• -- -- G- Mc_l _ Ka -V • • • • • •I • • AN NBC NEWS WHITE PAPER • VIETNAM HINDSIGHT ' • • ' PART II THE DEATH OF DIEM • • • • • • • • BROADCAST WEDNESDAY DECEMBER 22 1971 10 00 - 11 00 • - • r i _ ' · CREDITS • OpenJ ng T1 t1e NBC NEWS WHITE PAPER VIETNAM HINDSIGHT PART II DEATH OF DIEM Credi ts NBC NEWS WHITE PAPER VIETNAM HINDSIGHT Copyright c The Nationa1 Broadcast ng Co Inc 1971 A11 Rights Reserved Produced and Written By FRED FREED Directed by PAMELA HILL • • Associate Producers ALVIN DAVIS i I I 'I PAMELA HILL ' '' - ' ' ' ' Researcher ' I ' HELEN WHITNEY Production Assistant BARBARA SPENCE Film Researcher JACK GOELMAN • Unit Manager KLAUS HEYS • • I I I ' ' • Film Editors MARY ANN MARTIN STUART M ROSENBERG DAVID J SAUL JEAN BAGLEY • ' ' • • - ' - - t_ -'-' · - - -·· ' ·· · ·· ·-· ' - - - - ' • ' ' ' Supervising Film Editor DARROLD MURRAY ' '' I • PEOPI E WHO WERE IN'l'ERVIEWED FOR VIETNAM HINDSIGHT IN ORDER OF THEIR APPEARANCE AND POSITION HELD AT THE TIME • • GEORGE BALL Under-Secretary 1961-1966 or State MAXWELL TAYLOR M 1 tary Adv ser to JFK - 1961 Cha rman or the Jo nt Ch eCs l 962- 64 • JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH Ambassador to Ind a l 961-63 • DAVID HALBERSTAM Correspondent New York T mes 1962 63 Vietnam WALT M ROSTOW Deputy Special Assistant to the Pres dent · ror National Security 1961•-64 • NHU Wire o Ngo Dinh Nhu sister in law of Ngo Dinh Diem ARTIIUR SCHLESINGER Special Assistant to the President 1961 64 PAUL HARKINS US Military Corrur1ander - Vietna1t1 • 1962-64 • JOHN VANN American Military Adviser in Vietnam MICHAEL FORRESTAL Senior Member - White House National Security Staff 1962-66 • ROGER HILSMAN Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs RUFUS PHILLIPS American AID M ssion - V etnam - i • I C - __ • --------' -2- FREDERICK NOLTING u s Ambassador to South Vietnam 1961-63 LT COL LUCIEN CONEIN CIA - V1 etnam 1961-64 DEAN RUSK Secretary 1961-69 or State GENERAL TON THAT DINH Military Governor - Saigon • • 1963 GENERAL DO MAU Director - Military Security 1 963 •• 'MA TUYEN Leader • Saigon Chinese Co1runun1 ty ' • COL DUONG NGOC LAM Director Civilian Guard 1963 GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH Co1ru11ander 1963 Second Corps - A • • • I 0 • • • VI'I-p 1 ACT VII SLOW ZOOM IN TO XCU DIEM BALL VO LS TROOPS MARCHINGG It was e ther a question MS MME NHU out or • or pu11 ng V etnarn at that time and ••• and or hav ng the Diem regime MS DIEM shape up or BALL SOF r • acing the possibility o some other CU GEORGE BALL regime coming in • • • - CONEIN SOF My instructions with my meeting w th CU LUCIEN CONEIN •• • Gen Duong Van Minh in October or 1963 rom Ambassador Lodge were that I was ' · to inform Gen Minh that the United States government wou1d not thwart their coup MONTAGE SOLDIERS FIGHTING IN SAIGON STREETS • KALBER VO I This 1s the second of two progra111s examining how in the years of John F Kennedy's presidency we slipped deeper • ' into a war in Asia against Asians A war that our most respected military • had a ways warned us against VI I -p 2 committed ourse1vee more deep1y than CUT TO STREET MELEE Kennedy had ntended to winning the war in V 1 etnarn MS OF BURNING PALACE cu KALBER SOF We d d not ask what kind of a government we were supporting we did not ask whether we should be there We were there and we assu111ed that i t was r 1ght that we should be there The queat1on was what would we do how far wou1d we go to win the war • • KALBER VO MONTAGE OF RIOTS IN SAIGON ' In The surmner of 1963 the focus of our attention was the fa1ter1ng government of Ngo Dinh Diem Diem was losing the war what were we going to do about 1t1 CONEIN SOF cu ·coNEIN Now General Don promised me that he would turn over the plans for the coup That I could give this personally to Lodge • Is informed Lodge that this was the agreement IN ZOOM IN TO XCU • I • -· • v r r r --p 1 ACT VIII KALBER VO MONTAGE OF IMMOLATIONS • Between June and October 1963 seven Buddh sts monks burned themselves to death as a protest aga nst the government 0£ Ngo D nh D em has 1ost the support or Dlem h s peop1e To continue to hold power he has to use more and more force MS OF AMERICANS DANCING In August 1963 there are more than VN 12 000 Americans in Vietnam The war costs us a hal a b111 on do11ars a year and we are 1os ng it ' • SLOW ZOOM IN TO WHITE HOUSE • The President of the United States I • sees his range of choices being • ' narrowed ••• MS JFK BACK AT WINDOW FORRESTAL VO I think he had developed a sense or about to get into a trap XCU JFK I I think the President was worried'that • events were moving in a d1rect16 n -1hich might be very PULL BACK hard to reverse or even becbme 1rreversiole MS JFK RUSK STILL KA·LBER VO The issue has bitterly divided his advisers • • • VI t'I -p '2 MS RUSK BACK • • MCNAMARA AT CONFERENCE STILL Some say we have to support D em and concentrate on the war in the XCU RFK r1e1d Others argue that we can't support a corrupt oppress1ve government XCU HARRIMAN They say Diem can't win the war • MS NOLTING AT AIRPORT A h nt or • how the debate inside the administration is going 1s the • or replacement Frederick Nolting as • Ambassador to Saigon No1ting has insisted Diem can win the war and do it without American troops • •• • • CU JFK PAN TO LODGE The man chosen to rep1ace No1t1ng • 1s Henry Cabot Lodge ' CU LODGE Kennedy has decided that he wants • a man in Saigon with '' force or personality '' ZOOM IN TO XCU that will allow him to dominate the situation '' I LODGE SOF RY CABOT LODGE WITH PRESS Well I would tell anybody that America • 1s conu111tted to respect people's • religious convictions and religious • · • I · ff - ' - - ' '-'· ' ° - - -- --'$ - - · - c - -- - -- - t4 u -- - _ -- _ _ ' '- •· · • VII l --p 3 tole ance and that's what I wou1d say to anybody who asked me a quest on about Amer ca MS LODGE CORRESPONDENT VO Does that mean you 1 11 be arriving • on the scene w th sympathy or the Buddhist cause • MS · LODGE SOF ' ' It means I ' l l be arriving on the 'I ' scene as an American who believes I ' ' I ' 'I in religious tolerance •• • • ' ' ' CORRESPONDENT VO ' Do you think there w111 be or shou1d • ZOOM TO CU LODGE be any change in our policies toward - the Vietnam government when you arr1ve there • LOGDE SOF I • • I think the policy of the United States ought to be to help the republic • • of Vietnam to win and maintain its • • • freedom from co1mnunist terrorism J And that any event or any action which is which promotes that objective • we are for • I -- ' · ·• • ·· ' • - • • • ' • LODGE VO and anything which hinders that objective we are against KALBER VO D em•s brother Nhu says ''The Amer1cans are send ng us a pro-Consu1 MONTAGE OF TROOPS IN TRUCKS As Lodge r11es to Vietnam D em suddenly declares martial 1aw • Spec a1 rorces troops whose wages are pa d by the Un ted States Centra1 ' ' Intelligence Agency disguised n '' •• Vietnam army uniforms MONTAGE OF BUDDHISTS ARRESTS begins to carry out raids on Buddh s pagodas all over the country In two • • hours 1400 people are arrested LS DIEM WITH TROOPS CONEIN VO • This man at this point in my estimation figured that he no ionger • needed the Americans • He had to find • another solution for himself • for his cq_untry Ngo Dinh Diem has always wanted one MCU OF VN SOLDIER 1 • DIEM DEPARTS IN CAR I thing • He wanted above all • reunification a d a free Vietnam • • PULL BACK FROM CU • • VI I I -p 5 KALBER VO Lt Co1 Luc en Cone n s the key CIA agent in V etnam 2 SHOT CONEIN McCONE Later he is secretly awarded this medal by CIA Director John McCone CU McCONE He has known Diem since World War II • ZOOM IN TO XCU CONEIN He knows what Diem is thinking now CONEIN SOF • CU CONEIN He had to make a deal w th the peop1e or the north H s brother Ngo D nh Nhu in early 1963 told me persona11y 'I that he was dealing not on1y me •• • he told other people but he to1d me personally that he was dea11ng with • ' the people of North Vietna111 • • CONEIN VO ' Ir he had told this to me the Genera1s MS NHU SMILING ' • knew of this also • LS DIEM INSPECTING TROOPS and they considered this as a danger • because what in the devil were hey CU NHU fighting for if the • • Central government was negotiating behind their backs • TO WEAPONS TO MS DIEM • KALBER l VO Lodge hears from Conein the Generals • • -- _----- - • ' V I 1 Y -p 6 l are p1ann1ng a coup I CtJ OEN They want to know what the Un ted DOH • States' att tude wou1d be ZOOM TO XCU GEN MINH Lodge cab1es Washington It s Saturday when Lodge's cab e LS HELICOP'l'ER LEAVING WHITE HOUSE reaches Wash ngton MONTAGE OF LEISURE SCENES The president 1s weekending at Rusk 1s in New York Hyannisport McNamara 1s on his vacat on 9 McCone son h s honeymoon SLOW ZOOM TO DOOR At George Ball's house wh 1e he gets ready to play tennis the 1ssue s •• discussed and a cab1e drarted • • PAN UP TO CU BALL CU HARRIMAN This cable will be signed by Ba11 It is supported by the 1ibera1s ' Harriman • Hilsman -who are embarrassed by D em 1 8 CU HILSMAN PAN DOWN JFK'S FACE TO HAND repressive policies and who fee1 D em 1s preventing us from winning the war • • BALL SOF • CU BALL I thought that the string had pretty - well run out and if we were going • • to continue to support any regime • ' • • • either Diem had to reform his government and take control or some new gover1u11ent ad to come in • • • • • I V tl I -p 7 ' •• TAYLOR VO HS TAYLOR STILL ' I t author zed Lodge to te11 the - -- Generals that they cou1d count on Amer can support ••• TAYLOR SOF ZOOM IN TO XCU TAYLOR r they took act1on aga1nst D1em so th s n errect was an open nv tat1on to plot and execute a coup aga1nst the D1em government the assurance that the Amer1cans would back up the plotters • •• MCU BALL • • BALL SOF • I called President Kennedy who was in • I • Hyannisport and gave him the contents ' ' • of the cable and I telephoned Secretar Rusk who was in New York and did the • We decided to go ahead with the cable I • saine thing • I • GILPATRIC VO SLOW ZOOM FROM MCU TO XCU GILPATRIC I was at my home in Maryland and late • that night I got a call from Forrestal • • • • MS GILPATRIC GILPATRIC SOF ' I was told that the President had • • VIII-p 8 a1ready c1eared t over the phone w th George Ba11 and that Dean Rusk had been 1nror111ed and I regarded thererore the quest1on or or the contents that cab1e as a po11t1ca1 dec s1on wh ch the State department had the primary responsibility So even though I was somewhat unhappy about the thrust or the cable I d d cJ ear t for the Defense Department TAYLOR VO MS GILPATRIC The f rst that I knew o th s cab1e •• was a telephone ca11 from • Secretary of Defense Roswe11 G 1patr c • • ' Deputy • TAYLOR SOF MCU TAYLOR I was very much d sturbed by what the cable contained and requested l • • ' • a copy of it from the Pentagon I ' r received one later·1n the evening • I I I would say about ten or eleven o'c1ock • that nighta •• the first time I saw the • cable • • ' This of course was a most • '' • • unusual procedure because it meant J that a cable which ••• the content or ' which had enormou impact upon our ' • ' • ---- - - -·-·- 1 • - - - - -·- •- ' - - I' - -- · ·• • VII'I -p 9· po1 cy n South v etnam not on1y that year but even n the present ' • t me ••• was be ng sent out w thout the conc11rrence or the Secretary of' Defense or the Jo1nt Ch ers of' Staf'f' JFK DISEMBARKS TRAVEL SHOT KALBER VO On Monday Kennedy Rusk McNamara and McCone are back n Wash ngton They have second thoughts about the • cab1e • SCHLESINGER SOF • • ' SLOW ZOOM TO CU SCHLESINGER President Kennedy was unhappy about the • August 24th cable • It would be putting it too strongly to say that he thought something had been put over on h m • ' but he thought something had gone out • as a governmental judgment I governmental decision which haQ not • • • • been fully and adequately discussed • • • RUSK SOF • When the three of us got back to to n XCU DEAN RUSK we had a chance to look at the text I or the cable I had the impression that the cable went somewhat further· • than we really wanted to go and we • ' • Vl 1 t-p 1 0 took some steps then to sort ••• pu11 back on that cable a b t HILSMAtl • MS HILSMAN SOP McNamara and McCone had returned and because they had not persona11y approved or were n a pos t on where t • they cou1d ra se object ons and ra se doubts wh ch they d d Th s made • Kennedy very angry HILSMAN VO MS JFK PAN ADVISERS AT CONFERENCE So there was a meet1ng that Monday ' ' was again thorough1y d scussed and I Kennedy ended up by say ng the cabie ' • i ' has just arrived in Sa gon on Sunday ' • I ' • ' I no action has been taken 1t snot I • • I• too late to renege call it back ZOOM IN TO XCU JFK • I ' And he went around the • table and asked each one or them _ CUT TO XCU RUSK • I do you want to withdraw the cab1e CUT TO CU JOHNSON MCNAMARA BALL • • HARRIMAN LODGE GILPATRIC XCU JFK PULL BACK TO MS • • • • And nobody said he did so the cable • I stood ' • • • • • • · ' ' - _ • ' - VI I J -p 1 1 • KALBER VO ZOOM IN ON TELETYPE MACHINE AND HOLD • • Lodge cab1es Kennedy ''we are 1aunched• • on a course rrom wh ch there s no • respectable turning back '' ' ' ' ' FORRESTAL SOF CU FORRESTAL There were I l I 'l ways as there always s ' ' II 1 n Wash ngton slogans ror descr b ng ' I ' l · • v•· -· -· · - · · i ' '• these th ngs one or them that was ' _ ' - ' · ' · ·- •- · I f' ' ' ' • l ' ' • ' · ' -·•·· current at the time was ''that we shoul d - _1 _ - • ' Y • ·· · ' • j I · - ' -- ' · ' · · · C' ' -· ·-· -- • - - ·- -- ' • - • _ _•- i • ' ' ' •' ' • think or ourselves as a good doctor - • •• ' • •· '_J - -- '·fU·' · • - - - ·-fJ with a sick and dying patient j -- ' -- - That r j - -u f•• ·' t i _· ' • ' - •--· '1•j - ' 'of 1 •t _tl o · ' t J i • WI •·• c ---- - _ •1t J the United States had tried everything _ v f - H1 •• l'C•· - _ ''- ff' S ·· • -- •· · • to think or -- -'- 'f iit rt -- - · but had found that the tWt t - --1 '' • • 1 - ·'If ' • t f y- • '- f• patient was simply not savable ' • ' t C 1« ·' '· ' i ' '-' J · · · - ·- • t · 'if i • • • MONTAGE OF ACTIVITY IN SAIGON STREETS • ' • · ·· rt -' ' · · -- ' ' • · · • KALBER VO - · '' _ a•• •• 4 • ·· · The coup 1s scheduled for August 26th •· • • · • •' August 26th passes - nothing happens • _ ·-· ' ' ' ' ' ' 't ' - · · ' -·'·• X Washington waits ' • ' - ' '• - • • I • · HILSMAN VO ' Now we didn't know whether there was GIRL going to be a coup • • • Some or us ••• some people thought there would never be a coup I • ' • • • • • ' ' • TRAVEL SHOT OF VIETNAPt1ESE ' ' · ' HILSMAN SOF So word d dn't rea11y come that 1t MS HILSl·IAN was ore What happened was that over the next week or 10 days t became 1ncreas ngly c1ear that the Genera1s were not go ng to act Then the ssue became what w 11 the Un ted States do» w111 the Un1ted States D em ••• r D em does not change h s policy w111 we go on support ng h m - the repression of the Buddh sts W 11 we go on support ng him in a po1 cy •• of repressing ha1r of his country wh ch • • ' a bound to 1ose the war and drag us • • • down with him n the gnom ny o • attacking the Buddh1sts1 do What do we That became our issue PAN UP TO CU JFK • KALBER VO AT HYANNISPORT Now for the President there s no' • I • • easy choice Diem is the on1y strong • leader in South Vietna111 but he is iosing the XCU JFK • LS JFK CAROLINE AT BEACH HYANNISPORT J war The alternatives are down to two Persuade him to change or agree to • the coup ZE SUPER TITLES • • • - •' ·· lACT IX KALBER VO SLOW ZOOff IN TO WHITE HOUSE AT NIGHT Now -1 n September 1963 V1 etnam is on the Pres1 dent•s m nd PAN DOWN FROM PRESIDENTIAL SEAL TO MS JFK • FORRESTAL VO He spent I th nk probab1y between 15 or and maybe 20 percent h s_t me everyday on the subject • I PULL BACK FROt1 XCU TO MS JFK - STILL thtnk 1t was for h m the beg nn ng or a process of learning so much about • 1 t that he was beg nn ng to get concerned SLOW ZOOM IN TO XCU •• about some of the major prem ses n • which we were operat ng ' ' • • • • • • FORRESTAL SOF • Once he asked whether I thought we CU FORRESTAL 'I hadn't perhaps over estimated our own human resources our own army our own • AID agency our own economic peop1e • I • Over estimated their abilities to be I helpful 12 000 miles aways in a foreign • coµntry • • • And under-estimated or 1 • should say also over estimated the 1 capacity of the Vietnamese goverrut ent ' to absorb this kind • t • • I • • • ' _ - _ I - XX-p 2 o he1p and to use t • KAISER VO PULL BACK FROM CU JFK AT WINDOW H s prob1em s who can he ask The reports rrom the cornmand ng genera1 and the CIA n Sa gon are st 11 optimistic The charts and stat1st cs st 11 show we are w nn ng the war Some MONTAGE OF BUDDHIST IMMOLATIONS or his c1osest adv sers agree In Vietnnm the Buddhists have now • •• • been joined by the students On September 7 800 students are arrested • •• in Saigon The country has turned against Diem • • MS JFK WITH CHET ' HUNTLEY AND DAVID BRINKLEY • The President expresses his concern - •• publicly • on September 9 when he is interviewed SLOW ZOOM IN TO CU JFK - by Chet Huntley and David Brinkley • • I • KE·NNEDY SOF • We don't want to have a repetition or CU JFK • China because that was our most the most damaging event certainly that has occurred to us perhaps in this century When that passed into the control or the • • ' • • -- ·- --- - · - - _ _ _ _ c f - - • • • -- ' • •_ -_ a·-· • ' ' -··J •' • --· _ · • • i_ • ' -· ' ' · · • ··- - • _ -·- · ' ' • • - ' _-· 'c ' • •r _ • ' - ' ' r - • · · CUT TO MCU CHET fflJ1 1'LEY - ·- •· - ' Co1 1a1uni st s KENNEDY VO • '• - ''· • ••• - • ' ' ' ' --- - i _ • What has occurred to us ••• -- _·---- ' ' KENNEDY SOF cu ·· _ ' - ·-·- _· -- _' s the past two months do not g ve us as great an assurance ror success n the strugg1e as was true up to May and June Now we are attempt ng to use our • nr1uence to br 1 ng the s tuat on back • to what 1 t was CUT TO Mc1JAMARA STILL PAN UP TO CU TAYLOR Privately Kennedy's adv sers are •• deeply sp11t over how to get the • situation ''back to what it wa F1 na1 1 y I ZOOM IN TO CU McGEORGE BUNDY ' • i the still unspoken question s asked • Can we go on in Vietnam with or without CUT TO CU RUSK • Diem IN TO XCU • HILSMAN VO • ' The person who really raised it and made it very blunt and clear was Robert Kennedy • He said well I think personally that MS • can't go on helping Diem if he refuses SLW ZOOM IN TO MS RFK • • • • I • ·- ' -_ ··- • NT - ' _ • · _- - ' · ' ' ' ' _ - ·••-· '' f ·1 r·· -• · •• - - i -• ' - ' · -« _ ·- ' ' --' _ - - ' • · 2 SHOT RFK JFK to change h1s po11c1es ZOOM IN 10 XCU RFK and that the t1me has thererore come when we the Un1ted States must cons der gett ng out tota11y Leav ng depart g No more a d no more anyth ng PULL BACK FROM RFK JFK SILHOUT'l'E HILSMAN VO CU ROSTOW The second th ng was that 1n th1s very CUT TO HARRIMAN XCU dramat c meet ng n the State Department • HILSt'lAN CU HILSMAN SOF • there was an NSC rneet1ng w1thout the •• President and there was some very tense • argu1nents between the Secretary ' • or Derens • · • on the one hand and myselr and Avere11 Harriman on the other Pau1 Kattenburg • was there as my aide And when a tota1 • impasse was reached Paui Kattenburg • • • had the courage to voice the uit mate implication of what Harriman I and he • • Kattenburg had been saying that we • • couldn't go on with Diem and that if we • • couldn't work out some way or putting pressure on Diem even at the risk or a I coup then the United States should • • get out of Vietnam • ' • • • • • lX-p 5 ' ' · PAN FRON CU McNAMARA TO CU JFK KALBER VO McNamara suggests one more ract r nd1ng m ss on to V etnam Roger H lsman protests He asks ' I What good can another ract t nd ng I I miss on possibly do ' '' ' PULL BACK FORM XCU HILSMAN-STILL ' ' ' I HILSMAN VO ' ' I • twas so upset I ''I HILSMAN SOF ' that I did something that's rea11y • unrorgiveable ' I fo11owed the Pres dent or the United States nto the Ova1 or ce I • espostulating against this or at 1east repeating it and President Kennedy sort ' 1 I • I or in the manner of ta1k1ng to a ch11d ' • who is m1sbehav1ngs said with some • irritation in his voice I know al1 th s I Roger '' but in words or one syllable he sounded like he said ''I know all this but we've got to keep the JCS on board n ' • ' By that he meant not going along with us and not leaking to the press and doing I all sorts of things we can keep And the only way ' ' • ' • • ' • - - 11 ' - - - - • the JCS on board s to keep McNamara on board And apparent1y the on1y way he can keep t1cNamara on board 1 s to l et And be sa1 d h m go and see ror h mseir I know th s s cost ng us I know t•s gonna cost us but that's the pr ce we have to pay'' To keep the government together you see MS OF PRESS COFERENCE • CORRESPONDENT VO As a resu1t of ' your v1 s1 t to V1 etna1n w l1 there be an 1 ncrease n Amer can •• • manpower or Amer can equ pment • MCU• McNAMARA ' • ' MCNAMARA SOF • • I'm inclined to th nks certa niy not as MCU MCNAMARA a result or the v s t but I'm nci ned • to think ••• we w 11 o course cont nue to supply the assistance both iog st cai - ' • and training assistance that s requested of us by the South Vietnattiese There wil 1 • be a continued flow of support to the country but I doubt that it iii be • necessary to increase the manpower in a1 1 substantial degree above present 1e el GIS ON MILITARY COMPOUNDS • • ' • - ·- ··- •' •• _ ' -- XX-p 1 KALBER VO That 1eve1 snow over 16 000 OIS IN MILITARY OFFICE Amer cans n V etnam eche1ons or And n the upper the State Department and the m 1 1 tary n Sa gon there 1s a deep MS - INS AT WORK d v s on Lodge and Hark ns bare1y ta1k to each other MCU HARKINS STILL HARKINS VO He 1 ked to sett1e th ngs and do th ngs • on h 1s own HARKINS SOF •• MCU HARKINS • w thout too much consu1tat on w th h s • I • own staff or with those others n the • ' ' • country This cashe to me and most • apparently to me when Secretary McNattLara ' and General Taylor v1s1ted 1n 1ate I September early October of 1963 and ' I • they asked me if I'd seen two or three ' • ''• ' or four cables that ca1t1e through the I I ' State Department involving some or the military operations I said I • hadn't • • I ' I ' ' • Well they hadn't been shown to me by the Ambassador • I MS DIEM G ETING McNAMARA TAYLOR LODGE AND HARKINS IN PALACE KALBER VO I There is a met ting with Diem McNamara I ' ' XX-p 8 ' and Tay1or know and D1 em must know i t J s a r1 na1 pu1se taki ng • • TAYLOR VO We had the ree11ng that based upon D1 em•e record up 'tj l 1 63 wh1 ch was • qu1 te good ••• TAYLOR SOF cu TAYLOR that we cou1d succeed w1 th Di em 9 or Di em wou1d succeed w 1th our ass1 stance 1 1 he wou1d do certai n th1 ngs I f' he woul d • make a rea1 errort to conci 1 1 ate the pol 1t ical elements wh1 ch were chal l eng1 ng •• streets and make some errort him 1 n the to bring outsiders 1 nto government so • • ' that as the phrase was he wou1d • broaden the base of his cab'inet So - we had no fear at a11 that th1 s was ••• - the situation was disastrous or • • impossible 1r these th1ngs happened I 1S DIEM McN I RA • TAYLOR LODGE IN PALACE TAYLOR VO There was a real question whether Diem would make the adaptation required but • nonetheless it was the best solution for the monent I thought to let him tt'Y• • CU RUSK JFK MCNA RA KALBER VO The President STILL • still not • mind He still considers his option • • · ' ' l X-p 9 OI LPATRI C VO XCU GI f PATRiC In the sess on wh ch McNamara and X PAN TO McNAMARA JFK had with the President ear1y 1n October l 963 ' O' ILPARTIC SOF CU GILPATRIC there may have been others present but he spec r1ca11y author1zed and d1rected us to come up w th a p1an wh1ch wou1d ca11 ror a tota1 w thdrawa1 of u s • or orces by the end 1965 • KALBER VO PAN UP FROM JFK HANDS •• But pressures are bu11d1ng that cannot TO XCU • be held back ' Kennedy has no more •' opt ons ' ' ' • He can no 1onger support '• Diem He can't simply pu11 out ' - -- Reluctantly he dec des to suspend • I ' _ I our aid to Vietna111 • BALL SOF • It was not a decision anybody 1ooked I MCU I forward to with any great pleas ire but the President felt that Diem· at that • • • • · ' -· - i ' ' J - permitting actions to be taken in the ' • I · time was demeaning the United States b1 • na1ne of his goverr1111ent that were so _· ' ' 1 • •'• • ------ ·- · - · -_- - · ' ' ' • - _- · -- ' -_ ' - · -' -_ -- 1 - - •-· --· '· -· - ' _ -_ · -- -r · - - r- ·t _- - -'•· ·•·' -·-· ' · • - •·v • ·• l ' · ' •• • ' ' ' · _- - 'f w - 1 - C- - 1·1· •· - il'•·· - - ii •' ' - - · - •· _J ' JJ @ ' • - • - ' · - ·- l 1- • • - -- - - -- ·- - -- •_ _ l'J J- -- -· J ' - · ' ' · •- '--• _ · · x_ •-· • •'•• · l i ' - i - _ i •-f•-t' • ' ' _ - 1' ' • ' ' ' r - • • • · • · · -- ' · · ' • • -- r · -·i -- J ti'c 1 n·· ' ·- _ - · •• - - A - --✓ • t '· ' • • - '-' • _ ·- ·-W • - - r J · N C -· 1· J · • - 'V • _ ' ' _ - - · i 1 ' · _ - t-·· _ -- 7 · · - · - 1-'- • - · •• --•• - • - _ - _ _ ' distasteful -· • PAM HILL • • • ' - C Were there those in the adm1n1strat1o· 1- iCU BALL '• • ' ' opposed to that' - ' • • - i ' -·-· ' ' - ·- - A _ _ ' - ' -· ' - • • _ - •S •c -' ' ' ' '•' - -· - · - · ·-- · • ' • ' •· · ' • - ' ' - CU BALL BALL SOF I don't recall that there was any very heated debate on the subject Xt seemed to me at the t me that there was rather widespread agreement that the D em reg me had to rerorm r we were go ng to cont nue to g ve tour support MCU BALL PAM HILL VO What do you consider that dec1s on meant or the Diem regime 1n terms or our association with them •• CU BALL BALL SOF Well I think what the dec1s on meant n • V etnam was a signal to the forces that • ' were not necessarily opposed to the • regime but to Diem but felt that Diem • was not providing the necessaryieadersh p It was an encouragement obv1ous1y for them to go ahead and try to organize • another goverru11ent This was inevi tab l e • it seems to me when the American • gover1unent made a decision to cut orr I • aid • ZOOM TO CU JFK J KALBER VO Kennedy has · conur1itted the United States by withdrawing support l X-p 1 l • DISSOLVE TO MLS JFK AT DESK I '' to change 1 n the government f'rom Di em II FREEZE of' V1 etnam to our acquiescence • 1 n the overthrow o D em • 'l'ITLES • I • • • ' • • • • • • ' • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ' ' • t • '' - - ··' - ' ' '' ' · ' • ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' · -' ·· _ ' ' ' ' ' '' • ' ' • X-p 1 • A morning • - 'I _ - _ ' _ 1 ' ' ' -- · - - ' or October 2 1963 A street 1 n Sa1 gon i CUT TO MS VIETNAMESE MEN WATCHING COCKFIGHT ' KALBER VO MS COCKFIGHT ·• __ Oenera1 Tran Van Don Act ng Chi er ' CU DON STILL or the Joint General Starr SLOW ZOOM IN TO CU DON acc1denta11y'' meets Co1one1 Conei n of' • • the CIA l General Don says the coup 1 s on aga l n CONEIN SOF ' ' ' 'l l I was to1d-that I was no to encourage CU CONEIN • • ' '' • ' nor was I ' I _' to d 1sco 1rage a coup by my Ambassador · ' • that I was to1d • MS COCKFIGHT Those were the exact words • • • ·coNEIN VO • CUT TO • • At no time was I to te11 them CU DON · you are to have a coup CUT TO MS COCKFIGHT •- ·-' - - or you are not to have a coup CUT TO XCU DON ' ' - - • ' ·-- MS 2 SHOT COCKFIGHT l DEAD • t KALBER VO I - General Don says General Big Minh is PAN UP TO XCU • BIG MINH ZOOM IN TO XCU DON FREEZE the leader of the coup • • • He wants to see Conein • • CONEIN SOF My instructions were that I was to MCU CONEIN SMOKING inform General Minh that the United • - --------- - -- - • X-p 2 states government wou1d not thwart the r coup And I conveyed th s CONEIN VO MLS TRAVEL SllOT LODGE DESCENDING STAIRS You cou1d 1 ken 1t to a footba11 team Ambassador Lodge was the quarterback9 the coach ng was be ng conducted by Wash ngton • n c and I was the eyes • MS LODGE ENTERING CAR and ears and the mouthp ece or Henry Cabot Lodge to the Junta • • c·oNEIN SOF MCU CONEIN It was quite obv ous that rat one •• point that this Amer can hand had • • shown that the who1e th ng wou1d oiow • I up and therefore it wou1d be an extreme embarrassment • Therefore Ambassador Lodge made t very ciear to me that if something went wrong that • ' he would have to be able to have • • • den1ab111ty that I even existed ' 2 SHOT VIETNAMESE IN FIELD ·KALBER VO Most • • Americans in Vietnam see no sign of what is about to happen • erican advisers working with the army or South Vietnam do not hear ' t X-p 3 I • about the coup Un ted States headquarters does not be11eve there wi 11 be a coup HARKINS VO I thought the thing was dead as rar as an overthrow or D ern was concerned and I went on w th my bus ness of ght ng the war and tra ning the m 1 tary MS HARKINS WITH GIS And unbeknownst to me a1though I was • • • the senior m11 tary man there the CI • was working with the Ambassador and contacting the Genera1s • HARKINS SOF • cu I didn I t know this I was not 1 nfor1ned ' or this until I read t 1n the - I • ' Pentagon Papers in 1971 -CONEIN SOF • MCU CONEIN I by accident had been there for any years and I had gotten to know these I ' ' · individuals so consequently when they had something very important to talk • about they would not talk to their ' • • military advisers which upset the ' whole military chain of con It1and Because poor Gen al Harkins it was ' •• X-p 1 not h s rau1t What wou1d happen she wou1d say I have rece1ved th s b t or nrormat1on what does th s So he• d go up and h1 s seni or mean '' adv ser wou1d go up and he wou1d ta1k to for example to Genera1 Don and say ''What's th1 s I peop1e are p1ann1 ng a hear you coup Coup •• would say Genera1 Don• '' tJe don't know what you're ta1k ng about •• KALBER VO By now Diem and Nhu have heard about VIETNAMESE RIOT FORCE '' the coup • • Diem begins to p1an to use it for his own purposes • CU DIEM STILL • • CONEIN VO ' ' •' Well he had Bravo One PAN UP TO XCU DIEM STILL • which was a phoney coup and he had Bravo Two which was to bring him PAN ACROSS VIETNAMESE TROOPS TO • back into power • • I And they would be brought back 01 'MS DIEM popular acclaim by his m11itary and • be re-established and therefore he • • I would go into the progra1 1 that he had • originally planned which was to I 1 • negotiate with the North and insist -that the Arneri ans get out • • • • ' • I '- ' • • • 0- · L •• • •• • • · · · • - •· f'l •• - • ·• · - -- - _ • • - _ - _ ··- ti ·--_·_ _ --' - _·• -' ' _ - --_ o --•· - - '• • · ·•· - ·· ·• ·• --- · - _ •· • I - I KALBER VO XCU TON THAT DINH STILL To carry out h s plan D em now ca11s 1 on General Ton That D nh JACK PERKINS VO MCU GENERAL TON THAT DINH So the pa1ace wanted to stop the coup that they heard was bu 1d ng and they • turned to you • • DINH SOF I ' To rne ·yes Yes s1r JACK PERKINS VO • Nhu called you in Mr Nhu ••• MCU DINH n·INH SOF •• • No twas Pres dent D em himseir MCU DINH • • PERKINS VO I President Diem h mself ca11ed you CU DINH n DINH SOF - • ' L • ••• called me on the phone i11unediatel y _ CU DINH JACK PERKINS VO And then the palace decided to g ve· ou MLS DINH - • control of troops to try to build up I • • a counter coup' MCU I • • MCU DINH • Yes yes sir J ' • ' ' ' ·-··· · ' _ · ·- - - ' • ·_ ' ' · i ·- -- ' · · · - · ·- _ '-·- ·· ··_ · · ·_ ' J·AcK PERKINS HCU DINH VO To make a counter coup INH HCU SOF After that ••• I have to1d yo u •• President D em when he has ordered to me to nvest gate ••• he ordered me to see Mr Ngo So Mr Ngo D nh Nhu D nh Nhu g1ve me h1s own troops from • palace and de ense o palace everything • JACK PERKINS VO MCU DINH Nhu gave you contro1 of a11 these n · _ • order to stop the coup DINH SOF • • • MCU DINH Yes to stop it • • JACK PERKINS And you used them eventual 1y to 11 8-ke I • • the coup • DINH SOF MCU DINH MCU Yes yes sir DINH Laughing • I think I it's the best way to do • KALBER VO MS LODGE STILL From the American Embassy ' • · a final cable to the President ''We nc 1 ZOOM IN TO CU LODGE l longer have the power to delaJ the I coup '' ' ' I I Kennedy ables Lodge • I I I ' • 'I • 1s in the interest • lt X- p 7 ·scu JFK STILL of the Un ted States government that the coup sha11 succeed MONTAOE OF SAIGON STREET SCENES • KALBER VO November 1» Sa gon There are now 16 732 Americans 1n V etnam • We are spending ha1 -a-b1111on • do1lars a year to support the war • aga nst the V et Cong contro1 80% or They now the countrys de • • • • At 1 20 p m the coup beg ns •• • From insurgent headquarters» Co1one1 • Conein reports to I odge • • • I • CONE IN- SOF • CU CONEIR •• I had a radio a special rad o that cut me into a special net •• • directly to the Embassy p1us 1 I had with the junta or the plotters ' • ' agreement that I had a specia1 • telephone line directly to the U s • • • • Embassy • • SLOW PAN OF CU TAYLOR • I STILLS ' DAVIS • ' General Taylor and others told Us that they were not precisely aware • - ------ - - -- - - --- - ___ - • or ' the moment or the coup Do Yau th nk that's poss b1e • CONEIN VO • My personal opinion s this s quite inconceivable because dur ng the whole reporting period CONEIN SOF MCU CONEIN through my own channe1s I was report ng by cab1e every one r the developments lead ng up to • or and including the timing •• the • coup ' • ' CU DINH PAN TO CU CONE I l VO • Every one of the meetings every DON BIG MINH one of negotiations the discussions that were he1d with • General Big Minh with General Don I • with General Kim and any other • military leader who were participating • in the coup was completely reported • to Washington n c and I received many times guidance exactly or what · I was to discuss with these individuals I • and the·11m1tsJor·w ich I could discuss I these problems with them • • • • 0• -· - -• - _ I - - • - · • •• - ·- - - -·i· t-s - - -• ' ' ' ' _' _ ' ' ' •• ' ' ' ' '- - • ' - ' C ' ·- --- - ·'· -· ' · ·' ' ' ' ' - _ ' '· ' ·' -· '· '' ' '· ·' · · ' · ·-·' · - ' - ' ' _ • ' • X - ' - · p 9 ' · ALVIN DAVIS VO i· MCU CONEIN ' · ' ' ' '' '• ' •· _ __ · e -- ' • -· - - - - • -- - · 'l' - - · · '· · ' -- - • •· · - - v · • ·-· _ _ · _ ·' - - '' •- '· ' - - · - •_ - - - --- - • • · ' _ · ' -1 · ·· · _ ···- -· - ·· - ' · • ·· ' - -· • r - D1 d you ever g1 ve any advi ce to - · ' ' Don or B lg Minh or any of' the · ' _ _- '•' - '' genera1s about dep1oyment of' troops • • - j •_ ' -• _ - •'- • -' -' _ ' • ' '' · __ · surrounding the palace cl osi ng _ ' 'i _ _ - - · ·- T -' ' ·_ - •'· · · ·- --- ' '- - · · ' ' - • - - ·•' _ ' ' -· '·· ' • · - ' - _ _ • ' _- - -· - ' - ' ' the doors CONEIN SOF MCU CONEIN Do you want the truth ALVIN DAVIS VO Yes MCU CONEIN I want the truth CONEIN SOF • MCU Now the only thing that I ever CONEIN • gave to and advise was • that at • • I • one time when they came to me and -i •• said they are bogged down • The 't reason being bogged down was that one unit that was supposed to be I in place was being delayed and I off the top of my head • • with no 'I I r • instructions and no instructions • from my govermnent I said ''Once • you are into the attack you must 1 I continue • Ir you hesitate you're n going to be lost • • • ' p 1 0 X - • McGEE SOP HS FRANK McGEE The government or South V etnam has been overthrown ro11ow ng a fourteen-hour batt1e in Saigon bet een a large f'orce of' mi 11 tary rebels and spec1a1 troops guarding the Pres dent al palace CU DIEM STILL A 1ate report says Pres dent Ngo • Dinh D em and his brother I Ngo D nh Nhu surrendered foI1ow ng MS McGEE a r1nal ninety-minute fire r ght around the palace - The two are said to have been found 1n a • basement bunker in the pa1ace and ' placed under arrest • TRAVEL SHOT SAIGON STREET • KALBER VO • This report is untrue I Diem and - • • Nhu have escaped from the palace They are hiding in the Chinese quarter PAN SPECIAL FORCES PRISONERS • Early the next morning Diem talks to the Junta l • I I V I PULL BACK FROM XCU TO CU ·DIEM D F EZE He asks for safe conduct into ' ' exile ' ' ' • ' ' '·- _· - 1--· _ ' - -- • ' · _ ·- _ · _ · - ' • •J ' ' ' ' · · - · ' ' ' _ ' ·- '_- _ ' - -- ' · - --- ·- _ ·- · •' __ ' ' · · ' • ' ' ' ' - ' - ··' ·-·- ··- -- ·- · ' ' ' _ ' · ' ' ' ' _ ' -· · ' - - • ·· ' ·' _ ' ' ' ' - -'' ' · ·- ·' ·• ·' • • • - ' ·_' · _ · _· -7_ ' ' ''• ' ' ' • ' X - ' · '· • f •• •·' - • · - p 1 L - ' ' ' ' - - _ · ' ' ·· -- - -_ _ •' '-·• · •· CONEIN SOF MCU CONEIN The i nsurgents went 1n to 1ook ror ' ' ' Di em and bri ng h1m back And they ' had arranged and I can swear to ' ' this because I'm the one who personally said this I asked the Embassy ror an aircrart and I was to1d I had to wa t 24 hours be ore I oould get the aircraft that was necessary to transport D em to a nation who wou1d accept his ex ie I spoke or the United States 'I government and I was author1zed ' and I informed the junta that 7 • had an aircraft but it wou1d take ' I I me 24 hours to have that aircraft • • ALVIN DAVIS VO Instead CU CONEIN • • CONEIN SOF I Instead he was shot by a Major CU CONEIN l - CONEIN VO ' ' ' ' 'r t' • ' - in the Vietnamese army TAYLOR VO ' MONTAGE OF COUP AFTERMATH IN SAIGON A message was pas into the President which contained simply • X - t 12 the news that both D em and h s brother Nh_u had been ki l 1 ed f nd the exp1anat on be ng prov ded by the 1eaders or the coup was that the two brothers had co11n 11 tted su1 c 1de TAYLOR SOF CU TAYLOR Pres dent Kennedy upon read ng that jumped to h1s feet ·h s ace I turned pale he seemed to have d1 ficulty in controlling h mseir •• and rushed out or the room • • SLOW THRU WINDOW JFK AT DESK ZOOM FORRE3TAL VO • It shook him personaiiy ••• bothered ' him as a moral and rel gious matter It shook his confidence I think in the • I kind of advice he was getting • • about South Vietnam and it troubled FREEZE JFK AT DESK him really deeply • • TITLES • 1 ' I • • • _ACi' XI ACTIV1'1'Y IN SAIGON STREET HUYEN VAN CAO VO • Transia ted -· Pres d nt Ngo D nh Diem d d SLOW ZOOM IN TO PORTRAIT becaus h resis ed the domination o LS GATHERING AT GRAVE SIDE ore gners Resisted th scheme tor a ss 1anding or Dl EM AND PULL BACK TO V etnam oreign troops n Resist d the attempt to w den a war which wi11 destroy both parts of V ctnam In a word President Ngo d Ed for th€ peop1c of Vietnam KALBER VO • 1971 the rehabi1itation of Ngo Dinh Di em had begun in Vietnam TRAVEL SHOT OF • • CUT TO · Eight years a ter his death November LS DIEM'S GRAVE cu VN scot 11' • • I • CUT TO LS PORTRAIT OF DIEM • How he died LS PRIEST AT ALTAR who ordered his death has been a • mystery for eight years ' I - On November 1 1971 the members or t GENERALS • unta • • • C CH - PAN CONGREGATION LS • G _ TO MS AND PAN eZNI ZV L lJUAL FACES • who plotted the overthrow or Diem me· • ' l - - at a garden party to commemorate h1s death KALBER VO PAN FACES OF GENS MiNH DON DINH STILL They were the same men who had argued eight years before over whether they Tha t argument ought to k 1 11 Diem went on over several meetings kept secret unt 1 now COL NGHIA SOF Trans1ation I can confirm one thing for you and CU COL NGHIA that is tre fate of President Diem was •• decided by the majority of the members • • ' of the revolutionary committee on the • night of the first ••• second or • November 1963 It was decided by a • • · majority of that cornmittee that's al 1 • • The majority against XCU COL NGHIA · • • • I ALVIN DAVIS VO • Against what XCU COL NGHIA • COL NGH Trans a ion • • TO GU NGH ' • Nhu and • Diem SOF • CU COL NGH • Against heir lives or a ' ' - -' ' · ·· ' ' I '' ' · - ' ' _- • X'I - • ·- COL NGHI A SOF - I• CU COL NGHIA p 3 • Both GENERAL DO MAU VO Translation · CU GEN DO MAU STILL • We were very tired ZOOM IN TO XCU STILL We had fa11en asleep in Khiem's o ce ' ' I ' I ' ' '' ' GEN DO 'MAU SOF Transl at ion • • MCU DO MAU ' I ' When we woke up we discovered that the • of ice was empty • ' • I ' I Khiem ordered me to I ' ' go out and find where the other Genera1s •• '' ' i ' were • ' I finally found them in Genera1 Big Minh's offiee ' ' Now it seems it wan • I General Little Minh who said to me they • were there in order to discuss the fate • of President Diem That they had decided to kill him - I was so furious • that my face was red when I came back Why have ·you decidGd to ki11 ·' at them • l 1 ' • - • President Diem when before the coup •• General Don and I decided we ali • ' I ' r • • I agreed to send President Diem to Dalat I I i I • • with a military escort General ig I Minh simply shrugged his shoulders while General Oa came back at me with I this • • '' • friend you must not listen X I - 1 st n to Co1one1 Do Mau p 4 To k 11 weeds you must pu11 them up by the roots was fur ous I 1 sa d wei1 now the respons1b11 ty s yours'' and X 1eft the • room and went back to my p1ace cu 1· TO SLOW ZOOM IN TO CU DIEM'S PALACE STII I KAI BER VO When the coup began Diem and Nhu were in the palace The p1an was to capture them there • DISSOLVE TO INTERIOR OF •• PALACE The palace was to be surrounded by • troops of the junta • • • • • PULL BACK TO RE VEAL SOLDIERS PILFERING This did not happen ALVIN DAVIS VO • You were with the Generals Weren' you · ' ll ' • · all in on how to prevent Diem from I - 1 I • getting out of there • • SOF LUCIEN CONEIN • CU CONEIN • Well I can say this one thing that the nit that was supposed to be there to I take care of that facet was the one that was delayed CU DIEM ZOOM TO XCU DIEM ·- --- ·- - - u ----- - ___ • - - - - ·- - · ·· --- - ---- - _ ··· • Diem and Nhu got out of the palace during the height of the attack · - ' • I - MS NHU STILL SLOW ZOOM IN TO XCU p 5 by going very simply through a tunnel and they got into an automobile and just drove on out and went into Cholon • KALBER VO CU MA TUYEN The leader of the loca1 Chinese community is Ma Tuyen MA TUYEN SOF Translation MCU MA TUYEN • President Diem came to my home at 2100 hours on November 1 1963 • •• • When I saw the President arrive I CUT TO MLS MA TUYEN • ' came out to meet him and invited • him into my house to him I did not ta1k • • I only invited him into my house CUT TO MCU MA TUYEN • t' to rest and offered him tea • I I • • That's all ' I ' • MA TUYEN VO Translation • The President told me that he was LS THANH TAN CHURCH going to Thanh Tan Chu ch ' I • • • - - '• •·• · ' ' · _ - - _ ' ' __ - ' · ' ' ' ' · · ' ' - - -- X - p 6 CONEIN VO XCU CHILD'S FACE PULL BACK TO 2 SHOT CHILD Children recognized them reported MOTHER to the military that XCU VN MALE Diem was there and this was • CUT TO CU VN CHILD the first indication that we knew Diem was not in the pa1ace • • KALBER VO PAN GROUP OF VN GENERALS It is then that the general who in 1971 will meet to mourn Diem meet in secret to • SLOW ZOOM TO XCU BUILDING • argue again what to do with him • PAN UP FROM GENERAL LAM HANDS • ' TO CU • General La1r1 is put in command of the convoy that is sent to • bring Diem and Nhu back to the headquarters of the junta •- • '• • GENERAL LAM SOF Translation • I 'I • At first I wanted to put them in MCU GEN LAM • • ' t• • a jeep but when I realized for their security I was not well ' 'advised to put them in a jeep since it would be too vulnerable I • · found an armored car which provided more security for the President and his brother -·· - - -·--- - - - - • • a Ii - - l XI - p 7 _ • - e ' -- ' - ' •· ' • cu ALVIN DAVIS VO GEN LAM • How did i t happen that you d dn't put a bodyguard along with the two brothers GEN LAM SOF Translation PULL BACK TO MCU GEN LAM I didn't wa 1t to because I thought they were amply secure n the armored car ALVIN DAVIS Vo · CU GEN LAM Was there a time which you •• considered especia11y dangerous • during the trip back • • • GEN LAM SOF Translatfon • No except at one point ••• we MCU GEN LAM came to a crossing where we were stopped by a train · I • • I • ALVIN DAVIS VO For how many m1nutes1 MCU GEN LAM GEN LAM SOF Translation • MCU GEN LAM I About five minutes • And that was • when tne·y were- killed ' I • • I• - ' ' X'I MCU GEN p 8 LVIN DAVIS VO In the armored car LAM 9EN LAM SOF Translation MCU GEN LAM Yes that's what I thought 1ater GEN DO MAU Translation MCU GEN DO MAU I slept until Noon I went back ' ' to General Headquarters and to the right • or ' the building I saw ' When I the armored car open •• I reached the car I saw Co1one1 ' Thieu there as wel1 • He's now • ' President of the Repub1 c • V etnam •• or Then I saw two bodies the body or President Diem and the body of his brother_Nhu DAVIS VO I I MCU Did you look into the car1 Gen Lar11 • GEN LAM SOF Translation · • • No I kept on going MCU GEN LAM I continued • I in my jeep to GHQ When I arrived at GHQ I was told that -- · - ---- - ----- - _ · r •• •· - - • • - -· -- xx - i ' p 9 ' I '· DAVIS VO cuT TO cu GEN I 'I LAM ' I ' I' Well then who killed the two '' ' ' ' ' '' ' brothers ' ' ' ' ' ' I I II I OEN LAM SOF Translation CUT TO MCU GEN LAM I · 'I I ' ' i ' ' Three months later I was to1d that I I ' ' it was Captain Nhung who had k111ed I ' 'I' ' ' ' · i ' • ' ' ' the President ' ' · 1 '1 ' ' 1• 'I ' I '· 'I • ' ' I DAVIS VO CU LAM '1 •I •I • I II •' What were his duties in the '' ' ' ' I ' j Vietnamese army •• ' I d I ' ' ' MCU GEN LAM ' 'I He was General Minh's aide-de- I 1 I I ' ' • General Nguyen Khanh· headed a PU JL BACK TO CU GEN KHANH I coup that ousted Big Minh early • in 196lJ • • • • He himself was ousted a short time LEAVING BUILDING I later Now he runs a restaurant in Paris ' • t • • • ___ ---- i ' KALBER VO - · ' l • • • I XCU GEN KHANH STILL --·--- --• - __ - - - - ·- ----- - _----- -- _ - ____ _ · - - - -- I car11p and bodyguard • TRAVEL SHOT KHANH AIDES '1 • • ' l GEN LAM SOF Translation CUT TO ' -· ' - ' · ' ' ·'' · - '· ' · ·' I --- ·- ' ·I XI - ' ' p 1 0 GEN KHANH VO Translat1 on • OEN KHANH VN IN JEEP We met at Dalat after I took '' • • control on January 30 1964 to I 1 discover the truth about the death or '' ' Diem It is known who k111ed '' • 'I Diem ' I GEN KHANH SOF Translation • MS GEN KHANH • • •· 'i't 1 · i 1 ° 1 ' But I gave my word as a Genera1 ' ' ' that I would not d1vu1ge the · '• ' · j ' secret ' I ' '' ' • DAVIS VO ' • CUT TO CU GEN KHANH • But the first thing you did when ' you became President was arrest a Maj or na1ne Nhung forttierly Captain Is that correct • GEN KHANH SOF ' Translation • I arrested him for his own MS GEN KHANH • security because I knew that ' pro-Diem elements would revenge • • • themselves against him And also I I arrested him because he was a very important wi ness ror me ' • • • • _x r - ' p 11 'i cuT TO MCU GEN• KHANH • ' • '' Unrortunately two days 1 a t er th a man was round hanging n his 'I • • ' ' I ' cell by the strings parachute or ' his At least that s the orricial version or the report I • received 24 hours later or The 1oss ' this man meant that I had no • - witness to verify who gave the order to kill President Diem and his brother • ' ' DAVIS VO ' ' ' ' • 7 ' ' • -· - ·e-· _ MCU GEN K • ' But this Major was the assass n H • • • wasn't he I • • • - GEN KHANH SOF Translation Major Nhung was lOOj the assassin CUT TO MS GEN KHANH • - of President Diem and or his CUT TO CU GEN KHANH I • • brother Nhu • • • DAVIS VO MS GEN KHANH What 1s General Big Minh's • · position on the decision to kill ' ' Diem • • • • ' • • I • ·• • XI - p 12 • crJ' f N KHANH SOP anslat1on ro CU GEN KHANH ' L • I would rather you ask the question directly to Minh himself as directly and frankly as you have ' done to me and I hope Minh will have the courage to answer frankly about what happened ' ' ' KALBER VO ' PAN UP FROM LEGS TO • ' General Minh did not choose to MS MINH ' • ' answer •• • • News Associate Producer Alv n Davis IN TO XCU GEN MINH STILL ZOOM • e He refused to eee NBC ' ''' Nevertheless what happened ' ' and his part in what happened • • • is now clear LS GHQ OF JUNTA The killing of Diem was ordered at a final meeting of the junta • in the early morning hours or CUT TO CU OF ENTRANCE FREEZE • ' November 2 1963 • ' • Associate Producer Alvin Davis MS ALVIN DAVIS • - spent 6 weeks talking on and orr • the record with the principals at ' • that meeting ' • I j ' XI - p 13 I ccJ DAVIS I ' - '' ' t e cou 0 kill 01 egan I'· ' ' ' ' •· • •· '· · • ' l I s General Big Minh ad assured at l o r the J • • th ' e decision ern had not Y t e been made r a terward Even h P b ' I ' - east three members unta to whom I spoke that Diern's l ife would be spared • D 1 em apparentl y meetings and arguments and r1na11y •• I I • I • a vote • ' Seventeen genera1s and t ' colonels took part I • ' Three who would have voted to save • Diem were assassinated before the •• vote was taken • • • Four others including the 0 t ui -1 • ¢·-t l • t-1 President Prime Minister Khiem 9 • I ' were expressly left out of it The decision began to go agai st Diem when it was learned that he • and his brother aad escaped rrom ' the palace • But there were many • •• • • r- - · -- ----- --- - • '• _JL- · • ay' • -·n •-• - --t_1 • ----·- --- - ----- - _ ---'-t r-- ' -- -- _-L - - - r ·-•• ' - __ - • C • • - J•'•-'• •--••• • • • · ---· i·· ·- •- 7 j - _ --'---' ' 1 -• --• - - '1l -' ' J •- 7 - ' · -• ' - - - -- -- JL• • ••- •-• - • •• -- - • - - ·-- - - - ' - i J -' ----··- - ' - f - r - ·---· -- -_-__- - - ---- -- - c - • • - - ----- - ' O• ' - - •• •- - - • '0 - · --·• • • _ - ••• --- - - --• - • - - - - - - - - - - - •-- - · • - _ -_ - - • ·· • ---- - - - - - - - - - - L • • - - - - • - o - -•••-- • • - - - - - 1 '· ' ' among the 17 who had wanted him killed rrom the start There • were for an example the words uttered by Big Minh and overheard ' ' ' in the only phrase spoken in French rather than Vietnamese THE PIG II MUST BE KILLED I '' ' •I Here 1s the sequence as well as it can be reconstructed ' · -- _ - • Diem had • · ' '• '' ' • his nephew call the General Starr ''1 • • ' • · • at 00 a m on November 2 and •• I · ' t ' '' ' ' ' ' - ' ' t '' talk to General Don ' I ' •''1 '-- '' •' l He refused ' ' II • 1 ' ' -I to speak to Big Minh ' ' ' • The nephew ' i 1 I ' ' ' ' asked for full honors» together • • ' ' • • • • '' 'I' with a graceful exit from power '' ' 'I ' ••• and safe conduct to sanctuary in '' I '' I I another country General Don was ' '' 'I ' '' polite and correct but t1Jrned him • • I down • But Big Minh was furious • over the slight to hims the leader CU ALVIN DAVIS Between 6 00 a m and 9 00 a m • • on November 2 there were three • 0 key phone cails from Diem himself • f On the first Diem again refused • • • ' to speak to Big Minh • I On the • I ' - • ' ·• '• --· - - ------------- --- _- - ' - -- -- - - ·-·--· -- -· _···· · · ·-·· · - -- - __ s i ' ·''·' i --_ ___ ' 'O V _ - ' - ___---- --- __ -- • - ---- ---- -- --- ·-···_ ··· - • • q - -- -·_ ·- ·---- --- - - - - ___ -__ --- - --- - - _ c--- --- - - -· -- •• •• • ·• r•-_-r _ • ' ' - - • - --- __ -·c ---- - -c--_- • _-·_' - --- ---_ __ _-_ _ _ ---cc------ - - · - - - - _ _ • •• • · •'•- ·- • -- • • • • ''' -- - -------- - --J • • C -- 0_ • - _-------·· -· -•• • • ·' • • - - __ · ·- - - ± - - - 7 - • • - - - ·• - ' -- _ · -- -• -· --· - •• ·- ----- -----··----• -• ·_ • - '- -- • · •i - -- -· - - • ' - '- ' - -• - - • - -- ··-·- t l JE M c • -- - • l'ZZE'Wlitii - -- z-z Ii - ·• - I JJ y· - - ' ••• • ' ' • • I 4 - XI - p 15 I second he r1na11y spoke to M1 nh • aga n asking for fu11 honors I Minh now angrier than ever hung up on him On the third D1em gave in asking only for safe conduct The armored column was immediately dispatched to p ck up him and his brother in front of the Church at Cho1on • • ' Just berore the column le t the vote began ' ' DAVIS VO • ' ' _ 1 ' •• CU GEN MINH STILL Big Minh ' ' ' '' ' k 111 I ' ' ' ' ' ' CUT TO CU GEN DON STILL • k111 General Don • '' ' • General Le Van Kim k111 ' ' ' - General Xuan kill • Colonel Nghia kill CUT TO MCU COL NGHIA • DAVIS SOF • • • And so it went • • MS ALVIN DAVIS • • • • Colonel Nghia is right At the end there was total unity and a • ' • ' • CU GEN XUAN • I • • CUT TO CU GEN KIM ' 4 CUT TO to me been broken • • ' '' ' • • ' • • I' • 'l'he Xl - P 16 by • I MCU ALVIN DAVIS I I I ' Co1one1 cont ol I Larn Was in ' m111tary of the Col ad10 umn in constant contact With Big Minh its way back the coltunn ' I • as Lam has said I ' I• On I I ' ' ' ' reached a grade cross ng and stopped for a tra1n go • • five minutes to 1et by • • Lam told Minh by radio where they • • • - Were Minh's last signa1 was ''Maintenance '' -- ''Nowt'' Latu ' drove up along the left side of the armored car and Captain Nhung • in a jeep with Colonel Nghia 1 drove I up along the right side • Lain signaled the ''Now''' to Nhung • -Nhung opened the door or the armored car and shot the two brothers as l they sat with hands tied behind their backs • • • ' • • '' p l 1 Xl - Then the train passed and the column continued on to GHQ Lam who as you saw denied to me that he knew the brothers were dead went inside and reported to Big Minh • ''MISSION • • • ACCOMPLISHED'' I I I I showed this summary to Co1one1 Conein • CONEIN SOF CU CONEIN • I happen to know that there was a blood oath taken ' • And th s b1ood ' oath is st111 binding ' CU CONEIN • • DAVIS VO Now I'm not asking you to d1vu1ge any oath or any secret that's • '' ' part of our agreement I'm just informing -you ' PUL BACK TO MCU or thi s and asking you if you have an comment on it • • CONEIN tSO'F • o MCU CONEIN ' • 1 have no comn ent on thts • because I consider that ••• nat l ' • • '·-- ' · '- -- I XI - p 1 8 ' and though you know it be my guest and tell everybody • DAVIS VO coNEiN JtllCV When you say I know it you mean as rar as you're concerned what ' ' I have told you fits what you know • ' • ' · ' · ' • CONEIN SOF 'I · I ' ' I ' '1 • - ' '' I ' '' ' MCU CONEIN SMILING ' In all probab111ties yes I l 1 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '' I I' '· ' ' I '' ' DAVIS VO ' · ' ' ' ' ' ' I '' ' l - •• MCU CONEIN ' • Well I'm asking you or ••• ' • • don't hedge on t please ' I'm ' L • T I ' • ' • not asking you to say anyth ng • • • t -l • •• ' ' '• other than what you just said n ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' another orm ' ' You know t ••• • ' I• ' ' '• ' I I ' ' h ' · 1 ' ' •• CONEIN SOF • Yes You MCU CONEIN • ound it out you know it ••• II I au CONEIN • DAVIS VO And you said it is-correct • XCU CONEIN CONEIN SOF • I ' It's correct XCU CONEIN • • ' ' ' ' • · ·- --- ' -- -' -· -c • - _ - ---c--' c ' - • - • ' -- - ---- - · ·• - ' -- -- - - - - --- - - - _ · 7 ' ----------- ---- ·' · - -- -- - _ -- ' -- - J _ _ ' - - ---------- • - c _-- --- -----_- - -- • - ___ _ -- --_- - -_- - •' -- - ·- -_ -- - --- -• ' -- ' _-· - ·'· --- ' ' ' ' ·- ·------·----·· -• - - - --- •• • •• -••--- -c - r _-____ --•• ' -•_- ' '- ' -- - · ' - -· ' ' ·-• • - • _ - • - ·- •• - ·• · '·' C ____ u ·- ' - • •• J T • ' ' ' ' ' ' ' •' ' ' - ' ' I I ' · ' XI - p 1 g •• KALBER VO Thus 10 000 m11es away rrom Wash ngton a man dies V1o1ently oNTAGE OF VN WAR 5CENES A war in Asia becomes our war For the rirst time we beg n to • ' 1ook at what we have gotten ourselves into GI WADING IN RIVER FREEZE - • CUT TO JFK PAN TO CU FROM XCU DOUBLE EXPOSURE STILL •• And John F Kennedy s tt1ng w th a trusted adviser has some • troubled thoughtsft • FORRESTAL VO • ' CU JFK I saw him the last time on Thursday I think the 21st November or He·d asked me • CUT TO MCU JFK STILL to go out to Cambodia first • ' • • I ' Saigon then to Pnom Penh • • • DISSOLVE AND PAN UP FROM WRIST WATCH • - He did what he sometimes did • • at the end of the day or when he was a little tired He asked me to stay a bit an • • • • - · • • 'I •_ - I ' ' '11' wi • • • --·- _ - ·- --· - - - -------------· ' • • XI - p 2 he said when you come back I want you to come and see me because we have to start to p1an TO XCU JFK PROFILE DISSOLVE • STILL ror what we are going to do now DISSOLVE AND SLOW ZOOM IN TO XCU JFK in South Vietnam He said I want to start a comp1ete and ver I C • DISSOLVE TO XCU JFK PULL BACK TO MS • ' profound review of how we got nto this country •• • DISSOLVE TO XCU JFK AND PULL BACK what we thought we were doing and • what we·now think we can do • ' Re • said I even want to·think about • •• whether or not we shou1d be there • FORRESTAL · SOF He said because this was of cu course in the context of an • I election campaign that he didn't --- • • • • think that we could oonsider drastic • • 1 • changes of policy quickly But that what he wanted to consider I when I returned and when people were ready to think about this • • - • ·-- -- - _ ·- r --r-o -· - • • XI - P 21 more c_learly was how coul d some kind or a gradual shirt 1n our presence n South V1etnam occur I think he probab1y said that to some other people as we11 • But I have a very clear ccollect on or it and of course the £o11ow hg morning when I arr ved n Sa gon ' • ' - actually it was night out there at ' ·•l 2 00 o'clock n the morn ng he was - - • k111edo ' I •• PULL BACK FROM WHITE • HOUSE NIGHT ' JFK FUNERAL SCENES KALBER VO One legacy he leaves • ' Vietnam • It is useless to speculate what he • would have do e if he had 1 ved» But we know or Diem had _1j_ve o that the death of these 2 men - climaxed a gro 11ng erisis that ' • was a t1Jrning poj_nt in our • • involvement · n Vietnam • • • MS OF ETERNAL FLAME • J After that we had fewer options ' the choices were hardere ' • ' • • • - i 11 h' · it -- -- - ·- · -- -_ _ - ---• _- _ - -- - - _ --•------Tlf F ti' -- ----- ·•·- - -- - ·------ c------ - • •' ' • - ·-· ·• _ d --k - - - -- ---- • • • ' • •' - - -·' - l · ' I• ' ·- r_- c · - ' ' ' ' ' • ' ' • '' ' '- ' I • I ·• '• - ' • ' • - ' ' • - • SOF • 0 ••• in PP 0 sea French 1 ndochina Re the asp1rat1 ons and the backward But he also believed that the Uni ted '' I I •• States must confroQt and contai n _ communism in Southeast Asi a He and his advisers accepted ' ' Without re-exam1nat 1on the slogans or 2 0 years or American rore gn •• policy • • • ·• - __ ' • They d1 d not want to be soft on communism • ' ''P · ' ' •' • • They were aga1 nst appeasement I • They ' - -- • ' · • -· ' ' - i' ' _' ' · • said ''no more Munichs'' as we now -- - • Perhaps -- · - '· ' ' · -· ' r' • ' ' - ·· -· '· · -' say ''no more Vietnams'' '' • · • ·_•' 1 ' t _ _ f • • ' --· _· the real lesson to be 1earned 1 s ' · ' ' • • • ' ' ' '-- · ' - • · •• no more easy slogans • '' • • ·· • • I • KALBER SOF • MS 'led 1961 in Taylor mission The into administration the Kennedy • • that decisions of series a • more States United involved the could we war a and more deeply in • not win • • --- -- -- --- -------- • - · - '•· - ' '• _ _ _ - • • i- • • • - ' · • • •· - -c - _ • ' ' ' ' ·' - ' ' ' _ Xl - P 23 Up an technol ogy t hen that failed we tr1 ed that to force goverrune n t to rero1•1n 1 tsel f and the result was a coup and 2 lllttrders that d · ' I ' ' I I eepened and comp1 cated our mar 1 a I ' a nd military 1nvo1vement ' ' ' It is true that in November o ' I l963 there was st111 on1y 16 000 ' ' Americans in Vietnam A face sav ng • I' Withdrawal a neutra1 zed V etnam • ' ' • • would have been costly but it • - ' · might not have bee imposs b1e · 1 ' ' 'l ' Certainly the death of Diem and or Kennedy narrowed the options • open to Lyndon Johnson • ' They • did not foreclose a·decision on • 'his part to lessen our m1l 1tary • corm111 tment but they did make • • • it more difficult • • • ' ' ' ''' ·_ · _ _ - ' tt · _ ' -_ ' ·- - ' - ' KALBER SOF I We have assembled in these cu ' • as we could and it shows that • - ' -· - _ _ 41 • •I • - -·- ·----· - - - c • QC ·•-- -- -wow - - - - - - - - · · - -- -- -- - - -- ------- -----' - 4 _ ' -- '' ' ' · F • 1 - · J s ' _ ' - '- '· ' • · ' j ' • ' ·· ' ' ' ' ·•· ' ' _ ' XI - p 24 for our deepened involvement in Vietnam Kennedy and his • advisers must bear responsibility This is not to deny that they were good and patriotic men intelligent and dedicated But like characters in a Greek tragedy ' they were victims or Hubris the r • pride their arrogance in be11ev ng '· they could manage the crisis or ' ' the world with American know- ''• '' '• how • • ' They failed to perceive the 1 m ts of their own power to change the • ' • world • In the end John F • Kennedy skeptical sophisticated - or all of the pitfalls or aware involvement in a war·in Asia • I ' • against Asians becam the architect • • of that involvement • MS ETERNAL FLAME MONTAGE GIS LEAVING VIETNAM • • MUSIC UP • I NOW I'VE BEEN HAPPY LATELY • ' • ' • ----- • ---------·-- -· - - ·--- -- -- ------- --------------- ·' - ' ' ' ' ' ' • XI - 25 MONTAGE GIS ARRIVING IN US THINKING ABOUT THE GOOD THINGS TO COME AND I BELIEVE IT COULD BE SOMETHING GOOD HAS BEGUN MONTAGE GIS GREETING FAMILIES OH I'VE BEEN SMILING LATELY DREAMING ABOUT THE WORLD AT ONE AND I BELIEVE IT COULD BE THAT SOME DAY IS GOING TO COME WHEN UP ON THE EDGE OF DAWN I • • THERE RIDES THE PEACE TRAIN OH PEACE TRAIN TAKE THIS COUNTRY COME TAKE ME HOME AGAIN • NOW I'VE BEEN SMILING LATELY •••• • ' • • ' • • ' ' • l • • I • • ' • • ' ' • ' ' ' • - • • •