·--···--·----------- - ····•-··-·-- i ··-·· • - ·-···--·- 3 I ·- ' · •J • _ -' Mi - 1 iI i C1 25X1A I' Approved F elease lQ Q 1 SJ NLF-16-5--11-3 I 30 October 1963 WASH - · PASS FOL FLASH MSG p SECRET - VIA CAS SAIGON-206 FROM AMBASSADOR LODGE DTG 30 1030Z TO SECSTATE WASH EYES ONLY FOR RUSK HARRIMAN BALL HILSMAN HUG S g OSD EYES ONLY FOR MCNAMARA GILPATRIC WM WHITE HOUSE EYES ONLY MCGEORGE BUNDY 25X1A INFO FOR ADM FELT EYES ONLY CIA EYES ONLY MCCONE 1 CARTER HELMS REF c CAS WASHINGTON 79109 C 1 WE MUST OF COURSE 1 GET BEST POSSIBLE ESTIMATE OF CHANCE OF COUP'S SUCCESS AND THIS ESTIMATE MUST COLOR OUR THINKING BUT 0 00 NOT THINK WE HAVE THE POWER TO DELAY OR DISCOURAGE A COUP DON HAS MADE IT CLEAR MANY TIMES THAT THIS IS A VIETNAMESE AFFAIR IT IS THF ORETICALLY POSSIBLE FOR US TO TURN OVER THE INFORMATION WHICH HAS BEEN GIVEN TO US IN CONFIDENCE TO DIEM AND THIS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY STOP THE COUP AND WOULD MAKE TRAITORS OUT OF US FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES THEREFORE I WOULD SAY THAT WE HAVE VERY LITTLE INFLUENCE ON WHAT IS ESSENTIALLY A VIETNAMESE AFFAIR IN ADDITION THIS WOULD PLACE THE HEADS OF THE GENERALS THEIR CIVILIAN SUPPORTERS AND LOWER MILITARY OFFICERS ON THE BLOCK THEREBY SACRIFICING A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY Presidential Library review of State equities required 0 Approved For Release 2og 1- q 8 1 e ·16-5-1---11-3 •· k' l l i i ' l• t vii J · D CLASSIFIED AUTHORITY @CBY l 6 H V 'Rh0m1M ¥ NLF DATE •I h lo 1 Approved For 4ase 2001 08 16 NLF-16-5-1----3 C - 2 - LEADERSHIP NEEDED TO CARRY THE WAR AGAINST THE VC TO ITS SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION AFTER OUR EFFORTS NOT TO DISCOURAGE A COUP AND THIS CHANGE OF HEART WE WOULD FORECLOSE ANY POSSIBILITY OF CHANGE OF THE GVN FOR THE BETTER DIEM NHU HAVE DISPLAYED NO INTENTIONS TO DATE OF A DESIRE TO CHANGE THE TRADITIONAL METHODS OF CONTROL THE POWER POSITION OR SOLIDARITY OF THE NGO FAMILY THROUGH POLICE ACTION OR TAKE ANY ACTIONS WHICH WOULD UNDERMINE THIS 1 DESPITE _ IF OUR ATTEMPT TO THWART C THIS COUP ERE SUCCESSFUL WHICH WE DOUBT IT IS OUR FIRM ESTIMATE OUR HEAVY PRESSURES DIROCTED DEPTEL 534 -- • C G THAT YOUNGER OFFICERS SMALL GROUPS OF MILITARY WOULD THEN ENGAGE IN AN ABORTIVE ACTION CREATING CHAOS IDEALLY SUITED TO VC OBJECTIVE 2 WHILE WE WILL ATTEMPT A COMBINED ASSESSMENT IN A FOLLOW- 'C ING MESSAGE TIME HAS NOT YET PERMITTED SUBSTANTIVE EXAMINATION OF THIS MATTER WITH GENERAL HARKINS MY GENERAL VIEW IS THAT THE U S IS TRYING TO BRING THIS MEDIEVAL COUNTRY INTO THE 20TH CENTURY AND THAT WE HAVE MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS IN MILITARY AND ECONOMIC WAYS BUT 'IO GAIN VICTORY WE MUST ALSO BRING THEM INTO • THE 20TH CENTURY POLITICALLY AND THAT CAN ONLY BE DONE BY EITHER A THOROUGH GOING CHANGE IN THE BEHAVIOR OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OR BY ANOTHER GOVERNMENT THE VIET CONG PROBLEM IS PARTLY MILITARY BUT IT IS ALSO PARTLY PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL 3 WITH RESPECT 'ID PARA 3 REF I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE OUR PRESENT POSTURE OF KEEPING HANDS OFF BUT CONTINUE TO MONITOR AND PRF8S FOR MORE DETAILED INFORMATION · _ T ' · _ • N't • Approved For Release 2001 08 16 NLF-16-5-1---11-3 ··-7 - ---·----- CAS HAS BEEN c 0 f- -0 c p I - • · · Approved For ase 2001 08 - LF-16-5-1---3 •l' Jl l 1 ' t 3 t · _· t _ - 3 - ANALyzJNG POTENTIAL COUP FORCES FOR SOME TIME AND IT IS THEIR ESTIMATE THAT THE GENERALS HAVE PROBABLY FIGURED THEIR CHANCES PRETTY CLOSELY AND PROBABLY ALSO EXPECT THAT ONCE THEY BEGIN TO MOVE 1 NOT ONLY PLANNED UNITS BUT OTHER UNITS WILL JOIN THEM WE BELIEVE THAT VIETNAM'S BEST GENERALS ARE INVOLVED IN DIRECTING THIS EFFORT o IF THEY CAN'T PULL IT OFF IT IS OOUBTFUL OTHER MILITARY LEADERSHIP COULD DO SO SUCCESSFULLY THAT THE GENERALS WOULD BE RETICENT IT IS UNDERSTANDABL 0 TO REVEAL FULL DETAILS OF THEIRo l t' PLAN FOR FEAR OF LEAKS TO THE GVN 4 25X1 RE PARA 4 REF · WE EXPECT THAT CONEIN WILL MEET N THE NIGHT OF 30 OCT OR EARLY MORNING 31 OCT C 5X e 0 1-1 l 0 2' WE AGREE WITH PARA C § THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR DETAILS AND QUESTION 2 r S TO HIS ESTIMATE OF THE RELATIVE STRENGTHS OF OPPOSING FORCES WE DO NOT BELIEVE HOWEVER THAT WE SHOULD SHOW ANY SIGNS OF ATTEMPTING TO DIRECT THIS AFFAIR OURSELVES OR OF GIVING THE IMPRESSION OF SECOND THOUGHTS ON THIS VIETNAMESE INITIATIVE IN THE MEANTIME WE WILL RESPOND SPECIFICALLY TO CAS WASHINGTON 79126 P EASE NOTE THAT CAS SAIGON 2059 CORRECTS CAS SAIGON 2023 AND TWO REGIMENTS OF THE 7TH DIVISION ARE INCLUDED IN THE COUP FORCES g5c1 APPARENTLY PARA 5 REF OVERLOOKS CAS SAIGON 1445 1 s 2 C 1963 WHICH GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF THE FACE TO FACE MEETING OF 5 X 25 1 AND CONEIN A IN ·s JffTION AND THROUGH THE SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENT OF SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED 25X1C Approved For Release 20QH 08 1 • · · -16-5-1---11-3 - Approved For a e 2001 ' 9 _6 -5-1---3 - 4 - _ 25X1C - A S PAR_TICIPATING IN A PLAN TO CHANGE THE GOVERNMENT SX 1C PLEASE NOTE T - REMARKS PARALLEL IN EVERY WAY THE LATER 25X1 C STATEMENTS OF X1C ro Ill AND W BELIEVE THAT THE LIMITATION OF CONTACT CONEIN IS AN APPROPRIATE SECURITY MEASURE CONSONANT WITH OUR URGING THAT THE SMALLEST NUMBER OF PERSONS BE AWARE OF THESE DETAILS 6 WE 25X1 DO NOT BELIEVE IT WISE HIS PLANS TO GEN STILWELL '00 ASK THAT THE VIETNAMESE BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE MEMBERS OF THE U S MILITARY WHO LEAK TO THE GOVERNMENT OF VI ETNAM I DO NOT DOUBT THAT THIS IS AN UNJUST SUSPICION BUT IT IS A FACT THAT THIS SUSPICION EXISTS AND THERE IS NO USE IN 0 c 0 PRETENDING THAT IT DOES NOT 7 c I MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR FURNISHING THE BERTH UIPPED MILITARY AIRCRAFT WHICH I TRUST IS A JET I INTEND TO TELL PAN r- 0 r '1- AMERICAN THAT A JET HAS BEEN DIVERTED FOR MY USE AND THEREFORE I WILL NO LONGER NEED THEIR SERVICES 'ro THE NEWSPAPERS AND SUSPICION THE THIS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY LEAK GVN MAY STUDY THIS MOVE WITH SOME I WILL ANSWER ANY INQUIRIES ON THIS SCORE TO THE EFFECT THAT I AM MOST PLEASED BY THIS ATTENTION AND THAT THIS IS OBVIOUSLY DONE AS A MEASURE TO INSURE MY COMFORT AND SAVE MY TIME • TO ALLAY SUSPICIONS FURTHER I WILL OFFER SPACE ON THE AIRCRAFT TO MACV FOR EMERGENCY LEAVE CASES ETC AND HANDLE THIS IN AS ROUTINE FASHION AS POSSIBLE I WISH TO RESERVE COMMENT AS TO MY ACTUAL TIME OF DEPARTURE UNTIL I HAVE SOME ADDITIONAL INFORMATION C B PEFULLY TOMORROW Approved For Release 200 ·16-5-1---11-3 I _ • -I • ' ' Approved For eease 2001 08 16_ _ -16-5-1-1-3 •- _ - - -•---· - ' I · ' c_-i _ i' _ L - 6'' t l 11 - 5 - 8 YOUR PARA 7 SOMEWHAT PERPLEXES ME IT DOES NOT SEEM SENSIBLE TO HAVE THE MILITARY IN CHARGE OF A MATTER WHICH IS SO PROFOUNDLY POLITICAL AS A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN FACT I WOULD SAY TO DO THIS WOULD PROBABLY BE THE END OF ANY HOPE FOR A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT HERE THIS IS SAID IMPERSONALLY AS A GENERAL PROPOSITION SINCE GEN HARKINS IS A SPLENDID GENERAL AND AN OLD i FRIEND OF MINE TO WHOM I WOULD GLADLY ENTRUST ANYTHING I HAVE I ASSUME THAT THE EMBASSY AND MACV ARE ABLE TO HANDLE NORMAL ACTIVITIES UNDER A THAT CAS CAN CONTINUE COUP CONTACTS UNDER B AND AS R XiARDS 1 C WE MUST SIMPLY 00 THE VERY BEST WE CAN IN THE LIGHT OF EVENTS AFTER THE COUP HAS STARTED c· HOWEVER 9 WE APPRECIATE THE STEPS TAKEN AS OUTLINED IN PARA 8 WE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT THE GVN IS NOT TOTALLY INEPT IN ITS FOREIGN SOUNDINGS AND THAT THESE MOVES SHOULD BE AS DISCREET AND SECURITY CONSCIOUS AS POSSIBLE I WOULD OF COURSE CALL FOR THESE FORCES ONLY IN CASE OF EXTREME NECESSITY SINCE MY HOPE COINCIDES WITH THE GENERALS THAT THIS WILL BE AN ALL VIETNAMESE AFFAIR 10 WE ANTICIPATE THAT AT THE OUTSET OF THE COUP UNLESS IT MOVF s WITH LIGHTNING SWIFTNESS THE GVN WILL REQUEST ME OR GEN HARKINS TO USE OUR INFLUENCE TO CALL IT OFF I BELIEVE OUR RESPONSE TO THIS SHOULD BE THAT OUR INFLUENCE CERTAINLY COULD NOT BE SUPERIOR TO THAT OF THE PRESIDENT WHO IS COMMANDER IN CHIEF 0 Approved For Release 20 -16-5-1---11-3 c 0 v 0 l- o r 0 Approved Fo_ r ase 200 -1-6-5-1 • - 3 - 6 - 0 AND THAT IF HE IS UNABLE 'IO CALL IT OFF WE WOULD CERTAINLY BE UNABLE 'IO DO SO AND WOULD MERELY BE RISKING AMERICAN LIVES ATTEMPTING TO INTERFERE IN THIS VIETNAMESE PROBLEM THE GOVERN- MENT MIGHT R UEST AIRCRAFT HELIOCOPTERS FOR THE EVACUATION OF KEY PERSONALITIES THIS WOULD HAVE 'IO BE STUDIED CLOSELY BUT WE WOULD CERTAINLY NOT COMMIT OUR PLANES AND PILOTS BETWEEN THE BATTLE LINES OF THE OPPOSING FORCES WE SHOULD RATHER STATE THAT WE WOULD BE WILLING 'IO ACT IN THIS FASHION DURING A TRUCE I N 0 J WHICH BOTH _SIDES AGREE TO THE REMOVAL OF KEY PERSONALITIES I u l BELIEVE THAT THERE WOULD BE IMMEDIATE POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN ATTEM NG TO TAKE THESE PERSONALITIES 'ro ANOTHER NEIGHBORING COUNTRY AND PRO-e CJ THE ABSENCE OF BABLY WE WOULD BE BEST SERVED IN DEPOSITING THEM IN SAIPAN WHERE v 0 PRESS COMMUNICATIONS ETC WOULD ALLOW US SOME b c LEEWAY TO MAKE A FURTHER DECISION AS TO THEIR ULTIMATE DISPOSITI ON IF SENIOR VIETNAMESE PERSONALITIES AND THEIR FAMILIES R UESTED ASYLUM IN THE EMBASSY OR OTHER AMERICAN INSTALLATIONS WE WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO GRANT IT IN LIGHT OF OUR PREVIOUS ACTION WITH RESPECT TO TRI QUANG THIS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PRESENT LATER PRO- BLEMS BUT HOPEFULLY THE NEW GOVERNMENT MIGHT FEEL DISPOSED TO HELP US SOLVE THIS PROBLEM NATURALLY ASYLUM WOULD BE GRANTED ON THE SAME BASIS AS THE BUDDHISTS I E PHYSICAL PRESENCE AT THE EMBASSY OR OTHER LOCATION 11 AS TO R UESTS FROM THE GENERALS THEY MAY WELL HAVE 0 NEED OF FUNDS AT THE LAST MOMENT WITH WHICH '1'0 BUY OFF POTENTIAL C Approved For Release 20011osi1 s·· · NLF-16-5-1---11-3 ' _ - 1 - -- - · • -- --·--- · - V a S'-- - Approved For ase 2001 08 16 NLF-16-5-1 -3 Tr ' - _ I J - · 7 - --·- · C_ ' ' - OPPOSITION TO THE EXTENT THAT THESE FUNDS CAN BE PASSED DIS- CREETLY I BELIEVE WE SHOULD FURNISH THEM PROVIDED WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE PROPOSED COUP IS SUFFICIENTLY WELL ORGANIZED TO HAVE A GOOD CHANCE OF SUCCESSo IF THEY ARE SUCCESSFUL THEY WILL UNDOUBTEDLY ASK FOR PROMPT RECOGNITION AND SOME ASSURANCE THAT MILITARY AND WE SHOULD B E PREPARED i MAKE THESE STATEMENTS IF THE ISSUE IS CLEARCUT · PREDICATING OUR ECONOMIC AID WILL CONTINUE AT NORMAL LEVEL 'ro 0 POSITION ON THE PRESIDENT'S STATED DESIRE TO CONTINUE THE WAR AGAINST THE VC TO FINAL VICTORY VOA MIGHT -BE AN IMPORTANT MEANS Li o l l' ' ffi 0 C OF DISSEMINATING THIS MESSAGE SHOULD THE COUP FAIL WE -WILL HAVE TO PICK UP THE PIECES AS BEST WE CAN AT THAT TIME WE HAVE A COMMITMENT TO THE GENERALS FROM THE AUGUST EPISODE TO ATTEMPT ·- -c C v 0 TO HELP IN THE EVACUATION OF THEIR DEPENDENTS WE SHOULD TRY TO LIVE UP TO THIS IF CONDITIONS WILL PERMIT • AMERICAN COMPLICITY WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE CHARGED AND THERE MIGHT BE SOME ACTS TAKEN AGAINST SPECIFIC PERSONALITIES WHICH WE SHOULD ANTICIPATE AND MAKE PROVISION AGAINST AS BEST WE CAN SHOULD THE COUP PROVE INDECISIVE AND A PROTRACTED STRUGGLE IS IN PROGRESS WE SHOULD PROBABLY OFFER OUR GOOD OFFICES TO HELP RESOLVE THE ISSUE IN THE INTEREST OF THE WAR AGAINST THE VC THIS MIGHT HOLD SOME BENEFIT IN TERMS OF CONCESSIONS BY THE GVN WE WILL NATURALLY INCUR SOME OPPROBIUM FROM BOTH SIDES IN OUR ROLE AS MEDIATOR HOWEV THIS OPPROB UM WOULD PROBABLY BE LESS DISTASTEFUL THAN A DEADLOCK WHICH 0 Approved For Release i LF-16-5-1---11-3 f- 0 c p ' · -· - 8 - i J WOULD OPEN THE DOOR TO THE VC WE CONSIDER SUCH A DEADLOCK AS THE LEAST LIKELY POSSIBILITY OF THE THREE 12 AS REGARDS YOUR PARA 10 1 I DO NOT KNOW WHAT MORE PROOF CAN BE OFFERED THAN THE FACT THESE MEN ARE OBVIOUSLY PREPARED TO RISK THEIR LIVES AND THAT THEY WANT NOTHING FOR THEMSELVES 25X1CIF I AM ANY JUDGE OF HUMAN NATURE ' FACE EXPRESSED SINCERITY AND DETERMINATION ON THE MORNING THAT I SPOKE TO HIM HEARTILY AGREE THAT A MISCALCULATION COULD JEOPARDIZE POSITION IN SOUTHEAST 0 a i ASIA - WE ALSO RUN TREMENDOUS RISKS BY DOING NOTHING · IF WE WERE IX w 0 CONVINVED THAT THE COUP WAS GOING TO FAIL WE WOULD OF COURSE Cl DO EVERYTHING WE COULD TO STOP IT 13 c GEN HARKINS HAS READ THIS AND DOES NOT CONCUR C c 0 f-- 0 r i i Approved For Release 2001 6-5-1---11-3 ·---- ·-- ··· ------·· --·-··---· ·• --- -- ····- - _____ ···---· -·---