··co626s874 Approved for 2024 08 05 C06265874 - Release - - CLASSIFIED when blank-TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document-Automatically downgraded or declassified when filled in form is detached from controlled document• T 0 p CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION SOURCE DOC ND DOC DATE REGISTRY CIA CONTROL NO ' COPY NO NUMBER OF PAGES NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS ' E DATE oo·cuMENT RECE I YEO -a C LOGGED BY R E T ATTENTION Tllis orm will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received bl me Central lnte Ugence Agencll or classified Top Secret within the CIA and wtu remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded destroJ1ed or transmuted outside of CI A Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose ot11cial duties relate to the matter Top Secret Control Officers who receive and or release tfte attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custodl in the left-hand columns provided Each individual who sees the Top Secret document wm aign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns RELEASED RECEIVED REFERRED TO OFFICE SIGNATURE DATE TIME DATE SEEN BY TIME SIGNATURE OFFICE DIV DATE material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below NOTICE OF DETACHMENT When this form is detached from Top Secret met transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record BY BY FORM 8 73 26 Si4nature IDATE OFFICE OUTSIDE CIA TO BY Si4nature WITNESSED BY Si4nature Si4nature OFFICE D JSPATCHED DESTROYED DOWNGRADED TO I DATE OFF ICE I DATE UeE PREVIOUS CDIYIOIIS 10P S CftEf Approved for Release 2024 08 05 C06265874 40 C06265874 I 28· September 1963 -ti ' · 9 MEMORANDUM FOR t-VIA Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director Plans SUBJECT Chronology of Events Contacts and-Discussions Relating to the Saigon Station Coup d'Etat Activities of August 1963 REFERENCE a Memorandum for the· Director Sequence of Contacts with Vietnamese Generals August t9 3 b DIR 70474 1- j The following is a chronological listing of the events cont cts and discussions rel ting to the Saigon Station coup d r eta t activities between 21 August and ·2 Septeml er 1963 This record has been prepared from a review of pertinent operational· correspondence with correlative commentary from those officers directly involved and therefore represents an accur · 0 reconstruction oi the-events contacts and discussions All dates are Saigon time 1 21 August Declaration of Martial Law 23 Aug 1 st Conein General Tran Van Don Acting Chief of Staff Vietnamese Armed Forces meeting with following significant points a troops not under General Don General Ton That Dinh Military Governor of Saigon has control of III Corps troops and Colonel Le Quang Tung Chief ARVN Special Forces High Command is responsible only to the Presidency b Don tated did not want President Diem replaced by an exile admitted no one within the military was capable replacing Diem · c stated this was the l' I i t l i i i i' of • · qdi n v • 1 ' ·- -· -- -- - ------ - - 1 c-t ii-• t·· ···-·· 7 --· - -- -- fC -· Approved for Release 2024 08 05 C06265874 - - ____ __ _ r-· C06265874 •· i Approved for Release 2024 08 o'S C0626587 4 ' • '--•- I ' -2- first s·tep could not reveal what _next step would be· d _ stated that a_fter first phase things can--· not revert back to what they we e before s_pecifically refe_rred to the government e if ·non had to choose between Diem and Counsellor Nhu he would choose Diem repeated that if had to make choice betwe en the Pr·esident and Nhu Nhu was going g wanted assurances of suppo rt from the USG 25 Augus·t Spera General Nguyen Khanh Commanding· Genera II Corps held meeting morn·ing _25 August at latter's reques·t a _ stated some of general·_ officers determined to stop taking orders from· Ngo fam1ly the very minute SVN anti-Communist stand comes into q·uestion fears acc·ommodation with the DRV b asked if USG would support army takeover of the· country - stated regardless of USG decision they would go it alone should it become clear there was a softening on the anti-Communist position c •cited he has four divisions of troops d does not trust General Don e stated General Tran Thien Khiem Chief of Staff · Joint ·General Staff was completely_ on his side f stated they were only generals and it would be up to uso· to take care of political organization after the coup 25 August l During afternoon 25 August Ambas·sador Lodge called Richardson to his the Anrbassador's office present were Lodge ·General Harkins DCM-Trueheart General Weedeo DepTel 243 of 25 August had already been in part discussed before Richardson's arrival Lodge and rest of the group accepted this cable as a command decision the· tenor of the meeting was simply that of proceeding with instructions Lodg e did not ask for comments or general discussion relatin_g to the advisability or inadvisability of the action contemplated Lodge-'s approach appeared to be that we should do everything possible to implement these instructions immediately and· with maximum speed the only discussion at this time related as reported in SAIG 0296 to the question of whether Diem should be given an option of removin g Nhu General Harkins was st ongly in favor · -- • - J • - - ···c - • Approved for Release 2024 08 05 C0626587 4 C06265874 - ' j '· Approved for Release 2024 08 05 C06265 74 t - •• · - I' -----· -3- of giving Diem an option Lodge Trueheart and· Richardson believed that Diem would not accept such an opti on·and that providing him with the option would ·further alert him to· the possibilities of a coup effort against him_ consequently Lodge originated a message to State recommending against providing Diem with the opti·on· of -removin_g Nhu Trueheart· took the lead in the· formulation of this· recommendation during the discussionJ in yiew of the fact that this message was· going· forward and because the Ambassador was to present his credentials to President Diem on the morning of 26 August no other action vis-a-vis Vietnamese personalities was contemplated pri9r to re eipt_ of Washington's response and the completion of Lodge 1 s·presentation of credentials Lodge and Harkins pr9posed that the Station convey guidances contained in DepTel 243 to Generals Khanh Khiem Don and perhaps Dinh As stated in this communication Harkins said that if necessary ·he would be willing to convey these guidances directly to the Vietnamese Generals • i 26 August _ VOA broadcast stating ARVN not responsible for pagoda raids but blaming 1 t on· _ARVN Special For·ces and secret police headed by Counsellor Nhu Ambassador Lodge presented credentials to President Diem 26 August 1- r I After Ambassador's presentation of cred ntials 'on the morning of 26 August Lodge called a meeting at his residence attended by Lodge Barkins Trueheart and Richardson Meck1in· USIS Director was inadvertently present and Ambassador-ailowed him to remain Lodge decided that Harkins was to take no initiative w ith Vietnamese generals and that the American official hands should not show in terms of American· official hands he asked Richardson also_ not to• participate in discussions with Vietnat Uese on coup questions during this meeting of 26 August Richardson asked Lodge whether he Lodge interpreted DepTel 243 as an instruction to act and Lodge stated he did again ·there was no discussion on the overall advisability or inadvis·abili ty of proceeding with the action as stated SAI G 0300 the decision was ·- · -- ·• £°PO• _ ' I l -----· --·--- I c -6 _ _' • - f· ' 'C• - -·'· Approved for Release 2024 08 05 C0626587 4 - - 1 CU6L65874 •• '3 • - i Approved for Release 2024 08 05 C0626587 4 - ·- __ -4-· taken during this meeting at Lodge's home that CAS · would ·make contact immediately· with Generals Khanh and Khiem It cannot be recalled whether much if any discussion was devoted to whether we should• fan out and make contact with a variety of Viet-namese· military personalities we were not sure of Don and Dinh nd Richardson's calculation was that we would be able to get the _word to he generals as securely and effectively_ through Khanh and Khiem· · the latter bei g _in a reasonably_ strong and central ·position and according to Khanh enjoying Khanh's ·full confidence as it turned out during the process of these few days the guidances reached to· our knowledge Generals Duong Van Minh Tran Van·Minh and Le Van Kim·- the latter through the intermediary of Mr Rufus Phillips who provided Kim with Ambassador Lodge's personal assurances ·of support· and of backing for the CAS demarcheo ' 26 August Conein General -Khiem meeting· a Nine points explained to· Khiem see re erence a for listing of nine p·oints These nine points· had been cleared in written form by Trueheart who participated in drafting prior to their submission to either Khanh or Khiem b Khiem asked that the nine points not be raised with General Don c Conein to be taken to-General Minh d Khiem concurred in Spera contact with Khanho 26 August Spera General Khanh meeting in Pleiku - a Khanh not ready _ to move ·now b wait until Counsellor Nhu moves in the direction of accommodation with the DRV c disturbed because contact had been ade with General Khiem without prior approval from him Kh8 nh d Kh iem asked ·tha t contact not be made with General Dinh e asked if USG ·would give asylum and support to families of the coup prin ipalso 27 August National Assembly elections postponedo 27 Aµgust Conetn General Khiem meeting a Khiem asked for the meeting b Khiem stated that at a meeting of the G n rals at th JGS it was agr ed that a -coup T - Approved for Release 2024 08 05 C0626587 4 C06265874 _ _ ____ -· Approved for Release 2024 08 05 C06265874 1· -'1 - -- -5- d'etat was· to take place within one week c the coup group was to be headed by General·Duong Van Minh see SAIG 0346 for additiona l names d Generals Dinh and Cao to be neutralized e Colonel Tung is the primary target f Vice President Tho is aware of the plan and supports it g the new government would not be a mi1itary·ju ta but a mixture of civilian and military h · General Minh does not want direct contact i General Khiem does not want direct contact except through Major Nhon with Spera j there should be no more discussion of cutting· off aid since it was confusing the· various · elements k Khiem was assured of fact USG would attempt support the families in the event attempted coup was a failureo 28 August Spera General I hiem meeting a made arrangements for a meeting between Spera Conein and Khiem Minh b Lt Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao saw Khiem the previous day· 27 August stating he and Huynh Van Lang were· planning a coup - asked for Khiem's participation c Khiem stated Colonel Vien Airborne Commander was Counsellor Nhu 1 s man d cites forces available to the generals and states can also count on Marine Commander Lt Colonel Nguyen Khang 29 At1gust At 0745 hours Richardson Spera and Conein ·l tter two of whom were scheduled to contact Generals Minh and Khiem at 0815 same morning were shown a message from General Maxwell Taylor to General Paul Harkins stating aspects of Vietnam situation being reviewed· at White House and commenting that second thoughts were beginning in Washington faced with this information and given strictly limited time factors 1-Zichardson decided that the meeting with Generals Minh and Khiem should not be postponed but that conts cting officers would make this meeting a factf i ndj_ng mission without encouraging or discouraging Gen eral Minh 29 August · Conein Spera meeting with Generals Minh and Khiem 0815 hours · a Minh and Khiem reviewed reasons for caution b Generals stated that the USG had built ARYN Special Forces into Can Lao Army '_ - '°' Ci r -- - - -----·-- · · ·c _ ' Approved for Release 2024 08 05 C06265874 • Y 1 - --··•·-··--- c C06265874· • - - -• - - -- ·l i -· • r-f-'-- · -s _ ___ Approved for Release 2024 o·aios C0626587 4 T '- ___ ·-6-· c Generals want firm evidence that USG will ba·ck d feeling is hat the Generals have a plan but will not discuss _it - mentioned that Dinh ·would have to be neutra•liz•ed e Genera_l Minh said that USG ·should stop economic aid to force Nhu 's· hand -· -this would give the Generals a moral reason for revolt since could then clalm that without aid VC would win f Minh paid lip-service to loyalty to President Diem g stated Vice President Tho had -lost much prestige lately h military· gove·rnment was inevitable for in i tial period o them ·1 ·29 A ugust ·Rufus Phillips meeting with Bui Diem Dai Viet politician and oppositionist _and General Le Van Kim a infonned Phillips of the Spera Conein Minh Khiem meeting see above - Kim conf us ed Spera for Richardson - asked if Spera Conein meeting had ·_blessing of Ambassador Lodge b at subsequent meeting same night Phillips ·confirmed that Ambassador had given ull blessing c Kim stated Conein should contact Khiem on morning of 30 Augus t d Minh needs American assistance on the actual specifics ·of a pla n - ow it should be carried out and what support the USG would render e _Ambassador authorized the contact with Khiem a nd sta ted we ·can volunteer b 1 ·assist in tactical plannin_go b 3 30 Au_gust l 7 report received to eff°ect that GVN wou·ld arrest · e n e r a l s within 24 hours warning was to have been pa_ssed through Major Nhieu by Colonel Newman Nhieu could not be reached Newman called Kim residenca but feels p one tapped and person imitating Kim answered Newman finally talked with Madame Kim Kimis aide was sent to escort Newman and Colonel Strickler to Kim 1 s residence 30 August In gram Lt Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao meeting · a Thao who claims be associa_ted with Dr Tran Kim Tuyen and Huynh Van Lang met with generals evening of 29 August b Thao claimed generals Khiem Minh and Khanh would support coup if someone else starts· c military would support Vice President Tho d Generals have too much to iose to start coup prestige position fine living etco e Thao -- -r s - ---sv · ' · r - -- - · l· · · - ·c Approved for Release 2024 08 05 C0626587 4 · - C06265874 _ _ - - ••J • ' • Approved for Release 2024 08 05 C0626587 4 ' -·· I i · I '--- I ' i - -7- t indicated his opposition to Nhu f claims_ will execute coup within one monthj g listed proposed members new government see SAIG 0483 · 30 August 31 August 31 August Station sought meeting with General Khiem who passed word through Major Nhon that he was too busy Khiem was called to the Palace Lodge decided that General Harkins would seek meeting with Khiem Station suspended contacts until results of the Harkins Khiem meeting were known ordnance list of Colonel Tung's Long Thanh Camp was turneq over as bonafides of USG intentions General Harkins meeting with Gener·a 1 Khiem General Harkins was authorized to meet with General Khiem to give Khiem assurances of USG backing Khiem showed a reluctance to talk and suggested that Harkins meet with General Minh -Khiem commented that Minh had called off the planning and was working on other methods which R hiem would not describe Khiem further states tbe Generals were not ready as they did not have enou gh forces under their control Harkins decides not to give General Khiem assurances which he had been authorized to impart Ambassador Lodge approved H2 rkinst decision on 31 Augu t after Harkins reported subsequently approval of Harkins 1 decision was also received from the State Department Rufus Phillips meeting with General Kim a Kim sts ted Nim clearly knmvs of coup plotting but that planuing was to continue but tightly compartmented b Kim did not know that Khiem had seen P a rkins on the morning of 31 August and was sure that Minh did not either c Phillips informed Kim that Khiem had told Harkins that the Generals could do nothing and planning had ceased - perhaps best solution was· for Nhu to become Prime Minister with military s- 1pport c I Kim reacted violently stated Khiem did not speak for rest of generals - Nhu unacceptable 7 - ·- ' ·c a· r rr P 1 i - - _______ ___ _ _ _ • --- r-- - ' • '- • ' I' -__ _ _ ·c --' Approved for Release 2024 08 05 C0626587 4 - - 1 -- C06265874 • 't• - - Approved for Release 2024 08 05 C0626587 4 ' '- _ -8- · - I e Khiam possibly turned against coup group and· playing lone hand f ·xim suggests a meeting betwee·n Ambassador Lodg_e· and General Minh Second meeting between Rufus Phillips and General· im after Phillips had -sought to see·Ambassador Lodge Phillips saw Lt Colonel Dunn Ass istant to the Ambassador who made the decision without reference to· the Ambassador that meeting between Ambassador-Lodge and General Minh would be undesir able Significant _points of Phillips General Kim meeting a Khiem had not informed Minh-of his previous meeting with Harkins b Nhu was aware of the plot c a Colonel Cuong was reportedly contac ted by unspecified Americans o Kim trans-· mitted following from General Minh a ARVN · Special Forces were on fu11 alert - coup attempt· would esult in certain fai ure b planning had not been discontinued c Nhu not acceptable under a6y conditions · d Generals did not lack the will - they lacked the means e since no overt action had been taken by the USG against Nhu people were not aware the USG was not still supportipg Nhu f Kim questions Khiem's· e iabilityo 2 September· Times of Vie tnam headlines ·story entitled CIA Financing Planned Coup d' Etat 2 Correlative Commentary Although various preliminary eetings had been held as outlined in the chronology above prior to 26 August 1 the Station began i t_s action plan upon receipt of instructions from A tu bassador Lodge after his credentials presentation on the morning of 26 August Both General Khiem and General Khanh were contacted that day and the nine pointstt were explained which in our judgment constituted a clear call for actiono Both Spera and Conein state-that during their meeting with General Minh on 29 August General Minh confirmed that he T- as twa·re of the nine points '' Our assumption is that General Kniem acquainted Minh with these points and the approaches made by Coueino Spera was inrormed by General Khanh on 26 August that Khanh was p coceeding illliuediately to Saigon to discuss the situation with Minh and ·Khiem - _in the latter's case Kha nh had indicated that he regretted that J hj_em had been cut in prior to - I YERO l - C' R-Y c - n -- - · Approved for Release 2024 08 05 C0626587 4 _y · co6265874 ' ___ ·_ _ -' ·- ' - -- ' --- Approved for Release 2024 08 65 C0626587 4 -9- receiving his Yt hanh 's consent To ·our direct knowledge the_n the three principal generals were promptly informed of the guidance contained in DepTel 243 and of the need for act ion Both Conein and Spera were advised by Khiem and Khanh respectively not to see General Don They considered General Dinh unreliable and a target to be neutralized 3 Throughout Lodge and Trueheart ·followed these developments closely and in detail We reported to Trueheart on an item-by-item basis and also reported on a number of occasions directly to the Ambassador The Ambassador's· emphasi_s· throughout was on the earliest possible action by· the generals · Trµeheart ·together with Smith Conein and Richardson explored the developments and possibilities exhaustively on a day-to-day basis and on a 24-hour basis Trueheart' s emphasis wa s ·consistently on the need to get a coup started Richardson encouraged launching a coup as soon as possible consistent with the probability o success This position was in response to Agency communications and in· response to· President Kennedy's correspondence to Ambassador Lodge · 4c ·The passage of the nine points constituted ·a call to action Conein told General Khiem we were 100% behind the effort whereas Spera did not discuss timing with General Khanh Ambassador Lodge passed his personal assurances through Phillips to General im Assurances w re given of _the USG's agreement· to assist the families of the coup principals in the event ·of failure On 26 August General Khiem had given assura·nce of action within one weeke The s·ta tion elected to approach this action with the General officers rather than with the officers below General officer ·rank since we felt we were in contact with the most powerfully placed senior officers where the best chance lay as well as protection of the USG and Vietnamese security thereby avoiding starting various movements·which would not be coordi11ated at a central point and thus counter-productive There was a clear distinction between our full encourage-ment and a tually being in a position to put together the ingredients for a successful coup The actual composition and t e launching of this action clearly lay -with the generals and the Station was· not _in a position to engineer the actual coup ·The Ambassad r who after all had not been in Saigon even a week was not- able understa nd bly to provide _specific guidance· in terms of tactics or weighing the possibiiities involved Trueheart entered - • t Y E ROl P 'f ' '--i Cfn-· _· 1 ·_- re __ Approved for Release 2024 08 05 C06265874 - • 'C06265874· - · • _ ·---1 • _ Approved for Release 2024 08 05 ·co626587 4 • __ - -- _ • 4 _ _ -10- '1 deep·ly into the operational picture_ and came up with a considerable number of suggestions· as· the effort deve·lopedo A significant factor was that at no·time did we have sufficient details allowing for a definitive and reasonable· assessment of the feasibility of success or failure of a coup action permitting a review of the _da ta by_ G eneral Harkins or Washingtono 5o The developments of 29 August relate to the Maxwell Taylor cable to General Harkins as reported in SAIG 05200 When Spera and Conein retJ 1rned from their meeting wi_th Khiem and Minh 1 we proceeded to Trueheartrs office to make our report o The Ambassado r came in and Richards n · advised him of our meeting with General Weede of Ta_ylorrs cable and of the decisions which Richardson had made as a result of the Taylo cable Lodge was angry and expressed the view that Richardson s decision had destroyed the possibilities of carrying out a coup Richardson expressed a firm dissenting opiniono · Con•ein stated during this meeting that he thought the decision had adversely affected the meeting with General Minh Spera stated he f e 1 t the Generals were not ready regardless of what we could have said RJchardson 's review· of the record leads him to conclude nowr as· he did on 29 -August P that the Taylor cable incident had no actual effect_ on the development f coup possibilities 6 When Richardson saw Trueheart that afternoon and told him that he ·felt it obligatory to report this development to his headquarters Trueheart said h felt the Ambassador had already forgotten the matter he went on to expres·s the reservations incorporated in SA IG ·0520 1 Paragraph 1 Since that timel there has been no further discussion of this matter_ between Lodge and -l1icha rdson or between Trueheart· and Richardson On Sunday afternoon 21 September Richardson informed True eart that he had sent in a cable for internal Agency records a few days beforeD Trueheart made no _comment other than 'to e press his understanding of Richafdson ts· position that the professional record had to be kept Richardson az pects no repercussions from Trueheart 1 s knowledge that R cha ·dson bad reported this development Trueheart clearly understands· that the report was made reasonably well after this particular coup operatio had apparently come to an endr • 7-a As re1xn·ted in SAIG 0485 Lodge held a meeting on 30 August with H ark ns 1 Trueheart and Cone in and he instruc ted ·- · - - -- • - -- YERC'' - - - • f C ' ' ' J • J ' • - r Approved for Release 2024 08 05 C0626587 4 C06265874· fl · - • •••' - · ' • I· •• ¥ • Approved for Release 2024 08 05 C0626587 4 - - • • ·' · -11- Harkins to continue coup discussions with General Khiem as contained in the Station's cable ·Before these instructions were issued Richardson had advised the pa_rticipants that he did not believe the generals had a specific pla or felt themselves ready to act Richardson did this ·because· Lodge had previously stated during the course of these deve·lop- · ments that once General Harkins -was thrown-into a-posture· of active coup J ' lotting directly with Vietnamese generals the USG might wel• l have reached -a point of no return in its relations with Vietnam Consequently Richardson wished to enter his assessment and reservation on the record during this meeting ven though this assessment was no more than impressionistic ·1 _8 Wit thes·e same considerations in mind · Richardson insured that eneral Harkins receive the report on the Ingram Lt Colonel Thao meeting on the evening of 31 August At the time Richarq on knew that General Harkins was sch eduled to meet with General lChiem the fo1lowing morning and wished him to be aierted'-to the substance of Colonel Thao's report which Richar son was· inclined to accept as accurate However Richardson did not send Harkins a personal evaluation of this report · · 9 On 3 August we reported in SAI G 0499 the results of General Harkins'meeting with General Khiem Harkins had reported this ·'meeting pers·onally to Lodge Trueheart and Richardson that morning -Harkins' conclusion- from which none of the participants dissen ed was that the generals• coup as far a s this phas·e was concerned had come to an end We received no instructions to continue efforts with the generals towar'c1 the objective of achieving a coup Subse quently the Ambassador's instructions were and continue to be that when the subject of launching a coup is brought up _in conversation with us ·we are neither to encourage nor discourage coup plotters but listen to their comments with an open-minded or sympathetic interest Approximately one week ago Truehea t informed Richardson that Washington wanted to be assured that we did not find ourselves inadvertently involved in sparking or cranking up a coup In this connection it·should be pointed out that we have not informed the generals of any change in USG posture as represented by the nine points In other words the USG call for coup action remains operative ·-in the generals I minds Richardson made this point to Trueheart and Colby separately on 28 September l · - --· f0 4-·' -· · Approved for Release 2024 08 05 C0626587 4 - C C06265874 Approved for Release 2024 08 05 C0626587 4 10 • As late as two or three days ago Ambassador Lodge in response to Richardson's question confirmed again his previous guidance tl lat we are neither to discourage nor encourage coup plotting btut to receive information with open minded or svmpathetic interest • I 11 iin preparation for Colbyts visit to Saigon with Secretary of Defense McNamaraf Richardson raised the possibility with Lodge and Trueheart of Colbyfs visiting Generals Khanl 1 2 K hiem and'perhaps General Duong Van Minh These visits would be made within the framework of Colby's membership in a highranking of Ucial USG visitors team Richardson thought that McNamara's group might constitute a natural context for Colby to see one or 'the other of these officers It seemed possible that if any of -t hese officers wished to open up a subject privately with Colby they might have the opportunity to do so Lodge and Trueheart 'expressed strong reservations about Colby rs visiting th g nerals in question r I 1 I 'i i i I ' ' I ' ··y -· ·- - · •·- ' I · i • · Ytr Rdl -- or- Approved for Release 2024 08 05 C06265874 r