2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 - 1 3-00000 nus FOLDER CDNTAINS NOTES ON CLASSIFIED MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA ffiAOOUAJlTER5 BY K USE SELECT COM-O'ITEE ON ASSASSINATIONS SfAFF MEMBERS Nm NOl'E 5 GENERATED _UPrn ACOJLtITABLE PAGES HEREIN HSCA SfAFF MEMBER ----------------------- ' ' - PAGE NUMBERS OF ACCOUNTABLE NOTE PAPER ISSUED FOR FUR1HER NOTES GENE TED AT HSCA ' FOLDER REQUESTED BY PRINf NAME DATE z - - ' - _ _ • - J31 _ _J LM 4 'IN l ' J - REQUESI'OR'S SICNATIJRE I --·- Q _ tA - 2-l - l I I - _ __ '• 1 -------------------- ----------- --------• -I I ________________________ ________________________ _ ___ _ I ALL PAGES HEREIN A E ACCOUNT BLE NO OOCUME 'ffS MAY BE COPIED QR REr OVED FROM THIS FOLDER 13-00000 -r · - f i 'I t f I 13-00000 i ' _ 2 y i ti it111 w · l ' '•-· · li1lf i i-_r ' ·- · · ' 7 - 0 1 1_ • ' J ' s l ' ' • r · -- t ' L I ' -_ ' f ' VA i-t l r J - ' - - - - f f•· 'k 1 't' °'f •' ' - ·' - i e f - °-' -J - ··r a ·· -· - - -- - l b- ··-N O t t r v itf It _ _ _ '¾t --f·•-- '- • '- '' ' ' s's ' ' ·• - q -•1 - ffjJ -- - · - - - _ - _- Ra '··• ••· _ -Ir '11i- t - -· 1 - •••• • - - - it-f'ii rt l Y £ _ - ' - -- CONFIDENTfAL ·•· l J- _ r a - - - SC J pLc ·#1s-'fo1eifi_ 16 November 1978 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT HSCA Access to Mexico City History 1 HSCA requested access to some 200 pages of the three-volume history of Mexico City - about a third of the material The substantive content runs the gamut -from the history of Mexico University through detailed operatiortal support capabilities and high level political connect ions and activities It is an impressive accumulatio of operational activiti - classical sources and methods as we 11 as detailed revelations about past events ' 2 We pointed out that the agreement between Chairman Stokes and DDCI Carlucci directly faced the issue of the irrelevancy of the vast majority of the history and the sensitivity of it The HSCA position had been that it had· to verify this and the access given to senior levels w•s to satisfy this Now it was being requested in conn ction with depositions which would serve to get this material into a Committee transcript Since some two-thirds of the station's histo y the work covers 1947 through 1969 pre ceded the visit of Oswald to Mexico in 1963 and assassination of the President that clearly had nothing to d9 with the Committee's charter I added that Mr Carlucci -is out of town and will not be back until some time Sunday so I could not go back to him The request was so far beyond the agreement that I felt I could not modify it Cornwell then asked that I speak to the Director I I I I I i- i 3 I saw the Director at about noon and summarized the agreement and the dilemma also going over the above He stated that I could offer access to one senior staff member in addition to Blakey and Cornwell on the condition that material from the history not be used in depositions 4 I spoke with Cornwell giving him the message He said that they may wish to use some of the material I replied that the history is based on other sources those related to the_ portion that is within the Committee's charter I' CONFIDENT Al f - c---lMPuET CL m J l 1 9 ' --- ___ -- --·- --··· i I i j ' coNFIDENTJAL was based entirely on sources to which Committee investigator's have had access Our problem was the overall · collection and particularly some of the substance of the history He asked if he could come back and ask for it if they wanted to use something in particular I said that we had never closed a door completely but that the Director's condition was fairly clear Those things Televant to their authorized inquiry were already in their hands so I could not think what they would have to use from this They will ask us and we can react when they do S Goldsmith came over to start reading c L ____ 9- S D Breckinridge l I I i I - · - •· - __·· • ··--· · · ·- _ II I 1· Distribution 1 - t Hitz OLC · · 1 - H Smith SA DDCI 1 - N Shepariek PCS LOC 1 ·w Sturbitts LA Div· 1 OLC Subj · · -- · 1 · OLC Chrono · ·· · ·- - - - _ · _ -_ -_ • · · ·- · · -· · • ' ' - • - - · · ··-· ' ' • ' 2 - -- • · · ·- _ -· · - ·_ _£ ·_ - ·- I · '· ·· · --- · ·· · · - · · · · · _ - · · · l ·- · - -··- _ _· I I I I i1· ' CDNFIDENTIAl • 13-00000 i I 24 August 1978 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUHJECT Examination by Mr G Robert Blakey of Sanitized Portions of History of Mexico City Station 1 At 1745 hours on 23 August 1978 Mr Scott Breckinridge Mr Norbert Shepanek and the undersigned met with Mr G · Robert Blakey Chief Counsel of the House Select Committee on Assassinations HSCA The meeting took place in Mr Breckinridge's office The purpose of the meeting inter alia was to make available to Mr Blakey certain sanitized portions of CS HP 329 SECRET · a three volume history of the Mexico City Station covering the period 1947 - 1969 The portions selecte l for sanitization were previously designated by Mr Gary Cornwell as 1 eing of interest to the HSCA Mr Edwin Lopez of the HSCA · if w s also present but did not have access td the Mexico City Station material ·2 Mr Blakey was furnished the following sanitized portions of the Station history which he read in my presence a Volwne I Chapter II C - Station Expansion and Joint Operations 1959-1969 consisting of pages 34 hrough 57 b Volume II Chapter III A-3 - The Cuban Embissy consisting of pages 221 through 256 c Volume II Chapter III A-4 - Operational Support and Technical Collection Activities consisting of pages 257 through 298 d · Volume II Chapter III B - Covert Action Operations portion relating to student operations- only consisting of pages 327 thro gh 336 _ - rv - _ _ · _ · e yolwne I I ·Chapter Joint Oper·a_t ions a d -·P1 0 j ect s Using Mexican Government Officials portions relating to Project LIENVOY and LITEMPO only consisting of pages· 499 through 423 f' Volume I It ·chapter X ·_ Merida Base 1962 - 1965 ' consisting of pages 485 through 494 -1 S E C R L _ 'f 13-00000 S E C I E T 3 I assure l Mr Blakey that 1 would be happy to discuss with him any of the deleted items and explain the nature of the content and the reason for its deletion I told Mr Blakey that since he was personally reviewing the material and the same would hol l true for Mr Cornwell I felt that I could be very candid in describing the deleted portions Mr Blakey thanked me but did not at any time raise any questions about deletions After he had finished his rr Jdcw I repeated my offer to discuss any portion of the material lie again thanked me and said he had rio questions 4 Mr Blakey did not indicate nor did l ask whether he would continue to seek access to the entire three volume history in its unsanitized form 7 - __ - -- _ _ - _ _ -··· s - r · C R I T- -- i l 13-00000 MEXICO CITY SfATION lli story 200 sclcctcJ pages Blc1kcy rcvjcwcd on 23 August 1978 __ 13-00000 -· - ·•-··· · · - - • · - • • - - SECRET Historian's Note This paper covers act±vities of the CIA station in Mexico City and bases in Monterrey Nogales and Merida from 1947 to 30 June 1969 While re- search on this paper was being done from late 1969 to mid-1970 some projects pf long duration were terminated for security or economic reasons In those instances the descriptions of these activi- I ''' i ' 1 r r ties extend beyond 30 Jupe 1969 Because the paper is not indexed the table of contents contains a petailed synopsis of each chapter The reader wfll note some repetition of I operational events in the text for this There is a reason Chapters I and II were an effort on the part of the writer toI reduce to a reading minimum a chronological summ ry of the origins of CIA oper- · ations in Mexico frQm 1947 to 1969 for persons who do not have the time or the need to read several hundred pages of station history Subsequent chapters I j treat the projects in more detail For the convenience of the reader the writer has grouped together those projects which pertain to - iii - · 13-00000 SECRET the same target Each of these target categories begins with an introduction which is nothing more than a brief history of the target for the benefit of persons not familiar with the Mexico operations The Mexico City Station had one of the most I extensive and expensive unilateral technical collection programs conducted by the Agency For that reason those projects are presented together although they are also mentioned in station coverage of specific targets These unilateral projects had two characteristics which should be remembered the majority of those still current in 1969 were sources turned over to the station in 1947 by the i 'i f i j I i FBI or were recruited from contacts of these sources the agent networks in the unilateral operations were 'I a series of family relationships Readers may be confused by a Mexico Station practice of changing cryptonyms of sources when ' I they were switched from one project to another Some sources used by Mexico were identified by as many as four project cryptonyms Insofar as possible the writer included all the previous cryptonyms for - iv - SECRET l ' 13-00000 SECRET the convenience of readers who may wish to review the inactive projects in which the sources were i used Inactive project chronological and subject files were provided by Lucille Long and Dorothy Kishter of the Records Integration Division RID both of whom devoted considerable time to search- l i'- ing indexes for records which were not included in the Clandestine Service records system A presenta- tion of the current projects 1969 could not have been written without the cooperation 2 r c gen arous assistance of all personnel of the Mexico Branch of the WH Division in making available their operational files which were excellently maintained in comparison with other records Anne Goodpasture • Historical Writer Western Hemisphere Division ' I t ' - V - SECRET SECRET responded by asking that Jones be assigned to Mexico City a' s a civil attache to investigate the activities of German res idents Jon s opened the FBI office in Mexico City in June 1942 on the second floor of an office building at Londres 85 across the street from the US Embassy chancery and residence which was located in a compound at Londres 101 He had a staff of two men the assistant civil attache Marion Stokes Davis and the chief clerk Charles Turnbull In the fall of 1942 Clarence Moore replaced Jones 10 and in August 1943 Birch D O'Neal replaced Moore By mid-1943 the FBI had between 25·and 30 agents • working under cover throughout Mexico One of them was aymond J JO'Mar who ecame the chief of the CIA station in Mexico in · i95i-_ The number oc----f - - - - - s l o t s in the Mexico C i t y - - - - - - 3 L office had also increased to eight These agents concentrated on two cases which involv d extensive investigations the code names of which were ALTO and CLOG The ALTO case involved censorship of letters of persons trying to obtain the release - 8 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET · i I i I and Captain W C Ford USN I They visited 16 countries in Latin America to examine relationships Ii between station officers and those in other Embassy components station morale and operational and administrative matters I A memorandum prepared by these inspectors after their return to Headquarters noted that Ambassador Walter C Thurston was completely satisfied with the manner in which Doyle was handling his operations The same memorandum reported that the administration and operations were in excellent condition and that the Mexico City Station gave every indication of b lng the outstanding station on the circuit In the early years the station acquired some surveillance assets for sporadic use on the CP and leftist groups but they had no organized team that could cover the activities of Soviet Embassy officials The FBI refused to turn over the background data from their files on the Soviets Furthermore it soon became apparent that the Mexican Government could not be relied upon to provide detailed coverage of the activities of such a large number of the --16 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET Soviet Bloc officials who had complete freedom of movement all over Mexico and clandestinely into the United States The Mexican security agents had neither the training nor the motivation for this sort of effort Accordingly the station embarked on a program to develop unilateral support operations This was not to the detriment of the other targets which according to SOI 23 took priority over the Soviets LIFTER LIBETHENITE and LIONHEART turned over by the FBI were covering Communist and leftist activities LIBELER turned • over by the FBI was a high-ranking Mexican Government official who kept the station fairly well informed on events that were happening inside government circles He also provided some personality information on the Soviet officials with whom he came in contact B Development of Unilateral Operations 1951-1958 The first significant productive unilateral support operation was developed by Charles W Anderson III in October 1950 This was LIFEAT which in 1969 passed its 19th anniversary - 17 - SECRET Initially a j ' ' j- 13-00000 SECRET small telephone tap operation with a yearly budget under $5 000 it developed into a large sophisticated audio operation covering telephones TELEX syste £ and microphone plants with capabilities limited only by the availability of persons to man the recorders and_- t r a n s a k e In 1969 the LIFEAT budget w a In the process of getting the telephone tap I operations under way other support agent prospects f-· were developed ·LIMESTONE 201-150706 a Mexican I employee of the Hoof and Mouth Control Unit US i - Department of Agriculture and LIMEWATER 201183704 a telephone company supervisor were ·the original LIFEAT agents They suggested their sons daughters parents in-laws and friends for recruitment From this assortment the first 12 agents were recruited for an umbrella-type project LJPSTICK • to provide mobile and fixed surveillance teams to parallel LIFEAT and to man three photo observation posts around the Soviet Embassy These agents were I I all untrained in clandestine activities they were Auto1 1a tic Teletypewriter Exchange Service of Western Union - 18 - i i SECRET I ·1 t• • 13-00000 SECRET ---------------·------------- I I i mechanics clerks salesmen a housewife and the j quarterback on the football team at the University of Mexico I Their one common bond was that they j I were related in some way to LIMESTONE ·and Lll YEWATER This project was developed by Charles Anderson and Harry T Mahoney These original LIPSTICK agents formed the nucleus for the extensive oper tional support projects in Mexico and in 1969 many of them were still on the job I E Howard Hunt opened the first Office of I 'I I' Policy Coordination OPC station in Mexico- in December 1950 This office - s co nbincd ' ' i th the Office of Special Operations OSO in 1952 I 'I The • I I base in Monterrey Mexico with a staff of two was opened in the US Consulate in June 1951 by John H Jenkins Jr lhile the station was developing unilateral support operations contact was continued with the head of the Mexican Security Service Direccion Federal de Seguridad - DFS In 1952 a police training officer Robert L Melberg was assigned to Mexico under official cover His assignment I i ' • dt I I• i _ ' • ' ' ' • - 19 - SECRET i 13-00000 SECRET was to develop and train a liaison investigative unit to be used jointly against the Communist target The head of the DFS designated a group of five agents who could be used in this project LIVESTOCK No sooner had the training program started than LIVESTOCK-2 the team leader shot a politician This killing by a member of the President's security service caused such an uproar in the newspapers that LIVESTOCK-2 was jailed until the public forgot about it which was almost two years later In early 1954 while Harry T Mahoney and his wife were occupying temporary quarters after i I l ii ii i I '' their arrival in Mexico City a young Mexican- I American student tapped on the door one day He introduced himself to Mahoney's wife as a student at Mexico City College He explained that his mother was an American schoolteacher and that he I i i ' was working his way through college by selling • eggs chickens and cheese to people in the apart- ment building where the Mahoneys lived That even- ing Mahoney learned about the egg salesman and stayed home the next day to meet him - 20 - SECRET After that ' I• L j L 13-00000 SECRET meeting Mahoney checked citizenship files in the Embassy and gathered enough background information for a request for an operational clearance The salesman was Raymond H GERENDE 201-119523 who became the principal agent for the photographic bases acted as a transcriber for LIFEAT alternated as a handier for the unilateral surveillance teams and performed various other operational tasks from 1955 until 1970 His family and friends provided a recruitment field for several other agents within the operational support agent network of the station In 1954 the budg6t requirement for the 18 Mexico City Station were $463 692 - The five cate- gories were Station Support FI FI OA pp $275 545 133 795 15 000 35 352 PP Project Development 4 000 There were 19 foreign intelligence FI and six • political and psychological warfare PP field projects The same year the Deputy Chief FI at Headquarters Ronald A MacMillan sent Walter Jessel to Mexico to observe what MacMillan regarded • GERENDE was terminated on 26 June 1970 because of security problems arising from hostile divorce action by his European wife - 21 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET as the finest technical surveillance operations in 19 the Agency The table of organization T 0 at that time totaled 18 10 officers arid 8 clerical r j I I ' I From January 1953 to March 1954 the station for- i I I i warded 337 FI reports to Headquarters of which 324 ' I were disseminated to customer agencies By 1955 the Mexico City Station had tapped every telephone line in the Soviet Czechoslovakian and Polish embassies as well as the Communist Party headquarters In addition Projects LIFEAT and LIPSTICK had the capability for a quick swing off to cover targets of opportunity as they arose There was contact with the Mexican Security Service and the FBI The latter then had a large staff of 20 to 30 people in Mexico and used the cover of legal attache in the US Embassy Operational support projects by the end of 1955 included two indigenous surveillance teams four observation posts phone tapping capability and several independent investigators All of these operations were handled on a I unilateral basis I I I - 22 - 13-00000 SECRET The CIA base in Nogales Mexico with a staff of two was opened i - - - - - - - in May 1956 f I by Robert T Shaw I I' Another person recommended by LIMESTONE was LIKAYAK-2 201-119970 son in 1956 He was recruited by Ander- LIKAYAK-2 developed the unilateral I il mail intercept and Mexican Government file search project LIBIGHT il Indirectly LIKAYAK-2 laid the groundwork for the joint telephone tap operation LIENVOY by introducing his Mexican mentor LIELEGANT to his station case officer Alfonso G Spera in 195e In 1969 the LIBIGHT Project with LIKAYAK-2 as the princip l agent passed its 13th anniversary Shortly after Winston M Scott was appointed A native of Alabama he had served as a professor FBI officer and a naval officer assigned to the X-2 Section of the Office of Strategic Services OSS · in London during World War II He was Chief Offic of Special Operations OSO in London from January 1947 to January 1950 At Headquarters· from January 1950 until December 1952 Scott was Chief WE and from 1952 to May 1956 he was Chief Inspection and Review Staff While Scott had had no previous experience in ' exico he had served with the FBI in Havana and h d a broad understanding of intelligence operations from his Headquarters and European assigrunents - 23 - SECRET ------------------------ lt j i 13-00000 SECRET COS in early 1956 the 11 Division WH prepared a pro osal for reclassification of the Mexico City Station T O which raised the COS slot to GS-17 and the deputy Chief of Station DCOS slot to GS-16 contingent on the simultaneous reclassification of chiefs and deputy chiefs of station at Rio de Janeiro Buenos Aires and Santiago to GS-16 and GS-15 to be - compatible with emphasis placed on thes countries 20 by the stepped-up program for Latin America When Scott arrived in Mexico on 8 August 1956 Lyman D Kirkpatrick and Turner Smith were there conducting a review of the Station The inspectors noted in their report that lack of clerical and operational personnel had caused problems in administration and in the utilization of operational data from the technical operations The inspectors further noted that Ambas- sador Francis A White and Counselor William P Snow White at age 61 was appointed as Ambassador to Mexico in 1953 by President Dwight D Eisenhower White had been career Foreign Service officer 1915 to 1933 and resigned as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Czechoslovakia when Franklin D Roosevelt was elected At the time White was appointed to Mexico he was a banking executive He followed flamboyant William D O'Dwyer The atmosphere at the Embassy changed to reflect the appearance of the chief White was elderly portly quiet business-oriented and very - conscrva ti ve - 24 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET the same title of other embassy section chiefs Consular Section Political Section Economic Section and United States Information Service 24 USIS - Headquarters agreed with the title for the station but the chief's title was changed from attache to First Secretary The DCOS •• i I i I and the covert action CA officer had the title I l of Second Secretary No other officers were l In December 1956 the station rented a small two- l I i story house which had a maid s room on the roof that 1 ' was an ideal lookout into the adjoining garden of the Soviet Embassy This was used as a third photographic- base to observe the activities of the Soviet officials and their visitors In September 1957 SL the station through LIMOUSINE 201-5762 purchased • This project first had the cryptonym LIPSTICK LICALLA Two other photographic bases LIPSTICK LIMITED and LIPSTICK LILYRIC were located across the street from the front entrance to the Soviet Embassy in separate apartments These three bases were later managed through the LIEMPTY Project 28 - SECRET i i j I I I j I i 13-00000 SECRET the property adjacent to the Soviet Embassy The four houses including LIPSTICK LICALLA were remodeled by CIA The three vacant nouses were rented to selected tenants toring device in It was planned to place a moni- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - were purchased and of each house sent to Headquarters where the installation was made When the were returned by special plane it was discovered that the audio unit had been put in the I__- lwhich faced the street instead of the one adjacent to the Soviet Embassy compound This origi- nal disappointment d d not alter the later importance of the property for very sensitive highly classified close support audio operations The station offices until mid-1957 were located on building in downtown Mexico City After the 1957 earthquake the offices 125 were moved t q - - - - - - - of the same build ng I The property consisted of four row houses one of which was LIPSTICK LICALLA but the occupants were not ware that CIA owned the property LICALLA paid the rent to the ostensible owner and was handled as a part of LIEMPTY Operationally the other three houses were a part of the LIMESA LI MUST Project - 29 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET elaborate briefings took place with various visual aid props prepared by the station Unilateral agents in the umbrella support project LIPSTICK numbered 49 in early 1958 with members of the surveillance teams basehouse operators transcribers and general handymen all related to each other This relationship of the agents was thought to be good security until LIEMBRACE-1 and LIPSTICK-47 were arrested by the Mexican Secret Service while on surveillance in June 1958 and the whole network fell apart I Through hasty recruitment of a prominent American lawyer the station pai - - - - - - - - - - for release of the agents but not before they had revealed all of the cases they were working_ on and the identity of their CIA case officer The remnants of the project were separated into four operations This project continued until August 1961 when Ambassador Thomas C Mann said he did not want any American businessmen involved in these briefings - 33 - --1 SECRET I' 13-00000 SECRET C Station Expansion and Joint Operations 1959 - 1969 The only new requirement in the Related Mis- sions Directive R ID for 1959 was the addition of the Chinese Communists as a minor reporting target even though there was no official Chinese Communist establishment in Mexico The Mexicans had diplomatic relations with the Chinese Nationalist Government There was a flurry of - - a c t i - vity which resulted in having a troupe of Chinese Communist acrobats 31 denied entry to Mexico The outstanding achievement of the station in early 1959 was the setting up of a joint 32-line telephone tap center LIENVOY backstopped by the 32 President of Mexico - This gave the station the capability for intensified coverage of the Soviet and Satellite installations In July 1959 the Nqgales Base after operating 33 for three years was closed I ' See Appendix D Two of these lines were reserved for testing equipment - 34 - SECRET zs ae CM •C P ' ·°HP £4li 13-00000 General James Doolittle of the President's Board of Advisors on Foreign Intelligence Activities visited Mexico for a study of station activities Pat M Holt of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was briefed on Soviet and CP activities during the same 42 month In November 1961 two inspectors from the staff of the Inspector --General IG spent four days inspecting the station The inspectors reported that the Mexico City Station was the best in WH and possibly one of the best in the Agency It had a broad range of assets commencing with a close personal relationship between the·station chief and the President of Mexico high-level telephone taps photographic surveillance unilateral intelligence· assets and a broad scale of CA capabilities The station had been aggressive and well managed with the exception of a possible tendency to neglect administrative details During 1961 the station produce 722 intelligence reports of which about 45 percent came from telephone tap operations lThe • a technjcal facili- ties and capabilities were described as extraordinary and impressive J The intercept operation under - 39 - SECRET - ' - -l - C -r-- - --- - c ' j • • - - -9' '--• - U• -· ·'• --- - • · -' - · - - - ' -_•- _ 1-' '9 · ••- - 'f ' 1 ¥-- _ ·MIi SECRET for offensive purposes On 25 October 1962 with the approval·of Headquarters and Ambassador Mann Scott met with Lopez Mateos ·in Mexico City and showed him photographs supplied by Headquarters of some of the areas where Soviet missiles and launching sites were located in Cuba Lopez was 49 very grateful for this briefing In November 1962 approval was _obtained to ·open ack C l base in ---------- erida Yuc tan 03 S tewa r_ £ opened the base in December 1962 The base was to provide support to possible paramilitary 50 operations against Cuba In January 1963 four addi tiona 1 sec re ta ries arrived at the Mexico City Station with designe cover They were needed because of the increased · emphasis on technical operations against the Cuban arid Soviet installations and the vast quantity of paper produced by these opera t ions which could not 51 be processed by the previous staff Il At the request of Headquarters and the 9-uatemal Station the Mexico City Station devoted a great deal of time and manpower to the coverage of the - 42 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET activities of Juan Jose Arevalo Bermejo 201-006803 former President of Guatemala and a candidate in the 1963 presidential elections of Guatemala Sta- tion operations against Arevalo included a LIFEAT telephone tap an informant LICOOKY and physical and photographic surveillance LIEMBRACE and LIENTRAP • From some of th information collected through these sources the Mexico City Station prepared a composite photograph of Arevalo and the Soviet military attache· to Mexico Alexander G Sidorov 201-018498 standing together in the lobby of the apartment building where Sidorov lived This photograph appear d 52 in at least three Guatemalan newspapers In May 1963 Scott learned confidentially from Gustavo Diaz Ordaz that he would be selected 53 by Lopez Mateos as the next President of Mexico Later in the year Diaz became the PRI candidate tantamount to election which assured LIENVOY of an extended six years under virtually the same 54 management In 1963 the routine reporting of an operational lead by LIENVOY developed into·a long investigation - 43 • SECRET 13-00000 ✓ A man with a US accent speaking broken Russian telephoned both the Soviet and Cuban Embassies on 36 September and 6 October 1963 l H identified himself as Lee Oswald and Harvey Oswald This information was cabled to Headquarters for traces and identifying data After the assassination of President·Kennedy on 22 November 1963 in Dallas 5 Texas the Mexico City Station spent several months investigating leads in connection with Oswald's visit to Mexico The outside counterespionage_ counterintelligence ii · f' CE CI unit LILI -i1 was ac ti va ted in December 1963 and was envisaged as an unofficial composite of the station which would reduce the number of official cover positions 1 I During January 1964 Headquarters approved and I I i furnished equipment radio central and four automobile radios for the chief of station to give on loan to Gustavo Diaz Ordaz as an aid to the future 56 1I I · President of Mexico during his campaign - In addi- i tion to the equipment CIA gave Diaz Ordaz $400 per • i · 1 I The project failed and was terminated in 1967 --44 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET I I month as a subsidy from December 1963 to Nov mber i 1964 - I It was ostensibly to pay for his two body- guards during his campaign tours In reality it was paid to LITEMP0-1 Diaz Ordaz' nephew and may well have gone into his pocket This was in addi- tion to a regular salary of $512 per month paid to · - · LITEMP0-1 as a station support agent The LITEMPO Project provided cover for a 16-millimeter passport camera concealed at the Mexico City International Airport For the first two years Robert Zambernardi the station technical officer serviced the camera and picked up the film during meetings - ith the Mexican Chief Immigration Inspector LITEMP0-10 in locations other than the airport In 1964 th operation was turned over to their replacements Lewis D Humphrey Jr and LITEMP0-11 Later the operation was turned over completely to indigenous personnel under LITEMP0-12 The film was delivered by LITEMP0-12 to his case 58 officer for processing by the station - All passports of travellers arriving in Mexico City from Havana were photographed This was a strategic This camera was installed in 1962 by Warren L - Dean and two LIFIRE agents 57 - 45 - SECRET v-· 13-00000 SECRET spot because Mexico was the only direct air link between Cuba and Latin America Station personnel devoted considerable time providing support for JMWAVE and other stations on a worldwide basis in their coverage of the Cuban target This support consisted of obtaining travel permits for Cubans to enter Mexico obtain- ing visas for Cubans to enter the United States renting and servicing accommodation addresses and briefing debriefing training and dispatching agents to and from Cuba The station also handled Cuban defectors who hose to make the last minute 59 jump in Mexico City rather than return to Havana One of the most demanding·of these support cases was the reception and protection of the younger sister of Fidel Castro Ruz who was surfaced in Mexico City on radio and television on 29 June 1964 The station then kept her sequestered for the better part of a month • She and her two friends were first accommodated for four days in the luxurious guest house of an American in the outskirts of Mexico City Before the group could become a burden to these good - 46 - SECRET --------- ·-------------- 13-00000 SECRET people another American offered assistance in ar- ·1 ranging very comfortable quarters at no cost in the remote but comfortable resort town of Puerto Vallarta I· on Mexico's Pacific Coast i The party including the JMWAVE case officer who remained with the three women throughout the unorthodox situation was flown i to the destination and back in the private plane of still another friend of the station Finally when the delights of the Pacific retreat began to pall l lr the group was taken to a career agent's ranch located i· a couple of hours south of Mexico City ' t n 2dditio ' to protective custody the station was called upon to provide daily mail service to the group for the two weeks they were at the ranch On 24 July 1964 60 they were restored to their relatives in Mexico City A team from the Inspection and Review I R Staff at Headquarters conducted a thorough review of the • Mexico City Station administrative and operational program in July 1964 They wrote The Mexico City Station approaches the classic type station in opportunities and in operations It had high-level liaison operations unilateral operations and joint ✓ ' lj -I ' ' - 47 - 13-00000 SECRET - ' -i operations with ·the host government as well as Soviet Satellite Cuban and indigenous Communist Party operations There was local collaborative liaison with other US agencies the State Department the FBI the Immigration and Naturalization Service I NS and the military attaches To accomplish this wide range of tasks the station -- was organized into Soviet Cuban Satellite Covert Action Communist Party and Operational Support Branches The last branch was an operational catch- all responsible for direction of all technical surveillance and liaison operations In reality operational support operations were an xtension of the chief of station's personal clandestine capabilities particularly those projects involving 61 Mexican officials ·The extensive support capabilities which concentrated on the Cuban community included a waste- basket trash operation from the Cuban Embassy handled by LITAINT-2 recruitment of staff officers of the - Cuban EMbassy a tap on every telephone line from the Cuban Embassy or official residence by LIFEAT _- 48 - --- - SECRET - - ' -2 ' i -7 J k fJ' J 120'# -• '·3 h mtt J N- 1-•- _--------•----- V •' t 13-00000 SECRET ·•I or LIENOY photographic coverage of the entrances - to the Cuban Embassy by a high speed impulse camera handled by LIONION mail censorship of selected addresses by LIKAYAK-2 complete passenger lists from LIFIRE of all incoming and outgoing flights by the 45 international airlines which made daily connections--in Mexico City mobile surveillance of any target in Mexico City and concealed microphones in the wall in the telephones in a love seat and even in the leg of the coffee table in the Cuban 62 Ambassador's office A Cuban Refugee Reception and Orientation Center LICOMET was also run by an American contract agent · - _ · •' This center screened refugees about 350 per week during 1964 and 1965 for possible operational leads · and debriefed those with information of intelligence 63 value During 1964 approximately 47 percent of the station s cable traffic was concerned with Cuban - operations and 70 percent of the positive intelligence concerned Cuban travel station had increased to 87 The staff of the 54 inside and 33 out- side n addition to about 200 indigenous agents 49 - SECRET t' 13-00000 SECRET 64 The budget for fiscal year 1964 was $2 278 219 In the CA field the inspectors noted in 1964 that the Mexico City Station had a comprehensive and competently managed program projects in media ----- l landl - and It had effective and in the Ifields l -------- I Three of the station's media operations LILISP-E LILISP-M nd L SIREN included press placement in two major daily newspapers a weekly press bulletin with ide distribution a weekly magazine for mass distribution in rural areas radio and TV programs and a mechanism for publishing various pamphlets and bulletins on a spot basis In 1964 the three principal media projects constituted the most costly in the station's operational program annually and com- each amounted to over I I I station's CA budget prised - 50 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET did not approve of CIA support to this type of 67 organization - ' The inspectors in 1964 also looked over the file room - They considered the Mexico City Station files as being more complete than those of any other station in the Western Hemisphere Division There were more· than 9 000 personality files a large number of subject files and a vast accumulation of 3 x 5 cards The volume of the files was in- creasing at the rate of almost two linear feet per 68 month The file section also had responsibility for name tracing for other Embassy components prepa- ration of pouches to Headquarters and lateral stations indexing cross referencing and filing The smooth functioning of this-section was hampered by a lack of trained clerical employees It was difficult to get people to accept an assignment in • the file room because the tasks were dull tedious and infinitely demanding of the individuals' time From December 1957 through December 1958 the station provided 69 135 file traces of which 65 000 were visa applicants 69 - 52 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET • i During 1965 two key officers were transferred from Mexico City to the Dominican Republic They V were David A Phillips chief of the Cuba Section and James M Flannery chief of the CA Section In response to an amendment in the RMD for 1965 the station began reporting information on leaders and activists of the Communist and extrem74 ist movements for the Key Subversive Watchlist For budgetary and operational reasons the Merida Base was closed in May 1965 and emphasis was concentrated on covering the Cuban target in Mexico City by an i cre sc in the utside case officer complement and inside offical staff of the Cuban Section Through Projects LIFEAT and LIENVOY the station tapped the telephone lines and planted transmitters in the newly opened offices of the New China News Agency first Communist Chinese repre75 sentatives in Mexico • The top personnel figure for the station was in FY 1966 when its size had increased to 90 American staff employees 51 were inside the station using official cover and 39 were outside using • 1 '' ___ - 54 - SECRET 13-00000 ---·-· -----···· --·· --··-- ---- __ _· · - - SECRET nonofficial cover Of the total group 28 were case officers and 62 were administrative clerical and operational support personnel The number of indigenous agents and informants continued to be 76 around 200 The budget was $2 300 000 In response to a request from the Bureau of the Budget BOB Headquarters prepared an evaluation of the clandestine collection program in Mexico for FY 1966 This study included a brief descripI _ -' tion of the operational climate CIA targets and the general manner in which the Mexico City Station had satisfied the £ V e ents received by the BO 77 - The paper was well Several significant personnel organizational and requirement changes were made in late 1966 and early 1967 Francis S Sherry was transferred to Mexico as chief of the Cuba Section Daniel S Watson who had been chief of CA activities was assigned as deputy chief of station Albert F Reynolds was named as chief of the CA Section The nonofficial cover technical unit was abolished with the transfer of the outside technical officer - 55 - SECRET • 1 13-00000 SECRET l l i to Panama I I• The station gained a temporary official l' cover slot in 1967 and 1968 hat of assistant -1 a ttache for the Olympic Games which was filled by Philip A Agee l ✓- This Headquarters-directed assign- ment was of marginal value to station operations The station h9ldings of classified materiel in the file room continued to expand to the point that by the end of 1967 they measured 1375 5 linear feet 874 0 for subject files and 501 5 for index 78 cards - This tremendous influx of paper came largely from the extensive technical operations Ir • I I The chief of station maintained a close personal hold over the administration of files and felt· strongly with regard to his need for this volume of classified material To a Headquarters survey team in late 1967 he pointed out that he felt he would get adequate advance warning of any critical emergency in which case his plan was to ship the classified material to the United States It was esti- mated that it would take approximately six days and nights of steady burning to destroy the quantity of material on hand It was also estimated that over Agee resigned from CIA after the Olympic Games in October 1968 - 56 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET I I I j III I Unilateral Operations A Foreign Intelligence Operations The FBI and the most important I NS regarded Mexico as the -- base abroad from the point of view of US internal security ci CIA-thinking in early 1950 in regard to an intensification o f effort within the Deputy Director for Plans DDP complex led to the concentration of effort on the more important operating centers instead of dispersing assets thinly throughout a given geographic area The plan was to establish a model cir pro- c 1 gram in Mexico which would be beneficial in the general improvement of CEwork and standards through- C 1 out WH as well as the DDP This was the principal reason for the increase in the staff from 18 Americans in 1954 to 76 in 1961 with a corresponding 87 budget increase from $463 692 to $1 697 500 To accomplish the PE ··and FI mission the FI c 1 operations officers ere assigned to four administrative sections named for their targets or type of operations CP and International Communism ' - 59 - I I 13-00000 SECRET Soviet and Soviet Bloc Cuban and Operational Support and Technical The official cover complement of these sections from about 1961 to mid-1969 consisted of for the CP Section - - - - - for the Soviet Bloc Section for the Cuban Section and for the Operational Support Section The CP Soviet Blee a d Cuban ase officers handled informants and penetration agents on their targets The telephone taps s rveillance and technical operations were run by the two Operational Support Section case officers The processing of the large volume of transcripts reports and photographs was handled by the section concerned Each section was • responsible for the operational handling and station support for its respective case officers under nonofficial cover This did not include a Technical Services Division TSD officer who occupied an official slot from 1957 through mid-1969 He usually made the technical installations but did not handle the agents - 60 - - 13-00000 -SECRET ' i' i Two other acquaintances of LIFTER-8 were Haitian exiles Gerard Pierre Charles and his wife Suzy Castor de Pierre Charles 201-350227 and 201796149 They were studying and teaching at the University of Mexico and were active in the Communist movement in Haiti LIFTER-8 and his wife In 1968 Lombardo Toledano died and the PPS hierarchy underwent a change which did not improve LIFTER-S's position However he continued to be a valuable source on the WFTU and Haitian exile activities LIFTER-8 was besieged with personal and financial woes His daughter a perennial student was married in 1962 but a year later left her husband an returned home with a baby girl His wife had a chronic illness dating back to 1952 and constantly suffered from real or imaginary illnesses At no time during the 22 years he worked for the - 74 - SECRET SECRET ' I I I n ' G oni toring of telephone conversations and inter- 1 i ' ' cepting of mail voluminous Ir __ _ _ They talked constantly an 1 were wr i t_e rB 'Ji --___ c - - c • • - _ _ _ - - cc- These operations were directed by the CIA case officers for LIFEAT LIENVOY LIKAYAK-2 and LIE IBRACE Some of the tapes from the telephone taps were tr nscribed by the FBI which then returned the unerased tapes with copies of the tran' scri t for station records and inforrna ion Most of the exploita le leads wer in the United States· and were inves_ tig2 ted by the FBI Su 1 maries of the more interesting of these c2 ses follow Albert Maltz 201-5239 was a motion picture screen riter who served a prison term for contempt 1 of court when questioned regarding his members ip in the CP of the United St tes Ee was 03e of the Hollywood Ten ' convicted by the US Government Maltz arrived in Me ico in A ril 1951 after being released from the penitentiary Gordon Kahn one Ten motion picttire writers and execu ives whose Co unist Party activities were exposed by the US Department of Justice in 1948 and 1950 - 123 - ·- schoolteachers cooks and domestic servants Some 16 families gu rds code clerks and chaufieurs lived in common quarters inside the walled-in compound The others lived in apartments in the 109 area near the chancery The Soviet Union had only two diplomatic greements or treaties with Mexico diplomatic relations One established The other was a cultural-ex- change agreement signed in April 1968 by Antonio Carrillo Flores Mexican Foreign Minister when he 110 visited Moscow The officials of this very large Soviet installation in Mexico were not there all those years to conduct diplomatic business or promote foreign trade This wa s the headquarters for espi- cnage operations against the United States Mexico 1d other countries in Latin America Some two- hirds of the mal staff were intelligence officers who did little or no overt work These officers with diplomatic rank and titles in most cases were scattered throughout the Soviet official installations of which there were seven in Mexico City as of 1969 These were the Soviet Embassy the office - 139 - 13-00000 SECRET University in Moscow under Soviet scholarships Young leftists or CP youth members started out by enrolling in Russian at the cultural centers where they were carefully screened by intelligence officers from the Soviet Embassy who used the cover of cultural officer The students who learned Russian and were considered politically reliable were given scholarships for four to six years of study in the 113 Soviet Union There were 12 non-Soviets who worked for the Soviet Embassy Mexican chauffeur for the Commercial Office eight Spanish Communists who edited 1 1 l the Soviet bulletin and three Mexicans who ran the Films Office They were all rabid Communists and efforts to recruit them by the station and L 114 --- fet witn failure For the Soviets Mexico was also an escape l route for their espionage agents who got int trouble and were about to be caught by the FBI in the Uni 'ted States The Sterns and Halperins used Mexico en route to the Soviet Union William Martin and Vernon Mitchell two National Security Agency NSA code clerks also escaped by way of Mexico s - 141 - SECRET Rudolph 13-00000 SECRET Abel made it to Texas en route to Mexico before he was arrested Americans in the pay of Soviet _ intelligence also went to Mexico for meetings with V-Soviet case officers In addition to the Soviet Union Czechoslovakia and Poland_-had resident commercial missions in Mexico While both the Soviet and Czech commer- cial offices were sizeable and active only Czechoslovakia had any serious commercial interests in Mexico • Under the aegis of a commercial treaty - · of 1949 and a payments agreement effective in 1950 the Czech commercial office actively worked to recapture its prewar market for textile machinery machine tools and consumer goods in the face of strong competition from Germany and Japan A degree of success was evident from the fact that Mexican imports from Czechoslovakia in 1956 • $1 900 000 were more than double those of 1955 However Mexico's trade with the Soviet Bloc was marginal to the Mexican economy averaging less The commercial officer positions in the Bloc embassies were primarily cover for intelligence activities - - t I- I I - 142 SECRET i I 13-00000 SECRET through the Mexican Government security service to talk with the NCNA representatives to try to recruit them but they all failed During 1966 the station learned from the LITEMPO Mexican Security Service contact that the Mexican Government had refused to renew the temporary resident permits for the NCNA representatives Working with the Mexican Security Service the station made plans again for an approach by a Chinesespeaking officer from Headquarters The NCNA rep- resentative refused to talk with the officer when approached on the street in Mexico City 1221 Station coverage of the Soviet Bloc installations consisted of telephone taps surveillance photographs mail intercepts and audio In addi- On one occasion a Chinese-speaking Headquarters officer on temporary duty in Mexico planned to take the same plane with one of the NCNA repre·senta ti ves from Mexico to London via Bermuda At the airport the Headquarters officer checked his ticket and baggage for the flight seeing the Chinese in the waiting room with others departing on the plane Just as the passengers were boarding the plane the NCNA target walked out of the waiting room into the airport terminal leaving the Headquarters officer no choice but to board the plane and depart for Bermuda or lose his baggage and the price oi his ticket - 145 - SECRET ·' 13-00000 ----------·· --···-----··· -· ··---··-·· ··- ·-·· ·-··· -••··- - -------····•··········-··- SECRET tion from 1950 until 1966 the station maintained an extensive network of double agents These were terminated one by one as individual evaluations of these operations revealed them to be of dubious value to CIA as compared with their greater value to the Soviets This program was followed by the development of access agents through recruitment of informants who had a bona fide social or business relationship with Soviet officials From the time the station opened several i I Soviet officials were singled out for recruitment approaches but none were successful One of them AEIMPULSE 201-185353 was approached through LIEMPTY-3 an access· agent in 1961 by Herbert Manell the Soviet Bloc case officer in Mexico AEIMPULSE remained under development for several years in Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America until it was decided by Headquarters that he was probably a provocation agent The station obtained unique intelligence on A history of this operation and damage assessment of CIA personnel and assets exposed was prepared by William C Bright of the Soviet Bloc Division - 146 - SECRET I l t f 13-00000 SECRET the Czechoslovakian Embassy with the recruitment of LIBRIFORM and the surreptitious entry of LINIMENT A move of their Embassy shortly after this operation thwarted plans for future entries LIFEBLOOD 201-30789 was a station informant on Polish diplomatic activities from July 1948 when she was first introduced to Robert L Brown by LIBRIFORM LIFEBIDOD was the private secretary to from 1945 until she resigned to remain in Mexico in 1949 with her husband a medical doctor who had immigrated from Pcland tc Mcxicc From 1964 DMPETAL the Mexican secretary of the Yugoslav Ambassaqor was used as an informant by the station Some of the more interesting of these operations were LIMOTOR Alfred L KONITZER LIMAGPIE LINEB LIJENNET LICOZV LIOYSTER LIMYSTIC anp DMPETAL a synopsis of each follows LIMOTOR l ' 123 This project provided for the use of an unlimited number of American students at universities -I in Mexico City from August 1957 through September - 147 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET 1964 A controlled staff agent enrolled at the University of Mexico School for Foreigners and acted as a spotter of agents in contact with Soviet intelligence officers also enrolled at the school The purpose of the project was to obtain information concerning the personnel targets and methods of operation of the Soviet intelligence service and to identify American students being developed by the Soviets The first yearly estimate of the cost for the project was $9 840 for the period 1 August 1957 through 31 July 1958 The Mexico City Station case officer who developed this operation was Charles K Jett The University of Mexico School for Foreigners was set up as a place to provide Spanish language training for foreigners primarily American students who planned careers in La tin American studies The University of the Americas formerly Mexico City College had a similar curriculum Some liberal arts ourses and fine arts workshops were taught in English while the students were learning Spanish This atmosphere of several hundred students presented the Soviet in elligence service with an - 148 - ' 13-00000 ----· - ------- -·· I i SECRET I I I ideal pool of candidates to choose from I Most of the students were impressionable and naive responding to the attention of other foreigners interested in them Four young Soviet intelligence officers from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City were enrolled at the schools and quickly made headway contacting the students Some of these stu- dents reported their contacts to the US Embassy and others were spotted and developed by the outside LIMOTOR staff agent t LIMAGPIE was one of the first students to walk into the Embassy He was handled as a project separate from LIMOTOR Alfred L KONITZER 201-185999 was recruited at Headquarters and enrolled at the University of the Americas in i I I October 1957 acting as an agent spotter for the I t LIMOTOR Project l Within the first few years of the project some 20 sources had been used at various times to i I report on contacts with the Soviets but their short one-quarter schooling in Mexico in many instances I II then going on to another location created all sorts of security problems Neverthele s a stable of double agent operations threatened to - 149 - SECRET I • 'i 13-00000 I SECRET I I develop within the LIMOTOR complex In other pro- fessional areas the Mexico City Station already had a half dozen time-consuming double agent operations against the Soviets ln the LIMOTOR Project the Soviets were not so interested in obtaining information as they were in guiding the young students into a US Government career This raised the policy question of how far CIA could go in encouraging these students to maintain contact with the Soviets knowing that this contact would surface perhaps again t them if they should seek employment in some sensitive US Government job at some later date In one test case the Mexico City Station was advised by Headquarters that LIMOTOR-21 who had passed the Foreign Service examination should not be considered for recruitment as a double agent It was also stated that while Headquarters could attempt to clear him with the State Department security that at best LIMOTOR-21 would never be 124 full ' trusted by State Department Security I I I This raised the question of why CIA was engaged in these operations involving young naive American students if they could not be protected assuming - 150 - I 13-00000 - - I - - - _ -r·- _' p - I • i ' - 3Jc - - J f - - et- 1- -1J 3 - '-I 3 - '-i ' • i I - 1 13-00000 i • I '-' t C 0 --- U C· IC 'S° 0 · 1 t 4l --' f EA - 1--'f J J l --''1 - -dl lc f e t q Ok t r f ' f · i t-i -- '1i l J - t· ci •· J I• • 1 1 ' I i -- · 1 i Cr '- - - f-l n- c -'- '-'- R c__ - • u' - ri •• 't- 4 ' 'l l °'' 'dV t· i - c b 13-00000 ·-·· ' j •·• 1 SECRE' ' by the CIC in coordination with CIA and_ the FBI Soviet intelligence Officers recruited a US Army corporal and used him for the collection of positive intelligence concerning US Army cryptographic p ocedures and equipment The agen fuet his Soviet case officers in Teheran Iran and in hlexico City cxico tIA's role in Xexico City was that of pro- viding surveillance and investigative assets to CIC when the agent rnet City s Soviet handler in Mexico The case is summarized here to show how easy it was ior the Soviets to meet in Mexico City their gents ope ating in the U ited States The costs for this ac ivity by the Mexico City St tion were absorbed in the operational support p1·ojects of LIENVOY 's tele pho 1e f t _ u 1il la_Dtelepho ne G -c - • -- 'C __ un 1 te--· J tio - LIFEA'I' 'IRE J ' _ __ r- ·• J ' ' 011 L---- for 'i ravel da ta 1 LIE B ACE L tap opera- tap ope1·ation l o- € _ t i1a tera J sur- t e2un L Ll'u - - '· D G 17 pr o · t o b ase v ' ' l· 1 _ ace r ' r __ un i - i a 1 era J T ·- -- -- - _ Li lc · e c G __ 11 pho o · base LICALL'1 ·r '2 un 1 · 1za Lera u 1 i- ·o photo ·bc s e and LI TE rpo @ j Ji 111 support p - oj ect which pl10tographed@_assports nd p1·ovided • _ police backstoppin - 205 - C _ r ' · - ' '°' 120 i ' l IOl R 13-00000 SECRET 3 The Cuban Embassy Fidel Castro Ruz assumed power in Cuba fol- lowing the collapse of Fulgencio Batista's govern133 ment on 1 January 1959 -- Castro had launched his drive for the liberation of his homeland from the Yucatan Peninsula of Mexico in 1957 and many Cuban leftist exiles were still in Mexico as of 1959 One of them Teresa Casuso Morin 201- 169119 a former Cuban commercial attache in Mexico 1949-1953 assumed charge of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico on 1 January 1959 Salvador Massip y Valdez 201-218391 was the first Ambassador to Mexico under the Castro government Massip's tour in Mexico February 1959 to March 1960 was characterized by a series of unpleasant incidents Soon after his arrival he alienated the Mexican Foreign Ministry by refusing to pay the normal courtesy calls upon many of his olleagues in the diplomatic corps because they represented dictatorship countries He also ignored many Western ambassadors at formal receptions and associated principally if not exclusively with Soviet Bloc representatives - 221 - SECRET In 13-00000 SECRET October 1959 Massip appealed to the Mexican public for support of Cuba in a moment of imminent danger from aerial bombardment by planes operating from foreign bases In January 1960 Massip publicly aligned himself with the Mexican Commu nist painter David Alfaro Siqueiros during the latter's ittacks against Mexican President LopezMateos The Mexican press charged Massip with interfering in Mexican affairs He was subse- quently recalled to Cuba and assigned to Ghana Jose Antonio Portuondo Valdor 201-40662 replaced s3ip i Jun 1960 as Ambassador tc Mexico After experiencing difficulties in using the Mexican press as a propagand outlet he turned to direct agitation among students and labor Portuondo a former university professor invited Mexican professors to teach in Cuba and reportedly paid $8 000 to 12 students of the National Polytechnic Insti• tute in Mexico City to organize and pay for agitation in support of Cuba The Mexican Government retaliated by confiscating all incoming propaganda In 1959 Lopez Mateos ordered raids on Communist Party headquarters arrested Siqueiros and a number ofPl r· y leaders and expelled two Soviet diplomats for plotting in a nationwide rail strike - 222 - SECRET ' p I I 13-00000 -4-- -·-· ··--------·-- •--M•••• i SECRET i I - I •1 ·i - materials from Havana The searches at the Mexican airport of baggage of incoming travelers from Cuba were so intensive that Portuondo went to the Mexican Foreign Ministry to ask that Cubans be permitted to travel through Mexico to other countries without having their baggage searched The Mexicans of course went right on searching baggage of those who had a stopover in Mexico Furthermore the Mexican ringleaders in the pro-Cuba demonstrations were arrested and thrown in jail and kept there for as long as six months before they were sentenced They were charged with '·social disr ptio whi• h under Mexican law resulted in sentences of from five to ten years Carlos Lechuga Hevia 201-262106 replaced Portuondo in May 1962 as Cuban Ambassador to Mexico Lechuga was not particularly active in Mexico and soon went on to become Cuban Ambassador to the • United Nations in New York This appointment led some to believe that Cuba no longer considered f • I l Mexico as its key springboard for latin America Joaquin Hernandez Armas 201-301755 arrived in Mexico in May 1963 as a replacement for Lechuga - 223 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET Hernandez did not participate in the Castro revolution to any extent but his CP membership dated to his student days in law school at the University of Havana I In 1946 he was head of the CP in Pinar del Rio Province where he was said to be active in party espionage activities He served in the Cuban Foreign Ministry under Castro and then was Ambassador to Brazil 1961-1963 Mexico was the only country in Latin America which had continuous diplomatic relations with Cuba from the time Castro assumed power The Cuban Em- bassy in Mexico City was staffed with four officers in 1959 and expanded to 28 Cuban officers by 1968 Half of those were known or suspect Cuban intelligence officers There were three Cuban consulates in Mexico in the port cities of Merida Veracruz and Tampico They were staffed in Veracruz and • Tampico by a consul in each and by two vice consuls at Merida 'I I officers All were known or suspect intelligence They handled Cuban fishing boats and served as collection and shipping points for sending needed materials to Cuba which could not be 134 obtained directly from the United States - 224 - SF CRET I 13-00000 SECRET There were five branches of the MexicanCuban friendship associations run by Mexicans but supported by Cubans They were located in Veracruz Monterrey Tampico Morelia and Mexico City They distributed pro-Castro propaganda and maintained a steady program of free cultural events attractive to students From 10 to 20 such students were given free trips to Cuba each month beginning in 1968 as scholarships Travel from Mexico City to Havana was provided by Cubana the Cuban Govern135 ment airline ' The Cuban consul in Mexico City was the cocrdir ating point for rranging trRvP 1 of a steady stream of pro-Castro revolutionaries to Cuba from throughout the West rn Hemisphere Some went for sightseeing trips and otherswent for guerrilla training A large percentage of these travelers 136 were dissident students from the United States ring 1968 there was a sharp increase in • the number and type of Cuban travelers These in- cluded visits to Mexico of a Cuban ballet group a theater group lecturers artists with exhibits delegations to international conferences and 137 travelers to the Olympics - 225 - SECRET '' 13-00000 SECRET Prensa Latina was the Cuban Government press organization which operated worldwide In Mexico City it had a staff of 13 employees in 1968 and 138 had direct teletype service with Havana CIA operations against the Cuban target were developed by Thomas J Hazlett who was assigned to Mexico City under official cover in February 1957 as the officer responsible for CP exile operations Hazlett was an unusually energetic and imaginative officer with fluent Spanish who had the personality and background that appealed to exile intellectuals He assembled information from in- formants among exiles such as LINLUCK and targeted the unilateral telephone tap LIFEAT against leaders of the groups as they were identified He used agents from the Mexican security service LIVESTOCK to supply information from their files on the activities of various exiles Thus he located their hang- outs and meeting places which were usually restaurants and coffee shops then circulated in these places developing friendships In 1958 Hazlett chanced a meeting with Gustavo Arcos Bergnes a leader of the pro-Castro 26th of July Movement - 226 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET in Mexico An avid reader Hazlett visited every leftist bookstore in Mexico City collecting paperbacks published by leftist exiles met the By the time he authors he had read most of their books and had mutual topics to engage their interest and gain their confidence In August 1959 two officers of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico LITAG-1 201-267743 naval attache and LITAINT-1 201-98818 air attache walked into the US Embassy office of the naval attache and expressed their dissatisfaction with the Communist I I influence over the c stro government Hazlett talked with them and they agreed to remain in their positions and cooperate with CIA Both of these of- ficers were used as sources until early 1960 when they defected to the United States In October 1959 Hazlett made contact with LITAMIL-1 who helped develop a network of 18 access LITAG-1 crossed the US border at Laredo Texas by automobile on 30 March 1960 LITAINT-1 was flown to San Antonio Texas in a private plane of LIENVOY-1 on 12 April 1960 through arrangements made by the station in hlexico The CIA Office of Security in San Antonio arranged admission to the United States Both officers were subsequently handled by the Miami Station - 227 - SECRET j 13-00000 agents consisting of former Castro followers In April 1960 Hazlett recruited LITAINT-2 a close friend of LITAINT-1 and developed from infor tion supplied by him a network of 14 access agents who performed various tasks Five of them formed a goon squad which carried out harassment operations such as tossing stink bombs inside · ' Cuban installations painting city walls with antiCastro slogans saturating the Cuban Embassy gate f I with false telephone calls distributing false in- vitations to Cuban Embassy reception and scattering anti-Castro leaflets clandestinely at night Another one recruited the garbage and trash col- i lector from the Cuban Embassy When the chief of station returned from a WH regional conference held in Panama City on 23-28 May 1960 the Cuban target was put at the top of the list for the Mexico City Station As a result f this eve y investigative asset of t e The long-term significant agents of the LITAMIL and LITAINT networks were incorporated into the LIRAVCNE Project in 1964 See above footno e - 228 - SECRET v_ 13-00000 SECRET station was directed against the Cuban Embassy and the Cuban exile community in support of the JMARC operation Jack Stewart was assigneq as a second case officer under official cover to work with Hazlett on the Cr-------farget During 1960 the Mexico City Station hadl__Jagents who were members of the Cuban Embassy staff and - others who were closely connected with the Embassy staff The station also had the cooperation of the Mexican Government through LIENVOY and LITEMPO for support and security protection Travel control was provided by LIFIRE An ·out- side covert action group working on the Cuban target was set up by Stanley M Moos in August 1960 but was compromised in November 1960 when two briefcases filled with classified information were stolen from an unguarded station wagon on a Mexico City street During February 1961 the first transmitter was installed in the office of the Cuban Ambassador 139 to Mexico It functioned well and provided a Between 1961 and 1968 at least a dozen audio installations were made in Cuban installations and residences but all of them eventually failed LIROMANCE and LISAMPAN are two projects which provided for short-term multiple audio installations - 229 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET ✓ j i check on information provided by CIA agents in the l I Embassy In March 1961 Jose Pardo Llada mouthpiece of Fidel Castro defected in Mexico I He was hidden by the station with the help of LITEMPO until he 140 gave a prf SS confe7ence and left for Madrid I l Two months later three officials from the Cuban Embassy defected with subsequent station-arranged press conferences All had been sources of the 141 station In June of the next year the assist- ant commercial attache at the Cuban Embassy Pedro Lucas Roig Ortega 201-324221 defected and after J i 142 for the United ·states He had previously been recruited by Hazlett In October of this same year the station set up in an apartment just acros the street from the front gate of the Cuban Embassy a photographic • surveillance project which provided photographs of visitors and license plates of automobiles of interest By tracing license plate numbers and show- ing photographs to penetration agents inside the ' '·· - 230 - SECRET ' i a press conference arranged by the station de arted 13-00000 SECRET Embassy the station identified most of the visitors I and exploited some of them for intelligence purposes -1- i This photographic surveillance proje t was identified I by the cryptonym LIONION I I I The Merida Base was open_ed i-n December 1962 to provide support for Cuban operations in Mexico Robert T Shaw was assigned to Mexico City as the case officer for Cuban operations in April 1963 as a replacement for Hazlett who was transferred to the Dominican Republic In October 1963 David A Phillips former chief of the CA Section was added to the Cuba Section as the senior officer responsible for both FI and CA activities In April 1965 Phillips left Mexico City for temporary duty at Headquarters preparatory to a transfer to the Dominican Republic Shaw resumed charge of the Cuba Section until 1966 when he was transferred to Nicaragua and replaced by Francis S Sherry Bf 1964 the station had at least 50 agents working as sources against the Cuban target Their usefulness was reviewed to eliminate nonproductive •· The Merida Base was closed in May 1965 because the cost of maintaining the base outweighed its value to CIA and the intelligence community - 231 - SECRET i j 13-00000 I informants and to consolidate their administrative control into three formal projects LICO IET and LIRENO i' i LIRAVINE I l Information from these in- f • formants was supplemented by that obtained from I I surveillance teams telephone taps audio opera- ' tions and the Mexican security service The telephone taps LIFEAT and LIENVOY and • audio operations LISA iPAN revealed Cuban involvement in subversive activities in Latin America One example of this activity was a naturalized Mexican of Spanish origin Victor Rico Galan 201336474 He was one of the founders of the pro- Castro National Liberation Movement • i ' in Mexico He visited Cuba ic r twc- months each in 1962 aL1d 1963 In late 1963 at Cuban direction he visited several Central American countries Venezuela and Brazil contacting key Communists Cuba in 1964 and 1965 He again visited In Mexico his contacts with members of the Cuban intelligence service at the Cuban Embassy increased sharply In 1964 and 1965 _he took trips to Guatemala and the Dominican Republic The Mexico City Station had followed his activities from the unilateral telephone tap project - 232 - SECRET _· -_ · ti - T '1-- -· ----- ---- · - ---- - -- - - - ' -·- · ----- ' ' - _ --------•' · 1 -_ _ -- - -i P' --1 - ' 'P -- •-' ' •- --- -• If P 1 ' A _- --'t CX __ I ff '6_¥ _ i_D T QS_ • - _ • • - - _ - • • - -_- - -•- - - · -----• · · -·· i · · ' 13-00000 LIFEAT and passed some information on him to the Mexican Government which whetted their appetite enough for them to put him on the joint telephone tap coverage LIENVOY This revealed intense criticism of the Mexican President Diaz Ordaz and that Rico Galan was trying to form a new leftist political party in opposition to the PRI v·· The re- sult was that the Mexican Security Service picked him up in 1966 He was subsequently charged and convicted of being a part of a conspiracy against ' the Mexican Government The Mexican Security Service through LITEMPO I • cooperated closely with the station on Cuban operations This included security protection and ex- change of information For example in September 1966 a wooden box fell off a delivery truck in Mexico City and broke open The box contained guns The security service investigator called to the scene was a station agent LITEMP0-12 He and another agent went to the address on the box a small residence in Mexico City and arrested the The LIFEAT coverage was dropped when it became apparent that the LIENVOY group intended to cover this line - 233 - SECRET I _- Ii I i I i · 13-00000 SECRET I ' two people there I Two agents remained in the empty f house and a short while later after a tap on the door the cultural attache from the Cuban Embassy Julian Lopez Diaz walked in He flashed his dip- lomatic identification but the Mexican agents after checking with their headquarters tore it up searched the man and discovered $6 000 in $20 bills in his wallet They took Lopez to the security service detention room and held him incommunicado for 72 hours while he was being questioned By almost sheer accident the Mexican service had stumbled onto a shipment of arms intended for the Guatemalan CP guerrilla group The police seized an additional $4 000 and a large quantity of carbines submachine guns and ammunition at the resi- I ' I I i I dence which was the home of a Guatemalan revolutionary Lopez was released to the Cuban Ambassador and declared persona non grata The Guatemalans and Mexicans were sentenced to prison terms The Cuban diplomats in Mexico resorted to I terrorist tactics when it suited them In September 1968 they kidnapped from a Mexico City street a l Cµban former code clerk AMDAUB-1 201-802332 who - 234 - SECRET ' • i 13-00000 ' ----- - I I had been granted asylum in Mexico t The Cubans took him to the Cuban -Embassy and drugged him until departure of the next Cubana I I• i· i j flight when the Cuban Ambassador and two Cuban Embassy diplomats waving pistols attempted forcibly to put him on the flight to Havana Fortunately AMDAUB-1 's caretaker had advised the station that AMDAUB-1 was mis ing when he did not return from an unaccompanied trip into the city Thestation notified LITEMP0-12 who arranged for a stake-out at the airport and at border points When the Cubans arrived with AMDAUB-1 LITEMP0-12 inter vened and took them into a small office where- he asked the Ambassador and his two aides to wait while' he and AMDAUB-1 talked in an inner office Once inside the inner office LITEMP0-12 locked the door and had AMDAUB-1 sign a statement that he was being forced to go to Cuba against his wishes Next L TEMP0-12 telephoned for a ladder to be brought to a window from the inner office to the outside of the building below He and AMDAUB-1 climb d out the window and down the ladder to a security office car which took them to a safehous - 235 - SECRET - ------------ - ---- ' 13-00000 SECRET leaving the Ambassador and his two aides waiting in the outer office They were furious when they learned that the defector had gotten away Both ✓ the Cubans and the Mexicans had considerable press play over this episode LISAGA-1 proved to be an embarrassment to CIA and the Mexican Government He was a Mexican opera- ting in Cuba for CIA under Mexican diplomatic cover who was discovered by the Cuban intelligence service and exposed publicly Their complaints to the Mexi- can Government were brushed off as improperly presented For reasons dictated by a nationalist foreign policy Mexico appeared to have bent over backwards to avoid a break with Cuba in spite of considerable evidence that Cuba used Mexico as a base to conduct subversive operations in the United States and Latin America There was no reason to-believe that Mexican foreign policy would change so long as Cuba's subver Later at the request of the Mexican Government CIA arranged for AMDAUB-1 to enter the United States at Miami See Chapter IV - 236 - SECRET I f I 13-00000 V I sive activity was not a threat to the Mexican Government 143 LIRAVINE This project was submitted in late 1964 by Robert T Shaw for the purpose of consolidating into one administrative group a number of active Cuban informants some of whom had been working for CIA since 195 ·-· The objective was to develop positive intelligence and counterespionage information on the activities and personnel of the Cuban Embassy complex in Mexico with a view toward re- cruiting ntelligence officers and placing technical devices inside the official installatioo Both of these objectives were realized The agents inside the Embassy provided CIA with sufficien casing data to permit the installation of the only unilateral audio network LI SAMPAN· in any Cuban Embassy in the world The project was approved in 1965 at a co t of $20 000 Through some expansion and turnover of agents who left the area and were replaced by new recruitments the cost edged up to about $30 000 for 1967 but dropped again to $20 000 in 1969 when - 237 - SECRET - ' • - 13-00000 SECRET i I f I some of the fat was taken out of the budget by removal cf marginal informants The first project provided for 11 access agents The most productive of these were the LITAMIL's and the LITAINT's Marginal agents were LIOLE0-1 LISICLE-1 AMSEVER-2 AMPACA-1 and LICAR0-1 · LITAMIL-1 201-267298 144 This agent was born in Cuba in 1913 Becom- ing extremely anti Batista he went to Mexico City as a young man and went to work in a printing comp y hich he later bought He was an original member of the 26th of July Movement and had contributed $50 000 to this group The leader of this group ·Gustavo Arcos Bergnes was also a close friend of LI TAMIL- 1 Hazlett in the course of developing information on Communist exile activities during 1957 and 1958 · had met Arcos and held several conversat ions with him LITAMIL-1 knew of this acquaintanceship because be had taken telephone messages from Hazlett when Arcos was not at home He had also telephoned Hazlett on one or two occasions when Arcos could not keep an appointment - 238 - SECRET I I Il 13-00000 SECRET When Castro took over the Cuban Government Arcos returned to Cuba and received an appointment as Ambassador to Belgium Hazlett was still fol- lowing unilateral telephone coverage of exile activities and learned that Arcos' old friend LITAMIL-1 was becoming disillusioned with Communist influence in the Castro government In October 1959 Hazlett contacted LITAMIL-1 as a friend of Arcos and arranged a meeting LITAMIL-1 agreed to cooperate with Hazlett and provide information on persons in the pro-Castro Cuban colony who still considered him as a part of the revolution This cooperation led to the recruit- ment of practically all of the early sources on Cuban activities in Mexico and lasted until 1963 when Hazlett left Mexico LITAMIL-1 received no CIA salary but was given a loan of $800 in 1959 for which a request for repayment was not made because of his valuable service to the station LITAMIL-2 201-275992 Hazlett met LITAMIL-2 on 13 April 1960 in company with LITAMIL-1 in Mexico City Hazlett had learned from LITAMIL-1 that LITAMIL-2 once a fan - 239 - SECRET I f 13-00000 SECRET of Fidel Castro had soured on the revolutionary government of Cuba sometime during 1959 when a hoped-for job in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico did not materialize He agreed to cooperate with -Hazlett and was recruited for use as a cutout for LITAMIL-3 consul of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico 1959 to l961 LITAMIL-2 was born in 1918 in Cuba and lived in the United States from 1936 to 1941 when he moved to Mexico City as an employee of the Venus Pen Company When Castro was in Mexico prior to 1957 I • LI1'AMIL-2 joined the 26th of July Movement and worked as a support-type officer He rented safe- houses automobiles and other equipment which were needed On occasions he fed and housed the train- I I iI ·t ees in his home in Mexico City LITAMIL-2 worked closely with Castro but did not join the expedition back to Cuba in the Granma he remained in Mexico City assisting the revolution by collecting money LITAMIL-3 was the uncle of LITAMIL-1 Narue of the boat used by Castro to return to Cuba in 1957 - 240 - SECRET II 13-00000 which he used to buy arms and equipment for Castro and the group in the Sierra Maestra Mountains of Cuba He also took part in the establishment of a clandestine radio station in Mexico hich served the Castro forces with information and propaganda Following the · Castro victory LITAMIL-2 went to Cuba but to his dismay was snubbed by Castro who according to rumor thought LITAMIL-2 had leaked information to the Mexicans LITAMIL-2 returned to Mexico somewhat disappointed by this treatment He also was distressed by Castro's turn to Communism At this point Hazlett met him and made the recruit'llent LITAMIL-2 agreed to play a middle-of-the-road role as a CIA agent and continue apparent friendship for pro-Castroites and anti-Castroites alike He was a source of information on all types of Cubans and he provided information of a personality nature to use as a means of determining if the person might be of use to CIA and susceptible to a recruitment approach During 1966 he became friendly with members of the New China News Agency in Mexico and exchanged - 241 - SECRET l•· 13-00000 SECRET dinner invitations with them at station direction While in their residence he memorized the interior of the house and supplied detailed descriptions and drawings which assisted the station in making a technical installation In fact he was the only station source who had been inside the house before the clandestine entry was made to install the transmitters LITAMIL-2's wife - - - - - - - w a s an Am- erican citizen who was also recruited by the station to process telephone tap and audio tapes LITAMIL-2 was paid a salary of $280 from 1961 until 1963 when he was raised to $300 per month This salary continued until 1968 when it was raised to $320 per month which continued until 1969 when his salary was cut in half because of a decreased access and a different approach by the station to the Cuban target LITAMIL-3 201-290894 • Hazlett recruited LITAMIL-3 on 29 November 1960 at a meeting arranged by LITAMIL-1 The meet- ing was made after the station CA assets placed a newspaper article brutally attacking LITAMIL-3' - 242 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET pointing out his alleged pro-Communist activities in the Cuban Embassy LITAMil r-3 was very upset over the article and wanted desperately to talk with some US official to see if this press campaign could not be stopped since he was pro-United States and wanted to explain that his work in the Cuban Embassy had always been that of a dedicated career diplomat He was anxious to clear his name with US officials LITAMil r-3 was born in Cuba in 1907 He had spent 31 years in the diploma tic service and served in Mexico as attache and consul from 1938 to 1952 and 1P59 to 196i This agent was a proud old man who would not take any salary from the station He arranged the recruitment of four officials from the Cuban Embassy all loyal friends of his who agreed to cooperate with Hazlett LITAMil r-6 7 8 and 9 These were known as deathbed recruitments because he introduced Hazlett to each of them at different times when he was in the hospital awaiting surgery for kidney stones As a token of appreciation the station paid the hospital bill - 243 - SECRET E fii flW Jµi4S AW442 GJkl f P'U $-Cfi U$Zltzaz_ so as z t' At'§ J _v p zu_ qss wi •-_- _ -•- A - _ _t • ·-- r'--ff_Ut s • 'll'l-•--•--•-c • _ _ • » ¾_¥1 13-00000 SECRET LITAMIL-3 resigned his job from the Cuban Embassy in 1961 to remain in Mexico To support himself he took a job working for his nephew LITAMIL-1 as a salesman at $200 per month Dur- ing this time he continued to cooperate with the station by providing information and identifying photographs of Cubans and visitors to the Cuban Embassy until mid-1968 when he became a semi-invalid suffering from a recurrence of kidney stones LITAMIL-7 201-330173 This woman was the Cuban secretary of LITAMIL-3 at the Cuba_n Embassy Hazlett met her in the hospital room of LITAMIL-3 the day before he was to undergo surgery in July 1962 In LITAMIL-3's presence she agreed to cooperate with Hazlett and provide information on persons in the Cuban Embassy From 1962 until 1967 when she retired after 30 years' service she provided the station with personality and background information This was a valuable source for identification of new employees and their positions She also -was helpful in identi- fying LIONION photographs of visitors to the Embassy LITAMIL-7 cooperated with CIA out of loyalty - 244 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET to LITAMIL-3 and like the proud old man she refused to accept compensation for her services During 1968 she became ill and was not available for contact for some time After her retirement her access to information of value to CIA became virtually nil The only remuneration she received was some flowers sent when she was ill and a few inexpensive gifts LITAMIL-9 201-329609 Hazlett approached LITAMIL-9 on the night of 18 July 1962 The scene of the meeting was the hospital room of LITAMIL-3 who lay_near death awaiting the kidney stone operation the following day He had summoned LITAMIL-9 an old friend to the hospital and then introduced Hazlett This meetin in the presence of LITAMIL-3 lasted three hours LITAMIL-9 talked freely of Cuban personalities and activities but expressed reluctance at becoming in- i volved in clandestine activities with a US official At a subsequent meeting however he agreed to provide information His position as cultural officer in the Embassy provided no access to classified information but his observations gave the station - 245 - SECRET I 13-00000 SECRET an additional source on personality data and relationships inside the Embassy He also traveled to Cuba but would not communicate with the station from there In the spring of 1965 he was transferred to Cuba and remained there until December 1966 when he left his position with the Cuban Government and obtained permission to reside in Mexico When he contacted the station in December 1966 he was paid $5 000 which represented accumulated salary while he was in Cuba although he had not been productive during that time He had no access of particular interest to the station after his return from Cuba but he could be contacted if desired LITAINT-2 201-275934 This agent was recruited on 28 April 1960 by Hazlett who met him when he was trying to contact LITAINT-1 who without prior station knowledge had crossed the border at Laredo Texas LITAINT-2 was born in Cuba in 1930 of a Mexican LITAINT-1 Cuban air attache was recruited by Hazle t in August 1959 and cooperated with CIA until April 1960 when he defected to the United States - 246 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET mother He had lived in Mexico City since 1957 and was a salesman for a television firm when he was contacted by Hazlett LITAINT-1 an LITAINT-2 had been close friends for many years As a result of this friendship LITAINT-2 knew all of the Cuban diplomats and many of them patronized the store where he worked Hazlett developed LITAINT-2 for access to Cuban intelligence officers In 1962 LITAINT-2 was also used to direct a harassment team of lower-level agents LITAINT-8 9 10 11 and 12 This harassment team created confusion at the Cuban Embassy by throwing stink bombs into the installations painting signs on the walls of the Embassy compound and making anonymous telephone calls By 'late 1963 the station discon- tinued these operations because they were coming under the eye of the Mexican Security Service and the Cuban Ambassador was protesting loudly that it was the work of the American Ambassador LITAINT-9 was transferred to the LIRICE surveillance team The other members of the harassment group were terminated LITAINT-2 was sent by CIA to Miami Florida in November 1960 for clandestine training by the AMOT group I J I - 247 - SECRET 't 13-00000 SECRET LITAINT-2 was also in charge of the Cuban trash operation A rag-picker sat in the truck that picked up the garbage and trash from the Cuban Embassy and sorted out the waste paper that had writing or photographs This little garbage-spattered bundle ·was turned over three times a week to LITAINT-2 who passed it to the stat ion where the bi ts were pieced together and to the surprise of the station contained some worthwhile information One item was a draft of a report that concerned contact of an access agent with a US official The operation also identified persons seeking employment with the Embassy or trying to get visas to eo to Cuba LITAINT-2 was paid $256 per month salary in July 1962 and was raised to $304 per month in 1968 LITAINT-7 201-288953 This agent was the second secretary at the Cuban Embassy and was a source of LITAINT-5 201287689 until June 1961 when LITAINT-7 and his • LITAINT-5 was a Cuban vice consul in Los Angeles California who arrived in Mexico on 11 August 1960 and resigned from the Cuban Government He was in touch with LITAMIL-1 and was recruited by the station to work with Stan1€ - M Moos in September 1960 until the operation folded after the loss of two briefcases - 248 - SECRET 1 _ 13-00000 - --- -- SECRET wife a consul at the Cuban Embassy and LITAINT-6 an employee in the Cuban Embassy Consular Section went to the Mexican Minister of Interior and asked for permission to remain in Mexico after resigning their positions LITAINT-7's greatest contribution was a dramatic defection speech which received widespread covert action coverage He was retained by the station as a source until 1965 when he and his wife emigrated to the United States He received no salary LISICLE-1 201-350663 1'his agent was a Mexican medical pecialist who first came to the attention of the station in 1964 when he walked -into the US Embassy to report that he had been invited to Cuba to participate in a medical congress He was interviewed by a sta- tion officer and was given some operational training and guidance for his travel to Cuba This initial assignment rattled him and he returned to Mexico full of cooperative spirit but psychologically incapable of performing any task which he considered risky He subsequently dabbled at the Cuban target attending cultural institute meetings - 249 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET LICOMET-1 201-285165 was the titular head of the unit and principal agent for the project from 1964 until 1968 when he obtained full-time employment with a private firm and was replaced in the LICOMET operation by LICOMET-2 · 201-327270 The project expanded in size from a staff of five in 1964 to twelve in 1969 The group consisted of a principal agent four interviewers two secre- taries a visa processer a guard a janitor a receptionist and an informant in an airline office The project cost $30 000 in 1965 $56 000 in 1966 $50 000 in 1967 and less than $30 000 each year for 1968 and 1969 The production in 1965 was 52 positive disseminations During 1966 the figure increased to 165 disseminations In 1967 despite a 75 percent drop in the numb r of Cuban refugees arriving in Mexico intelligence production showed an improvement in both quality_and quantity During this year 175 dis- seminations were made Of special importance was information obtained on live practice firings of SA-2 missiles in Cuba The project also provided the station with Prensa Latina pouches which were - 253 - SECRET 13-00000 ·- 'di f -- r • tr SECRET opened in the station by the TSO officer who photographed the contents resealed the pouches and returned them to the LICOMET agent for insertion in the mail channel to Cuba These pouches contained communications from Cuban intelligence assets throughout the Western Hemisphere In 1968 the pro- duction dropped to 46 disseminations primarily because of the continued decrease in the number of Cuban refugees as well as in their knowledgeability of information which was of interest to CIA One of the problems of the project over which the station in Mexico Gould exercise little control was a constant change of LICOMET·personnel The project staff consisted of refugees rather than permanent residents These refugees were for the most part in Mexico waiting to go to the United States No one could predict the processing time for US visas As a result it was impossible to plan for personn l changes Oncethevisas were issued the refugees with very little notice left for the United States It was then necessary to train others to fill the vacancies - 254 SECRET 13-00000 SECRET 4 Operational Support and Technical Collection Activities The Mexico City Station had an extensive net- work of investigative operations which for want of a better term was called operational support These included a unilateral telephone tap capability of 18 lines LIFEAT a joint telephone tap capability of 30 lines LIENVOY a unilateral surveillance team LiEMBRACE a travel control operation LIFIRE liaison with the Mexican Security Service LITEMPO a mobile surveillance phototruck LIENTRAP six photographic surveillance basehouses LIMITED LICALLA LILYRIC LIHABIT LIONION LITABBY a mail intercept LIKAYAK-2 audio operations LIPALLET LIROMANCE and LISA IPAN and highly sensitive technical operations LINIMENT LIMESA LICASA From 1961 through 1969 the station spent approximately a operations dollars annually for these Most of this money was used for payment of salaries of the large networks of agents required to maintain the operational bases for these projects These operations were the primary sources of operational information on Soviet Bloc and Cuban I I - 257 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET Mexico City was also a official installations location with a continuous requirement for short- term targets and support to other CIA stations throughout the world This consisted of surveil- lance of agents traveling from Latin America through Mexico en route to Cuba providing accomodation addresses arranging meetings for agents hiding Cuban defectors and providing clandestine transportation of agents to the US border 147 LIFEAT The basis for unilateral telephone tap operations was laid in the fall of 1950 when two employees of the telephone company were recruited by Charles W Anderson III One was a supervisor for repairs and maintenance LIMEWATER-1 and the other was one of his subordinates LIMEWA'fER-2 a lineman who did repair and maintenance work These two telephone company employees were handled by an outside principal agent LIMESTONE LIMESTONE worked for the FBI during World War II and knew that LIMEWATER-1 and 2 placed telephone taps for the FBI from 1941 to 1945 After World War II LIMESTONE worked for the Department of Agriculture Hoof and Mouth Control Unit until about 1950 when they closed some of their offices He was then hired by CIA He died of a heart attack in 1956 while still employed by the Agency - 258 - I SECRET 13-00000 - - -· SECRET The principal agent as of 1969 was David M WILSTED 201-9195 who was hired in November 1951 as a transcriber of Polish in one of the LIFEAT I basehouses During 1951 taps were placed on the telephone I lines of the Soviet Czech and Polish official installations $5 000 I The cost for the first year was about ' By the middle of 1955 the operations coverage had been extended to leaders of the local CP and Communist-front organizations and the cost had increased to $78 000 a year In 1955 LIFEAT produced 19 positive and six counterintelligence disseminations The Soviet Bloc country desks judged the operational information of this tap operation to be the best CIA had anywhere In 1956 LIFEAT produced 36 positive and 74 counterintelligence disseminations The cost of the project for this year shot up to $132 519 which included the WILSTED was a technical sergeant with the Air attache in Mexico from 1946 to 1948 He then worked for the Department of Agriculture Hoof and Mouth Control Unit until 1951 when the office he was with closed He was married to a Mexican Olga A PARFINIK who was the sister of Oliver G SCANTLING 201-79171 of the LIRAZOR Project 148 - 259 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET i i l I I I I I I staff· salaries and allowances $35 000 of 1 employees under nonoffical cover and salaries $21 000 of - US contract employees under non- official cover During 1957 LIFEAT had 23 target lines and produced 141 positive intelligence disseminations It also covered the lines of several US Communist expatriates at the request of the FBI There were seven listening posts located near the various intercept points The station had plans to add four or five more lines but expansion came in the form of a new operation LIENVOY This was an unofficial bu joint telephoue tap operation with 149 the Mexican Government The targets of LIFEAT were adjusted to complement coverage by LIENVOY For instance in 1960 it was learned that LIENVOY coverage would be placed LIFEAT and LIENVOY were handled independently and represented two concepts of telephone tapping LIFF AT taps were made from I I I As a result ------ r-L l l' M 1 · r e q u 1 r e a a 1 1 s t e n 1 n g p o s t nearby for each tap LIENVOY had from which taps were made All 30 LIENVOY taps went into the same listening post I 260 - SECRET - i Q @U Q • __ _ _ Qi_ _ i r l _ _ _ --- lllllllljl l'llll _ · 'l' IJlll Pllll i9 1 1 1 111i111111' 11 11al --- ---- -'ti S Gi NLWc iUtfiZ J s J oqs5 e sq _ Zill JP 4 J-_Gqt L 3'WJ 7 ti _tQF CtA 0 4 ¥ ce _ _ _ _J111-Pl PA 13-00000 SECRET I I on all Soviet and Satellite official installations LIFEAT taps were taken off and placed on other I targets of interest to the station LIFEAT maintained an average of six listening posts as of 1969 and could operate about three lines from each in instances where there I were three targets close enough together to run wires without security problems One of the problems with LIFK T was its cost which hovered around $100 000 a year Salaries and fixed allow- ances for this network of Mexicans were $73 241 in 1969 Americans and Rent for listening posts amounted to $16 600 for the sarue period Positive intelligence declined to zero in 1969 r t l ' j r The reason for this was elimination of the disseminations of marginal information Also LIFEAT was used to concentrate on residences of Soviet Bloc and CP personalities considered susceptible to recruitment There was no indication that the Mexican Government was aware of this project The LIFEAT Project also gave the station a capability for mounting other unilateral operations - 261 - SECRET -···- - ---•······ t i·' 13-00000 SECRET LISAMPAN was a multiaudio project covering the Cuban Embassy and the residence of the Cuban Ambassador in Mexico David M WILSTED and the two LIFEAT telephone linemen LIFEUD-2 and LIFEUD-3 made the installations The group also tapped the TELEX system of two Soviet Bloc official installations LIEMBRACE This project consisted of a network of nine agents a six-man surveillance team a radio repairman and a two-man phototruck team This was an outg -owth of the LIPSTICK Project which was handled unilaterally from 1952 The surveillance tea used four radio-equipped vehicles in addition to the panel truck which had a camera with telephoto lens mounted in a concealment device As of 1969 the agents were LIEMBRACE-1 2 4 5 8 10 and 14 LIEMPTY-10 and 11 manned the phototruck LIEMBRACE-1 2 4 and 5 were recruited in the 1950's under the LIPSTICK Project and were handled by Joseph G Sancho an outside case officer until June 1958 when four members of the team were arrested by the Mexican Secret Service while - 262 - SECRET 13-00000 -- SECRET '' conducting a surveillance of the code clerk of the I - - - - - - - - in Mexico City LIEMBRACE-8 the radio repairman was formerly LINSTOCK He was recruited in 1953 by LIMESTONE the principal agent of LIFEAT LIEMBRACE-10 and 14 were added to the team in 1960 and 1968 and were recruited by team members LIEMBRACE-1 and 2 were brothers and were married to sisters LIEMBRACE-4 was according to the record the nephew of LIEMPTY-10 LIEMPTY-10 formerly LIPSTICK-2 was recruited in 1952 by his brother LIFEUD-1 the telephone company supervisor for LIFEAT and handled by him until 1955 LI EM T'i-11 was recru1 t ed in 1955 by LIEMPTY-10 Team members arrested were LIEMBRACE-1 3 6 and LIPSTICK-47 As of 1969 LIEMBRACE-1 was the only one of those arrested who had not been terminated Sancho was blown to the Mexican police but the stah Sb rder A similarity of names mother of LIElIBRACE-4 and wife of LIEMPTY-10 suggests that LIEMBRACE-4 might have been a stepson of LIEMPTY-10 - 263 - SECRET - 4 9' '-' O W i'lll ID lf' • _ _ _ _ _ • - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 13-00000 SECRET These two agents were turned over to Oliver G SCANTLING from 1955 until 1958 when they were turned over to Raymond H GERENDE and his brotherin-law LIEMPTY-4 In 1968 LIEMPTY-10 and 11 were incorporated into the LIEMBRACE Project LIEMPTY-10 by the Mexican ecret Service while using the photo- and LIEMPTY-2 until 1965 when he became a singleton agent under Project LIRAZOR He provided cover for an office and the automobiles for the LIPSTICK Project until the police roll-up in 1958 - 264 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRE'l' During 1958 the project cost an estimated $24 000 of which $16 200 was for salaries of six team members $50 663 By 1966 the cost had increased to Team members received a monthly salary of $250 each for the two leaders and $200 each for their subordinates in 1958 These salaries had doubled by 1966 increasing the cost of the project However the team members were recruited when they were young men some just out of college and in order to prevent their leaving for betterpaying positions in private industry the station had to periodically increase their wages The team was handled by a case officer under official cover who held clandestine meetings in various downtown areas with LIEMBRACE-1 to pass assignments and receive reports During demonstra- tions or when the team was used during visits of US Presidents to provide current information on the security situation the team leader communicated with his station case officer by radio to a base inside the station - 265 - SECRET 4J @ Z #-'f411JS • 4 1 1½ 5' 4 t ' - 13-00000 SECRET 151 LIRICE The LIRICE Project provided for a surveillance team handled unilaterally for investigations against the CP of Mexico This project was _the i I I outgrowth of the LIJERSEY surveillance group re crui ted in 1957 to parallel the LIPSTICK LIE IDRACE group I After the arrest of team members in 1958 i by the Mexican Secret Service one surveillance team was given the cryptonym LIEMBRACE 'I The other team LIJERSEY was included in the LIEMPTY Project In 1960 the LIJERSEY agents were taken out of the LIEMPTY Project and included in the LITEMPO Project Their cryptonyms were changed to LITED This change was made because their outside case officer Simon D CLACKETT resigned and returned to his home in i' Arizona I In 1961 CLACKETT asked for his job back Since the team had not been effective under the LITEMPO Project the agents were again put under• CLACKETT A fourth cryptonym LIRICE was assigned agents were included in this project for variou3 periods of time They consisted primarily of marginal assets from other projects who were - 266 - SECRET J f I i f 13-00000 SECRET assigned to surveillance and investigative tasks under CLACKETT after efforts to use them effectively in other areas had failed However at no one time were there more than - persons in the group These men lacked the education interest and motivation to ever develop into good surveillance assets The LIRICt Project was approved in May 1961 for $29 815 of which $13 115 was used for CIACKETT's salary and allowances were $10 200 Salaries for agents Approximately $6 500 was earmarked for operational expenses including the purchase of · a $4 000 automobile Cn 2S 1ai - h 1955 Je rcu · K BENADUM c recr agent for the LITEMPO Project called his station case officer and advised that LITEMP0-4 agents had arrested two men on the previous Saturday morning 27 March The men were conducting a surveillance of a Panamanian HYSAGE-1 who met another Panamanian under LITEMPO surveillance As the two surveillance teams came together the LITEMPO team arrested LIRICE agents The LITEMPO surveillance was being conducted at station request Clearly there was a lack of proper station coordination of surveillances The f I ' ' I - 267 - I SECRET ' Oz a -·4 fG'A JPW- iqa • e f lf Ol ll lllt' IIS ' ' 'l FII o 11 c i a --' -••-•-c••ow u • •• ' '_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ---- l 13-00000 SECRET LIRICE agents were taken to the Mexican Security Service headquarters and interrogated throughout the weekend The two men had a meeting with CLACKETT scheduled for Monday morning at 1100 hours ff They gave their meeting instructions to the Mexican police and LIRICE-1 went along to identify CLACKETT who was known to him as Ricardo f I' Three Mexican i Security agents walked up to CLACKETT put a gun in his back and escorted him to their headquarters He was relieved of his identity documents true name money and other personal papers After questioning I f l by the Mexican Security Service and intervention of the station through the LITEMPO Project CLAC ETT was permitted to leave the country again on 31 March 1965· He resigned The agents LIRICE-1 and 7 were also released with the project automobile which had been impounded • i j After the above episode the team members were again p aced under the LITEMPO Project ment lasted until October 1966 This arrange- Wade E Thomas the station's CP case officer was not satisfied with the LITEMPO handling of the team justifiably because the communications were poor and investigations were - 268 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET conducted in a haphazard manner Thomas took over direct handling of the team with LIRICE-5 as his routine channel of communication to other team members By November 1967 it was apparent that LIRICE would not become an effective investigative unit Team members were constantly being replaced for various reasons They had annoying personal problems that had been tolerated such as constant requests for loans and histories of family illnesses for which they needed money Their salaries were com- par tively sm ll for their large families received less than $300 per month received from $80 t $175 per month LIRJCE-1 The other agents By January 1968 there were only two members of the team left LIRICE-1 and LIRICE-7 reporting on the CP target and neither of them had cover employment They con- - tinued in contact with the station CP case officer until 1969 when a decision was made to pay them termination bonuses and release them 152 LIEMPTY This project was approved in 1958 -was a LIEMPTY new cryptonym for the LIPSTICK Project which - 269 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET had provided the station with visual and photographic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City from 1954 The original agents were recruited by Charles W Anderson III and Harry T Mahoney One two-story house LIMITED and two ipartments LILYRIC and LICALIA were used as observation posts overlooking the front and back of the Soviet Embassy chancery in Mexico City The LIMITED base was used until 1955 as a LIFEAT basehouse and was occupied by LIPSTICK-7 the sister-in-law of LIMESTONE the first principal agent of LIFEAT l11 June 1955 the house was for j sale It was located diagonally across a four-street intersection from the front gate of the Soviet Embassy compound the only exit and entrance to the compound The station - using a US real estate dealer in Mexico LIMOUSINE purchased the two-story colonial house in 1955 for $12 000 Another $3 500 was spent for reno- vation _including a concealment area which faced the Soviet Embassy gate This small area hollowed out of the LIPSTICK-7 was termimted in 1957 - 270 - SECRET 'l 13-00000 corner of the stone building concealed a camera and balscope lens with room for one person to operate the camera provided he was not very large and did not stand up Philip Roettinger instructed LIEMPTY-6 formerly LIPSTICK-14 the agent who moved into the house after renovation how to oparate the camera and how to prepare daily operational logs of events at the gate of the Soviet Embassy This base operated without a major security problem until September 1964 when it was closed The station received word from I Headquarters of a decision to publish in the Warren Commission Report an operational photograph taken from this base in September 1963 during the time Lee Harvey Oswald was in Mexico City Furthermore the publication carried the statement that the photograph was made by CIA in Mexico City and showed an unidentified person leaving the Soviet Embassy The photo- graph of an unidentified man who appeared to be a Caucasian was passed by the station to Eldon Rudd FBI agent in Mexico City on 22 November 1963 Rudd carried the photograph to Dallas Texas where it was shown to the mother of Lee Harvey Oswald to see if she could identify the person - 271 - SECRET Subsequently at a '' I 13-00000 SECRET press conference Oswald's mother accused the FBI of showing her a photograph of Jack Ruby taken by the CIA in Mexico City To prove that the photo- graph was not Ruby the FBI insisted that it be published in the Warren Commission Report To protect the LIMITED ag nts the station had no choice but to remove the photographic equip ment nd relocate the agents The LIMITED house ✓- had suffered from a long rainy season in 1964 during which time the concealment area caved in ·leaving a gaping hole in one corner of the front of the building LIEMPTY-6 and family were moved to another location in late 1964 in the same apartment building which housed the LILYRIC base The LIMITED property was sold to LIMOUSINE for $12 000 The § a s e was first opened in 1957 and· s maintained by LIEMPTY-14 formerly LIJERSEY-12 · • GERENDE She was recruited by Raymond H • She became the best source among the LIMOUSINE razed the old house and erected a new apartment building In 1967 LILYRIC agents moved their base to the top floor front apartment in this building LIEMPTY-6 was terminated in 1968 because of a e and lack of interest - 272 i -' SECRET - ------ f 13-00000 S l CRET photographic assets Her daily logs and reports were detailed and complete clear sbarp and ✓ The photographs were When the time came to select agents to move into LIMOUSINE's new building there was no question that LIE IPTY-14 was the best observer in the group The LILYRIC base was moved - into the apartment with no security_ problens As of 1969 she had completed her 12th year with CIA The LICALL photobase was located in a row house _ also owned by CIA through LIMOUSINE alongside the Soviet Embassy property overlooking the garden and back of he chancery The agent in this base was LIEMPTY-9 formerly LIPSTICK-39 recruited in 1956 by LIEMBRACE-1 as LIPSTICK surveillance team He was a member of the LIEMPTY-9 was the brother of LIPSTICK-47 who was arrested by the Mexican Secret Service in 1958 and resigned when released The LICALI A base providedphotographs of- Soviet activities in the garden areas • From the LICALLA reports the station determined which Soviets worked in the same offices identifying intelligence personnel by association the r 1a id's The LICALL work base was located in room on the roof of LI CALLA and afforded - 273 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRE'l' a view into the windows of the Soviet chancery The LIEMPTY Project was approved in 1959 for $95 000 This included salaries for agents in the three photobases Oliver G SCANTLING Raymond H GER DE the LIENTR P truck and personnel and a - man recruited but uritrained surveillance team with LIJERSEY cryptonyms who were directed by an outside case officer Simon D CIACKETT In 1960 the costs declined to $53 000 when CIACKETT resigned and returned to the United States and the i LIJERSEY agents were transferred to the LITEMPO project The costs for 1966 were $45 300 as a resul't of SCAN'l'LING's transfer to Project LIRAZOR With the transfer of the LIENTRAP truck to the LIE BRACE Project the cost for 1969 was $43 500 Approximately $32 000 was spent on salaries for igents in this group 1969 the remainder was spent on vehicle maintenance rents utilities and equip nent LIOOGTROT 153 This project was approved in 1954 It was developed by Charles K Jett to provide information on the Czechoslovakian Embassy in Mexico City -- 274 - SECRET 'l' -9- 1 · 'R ag c 13-00000 SECRET ✓ t - ·'• • 154 · - _ LIONION - This project provided the station with photographic coverage of the entrance to the Cuban Embassy Jack Stewart started this activity in 1962 using a mother and son team of Cuban exiles as basehouse operators in an apartment directly across -- the street from the entrance to the Embassy The first project was approved in 1965 for an estimated $11 000 of which $6 000 nuses s for salaries and bo- The remainder was used for rent utilities and miscellaneous expenses Two types of photographic equip nt were used One s -- - t '· f· a 35-millimeter Exacta equipped with a bal- · scope telephoto lens • The other was a high-speed impulse 35-millimeter camera de vised by the TSD at Headquarters The lens of this camera was acti- vated as persons appeared near the entrance of the target It photographed continuous shots until the person oved out of the line of sight f the lens Two rolls of 100 foot 35-millimeter film were produced each week This film was developed at the station but sent to Headquarters for exploitation because of its sheer volume The manually-operated - 277 SECRET • 4 13-00000 SECRET balscope provided the station with sufficient daily coverage of persons visiting the target to satisfy local operational requirements for identification The average yearly cost of the project from 1966 through 1969 was $10 000 The value of the project was the identification of Cuban Embassy official personnel and visitors to the Embassy for future operational exploitation such as the recruitment of access agents 155 LIROMANCE In January 1965 the Mexico City Station officer for c a erations Robert T Shaw noticed in the telephone tap transcripts from the LIENVOY operation that the Cuban Embassy was negotiating with an upholsterer for repair of certain furniture - 278 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET LISAMPAN LISAMPA S was i nni lateral audio pcnetra tion of the Cuban Embassy and consulate in Mexico City from September 1967 until May 1969 when silence came to the last of six audio devices It was the only unilateral audio operation which CIA had against any Cuban official installation in the world i The operation lasted 20 months and cost CIA abo t $60 000 for rent and salaries for the sup- l the principal technical specialists David M I WILSTED LIFEUD-2 and John J McGee who were paid i from other projects I port mechanism This did not include salaries of The project produced no positive I i ' t - 279 - SECRET f i I 13-00000 SECRET intelligence II It did yield useful background data and some very valuable operational lead Initially it also produced a volume of noise which if nothing else added texture to the lives of the six monitors and transcribers LISAMPAN was first proposed in October 1966 when the Mexico City Station learned one of its agents LIFEUD-2 LIFEAT Project a lineman for the Mexico City telephone company would have access to the Cuban compound in connection with a modernization program of the telephone system Detwe n April and August 1967 during three entries LIFEUD-2 installed five hot-miked telephones and one carrier current transmitter in the Cuban Embassy and consulate offices The installa- tions were supervised by David M WILSTED American principal agent of the LIFEAT Project who in turn was directed by the inside case officer for the project Michael J Farmer and the station' technical officer John J McGee Management of the monitors and transcribers was handled by James E Anderson replaced Farmer as inside case officer for LIFEAT in the fall of 1966 - 280 - SECRET 13-00000 -··· - SECRET Francis S Sherry chief of the Cuban Section at the station Transcripts were processed by station personnel in this section Two separate listening posts were established it I to monitor the devices LISARI located behind the Cuban compound and LISASH located directly in front of the gate to the compound t In addition another listening post was established as a part of the LIONION Project directly across from the door to the Cuban consulate on the corner From t r I I I I this site LIONION-1 and his mother ran an impulse camel'a aimed at the doorway of the consulate and through a carrier current circuit running through the LISASH listening post could also listen in on conversations of visitors to the gatehouse of the compound LISASH and LIONION were reportedly not witting of one another LISASH monitored two hot-miked telephones DOG and EASY while LISARI monitored one of the I ' other three devices on a rotational basis I - 281 - SECRET The I I l I I 13-00000 SECRET t q r 1 L1 following indicates the location of each hot-miked installation Cl L1 q •II I I I I ABLE The telephone of the chief of Mission BAKER In the office of the Ambassador's secretary CHARLIE In one of the inner offices originally the room was later changed into a waiting room and the take was not of significant value OOG In the gatehouse to the compound where visitors to the chancery were admitted EASY In one of the consular offices FOXTROT In an upstairs con ulate office In March 1968 ABLE was lost routine telephone· company maintenance the telephone instrument was re oved by a telephone company employee and replaced by another telephone · The company employee was not aware of the CIA opera- 'I 'L l •• • _ ' tion The telephone was lost in the shuffle _ ' ---· ci-- • - °'' ' - _ j o V · - ---v _ The LIENVOY Project tapped every telephone in the Cuban Embassy This was a joint project shared _ _ _ · wt th the Mexicans The advantage of LI SAMPAN · which to some extent duplicated LIENVOY coverage s that it also provided conversations in the areas of the telephones by persons other than the callers Thl s LISAMPAN supplemented the product from LIENVOY - 282 - SECRET -- - --- Through • 13-00000 SECRET I i In October 1968 EASY was lost The tele- phone company in another routine action cut the loop connection for its own use Efforts later to reactivate EASY from another listening post were BAKER was lost during the installation of a new TELEX machine in the secretary's office on 7-16 January 1969 The last tapes did not indicate that a search or sweep was made for the device but rather that the wall block was removed as part of the normal TELEX installation On 6 1969 a countermeasures sweep was conducted in the gatehouse where DOG was installed Since OOG was live-monitored at the time the loop was not disconnected and the countermeasures activity The audio device was disconnected then reconnected by the sweepers and at that point quit functioning ' • j The station was of the opinion • that it was possible that the block was changed during the test suggesting that it was not compromised It was later determined by LIRING-7 a pene- tration of the Cuban Embassy through visual obser- I 'I t I I i I f I unsuccessful was recorded l vation that the wall block was changed - 283 - SECRET In spite 13-00000 SECRET -l ·1 of this fact the transcripts indicated with a ii reasonable degree of certainty that the device 1 i was discovered by the sweepers by the comments ''Hey there is something here 1 It is inside ' It These remarks were accompanied by whistling sing- 1 1 ing yoo hoo-ing high frequency tones scratching and knocking of the Embassy employees indicated very clearly Furthermore FOXTROT was either live- monitored or taped until 12 May l The conversations f l that they suspected that the Embassy telephone system had been tampered with and that in the future telephone company employees would not be allowed to enter to make repairs and adjustments On 12 May the station disconnected the loops to the LISARI and LISASH listening posts and re- I moved all incriminating equipment The LIONION carrier current circuit had already been discon- nected on 30 April LISARI was still able to live-monitor FOXTROT About a week later still in May 1969 the DOG and FOXTROT loop connections were remade to LISARI The devices were negative although the telephones functioned normally As of 1230 hours - 284 - SECRET ' '- l •J ¥ $C c J £AW _ __ _ _ _ _ __ l 13-00000 SECRET 24 May CHARLIE was still functioning but at 0900 on 26 May CHARLIE was dead though the telephone performed normally In addition to the LISAMPAN devices there was a hot-miked telephone in the residence of the Cuban Ambassador This was not continually manned but could be monitored from a nearby listening post LIHACK-4 Sometime between 22 and 23 May while the Ambassador was out of the country the device was removed apparently by the Cubans Although the station had instructed LIHACK-4 to continually monitor the device or watch the residence he admitted that the surveillance was limited to spot checking by his wife The station was therefore unable to determine when the Cubans entered the residence to take action resulting in the loss of the device It was not resolved whether all the devices were discovered as a result of a special or routine sweep It appeared obvious enough that OOG and subsequently FOXTROT and the device in the residence were discovered as a result of the search It was not clear whether BAKER was discovered I I - 285 - SECRET ' t i -' •' f · 'II I I I I 13-00000 SECRET accidt ·ntly as a result of the TELEX installation if discovered at all It was equally unclear ln statements made by AMBEDEW a Cuban intelli- gence officer who defected to CIA He disclosed that in February 1969 Armando Lopez Orta Cuban intelligence chief in Paris briefed his subordinate officers on a device found in the Embassy in llexico It was not clear whether this discovery was that of BAKER or whether Lopez referred to a much older installation LIROMANCE which had long since been abandoned There was also a question whether the arrival and departure in Mexico of possible Cuban sweep specialists was connected with the losses The sweep on 6 May which resulted in the loss of DOG s probably conducted by regular Embassy employees A possibility considered was Cuban Ambassador l Thel lthe I l_w_a_s_a_Jp- L _ __ _ _ proached under a false flag Mexican Government by LIEMBRACE-4 a member of the station's unilateral I I I iC I I surv illance team on 15 January 1969 to provide information on the residence and to allow him to enter and take photos At first she was generally - 286 - I SECRET t 13-00000 SECRET uncooperative and failed to appear for a scheduled ceting but on 1 February she accepted the recruitncnt reluctantly On 15 February he obtained a plan of the residence from her she accepted money and subsequently let him enter and obtain information on the telephones On 24 February she permit- ted L FEUD-2 to enter the residence I He changed the telephone instrument in the office of the Ambassador leaving one which was hot-miked He had been instructed to change only the inner component of the instrument but found that the screw holes on the bottom did not match those wi til the Oi1 ponent he had so he changed the whole unit instead The • I I new telephone was similar to the old one except that the old one had a cracked dial The audio device in the residence worked perfectly LIHACK-4 monitored a conversation between t e Ambassador and unidentified visiting Cuban that indicated either he and his visitors were un- aware of the device or were pretending to be unaware No really sensitive information was discussed however The device i ·om the residence was the last to be removed but the Cubans may well have noticed - 287 - SECRET I' 13-00000 SECRET the new telephone and left it there since the house was empty from March to 1 September 1969 knowing that no conversations could be reported on it It was considered that I I The discovery of DOG led to a telephone-bytelephone search resulting in the finding of FOXTROT and the device in the residence It was speculated as to whether this could have been prevented if all the loops had been disconnected for sometime after the less of BAKER It would have made the detection more difficult but the station could never have prevented the eventual loss of the devices installed in the tel phones because LIFEUD-2 lost access to the Cuban compound because of his assignment to another area and could not control the telephones Without such control there was no possible way to prevent their routine replacement as was the case of ABLE - 288 - SECRET I i I r •• I I 13-00000 was made possible through the expert knowledge and craftmanship of - - - - During the period of this operation about two weeks every man in the Mexico City Station working schedule maintained his regular and then provided surveillance or other support assistance to this operation during the night This as necessary to prevent any indication of unusual activity on the part of station officers 158 LIMESA The op- rations of this project centered around - _ ' a basehouse Unit 11 2quipped with an electrical ' apparatus which conducted a technical surveillance of the Soviet Embassy The basehouse was a part of a four-unit complex collectively known as LIMUST and O¥ ed by CIA It was purchased by Harry T i Ma oney through LIMOUSINE in September 1957 The • -i 'J six LIMESA personnel were husband and wife teams who acted as basehouse operators for three of the four units in the complex The fourth unit LICALLA was a photographic surveillance administered under the LIEMPTY Project 295 - SECRET base II l 13-00000 SECRET The property cost $50 000 in 1957 t Another $50 000 was spent during the next two years for rebuilding and furnishing the properties I · From t 1966 through 1969 the project cost approximately i l $12 000 per year of which about half was spent for salaries and bonuses The remainder was spent 1 I for equipment an operational expenses This was one of the most importan·t projects of the station and provided highly sensitive information LICASA 159 This project was developed in 1958 by Winston M Scott who was introduced to the Minister of Communications at a diplomatic reception • Scott expressed an interest in communications and was introduced by the Minister to the Chief of the International Section This was LICASA-1 the only agent in the project who was developed socially • by Scot He was offered $1 000 a month to provide copies of all Soviet Bloc cable clear text and coded traffic At first LICASA-1 was possessed For additional details of this operation the read r may wish to consult project records - 296 - SECRET l 1 13-00000 SECRET with a fear of being discovered but $1 000 a month s too good to turn down Scott set up an elabo- rate meeting system for the first year which involved four persons plus LICASA-1 j ·Harry T Mahoney or Frank R Estancona ac- 1· I companied Scott to a street location where LICASA-1 was parked in his automobile Scott LICASA-1 and t the station case officer then drove in Scott's ' I quasi-personal car to a safehouse apartment where Scott and LICASA-1 sat in the living room and l chatted while Mahoney Estancona and Anne Good- _ i pasture copied the telegrams on a high-speed I · I i Rekordak set up in the maid's room off the kitchen LICASA-1 was not willing to let the material leave his possession during 1958 The copying operation took three people two hours because LICASA-1 brought copies of traffic for three to six months periods of the previous year At the first me ting on 17 June 1958 six rolls of 100-foot microfilm were needed to copy these files were held once a month Meetings By 1959 traffic was obi tained with only a one-month backlog and kept overr ight at the station - 297 - SECRET 13-00000 Oliver G SCANTLING was inserted into the ·cj _j ope1 tion as a cutout for Scott from 1962 until 1969 when the station case officer began meeting LICASA-1 In addition to Soviet Bloc traffic the project expanded to include traffic of most other countries throughout the world and was considered useful to the NSA In June 1968 NSA advised that-when the i i LICASA production was compared with that from simi- • lar collection resources it was rated among the j most valuable Two-thirds of the production for 1967 concerned Cuba some 40 percent of which was unique NSA published 140 reports on Cuba during 1967 as a result of LICASA production The critical element in dissemination of this information by NSA s the delay in receiving the material as the agent was met only once a month To speed up this process the station began weekly meetings to receive information on priority targets l T e project cost was approximately $13 000 per year which included $12 000 for the agent gifts and entertainment - 298 - 1 SECRET ·· 13-00000 -- ---- ---· -------- SECRET 8 Covert Action Operations Establishment of the OPC in Mexico was char- acterized by misunderstanding and confusion Head- quarters advised the Mexico OSO Station Chief William H Doyle that E Howard Hunt would arrive on 15 December 1950 160 Hunt were 1 1nstructions to OSO regarding Hunt was being assigned to the OSO office for cover purposes and was to be provided suitable desk space 2 Complete agreement had not been reached at Headquarters egardine Hunt's relationship to OSO Pending agreement Hunt was not to engage in operations 3 Hunt was subordinate to the OSO chief for administration and discipline but operationally he was responsible to f j OPC Headquarters 4 OPC operations were to be coor- dinated with OSO to the extent necessary J I t I to avoid duplication or confusion In the event of disagreement the matter was to be referred to Headquarters - 299 - SECRET 13-00000 SECREl' 5 OSO was to provide OPC pouch facilities with the understanding that OSO had a right to see OPC dispatches 6 Hunt was to be completely inde- pendent of OSO financially On 20 December 1950 Headquarters advised the OSO station chief that a letter in regard to Hunt's assignment had been pouched for delivery to the Ambassador It ' The station was asked to find out if the letter had been received and if so to have 161 Hunt report for duty The OSO station chief 162 in Mexico replied t f J J 1 Letter to A1 1bassador arrived Mr Doyle called in by Counsellor of Embassy to interpret letter which referred to Mr Hunt by his pseudonym and also to Mexico by cryptonym This flagrant violation of security was embarrassing to both ' Ir Doyle and Mr Hunt In a meeting in Mexico in the Ambassador's ffice Hunt advised the Ambassador that he Hunt was assigned to Mexico to set up a new and separate facility Operational responsibility was to run not through the OSO station but directly from Hunt to the Ambassador Doyle's position at the same meeting was that as the ranking CIA officer in - 300 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET ' i I i I vcxtco he should be responsible to the Ambassador for all CIA activities and operations At the A ib 1 ssador 's request the matter was referred to fl 'adquarters for clarification Headquarters re- plied that Doyle was not responsible for opera163 tions of Hunt Hunt was to have his own cable facilities when personnel were available and was responsible only to OPC Headquarters and to the Ambassador Further Doyle was not authorized to see OPC pouches The Ambassador was not satisfied with this explanation because he did not wish to deal with two senior persons representing different activities of the same government agency By this time Doyle was awaiting a transfer to another station The OSO replacement was Raymond J O'Mara who would not arrive in Mexico until June 1951 Clare ce W Moore Jr was sent to Mexico for temporary duty as acting chief of OSO until O'Mara arrived I Both Moore and Hunt were directly un'der the Ambassador until July 1951 when O'Mara was 164 desi nated as chief of all CIA activities in Mexico Hunt was named deputy chief with specific responsi- I i J bility for OPC activities O'Mara was charged with - 301 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET operntional responsibility for both OPC and OSO _nctivities and was authorized to direct supervise coordinate and control all OPC functions At a meeting with State Department officials in Washington on 19 July 1951 senior CIA officials were advised that as a matter of policy it was most desirable that normal overt activity in Mexico 165 be supplemented by a CA campaign conducted by OPC The CA program in Mexico included all areas ·of the public media press radio television motion pictures private journals and editorial opinion publications I In 1954 the station had four CA projects at a total cost of about $35 000 The first project s a funding mechanism using the cryptonym LILISP I J J t I I As other projects dependent on this mechanism for funding were approved they had cryptonyms LILISP-A B C D and through the alphabet to N befor the practice was stopped when the funding mechanism folded because of the illness of the prir cipa 1 agent LILISP-X was a cryptonym which - 302 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET identified the funds available for operational de- • velopment activities for any type of CA capability In 1961 there were total budget of $229 600 CA projects with a This increase was part of an overall WH expansion in political action and covert operations on Cuba in order to combat and overcome threats to US security arising from revolutionary turmoil centered in Cuba and the Caribbean 166 in general For the same reasons the CA budget J I and program continued to expand until in 1964 there 167 wereDprojects at a cost of $542 000 Inspectors from Headquarters in August 1964 noted that the Mexico City Station had a comprehensive and competently managed CA program J l • · It had effective projects in media The most important gap was in the field of which was extremely difficult - - to develop because of the firm government co trol in this area LIETHIC an outstanding Mexican impressed the inspec - - - - - - - - - - - - - - tors as particularly valuable in exploiting fastbreaking stories - ' The inspection revealed some - 303 - 13-00000 SECRET duplication and overlapping in CA operations Subsequent termination of marginal assets and refinement of projects reduced the CA budget to 169 u 4 1101 70 009 in 96 and to 08 s j in G9b 4 At this point there wereOcA projects zl The bulk of station CA activities were directed towards the support of other stations in the Western Hemisphere This was accomplished through use of placement media in the replay of articles and broadcasts in support of activities in other w countries in Latin America - ll Historically there were never more thanLJ CA case officers under official cover at the Mexico City Station at any given period as compared with a top figure of D -f_ Q I case officers in Q966 171 The reason for this was that CA operations were much more sensitive than most FI operations and could not be traceable to an official installation All of the CA operations were handled by outside contract agents· or staff employees using nonofficial L cover There were cers in l9 4J in D of these outside case offi- but the number was reduced to I Lf c__ - _-2 969 q 304 - I - - SEC - -- ' i '- - 1 13-00000 SECRET also approached the station but he was told that he i should seek support from businessmen such as LISIREN-½ which he did Thus the Mexico City Station did not - believe that LISIREN-3 knew the source of funds which he received from LISIREN-1 As the propaganda activities developed LISIREN-3 ·refused to take the advice of LISIREN-1 on communications matters and the relationship began to sour I In March 1963 LISIREN-3 advised David A I i Phillips the station CA chief that LISIREN-5 1 McCone had arranged for LISIREN-3 and LISIREN-5 to 201-725283 a close personal friend of DCI John A meet with McCone in Washington 1 I i J j The station cabled Headquarters to be prepared for a request for financial support LISIREN-3 and LISIREN-5 briefed the Director on the activities of the Social Studies Center and asked for a direct subsidy of $80 000 per month When LISIREN-3 returned to Mexico City he contacted Phillips and advised that he did not really expect to receive $80 000 a month but expected 51 2 to receive at least $40 000 per month from CIA which - 320 - SECRET 13-00000 I I SECRET which included the cost of termination payments ARLISS received a salary of $3 000 per year LITK R-1 was paid a salary of $245 per month LITK R-2 was paid no salary because she was the wife of ARLISS and a full-time employee of the USIS library in Mexico City LITEAR-3 was paid a salary of $235 per month Student Operations The University of Mexico was founded in 1553 some 80 years before Harvard It was a faithful copy of the medieval University of Salamanca until about 1929 when President Emilio Portes Gil in a wave of enthusiasm for democratic processes rein- corporated the National University as the National Autonomous University entrusting i1sgovernment to a mixed directorate half of the members of which were elected by the faculty and half by the student body with the power of hiring and firing all•personnel The result which should have been antici- pated was that the university became a training school for politicians The professor who failed a student had to be prepared to defend himself and a professor who wanted a job had first to electioneer - 327 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET among the student leaders University politics took on all the excitement of national politics the same cleavages appeared and rival student leaders used the same methods as their elders In 1944 for example the rector who stood with the right wing appointed a director of the National Preparatory School The left- wing was annoyed and on 26 July a battle was fought between those who were in favor of the rector and those who were not Students climbed to the roofs of the buildings and ' dropped bricks on the heads of their enemies two of whom were killed That was all it cost to pro- cure the resignations of the rector and the newly 181 appointed director A new rector approved by the left wing was elected he was Alfonso Caso a distinguished archaeologist By this time the right wing was un- happy and raised a row A self-styled Committee for the Defense of the University staged a noisy ii demonstration against Caso accusing him of being a Communist because he was tl E brother-in-law of ii the Marxist Vicente Lombardo Toledano In April 1948 left-wing students issued an i •· i - 328 - SECRET f I i I 13-00000 SECRET 11 ultimatum to Caso's successor demanding more lenient examinations A right-winger he refused to yield and the students threw him bodily into the street Called hoodlums by the Mexico City press 4 000 students marched in protest against the insult J 1 l of being called hoodlums President Miguel Aleman wearily intervened and managed to quiet the storm In 1950 the student body of 27 000 was moved to the new University City where it was hoped that the gymnasium athletic fields space and fresh air would siphon off student surplus energy anything the students became wilder I J If In 1952 the right-wing group ousted the rector in this operation the LILISP-C group During 1956 the National Polytechnic Institute called a strike of 25 000 students demanding replacement of the administrative staff Student demonstrations broke out all over Mexico City in August 1958 over a rise in bus fares with students wrecking and seizing new buses Other strikes and demonstration occurred periodically but the big J I outburst came in 1966 when striking law students - 329 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET took control of the National University and demanded -· ' the resignation of the rector Ignacio Chavez An estimated 2 500 students stormed the administration building and forced Chavez and at least 35 other faculty members to submit theirresignations in writing which were accepted i The strike began when two law students were dismissed for distribu- J ting Communist literature The left-wing law stu- dents touched off the strike with demands that the law school dean be dismissed and the students reinstated Chavez refused and was forcibly ousted The internal struggle at the university closed j classes to the entire 70 000 student body for two and one-half months before a new rector could be agreed upon Meanwhile the Mexican Government proclaimed that university autonomy was a status related only to academic matters and one not to be exploited by subversive elements for their ulterior 182 purposes To put some muscle into the proclama- tion the office of the Attorney General announced the arrest of eight Trotskyites including three 183 Arg ntines who were among the student agitators • Student demonstrations continued through 1967 1· - - 330 - SECRET 13-00000 • • • SECRET nd 1968 and forced a showdown on the night of 2 October 1968 between the rioting students and the i 'xican Army in the Plaza of Three Cultures in downtown Mexico City IQ Ill • It developed into a shoot- ing contest and the students lost Some 200 stu- dents trapped in the army cordon were taken to a military camp to cool off and answer questions One station asset LIEMBRACE-4 201-110542 was included in this sweep when he was caught in the nrea at station instructions to report on the demonstration and c uld not get out • • • • • • - • He was released after several days detention during which time he managed to convince the military interrogators that he was in the demonstration area by accident - 331 - SECRET • 13-00000 0 t-1 SECRET _ · II 1 rl 11 ll 1 I 1 · 3 i _ I d • •I I - 332 - SECRET 13-00000 - SECRET - - 3 •· 7A i ·i - 3 I I 1 i - I J I I I - 333 - SECRET 13-00000 ''i _ SECRET JI - i 1 ·1 1 f i J I I j 1 1 J -t I I ' I I - 334 - SECRET 13-00000 t ___ - _i f -11 SECRET I l I - 711 -· • ·I - _' i -i ' r- -4 -· i I ·- - - c J 4 -- I r f ·71 II 11 -11 · a 11 ii - 335 - a SECRET 13-00000 --- - ·----· ·-··•-------- 11 SECRET _ a J - 3 l1 f a ·1 t S a i J J j rl - 336 - SECRET _________ __F _ _ 13-00000 SECRET iill 4 - I - SECRET 13-00000 ii· SECRET · ·1 · 1 i • •1 a ' ·1 -11 _ 1 J I a II 4 _' - o - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET t Il J i · 4 I I I - 339 - SECRET 13-00000 2 SECRET I I ·i J I 1 J J f j J t I j I· I t - 340 - SECRET i I 13-00000 SECRET - 3 Theft of Two Briefcases 188 On 29 November 1960 two briefcases containing classified information on Mexico City Station operations and on US Government support of the Revolutionary Democratic Front Frente Revolucionario Democratico - FRD an anti-Castro Cuban exile propaganda group were stolen from Stanley M Moos Moos was a 45-year-old US citizen who had served d JI • Not included in this figure was a $10 400 payment to the family of LIAGOG-1 201-327871 who died in 1969 11 • •· - 341 - SECRET 13-00000 1 SECRET _ 3·· ·' t t 1· as a career agent in Mexico from 1951 to May 1960 lie worked exclusively on CA projects using commer- i ·- i cial cover I' at $5 000 per year but was raised to $8 330 with - l ' J I · 1 _ -J · i Moos was hired as a contract employee career agent status before he resigned in May 1960 and moved to Houston Texas v 3 S In August 1960 Moos recruited again by E Howard Hunt to work on CIA projects on a part-time basis on business trips made between Houston and Mexico City Moos received a salary of $30 per day as a contract agent for those days he actually performed CIA wcrk Moos visited the station offices in Miami and l Headquarters in November 1960 for a briefing on aspects of his job He then spent Thanksgiving in Houston with his family and on all of these travels be carried two large briefcases of classified CIA 7J • t papers Moos arrived in Mexico City from Houston on Pan American Airlines at 1115 hours on Tuesday 29 November 1960 He picked up his station wagon I at the airport parking lot where he had stored it i then dropped off a traveling companion and proceeded ts ' ii to his office at Rio de la Plata No 56-502 - 342 - SECRET He 13-00000 SECRET p3 rke d the station wagon around the corner on c Ile Atoyac in front of No 21 Moos went in the back seat of the station wagon and opened the two briefcases and extracted some papers pertaining -I i J J I 1 I i I a II • • • to his personal business He closed the briefcases covered them with a suitbag and laid them on the floor in the rear of the station wagon He then got out and locked the doors and windows of the station wagon Some 30 minutes later Moos re- turned to the station wagon and after glancing to the rear to note that the suitbag was in place proceeded to his apartmen nnen he picked up the suitbag the briefcases were missing Examijation of the station wagon revealed that a small window in front bad been forced open Moos returned to the Atoyac area and drove around for about a half hour then went back to his apartment and telephoned his Mexico City Station contact Jack Stewart to • report the bad news Stewart then advised COS Scott and subsequently began a detailed debriefing to ascertain the contents of the briefcases and to itemize the dar ge Scott sent Frank R Estancona to alert the - 343 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET LIFIRE team which had access to the Mexican Security Service to spread the word that a $400 reward would be paid for the return of two briefcases stolen from an American's station wagon on Calle Atoyac J i 1 ·t I Lorenzo B Sanchez was sent to canvass the Atoyac area to see if the briefcases were being peddled All sta- tion case ·officers were called in and notified of the loss LIFEAT and LIENVOY case officers began to live-monitor all telephone lines of the Soviet Czech Polish and Cuban Embassies By 1800 hours that evening no traces of the missing documents has been found Scott 5ent a cable to lieadquarters and Miami notifying them of the loss Headquarters sent a representative of the Of- 1 fice of Security to Mexico City Materials in the briefcases were reconstructed from station records A list of these items was sent to Headquarters t 1 Every investigative asset of the Mexico City tation combed the city even the thieves market in search of the briefcases but no clue to their whereabouts was ever found I All leads came to a dead end • Sanchez was the only person in the station who could pass for a Mexican j - Moos - 344 - SECRET 13-00000 -- -·- --·---- ---- SECRET was returned to Headquarters for a technical interrogation on 19 December 1960 He appeared to be truthful in the reporting of the loss and circumstances surrounding the incident There was no evidence of deception A survey of the damage caused by the loss of the briefcases dated December 1960 indicated that Moos not only had classified data on current operations but documents and data on CA operations dating back several years Among the missing papers were j the true names of the following CIA employees I t J Joseph Baker Gerald Droller Jacob D Esterline John Heyn David A Phillips Grace Roberts Stannard ' ii K Short Jack Stewart Philip Toomey E Howard Hunt and William Kent The following official cryptonyms and pseudonyms were compromised · A IHAWK-1 AMCIGAR AMGUPPY-1 and 2 AMRASP AMWAIL AMWAIL-1 through 12 JMASH Samuel G ORRISON pseudonym for Moos and I •'' Walter C TWICKER pseudonym for Hunt Details of CA operations were included in a calendar-type looseleaf notebook and an accumulation of two years of back fillers The following Mexico City CA operations were considered as compromised by - 345 - SECRET I I 13-00000 ··- '--- ---- SECRET J · •• l 4 this loss JMARC activities of the LILISP-E a press placement project LILISP-M distribution of a biweekly bul- 11 letin LILISP-N an area-wide anti-Communist front group I The following miscellaneous agents and contacts were also identified in the missing papers AMSAIL-1 LIMASK LITAINT-6 LITAINT-7 RNIABILE Rodrigo B Rodriguez Raul E Ruffo Adolfo Desentis Crtcg i Flo -encio R Maya Ray Fisk tnd LIBELOW J I NS officials named in the papers were Allen Skinner and John Robbins of the I NS office -1 J l 3 l ' 7-1 1 in Laredo Texas The briefcases also contained keys· to three post office boxes in Mexico City which were used for operational correspondence It was obvious from the investigation that the loss was caused by lamentably poor security practices developed by Moos over a long period Security practices by his station case officers were equally poor as evidenced by the volume of - 346 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET i original copies of cables and dispatches taken out o the Embassy without any attemp made to para- phrase the contents or protect the papers against Joss Moos had resigned as a career agent in May 1960 with no apparent effort made by his station case officer to relieve him of his operational notes at the time of his resignation If it had not been for that breach of security Moos could ·•l not have lost these operational notes in November 1960 t i • t - 347 - 1 SECRET 13-00000 SECRET project was an attempt to establish a nonofficial cover CI unit in Mexico City In Octo- ber 1960 Charles W Anderson III and0'1 anl W J Hughes submitted a proposal to the Mexico City station in a detailed project outline The pri- mary obje tive was to develop a lorig-range program of counterespionage and action operations against agents in Mexico who were used by the Soviet Bloc countries and Cuba -called f 11 a The first staffing pattern LI team of QciA employees oni' GIS-15 chief LJGS-14 intelligence officers GS-9 j nior officers with - estimated budget of per year ' l t l s6Go 262 2 lf The Mexic6 City Station responded by cable in January 1961 recognizing the need to move operations way from officiai cover in the generally favo b e 0 3e - tional cli m c te of Me - ico 1- However the 2xico City Station felt that CI operations s uld be directed by case officers in the official installation and suggested that the easiest oper- 0 1s -co move outside were CA projects CA oper- ations were then handled outside Under nonoffici l - G r 353 - SECRET 13- SECRET City Station thatLFI Section official positions for support projects be transferred to the outside unit In May 1961 Winiton M Scott COS Mexico was at Headquarters on temporary duty The pro- posed CI unit was the subject of discµssion between Scott and senior CI staff personnel Scott was in agreement that a CI unit should be formed and requested that Headquarters proceed with the planning and the selection training and dispatch of personnel to the field Scott wanted all personnel of the unit to go to the field as career agents and he requested that all be experienced CI CE operations officers' who were fluent in Spanish · He also spe_cified that they be prepared to concentrate on the s o v i e t and Satellite targets A - a result -of this - conversation the_ budget for the proposed CI unit was included in the WH Operational Program for FY 1962 which was approved by the DDP in July 1961 At a WH regional conference in Mexico City in u ust 1961 Jacob D Esterline WH chief of oper- 3 a tions and ed P Holma Mexico Branch chief dis- cussed the p r o d CI unit with arren L ean - 355 - SECRET - ---· ----------· ·- DCOS Mexico '6e n indicated L t h e Mexico City 1 Station was not generally in sympathy with HeadQuarters' proposal to set up an outside CI unit r n contrast to Scott's remarks in May whi J e at 5 Headquarters _pea felt tha ·c the outside unit should include both CA and CI components and should be made up principally of junior officer trainees €sing stu- f dent cover at places such as the University of Mexico- Instead of resolving the divergent views of 3 Scott and Dea in Mexico during the regional confer ence WH officers returned to Headquarters and discussed them with representatives of the CI Staff and then forwarded a dispatch to the station f o th station was in curt language The reply In essence Gharged that Hcadc _uarters was trying to set up a CI outside unit responsible to a Headquar ters staff riiiss ion with too much independence f1 or the station 1 This insinuation was a station interpretation of the original proposal which in no way implied that the unit would be autonomous or exempt f1 om station con1 trol Nevertheless the station insisted that CI operations be run from official cov r positions and SECRET 13-00000 SECRET 1 October 1963 through 30 September 1964 for a 4 total of $€_3 48 From December 1963 until August 1964 ETSINGER and REYMANDER spent time establish- ing and working on their cover business though no business developed from the efforts o qoing through the motions of preparing lµvestment survey Sev- I eral eu veys vere prepared both from information l '1 from the files of'- _ Matso and independently LILINK was under the direction of the deputy chief of station Alan P White The first case turned over to LILINK in August 1964 was Natalie K MICHNOFF a staff agent with 'tudent cover at l L the University of Mexico School for Foreigners She was sent to Mexico in 1963 to act as principal ✓ gent for the LIMOTOR operation which from 1957 o 1962 had been an active umbrella type project Lf supporting toung American student in contact with Soviet intelligence officers By the time MICHNOFF arrived in Mexico the enthusiasm of CIA for this type of short-term double agent operation had worn s o thin that the LIMOTOR Project was redirected toward collection of positive intelligence instead of counterint7ce A s r sult all but two - 367 SECRET 13-00000 SECRET IV Joint Operations And Projects Using Mexican Government Officials The branches of the Mexican Government of particular interest to CIA were the Presidency the Ministry of Interior and the Mexican Security Service called the Department of Federal Security - Direccion Federal de Seguridad DFS Federal executive authority in Mexico was vested in one single person who was elected as President of the United Mexican States or more commonly President of the Republic Despite the fact that the Mexican constitutional system shared some of the characteristics of the parliamentary ·- system it was frankly presidential In fact the President was head of state and head of government contrasting with the parliamentary characteristic of collective responsibility for government The internal structure of the Federal executive authority possessed certain degree of flexibility because the number of ministries and departments was not fixed by the Constitution but by lesser - 372 - ··- I 13-00000 SECRET 1 1 1 l 1 t l 1 I • • • • • • - laws which could be modified as in the United States according to the circumstances and the personality of the President The Ministry of Interior called Secretary of Government - Secretaria de Gobernacion was responsible for the conduct of relations with the other Federal authorities with the governments of the Mexican states and with the municipalities It also provided the Federal judiciary with the aid it required for the proper exercise of its functions This Ministry was responsible for the appointments of high officials of the administration magistrates and judges after their designation by the judiciary A function of this Ministry of great importance in the political life of the country was that of controlling administering and monitoring elections It was responsible for the supervision of all printed matter together with all radio and television broadcasts Furthermore it directed the internal demographic policy of the country with the exception of the colonization of unoccupied land and finally it exercised control - 373 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET - 1 -J over all affairs related to internal politics -1 -4 This Ministry was often a springboard to the Presidency all but one of the nine Presidents - _ of Mexico between 1928 and 1969 served as Minister -J of Interior prior to election as President -- 1 ---J Upon recommendation of the PRI President 192 Miguel Aleman Valdez created the DFS by presidential decree in January 1947 --- ' The DFS was placed under the Ministry of Interior l General Marcelino Inurreta was the first DFS chief and a most ardent I promoter It quickly became influential as a per- son l intcllisence service of the President ·---1 No provision was made for the DFS in the national bud- --4 get Funds were siphoned from the appropriation of the Ministry of Interior Police an agency exclusively for law enforcement At its inception the DFS's primary responsibility was the investigation of national security matters in fa t its • A principal attention was given to domestic political affairs These functions had been the responsi- bility of the Attorney General of the Republic the Attorney General of the Federal District and 1 • - • ·· - 374 - SECRET --- - ' 13-00000 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - · her - · • - - 1 ' C ' - - --- SECRET Q n Q the Political and Social Section of the Ministry of Interior the DFS During the Aleman administration had representatives in each state of the Mexican Republic and attempted through its sources 13 I ·•••• to penetrate the political parties and movements l opposed to the government 3 cies and military installations to report on dis- Bl · 3 l1 I The DFS also engaged in placing informants with civilian governmental agen- loyal employees The DFS had no power of arrest and was obliged to depend upon other police organi- zations for this function Sometimes the DFS in- vestigators merely borrowed and used credentials belonging to other policemen for this purpose The early days of the DFS were marked by illegal ar- rests killings detentions extortion blackmail and outright thievery The Ministry of Interior to which the DFS was nominally subordinate was • •d precluded from exerting any control over the DFS organization and operations General Inurreta was responsible only to the President who was convinced of his personal loyality When the general left the DFS at the expiration of the Aleman administration in 1952 he took large quantities of modern - 375 - SECRET 13-00000 l ·1 l 1 1 ' 1 1 l I I I •'3 SECRET police equipment which had belonged to the DFS and established a private investigation and strong193 ar1n group Adolfo Ruiz Cortines Aleman's successor to the Presidency continued the existence and powers of the DFS by verbal decree and at the same time personally ordered the illegal activities of the DFS investigators to cease Without the driving influence of Inurreta the DFS relaxed its activities and became relatively innocuous in comparison to its first five years of life Colonel Leandro· Castillo Venegas replaced Inurreta as head of the DFS until 31 December 1953 Suarez Torres His deputy was Luis They were replaced in 1954 by Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Rangel Escamilla as director and Captain Fernando Gutierrez Barrios 194 as deputy director -When Adolfo Lopez Mateos came to power in December 1958 he retained Rangel Escamilla and Gutierrez Barrios in their positions in the DFS Although there were frequent rumors that Lopez Mateos intended to fire Rangel Escamilla the - 376 - SECRET I 13-00000 _ · t·--- - _ • • · SECRET latter remained director of the DFS until 1963 The real power in the DFS was Fernando Gutierrez Barrios who as deputy director revitalized the service and under more than normal handicaps attempted to give it the semblance of a genuine nonpartisan investigative agency Most of the strong-arm men were dismissed and were replaced with young lawyers and graduates from the schools of higher education and from the military academy Gustavo Diaz Ordaz was Minister of Interior in the i l Lopez Mateos administration and 1 1cceeded in bring- I • ing the DFS under control of his Ministry He was able to do this because he and Lopez Mateos were 195 close personal friends with mutual interests In 1964 Diaz Ordaz became President of Mexico I I and in May 1965 he named Gutierrez Barrios as direc- a activity which endangered the political security tor of the DFS The DFS was responsible for investigating of the country including espionage sabotage and other subversion It investigated frauds involving membership lists of political parties and other political irregularities - 377 - It was charged with 13-00000 SECRET monitoring the activities of foreign embassies most of this effort was directed at the Cuban Embassy from 1960 to 1969 With regard to the other foreign missions in Mexico City the DFS generally restricted its activity to periodic interviews with responsible embassy officials concerning events of interest to their respective establishments The DFS monitored Cuban travel overtly and clandestinely at the inter- national airport in Mexico City and collected intelligence on all political parties labor unions governmental roiilistrias and other organiz tions 196 of political interest There were 150 agents assigned to the DFS as of 1966 1 ·1 I a • groups The service was organized into three the Operations Group which was respon- sible for political investigations special investigations and regional representatives the Support Group which operated a telephone monitoring unit archives photo laboratory and a criminal laboratory and the Administrative Group wbjch handled vehicles weapons credentials office - 378 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET -41 197 supplies and messenger service · 1 CIA relations with Mexican Government officials began in July 1947 when Gus T Jones a CIA contract employee and former head of the FBI in Mexico introduced William H Doyle the first COS to Inurreta There followed an exchange of information on the CP and Soviet Bloc official installations in Mexico until July 1948 Doyle advised Headquarters that the personnel comprising the DFS were by and large unreliable self-seeking and generally disinterested in work of importance I to CIA DFS interest had shifted to investigations of contraband where the payoff was greater and Doyle felt that DFS demands made upon the station resulting from association with them outweighed any future usefulness He indicated that a social relationship would be retained in the event that - the station was ever required to call on the DFS 198 I for assistance Headquarters advised the station that following the Mexican national elections in July 1952 liaison with the DFS would be initiated through Project - 379 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET ···e i - · •- -• --4 LIVESTOCK Robert L Melberg was assigned to Mexico under official cover in June 1952 as the officer responsible for police training and liaison l l - d 4 1 l 1 1 Melberg a group of eight DFS agents under LIVESTOCK-2 for training and joint operations against the CP The group had just begun functioning when LIVESTOCK-2 shot and killed a politician on 31 August 1953 He was in the Mexican federal penitentiary until 20 April 1955 During this time he remained on the station payroll but the DFS agents who had been under him were inactive The group functioned again under LIVESTOCK-2 from 1955 until 5 October 1959 when it was terminated for payroll padding blackmail providing false information and the general unreliability of 199 LIVESTOCK-2 -- Two agents from the LIVESTOCK Project were retained as the LIFIRE Project They provided airline manifests and limited surveillances When the LIVESTOCK Project was functioning Charles W Anderson III was in contact with - 380 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET LIKAYAK-2 and had established a mail intercept operation in 1957 LIBIGHT which functioned with In August 1958 Ambassador Robert C Hill brought Winston M Scott COS into contact with a confidant of former President Miguel Aleman in order to discuss Communist activities Shortly --------· thereafter I An in- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - formal agreement was made to cooperate in the col- • i i lection of information on Soviet and Communist targets CIA provided technical assistance for a joint telephone tapping installation with Mexican Government cover This led to a productive and effective relationship between CIA and select top officials in Mexico which proved to be of substantive value 1 t to both The relationship between Scott and top J I - 381 - i f r I 13-00000 SECRET exican Government officials was in essence a political one It became an unofficial channel for the exchange of selected _sen itive political information which each government wanted the other to receive but not through public protocol exchanges Ambassador Hill and his successor Thomas C Mann gave their blessing to this relationship but Fulton Freeman who replaced Mann in 1964 felt that he should be the one to confer with the Mexican Presit I t 1 • ll • • • •I dent on sensitive political matters The telephone tapping operation LIENVOY was successful as a producer of positive intelligence and was considered by Headquarters as a model for imitation by other stations particularly in the area of efficient processing and exploitation of raw take The reason for this success was the presence of staff agent Arnold F AREHART inside the listening post This assignment was vital to the preservation of CIA's equity in this operation which cost $150 000 for the installation Even with AREHART's presence there was petty theft of equipment and periodic laxity in processing the tapes • See VI Relations with the US Embassy I - 382 - I SECRET ✓ 13-00000 SECRET JI ·-11 · a l - ·• 11 Independently of the LIENVOY mechanism and 11 LIBIGHT CIA maintained a working-level relation- ·i ship with the DFS through Project LITEMPO l Jeremy K BENADUM who resigned from that organi- 3 -·• • •I This project initially evolved around a senior FBI agent zation in Mexico and was recruited by CIA in November 1960 BENADUM had been in the FBI office in Mexico since 1953 and w s the assistant legal attache During that time he was responsible for police liaison with the Mexican DFS He knew Gustavo Diaz Ordaz in the _Ministry of Interior but he knew his nephew Emilio Bolanos Diaz even better BENADUM and Bolanos were godparents to each other's children BENADUM had hired Bolanos when he was a messenger I I I - 383 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET 1 J in his uncle's Diaz Ordaz Ministry of Interior BENADUM proposed to bring his sources with him when he was hired by the station It was expected that through BENADUM and Bolanos LITEMP0-1 the l J 1 station could develop an effective penetratio of the Ministry of Interior As it developed both BENADUM and LITEMP0-1 were so self-seeking that the project floundered for lack of management and initiative It became a network of 11 fairly un- productive and expensive agents until October 1963 J I -I I I • • • • • when $10 000 of fat was cut from the budget It did provide-the st tion chief covert access to Diaz Ordaz and to the DFS deputy director Gutierrez Barrios Through the LITEMPO Project the station subsidized the campaign of Diaz Ordaz for President by providing special radio equipment for automobiles and a monthly payment of $400 for salaries of two additional bodyguards The LITEMPO Project also operated a concealed passport camera at the international airport which was used to cover travelers from Cuba In 1965 at the request of Gutierrez - 384 - SECRET - - 13-00000 SECRET r- - - il i 'f 11 --- f- ·-• r en return to Mexico one of these agents LITEMP0-12 - - was placed in charge of investigating subversive activities and was assigned to L _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ J The other was assigned to the Presidential staff as a bodyguarB and was of no use to the station From that time the LITEMPO Project became a producer of positive intelligence and the course of the liaison changed to one of operational support and security fr- @ for station operations During 1968 LITEMPO was expanded through the L ARBOR Project to include r---1 l-4 t il 201 LIVESTOCK-- The purpose of this project was to provide a i liaison relationship between the Mexico City Station - - i· t and the Mexican DFS Robert L Melberg was assigned to the Mexico City Station under official c·over in June 1952 as the officer responsible for police 1 ia ison 1 - 385 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET I I ' -i J j j d • LJFIRE This project was the outgrowth of the LIVESTOCK Project Four agents handled by LIVESTOCK-2 • re recruited by Warren L Dean in 1959 when the 398 SECRET 13-00000 SECRET LIVESTOCK Project was terminated -1 were These agents the team secretary LIFIR -2 formerly LI 'ESTOCK-19 a photographer at the international airport LIFIRE-4 formerly LIVESTOCK-18 a surveillance agent LIFIRE-3 formerly LIVESTOCK-20 J and a surveillance team leader LIFIRE-1 formerly J ability in 1961 and replaced by LIFIRE-5 a former J - I J a J ·• • • •11 LIVESTOCK-23 LIFIRE-3 was discharged for unreli- DFS agent and friend of LIFIRE-1 The team leader LIFIRE-1 was the brother f the chauffeur of President Adolfo Lopez Mateos Through his political connections LIFIRE-1 received· a position in northern Mexico along the US border in 1963 and resigned He took LIFIRE-4 with him but LIFIRE-4 quickly became disillusioned and returned to Mexico City and was hired again by the station The secretary LIFIRE-2 was terminated when LIFIRE-1 and LIFIRE-4 left Mexico City because the remaining two agents did not have enough work to warran·t fulltime employment for her • The two agents LIFIRE-4 and 5 had credentials as employees of the Mexican Government and were stationed at the international airport where they - 399 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET I obtnin d a copy of the passenger manifest of every l incoming and outgoing commercial flight 1 t o men also extracted information from passports i f 1 •• These persons traveling through Mexico of interest to the station They provided a limited surveillance c 3 pability and could follow a traveler to his hotel Hov -cver obtaining travel manifests consumed most i j of their time because of the sheer volume of international flights Mexico had one of the busiest airports in the world which had an average of 75 international flights arriving and departing each 203 day l 1 These manifests were of great value in checking travel for the Mexico City Station and other stations throughout the world The Mexico City Station was constantly called on by the local FBI office for confirmation of travel of persons of l jl LI d - 400 - d Rr RET 13-00000 SECRET l 1 1 l 1 t 1 J 1 1 J I ·1 interest to that office These manifests were delivered to the station case officer in clandestine meetings in an automobile at various locations in the city three times per week and were packed in suitcases The two agents also used a necktie photographic concealment device for spot cl ndestine photography Headquarters rated this project as perhaps the most prolific and reliable source in CIA of timely information about travel to Cuba ✓ Frequently it was the only source of information about Cuban travel of Latin Americans who showed only Mexico as their destination and concealed their true destinations from their governments During the period 1 June 1963 through 30 April 1964 the LIFIRE Project was the source of 615 reports on Cuban travel and air shipments The volume of reporting from this project was consistently high and much of the travel a data was reported by cable on Headquarters instructions J thts couple operated a mobile phototruck equipped • 11 - In addition to air travel and spot surveillance with a concealed camera and telephoto lens that operatP d through a periscope in a specially-built turret - 401 - SECRET 13-00000 · - fteisri¢ feit-WS Mtr I ··n· •· ·w e · SECRET in the top of a panel truck The truck was sold as an economy measure in April 1967 since it duplicated a phototruck operated by the LIENTRAP team The LIFIRE Project cost approximately $30 000 for its first year June 1960 through May 1961 because of the large investment of equipment including the purchase of two automobiles with radio communications However costs averaged about $12 000 from 1966 to 1969 of which approximately $10 000 was paid for salaries and bonuses to the 204 LIBIGHTLIKAYAK-2 was an employee in the Mexican Ministry of Interior in the early 1950's and be-- J I J came disillusioned with his job With another former Mexican Government official LIKAYAK-2 ·formed a private investigation agency He w s recommended to the Mexico City Station by LIME- STONE the principal agent for LIFEAT as a cover me hanism for the LIEMBRACE surveillance team LIKAYAK-2 was recruited in March 1956 by Charles W Anderson III who decided not to use the business - 402 - 13-00000 • SECRET » _•·- If · for cover purposes Because of LIKAYAK-2's pro- fessional background chemist and former director of the technical laboratory in the Ministry of Interior Anderson developed the agent into a postal intercept operation With the permission of LIKAYAK-2 organized a network of 22 agents between 1957 and 1969 The group was capable of intercepting any item from any post office in Mexico City Sixteen agents had credentials as postal inspectors and made the intercepts for '· m 4 LIKAYAK-13 a postal department official He de- livered the letters to LIKAYAK-4 a government official who processed them in the laboratory of LIKAYAK-2 • - 403 - -SECRET 13-00000 SECRET l 1 -1 1 1 21 1 The LIBIGHT Project also provided access to tht• immigration files of the Ministry o·f Interior hich included all foreigners except diplomats These dossiers could either be copied by LIKAYAK-2 or loaned to the station for a day This was a valuable asset for checking biographic data on agents or target individuals The files con- tained photographs copies of passports marriage 1 I -1 2 data residences of the subject and a notation of travel to and from Mexico Other agents in the LIBIGHT Project had public utilities credentials and could gain access to offices and residences for casings and audio installations for the station a l •1 1 •II J - 404 - SECRET ✓-- 13-00000 SECRET • t • I 1 • LIKAYAK-2 was sJbsequently handled by Alan P d White and James E Anderson - 405 - SECRET 13-00000 -----· · ·0 · SECRET '• t I • a I I •I II - 406 _ ----- 13-00000 SECRET - · • ·-· --1 - 1 - 1 ' l a I •I I I I I - 407 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET Cl l • -t -- - •I The project cost approximately $40 000 per year for the entire network Almost $37 000 of this amount was paid for salaries and bonuses LIKAYAK-2 was paid $400 a month in 1957 and had beerl raised I I to $500 as of 1969 I I I - 408 - SECRET -- - ' ' Ot 9 JC _ - - - 13-00000 · w u - _ - -•-- SECRET 205 LIE -VOY- In August 1958 the US Ambassador Robert C - 11111 entertained Carlos Trouyet owner of the Mexican telephone company and Mexico's richest M ·-q industrialist at a breakfast to which Winston M Scott COS was invited Scott was introduced as 4 an expert on Communism d pro-US Mexican offered his assistance in collecting • Trouyet an extremely information on Communist activities - - A d i# - ·• • - discussed recommending a new method - - - - - of telephone tapping with Scott's help Meanwhile the Mexico City Station was in contact with other persons close to Aleman One of these persons was LIELEGANT 201-225439 a Mexican lawyer and presidential adviser Scott LIELEGANT had used LIKAYAK-2 to establish contact With CIA in May 1958 See LIDIGHT - 409 - SECRET 13-00000 a -- ---- - ___ ii · i y Qa··•£t @ rrer'fs a' - d· c- - _ _ 2 - · - · · · --·-··--· · · · · · - - - · - - · · -- -· - -·- ---•···--·--- SECRET - -4 and Alfonso G Spera case officer for LIKAYAK-2 1t1 Tl 11 h3 d talked with LIELEGANT in general terms about Co nmunism in Mexico Lopez Mateos became President of Mexico on 1 December 1958 According to LIELEGANT Lopez sent for him and told him he wanted to establish J a security unit under him LIELEGANT reported this to Scott who met with Lopez Mateos on 16 December 1958 In the discussion that followed they agreed to cooperate in the collection of information on • Soviet and Communist targets with LIELEGANT to act 1 This was put under the jurisdiction of Benito Coquet J for Lopez Mateos in heading a telephone tap unit who was then the director of Mexican social security 0 Trouyet was aware of the plan and agreed to provide j a 50-pair cable from the telephone company Headquarters agreed to supply the equipment • j d This equipment was delivered to Mexico by a•special aircraft with a team of TSD engineers who made the The listening post had 40 Ampex tape recorders for voices 30 dial recorders for dial tones of numbers called 11 Wollensak tape recorders for transcribers and 11 Revere tape recorders for transcribers _ 410 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET ·- - I ' a· installation first in an office with LIELEGANT's •·l·· h t - 1 -a ·11 - JJw firm and later in a resid nce near the main telephone central of a This residence had the cover restricted government office Mexican Army officers were detailed as tran- scribers and monitors Other employees of the listening post were friends of the Army officers a ·11 or persons known to LIELEGANT or his son LIENVOY-2 who became the Mexican responsible for the listening post The station placed a staff agent Arnold F P EHART in the istening post as an outside case officer responsible for supervision and mainten' S ' • • • •I II II I ance of the equipment As of 1969 AREHART com- pleted his tenth year in this position The initial project provided for a listening post and a separate unit to investigate leads from the taps The separate unit LITABLE folded quickly I The agents consisted of semi-illiterate bodyguard types who could not respond to training The train- ing officer Bernard E ELAK MAN was returned to Headquarters in 1959 shortly after his arrival in Mc ico for health reasons - 411 i' R'T' He was not replaced 13-00000 ·• - SECRET - · - ···1--·· ·• -1 1 The LITABLE agents were terminated soon thereafter Another early personnel problem evolved around thl senior outside case officer He did not have a Sp_ t11isti language capability and he was also re- turned to Headquarters when he could not adjust to the outside role of a staff agent He was not replaced By the end of 1959 the project was covering 30 lines 15 of these were selected by the station ' I were around $150 000 '11 by LIFEAT but in June 1960 LIELEGANT indic3ted • I 1 • • • • • • and 15 by the Mexicans The installation costs The first targets selected by the station were CP person litie ct covered that ----- · wanted to cover the Soviet Bloc installations LIFEAT taps were removed to prevent LI'ENVOY from accidentally finding them and tracing the wire to a listening post From 1960 through 1969 the 15 target lines of the station were Soviet Bloc installations I - 412 - SECRET I 13-00000 ✓ SECRET ' ' f -q _ - I ·'4 -- · t q lJ 'll The LIENVOY Project cost about $60 000 per year after its first year This figure did not include salary and allowances for the outside staff agent AREHART who worked exclusively on LIENVOY but was paid from support funds There were ten Mexican employees working in the listening post who prepared the daily transcripts and a summary of information from the lines which were not fully transcribed •ii • • • • • • This summary was delivered each morn- ing about 0800 hours to the station case officer by AREHART Any items of unusual significance were brought to the attention of the chief of stat ion before 0900 hours Russian Czech Yugoslav and Polish language tapes were transcribed by other contract agents not tied in with the LIENVOY Project These persons usually had one room in their residences sealed off as a work area for handling tapes Alfonso G Spera set up the LIENVOY Project and acted as the station case officer until 1960 - 413 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET when he was replaced by John B Brady who handled c project until October 1961 - - -- i From November 1959 until mid-1964 the project operated under the original group of Mexicans LIELEGANT LIENVOY-2 and Lopez Mateos with Coquet and Trouyet both knowledgeable but not taking a posit on in the management · t 1 •• 11 --·•- · •a •I •II In mid-1964 it became ap- p rent that Gustavo Diaz Ordaz would replace Lopez Mateos In August 1964 Lopez Mateos briefed Diaz Ordaz on the tap unit and recommended that he re- tain it without change tain Diaz Ordaz agreed to re- LIELEGANT and LIENVOY-2 Coquet whom Diaz Ordaz did not like personally was phased out of the project New cover for LIENVOY was provided b ' the Presidential staff as a unit of the Census • From October 1961 until October 1968 the station From October 1968 to June 1969 James E Anderson handled the project case officer was Anne Goodpasture - 414 - SECRET _ 13-00000 • r_ ··- _ r - - - SECRET f • J r· · I The Headquarters _ I__ taff cons_idered the I 1 11- ·yoy Project as a model for imitation by othe • 'f· ··-·1I I 1 tations particularly in the area of efficient · processing and exploitation of raw take From 1959 through 1968 the project produced an average of 100 positive intelligence reports a year although some of this information was of marginal value The operational information from the project on Soviet · tSI outstanding and essential to developing operations - · - _31 ngainst those targets Bloc officials and their contacts was considered 1__ · - t During late 1968 LIELEGANT asked the station fl 11 In early 1969 LIELEGANT and LIENVOY-2 again requested CIA training for another investigative rt lid ut- _ f' - 11 -j - 415 - SECRET 13-00000 - -·--·•• • SECRET - -ma-11·· · roup similar to LITABLE Wade E Thomas went to ·· - ' ii _ Mexico on t mporary duty and provided training to n roup of - agents in mid-1969 The project had many frustrating situations 1n • ii • - ·· dealing with LIENVOY-2 who was basically dis- honest and conniving Neither he nor his father LIELEGANT were subject to any control by CIA xcept through the tightening of purse strings The two of them met with Scott and acted as a com- munication channel to the President of Mexico - · - i -JJ· ti· Typical of LIENVOY 2's demands on the station ich wc c cf o value ccpt unit s the LISALAD mail inter- At station request Headquarters sent tJ John J McGee on temporary duty to Mexico in 1966 ti for a unit LISALAD to intercept mail •II to provide training in flaps and seals to LIENVOY-19 thought at the station that this was an attempt on the part of LIELEGANT and LIENVOY-2 to und rmine the position of LIKAYAK-2 Like all other requests from LIENVOY-2 this was presented as a request from the President • • It was However once LIENVOY-19 and LIENVOY-2 lear d of the tedious work involved in - 416 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET · · _ processing_mail intercepts the function was aban- I ·ty ' -·· ' doned as far as the station could determine Nev- rthcless LIENVOY-2 continued to bill the station for office rent and the salary of LIENVOY-19 even though the office no longer existed and the agent snot doing anything for the station Scott de- cided to ·continue making the payments rather than confront LIENVOY-2 with this fraud and offend him or his father LIELEGANT LIENVOY-2 also claimed to Scott that two of - the LITABLE agents were retained as investigators -· i Scott agreed to subsidize their salaries as a part fa monthly stipend paid to LIENVOY-2 for operational expenses According to AREHART he paid all the operational expenses at the listening post i 4 from his station revolving fund • • payments to LIENVOY-2 represented a flat subsidy ti M Therefore the of $500 per month in addition to a salary of $480 per month This payment of $980 per month to LI- t -- VOY-2 was recognized by Scott as an ante for main·3ining the relationship with LIELEGANT who received no salary from the station The project would have functioned better and - 417 - 13-00000 SECRET would have cost considerably less without LIENVOY-2 or LJELEGANT On the other hand LIELEGANT and ur ·voY-2 were both part of the package presented by Adolfo Lopez Mateos when the project started i I l Only experience in dealing with them revealed that their contacts with succeeding presidents were not a close as the relationship they shared with Lopez Katcos In their dealings with the station LI- t VOY-2 and LIELEGANT gained a considerable knowl- '' I edge of the station's operational assets and capa- b lities From a security viewpoint they knew too rauch to termin te them with prejudice unless the Hlation was also willing to terminate the operations they knew about which included LIFIRE LIBIGHT I LITEMPO and LIENVOY I 206 I ITE IPO- ' I' I' ' The LITEMPO Project provided for operational support and security backstopping for the Mexico City Station operations from 1960 The principal agent was Jeremy K BENADUM a career agent He was a former FBI agent in Mexico and had been the assistant legal attache from 1953 - 418 - SECRET He resigned from the 13-00000 - 1¼1 ii l1 ii •II II •I •8 SECRE·T rnl in the face of a transfer to the United States ind was hired by Winston M Scott COS because of nrsADmf 's numerous contacts in the Ministry of Interior One of BENADUM's main contacts was LI- n MP0-1 the nephew of the Minister then Gustavo Dtnz Ordaz The budget for the first project year 1961 was- $55 353 which supported four employees of the Ministry of Interior $9 000 a five-man surveil- lance team of agents transferred from LIEMPTY who had been recruited under LIPSTICK LIJERSEY $10 000 salnry and allowance or BENADUM $21 000 and sc e $15 000 for operational expenses The project suf- fered constantly from lack of effective management The surveillance team reports were of little or no value because the agents did not receive proper direction They were removed from the LITEMPO Project and placed under LIRICE in 1962 ENADUM and LITEMP0-1 were so occupied with station requests for operational support and security backstopping in connection with the JMNET operation that all other tivities were neglected They arranged through - 419 - SECRET 13-00000 -11 •II II I I I I I 'I I ' SECRET tfr ncnn officials for such things as the purchase nd storage of 200 000 liters of aviation gas and • ooo liters of oil on the Mexican airfields at c tumal and Cozumel for use during the Bay of Pigs operation the evacuation of an unmarked C-54 Agency pl tnc with a Cuban exile crew which made a forc-ed landing in Chiapas the location and arrest of Cuban nationals who had deserted their training posts in Guatemala and were at large in Mexico nnd the legal entry into Mexico of Cubans whose presence was necessary in connection with operations • ainst Cuba directed from Miami and other stations In the handling of these sporadic security and supr-ort operations · day-to-day management of the LItDIPO Project personnel was neglected by BENADUM Dnd LITEMP0-1 Once the project got off on the wrong foot in tn way of effective management it was difficult to repair the damage None of the original agents had the slightest concept of positive intelligence rt·porting U1K As a result the project produced noth- during its first few years - 420 - SECRET 13-00000 -- - --- »- SECRET 4 q t til lq -- During 1962 the contacts of BENADUM in the Htntstry of Interior asked the station to provide qutpment for a 20-line telephone tap operation at a Th is request cost of approximately r cctved Headquarters' approval in principle but ¥JS never implemented as a project because the J ITD PO group under BENADUM had not convinced '-' M-4 •t3 I I I I I I I 'I the station that they could manage such a tap center Their concept of operations consisted of etting people out of jail putting people in jail und arranging meetings for bribes They did not have the discipline required for day-to-day manage- aent of the routine required for processing tele- phone tap information Also their concept of tele- phone tap operations was to listen to the conversation jot down an address or name but make no tranficripts Further their targets were criminal cases or political enemies rather than those of interest to the station Although the original surveillance team mem- 1 t•rs were removed ·from the project the cost con- t t nued to increase amounting to $59 235 for 1963 Readquarters asked the station to provide closer - 421 - SECRET 13-00000 t- • __ _ l _· w SECRET t t •7t - r·• r t f• l-- aupcrvision of the project in an effort to increase 118 tton production and reduce its cost review $10 000 was cut from the project by t •n in i ting margina 1 agents and cutting opera tiona 1 «-Xf 'OSCS The project did not produce positive intel1 H cnce t1 until LITEMP0-12 was recruited He was a Kubordinate of LITEMP0-4 the director of the DFS t l tl After a sta- When LITEMP0-12 returned to Mexico he was assigned to work with the 11tatinn From early 1966 LITEMP0-12 held meetings 1 ·ac-h morning with BENADUM and passed copies of re- ports received _from LITEMP0-12 agents about 20 assigned to subversive targets for the •I if next three years about 20 percent of the positive intelligence production from the station The reports covered activities of the CP Cuban xilcs the Trotskyites and Soviet Bloc cultural iroups II I I This produced The results from police raids against ·•ub 'C rsive groups were passed to the station via ITE YP0-12 During 1967 and 1968 his group also - 422 - SECRET 13-00000 • SECRET -oopc-ratcd with the station on covering the acti- l tics of US radical students travell·ing to Cuba Ir tt h •I I I I I I 8 In 1965 the LITEMPO Project also took over nagement of a concealed passport camera at the international airport which photographed documents of travellers from Cuba and selected Soviet Bloc rountries This was the primary source for the sta- lion for identification of Cuban and Soviet Bloc cfficials who were assigned to Mexico 207 llSAGA- The LISAGA Project was a third-country operation tbe A Mexican citizen LISAGA-1 was selected by COS Mexico City andLI- - - - - - - r - - - - - - - for assignment a s - - - - - - - in Havana Cuba for the purpose - 423 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET J V Clandestine Collection Concept and Assessment In examining the collection product two types of information must be distinguished The first positive intelligence was a clearly defined item collected for customer agencies disseminated according -to their needs and interest and was subject to evaluation I The usefulness and importance of each report was manifest when the report was J weighed against other information on the same sub- ject considering the source's access and reporting I record l I Security i telligencc on th other hand defied precise definition It was largely self- generated in response to Agency internal requirements or in pursuit of obvious but not necessarily formalized security objectives It received limited I I 1 - distribution to a few other agencies with security responsibilities if it was disseminated at all I 1 On receipt it was sometimes impossible to evaluate '1· with any degree of accuracy f In fact its importance r did not become apparent for months or even years until it was matched against other information received from a different source or until a sudden specific - 438 - SECRET i f 13-00000 SECRET and often urgent need arose in connection with a Presidential visit for example Security intel- ligence included all information concerning the identities activities contacts and movements of US and for·eign subversive personalities foreign intelligence personnel and other persons known or suspected of being engaged in activities inimical to the United States It was used to improve US security or to assist in the implementation of US a national policy I ' The station produced a large volume of security int llig ncie concerning US citizens initiating or maintaining contact with the Cuban and Soviet diplomatic installations travel to Cuba by US citizens and residents activities of Cuban and Soviet intelligence personnel travel of Mexican and other· Latin Ame rican key subversive personalities and methods used to support subversive groups outside of Mexico In FY 1 66 82 formal disseminations of security intelligence were made to the FBI the I NS the military services and similar customers More than half of these related to the activities of US nationals The bulk of the security intelligence - 439 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET however was retained by operational elements of CIA for analysis and internal use The Mexico City Station referred daily to indexes based on this material in tracing applicants for US visas and in support of its own and other stations' operational programs The same indexes were also regularly consulted in tracing applicants for US Civil Service positions employees of private industry whose access to classified information required a US security clearance and Mexicans visiting the United States as members of official delegations scheduled to receive classified briefings The station ser- viced approximately 35 000 name traces annually including visa checks from 1957 through 1968 and uncovered substantive information in about 12 per209 cent of the cases In 1962 FI INT RE conducted a review of 210 Clandestine Service CS reporting from Mexico This included a thorough study of 415 CS reports disseminated during the six-month period ending 31 March 1962 The appraisal was based on a general FI Staff Intel igence Group Requirements and Evaluation Branch FI INT RE - 440 - SECRET ' I 13-00000 i SECRET review and comparison of information from overt sources during the same period and interviews with customer analysts to determine the adequacy of past CS reporting and needs for future CS reporting Collection guidance on Mexico was also examined to determine its adequacy and relevance to the report ing The study reflected that the Related Missions Directive largely but not completely provided for the intelligence community's needs for CS reporting In general appraisal CS reporting on Communi t and leftist activities in Mexico was found i - J necessary to complement and confirm a volume of l similar information produced by the FBI and the Office of Operations 00 There was need for more information on Communist influence among individuals such as prominent Mexicans who supported Communism i• • I onindividual issues particularly leftist influence in the Mexican Government The overall Soviet plans for the numerous leftist assets in Mexico were not sufficiently covered in the CS reporting Informa- tion was also needed on the extent of Soviet influence and subversion in all its forms throughout ' I I - 441 - SECRET f 13-00000 SECRET i 1 1 I Mexico · I' Reporting on students' domestic activities j was considered insufficient in relation to the im- t portance of the subject I One-third of the reporting related to the Communist Party the National Liberation Movement MLN and the Popular Socialist Party PPS Over one--third concerned trips by Mexicans to the Soviet Bloc or Cuba for international Communist activitie and visits of Bloc and Cuban nationals to Mexico Many of the reports were too general in nature to meet community requirements for detailed data j J1 All reporting was consonant with objectives of the RMD There were no significant areas of marginal reporting where the CS should not be supplying information An assessment prepared by FI INT RE of CS reporting on Mexico for the period 1 February through 31 July 1966 covered 359 reports disseminated from Mexico City and Monterrey during that 211 period The findings revealed that the collection objectives of the RMD for Mexico approved 22 July 1965 well represented the community's needs and judgments as to priority Among the customer ' t - 442 - SECRET JI I 13-00000 SECRET reactions two were outstanding There wa·s urgent need for more and higher level CS reporting on the I I and the leftist influence in the Government The volu- minous reporting on low-level affairs of the PCM I greatly exceeded customers' needs or their ability i I l to absorb it Other noteworthy findings were f Only 10 3 j percent of the total product reviewed could be related to RMD Priority A objectives which con- ' cerned Cuban and Soviet activities in Mexico and the Mexican Government f The reporting relevant to t RMD Objective B-1 which concerned the CP and re- I lated subjects accounted for 78 percent of the production reviewed Low-level domestic activities of the PCM the PPS and front groups were overreported lacking was more information on active militant_ groups Customers had nothing but praise for the coverage of the Government's s curity precautions surrounding President Johnson's visit The 24 re- ports on this subject relevant to RMD Objective B-3 - 443 - SECRET - ___ 13-00000 - - · C O ·- - - - - - - - ---· ····-- SECRET were hailed as complete timely and very well handled Another review of reporting against the Operating Directive Objectives was completed in early 212 1968 This covered 337 disseminations to customer agencies during the period July through December 1967 The study revealed that while there was some excellent reporting from the Mexico City Station on an overall basis the same gaps needs t and overreporting characteristic of the 1966 review continued in 1968 The station had the same low- access agents and continued to disseminate their reports even though customer agencies did not want to receive this information To correct this situation Headquarters recommended that the station attempt to obtain higher access agents among Communist groups Also some of the political information was passed to the Embassy Political Section for background and situation reports The elimination of thi low- level information cut sharply the overall volume of formal dissemimtions from the station but it resulted in a better quality product - 444 - SECRET To meet 13-00000 SECRET customer requirements for information on Cuban and Soviet subversive activities CIA prepared working 213 papers These studies were well received by customer agencies and provided them with security intelligence not available from any other source - 445 - SECRET 13-00000 11 SECRET a i m 3 VI Relations with the US Embassy During the period covered by this history April 1947 to June 1969 there were six US Ambassadors assigned to Mexico Walter C Thurston May 1946 to November 1950 William O'Dwyer December · J J J J I _ l J _J _J _J i 1950 to November 1952 Francis White March 1953 to April 1957 Robert C Hill May 1957 to November 1960 Thomas C Mann April 1961 to January 1964 and Fulton Freeman March 1964 to November 1968 Relations between the first COS William H Doyle and Ambassador Thurston a Foreign Service ·eareer officer were cordial and friendly To Captain W C Ford and William G Tharp who inspected the Mexico City Station in February 1949 Thurston volunteered that he had no problems whatsoever regarding CIA operations in his area He stated that he was completely satisfied with the manner in which Doyle conducted his operations although he did not know what these operations consisted of but added that Doyle in his own quiet efficient manner appeared to be well informed and to have good coverage concerning subversive activities in Mexico - 446 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET J J Doyle served in Mexico from April 1947 until February 1951 I l l j j I I Relations between Doyle and O'Dwyer were J strained by circumstances surrounding the attempt 1 by Headquarters to set up an OPC station in Mexico j to deal independently with two senior CIA officials l J J independent of the OSO station O'Dwyer refused when neither could speak for all CIA activities in Mexico His insistence that one person represent all these activities led to the designation in July 1951 of Raymond J O'Mara as the chief of both OSO and OPC I - 447 - j SECRET 13-00000 SECRET O'Dwyer also objected to the opening of the CIA base and the FBI office in Monterrey In a cable t o - - - - - - - - - - - - O ' D w y e r asked 214 what three additional people there would do The only difficulties between CIA and Ambassador White occurred after the trrival of Winston M Scott in 1956 This was over an increase of slots in station personnel in the Embassy White was adamant in not wanting to increase the size of the Embassy He reluctantly agreed to the use of tourist documentation for these persons provided the Embassy would have no responsibility for them and they would not admit that they were employed by i ·- - 1 A - i II 1 the Embassy Scott's relations with William Snow MinisterCounselor of Embassy were excellent Snow was so impressed with Scott that he asked him in September 1956 if he could persuade Headquarters to send a team of file experts to Mexico to survey the Embassy records and made recommendations for a complete reorganization of their filing system John M Scott were sent to Mexico City from SECRET P _ As a result of this request Lorenzo B Sanchez and - 448 - • In fact 1- ' • Qi ifi ICWWWPW - - - - - - 13-00000 SECRET Headquarters and conducted a review of the Embassy files as a part of their reorganization of the station files There was a marked increase in services performed by the station for all Embassy components after 1956 This included traces of names of visa applicants persons on the Ambassador's guest lists and employee applicants Station photographic facilities were made available to the Embassy The COS took an active part in the Ambassador's l l ·1 I staff meetings and he briefed visiting US Congressmen and new apermen geadquarters ermitted Ambassador Hill to detail Thomas J Hazlett as the Ambassador's secretary during Lopez Mateos inauguration ceremonies The increased dependence on the station for Embassy service led Headquarters inspectors in 1961 to suggest that the COS might need J command guidance on the extent of station services 1 for the Embassy to insure that CIA activities would 215 not be neglected Through Ambassador Hill Scott met a wide range of Mexican political figures I ·I Hill promoted Scott as his expert on Communism and was instru- 449 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET mental in placing Scott in contact with President Lopez Mateos Because of this friendly relation- ship Hill endorsed Scott's request for additional personnel with nominal cover rather than tourist cover He assigned to the station office space twice the size assigned under previous ambassadors Ambassador Thomas C Mann was briefed at Headquarters on station operations and Scott's clandestine contact with President Lopez Mateos Mann had grown up in Laredo Texas and was a re of the sensitivity of the Mexican President to close and open association with an American Ambassador for fear that he might be subject to criticism by opposition nationalist elements Mann was perfectly satisfied to use Scott as a channel to j the President of Mexico for certain sensitive political matters j l J I I Mann al o considered the joint telephone tap project the best intelligence bpera216 tion in l atin America Mann's successor Ambassador Fulton Freeman did not share Mann's viewpoint and felt that he Freeman should deal with the President of Mexico on all matters In November 1964 Mann then - 450 - _ SECRET 13-00000 SECRET Assistant Secretary of State ordered Freeman to Washington and held a private conversation with him regarding his relationship with the President 1 l 1 of Mexico Raford W Herbert Deputy Chief WH met with Freeman and Mann at this time Freeman agreed that the COS could continue to have his own channel to the President-elect Diaz Ordaz provided that Freeman was kept thoroughly informed of all that transpired between him and Diaz Ordaz CIA as evidenced in the LISAGA Project did not l J J keep the Ambassador fully informed on all discus- traffi _between Headquarters and the station to sions with President Diaz Ordaz Freeman exhibited some distrust of Clh For instance in November 1965 he advised the COS that ------·-- beginning 22 November he wanted to see all cable see what was going on cable traffic was made 1 J l available by the station but sensitive sources were not identified in these communications Freeman made the same request of the local FBI 217 office The station had access to consular files and Political Section records l The visa and security - 451 - SECRET 13-00000 · · - · - - _ _ __ _ ____ c SECRET offices were cooperative in permitting use of their offices by station officers for interviews -t I i • J JI of walk-in cases or persons of operational interest who called at the Embassy for pretext interviews One example of cooperation by the Embassy occurred in 1962 when Roger Abraham the Embassy administra- l tive counsellor gave the station In 1967 the Mexico City Station provided the l 1 Embassy with file traces of 32 197 names Memoranda with derogatory information were written on 1 333 of 218 these names -- -4 Relations with the Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI l 1 l The FBI used the cover of legal attache and the size of its staff inside the Embassy compared roughly with that of the station's integrated personnel Relations between the station and the FBI were generally cooperative Every COS from 1947 until 1969 had been a former FBI agent John N Speakes Jr was the senior FBI representative - 452 - SECRET 13-00000 -- - --'Qi SECRET _ ' j •a a ' F in Mexico when Doyle opened the station Speakes f remained in that position until his retirement in 1958 I · ·1- in Mexico until 1963 when he retired and was replaced by Clark Anderson who remained in Mexico until he was transferred to Santo Domingo in April 1965 l J l He was replaced by John Desmond who served Nathan Ferris who had served in the Wash- ington FBI office as the senior representative for the Western Hemisphere replaced Anderson and was still in Mexico as of 1969 Headquarters recognized that Mexico was in a unique position as a consequence of its proximity J J l _J ·i 1 J to the United States and its obvious utility as a base for third-country operations directed against the United States In view of the fact that the FBI was charged with responsibility for the internal security of the United States the necessity for 219 FBI activity could not be denied Th_e Mexico FBI office received copies of all disseminatioIEfrom the station It also received counterespionage or security intelligence on all non-US citizens of interest to that office In- formation on US citizens except those in contact j - 453 - ·J SECRET 13-00000 ··1 SECRET j 1- · -j· with the Cuban or Soviet Embassy was passed at - Headquarters 4 -k1 Copies of legal attache reports 220 were passed in Mexico to the station From 1947 until 1959 legal attache officers concerned themselves with criminal cas s fugitives from justicer stolen cars and fraud espionage - investigations involving US citizens who fled to _J Mexico and US Communist Party leaders in temporary - 1 A exile in Mexico ·' 1 identical with tho e of the station plus criminal From 1960 on the legal attache targets were ii cases with which CIA was not concerned This led to some unavoidable duplicate reporting by the FBI and CIA Liaison with the FBI i_n Mexico sometimes became delicate because many persons of interest to them were US citizens on whom CIA had acquired information as a byproduct of technical operations 1 against the Soviet Bloc and Cuban official instal- - lations - The station was prohibited from passing this informaticn locally to the FBI without first J sending it to Headquarters and receiving clearance '··' ' to pass it locally - - · By this time the value of the ···· -- -' jJ -- - 454 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET infor ation had perished For instance US citizens telephoned the Cuban Embassy to pi ck up visas to 221 travel to Cuba They usually gave their name over the telephone By the time the station re- ceived permission from Headquarters to give these names to the local FBI office the visitors had gone to Cuba Yhen this was pointed out to Head- quarters an exception was made to existing regulations permitting the station to pass locally information on Americans who contacted the Cuban or Soviet Embassy The station began placing telephone taps for the FBI in the 1950's These were on the US CP leaders and persons who were wanted in the United States for questioning on espionage activities The targets were named by the FBI and consisted of at least two simultaneous lines and sometimes as many as four Their chief clerk transcribed·the reels and returned them with copies of the transcripts reels against the transcripts to make sure that i they were complete j j The station occasionally checked the The same group of FBI targets were covered by the station mail intercept opera - ' - tion - 455 - SECRET 1 'l I l I 13-00000 •· Q t S ' 4ii rt titnSer« '- racm r to M td l od t j J J j J I ·1 J I J J ------------ ---···· _-··---- ie p _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ • SECRET Between 1947 and 1969 there were a number of FBI double agents who met with their Soviet case officers in Mexico The station provided support to these operations in the form of surveillance and photographic coverage of the agent meetings and the agent activities while in Mexico The FBI did not always protect CIA sources An example of this was the handling of a CIA clandestine photograph in the Oswald case when the FBI told Oswald's mother that the photograph was made by CIA in front of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City As of 1969 the FBI maintained a st ff of three officers in the consulate general in Monterrey one officer in the consulate general in Guadalajara 222 and one officer in the consulate in Mazatlan Relations with the Department of Defense Ji Relations with the military officers were formal but no particularly close when the Mexico City Station was opened The military attache com- plained that when Doyle assumed charge of activities formerly handled by the FBI the military officers were cut off from the distribution of - 456 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET reports which they had previously received Doyle had provided them information in response to specific requests but the military office wanted to receive copies of all local CIA disseminations From September 1947 all local disseminations were sent to the military and naval attaches In 1956 Lt Colonel Oscar M Doerflinger was assigned to the military attache office in Mexico City in response to a specific request from CIA Doerflinger had served at Headquarters as the branch • i J chief fo Mexico just prior to his assignment to Mexico During his tour in Mexico City cooperation 223 with the station was excellent At the station's request in 1956 the air attache flew at low altitude over the Soviet Bloc official installation and made aerial photographs with a 70-millimeter aerial camera The photo- graphs were so clear and sharp that they showed a powerful radio antenna concealed in a well of the roof of the Soviet Embassy The air and naval attaches also made their aircraft available to CIA on special _flights for cargo from the United States On these occasions CIA paid the operating costs _ - 457 - 13-00000 SECRET In an economy move in 1967 the US Government withdrew the aircraft which had formerly been assigned to the Ambassador 1 Military officers worked closely with the sta- i tion in the investigation of servicemen who were in Mexico without leave from their bases Periodically these persons were in contact with the Soviet Bloc and Cuban official installations attempting to 1 j travel to Cuba or the Soviet Union In several instances information provided by the station assisted in locating the men and returning them to their US military bases 1 j J _l 1 l J J 1 The LIOYSTER operation was an example of station cooperation with the military officers and the FBI when an enlisted man in the US Army came to Mexico under military guidance and met with his Soviet intelligence case officer Military and naval attaches were members of the attache association and provided the station with personality information on the Soviet Bloc attache In one instance based on derogatory in- formation from a CIA technical operation the US military attache made a recruitment approach to the Soviet attache which was turned down - 458 - SECRET 13-00000 - - -w· - y -- p i i--· ·nasa n c1· irti i ij b si - rn_________ - - - - - - iictit d5c-s- · w bci ·r ' lii ffi$JP O- 'a - '' ILll· •c1 - SECRET Relations with the Immigration and Naturalization Service I NS j There were two representatives from this service stationed in the US Embassy in Mexico City 1 Their relations with the station were cordial and friendly They were particularly helpful in some cases involving Cubans of interest to the station I j who had problems with the US immigration laws Before the I NS had a representative in the Embassy the station handled one of their informants Liborio Santos who later became a local J J J I l 1 employee of the Consuiar Section of th€ ba sy Santos was paid by Doyle for three months in 1951 at the request of the Washington D C office of the I NS I NS inspectors stationed at El Paso Texas cooperated with personnel of the Monterrey Base in - the development of sources on the CP was recommended to CIA by that office LIOX DE Another source suggested by the I NS was LIVACATE-3 - 459 - SECRET 13-00000 --- ··-- - -·· -- - - - • ___ _ _ _ n• - · - • SECRET i I Appendix B Chronology of Key Station ·Officers 1 j MEXICO CITY Chiefs William H Doyle Apr 1947 - Jan 1951 Clarence W Moore Jr Acting Jan 1951 - May 1951 Raymond J O'Mara Jun 1951 - Jan 1953 Robert L Brown Feb 1953 - Aug 1956 Winston M Scott Aug 1956 - Jun 1969 James B Noland Jul 1969 - Jun 1970 ' Jul 1S70 - ' 1-' '3 1o11it 1913 - I John R Horton Ric - S- r s Deputy Chiefs Robert L Brown Charles w Aug 1948 - Nov 1950 Anderson I I I Acting Dec 1950 - Jul 1953 William G Rogers Aug 1953 - Sep 1955 w Sep 1955 - Jun 1956 Charles Anderson I I I Acting Alfonso L Rodriguez Jul 1956 - Jul 1958 I Warren L Dean Oct 1958 - Dec 1962 Duane L Puckett Acting Dec 1962 - Apr 1963 I I I I Alan P White May 1963 - May 1967 Daniel S Watson Jun 1967 - Apr 1969 Albert Reynolds Acting May 1969 - Jul 1969 Paul V Harwood Jul 1969 - 500 - SECRET 13-00000 c -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - • - · · - - · - · -- - SECRET He and his wife also transcribed the LIFEAT and LIENVOY Czech language portion of the telephone tap tapes from the Czechoslovakian Embassy Beginning in 1957 they were included in the LIDOGTROT Project They were identified by pseudonyms David B SCHIAGETER and Teresa W HERIKSTADT File No 50-6-44 Job No 62-644 16 Box 5 LICAPER - Proposed joint telephone tap operation with the Mexican Ministry of Interior Federal Security Service approved in principle by Headquarters but net i plemented for lo a 1 i ecm·i ty and economic reasons March 1964 File No 50-6-109 1 Job No 64-459 75 Box 17 LICHERRY - Spanish Republican Basque political exile in Mexico who reported on activities of Spanish exiles from 1949 to 1958 when the project waster1 minated for lack of production of information'useful 1 to CIA File No 50-6-34 Job No 59-124 Box 17 I l LICHEW - US citizen and professor at the University of Mexico Leo C REDLICH who as a contract agent served as the outside case officer for CA projects LIERECT LIPLUM LICOAX and LINLUCK between March - 503 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET 1962 and September 1968 when REDLICH was terminated because of his diminishing interest in operational activity File No 50-124-24 · Job No 69-249 50 Box 10 LICOOKY - US citizen newspaper reporter who reported on Guatemalan exile activities from 1964 to 1966 l J when she lost access to information useful to CIA and returned to the United States This source was identified by the pseudonym Joyce P PINEINCH File No 50-6-129 Job No 67-86 77 Box 27 LICOOL - Umbrella project for several surreptitious j entries into the residences of Soviet Bloc officials from 1953 until 1960 during which time audio devices were placed there The LICOOL Project was terminated when the decision was made to prepare a separate project for each audio installation File No 50-6-19 Job No 61-312 76 Box 17 LICRAFT - Former Cuban Government official and engineer 201-356959 1 who was used as a source of in- formation on exile activities of Cubans in Mexico from 1964 to August 1966 when he left the area File No 50-6-118 Job No 68-772 38 Box 10 I - 504 - SECRET 13-00000 ---·----------··· --·--------- SECRET LIDABBER - Production manager 201-68647 for who was used as an access agent to a Soviet Bloc official during 1959 File No 50-6-53 Job No 61-810 80 Box 18 LIEARTH - Double agent PETANG who was transferred from the Near East and Africa NEA Division Project PENISTONE to Mexico and was directed against Soviet Bloc officials from 1957 until 1959 1 when he returned to Beirut Lebanon File No 50-6-63 Job No 22-1228 26 Box 4 4 LIELOPE - Project which supported and directed the l activities of grantees to the United States from Mexico who were engaged in Mexican trade union activities J 1 from 1961 to 1964 when the project was terminated as unproductive File No 50-126-29 Job No 65-273 22 Box 11 LIEMBROIL - Students at the University of Mexico who pr vided information on activities of Communist student groups from 1961 until 1964 when the sources I were terminated for poor production 50 6-76 Job No 64-54 75 Box 23 - 505 - SECRET File No V 13-00000 SECRET Appendix D Operational Directives From April 1947 until 1 March 1948 general operational priorities were outlined in National Security Council Intelligence Directive Number 5 NSCID 5 Grouped in order of importance these priorities were espionage and counterespionage - -4 operations against the Soviet Union Soviet activities outside the USSR scientific research and technical developments relating to atomic biological and chemicP 1 w1rf rs guicted missiles and electronics and collection of information on - --· · 1· political econ mic and military developments likely to affect the security of the United States Correspondence between Headquarters and Mexico City Station indicates that Special Operational Instruction No 23 SOI 23 dated 1 March 1948 established the following more specific targets ··- - · -- l a Communist Party of Mexico b Activities of the leading Marxist Vicente Lombardo Toledano and his labor - 512 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET organization and leftistPopular Party Partido Popu 1ar - Pp c officials 1 I I l I I 1 I Soviet and Soviet Satellite d Spanish Communist Party e Political and financial plans of This directive was valid for three months Progress of the Mexico City Station in covering these targets was reported monthly to Headquarters n July 1948 SOI 23 was extended for siA months and reporting requirements were changed to quarterly intervals Headquarters continued extensions until the SOI was replaced by the first RMD dated 27 July 1954 which defined the CIA mission in Mexico The chief of station was assigned responsibility for a All US Government foreign intel- ligence FI operations in Mexico except for agreed intelligence activities con- 1 1 ducted by other US Government agencies b All US Government political and later named the Popular Socialist Party PPS - 513 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET psychological PP operations in Mexico subject to coordination at Headquarters with the International Organizations IO Division on pertinent international programs and with the United States Information Agency USIA concerning gray propaganda c Any paramilitary PM operations that might be necessary for Mexico This directive outlined the station's position · l l l l on relations with other US Government and foreign agencies Relations with the State Department were to be in accordance with the provisions of State Department-Office of Special Operations STOSO agreement Coordination with the FBI I NS Department of Defense DOD and USIA was authorized by Headquarters in cases of mutual interest No formal liaison was authorized with foreign int lligence services but the station was permitted to continue contact with the Federal Security Service and the British intelligence representative The basic FI mission in Mexico was to promote the security of the United States by the development - 514 - SECRET 13-00000 1I 3 ' 3 SECRET I and use of clandestine FI assets to collect information on the intentions capabi ities and courses of action of Mexico the Soviet Bloc and of other - countries likely to affect the security of the United States The basic PP mission in Mexico was to promote the security of the United States by covert opera- J tions planned in such a way that the US Government's role would not be evident but if uncovered could 4 plausibly be denied The purpose of these opera- tions were to a 1 J 1_ · Contribute to the worldwide objective of reducing the political and economic power and potential of the Soviet Bloc and its capability to wage hot war b Discredit the ideology of inter- national Communism and exploit its prob- 1 I I I lems _ c Combat the activities of Communist- oriented parties and other radical groups in Mexico d Combat the activities of elements hostile to the United States I I - 515 - SECRET 13-00000 · ttaHlzi i •· hi·t -A ··- - 111' l ii · - ii Fi is--ie efdde Oet --·• - ' · - re1r ut i 8 tii·i't· evrir Mi'liti f t · • · SECRET e Contribute to PP objectives in other parts of La tin America In order of priority the ·objectives listed in the first RMD were PRIORITY I A Information about official and semi official Soviet Bloc activities intentions personnel sabotage and related plans and communications and connections with subversive activities in Mexico and worldwide B Information about the activities and intentio s 0f Soviet Bloc intelligence services and their relations with indigenous Com unists C Counteract and negate Communist activity in the fields of propaganda political action and economic warfare and negate Communist influence in the following segments of Mexican life 1 J I I l • - · Ii · -- - · --ria·Jet -- D Infor ation on the organization financing 1 d activities of the Communist Party dissident Communist groups the Spanish Communist Party Communist fronts pro-Soviet groups and their influence at policy-making levels of the government - 516 ·h tri •ti ·• _ • 13-00000 • ·• ···-----·--· ·---- - -- SECRET i PRIORITY I I E Counteract and negate overt and covert Communist and other anti-US activities in all segments of Mexican life and where possible outside Mexico in the fields of propaganda political and economic action F 1 1 l 1 I 1 1 I I I J I Information aboutl I 'G Information about international travel of US Communists residing in Mexfco and of Soviet Bloc nationals H The plans and activities o I Information about secret shipments of strategic materials from or through Mexico to Soviet Bloc countries PRIORITY III • J Information about plans activities and personnel of diplomatic missions of other countries in Mexico including their relations with Soviet Bloc officials K Details of scientific and technological developments in nuclear energy biological and chemical warfare electronics aerodynamics and ordnance production of raw materials for atomic energy - 517 - SECRET 13-00000 j SECRET l l l L Counteract and negate overt and covert Communist activities and promote pro-US sentiment in intellectual and cultural circles in Mexico and when feasible throughout Latin America One of the PP tasks listed with this objective was to obtain and widely publicize the confession of the murderer of Leon Trotsky thus exposing the terroristic and brutal nature of Communism and Communist rule I PRIORITY IV M tion 1 Readiness for general war situa- The next year the same RMD was approved with i objective K deleted because the 1956 Opel 'ational Program for Mexico contained no provision to cover it I J It also provided for an area-wide anti-Communist front organization with chapters in all Latin American countries and yearly congresses to coordinate anti-Communist activities In 1956 the RMD had only 10 objectives- K J 1 and M were deleted and J was included with the Soviet Bloc requirement The need for CE and CI operations against Soviet officials and the Soviet intelligence services was emphasized Soviet Satel- lites and their services dropped to Priority II I I 1 This directive also called on the station to identify - 518 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET - -11 and report on the activities of US Communists in contact with Soviet officials in Mexico - - ··• ti l 1 l 1 I I 1 The 1957 mm represented a complete change in format but very little change in content or operational emphasis The long-range purposes of US policy remained that of counteracting international Communism and encouraging democratic governments friendly to the United States In 1958 one additional task was added This was recruitment of third country national diplomats who might be assigned to Soviet Bloc countries About the only change in the 1959 RMD was the recognition of the Chinese Communists as a Priority III objective This was a worldwide activity and not of special significance to Mexico since there were no Communist Chinese officials in the country Another objective included in this RMD was the plot- l l I J I ting of Latin American revolutionary exile groups An effort was made in 1960 to revise the RMD to more accurately reflect operational conditions and capabilities Coverage of Cuban revolutionary groups in Mexico - as made a specific requirement under Priority I because of the threat presented - 519 - SECRET 13-00000 - '--·- · ___ _________ __ JI --··-----··-··· SECRET- ·1 ·1 l ··1 11 - by Communist Cuba to US interes1sin Latin America Covert action operations were authorized against the Cuban targets in Mexico The same instruction remained in effect until October 1963 when the operational priorities were reduced to three major targets the Cubans the Soviets and These remained the primary reporting targets in 1964 1965 and 1966 though the Mexico City Station pressed for higher priorities for the CP of Mexico and Soviet Satellite activities 1 1 J J ·1 JI J 3 J In 1967 the RMD's were replaced by Operating Directives which were included as a part of the operational programs The Operating Directive dated January 1967 repeated the unchanged long-range United States policy toward Mexico Operational targets in order of priority were A ·Cuba B Soviet Union C Communist Party of Mexico D E Soviet Satellites F Latin American Exiles G - 520 - SECRET 13-00000 ·- - 1 SECRET J q l l · - ·1 - In 1968 the Operating Directive format was changed back to the Priority I and II categories used from 1956 through 1966 This directive was effective through FY 1969 the cutoff date for this paper In general terms the Priority I targets were A Soviet Union B Cuba c D l 1 I 1 I l Communist Party in Mexico The Priority II targets were travelers to the Soviet Bloc Satellite intelligence services and anti-US extremists ·Generally ·the Soviet Embassy in Mexico was the main target of the station From 1947 to 1954 SOI 23 gave higher priority to the CP and the Popular Socialist Party coverage but by 1954 when the first RMD was written it was recognized that the Soviet Embassy was the number one target During the period 1960 through 1967 Cuba was placed ahead of the Soviets as an operational target because of the threat posed in the Western Hemisphere by exportation of Castro-type revolutionary and guerrilla activities In 1968 the Soviets again became the - 521 - SECRET 13-00000 'i SECRET la i ll · 1 I D J l J l t 'I 4 priority target when Cuban revolutionary activities in Latin American countries were disrupted by t te assassination of Che Guevara the Latin American revolutionary and it appeared that the Soviets were pressuring Castro to discontinue these operations and CP activities The were of continuing interest but of a lower priority Soviet Satellite intelligence services were of lesser interest They like the Latin American exiles and targets of opportunity followed behind the Soviets and the CP of Mexico Cuba The Soviets used Mexico as an important base fer their operations against the United States and two-thirds of their officials in Mexico were experienced intelligence officers permissive attitude as far as the Mexican Security Service was concerned For these reasons the Soviet Embassy was the primary target of the station during most of the first 22 years of its history •t at - Si They also enjoyed a - 522 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET - ·t• 11 - i _ ll Jl I JJ ' ·1 I 1 1 ·1 1 I J I l I Appendix E Glossary of Abbreviations ADSO Assistant Director of Special Operations BOB Bureau of Budget CA Covert Action Central Cover Staff Counterespionage Counterintelligence Counter Intelligence Corps Central Intelligence Group Mexican Aviation Company National Confederation of Students Chief of Station Communist Party Cla11 iestine Service Chief Western Hemisphere Division ccs CE CI CIC CIG CMA CNE cos CP cs C WH Del DCOS DDP DFS DOD D 'i'O ·FBI FI FI INT RE FRD IG IISE I N 3 Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Chief of Station Deputy Director for Plans Department of Federal Security Mexican Security Service Department of Defense Developmental and Target of Opportunity Federal Bureau of Investigation Foreign Intelligence Foreign Intelligence Staff Intelligence Group Requirements Evaluation Branch Revolutionary Democratic Front In ector General Institute of Social and Economic Investigations Immigration and Naturalization Service - 523 - SECRET 13-00000 - SECRET 1 -· - t 1 ·· a i JPN I R International Organizations Division National Polytechnic Institute Inspection and Review Staff KGB Soviet Intelligence Service MI-6 British Intelligence National Liberation Movement Mexican Social Secretariat Medium Speed Wireless Transmission University Reform Orientation Movement IO a---l 41 41 l l 1LN MSS MSWT MURO NCNA NSA NSCID New China News Agency National Security Agency National Security Council Intelligence Directive I- cAs·· Organizat en of American States Office of Operations Other Operational Activities Office of Policy Coordination Office of Special Operations Office of Strategic Service One Way Voice Link 1 00 OOA OPC oso oss OWVL J PAN PARM _J PCM PM PPS PRI PSP Party of National Action Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution Communist Party of Mexico Paramilitary Workers and Farmers Party of Mexico Political and Psychological Warfare Popular Socialist Party Institutional Revolutionary Party Cuban Communist Party RID RMD Records Integration Division Related _Missions Directive POCM pp - 524 - · ·- - c r - ---- n ··· o - l J 13-00000 SECRET SAS SOI SR SW Special Affairs Staff Special Operational Instruction Soviet Russia Secret Writing TDY TELEX Temporary Duty Automatic Teletypewriter Exchange Service of Western Union Table of Organization Technical Services Division Trade Union International T 0 TSD TUI UCI UN UNAM UOM USIA USIS WFTU WH International Civic Union United Nations National Autonomous University of Mexico Mexican Workers University US Information Agency US Information Service World Federation of Trade Unions Western Hemisphere Division D - • • 525 - SECRET 13-00000 - ·_·r __ ai as 1111 iil f-f·f• f O r··i· t · · -· -¥ fu·· -e rh 11 ·er··· ·ot # tarirr Bffl i aiesss ----· -- sri J i i · -r - jsi t s Wi ti# P te i JJ16r%tt 'A FSk G't i -- --t -'· i - c - SECRET Appendix F Source References 1 The World Almanac Newspaper Enterprise Association New York 1968 p 512 U 2 Deadline Data on World Affairs Deadline Data Inc New York 1963 Mexico Domestic Affairs p 1 3 National Intelligence Survey NIS Mexico General Survey NIS 70 GS March 1968 p 40 4 Mexico 1966 Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior S A National Bank of Foreign Commerce Mexico City 1966 p 205 U 5 1 1 I ·2 a I l I u TMM-39 t 2 Jun 4 7 sub na ckgro md and Plans of the Popular Party Job No 65-696 6 NIS Mexico op cit 3 above pp 79-81 7 Ibid p 80 8 Ibid p 80 9 Ibid p 78 10 Memo of Conversation with Birch D O'Neal 4 Feb 70 WH HO 11 Memo for the DCI from Captain W C Ford sub Inspection Trip to Latin America Jan and Feb 49 HS CSG 400 Folder 95 12 TMMA-21 6 May 47 sub Informants and Investigators turned over to this office by the FBI Job No 65-696 Unless otherwise indicated all source references cited in this appendix are classified Secret - 526 - 13-00000 -· - -- ·· ••··· @ d -ti ·or czi - · -J li - ae i « •i··- t- ·- • ···1 ··w· ·• -·--trir · ·• i 7 · izi-i n•i··«J- · -• --- · 1s· - __ M Zii ti2•'· l l 1 SECRET 13 - _ Memo to Assistant Director Special Operations Colonel Donald H Galloway from Acting Chief Foreign Branch T Raymond G Leddy sub Coverage for Mexico 3 Apr 47 201-216903 TMM-540 7 Apr 48 sub SOI 23 Job No 65-696 15 TMMA-200 22 Jan 48 sub Budget Estimates for Projects Job No 65-696 16 TMMW-579 5 Oct 48 sub Expenditure Guide Quarter 1 Oct - 31 Dec 1948 Job No 65-696 17 Memo for the Director op cit 11 above 18 Memo for Record Dec 56 sub Operations in Mexico Notes by Winston M Scott and B H Vandervoort WH HO 19 Ibid 20 Memo for DDP 6 Jul 56 sub Reclassification Positions WH TO WH HO 21 IG Report 18 Dec 56 158874 TS 22 HMMA-5430 8 Oct 56 sub Files - Embassy and Station WH HO 23 MEXI-470 30 May 57 WH HO 24 MEXI-557 13 Jun 57 Wll HO 25 MEXI-870 3 Aug 57 WH HO 26 HMMW-5123 10 Sep 57 sub Current Table of Organization WH HO 27 ISTHMUS No 67 12 May 64 WH HO 28 Project LIMERRY File No 50-6-51 Job No 61-948 56 Boxes 17 and 18 29 DIR-25923 12 Jul 57 VII HO J J • I J I J 1 1 I I a - 527 - 13-00000 d- -- -· _ _ _ _ _ _ _ d - - dfte be • lE t - rN 'fPFf • e · · - ugq ·- i5 lo bcl•t es 1m -rtQ 'l w· -• ·r--re J t 1 si 1 ' d SECRET l - - l l l 1 1JJ '' 30 MEXI-792 22 Jul 57 WH HO HMMA-13398 31 Jul 59 sub Report of Progress on the RMD WH HO 32 Ibid 33 Memo for Record 10 Apr 59 sub I R Inspection Report written by Winston M Scott WH HO 34 Project LITEMPO File No 50-6-91 1 35 ISTHMUS No 17 15 Jun 60 WH HO HMMA-15945 16 Nov 60 sub Report of Progress on the RMD WH HO 37 38 Ibid Operational Program 1961 153441 TS Job No 62-288 39 HMMA-17494 4 Aug 61 sub Data on Case Officer work and Operational Projects at the Mexico City Station WH HO 40 ISTHMUS No 31 33 10 May 61 and 18 Jul 61 WH HO 41 ISTHMUS No 34 9 Aug 61 WH HO 42 ISTHMUS No 35 8 Sep 61 WH HO 43 ISTHMUS No 32 12 Jun 61 WH HO 44 IG Report 2 Dec 61 173085 1 TS 45 DIR-12294 17 Sep 61 WH HO 46 Project LITEMPO File No 50-6-91 3 47 ISTHMUS No 45 6 Jul 62 WH HO 48 ISTHMUS No 46 3 Aug 62 WH HO 1 - 528 - SECRET 13-00000 SECRET I I __ 49 ISTHMUS No 49 15 Nov 62 WH HO so ISTIDIUS No 50 6 Dec 62 WH HO 51 Minutes of COS Conference in Panama 27 Jan 63 remarks by Winston M Scott WH HO 52 ISTHMUS No 54 11 Apr 63 WH HO 53 ISTHMUS No 55 6 May 63 WH HO 54 ISTHMUS No 62 6 Dec 63 WH HO 55 Ibid 56 ISTHMUS No 64 13 Feb 64 WH HO 57 Project LITEMPO File No 50-6-91 3 58 Ibid 59 HMMT-4949 8 Oct 64 sub ZRFANCY RMD WH HO 60 ISTHMUS No 70 6 Aug 64 WH HO 61 l R Report · Dec 64 185215 TS 62 Ibid 63 Ibid 64 Ibid 65 Ibid 66 Ibid 67 Ibid 68 Ibid 69 HMMA-12149 27 Mar 59 sub WH FR 81-58 File No 50-2-4 70 I R_ op cit 61 above ·· l l l l l l I ----- - 529 - 13-00000 --------· -·- -----------•···-···--·-· ·--· - ---------------·-·-------- ------·-· -- SECRET I 71 Records of the WH Logistics Section as of Jun 69 l -i 72 ISTHMUS No 73 10 Nov 64 WH HO 73 ISTHMUS No 77 3 Mar 65 WH HO 74 RMD Amendment 1 Feb 65 WH HO ·1 ·1 75 ISTHMUS No 78 8 Apr 65 WH HO 76 HMMS-5534 16 Aug 67 sub Benchmark WH HO 77 HMMS-5547 21 Aug 67 sub Clandestine collection program in Mexico WH HO 78 1967 Survey Report 19 Feb 68 WH HO 79 Ibid 80 Operational Program 1969 WH HO 81 TMMW-579 op cit 16 above 82 I R Report 1954 WH HO 83 HMMA-17494 op cit 39 1 above 84 I R Report op cit 61 above 85 HMMS-5534 op cit 76 above 86 Operational Program op cit 80 above 87 CI Staff Memorandum 4 Apr 55 107822 TS 88 Karl M Schmitt Communism in Mexico University of Texas Austin 1965 pp 14-15 U 89 Ibid 90 NIS Mexico op cit 3 above pp 79-81 91 Karl M Schmitt op cit 8 above p 236 I 1 1 J 1 1 I J I I - 530 - SECRET 13-00000 -- a-- iri es S1 i -·- ·b y• - - - - cf• ·- s - L - - - ··• · -••-- SECRET l l l J J •j I J J J 1 I 3 92 NIS Mexico op cit 93 Karl M Schmitt op cit 94 NIS Mexico op cit 95 HMMA-34613 8 May Gs · sub Communist Party Penetration Program File No 50-120-6 96 Project LIFTER File Nos 50-6-80 1 201-30792 and 201-213893 97 TMM-816 2 Nov 48 sub British Intelligence File No 201-16137 98 Project LIONHEART File Nos 50-6-31 1 50-6-31 3 and 201-102716 99 Project LIVACATE File No 50-6-110 100 30 above p 96 88 above p 21 30 above pp 91-96 Project LIOXLDE F'iie No 50-6-126 1 101 Project LIREBEL File No 50-6-141 1 Job No 69-512 69 Space No 72075 102 Project LINLUCK File Nos 201-2225 and 50-6-50 1 Job No 67-566-99 Box 21 Folder 2 Space 34800 103 US Communists in Mexico File No 50-4-20 104 NIS Mexico op cit pp 7-33 105 Boris Morros My Ten Years as a Counterspy Viking Press New York 1959 p 245 U 106 Harry Bernstein Marxism in Mexico 1917-1925 a lecture to the American Historical Association in 1956 WH HO U 107 John W F Dulles Yesterday in Mexico University of Texas Aus in Second Printing 1967 p 480 u - 30 above May 1958 • 531 - - -- _ --•-rWrr•- -· ---'-· - _ 13-00000 -l ' r SECRET · i·'-·· - _j 1 t · 1 108 NIS Mexico op cit 30 above May 1958 pp 1-7 109 Working Paper 23 August 1967 sub Soviet Embassy activities in Mexico CIA-319 00008-67 110 Ibid 6 June 1969 CIA-319 00008-69 111 Ibid 112 Ibid 113 Ibid 114 Ibid 115 NIS Mexico op cit 30 above May 1958 pp 7-27 116 Karl M Schmitt op cit 88 above pp 215-216 117 NIS Mexico op pp 7-23 118 Project LI OY Project Renewal 1966 File No 50-6-7 1 119 NIS Mexico op cit 30 above May 1958 pp 7-23 120 Project LIENVOY OP cit 118 above 121 Source DMPETAL File No 201-738456 122 Project LITEMPO File No 50-6-91 3 I 123 Project LIMOTOR File Nos 50-6-55 1 50-6-55 3 50-6-55 4 Job No 65-273 21 Space No 81835 ti 12•1 DIR-42695 16 Feb 62 File No 50-6-55 3 Job No 65-273 21 Space No 81835 125 Alfred L KONITZER File No 201-185999 t 3 J JI I I 1 i • j l 30 above May 1958 - 532 - SECRET 13-00000 - --- _ ti •· SECRET 12G Project LIMAGPIE File Nos 201-115834 and 50-6-47 1 Job No 62-560 85 Box 20 127 Project LINEB File Nos 201-204930 and 50-6-66 Job No 65-710 70 Box 20 128 Project LIJENNET File Nos 201-104199 50-6-37 1 and 50-6-37 3 Job No 66-287 28 Box 4 129 Project LICOZY File No 50-6-111 1 130 US Army source LIOYSTER File No 201-735850 131 Project LIMYSTIC File No 50-6-59 1 Job No 60-535 15 Space No 7998 132 Source DMPETAL File No 76-6-55 3 • 133 Teresa Casuso Morin File No 201-169119 1 l 134 Working Paper 18 April 1969 sub Cuhan activities in Mexico CIA-319 00006-69 l 135 Ibid 136 Ibid 137 Ibid 138 Ibid 139 ISTHMUS No 29 8 Mar 61 WH HO 140 ISTHMUS No 30 19 Apr 61 WH HO 141 ISTHMUS No 32 12 Jun 61 WH HO 142 ISTHMUS No 45 6 Jul 62 WH HO 143 Project LIRAVINE File No 50-6-128 1 144 Project LITAMIL File 50-6-101 Job No 66-4 7 Box 2 145 Project LICOMET File No 50-6-114 1 -- 1 I i 1 • l' J l I 1 1 - 533 - SECRET 13-00000 · i - ' _ ii- •iir£ec ftd s''ltiffe'titrlf'sc ··'· • - MI i¥1i l'e½iai i 1 •itdttrU - e ' • ' tSiHizi' k - - • · r· _ c • J SECRET 146 Project LIRENO File No 50-6-133 1 147 Project LIFEAT File No 50-6-32 1 148 Project LIRAZOR File No 50-6-130 149 Project LIENVOY File No 50-6-75 1 150 Project LIEtffiRACE File No 50-6-72 1 151 Project LIRICE File No 50-6-95 1 152 Project LIEMPTY File No 0-6-74 153 Project LIDOGTROT File No 50-6-35 154 Project LIONION File No 50-6-122 1 155 Project LIROMANCE File No 50-6-131 3 Job No 67-566 75 Space No 34795 156 Project LISAMPAN File No 50-6-145 1 50-6-145 3 157 Project LINIMENT File No 50-6-4 Job No 59-31 Box 129 158 Project LIMESA File No 50-6-58 1 159 Project LICASA File No 50-6-69 J l 160 WASH 22915 OUT 75778 12 Dec 50 JBEDICT Mexico Job No 59-3 Space 84237 161 WASH 23755 OUT 76808 20 Dec 50 WASH-CIAPRO 3562 Folder _1 Box 21 _ 162 MEXI 678 23 Dec 50 WASH-CIA-PRO 3562 Folder 1 Box 21 163 WASH 24248 OUT 77423 26 Dec 50 WASH-CIAPRO 3562 Folder 1 Box 21 164 TMMW-1784 20 Jul 51 sub Designation of Functions Under Organization Change Job No 65-696 1 I I I i I I l - 534 - 13-00000 i _ ------- ---•-1P i Nt e1• - i La s s z - u 1 o i _ SECRET J j J 165 Memo of Conversation 19 Jul 51 sub in Mexico 64323 TS OPC 166 Operational Program 1961 175492_ 2 TS 167 Operational Program 1964 186723 2 TS 168 I R Report op cit 61 above 169 HMMS-5534 op cit 76 above 170 Operational Program 1969 WH HO 171 HMMS-5534 op cit 76 above 172 HMMA-33090 19 Sep 67 sub Mexico File No 50-120-2 173 Project LILISP-E File No 50-126-22 1 174 Project LILISP-B File No 50-126-22 1 175 Project LI ISP-C File No 50-124-2 176 Project LILISP-D File No 50-124-21 177 Proje t LILISP-M File No 50-126-23 178 Project LISIREN File No 50-126-31 1 179 Project LIETIIIC File No 50-126 -27 180 Project LITEAR File No 50-124-21 181 Lesley Byrd Simpson Many Mexicos University of California Berkeley Fourth Edition 1966 pp 354-355 182 NIS Mexico op cit 3 above pp 92-93 183 Deadline Data on World Affairs Deadline Data Inc New York 1964 II Mexico Domestic Affairs 1963 p 22 U 184 Project LICOAX File No 50-124-23 185 Project LIMIX File No 50-126-28 1 - ·-J ' l l J J l 1 J - 535 - SECRET CA Program for 13-00000 ' J SECRET 1 '- ' - 186 Mexican Social Secretariat Project LIAGOG File No 50-124-33 1 -- 187 Project LINOODLE File No 50-124-25 188 Stanley M Moos File No ·201-121193 189 Project L MERRY File No 50-6-51 1 Job No 61-948 56 Boxes 17 and 18 -· 190 Project LILINK File Nos 201-226902 and 50-6-99 1 Job No 68-496 28 Space 60793 ·1 191 HMMA-17494 op cit 39 above 192 Mexico 1966 op cit 4 above pp 41-42 193 NIS Mexico op cit 3 above Section 56 sub Intelligence and Security Mar 66 194 HMMA-1357 30 Dec 53 sub Status of Mexican F de 3 Scc ity Fila No 50-6- -737 195 NIS Mexico op cit 3 above Section 56 sub Intelligence and Security Mar 66 196 Ibid 197 Ibid 198 TMM-1249 19 Oct 49 sub Quarterly Report in Compliance with SOI 23 File No 50-6-4-90 199 Project LIVESTOCK File No 50-6-30 Job No 61-65 30 Box 28 200 Project LIENVOY File No 50-6-75 3 201 Project LIVESTOCK op cit 202 Project LIFIRE File No 50-6-80 1 203 Project LIFIRE File No 50-6-80 3 204 Project LIBIGHT File No 50-6-42 1 · I - · ·1 l l l l I l l J l l - 536 - SECRET 199 above 13-00000 SECRET 205 Project LIENVOY File No 50-6-75 1 206 Project LITEMPO File No 50-6-91 207 Project LISAGA File No 50-6-149 208 Project LIARBOR File No 50-124-34 209 HMMS-5547 op cit 77 above 210 Memo from Hayden Estey C FI INT RE 19 Jun 62 sub CS Reporting on and from Mexico - Appraisal and Guidance WH HO 211 HMMS-5126 11 Jan 67 sub Mexico WH HO 212 HMMW-16266 20 Mar 68 sub Reporting on Mexico File No 50-120-014 213 Working Papers op cit 109 110 and 134 Reporting on ibo-- e 214 US Embassy cable 3 May 51 sub rey CIA Base 57243 TS Opening Monter- 215 IG Report op cit 216 Memo for Record 10 Nov 64 sub Relations between Ambassador Fulton Freeman and Chief of Station Mexico City prepared by Raford W Herbert DC WH WH HO 217 DIR-60340 23 Nov 65 WH HO 218 Operating Directive 1968 sub 219 HMMW-9749 ·17 May 61 sub Responsibilities for the Coordination of Espionage and CounterIntelligence Activities Abroad WH HO 220 HMMW-1431 5 May 54 sub Relative Responsibilities of CIA and FBI in Mexico WH HO 221 DIR-30343 14 Dec 61 WH HO 44 above - 537 SECRET Mexico WH HO 13-00000 SECRET 1 -l l 1 1 1 1 l -_ l 222 US Embassy telephone directory 1968 WH Mexico Branch U 223 IG Report op cit 224 MEXI-3672 4 Dec 67 WQ HO 225 Informal letter 1 Jun 50 from Rolland Welch Consul General to First Secretary Charles R Burrows WH HO C 226 Memo for Chief Budget and Liaison Controll Staff 8 Aug 50 by William M Wheeler Jr C WH sub Proposed Opening of Sub-Station at Monterrey Mexico WH HO 227 US Embassy cable op cit 214 above tary of State cable 2 May 51 57236 TS 228 Ibid 229 Department of State Post Report 1968 Monterrey Mexico U WH HO 230 US Embassy directory op cit 231 Project LIRABBIT File No 50-6-26 1 65-80 86 Space 89741 232 Project LIPAIL File No 50-6-83 1 Job No 68-860 16 Space No 81575 233 Project LIPALLET File No 50-6-81 1 Job No 61-373 2 Space No 87577 · 234 Project LIDANCE File No 50-6-45 1 Job No 61-702 86 Space No 38613 235 Project LIDATE File No 50-6-68 1 Job No 61-312 88 Space No 25380 236 Project LIDASH File No 50-6-57 3 Job No 61-312 87 Space No 25380 21 above - 538 - SECRET Secre- 222 above Job No 13-00000 ···1 SECRET ·- ·• ' ' •j ··t ·' ·•1 · 1 - · -' - 237 Project LIJULEP File No 50-6-123 Job No 67-200 60 Box 12 2 8 Project LIHALT File No 50-6-112 Job No 65-710 86 Box 23 ·1 239 Project LIHACK File No 50-6-108 Job No 65-710 87 Box 23 240 LITAU-3 File No 201-299287 • '·-J i •• 11 1j -1 J J · ·1 -l -· i - ii - - 539 -