Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 ' - - Directorate of Intelligence Seeret 25X1 India Nuclear Debates-and ----Decisionmakers 25X1 A Research Paper Seeret NESA 86- 0011 February I 986 Copy 24 7 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 25X1 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 Secret Directorate of Intelligence 25X1 India Nuclear Debates and Decisionmakers ------ 25X1 A Research Paper 25X1 This paper was prepared by Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis with a contribution from --- Office of Central Reference It was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations --- 25X1 25X1 Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief Issues and Applications Division NESA ----- 25X1 Secret NESA 86- 00 I February I 9ti6 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 Secret 25X1 India Nuclear Debates and Decisionmakers - - - Key Judgments llfc1rmation available as of 3 February 986 was used in this report 25X1 Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi like his predecessors holds the Cabinet's nuclear portfolio and is the focal point for major nuclear decisions Since coming to office he has persistently drawn attention to the threat that Pakistan's nuclear program poses to India's national security He would prefer to find a diplomatic and political solution to the nuclear dilemma in the subcontinent since he does not want to divert scarce Indian resources to a nuclear weapons program - - - - - - 25X1 Gandhi's decisionmaking style is consultative and conciliatory On nuclear issues he receives advice from a wide range of political appointees opinion makers and scientists Indian Government officials and opinion makers are divided in their views on nuclear weapons although proweapons advocates are more vocal than in the past ----- 25X1 India's relatively free press and extensive professional cadre of civil servants scientists and military strategists encourage lively discussion of the nuclear options and set the climate for policy debate and formulation Although there is no unanimity in official opinion public opinion and the press increasingly favor building a nuclear deterrent 25X1 - - - - - - New Delhi will be slow to come to a decision on the troublesome nuclear issue and will be extremely reluctant to make any decision public A largcscale highly publicized weapons program would entail major diplomatic and economic costs and India's democratic traditions will ensure that all sides have an opportunity to contribute to-and drag out-the debate 25X1 Although India demonstrated a nuclear explosive capability in 1974 it has steadfastly maintained that its nuclear research and energy program is peaceful and has resisted demands to start a nuclear weapons program New Delhi's resolve however is being eroded by increasing evidence of nuclear weapons capability in Pakistan If Pakistan were to give undeniable evidence of its nuclear weapons capability or if China were to deploy nuclear weaponry in a manner to threaten India there would be overwhelming public support in India for a nuclear weapons program ------ 111 Secret NESA 86- 00 I February 986 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 Secret 25X1 Even if India and Pakistan were to reach a bilateral understanding without submitting to international safeguards New Delhi could still undertake a small covert nuclear weapons program This is probably India's most attractive option since it would preserve plausible denial be economically feasible and could be kept proportionate to Pakistan's program Secret lV Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 25X1 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 iSX1 Secret Contents Page Key Judgments 111 I New Focus to the Nuclear Debate Hardliners 3 Moderates 3 ----··--·------ - - - - - - · · · - - - - - - - The Advisers-Splintered Opinion ·- 3 -- -·--- --- ---·---- -------· - 5 The Inner Circle ---- - - - - - New Delhi's Scientists 6 Bureaucratic Equities 7 Department of Atomic Energy 8 Ministry of External Affairs 8 ----------------- - - - - - - - - - - - -----------·-··-------------------- Ministry of Defense --- ----- 8 --------- Committee on National Security 9 ------------------------------- Nonofficial Influences 9 - -----·---·-·--------· - - - - - Public Opinion 10 Opposition Parties 10 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- The Press 10 Outlook 10 -· Implications for the United States 11 Alternative Scenario 12 V Secret Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 Secret 25X1 India Nuclear Debates and Decisionmakers - - - - 25X1 Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi announced in June 1985 that-in view of Pakistan's nuclear ambitions-India was being forced to review its commitment to a peaceful nuclear program long the cornerstone of New Delhi's nuclear policy Although India detonated what New Delhi termed was a peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974 that nation is internationally identified with the worldwide nuclear disarmament movement and a widely publicized moral stand against nuclear weaponry New Delhi however has kept its options open by refusing to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and publicly stating its intention to maintain an option to acquire nuclear weapons 25X1 Since coming to office in November 1984 Gandhi has made clear as no previous Prime Minister has that India must respond to the change in the military balance that a nuclear-capable Pakistan would create Gandhi has been persistent in searching for an appropriate response to Pakistan's progress He has made frequent public comments about the economic cost of a nuclear weapons program and the military difficulties of adapting to nuclear warfare I 25X1 25X1 25X1 New Focus to the Nuclear Debate Gandhi's raising the issue has exposed a lack of consensus within the government and thrown the debate on nuclear weapons into sharper relief The Indian newspapers' front page stories and columnists have begun to discuss in earnest the pros and cons of nuclear weapons development and have criticized the Prime Minister for his inability to resolve the issue Some members of Gandhi's Congress Party and other political parties have demanded that the government launch a nuclear weapons program Since the Chinese nuclear test of 1964 India has had pro- and anti-bomb lobbies The dominant antibomb forces believed that India's moral stand against nuclear weaponry should serve as a model for the world The probomb advocates argued that India needed nuclear arms as a deterrent to the threat from China and as a means for India to take its rightful place as a world power 25X1 25X1 Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 Secret Indicators of an Indian Nuclear Weapons Program We do not believe New Delhi has sanctioned a largescale nuclear weapons program but India retains the capability to do so on short notice India detonated a nuclear device in the Thar Desert in 1974-the peaceful nuclear explosion Analysis of the research of key Indian nuclear scientists indicates that until I 977 they worked on theoretical problems that have weapons applications and on the diagnostics of the 197 4 test India's large program of civil nuclear power and research and development also f ives it an ample basis from which to develop a nuclear weapons effort Stockpiles of plutonium and recent advances in plutonium-producing research reactors and fastbreeder reactors will give India the advantage over Pakistan in fissile material production If India were to initiate a major nuclear weapons program which we de fine as a development and testing program leading to deployment of several small nuclear weapons we might expect to detect the following indicators • Testing of the high-explosives components of nuclear weapons probably at Chandif arh • Growing contacts between personnel of the Department of Atomic Energy and the military to estabfish weapons requirements and characteristics and to administer a hardware development program Secret • Stepped-up efforts to procure abroad specialized materials components and equipment for weapons production and for the civil nuclear program in anticipation of a foreign nuclear suppliers' boycott • Reassignment of key personnel within the nuclear establishment to new duties or locations • A nuclear test probably at the Thar Desert site to provide new technical data or more conclusive proof that technical development objectives had been achieved I 25X125X1 We have obsen'ed none of these actii·ities but we believe India could have a nuclear device ready for testing and could proceed rapidly with an underground test on short notice _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ 25X1 25X1 --------- 2 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 Secret During the last five years the dominance of the antiweapons forces has been assailed by growing ranks of hawks responding to the entry of Pakistan into the nuclear arena A flurry of books and films alleging that Pakistan was building an Islamic bomb appeared in India The allegations were given added credibility in Indian eyes when the United States invoked the Symington Amendment and severed aid to Pakistan in 1979 1 Press reports last summer that Pakistan illegally obtained and used USmade krytron triggers for a test of the nonfissile components of a nuclear device intensified Indian concern the opinion that nuclear weapons are tools of diplomacy and that the decision to develop them should not depend upon what Pakistan does Moderates According to our analysis of the public debate most moderates argue that India should initiate a weapons program only in response to undisputed evidence of a Pakistani nuclear weapons capability such as a nuclear test or a cutoff of US aid Many adherents of this view acknowledge that a Pakistani explosion of a nuclear device would begin an expensive nuclear arms race in South Asia There are very few Indians who would argue against nuclear weapons in the face of a demonstrated Pakistani nuclear capability A lively debate over the circumstances that should trigger a nuclear weapons program has replaced the militant pro- and anti-weapons arguments of the India's consistently held anti-nuclear-weapons posture suggests that most policymakers are moderates on 1960s and 1970s The introduction of the Pakistani nuclear issues and angle has given the discussion a new twist and to most Indians the question is no longer whether but - - policymakers base their opinions on a pragmatic assessment of the economic and diplomatic when India should acquire nuclear arms Arguments of the antiweapons forces have moderated considerac o s t s - - - - - - - - - - - - · a weapons bly as more observers argue that India must be able to program that includes sophisticated delivery systems respond quickly and decisively to Pakistan's advances would triple the defense budget I ----------- Hardliners Proponents of an immediate nuclear weapons program have always argued that this would not only counter a Chinese nuclear threat and a growing Pakistani weapons program but also would have wider international political benefits for India They see a weapons program as a means to ensure India's rightful position in global power politics and to contribute to the strength of the Third World by redressing the gross imbalance of power between the developed and developing world Many adherents of this view hold ' The Symington Amendment provides for the cutoff of foreign assistance to any country importing uranium enrichment technology for unsafeguarded nuclear facilities In April 1979 as a result of the publication of news regarding Pakistan unsafeguarded uranium enrichment facilit at Kahuta all US assistance to that country was cut off In 1981 the provisions of the S mington Amendment were amended allo ing Congrcs to waive the law if lJS national security interests were jeopardized as thev were believed to be when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan If Congress has reason to believe Pakistan is obtaining weapons-grade uranium or 1f that country tests a nuclear device Congress can reinvoke the cutoff of US aiJ I Indian opinion makers have argued that a weapons program would seriously undermine India's credibility in international forums and the Nonaligned Movement as well as the credibility of the disarmament movement with which New Delhi is closely associated I ---------- 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 The Advisers-Splintered Opinion Rajiv Gandhi's key advisers do not agree on the appropriate response to Pakistan's growing nuclear capability see foldout Although we do not have good evidence of the views of all his intimate advisers it is I 3 25X1 25X1 Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 Secret India's Policy Options Over the years Indian policymakers have defined several nuclear policy alternatives that are supported by various government bodies and officials These options not mutually exclusive continue to be argued in the press and policy circles 25X1 25X1 Recent Indian press r_e_p_o_r_ts th a_t_P_a_k ·-is-ta-n-t-e -vt-e d t he nonfiss i Ie cornpo- 25X1 • Do nothing nents of a detonation system have led Indian observers 10 conclude that Pakistan may not need a full-blown nuclear test to have confidence in the reliability of a nuclear weapon design • A preemptive strike on Pakistan's nuclear facilities Gandhi's and Zia's joint announcement in December 1985 not to attack each other's nuclear facilities would presumably negate this option Gandhi in numerous public interviews had already disavowed a preemptive strike as contrary to Indian principles as well as incapable of guaranteeing the elimination of all enriched uranium that may be stockpiled We believe that New Delhi has military contingeno· plans to carry out such an attack although some Indian strategists are concerned that the inevitable Pakistani retaliatory attack on Indian nuclear facilities would spread radioactive contamination over large portions of India • Mutual no-first-strike pledge In late July 1985 K Subrahmanyam proposed in an article published in the Times of India that both countries develop co ifidence-building measures 1ha1 would culminate in ihe acceprance of a pledge not to use nuclear weapons against each other Initial steps in the process would include a pledge not to attack each other's nuclear facilities agreed to in December 1985 and the accession by Pakistan to the environmental modification convention and the partial test ban treaty Ultimately the pact would allow each Secret Cartoonist's depiction of cynicism about the andhi-Ziu pled e not to u lack each other' nuclear Ji1cilitics - - - - - - - 25X1 side to retain its weapons option and would not involve mutual inspection of facilities • Hove under the nuclear umbrella of a superpower This idea first appeared and was rejected in the 1960s when a faction within the Ministry of External Affairs supported the acceptance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and a security guarantee from the United States The ruling Congress Party has publicly indicated as recently as August 985 £hat it continues to believe India should not depend upon another power to safeguard its sovereignty • A weapons program This option generates the most debate and is perceived by many Indians to be the only workable alternative • Accept the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty New Delhi's official policy is never to accept the NonProliferation Treaty since it is viewed as discriminatory to nonnuclear weapons states and would force India to put all nuclear facilities under full a eguo d j 1 cop 4 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 Rajiv's Decisionmaking Style According to most Indian observers RaJiv Gandhi has introduced a new style of decisionmaking to India He is consultative and decisive According to an Indian opinion poll he is widely perceived to be a good crisis manager He has termed himself nonconfrontational Unlike Indira Gandhi who procrastinated Rajiv is quick to identify problems examine the issues and seek workable solutions He looks to his advisers for facts and options and seeks counsel from those he considers experts--often professionals who had no influence in his mother's circle According to a US Embassy report Indian officials say that Gandhi often asks detailed questions that reveal a thorough understanding of technical concepts 25X1 Gandhi has surprised observers with his prompt attempts to reach sometimes bold solutions to major policy problems and has earned high ratings in a recent Indian public opinion poll Within his first year Gandhi concluded accords on two highly contentious domestic issues the Punjab crisis and Assam In both instances according to press accounts he sacrificed his party's political advantage for the nation's good In both instances he introduced unexpected proposals to bring movement toward solution 25X1 3080 1 2-86 clear their opinions range from those hesitant to take any steps now to at least one adviser who sees advantages in both India and Pakistan having nuclear weapons The Inner Circle Arun Singh Minister of State for Defense Research and Development is the Prime Minister's most trusted adviser according to the Indian press Singh is responsible for a large network of defense research establishments that will ir 1 eract closely with the civil nuclear program in the event of a decision to acquire nuclear weapons He has been involved in high-level discussions with the Pakistanis on nuclear matters The Indian press speculates that one reason Gandhi appointed Singh is to ensure that he had a trusted official in a key post in the event of a decision to launch a nuclear weapons program Singh's position in the Ministry of Defense makes him responsible for India's external security Since Gandhi holds the Defense Ministry portfolio many political observers 5 believe that Singh will function as de facto Minister of Defense G Parthasarthy 's longevity in government--he is currently head of the Policy Planning Committee of the Ministry of External Affairs-combined with his personal relationship with the Gandhi family probably ensures him a place in discussions on nuclear matters Parthasarthy is the titular head of the inOuential South Indian Brahman circle among whose members three-Raja Ramanna K Subrahmanyam and V S Arunachalam-are also nuclear advisers according to the US Embassy Although diplomatic sources in New Delhi predicted that Parthasarthy would not last long in Raji 's government because of his leftist orientation he has been involved in all major talks with Pakistan including nuclear discussions Parthasarthy was involved in the decision to conduct the 197 4 test of a nuclear device and his comments that New Delhi did not fully calculate the political and economic costs of the event Secret Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 Secret suggest that he would be cautious about the costs of a nuclear weapons program Romesh Bhandari the Foreign Secretary is a relative newcomer to nuclear decisionmaking circles According to US Embassy reporting Bhandari who is slated to retire soon takes part with Parthasarthy in all the Indo-Pakistani nuclear discussions and probably advises on tactics and diplomacy Before becoming Foreign Secretary Bhandari said that he did not believe India could live with a nuclear Pakistan according to the CS Embassy The widely accepted spokesman for the probomb lobby K Subrahmanyam is an important Gandhi adviser on strategic issues Subrahmanyam a career Indian Administrative Service officer director of the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis and recently appointed member of India's new National Security Board - - - - - - - - - - h i s views on Indian nuclear aims have little to do with Pakistani nuclear developments according to a CS academic who follows nuclear issues He has long held that India to position itself properly in the global order and to demonstrate its abilities relative to China should have a nuclear weapons program Subrahmanyam uses the specter of a nuclear Pakistan to gain support for his opinions but he believes that India and Pakistan would benefit from the resulting balance of power if both states controlled nuclear weapons In recent publications Subrahmanyam-in reaction to the announcement by Pakistan that it could enrich uranium-has urged that India justify its own weapons program and project an image that it may be harboring some bombs in the basement with the last wire yet to be connected - - - - - - - - - - - - - - that Subrahmanyam-who writes regularly for the influential Times of India-frequently tests ideas for government policy options in his news column 25X1 cw Delhi's Scientists We believe that Gandhi is receptive to the advice of scientists US Embassy reporting suggests that he is probably in fairly regular contact with key members of the scientific community Raja Ramanna chairman of the Department of Atomic Energy and the Indian Atomic Energy Commission and scientific adviser to the Ministry of Defense 1978-80 consults with Gandhi regularly and is one of his closest advisers on nuclear issues According to the CS Embassy in New Delhi Ramanna retains his longstanding reputation as a hawk on nuclear weapons 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Ramanna has administrative and planning control over both research and development and current operations of India's nuclear establishment As the architect of the 1974 nuclear test Ramanna has been kept in office because of his long experience and expertise despite the fact that he is beyond mandatory retirement age We believe that the Department of Atomic Energy will have considerable difficulty meeting its overly ambitious nuclear power goal of 22 indigenously developed power plants by the turn of the century and Ramanna may push more forcefully for a nuclear weapons program to deflect attention from the failing civil nuclear program Subrahmanyam is considered by the Indian press as well as Western academics to have the best access to India's nuclear and security issues experts We believe Secret 25X1 25X1 6 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 Secret V S Arunachalam the scientific adviser to the Ministry of Defense is one of the key participants in nuclear decisionmaking according to the US Embassy in New Delhi The Embassy reports that Arunachalam not only has Rajiv's attention on defenserelated nuclear issues and gets on well with Arun Singh but is also well connected to the South Indian Brahman circle in New Delhi By virtue of his position Arunachalam oversees some 70 defense laboratories and would be an important contact point between the Ministry of Defense and a program guiding nuclear weapons research and development His ability to deal effectively with foreign defense industrialists has earned him widespread respect and allegiance within the Ministry of Defense For over 15 years he has worked on the fringes of the atomic energy program and he has extensive contacts within that establishment Arunachalam often represents India on technology and nuclear applications issues and the Embassy reports is a skilled proponent of his country's interests In our judgment Arunachalam's interest in improving India's access to Western high technology will make him reluctant to support a nuclear weapons program that would sever the links he has so carefully forged He has been the bridge between the US position and Raja Ramanna the head of the Atomic Energy Commission on the nuclear assurances package in the Memorandum of Understanding with the United States 2 Arunachalam indicated to US officials that only he and Foreign Secretary Bhandari could give the assurances package the backing it needed to go through the necessary Cabinet committee meeting - - - - - - - According to the US Embassy M G K Menon is one of New Delhi's most important scientific advisers on nuclear matters We believe that he counsels against nuclear weapons Menon another South Indian was close to Indira Gandhi and appears to get along well with Rajiv Gandhi As one of five members of the Planning Commission responsible for government scientific programs he has a major voice in the allocation of funds He is also chairman of the Cabinet's Scientific Advisory Committee and like Ramanna and Arunachalam has served as scientific adviser to the Ministry of Defense Menon is one of India's most renowned scientists and represents India on almost every international scientific committee and commission During the discussions with the United States on nuclear assurances Menon on occasion substituted for Arunachalam - - - - - - - We believe that Gandhi has retained Homi Sethna chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission during 1970-83 as a personal adviser on nuclear affairs ---- Sethna wants the nuclear establishment to focus on Indian energy needs rather than a weapons program Retired in 1983 Sethna was a close adviser to Indira Gandhi who kept him as a personal scientific adviser until her death 25X1 25X1 lbX1 25X1 Bureaucratic Equities We have not identified a unified opinion on nuclear weapons within India's labyrinthine bureaucracy whose support will be vital for the success of a weapons program Entrenched cadres of civil servants who have to advise on and implement policy can actively advance or undermine government aims The Department of Atomic Energy and the Ministries of External Affairs and Defense will bear the major burdens of planning and implementing policy if the government decides to embark on a nuclear weapons program ---- 'The US-Indian Memorandum of Lnderstanding on Technology Transfer signed on 29 November 1984 was designed to further a more cooperative technology transfer procedure for India by standardizing procedures for protecting LiS technology and establishing a routine for the rapid clearance by the United States of Indian export requests Technology transfer items negotiated are subject to nuclear assurances - or pledges not to use the items in nuclear facilities negotiated with the Government of India 7 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Secret Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 Secret · 1'1' - -r t- Some members of the nuclear establishment will be disaffected if India undertakes a large nuclear weapons program Currently the civil nuclear power program consumes close to 75 percent of the entire departmental budget according to published department reports A nuclear weapons program would probably drain resources from the power program causing scientists associated with it to lose status and research opportunities According to US Embassy reporting a number of scientists in the power program support accepting international safeguards on the power program to enable India to import Western technology and know-how Launching a weapons program would cut them off entirely from Western technology Ministry of External Affairs The Ministry of External Affairs is unlikely to lobby for a nuclear weaoons program I 25X1 25X1 I Ministry is dominated by an antiweapons pro-Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty group I Department of Atomic Energy The Department of Atomic Energy which has a major nuclear policy role because of its monopoly on technical and scientific expertise is split between weapons advocates and opponents • The majority of middle-level scientists at Bhabha Atomic Research Center probably still hold the views that they expressed in 1979-80 that India should not start a nuclear weapons program even if Pakistan's nuclear 2oals were far advanced I IKrishnan Ras --- ------- gotra Foreign Secretary during 1983-85 recently was quoted in the Indian press as saying that New Delhi was making too much noise about Pakistan's nuclear program since it could never pose a significant threat to India We believe many officers are in a dilemma since they are only lukewarm supporters of improved relations with Pakistan-the only alternative to a nuclear weapons program c _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ J t r-' IA 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Ministry of Defense · ----- I younger scientists appealed to I Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in mid-1980 for India to change its nuclear policy and develop a weapons option to counter Pakistan L___ _ - - - - - - m a n y Bhabha Atomic Research Center scientists were disappointed that she did not adopt their suggestion 1 __J An Indian decision to embark on a nuclear weapons program to counter Pakistani nuclear developments would be supported by the military We do not believe however that the military is actively lobbying for a nuclear weapons program or is likely to do so in the near future the Defense Ministry c_a_n_n_o_t in it i-at-e 1-sc_u_s-s1-o-ns-on-st ra tegic issues except X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 _ _ _ _ _ _ ___J Secret 25X1 25X1 8 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 Secret Gen K Sundar i those dealing with territorial defense with the Ministry of External Affairs or the Prime Minister's secretariat The Defense Ministry is consulted only on issues that relate to military implications of a particular issue --- 25X1 25X1 The military has outmoded training in nuclear theater operations and little sophisticated understanding of nuclear weapons I The most advance d u n d e r st a n a n g w e h av e o b s e rv e d has come from newly appointed Army Chief of Staff Gen Krishnaswamy Sundarji Sundarji has conducted theoretical work on strategic and tactical implications of nuclear weapons and in 1981 organized two highly unusual military seminars on nuclear weapons According to a US scholar Sundarji has well-focused views on doctrinal matters and the relationship of nuclear to conventional weapons and would probably be the military's point man in political discussions on aspects of a nuclear weapons program - - - - 25X1 25X1 25X1 Indian military officers are concerned about how a nuclear program would be financed and controlled and how it would affect conventional forces according to a US scholar • Military officers fear that the costs of a nuclear weapons program and delivery system would absorb a significant portion of the military budget causing conventional arms and readiness to suffer and leading to a probable overall reduction in forces • Operating in a nuclear theater would demand greater mobility and specialized protective gear leading to significant changes in the Indian Army's mechanization efforts • The individual services are worried about which service would assume control of the weapons The Army fears its influence would be diminished if New Delhi approved air delivery of the weapons Nonofficial Influences 25X1 Nuclear policy in India has been shaped by an elite group but we believe policymakers will not ignore a widespread clamor for nuclear weapons by the public 9 Secret Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 25X1 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 Secret Bhabani Sen Gupta the press and opposition groups-all of which play an influential role in the debate as India confronts evidence of Pakistan's nuclear intentions --- 25X1 L __ _ _ _ J 25X1 Public Opinion The public at large favors a nuclear weapons program According to an Indian public opinion survey published in July 1985 72 percent of the literate urban population believed India should develop its own independent nuclear capability A majority of those surveyed believe Pakistan is likely to develop nuclear weapons in the next few years and that India should follow suit A recent India Today survey on Gandhi's first year gauged the Prime Minister approvingly as probomb We believe the rural electorate----traditionally conservative mirrors these views Opposition Parties More political parties are becoming involved in the nuclear debate The conservative Jan Sangh has always favored nuclear weapons and last summer the Bharatiya Janata Party BJP --an offshoot of the Jan Sangh-revived the demand making it a plank in its political platform The regional populist party Telugu Desam the BJP the Lok Dal and various members of the Congress Party demanded in Parliament late last summer that the government launch a weapons program India's Communist parties do not agree on nuclear weapons According to the Indian press the pro-Moscow Communist Party-India calls for India to stand firmly by its traditional opposition to nuclear weapons On the other hand the Communist PartyMarxist has said that India must retain the nuclear weapons option L __ _ _ _ _ The Press Increasing allegations by the Government of India on the progress of Pakistan's nuclear program are causing some of the press to move away from a traditional dovish stand Newspapers in English and the vernacular call for New Delhi to guarantee India's security with nuclear weapons The Times of India publishes a column by Subrahmanyam that showcases the hawk viewpoint On the other hand the Indian Express and India Today counsel caution and diplomacy as answers to the nuclear dilemma According to an academic who follows Indian affairs Gandhi is a devoted reader of India Today The pro-Moscow Patriot favors retention of the weapons option as an Indian nationalist symbol although it supports disarmament as global policy The Patriot blames Pakistan's progress on the United States and implies active US assistance to Islamabad for the nuclear program 25X1 25X1 Bhabani Sen Gupta an influential journalist leading spokesman for the antiweapons forces and research professor at the Center for Policy Research publishes a regular column in the influential newsmagazine India Today According to a US scholar Sen Gupta's views-especially on issues of regional security-are well known and respected throughout India's foreign policy community Academics who have interviewed Sen Gupta believe that he like many moderates supports a strong defense for India and would endorse a nuclear weapons program if India faced a threat to its existence In a public debate on the issue of nuclear weapons in May 1985 Sen Gupta supported a policy of ambivalence on nuclear weapons-leaving both Pakistan and the West guessing Sen Gupta however prefers to emphasize nonnuclear options-diplomacy and accelerated economic development-rather than weapons acquisition to ensure a strong polity L __ _ _ 25X1 25X1 Outlook The nuclear debate in India is likely to intensify over the next year We cannot predict with any certainty what path decisionmakers will take Pressures to Secret Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 Secret launch a nuclear weapons program are sporadic and generally responsive to external events such as the Chinese nuclear test in 1964 and the international nonproliferation debate in 1969-70 India-a nuclear weapon-will prompt Islamabad to stop well short of any verifiable agreement 25X1 If New Delhi cannot reach a negotiated agreement with Islamabad we believe that India will adopt a Lack of a consensus and India's traditional slowness small-scale covert weapons program Such a program in coming to grips with intractable issues in our view would allow New Delhi to maintain plausible denial and avoid risking the loss of access to Western argue against a dramatic decision Longstanding democratic institutions and strongly held opinions will economic and technical assistance This option would ensure that all parties will have an opportunity t_o_ _ also be easier for Indian policymakers since it would make a case for the policy option they support not require major resource diversions - - - - Indian decisionmakers will also be cautious because of the costs and risks involved in a decision to become a nuclear weapons power Gandhi's plans for India include steady modernization which requires positive political and economic relationships with the West but a nuclear weapons program would have adverse economic and political costs • Funding a major nuclear weapons program would require a shift of resources from some domestic programs creating additional pressures on Gandhi's efforts to reduce growing budget deficits • Soft loans from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank would be more difficult to get in the face of US opposition • Indian access to high technology and scientific and technical exchanges-keys to reaching Gandhi's goal of taking India into the 21st century-would be impeded • Gandhi's recent rapprochement with the United States on sales of military equipment would be jeopardized Over the next year we expect Gandhi to continue to seek a dialogue with Pakistan His self-confidence has been bolstered by domestic successes over the past year and the informal agreement he reached with Zia in December I 985 not to attack each other's nuclear facilities may encourage him to try to negotiate a broader solution to the nuclear dilemma 25X1 If Pakistan tests a nuclear device an event we regard as unlikely Indian domestic pressure would almost certainly force New Delhi to launch a declared nuclear weapons program and perhaps to test a bigger and better device than that of Pakistan In this atmosphere the combination of New Delhi's basic suspicions of Pakistan and India's drive to be seen as the major South Asian power could make the region highly unstable 25X1 Implications for the United States Rajiv's genuine interest in finding a political solution to the issue of nuclear weapons on the subcontinent combined with his advisers' inability to reach a consensus on the Indian nuclear option may leave some role for the United States especially in light of gradually improving Indo-US relations Indian policymakers have long declared that the nuclear issue can only be solved bilaterally with Pakistan but they also maintain that the United States must play a major role in blunting the Pakistani program Subrahmanyam has suggested in the Indian press that the United States can promote mutual confidence by providing New Delhi with intelligence on the status of Pakistan's nuclear program Under Rajiv Indian officials have proved willing to listen to and discuss the issue 25X1 25X1 Even so the intense mutual suspicions between India and Pakistan are likely to undermine if not prevent a negotiated agreement We believe Pakistan's need to secure what it perceives as its ultimate defense against 11 25X1 25X1 Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 Secret with other parties We speculate that the late December agreement between Rajiv and Zia not to attack each other's nuclear facilities may have been prompted at least in part by US importunings in late 1985 that the nuclear issue be resolved between India and Pakistan Other analysts within the US Intelligence Community believe the December pledge although congruent with US interests resulted solely from Rajiv's long campaign to start a nuclear dialogue with Pakistan These analysts point out that Gandhi's highly publicized concerns about Pakistan's nuclear program and his desire to develop confidence-building measures predate US involvement in the current round of talks K Subrahmanyam's idea for a confidence-building pledge not to attack each other's facilities first appeared in the summer of 1984 and was repeated in the Indian press in July 1985 I such a strike would cause the collapse of President Zia's government perhaps bringing to power a more pliable regime - - - - - - Other analysts believe that the probability of this scenario is low largely because the traditional indecisiveness and caution exhibited by most Indian policymakers mitigate against such dramatic action Some argue that the probability of a preemptive strike is particularly low under the leadership of Rajiv Gandhi who has said publicly that such a move would not ensure the eradication of fissile material and components A preemptive strike would almost certainly begin a war between India and Pakistan and would scuttle Gandhi's desire for better regional relations as well as continued leadership of the Nonaligned Movement 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Indian policymakers may calculate that a small covert program-dubbed in New Delhi the Israeli option -would allow them uninterrupted cooperation with the United States and the West In such a case US nonproliferation policies would not be jeopardized publicly If Pakistan tests a nuclear device however we believe India would not let its interest in closer ties to the West stand in the way of its own publicly acknowledged program 25X1 '-------- Alternative Scenario Some analysts believe that India will eventually seek to halt the Pakistani program by launching a preemptive strike against Pakistan's nuclear facilities These analysts argue that India will be compelled by its drive for regional hegemony to ensure that Pakistan remains unable to threaten India's national security According to this scenario cw Delhi would order its military forces to bomb the Kahuta uranium enrichment facilities and the Pakistan Institute of Juclear Science and Technology These analysts argue that Secret 25X1 12 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 Secret R jiv Gandhi's Key Nuclear Advisors 25X1 13 Secret Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3 Secret Secret Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 07 27 CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3