcirff'sa'id he would like to ca 11 6n various members to speak hr ie fly about those a·ceas Par t i cu lar ly the ChR irtnan nsked that· Dr Land be prepared to in form the Pr sid nt at o t the National Reconriaisaance Prbgram that General Doolittle be ready to discuss the U-2 OXCART and TAGBOARD·programs Dr Baker the · '·· · Signals In t 11 igence Program nd Mr Gray the Dunlap espionage case · the·Board agreed wlt Mr Coyne on the Dunlap ca e'there 1 • ' proposal that in the Board's r porting an oral statement to the President but 1 • '· nothing in writing source about which highly sensi iv · J' · In this connection the I • Chairman said that conversation with former Deputy Secretary of latter seemed unaware of the mceting·w th the President the I ' •• • ' · ' to iridicate to t e Pr sident the value of the ro e played by HcGeorge Bundy in tho staffing of Board sub_1ect matters for the President and mer tion shoulr also be made of the ' •' • • • • • - • • • 'i' l -- · ' ' Board's use of Panels in its review 'of _intel'ligence matters thought that b r • 1 t 0i J i1 n t8oard 1e f membe ts Dr Langer cone i'n e fog 1n tel 11genc e subjects coming within their etial Panel assign nts would be more ' ·· · _ ' t ' • to appropriate and he lpf ul thif •' ' p· z - s' f e·nt · than for al 1 Board members to· be · ·· ' i H r · called upon • Mr Clifford thanked the' members for thea su gestions arid sai f ' -that he would be guided· c cor·dingiy 2irt imaking • •• • - ' ' his presentation to the President I Chairman Clifford then made reference to the recently-discovered Soviet x At · espionoge case _involving Army Sergearit Howell · a ·· ' '· T1Ntf · · · which Mr Clifford more damaging than the Dunlap i thought might prove to be ·· • · case case and one which· ·· dramatizes ·tJ e recommendations which the Board has formulated in its o eport to the President - _ - ·· ·· ·r · ·- ·· · on the basis - f thr··1 i mlap matter · - r ·- Mr Clifford reca led · - · ····_1 · - -_- · ··· ' ' - · that when he recently discussed the Dunlap case with 'for'O r Deputy Secretary - of Defe·nse Gilpatric thf la et ti id_ _ hat if any progress is made - · _ t 11r1 1 -i1 '1 · ·•· • by the Government in the area of counter inte l ligenc the impetus -• · wi 11 have to come' · · ' · · '1 • ' 1 up to th Defense Dcpartment the Board qn th Howell i case - later on in the the list of topics which he Intelligence Mr McCone DCI 1s 1 · ° a-t#Ci i i1 r ·a oe_sEcRErf l r•·-Ii ' ' _ if 1 1 i Chairman-Cliffoid then turned to the-January 1 1964 letter which· ·0 Jt iiit he had received from the DCI volunteering information concerning the even ts· · • i 1Wti t_ '• ·• l• t t 'ft if t 'which'_had led to the recent CIA releas'e of infor c 1tion oh the estimate· of the Soviet economy with resulting critical editor isl reaction i n the• ·_ United States press ' Mr CliJford asked that Board members study the DCI 1 s I • etter as the bas is for later discussion • Mr • Clifford· said that he l1ad • - · · · · · y ' · • - 1 i ii i ' - to be curiously defensive and he expressed concern o v er ·the· found the letter ' 5l 1·i -· · - ·' -· - 1 t t '- J t' r i 1t-l · · t · i 'Jf - • ·· -' · danger inh•rent in what appeared to be an 'almost o ss ve interest on the part of the' DCI in regard to the CIA's image''• The C ai rman a ls·o· obs er-ved that according to newspaper accounts th·e· be I was qt that moment in Europe '· p' l $- I • - J l • • fit visiting several he ids· of state presumably on intelligence and other matters 1 rh i ' · '•' A ' 1 ' hrr · ir ii i • Mr Murphy recalled that previously the Board had urged cl'os·cr re lat'icins· f between the Pres ident a11d the DCI on intellige ce matters and he wondered if -n the· DCI' s current· trip abroad is· an indication that th is c lose relatio ' h t i· · ' · ' iiilts betw en the DCI and President Johnson c ou ld only Mr fltffoi saiJ' h t 1t be s·pec u lated that somet' imes a new Pre s ident · is sus cep t fb le to sugge1s t ions of £ered by experienced_ Ptes ident i tl adv isei-s and- in th is • ' ' • • • ' • _ - if f i i • • • • • ·the President may possibly have received · _ - '· 4 • uggestion from the DCI 'that the Secretnry· which he importance placed 'r'' 877 Page ·' _instan·c · · •' • Mr 1 Clifford left the Board meeting to take a telephone call from said that · 0 Jt ' of CI A was about· to Join the Board me'eting · ' lnd that it would be ·well for ' '•' t h c Bo a rd t o d c f c r b r in g in g up the NRO s u b j cc t a t th is t i mc • · In ·th is con cctlon Mr Cliff rd stated that he had recently been visited by·NRO · ·• _ '• · D rector McMiilan who had expressed his views a to the NRO problem and ouid · tepc t them to the Board when he joined the e iirig later tn the day At 10 20·a m the Board meeLing was Joined by the Deputy CI Gencr l I • • 't · · · I j ' Carter substituting for Mr McCone · - ' · ·aeneral Carter was accomranied by·• -1 ' ' ' Mr Knocke who was introduced as substituting for·Mr Kirkpatrick who · _ in the Far East and by Mr Fitzgctald referied tu by Cencr l Cart r as • I I t th CIA' s expert on Cuba Mr • C1 i ff o i d thanked the CI A o f f i c i a ls f c r · t h·c i r i t t e nd n n c c He p o in t e d out hat todiy the Boaid was having its fLrst mc ti g wit Pr sid nt J6hnson · therefore the Board would appreciate bein 6 brought up to ·uate 'would· like to ' hear'·frorn General Carter on the t p cs which h 1d been list cd fn'Mr Clifford's 'I ' ndte to Mr McCone and would be glarl t0 hear fi · Geneial•tariet on any rn fr'tets which he· migh_t also wish to cover General Carter said that Mr McCone's bsen frqrn the o r rj r vi f d his meetlrig wich th Board but that he would endeavor to cover for·· r McCone the var ious mattcr3 in which the Board had ex_pressed A n in'terest as set forth in Mr • C1 i f ford ' s no t e to Mr • Mc Con c dated Jan j ry 16 1 9 6 4 • Turning first to the subject of Cuba General Carter ·said thA t all sabotage efforts have been stood down that the President and Secretaries Rusk and McNamara have some serious doubts P out our policy toward Cuba nnd that the question had been raised as to wh ther it is not hypocritical for the United States Government to talk peace whil at the same time waging war'' against Cuba back from leave 42 General Cat ter added that ·when Mr Bundy gets ·· if' 1· t ' lf'if' i1 Ci' ' ' ti•• ·' · ' · • · ·i · ' ' ' '• ·'•· ' r t L ··•· ' f ' t ·' •'• ' _ -i I J ' ·- •• ' - - -' • - 1 •• · f _ ·I'i - TOP SECf''T I ·' ·· V J_ i · •·I 1 ✓- ··l 1 t there will be a mc ting to discuss a new poli y toward Cuba In An wer to an I J inquiry from Dr Land Gene al Carter said that Mr Bundy has no deputy to act in his absence Lhat t e DCI briefs the 0 -' j President on intelligence matters and Mr Bundy briefs him on f6reign polic • I matters Ind that the White House staff has not seemed to have srttled into I any new mechanism since November 22 j· •· · Jj General Carter s id that the President gets the CIA daily·intelligence check list which is handed to the President · l i i by one or a othc r member of the White House staff I not necess nr i Ly the same I one each time t '•J Also CIA has added a weekly check 1 is t -review I und it is j understood that the President reads them Mr McCone sees the President at least twice a week and attends all p6licy meetings e ccpt on occasions when I ·j i the DCI has to be absent in which case G neral Cart r·attends in his tead ' ' '• '1 General Doolittle asked whether there has also been a st nd do ri in cla destine intelligence collection efforts with respect to Cuba and j I I General Carter answered in the negative Mr Fitzgerald st tcrl that the i '- I I volativity of the Cuban people is a factor arid over the long run the apability of CIA to infiltrate inte ligcnce agents into Cuba is affected by the morale · of the Cuban people which in turn is affected by the su cess of sabotage nets ' ·• t i directed against Cuba r - In answer to a question from Chairman Clifford -Mr Fitzgerald said that no hard facts had been obtained concerning the purpos and subject '· I · ' matter of Castro's recent talks dth K_hru hchcv in Moscow although the r• Panama and Cuban 2conomic si uations may have b e discu sed -- Hr Fitzgerald • r· agreeing with Murphy that this is all specL 'ation on CIA' s part · ' ·· rGenetal Carter said that our Government's economic denial program against Cuba is also falling by the wayside as r flec t d by the actions 6f Britain and Spain in· trading with Cuba r 1ere -is a vi ew ·General Carter · · · • i I i - 6 - ' - • Joe SECRET 7 '·· ' ' ' 111 • · _ _ ' tt8P S' ·- - _ added that it is difficult for 6ur Governmcn ·to equate its policy of whca c £ ales to Rua s ia with a po 1 icy of economic den ia 1- ·agn inst Cuba however the President has said that he wants tb push the econo ic deninl _ I _'·' ' program f the Cuban peoptc transmits itself to W shingioo '- 1' Mr urphy then nsked if someo e could s y what is go ng-on in uba I · i Mt Fitzgerald rep lied that the mos't important development is the ser ie1s of Castro found at •eat' s end that there as an unanticipated hatd correncj balance of $100 million from the sugar crop th s giving Castro a basis for·obtaining extensions of cr dits forsuch transacticns as the putchase of B itish bus the Fre c are about to cxtc d Castto credits over a s year period n Pa a A althoug C st 6 lidn' I l ' · ' ' provoke the anti-U S incidents he gets cr d·it for it and Castro aleo gets credit for the Zanzibar coup cv n though he did not instigate hat 1incident · ' i either So Mr Fitzgcraldnotcd Castro is stronger and his arm is longer Dr Langer·asked if CIA is getting intelligence agents into·Cuba and i formation out Mr Fitz erald exbibited a chart depicting t e deployment 1 of agents in Cuba pointing out that there wa a tonc tr tion of ag nts in ' the ii -v-u -- arcc1 · He said howevcr1 that the figures · ere off because CIA had sloug d off the poor gents and because two aeent cts had been lost in the Havana area a 1 though a key agent fro1n each net had heen s ucccs s fu l ly pulled out Mr Fitzgerald _s _aid that CIA has ·64 singleton agents 83 agents legally re ' dent in Cuba and SS black subagents in on'e net _ In reply tn Dr Langer's question Mr Fitig rald said that about 1200 Latin American and African nationals a year are receiving t aining in Cuba and are returning to their 'respective· countrie _ • Handf -vii BY£MAN ContrnI System 44 · · · Mr Fitzgerald remarked in this connection that the volnti ity victorie3 ·which ·Castro has enjoyed HP NDLE v· 0 CO VliNT · ' _ -' ' ·' ' _ ' I · - 7 _ I CH ·-ll' ELS ONLY OB _SECR l •• •·· - · ·' ·· · · ' t ·tr- _ 1 • ·•· ' r• 1ilfJ•PJ J 1 Jfir - 'f j I ' - j L' • 1-- JtW l · t ·J· 0' ' - - 1 J ' _· 1 ••·· · - --· ·' · - i _' - ' 0 tr ·· · _ ' r- · ' ·rop V 1 I SECRET r _·· Mr Pace asked what arc the priority jntclligence objectives whtch are assigned for coverage by CIA agents sent into Cuba · Mr F ttzgerald · _ ·•' ft · said that the a ents are t rgeted- gainst the strategic military itUation · •'· r-· I r I In answer o a query about the question of the se of Cuban caves Hr ' Fitzgerald said that this question had been _pretty well resolved but CIA is keeping· at it - General Carter stated that CIA presently estimates there are from t ooo to 7 000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba who are operdting the SAM sites and providing military_training to Cubaris plus about 4 000 rion- rnilit ry Soviet personnel He added that by April the Cubaris 111 pro0 b ib1ly be rca·dy to take over t he air defense systems if the Soviets choose to turn the ov t to the Cubans Mr Fitzgerald added that fi sh had been received this morning of the first evidence of a Chinese pilot t kirig-·pirt in I ' air operations i Cuba this from a COt 1INT source 1 Mr Murphy inquired as to whet ier CIA had succeecied in plan tf hg ·agents 'I in Castro's immediate entourage ' Mr Fitzgerald' said that this is anoth r priority intellige1 1cP objective being pursued by CIA including the objective • · • a of obtaining intelligence on the _int er-relationship of fact ions within the ' Castro regime on t he extent of Cuban 1counter-insurgency programs in which Cuba has a goo l cap ability and on the Snv ie t b lac t ra iri ing · oif Cubans in counterintelligencE' activ- ties Cuba hr s a fairly wide intelligc'nce system with p 1en t y in the Un it e d St ates • Mr Fitzgerald departed the meeting at thfs point · upon conclusion ot the discussidn f the subject of Cuba Genera 1 Carter next turned to the Panama situation has regularly 1956 ' General Handlo via B Ir rnu Control S1stam · · He noted that CIA • • •· I ' '' V - · • ·n - 'r· I '' i -J 0£ SECHET- l · · · 'I ' ·•·· ins tJga t cd the rcccn t' incidents in panama I a'l though the Commun is·ts were quick to exploit the situation once it arose CIA sJcceedcd i phot grnphing ' · '· I I • 13 Castro-itcs whc were engaged in foll'enting the 'incident ofter· it ·start·cd Of a total if 45 Com 11unist Castro ites involved •· 13 had 'been trained i n Cuba •I i ' nnd they distributed leaflets and disseminated propag i nda over ·t he ·ra_pi-ci i • ' ' CIA· i so learned thn t one The lmll King pen ona 1 ly le d a nob of Panamanians ' 1 I J in the streets Dr Longer wondered if Panamanians and the world at l2rgc· are aware that radio stat ions in· Panama ere in the Hands of the Communists ' r General Carter replied that one •Juld not say that ·precisely ut it can be said that 30 minu tcs after the incident- began· tl1ere ·were inf lamatory broad' ' cae s on the air As for the sniper activi y General Carter said that one · -· • · sniper had been identified as a known ·Commun is L With regard tb Vietnam Gen ial Cart r siid' hat the bl6odttis ou · · who a re pro-A c r ican and anti neti tr al is t 0cncr al Khanli is the le ade·r G ncral Khin · 3 rd Corps Commander will be chief of sta-ff had been plugging for more counter-in urgcncy effort against the Viet co ng 1 and the new lcade s will take stronger action General Khanh has saict that ·h will look to U S Ambassador Lodge for guidnnce 9n political matters in_ ihe immediate Sai on area '• ' · · ' ' ' ' '' ·•- ' Genera 1 Carter' said that CIA haq rece•ived advance- in format ion f ram General Khanh that he was worricci about French mo cs with ·respect to Vietnam In answer t·o Mr Coyne' s question as to whether CIA had been back of I yest rday's coup General Carter replied that it is well known that the CIA does not instigate coups Mr Murphy noting the conspiratorial · Hi i·-H Lt Vil· • J ' ·•• 1 ' i 'iLL l j' LY - 9 J ' tl 08 StCRET ·•· · ' · ' - •· -- · ··i' · ·· · coJp group· The · ' 'r ' · ' wl i ch b g-an ye tcrday afternoon was accomplishe'd by a ·grolip of youne gencr ils 1 -1 · '• '· ···· · • 4 _ t r i IO e _ SECRET rf · I t f 4 aspect involving France in the Vietnam s ituo t ion asked whc ther CIA hacl received advance intelligence from French sources concerning involvement of the French Government in Vietnam · ' · · •·· ' General Carter said that none had - · · · been received despite good CIA penetrations in Paris Mr Murphy found it· clifficult to understand why there had been no hard intelligence on this matter articularly when there had been public statements by the French concerning France's neutralist objectives in Southeast Asia Goneral Carter said that effort there had been no evidence of a covert french dgtinst the Vietnam regime f· · v •'·•··- Chairman Clifford asked wh ther theie had been ari improvement in the Vietnam s i tua t io1 fallowing the previr - coup wh f ch over threw th Diem reg imc General Carter said that social reforms have been made but their timing and · a celcration have been disappointing He thought it too eRrly to say whether i the new regime will have the will and ability to lntensify the fig 1t against the Viet Cong General Klianh haH indicate to Amb 1ssador Lodge a desire to retain General Minh in the new governme t General Khanh also said that he saw no alfeasance on the part of the generals in the Minh regime although they were known to have cooperated with French int 11 igence in the past In answer to a question by Mr Murphy General Carter said there las no evidence that the murder of Diem and Nhu in the previous coup were motivating General Carter answered Dr Langcr's qu stion factors in the recent coup by saying th t there is no hard evidence of an increased flow of supplies arms and men into North Vietnam from Comnunist China '✓ Turning to the next item hich had been indicated as of inte est to the Board General Carter referred to the question as to the desirability to separate the coordinating function of the DCI from the po t of head of the CIA Chairman Clifford interposed the commen·t that from its inception th i' s Board had been concerned with achieving greater coordination and control over the total U s fo eign intelligence effo t the B0ard still urges it Halllilc via BfftWJ N I Docld 34671877 Page 47 ·' f' '' ·· o J0£_S£CRET btcCPG3 M M ewt1t ' ·'' • ' _- 0 I case whether involving u S mil tary personnel or 9ivili s nnd ' · another recommendation dealing with the criteria for selection of the heads ' _ 1 i '1 ' of sensitive agcncies·such _as the NSA The Chairman s tated that these proposed rec mmcndations would be taken up at the next Board meeting I I J Chair mR·n Clifford directed Boar members' attention to the report' And· · · ' · · · · recommendations which had been completed by the Board Panel on Signals Intelligence There was agreement with Mr Clifford's suggestion th t the report and its recouunendations be forw rded to Mr' Bundy for considera ion and action with the agencies involved rather than picsenting this complex subjec fo the President today · Mr Clifford ·mentioned to the Board the recently c6pytight d new p per I ·I article by former Pr sident Truman who took the CIA to task for eng-4ging in I I r · l' activities which were not within the function of CIA as originally created Mr Clifford reminded the Board tha t while Mr Truman was President the CIA was authorized and l 1 ectP d to engage i 1 covert act ions e g in Italy which had much to do ith stemming the Communist tide in post-World War II in I Europe Chairman Cltfforo brought up another matter which he felt could become more s1erious namely the aggressive c ampaign being waged by CIA to improve its public imagel Mr - C lifford asked that the Board members think ' · ' _ ' ·'• about this subject which uld meeting be ·placed on the agenda of the next Bo ord At that time the Board should hE t from th_e DCI regarding this matter and consider· it in the_ _ligh_t of previous -Board re ommenr at ions that 1 · ·'· _· · t - - · _ · '· r b I j ·1 ··1 · •• · ' ' r ' ifi#fJe r 1 1 ' _ •-- '-l ' - 1 i · · ' 0 - - '' A v · cliscussi g in_ the co rse of his visit with head of tate overseas is ·' j - • I the adv isnb i1 ity · of their countries enga•ging in economic reprisals ·against Cuba • • t' • - I c•'f ' · · 1 Dr Baker confirmed this stating that todgy he_ ha9 learned that · I 'j _ _ 'i f- i CIA is taking spec if ic · covert steps to influen·ce ces sat tons of trade with ' I ' - ' · r- f '· _ · 'l t 1 f ' '• I ' · · 'ti I I · i ' i_ • C ba portlcul rly in the ca9e of Spain - Mt Clifford cocrld only·spec late that the DCI had suggested that the f OS terfng of economic reprisals is properly a task for the CIA I' and the President may have agreed in the absence of any other advice or consultation I Mr Cliffocd thought thit th DCILs meet ingi with heads of state is the cour_se least like Y to succeed in CIA' s efforts to contradi t its growing image as becoming· a_ pol5 cy-making I or gan iza t ion in the Government f Mr Clifford repeated that the Board should I ' • - - i - • i hear from the DCI on this at its next meeting and consider making a recommcnda j - · I ' ' tion to the President ' 1_ ' · - At 4 _00 p m until 5 30 p m the Board met with the President in the Cabinet Room of the· White House a pertinent memorandum on the meeting is filed elscwhcra in the Board's records r When the Board tnembers returned to the Board 1 s·offices Chairman Clifford remained at the White House at the President 1 s request to confer on other matt-e'i -s of a non intelligence nature April 2 and 3 1964 ·were' selected as the dat·cs -of the next meeting of th Board a two day session ' · - · -'' _ ' · • -11 ONLY • ' A t 1 THE- WHITE HOUSE '· -·r n ' _ V ·· NASH IN c TON Feb uary 4 1964 White House mission and The_ s·erve ·with·· this advisory body con ldered the· ·- 1 By way f•_ • of Research·at Bell and noting a1s0 overhead ' ••✓ - 1 Jq 1 7 if Z RettMO tr r ttttrttznr s « ···---·- _ _ I the Army Assistant Secretary of Defense Director of Defense ' Mobilization and Pres1dent1al·A s1stant for National Security He noted too that w1 th Coyne on behaJ f of the Board - Affairs Mr Gray has made on-the-scene· reviews of intell gencP activit ies· in ·p1 iactically every country in the Near East Middle East Southeast Asia crid the Fa ' East The Chairman next mentioned· Dr Lan j_ his Presiden y or Pol aroid and his outstanding t - • • · - --- ri • ' ' contributions to photographic • reoonnaias cmce techniques having_ · · · · ·•' s ecial application to intelligence - · •• • J ' - · · · I He next mentioned ' ·· Dr· William Langer his distinguished academic c ree 1 and his ' long assotiation with the intelljgence estimaping process He next mer tioneci Mr Robert Murphy and his decades of service as a career dlploma·t rov11i amba sador and Under ·secretary of Sta e He next men ioned Mr Frank Pace noting that his · · ·· · • • expericnc-e as Director of the· Budget· Bureau and ' ' s Secretary r· or the Army as well as his-experience as President of General Dyna mice expecially equips him to keep abrear t of management and - or•ganiz ation the intelligence of the Board as intelligence and in more Truman J' · -' · ·_ ·• 877 Page 51 ' t t r ' • • i · ' •' n 16 ••' - _ ' t • _ · ' • '• t· · Efs nhower anct_·Kennedy in various intelligence capacities Mf' I Clifford then went into some detail w·ith respect • • I •• · 1' _ · - i 'to the history of 'the Presid nt1s For·e1gn_ ·Intelligence Ad visory ·I • He ·pointed Board and predecessor organizations of the· Boaro '·• out hat follciwing th close of World W r II a ri ty ·bt ad hoc groups ·were formed at ·the Pres1de'nt1a level t'o review sele c ted as pee ts of t_h ov_ernment 's f-oreigh · intellig'e c_e ' ' effort · r ·t 'j· ' C I · ··•·· • - ' J •_ · Studies were rnade fr6rn'-time to time · ·rec·ommendati 6ns ' · • · group disband · with· 11ttlG or no follow-up L7-Ction on' it r-· · · - _ i recommendations Commission on · •' ' · Organizatibn of the Executi v·e Br anch _rec'ommencted 1 11 iatch ·bcik -c fttee 11 to make periodic surveys of the forei'gn· intellii ence ·j to· be made up of House and Senate members and pr1vb te·citizens t-tr Clifford- noted that in 1955 th IIdo•ver·· the creation of a permanent' b i pal t'isa n ''' ' a ctivi iec · of C Ur ' Government agencie's' and to report' to the dongres·s· arid i 52 ' It' ' 'i 1 i i · 1' · · · · r i II ' 11·-· I i tactic l 1 to forestall the creaticn of a Watch Dog Committee · in the Congress The Board of · Ccinsul tan ts served for come t ••• five years until the members s Abmi tted their· resignations at the cJ ose of PresJ dent Eisenho -1er I s term of I office ·t hen po tn e d ou t th a t i n J o nuary 1 _ 06J Mr Cl lf forri· President Kennedy decided that ther was a continuing need ' 1'or 8 Presidential Adv1i0ory Board on fr reign intelligenr e but deferred temporarily the e ppointme-nt of new members that n May l · 1961 following the disaster experienced by the CE ntr8 l Intelligence Agency a_t Cuba's Ba· r of Pigs t110 P '8Sid2nt isGucd an Executive Order establishing this Board I • Mr Cl tfford noted that 2 t that timr and on several subsequent occasions President Kennedy rema rl ed to him that he· could not stand ' nothcr intel igence failure like the Bay of Pigs fiasco that as Pre3ident he mu st have th assur31 ce of adequate intelligence on which to make important ·decisions and that he would depend 1 h av ly on this Board to continually monitor the activities I of all of' the iritelligence agencies providing him with ' independent objective assessments and recommendations concerning ' tho·se activities ' r-Tr Clifford stated tl7at President Kenn dy I had informed him that CIA had providsd him with ''bad information on Cuba and that t his had resulted in bad decisions Based on this experience President Kenn2dy h ad emphasized to 1 Mr Clifford that he was activating the ' soard to p2rform a continuiQg mission for the President th t the Board was to - 4 • OJ HANDLE VIA C01 1 r f- t-lA t NELS Oi' LY · · _ - ' ·A 1it ' i 2- · t· · ·-· 877 'I · r have thrC e functions 1 invatitigation 7 · ' '· 2 recomm 1 ndation and 3 follo r- -t P 1 Mr Clifford noted that Dr Killian serv'3d 2 s Chairmari · · ·• i of the Board until April 1963 that he· resigned at th 'l t time I _ · because of reverses in his health and thereupon Mr Cllfford was moved up from member to Chairman · • -- ·'' 1 to d escribe -in some detail Mr Clifford then proceeded the workJ meetings review piobedures rep6rtirig procedures and general modus operandi of the '8oard · He noted that from· _ May 1961 until the time of President Kennedy's'death the Boardlheld 25 separate meetings covering a total of 40 days He emphasized that the intelligence community is mad up of · ·f a great many _departments and agencies and that t forts to coordinate and control them have thus far ba ely gotten off ·· -· the ground Some progress i1as been made but much more remains to be accomplished b Clifford theh want on to discuss in some detail the Panels and Task Forces of the Board citing a few e xarrtples Th Chairman next went into some detail with respect to the 1 ecbmmendati ons which the Board made to President Kennedy noting that during the past 2½ years the Board su mitted to the Pres_ident a total of 70 recommendations 1 A large f percentage of the recommendations made by President Kennedy's Board 1nvolv8d activitie's internal to the Department of Defense a lesser prop6rtion involved activities ihtetri l to the Central Intelligence Agency arid the Department of Stat·e a number of them related to activities of jplnt interest to tw0 v1A d ftr s ' t· '-i ' ' · · · - · • · · · · ·· · · ·i • - i_ t _ · t fJt LS 0 NL Y · HANDLE ' •· ' NW ij f' 877 Page 54 · • -- · _ _ · ·• • · _ ' 1 2 z -· --a •• ✓ -' · - - • · ·• - - - I G - · I 'i - _ · • • • --- _ ··_ •• • # ·iJ f · ·1 1 member agencies or the Intelligence Community or th 170 ·-• ' ·i recommendations the President approved 125 disapproved 2 r 0 'I · ' '' · • ··J and temporarily deferred· ftnal action on -the ·remainder Of the 125 approved recommenctations implementing ac_tions on 85 have been substantially completed • The remaining Presidentially- ·· - matters warranting continued Board attention and possibly · - · - ' ·1· l • · · r ' ' · _ the submission of further·Boardrecommendations to the _ • l I •''···· ' ' • •·· are as of major and contin't iing concern to the Board These 1 The vast size arid cost of the over-all in- elligence effqrt which involv s ' some 149 000 individuals 131 COO of whom Mr Clifford reported that the eft ort t ' 1s · year w 11 cost slightly less thari four billion dollars • 2 The National Reconnaissance Program at this I point Mr Clifford asked Dr Land to brief4'the President for three or fout minutes which he did on the highlights of the satellite reconnaissance· programs In the course of the briefing Dr Land exhib1 t·ed · to the President examples of the recent Gc bl t photography taken over Mon tan a • · 3 • '· · · The --tJ 2 o ·c·ar ' - Tagboard programs 1 1 At this s request rGeneral point pursuant·' tcS ' · 1 r or Dooli tle highlights N Docld 671877 Page 55 I i· ·t- t ' ·• --c t I - · · Next Mr Cliff'ord ctted several examples of intelligence are in Defense and 17 000 of wh m are in CIA y I • ' President • ' · t - included the following ·· ' _ · I•' •· ' · i ' I ·-• r ' approved I· commendations de l with substantive intelligence ' -' i · ·•· ' • i ' --· ···· r· • The Slgnals Intelligence Progrc1m · Here Dr ·Bnker at the ·request of' Mr Clifford briefed the Presir 1 ent · on the highlights' of the Signals Intelligence effort· and on the major contrib ition rhich ia nade to tha o• er all intelli 1 ence effort by elements of· the COMINT-ELINT c omrnun ity · 5 · The Counterintelligence Program • At thic point I Mr Cl1 7i'orct advJsed the President that following a serious j espionage penritration at the Na tional Security Agency J · resident Kennedy requested t e Board to make a thorough · ' examination of the entire s1 tuation Ha pp1ly Mr Gr y wa s · ' ' ' able to free himself in ordet to devote full time along with · • Alfl tfj _ Mr Coyne to· such a study · Mr Clifford requested Mr Gray - to bt•ief tl1e President on the highlight-is of the Dunlap case Thereafter Mr Gray mentioned briefly the which he did _ highl ghts of the Howell penetration Follbwing the Gray briefing Mr Cltfford present d to the P esident the rep6rt • I on the Dunlap t ' • · · ca se which had been prepared by the Board -1' •i · noting that it was dated as pf November 22 1963 ' President retained the rep'ort and later sent it I'' 'rhe to Mr Bundy Is office for approp iate staffing and it is n6w in the process of being staffed by us - - _ In the course of the Board's discussion · with the President the following maj r poi ts were made With respect to the recent developments 1n Panama the Presid nt was not happy wiih th 0ai in which CIA acquitted its elf The President ihdicate d that after the fact they to d us they had been reporting disturbing HAND E YL · coAt n c At t f fL QNLY -- f _· • i·i _ · · · · · y· · • · t-' - · · _ · - · • •- tT't - NW Bwl€Jf r 877 ' ·' ' ·· - ·- · · r-L _ _ UI • · l _ • · developments in anruna for months ·on end ·an·d that p rhctps this was 80 11 but from-the President's vantage point there was no I ' ···· 5qr1 specific information pinpointing developmeht until itter diffic lties h d occurred ' •' •· In the case of the coup wh oh h d occurred in outh our Vietnam on the night preceed1ng ·1 meeting with the Pre s iderit • he said that he received no intelligence at all on that development to the President that -In fact it appear d ' _ · • · ti · · 1 '• General Khanh had ·advised our intelligence people of a· suspected ·coup which would 'be' JS·temptect· by someone else in Saigon for the purpose or· 11 pulling us off the track ' ' Next the Pre_si lent inquired o's to the Board's view on a request that he had recently receiv ed ·rrom the Pentagon Reaoing from _ a commun 1 at1on ' whitb he had before him it appeared that the_ President was being inf armed by the· Pentagon that· a proposal had been made to reduce_ the military membership on· the U S Intelligence Board by dropping from tne USID the Di rec tors of G-2 i A-2 - and ONI retaining on U SIB the DC 57 the Deputy Director of CIA DIA NSA_ State -· AEC and FBI - - ' i I·· - ·• 7 ' r' • Ill i ' •• j i ' ' 1' • •- I -·· L ii _ ' • that militafy intelligence activities are being centralized ' in the Defense Intelligence Agency along t11 lines· ea rli er recommended to the President by the Board Presid nt Johnson· expressed appre61at1on for the Board's views on this m tter l ' indicating that i i would be help ul t him n esponding to the request of the Joint Ch1 efs ' or Staff I • ' ' Turning to another matter · the President asked whether _ the Bo rd believes that Congress is being p ovided with 'i 'l enough information on qur intelligence a ctivi t es i I Mr Clifford • resp0 1ded in the affirmative then brought up· the fact_ that there are increasing bressures'io the establishment of a •'' ' Congressional Watch Dog Cormnittee on intelligence I Mr Clifford I emphasized to the President the view of the·Board that the creation of such a Watch Dog Committee would be dilatoriua to the national security and national interests because it would be most diffic lt to keep cur secrets secret under st1ch Jiiijqtb 1 a corrunittee The meeting with the Pre · i ent terminated with an ' · •· · ' · ' expression on the President s pa rt of deep appreciation to ' ' ' ' 'i ' • t--'Wt f f · ' ' ' ' the Board for the continuing_ patriotic and substantive contri• • ' • · in discussion of Board Press '' NwM §l f 1 ' ' 877 58 '' let the • _' '• _ l '· ' - _ - ·7·· 1 I ' - ' · · PRl CJ IDIW'l' •S FOREIQN INntJ IO ENC R ADV s ORY BOA RD Jonunry 16 1964 D3ar John 1' The next meft't1Dg ot the PMaident •a Foreign Intelligence Advisory Doud 1a acheduled to be hold on January 30 ·1964 - Ind 1n line with establlshod pract- co ·it would be var much appreciated 1r you would meet w1tb - on the morning or prore·rably trom 10- 00 t 11 coo a m that dn '_ At the timl ot J'0 11' meeting with us t t -would be helptul it iOU WC1 1lid be · preparcnd t o diccuss the subjocta·outllnoO tbe attaehrnont S1noerely Clark M Ciifford Chairman Attachment • · • ' ' 'I' - - ' r · I l ✓- - '' • ' ·· i _J •·' · • ·•· · tJ£lltLrs c' i · • ' • _ _ _ •I J -r-· 2_ 4 • s 6• ' ' · •'· _ -1 I ·•·· ' 1 J t - t 'ft •I ' ij t' ' 1 b li 1J '•· c ' 1 ' ' S 'I i i · 1 ·· '' f f r df'i t1 1 • JJ •t · t •f c •il·'f '1 l 111•11 1 ' _ ' · · - t ¥' ' l ft - i i - r NW 381gf' 877 • ' I • '1 '• • -· I ' -t _ I' •• r ••I I • I 4 4 - n 0 L J ' • I 1 Or THE DIRl CfOR ·· r j · ' CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ' I ·F' I -' • I ' i WA$HINOTOl' I u D C I '··t· 1'· Tanuary 1964 r ' •_ -· ' - ' Dear Clark 1 As you probab y know I am leavini for E' iropc on Sat'IJrday and 1ence will miss an opportunity to visit with you in the immediate future However I wish you to know the hackground 0£ the pr ss inc iden·t which · unfortunately has been blown up · nd hence the theme of a great number of editorials · I i Therefore I am ttaching a memorandum prepared for my file to review the eries of events which lea up to the release of il formation on the Soviet economy with CIA attribution · Also attached is a copy of a lettc r fr m Senator Stennis and n 1 y reply Finally there is a copy of th 1 dir cJi Vjt Y hi h t D'l issuing' today in ordei t·o-p · · - ·n t·a n in-advcr _I' • - - _ ···-·····-···· ··· 1 • --- • • • • -te-u c ur CO of the situation -1 I rJ 1 __ - - - · - · · · - - • 4- • M- - # t ' J _ r r ' Frankly I am surprised at the publicity and £urthcrn1or- I cannot be overly critical of the attrib'ftion because of the long history of CIA's r 'leases on Soviet economy We have for 10 years been issuing• vol mes 6n this subject in unclassified form carrying the Central Intelligence Agency name and these ire in uni versities libraries and the hands of virtually all eco nomists ·and newspapermen interested in the subjec t Furthermore Allen Dulles has testified in open hearing and on the rc·cor d on this subject It was a favorite tcpic for speeches by Allen General Cabell and Bob Amory in the days when Cl ' officizils were making speeches Hence the denial of the pr ivilege of attribution w·ould have in my opinion not been respected y anye ne in the Jress · Page 1 ' I I l I I I ' · ·· _ _ ' • r • I ' 1 • 1 tt ' F ' ' '' - _· • · ·· · ' ' ' i 1- 1 1 _ · t l h I • I I ' ' I have known or some ime a s I told you that there a re people in t his Governme t most -particula ly iz i the State Department who enjoy harassing CIA in the press I think ·although I cannot prove it that they have not been inclinod to pass up this opportunity • • • ' I' A ttachm ents as stat1Jd --- -- ' • f1 •'• - ·- · ' · 'I The Hori orable Clark Clifford 877 Page 62 ' ' '--'' 1 '• · t 0 0 ••' ' I ' · ' ' • UNITED STATES SENATE I C ' January 13 1964 0 p y Honorable John A McCone Director Central Intelligence Agency Washington 25 D C Dear Mr McCone · · ·· __ Recently l r• ad·an arHcle stating that the CIA had held a press confe·rcnce during which the Soviet economy was discussed •' I ' My impress on is that the holding of press cc nferenccs is a distinct deptlrture from CIA I 1 3 past practice I would appreciate it if you would advise me of the significance of th1is occurrence and whether it repre S• nts a change of policy which will be a pre cederit for the· future' · · l Sincerely 'i ' -_ - ' - · · SI ' John Stehni s United States Senator l r3 i-- I ✓ '--1· • C 0 P y - I ' '•·· • ' J ·- ' ' 0 • • ri ' '· ' ' JI THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON 2 5 O C · • ' ' ' ' • ·• 1•· '· ' ' ·1 ' I •- · I i ' he Eor u - blo John Stennis Tho Unite cl f tatc s Scn te - 1 • ' t ' _ ' · · · ' ii ihin ton D C · -· • t Dear Scn - tor Stennis I ··· _ _1 ThiG is in r·cply·to your lett r of Janun1 y ·1Jfr A- 1 told you wh1 n I s w ou · it my meeting witlj your Cor u- 11ttce oa Fricl -iy 2-ft i·noon tho prcsa report of A 11 ClA p1·e 1 con c1·onco 1 ' w i son1cthi1 i of _an oyor-statemcut 0£ £act althou'1 h cii·cun1 Jt ccs ware Juch tl'41 t I can underztand the reauon for the u tatcn cnt · I · ' bat h i ppcnecl was·· that aavoro l reporters 1·cce ivcd uncla si ·ied i 1 fo i ·r 16 tion on the Sovi et econo ny fro n1 1S one of thcr l featured the CIA atti·ibution • 'fhis b1 out h an nv l uche oi rcquesta frorn o hcr reporters who f lt that one h id bech fo vorod lith- s 01 1 e inG idc iafonnati911 It There for6 pcopl p1·c1in rc d a bric i- lcn'lo1 andurn of ju 'Jt what had been told and invited tho inqni cn to·co1· 1c out and pick it up · All who inquired worcJa81 cd to co1 1 e t a particulc1r hollr The fact that thoy wei·e rnet and t ' lked to by a CL ofi'icor _ during the coursa of c listribut on of t he mcm oran lum L' ve cisc to the ropo rt that it h ad boon a 11 Cl ' preLls conforcnce 1 11 v-1hich I think 1 o verst tcs what' happened and - · - oui· II 1 have been concerned ave - the fac t that the CIP c 1 ttribution l G been gi vcn D lCh wiclo- r rond public Hy nil frun l ly don I t 11- do1· Gtand why because in this area narnc ly Sov·ict cconorni 3 CIA ha l been « r·ccognized · n 1thority and has for b o p i at 10 ycar J i suecl volw -1· e s of unclassi icd reportc 0£ one 001·t oi ano t1 cr which have been cliatributcd to libraries unh1 crsiti s lvlorcovcr the subje_ct was a f voritc subject 0£ my prodeceoco1· vho ioo i - cd uport'·u as ona area which he could troa_t f'roely and publicly· in cpcn Ior un 1 -You m i· · recall thci·o w ia an open hearing by the Joint Ecopon ic · Comrnittec on 13 Novc rnbcr 1959 at which the Direct9r of Central Inteiligcnce testified and 1 877 i ' · · · i · i_ • • '• I ·' I I J i · I' ·'· i i ' i ' I I ·i j · •• 0 1 · • ' I ·· • '- - ' I 0 ' ' ' ' J - ··- ll _ Sincerely 1$ 1 l ·I I John J McCono uiroctor 6 I 0 I • ·· ' · ·· ' • -•I Page ' · - - · · ' J • ··r • · I 1· i 1 -i • • I ' 1- ' -· I ···- 7 1 C 0 p l ' ·• · MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE ' '-' ' · i SUBJECT Recent CIA-Publicity · y· _- · • • ' i I_ • ' ' 13 January 1964 y • · ' ' Two recent developments within ClA shouid be noted rl ' · a Following the briefings of the NSC and Congressional-i'eadership I prOj OSed that c'IA findings on Soviet economy be released to· the public in the United States and Europe ii1 order to 1 influence I curtailment of long-range ·credits and 2 influence a · n umber of uncommitted leaders' of nations in Africa Southeast Asia and Latin America This plan was discussed nd agreed with the President Secretaries Rusk Harriman Alexis Johnson and ' thers · My proposed plan per Memoranda and _Notes of Conversation was to handle the Gubj ect through cut-outs on an unattributable basis and largely thr ough the foreign press on a carefully timed schedule 'to a void the impact of sudden propaganda' DDP organi zed to' implement this program -'Additionally info rmatiCln was to be furnished presumably on an unat1 ributc ble basis to Stewart Alsop SATURDAY EVENING POST J-nd Charles Mu -phy FOR TUNE who were sai d to b- studying the subJect · _ _ · __ • • •·· ·1 I · I '- ' I · · · l ·· ·• i · ' - b I have felt and expressedrriyself to the late Pre ident Kennedy to President Joh11s0 '1 to Secretary Rus and others that the DCtand Gl ir g -- -Y §t be changed Its basic and primary responsibilities by law --- ' ' are to' assemble all intelligence analyze evc1 luate estimate' and report such in telligence for the benefit of p'olicy makers • This function has· been submerged _a-nd CIA has consistently referred· to as a cloak I and dagger oud t whose activities· involve almost I excl sively oper ations ·designed to overthrow government_s iss ssinit Heads of State involve jl itself in politic'af· U irs' of foreign states and none' of these actiyitilii ie - i-ther controlled or co ordinated 1 or the State Department This is with the White Ho ise bee t J f t lit ffd' 1 ·0' l ' '· _ · _ · f··•· ' · I fif - t J· i-r_ • • i · ···••·T· · • · ' ·• I ''' - - -' · · itJ i S··- _ · • ·•'i r · ' _ _' - • ••• 1 '' D _ • -¥ i •1 i i-_ - Jiit J ' r 1it ' 1 • • i - w i''-' i 11 •' ' '· 1 ' • '· ' ·1H· i i' i jiti ivi t N ' 'if11 l i'i ' ' • ' ''•'1· · · i · 1' J' 1 ·J ' 'iih iit Vr ' • • · • · J it·· t ' ·'• r i u - lt' ·'tl f' 1 ·it ' r j itrr tl11 fr1 t tr trt t · JrfJ i - '· _- - _ - - - - _ - - --_ - t _-_ • j I tr · · 1 - •• ' • • -'' '• f• ' • -· ' I •· • • · C 0 p y f 'j j_otr •t r •- · v ' -_1 - ·i t ·- _ • • • - · · _ i ·A · i •· · i' • i •• j_ _ _ r · '• •· ·• ···• ·' ···'• ilJ i Jir 41J 'Jj illL 1iit¥ttlittr J 5 tt' • • i t mI Jiii itY K 1¾i i t iiti tt it i 1lf tiiJlj NW l f ' 877 Page 1 '- r - 7 • i • u- i ·- • · f I I ·entirely wrong both with respe t to the activity and the coordination and control and I wish to attempt to c hange this image · NOTE Hundrc·ds o·f editorials and dozens o speeches oi th Hill have dealt with this thesis in one form or another and there has been no rebuttal at any time to my knowledge No authorization was given by me for the ricfing of press or other columnists other than Alsop and Murphy or for attribution or for s1 atements or references to ClA's unique capabi ities in Soviet economy or the purpose of l ie releases I - I I i • • I 'I · · _ -'· I What has h_appened is that tb J- wo stated purposes 11 rnerged 11 a 1d journalists including TIME NEWS l EEK HERALD TRIBUNE Charles Bartlett and Mr Dale of the NEW YORK TIM S were bri'e fed during late December and early Jam f y - In the case of Charles Bartlett and Mr Dale permission Wi S given to attribute the information to CIA by DJ 1 and PR and app i rently · additional information on the depth of CIA' s work in studying Soviet economy was_ discussed As a result the CIA role th e -' ttributio_n and the fact that it had finally spoken out was 6£ far greater significance than the facts When the NEVf YORK TIMES featured this side of the sfory 1n a front page article there was a clamour £or like information for othc rs and as a 1 esult - lA inv_ited inquiring press m n· to c me down and receive icientica 1nformat10n which was then prepared 1n a written 1nemor andum The memorandum was discu ssed with them and thi s was interpreted to be a ' 11 forrnal press conference'' which is only p rtially true I In defense of DDI and PR 1 s acti - t ies it is to be noted that CIA_ has £or lQ years issued unclas·sified publicaL- ns on the Soviet economy ·and the method·usad in analyzing it ·_ Mr Allen Dulle3 used this subject as a favor ite topic f r his speeches which were numerous - 'ii fact Mr Elder my assistant states he h is written at leasl 12 speeches on this subject for Mr Dulles Howuver the_ timing and manner of release 1 - as given npecial notice by the press in this instance 877 I '· ·- I ·1 ' 7 I · •1 -· I • · I I I - 1 e · The consequences are as follows ' I ' 1 The W hite_J Io u 1an_d more particularly the State Department - ¼ h f1 1_lly _ 11'-'t111·h because yao-·not know the effect this pu pl cit 1· might have on their res pons ib ilitie s I 2 · IA 1 s __ methodology-and' findings_h - iv e be n questioned because a ·vast amou nt of information upon - · _ _ - which our conclusions are based was not disclosed and much of it cannot be disclosed 1 and hence the legitimacy of our conclusions is doubted by some experts and in the public rriind 3 - Congressional le _rs - Senato -s Russell V n's on and _C anno n - - -st · _fiJ c·11· f · e·n J Ii JjiP -- J X i 'ltl lJ J -- 9 ·Alld ha y O ' · • i expr cs s c cl_ the § Jy_e · · • r ·· 5 I A carefully planned DDP operation for covert release of information and developed at my dir ection has been de strayed The· purpose of J_1_s_ rip to brief Ii - ds it • a t • 4 st Ge_' L ' J - ·15 1X has ' ' ' 0 ' • 6 f h ctivi J Y -1 n -G Qntr ary_ t_q_ ·rny _ _pe d fie itten and oral orders and warning ' of DDCI at staff meetings wnent hes £ject was discussed J is As a result it my intention to is sue· ins tructiq ns for the conduct of all public rel_ations a ctivities in the future their careful coordination at the level of the White House and th_e State Department and until these orders ar issued I wish absolutely no contact wha ts·oeve r '1I no comments no discussions with the p ess except with my personal 0 authorization • I Nl u - 877 Page · - - ' • I' I 'i I • •