I Suspicions of Diem and Nhu The list of generals suspected by President Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu of plotting a coup included Tran Van Don Duong Van Minh Mai Huu Xuan However Nhu chuckled and added ’'They’re not worth worrying about they don’t have any troops ” Diary of Do Tho page 18 Who Ordered the Assassination Dalat General Tran Van Don was the second-ranking military leader of the Revolution of November 1 1963 standing immediately behind General Duong Van Minh In all documents shedding light on the mystery surrounding the death of President Ngo Dinh Diem General Tran Van Don is ranked among the instigators- nine for death one for mercy When he received news that President Ngo Dinh Diem was dead General Tran Van Don who was at JGS became very taciturn and his actions difficult to understand Many people at JGS say that when the body of President Ngo Dinh Diem was brought there General Duong Van Minh received from Captain Nhung and Major Duong Hieu Nghia the two officers who had shot President Ngo Dinh Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu in the head a report that the task had been carried out General Duong Van Minh shook their hands in the manner of victors General Tran Van Don quietly slipped off to some other place The taciturn manner of General Tran Van Don was the symptom of an accomplice Dalat General Tran Van Don must accept responsibility before history along with General Duong Van Minh for the suspicious death of Presi­ dent Ngo Dinh Diem General Le Van Kim himself cried out at JGS when he learned that President Diem had been killed General Kim shouted ’’What are we to do now What are we to tell the people We're finished At the same time General Mai Huu Xuan was running after General Duong Van Minh saying Keep quiet Don't worry about it The indifference of General Tran Van Don caused many people at JGS to understand immediately his complicity in the death of President Diem On November 2 1963 before bringing President Ngo Dinh Diem from the Cha Tam Church to JGS the Council of Generals opened a meeting to decide the fate of President Diem During the meeting some generals proposed sending President Diem to Con Son or detaining him in Dalat General Tran Van Don did not agree saying that support for President Diem would well up among the people In the end it was agreed by everyone on the Council of Generals to solve the problem by exiling President Diem The meeting broke up A group of generals Duong Van Minh Mai Huu Xuan Tran Van Don Nguyen Ngoc Le and Tran Tu Oai who had been waiting for the Council to agree on exiling President Diem opened a private discussion It was this group which decided to have President Ngo Dinh Diem killed Le Tu Hung Four Dalat Generals pp 74-76 The Fate of Major Nhung During that night January 29-30 1964 Major Nhung personal bodyguard of General Duong Van Minh and one of the two persons who killed Presi­ dent Ngo Dinh Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu was captured and taken away ' Le Tu Hung Four Dalat Generals p 9 In their afternoon of detention at Camp Hoang Hoa Tham the four Dalat Generals came close to death It was also there in a nearby room that Readjustment troops killed Major Nhung the person who shot President Diem and strung him up in a toilet Then it was announced that Major Nhung had hanged himself with a bootlace Le Tu Hung Four Dalat Generals p 64 There Was An Order to Kill Diem Colonel Duong Hieu Nghia Vinh Long Province Chief and one of the best-informed witnesses of the Revolution of November 1 1963 yesterday affirmed in an exclusive interview with Hoa Binh that there was a meeting of generals to decide the fate of President Diem and his brother According to Colonel Nghia this meeting took place between two and four o'clock in the morning of November 2 and it ended with a decision to kill Colonel Nghia stressed I won't say who proposed killing them arid how many people attended the meeting I am only certain of one thing that Colonel Nguyen Van Thieu was not present at that meeting It will be recalled that at the time Colonel Nghia was a major in the armored branch Regarding accounts carried in the press about men who took a direct part in the killing of President Diem and his brother Nhu in the M-113 armored personnel carrier and which also assert that Major Nghia himself fired the coup de grace Colonel Nghia smiled and said I am the only one who knows much about that but I dare not say anything The Vietnamese press has revealed many top secret secrets with which men involved in the coup are not familiar As I have said details about the Revolution of November 1 are national secrets They shouldn't be made public for another ten years So I will remain silent although the press blames me I will only confirm that I was not prese aboard the M-113 and did not participate in the murder of President Diem and his brother Colonel Nghia confided Thieu and Minh are my superiors Any dis­ closures of mine would reflect on one or’the other Wouldn't silence be best Recalling the M-113 and the death of President Diem and his brother Colonel Nghia said The press adapted so well Today all the soldiers involved with that vehicle are dead except for one first sergeant This NCO cannot be found So from what source are memoirs coming In closing Colonel Nghia promised he would publish his memoirs about the November 1 Revolution illustrated with photographs on this day in 1981 from Hoa Binh July 27 1971 story datelined July 26 J 24 March 1981 9 o 30 pm DINNER klTH GENERAL TRAN VAN DON Let us start at the very end As we kkb were about to finish the evening at ’Daniels’ Gene suddenly asked a question about Conein’s presence during the actual coup against Diem Conein had arrived at the HQ at about 3 and stayed until six Don said when it nas clear from the phone call that Diem had given himself up and would be collected® Then it was over and he went home That is why X was very xi surprised about his saying that there was a vote Don stated Then he added of course there might have been when I was out or away for a period That I don’t know He was visibly sweating and had patted his forhead once with ihB his napkin® Just prior to that I had asked him ” ” ’’Follow it of the Can Lao Party did you follow i he said with t e emphasis on the iaxt yes” Then section he descrived a how members from the northern under Ngo Dinh Can would be arrested if they went to Nhu’s southern section whilsy those from the south were not allowexd to the North Ie there was a major split within the Ngo family between Can and Nhu with “Diem trying to hold the balance in between” Those may not be the exact words of Don but they are very close II It follows therefore that the Buddist crisis was _in part a ’competition between the two younger brothers and not at all the singular work of Nhu would not be able to say given his clo iess to the Ngo's was the fear they undoubtedly instilled However as a throwaway remark it threw away a lot of his book perhaps I The notes which 1o Liow not in order of the discussion A The Ngo family It emerged much more closely from dinner than from his book how close he was to the family They stayed in his father’s houses in both Dalat and Saigon father then ayor He knew where the brothers were and at the seminar said when asked about WgaxkiHXN Nhu being in France that no he had been there in 1949 for one month only A man with that sort of information at his fingertips it was said without hesitation was clearly someone intimately zaa involved in the Ngo family ambitions from early one he was clearly trusted He said that Diem was honest and did not know about practical things He did not know what a table cost he said gripping the table las One saw the propriator of a Washington restraunt The Ngos would talk to each other in French on political matters Deracinated I said a bit stupid as he did also Wo French is a much more precise language in such topics he responded ‘‘’ell it to the Russian aristocracy Between 1955 and 1957 Diem gradually became a man of the state a President He bagan to demand that generals wear their ties and that people dress well before him Don compared this to the change Reagan introduced into Washington life Diem he said never offered him Don money He made it clear that he was not adverse to taking k money just as in his book he admits that he KHk enjoys the good life Conein Don said three times that he was not in the pay of the CIA or did not work for them Each time it became less or more convincing The best was when he said that he had asked Colby to write the into k to his book to make it clear that he was not a CIA man He looked fed up and was clearly annoyed by the into In all prob Colby explained to him that he had been especially hard on him”so that it would not appear that you worked for the the Agency” In that way veracity and pragmatism were married doubtless He said that he did not know Colby was a Catholic Mote on Sukarno he said in the car that he was wrong to p get involved with Chinese Communists but not with pretty gilrs He was disappointing here There was no way ’into’ the question and he was remarkably guarded A±x± It was as if he had taken Atas over the country 1 He went to he same lyceee in Saigon as Sihanouk 5 yrs his junior Knew him as King in Saigon in 47 fc aid a nice man did not talk politics — probably womanized Met Son N Thanh as PM s in PPenh He had a low estimate of him Also said he was like a Vietnamese although was a pure Khmer Was guarded about the probably fact that his family farm - the 2 700 acres acquired by his father from his medical pracise in the lush lands of Long Xuan was near Khmer Krom areas Said that they mistreated Si who was clearly not a Communist and that they could have gained a settlement with him Blamed R Diem for a bad ambassador sent to PPhen Said should have sent a school companion of Si's there to rep Saigon The most interesting thing was that he went to visit Angkor as a boy with his parents A measure of the French Indochinese consciousness of his childhood I’ve no doubt He said he could not recall how he felt about it He was very sensitive to the fact that RIark the French were there in Cambodia active” was his word in a way they were not in Vietnam In Vn the Fr were allowed to stay had good conditions but were marginal Aware that Fr advisors to Si and in the military Then said it was a conflict between the Americans and the French not a conflict between us at all” I refrained from informing him that this was a Marxist thoery of inter-imperialist contradictions Communist steength_ _Tet BB B BB B f B HP B BB HBB BBBBP BBB B B BP BBPBF BIBHB When the Saigon forces surrendured to the other side they cried They were only thin boys We could have defeated them They had taken such losses We overestimated their strength But asked what would have happened in 63 to 64 if the Communists had thrown themselves into the cities he said that they would have been defeated It takes a lot need weapons they did not have enough strength tie seemed unhesitatingly clear on this Yet to be convinced On 68 he was very impressed with what the North did as he put it and with their infiltration of the Army in the South But the people did not follow them And they NLF people got lost as well© I think the story about the command centre in Dalat and what he meaning the South Vietnamese just say what yes everything is OK when it is not 14 year old son does not sayxKkaX do what I say In command I had to follow everything The Southerners are 1945 said he was one oi the A Viet Minh Said he was called Io captured by the Gurkas and handed over to the Fr where them Implied clearly that it was not so the South was a wipe out experienced Gurkas Present period How ng ’ he said Need not to i ter the great struggle for independence But waiting for something to happen Says that some officers have defected from N to Chi and mentioned the few 100 from S Vn into Thai# fsxampled the way the Can Cao party just fell away to nothing overnight Jhis_obviously_surprised_and impressed him Ant Anything can happen in Vn he concluded The Koreans here very ruthless Used terrible levels of artillery undl even we had to ask that they stop Yes My Lies there but ’’these were covered up” Then they went over to social things building roads But also buying US PX and sending the stuff by the boat load to S Korea® Same with Thais forces nx# would have 3 month tour duty and each lot would have to be entirely re-equipped Tremendously expensive but did not go into fighting the enemy kestmoreland talked 3 hours Jan 38 about our pacification how work he said now first time understand® Next day arrested no more kaved ■1 MV Mm 5 waved hand to make clear that he thougyt of Winland as a featherweight Did not think he knew what Harkins wqs up to in the Ka Khanh coup His fellow Generals George asked a lot of questions on the various figures in the 'team' which I could not follow ri the wretched diff iculty of Vn names and the ignorence of that set of conficts weakness of interest from other side Thieu now in Surry Long description of how he sold his house in Wimbledon to an Am women a with an Egyptian wife Thieu very brilliant at 'presentations really wowed Nixon in 1969 and clearly Don also as he made his way up the promotion ladder Very clever about hinking for his won advantage k But in the end believed that the US would not let him down